South Carolina General Assembly
115th Session, 2003-2004
Journal of the Senate

Monday, May 12, 2003
(Local Session)

Indicates Matter Stricken
Indicates New Matter

The Senate assembled at 11:00 A.M., the hour to which it stood adjourned, and was called to order by the ACTING PRESIDENT, Senator KNOTTS.

SECOND READING BILL

The following Bill, having been read the second time, was ordered placed on the third reading Calendar:

S. 691 (Word version) -- Senator Hayes: A JOINT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF ALL YORK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICTS TO IMPOSE AN ADDITIONAL PROPERTY TAX NOT TO EXCEED FOUR MILLS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003-2004.

By prior motion of Senator HAYES

REPORT RECEIVED
JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION COMMISSION

TO:       The Clerk of the Senate

The Clerk of the House
FROM:   Glenn F. McConnell, Chairman
DATE:     May 8, 2003

In compliance with the provisions of Act No. 119, 1975 S.C. Acts 122, it is respectfully requested that the following information be printed in the Journals of the Senate and the House.

Respectfully submitted,

Senator Glenn F. McConnell, Chairman
Representative F.G. Delleney, Jr., Vice Chairman
Richard S. Fisher, Esquire
John P. Freeman, Esquire
Mrs. Amy Johnson McLester
Senator Thomas L. Moore
Senator James H. Ritchie, Jr.
Judge Curtis G. Shaw
Representative Doug Smith
Representative Fletcher N. Smith, Jr.

Judicial Merit Selection Commission
Report of Candidate Qualifications

Date Draft Report Issued:             Thursday, May 8, 2003
Date and Time Final Report Issued:     12:00 Noon,

Tuesday, May 13, 2003

Judicial candidates are not free to seek or accept commitments until Tuesday, May 13, 2003, at 12:00 Noon

Introduction

The Judicial Merit Selection Commission is charged by law to consider the qualifications of candidates for the judiciary. This report details the reasons for the Commission's findings, as well as each candidate's qualifications as they relate to the Commission's evaluative criteria. The Commission operates under the law which went into effect July 1, 1997, and which dramatically changed the powers and duties of the Commission. One component of this law is that the Commission's finding of "qualified" or "not qualified" is binding on the General Assembly. The Commission is also cognizant of the need for members of the General Assembly to be able to differentiate between candidates and, therefore, has attempted to provide as detailed a report as possible.

The Judicial Merit Selection Commission is composed of ten members, four of whom are non-legislators. The Commission has continued the more in-depth screening format started in 1997. The Commission has asked candidates their views on issues peculiar to service on the court to which they seek election. These questions were posed in an effort to provide members of the General Assembly with more information about candidates and the candidates' thought processes on issues relevant to their candidacies. The Commission has also engaged in a more probing inquiry into the depth of a candidate's experience in areas of practice that are germane to the office he or she is seeking. The Commission feels that candidates should have familiarity with the subject matter of the courts for which they offer, and feels that candidates' responses should indicate their familiarity with most major areas of the law with which they will be confronted.

The Commission also used the Citizens Committees on Judicial Qualifications as an adjunct of the Commission. Since the decisions of our judiciary play such an important role in people's personal and professional lives, the Commission believes that all South Carolinians should have a voice in the selection of the state's judges. It was this desire for broad-based grassroots participation that led the Commission to create the Citizens Committees on Judicial Qualifications. These committees, composed of people from a broad range of experience (doctors, lawyers, teachers, businessmen, and advocates for varied organizations; members of these committees are also diverse in race, gender, and life experiences), were asked to advise the Commission on the judicial candidates in their regions. Each regional committee interviewed the candidates from its assigned area and also interviewed other individuals in that region who were familiar with the candidate either personally or professionally. Based on those interviews and its own investigation, each committee provided the Commission with a report on their assigned candidates based on the Commission's evaluative criteria. The Commission then used these reports as a tool for further investigation of the candidate if the committee's report so warranted. Summaries of these reports have also been included in the Commission's report for your review.

