Printed Page 2590, May 14
| Printed Page 2610, May 14
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Printed Page 2590, May 14
| Printed Page 2610, May 14
| Judge Bartlett testified that he has not:
(a) sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b) sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator pending the outcome of screening; or
(c) asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Judge Bartlett testified that he was aware of the Joint Committee's rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
Judge Bartlett testified that he was aware of the requirement of reporting campaign expenditures in excess of $100 to the House and Senate Ethics Committees.
(10) Miscellaneous:
Judge Bartlett meets the constitutional requirements for the office he seeks.
The Bar found Judge Bartlett qualified. The Bar reported that Judge Bartlett "has served continuously as a full-time municipal judge for the City of Greenville since 1980. Prior to that time, he worked for one year as an assistant city attorney and for 2 years as an assistant circuit solicitor. Judge Bartlett is regarded as having excellent judicial temperament. He is highly respected for his administrative skills in the municipal court system and for his diligence, hard work, and timeliness. His reputation for integrity and fairness is well recognized among those interviewed. Some interviewed noted his lack of family court experience but believed he would be able to adapt to the Family Court based upon his strong judicial background."
Joint Committee's Finding:Qualified
Mr. Brown was screened on May 7, 1996, after a thorough investigation. The Joint Committee's findings as they relate to the nine evaluative criteria are as follows:
(1) Integrity and Impartiality:
The Joint Committee's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct.
Mr. Brown demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges,
(2) Legal Knowledge and Ability:
Mr. Brown stated that he had taught business law (about 15 years ago) and family law at the paralegal program at Greenville Technical College. He has also lectured on terminating parental rights to a D.S.S. group.
The Joint Committee found Mr. Brown to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Joint Committee's practice and procedure questions exceeded expectations.
Mr. Brown has not requested a Martindale-Hubbell rating and does not know if he has one.
(3) Professional Experience:
Mr. Brown graduated from the University of South Carolina School of Law in 1976 and was admitted to the Bar later in the same year.
Since his admission to the Bar, Mr. Brown worked at Legal Services in 1976 and has been in private practice since 1979.
Mr. Brown described his practice over the last five years as 5% civil, 5% criminal, and 90% domestic.
Mr. Brown provided the Joint Committee with five of his most significant litigated matters which he described as follows:
(a) Williamson v. North American Life and Casualty Company, 307 S.C. 230, 414 S.E.2d 177. Holding that a family court order can designate the beneficiary of life insurance proceeds notwithstanding the fact that a different recipient is named as beneficiary in the policy.
(b) Ledford v. South Carolina Department of Highways and Public Transportation, 92-CP-23-486. Plaintiff asserted that he should not be required to give the Highway Department his social security number because it violated his religious beliefs.
(c) South Carolina Department of Social Services v. Doe, 292 S.C. 211, 355 S.E.2d 543. Case which lead to statutory exception to the hearsay rule allowing the admission of the statement of a child 3 or younger in abuse cases.
(d) George Thomas v. Steven Ritchie Holam-Hansen. Establishing an indigent child's right to receive a trial transcript.
(e) White v. White, 283 S.C. 348, 323 S.E.2d 521. Allowing property division in an annulment proceeding.
Mr. Brown has handled the following domestic appeals:
(a) Williamson v. North American Life and Casualty Company, 414 S.E.2d 177, 307 S.C. 230.
(b) South Carolina Department of Social Services v. Doe, 292 S.C. 211, 355 S.E.2d 543.
(c) White v. White, 283 S.C. 348, 323 S.E.2d 521.
(d) Fridy v. Fridy, appeal currently pending in the Court of Appeals.
(e) Frye v. Frye, Court of Appeals Op. No. 2217 (Filed August 15, 1994).
(f) Department of Social Services v. Whitworth, Op. No. 93-UP-130 (filed April 28, 1993).
At the Joint Committee's request, Mr. Brown supplied a number of additional cases which he felt were representative of his domestic practice. Mr. Brown's response was incorporated into the transcript of his public hearing and can be referenced there.
