Journal of the Senate
of the Second Session of the 111th General Assembly
of the State of South Carolina
being the Regular Session Beginning Tuesday, January 9, 1996

Page Finder Index

| Printed Page 380, Feb. 6 | Printed Page 400, Feb. 6 |

Printed Page 390 . . . . . Tuesday, February 6, 1996

Justice Toal estimated that in the five years immediately prior to her election to the Supreme Court in 1988, she was in federal court approximately 50 times and in state court approximately 140 times. She also had appeared approximately 100 times for administrative trials.

Justice Toal stated that for the five years preceding her election to the Supreme Court in 1988, 57% of her practice was civil, 20% was criminal, and 23% was domestic. Justice Toal reported that 18% of her practice was non-litigation, and that 50% of the matters she handled went to a jury.

Justice Toal described her five most significant litigated matters as follows:

(a) Fox v. Scholer and Bruckner, C.A. No. 81-300-0 (D.S.C. 1981). The case involved a 7 count complaint alleging medical malpractice, alienation of affections and criminal conversation, intentional infliction of emotional harm, conspiracy, and fraud. Justice Toal was the sole counsel for Defendant Bruckner. After a 2 week trial, a verdict was returned for Defendants.

(b) Eslinger v. Thomas, 324 F. Supp. 1329 (D.S.C. 1971), 470 F. Supp. 886 (D.S.C. 1972), aff'd and rev'd, 476 F.2d 225 (1973). Case involved female law student who was denied employment as a Senate Page because of her sex. The Fourth Circuit held the practice unconstitutional. Justice Toal participated in various trials and motion hearings in this action.

(c) State v. Larry Portee, Fifth Judicial Circuit, General Sessions, 1980. Death penalty case involving murder during the commission of an armed robbery. Shortly before trial, the death penalty was abandoned and after 2 days of trial, a plea to voluntary manslaughter was offered and accepted.

(d) United States v. Adams, et al., U.S. District Court, District of South Carolina, 1981, Judge Simons presiding. Case involved allegations of embezzlement from the Fort Jackson Post Exchange. The defendant who Justice Toal represented received a jury verdict of not guilty after a 2 and one-half week trial.

(e) Owen Martin v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation (AMTRAK), C.A. No. 3-86-539-16 (D.S.C. 1986). The case involved personal injury resulting from the derailment of an Amtrak passenger train in Hamlet, N.C. The case was settled for an amount exceeding 1 million dollars.

Justice Toal listed five of the civil appeals she personally handled prior to her election to the Supreme Court:

(a) Lindsay v. National Old Line Insurance Co., 262 S.C. 621, 20 S.E.2d 75 (1974). This decision set forth rules for construction of


Printed Page 391 . . . . . Tuesday, February 6, 1996

the "Retaliatory Statute" which involves license fees and taxes paid by a foreign life insurance company and also set forth South Carolina's approach to retroactive legislation.

(b) Peterkin v. Peterkin, 293 S.C. 311, 360 S.E.2d 311 (1987). This case involved an important analysis by the South Carolina Supreme Court of the doctrine of transmutation.

(c) Tall Tower, Inc. and SCETV v. South Carolina Procurement Review Panel, (Tall Tower I), 294 S.C. 225, 363 S.E.2d 683 (1987); Charleston Television, Inc. v. S.C. Budget and Control Board, (Tall Tower II), 296 S.C. 444, 373 S.E.2d 892 (Ct. App. 1988), rev'd, 301 S.C. 468, 392 S.E.2d 671 (1990). These appeals all arose out of a procurement protest filed by Charleston Television, Inc. whereby it challenged SCETV's award of a long-term television tower lease to Tall Tower, Inc. These cases provided significant new analyses of state administrative law, scope of judicial review, rules of state procurement, and separation of powers.

(d) Catawba Indian Tribe v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 498, 106 S. Ct. 2039, 90 L. Ed.2d 490 (1986), 740 F.2d 305 (4th Cir. 1984); 718 F.2d 1291 (4th Cir. 1983). This case represented the third largest eastern Indian land claim. The case involved federal Indian Law, constitutional issues, and state property law. The case has now been settled by legislation adopted by the United States and the State of South Carolina in 1993.

(e) Able v. S.C. P.S.C, 290 S.C. 409, 351 S.E.2d 151 (1986). This case analyzed the requirements of the South Carolina Administrative Procedures Act regarding the fact-finding at the administrative level and is frequently cited.

Justice Toal listed the following criminal appeals which she has personally handled prior to her election to the Supreme Court:

(a) State v. Sachs, 264 S.C. 541, 216 S.E.2d 501 (1975). This case set forth a major restatement of the law of search and seizure in South Carolina.

(b) State v. Hyman, 276 S.C. 559, 281 S.E.2d 209 (1981). State v. Linder, 276 S.C. 304, 278 S.E.2d 335 (1981). These cases set forth detailed rules regarding the State's death penalty statute. Justice Toal participate in the submission of an amicus curiae brief which discussed from a legislative perspective issues regarding proportionality in sentencing and other issues.

(c) Downey v. Peyton, 451 F.2d 236 (4th Cir. 1971). A habeas corpus proceeding for a state prisoner. This decision set forth


Printed Page 392 . . . . . Tuesday, February 6, 1996

guidelines for when the "jury room may be invaded" to determine whether the jury received extra trial information.

Justice Toal described her five most significant orders or opinions as follows:

(a) State v. Larry Gene Bell, 302 S.C. 18, 393 S.E.2d 364 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S.Ct. 227, 112 L. Ed.2d 182 (1990).

(b) State v. Stacy Ford, 301 S.C. 485, 392 S.E.2d 781 (1990).

(c) Sangamo Weston, Inc. v. National Surety Corp., 307 S.C. 143, 414 S.E.2d 127 (1992).

(d) Foster v. S.C. Department of Highways and Public Transportation, 306 S.C. 519, 413 S.E.2d 31 (1992).

(e) Ost v. Integrated Products, Inc., 296 S.C. 241, 371 S.E.2d 796 (1988).

(4) Judicial Temperament:

The Joint Committee has historically viewed good judicial temperament as a very important and necessary quality in all candidates for judicial office. The Joint Committee was presented with allegations that Justice Toal's behavior towards Supreme Court and other judicial department employees has at times been inappropriate. The Joint Committee was troubled by these allegations and thoroughly investigated them as is outlined in the first part of Justice Toal's section of this report. The Joint Committee's benchmark for behavior and questioning were the ordinary rules of civility upon which reasonable minds could agree.

The allegations of inappropriate behavior fell generally in three categories:

(1) There was testimony that Justice Toal has on occasion directed her temper at Supreme Court and Court Administration employees in a manner that was out of proportion to the precipitating event. Clyde Davis, Clerk of the Supreme Court, (Transcript of 1/23/96 pp. 343-344, 345-346, 348-350, 354-356, 358-360, 361); Susan Widener, Law Clerk to Chief Justice Finney, (Transcript of 1/23/96 pp. 331-332, 333-338); Brenda Shealy, Assistant Clerk of the Supreme Court, (Transcript of 1/23/96 pp. 368-371, 374-375); Betsy Stevenson, Supreme Court employee, (Transcript of 1/23/96 pp. 377-378, 379, 383, 384-385); and Andy Surles, Assistant Director of Court Administration, (Transcript of 1/23/96 pp. 315-317, 318-323) each testified to an occasion or occasions when Justice Toal directed her temper at them. Other witnesses, such as Louis Rosen, former Director of Court Administration,


Printed Page 393 . . . . . Tuesday, February 6, 1996

(Transcript of 1/23/96 pp. 287-289, 291-292, 293-294, 296-297, 299-301, 310-311) and former Chief Justice Chandler, (Transcript of 1/23/96 pp. 411-412, 413-416) testified to hearing first-hand accounts of incidents when Justice Toal lost her temper with employees.

(2) There was testimony that Justice Toal has directed profanity at employees of the Supreme Court and Court Administration in a manner that was pointed at the employee as a damnation. Clyde Davis testified (Transcript of 1/23/96 pp. 343, 345-346, 354-356) to Justice Toal's direction of profanity at him and at other employees as a damnation. Betsy Stevenson also testified (Transcript of 1/23/96 pp. 377-378, 383, 384-385) that Justice Toal had directed profanity at her.

(3) There was testimony that Justice Toal has on occasion treated employees of the Supreme Court and Court Administration in a manner that was demeaning, belittling, and embarrassing. H. Lee Smith, former Assistant Director of Court Administration, (Transcript of 1/23/96 pp. 281-283, 284-285), Andy Surles, (Transcript of 1/23/96 pp. 318-321, 322, 327-328), Betsy Stevenson, (Transcript of 1/23/96 pp. 376-377, 379-380, 383-384), Brenda Shealy, (Transcript of 1/23/96 pp. 368-371), and Clyde Davis, (Transcript of 1/23/96 pp. 362) all recounted an instance or instances when they felt demeaned, belittled, or embarrassed by Justice Toal's treatment of them.