The Joint Committee determined that Mr. Brown had engaged in an active trial practice in the Family Courts, marked by a degree of breadth and sophistication.
(4) Judicial Temperament:
The Joint Committee believes that Mr. Brown's temperament would be excellent.
(5) Diligence and Industry:
Mr. Brown was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Joint Committee, and the Joint Committee's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
Mr. Brown is married and has two children.
(6) Mental and Physical Capabilities:
Mr. Brown appears to be mentally and physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7) Financial Responsibility:
The Joint Committee's investigation did not reveal any evidence of a troubled financial status. Mr. Brown has managed his financial affairs responsibly.
Mr. Brown was an E-5 in the United States Marines Corps Reserves. He was honorably discharged.
Mr. Brown is active in professional and community activities.
(9) Ethics:
Mr. Brown testified that he has not:
(a) sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b) sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator pending the outcome of screening; or
(c) asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Mr. Brown testified that he was aware of the Joint Committee's rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
Mr. Brown testified that he was aware of the requirement of reporting campaign expenditures in excess of $100 to the House and Senate Ethics Committees.
(10) Miscellaneous:
Mr. Brown meets the constitutional requirements for the office he seeks.
The Bar found Mr. Brown qualified. The Bar reported that Mr. Brown "has had extensive and broad experience in Family Court. He possesses a strong working knowledge of the law of Family Court. The majority of those interviewed felt that he is a good worker and well prepared in court and that he would have a good judicial temperament. Mr. Brown is perceived as having a good character, integrity, and reputation. Those interviewed believed that he would be a fair and impartial member of the judiciary."
Joint Committee's Finding:Qualified
Mr. DuTremble was screened on May 7, 1996, after a thorough investigation. The Joint Committee's findings as they relate to the nine evaluative criteria are as follows:
(1) Integrity and Impartiality:
The Joint Committee's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct.
(2) Legal Knowledge and Ability:
Mr. DuTremble was a legal instructor at the South Carolina Criminal Justice Academy in 1983.
The Joint Committee found Mr. DuTremble to be intelligent and knowledgeable. Because Mr. DuTremble met the expectations of the Committee regarding the practice and procedure questions asked in his prior screening, he was given, and he accepted, the option of incorporating his performance on those questions into the present screening.
Mr. DuTremble's Martindale-Hubbell rating is AV, their highest rating.
(3) Professional Experience:
Mr. DuTremble graduated from the University of South Carolina School of Law in 1978 and was admitted to the Bar later in the same year.
From 1978 to 1979, Mr. DuTremble served as a law clerk to Circuit Court Judge Julius H. Baggett. From 1979 to 1980, Mr. DuTremble served as Assistant Public Defender for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in Lexington. He was Assistant Prosecutor in Lexington from 1980 to 1983. From 1982 to 1983, Mr. DuTremble served as a legal instructor with the South Carolina Criminal Justice Academy. He was an Assistant U.S. Attorney in Charleston from 1983 until 1987 and 1989 to 1991. Mr. DuTremble was a sole practitioner from 1987 to 1989, and from 1991 to the present. His practice has mainly involved criminal law, with some civil litigation, and he currently specializes in white collar criminal defense.
Mr. DuTremble described his practice over the past five years as 10% civil and 90% criminal.
Mr. DuTremble provided the Joint Committee with five of his most significant litigated matters which he described as follows:
(a) U.S. v. Polowichak, 783 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1985), largest seizure of marijuana in S.C. history.
(b) U.S. v. Henry Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038 (4th Cir. 1988), largest heroin ring in Charleston.
(d) U.S. v. Brantley, 777 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1985), conviction of corrupt Sheriff of Jasper County.
(e) U.S. v. Southwire Corp., (1993) (not reported), defense of the largest environmental crime case brought in the District of South Carolina.
The Joint Committee determined that Mr. DuTremble had engaged in an active trial practice in the trial courts of South Carolina, marked by a degree of breadth and sophistication.
(4) Judicial Temperament:
The Joint Committee believes that Mr. DuTremble's temperament would be excellent.
(5) Diligence and Industry:
Mr. DuTremble was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Joint Committee, and the Joint Committee's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
Mr. DuTremble is married and has two children.
(6) Mental and Physical Capabilities:
Mr. DuTremble appears to be mentally and physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7) Financial Responsibility:
The Joint Committee's investigation did not reveal any evidence of a troubled financial status. Mr. DuTremble has managed his financial affairs responsibly.
(8) Public Service:
Mr. DuTremble is active in professional and community activities.
(9) Ethics:
Mr. DuTremble testified that he has not:
(a) sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b) sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator pending the outcome of screening; or
(c) asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Mr. DuTremble testified that he was aware of the requirement of reporting campaign expenditures in excess of $100 to the House and Senate Ethics Committees.
(10) Miscellaneous:
Mr. DuTremble meets the constitutional requirements for the office he seeks.
The Bar found Mr. DuTremble qualified. The Bar reported that Mr. DuTremble "has extensive experience as assistant United States Attorney, an Assistant Solicitor, and Assistant Public Defender, as well as a civil and criminal advocate in private practice. He is intelligent, knowledgeable in the law, and a hard worker. He is considered to be an excellent and effective trial lawyer. He has a good demeanor and sense of humor. It is believed that he would have a good judicial temperament."
Mr. DuTremble was asked about his general philosophy regarding interpretation of the Constitution, power of the General Assembly regarding legislating, and a judge's ability to publicly comment on recently decided cases. Mr. DuTremble's answers to these questions are printed in the transcript of his public hearing. The Committee has included these responses solely for the benefit of members of the General Assembly. The Committee does not represent that there is a correct answer to any question.
Joint Committee's Finding:Qualified
Judge Eckstrom was screened on May 7, 1996, after a thorough investigation. The Joint Committee's findings as they relate to the nine evaluative criteria are as follows:
(1) Integrity and Impartiality:
The Joint Committee's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct.
Judge Eckstrom demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communication, acceptance of gifts and ordinary social hospitality, and recusal.
Judge Eckstrom was an instructor of Constitutional Law at the City College of Chicago in 1984; an instructor of Business Law at the City College of Chicago in 1985; an adjunct instructor of Criminal Law and Procedure at Midlands Technical College in 1994 and 1995; an instructor of Government Ethics and Standards of Conduct for the U.S. Navy from 1992-1994; an Instructor of Rules of Procedure for Court Administration (training for new probate judges) in 1992; and an Instructor of Judicial Ethics at a JCLE for the S.C. Probate Judge's Association Conference in 1993.
The Joint Committee found Judge Eckstrom to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Joint Committee's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
(3) Professional Experience:
Judge Eckstrom graduated from the University of South Carolina School of Law in 1982 and was admitted to the Georgia Bar in 1982 and the South Carolina Bar in 1983.
Since his graduation from law school, Judge Eckstrom has worked as a judge advocate for the Department of the Navy from 1982 to 1986; as sole legal counsel for the South Carolina Vocational Rehabilitation Department from 1986 to 1990; as an associate for Nexsen Pruet Jacobs and Pollard, LLP in 1990; and as Judge of the Probate Court for Lexington County from 1991 to present.
Judge Eckstrom provided the Joint Committee with five of his most significant litigated matters which he described as follows:
a) United States v. Melendez; criminal jury trial in military court; drug case involving opposing scientific experts, and scientific evidence including urinalysis testing by radio-immunoassay and gas chromatography/mass spectrometry. Won acquittal after defending case on basis of faulty test procedures, inconsistent test results, and character trait evidence admitted under Military Rule of Evidence 404.
b) United States v. Stodahour; criminal jury trial in military court; ATM fraud and larceny case; used optically enhanced still photos in the courtroom, taken from financial institution's video monitor. Won acquittal after defending the case on basis of mistaken identification.