Clyde Davis, Clerk of the Supreme Court and supervisor of approximately 18 of the Supreme Court's approximately 50 employees, testified that Justice Toal's "rude and demeaning" treatment of his employees was regular and unpredictable enough that it affects the way he and his employees do their jobs. He testified that he and his staff are constantly on edge for fear of being "jumped on" by Justice Toal for anything, whether or not they make a mistake. Unfortunately, Davis never brought his concerns to Justice Toal's attention. He testified that unlike each of the other Justices whom he had served, Justice Toal, based on prior history, could not be approached with constructive criticism. Louis Rosen, former Director of Court Administration, also testified that Justice Toal's treatment of employees had a negative effect on some employees in Court Administration, and said that it had grown into a big problem by the time he resigned in 1995.

George Markert, Director of Court Administration (Transcript of 1/23/96 pp.251-270 ); Fran Trapp, former law clerk to Justice Toal, (Transcript of 1/24/96 pp. 440-452); Jennifer Aldrich, former law clerk


Printed Page 394 . . . . . Tuesday, February 6, 1996

to Justice Toal, (Transcript of 1/24/96 pp. 452-460); and Catharine Griffin, former law clerk to Justice Toal, (Transcript of 1/24/96 pp. 460-469) all testified that they had never seen Justice Toal exercise her temper, direct profanity at anyone, or act in a way that was belittling, demeaning, or embarrassing. The individuals who testified on Justice Toal's behalf were primarily former law clerks, staff attorneys, and employees who work in the basement of the Supreme Court building. There was testimony about tension between the Clerk's office and Justice Toal's secretary and law clerks, and between several Court Administration employees involved on the automation project and Justice Toal.

Justice Toal testified that many of the employees who had offered criticisms of her were involved in the areas of the Court that needed expansion and modernization. She indicated that she directed her highly charged nature to the demands of modernization and the lapses in performance she encountered in these employees so that she could correct the inertia normally inherent in bureaucracy. The Joint Committee agrees it is sometimes appropriate to apply pressure, but the adage that it's possible to object without being objectionable applies here.

Justice Toal testified that public employees are a valuable public resource and that she has an obligation to preserve and improve staff morale. She also said that it was important to respect all persons, and to respect the differences between different stations in life. Justice Toal indicated that some of the criticisms of her were legitimate, and that she would improve. She also apologized to any employees she treated inappropriately.

(5) Diligence and Industry:

Justice Toal was punctual and attentive in her dealings with the Joint Committee, and the Joint Committee's investigation indicated that she is extremely diligent and industrious.

Justice Toal is married with two children, ages 23 and 14.

(6) Mental and Physical Capabilities:

Justice Toal appears to be mentally and physically capable of performing the duties of the office she seeks.

(7) Financial Responsibilities:

The Joint Committee's investigation did not reveal any evidence of a troubled financial status. Justice Toal has managed her financial affairs responsibly.


Printed Page 395 . . . . . Tuesday, February 6, 1996

(8) Public Service:

Justice Toal has served on the Supreme Court since 1988. She served on the South Carolina Commission on Human Affairs from 1972 to 1974, and in the South Carolina House of Representatives from 1975 to 1988.

Justice Toal is active in professional and community activities, and has received numerous awards and recognitions for her achievements.

(9) Ethics:

Justice Toal testified that she has not:

(a) sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;

(b) sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator pending the outcome of screening; or

(c) asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.

Justice Toal testified that she is aware of the Joint Committee's rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.

Justice Toal testified that she is aware of the requirement of reporting campaign expenditures in excess of $100 to the House and Senate Ethics Committees.

(10) Miscellaneous:

Justice Toal meets the constitutional requirements for the office she seeks.

The Bar found Justice Toal qualified. The Bar reported:

[Justice Toal] is uniformly regarded by those contacted for her excellent integrity, professional competence, and judicial temperament, including her diligence, work ethic, and preparation in all matters. She has been active in public service. As a member of the Supreme Court she has been very active as a lecturer and participant in many legal and judicial education programs. She has authored a large number of opinions which articulate and reflect the high standards of that Court. She was described as outstanding, excellent, and superior as a Justice. The persons contacted about Justice Toal uniformly reported their opinions that she has brought credit to the Supreme Court, reflected excellence in her membership on the Court, and demonstrated those attributes of fairness and equality to the people of South Carolina and the Bar of this state.

Justice Toal was asked about her general philosophy regarding the sentencing of various categories of criminal defendants including repeat


Printed Page 396 . . . . . Tuesday, February 6, 1996

violent offenders, juveniles waived to Circuit Court, and "white collar" criminals. Justice Toal's actual response to each of these questions is included in the transcript of her public hearing held on December 12, 1995. The Joint Committee has included these responses solely for the benefit of members of the General Assembly. The Joint Committee does not represent that there is a correct answer to any of these questions.

Justice Toal was asked about her general philosophy regarding interpretation of the Constitution, power of the General Assembly regarding legislating, and a judge's ability to publicly comment on recently decided cases. Justice Toal's answers to these questions are printed in the transcript of her public hearing held on December 12, 1995. The Joint Committee has included these responses solely for the benefit of members of the General Assembly. The Joint Committee does not represent that there is a correct answer to any of these questions.

CONCURRING OPINION

We believe that Justice Toal is sincere in her apologies and has accepted any meritorious criticisms constructively.

Also, we feel it necessary to clarify what could be interpreted as a difference between Justice Toal's intent and her words. In her closing statement to the Committee, Justice Toal couples her apology with a rather negative commentary of some court employees' performance. While we are concerned that this coupling appears to be a shifting of blame for her behavior, we believe that this commentary is in fact indicative of Justice Toal's "hard-charging" nature and overwhelming commitment to an efficient, well-run judicial system. We also believe that her commitment to such a judicial system has, at times, blinded Justice Toal to the tenor and effect of her behavior. We believe that Justice Toal is sincerely committed to improving her relationships with Judicial Department personnel, and we believe that Justice Toal will abide by her commitment to re-examine and re-evaluate her means and methods of accomplishing her goals of improving the efficiency of our Court system. An open mind to improvement is an attribute for any member of the bench, and Justice Toal seems committed to that course.

Glenn F. McConnell

F. G. "Greg" Delleney

John R. Russell


Printed Page 397 . . . . . Tuesday, February 6, 1996

Ralph King Anderson, Jr.

Court of Appeals, Seat 9

Joint Committee's Finding:Qualified

Judge Anderson was screened on December 11, 1995, after a thorough investigation. The Joint Committee's findings as they relate to the nine evaluative criteria are as follows and are, in part, based on Judge Anderson's February 2, 1995 screening:

(1) Integrity and Impartiality:

The Joint Committee's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct.

Judge Anderson demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges.

Judge Anderson reported that he has been named as a defendant in several cases. In Annie M. Timmons v. [all members of the South Carolina House of Representatives and the South Carolina Senate], 3:CV-80-1640, the last entry in the file is an Order dated October 13, 1982, staying the case for six months in order to allow the plaintiff to petition to reopen it or it would be dismissed; the records at the District Court indicate that the defendants were never served. In U.S. v. Keefe, 4:CV-80-2472, Judge Anderson was a judgment creditor due to a Family Court Order giving him an award of attorney's fees in the sum of Two Hundred Fifty and No/100 ($250.00) Dollars. In Jasper Buchanan v. Ralph King Anderson, Jr., Sidney Tyson and Donald J. Zelenka, 3:CV-82-401, an inmate brought a Pro Se habeas corpus action. The case was dismissed and records indicate the defendants were never served. Robert L. Wilson v. City of Greenville, Mayor William Workman, Ralph King Anderson, Jr. ..., 6:CV-86-2730, involved a civil rights action relating to a local sign ordinance. The action was dismissed and records maintained indicate that the defendants were never served. Jasper Buchanan v. Richard Riley, Travis Medlock, William Leeke, Woodrow Lewis, Donald Zelenka, Ralph King Anderson, Jr. ..., 3:CV-86-1444, involved a Pro se action brought by an inmate of the State Corrections Department. The defendants were never served and judgment was entered for all defendants. In Donald J. Strable v. Clyde N. Davis, Jr., Clerk of Court, Supreme Court of South Carolina, Chief Justice, The Honorable George T. Gregory, Honorable Julius B. Ness, former Chief Justice, Honorable Cameron B. Littlejohn, former Chief Justice, Honorable Elijah Curran Burnett, Circuit Judge, Honorable James Edward Moore, Circuit Judge, Honorable Tommy L. Hughston, Jr., Circuit Judge, Ralph King Anderson, Jr., Circuit Judge,