c) Ken Murray, d/b/a Old Saw Mill Company v. South Carolina Vocational Rehabilitation Department; Plaintiff sued for breach of contract. Jury found for plaintiff on his claim and for defendant on counterclaim. While case was on appeal, Judge Eckstrom petitioned S.C. Supreme Court under former S.C. Supreme Court Rule 24 to seek
d) Norris v. South Carolina Vocational Rehabilitation Department; Defendant suit in U.S. District Court brought under Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. Section 201 et. seq. Plaintiff sought compensatory wages, overtime wages and liquidated damages from state agency employer. Obtained summary judgment on behalf of defendant before the Honorable G. Ross Anderson, Jr. The central issue was the effective date minimum wage and overtime provisions of FLSA applied to public employers as a result of Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 105 S.Ct. 1005 (1985).
e) United States v. Kauffman; Defended former service member in trial by general court martial. Defendant was apprehended by law enforcement officials after nearly twenty year desertion. Waived trial by jury. Citing exceptional and thorough case in extenuation and mitigation in sentencing phase, trial judge imposed no confinement even though three year sentence was authorized.
Judge Eckstrom provided the Committee with the following civil appeals which he personally handled:
a) Ken Murray, d/b/a Old Saw Mill Company v. South Carolina Vocational Rehabilitation Department; Successful post-trial motion before S.C. Supreme Court, under former S.C. Supreme Court rule 24, during pendency of appeal.
b) While admitted under the student practice rule, prepared returns and motions to dismiss, and successfully represented State of South Carolina in four (4) civil Post Conviction Relief proceedings in Court of Common Pleas, 1982.
Judge Eckstrom provided the Committee with the following significant orders or opinions:
a) Sandra Marie Garrick v. Billy Guy Bailey, Jr. and Ronald S. Bailey, as Personal Representatives of the Estate of Billy Guy Bailey, Sr.; Case No. 90-ES-32-00823. This case involved several claims against the estate. Plaintiff, an alleged common law spouse of the deceased, sought reimbursement for sexual services on a quantum meruit theory of recovery. That claim was denied on the basis that such contracts would be void as a matter of public policy.
b) Charles J. Rogers, Jr. v. Jennifer R. Chumley; Case No. 91-GC-32-00052 and 00053. These protective proceedings demonstrated the broad equitable powers of the probate court to correct a wrong. A durable
c) Judy C. Allen. Personal Representative of the Estate of James D. Heckman v. H. Lee Heckman; Case No. 91-GC-32-00090; Affirmed on appeal, C.A. No. 95-CP-32-1727. This case decided ownership of funds in a joint tenancy survivorship account after one joint tenant, the sole depositor, was determined to be incapacitated. Recognizing the existence of a fiduciary duty, the order held that the joint owner with capacity no longer possessed full discretionary rights to the account when his joint tenant became incapacitated. The case was affirmed on appeal.
d) In the Matter of Trevor O'Draeda Jones, a minor; Case No. 88-GC-32-00049. Order and Sentence for Criminal Contempt of Court against J. Michael Fullwood, Esq. This case demonstrates the contempt powers of the probate court. The attorney for a court appointed conservator was convicted and sentenced in the probate court on four counts of criminal contempt of court for his intentional and wrongful filing of four false and misleading accounting with the probate court. The defendant was sentenced to the maximum period of confinement for criminal contempt, to run concurrently with a related federal court sentence.
e) Thompson Funeral Home v. Estate of Lucia Edna Nettles Douglas; this case involved the applicability of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) to the sale of goods and services by a funeral home. In this claim against the estate, the UCC's implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, S.C. Code Section 36-2-315, was applied to the sale of a casket which would not fit the mausoleum crypt.
(4) Judicial Temperament:
The Joint Committee believes that Judge Eckstrom's temperament would be excellent.
(5) Diligence and Industry:
Judge Eckstrom was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Joint Committee, and the Joint Committee's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
Judge Eckstrom is married and has three children.
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| Printed Page 2610, May 14
| This web page was last updated on Monday, June 29, 2009 at 1:58 P.M.