Printed Page 398 . . . . . Tuesday, February 6, 1996

Honorable Frank P. McGowan, Jr., Circuit Judge, CV:89-1533, a Pro Se action was brought against numerous judges. The case was summarily dismissed by Judge Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., United States District Judge. The case was appealed to the United States Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals resulting in a per curiam dismissal on February 1, 1990. Jerry Lee Bruce v. Ralph King Anderson, Jr., Ferrell Cothran, Sharon N. Odom, Ray E. Chandler, Harold Detwilder and R. Wright Turbeville, CV:4:91-3572(H), involved a Pro Se action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Judge Anderson was never served and the case was summarily dismissed. Finally, Phillip R. Pyett v. Judge Ralph Anderson, Dudley Saleeby, Jr. and John DeBerry, CV:8:92-283-17K, involved a Pro Se lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The case was summarily dismissed.

(2) Legal Knowledge and Ability:

Judge Anderson has lectured extensively on civil, criminal, and ethical matters at various Bar and judicial conferences. Judge Anderson has written numerous materials for use at Judicial/Legal seminars and is the author of NUTS AND BOLTS OF SOUTH CAROLINA SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL LAW. Judge Anderson also reported that he will be the chief editor of a trial manual to be published by the Bar.

The Joint Committee found Judge Anderson to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Joint Committee's practice and procedure questions exceeded expectations.

(3) Professional Experience:

Judge Anderson graduated from the University of South Carolina School of Law in 1959 and was admitted to the Bar later in the same year.

Judge Anderson began his career in private practice in Columbia in 1959. He later moved to Florence in 1960, where he remained in private practice until his election to the Circuit Court in 1979.

Judge Anderson provided the Joint Committee with significant orders/opinions which he described as follows:

(a) State v. Jonathan Dale Simmons, ___ S.C. ___, 427 S.E.2d 175 (1993) rev'd ___ U.S. ___, 129 L.Ed.2d 133, 114 S.Ct. 2187 (1994). Death penalty case with numerous issues relating to death penalty law and criminal law in general. Defendant received the death penalty and the verdict was affirmed by the S.C. Supreme Court. Certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court.


Printed Page 399 . . . . . Tuesday, February 6, 1996

(b) State v. Thomas Lee Davis, 309 S.C. 304, 422 S.E.2d 133 (1992) cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 124 L.Ed.2d 263, ___ S.Ct. ___ (1993). Death Penalty case in which the defendant received the death penalty and the S.C. Supreme Court affirmed. The court specifically affirmed Judge Anderson's rulings regarding: (1) what is a deadly object; (2) Miranda Rights; and (3) Physical Torture.

(c) Joey M. Oliver, as GAL for Bradford Michael Oliver v. South Carolina Department of Highways and Public Transportation, 309 S.C. 313, 422 S.E.2d 128 (1992). Case involved litigation issues under the S.C. Tort Claims Act.

(d) State v. James Russell Cain, 297 S.C. 497, 377 S.E.2d 556 (1988) cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1010, 111 L.Ed.2d 764, 110 S.Ct. 3254. Death Penalty trial in which the defendant received the death penalty. The verdict was affirmed by the S.C. Supreme Court and certiorari was denied by the U.S. Supreme Court.

(e) Alvin Davis v. South Carolina, (Docket Number 85-CP-40-1771). The case involved an administrative mistake which resulted in Davis, a convicted criminal, being released without serving his jail time. Davis was arrested 10 years after his original conviction. Judge Anderson's order dealt with "numerous due process and constitutional issues". The State dismissed its intent to appeal Judge Anderson's order (which presumably found for Davis).

(f) Dillon County School District Number Two v. Lewis Sheet Metal Works, Inc., et al., 286 S.C. 207, 332 S.E.2d 555 (Ct. App. 1985) cert. denied 288 S.C. 468, 343 S.E.2d 613 (1986). Case involved the application of the Statute of Limitations to a roofing case.

(g) Columbia East Associates, A Limited Partnership v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 299 S.C. 515, 386 S.E.2d 259 (Ct. App. 1989). Action by a shopping center against the defendant supermarket alleging violations of the Unfair Trade Practices Act.

(4) Judicial Temperament:

The Joint Committee believes that Judge Anderson's temperament has been and would continue to be excellent.

(5) Diligence and Industry:

Judge Anderson was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Joint Committee, and the Joint Committee's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.

Judge Anderson is married and has two children.


| Printed Page 380, Feb. 6 | Printed Page 400, Feb. 6 |

Page Finder Index

This web page was last updated on Monday, June 29, 2009 at 1:59 P.M.