The Commission conducts a thorough investigation of each candidate's professional, personal, and financial affairs, and holds public hearings during which each candidate is questioned on a wide variety of issues. The Commission's investigation focuses on the following evaluative criteria: constitutional qualifications; ethical fitness; professional and academic ability; character; reputation; physical health; mental health; and judicial temperament. The Commission's investigation includes the following:

(1)   survey of the bench and bar;

(2)   SLED and FBI investigation;

(3)   credit investigation;

(4)   grievance investigation;

(5)   study of application materials;

(6)   verification of ethics compliance;

(7)   search of newspaper articles;

(8)   conflict of interest investigation;

(9)   court schedule study;

(10)   study of appellate record; and

(11)   investigation of complaints.

While the law provides that the Commission must make findings as to qualifications, the Commission views its role as also including an obligation to consider candidates in the context of the judiciary on which they would serve and, to some degree, govern. To that end, the Commission inquires as to the quality of justice delivered in the courtrooms of South Carolina and seeks to impart, through its questioning, the view of the public as to matters of legal knowledge and ability, judicial temperament, and the absoluteness of the Judicial Canons of Conduct as to recusal for conflict of interest, prohibition of ex parte communication, and the disallowance of the acceptance of gifts. However, the Commission is not a forum for reviewing the individual decisions of the state's judicial system absent credible allegations of a candidate's violations of the Judicial Canons of Conduct, the Rules of Professional Conduct, or any of the Commission's nine evaluative criteria that would impact on a candidate's fitness for judicial service.

The Commission expects each candidate to possess a basic level of legal knowledge and ability, to have experience that would be applicable to the office sought, and to exhibit a strong adherence to codes of ethical behavior. These expectations are all important, and excellence in one category does not make up for deficiencies in another.

Routine questions related to compliance with Canons governing ethics and financial interests are now administered through a written questionnaire mailed to candidates and completed by them in advance of each candidate's staff interview. These issues are no longer automatically made a part of the public hearing process unless a concern or question was raised during the investigation of the candidate. The necessary public record of a candidate's pledge to uphold the canons, etc., is his completed and sworn questionnaire.

Written examinations of the candidates' knowledge of judicial practice and procedure were given at the time of candidate interviews with staff and graded on a "blind" basis by a panel of four persons designated by the Chairman. In assessing each candidate's performance on these practice and procedure questions, the Commission has placed candidates in either the "failed to meet expectations" or "met expectations" category. The Commission feels that these categories should accurately impart the candidate's performance on the practice and procedure questions.

This report is the culmination of weeks of investigatory work and public hearings. The Commission takes its responsibilities seriously as it believes that the quality of justice delivered in South Carolina's courtrooms is directly affected by the thoroughness of its screening process. Please carefully consider the contents of this report as we believe it will help you make a more informed decision.

This report conveys the Commission's findings as to the qualifications of all candidates currently offering for election to the Court of Appeals, Seat 3, and the Family Court for the Third Judicial Circuit, Seat 2.

Mary E. Buchan
Court of Appeals, Seat 3

Commission's Findings:   QUALIFIED AND NOMINATED
(1)   Constitutional Qualifications:

Based on the Commission's investigation, Judge Buchan meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service on the Court of Appeals.

Judge Buchan was born on September 26, 1952. She is 50 years old and a resident of Marion, South Carolina. Judge Buchan provided in her application that she has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1980.
(2)   Ethical Fitness:

The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Judge Buchan.

Judge Buchan demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.

Judge Buchan reported that she has not made any campaign expenditures.

Judge Buchan testified she has not:
(a)   sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)   sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)   asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.

Judge Buchan testified that she is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
(3)   Professional and Academic Ability:

The Commission found Judge Buchan to be intelligent and knowledgeable. Her performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.

Judge Buchan described her continuing legal or judicial education during the past five years as follows:
"Various Seminars offered through S.C. Bar Continuing Legal Education;
Scientific Evidence course, Reno, Nevada."

Judge Buchan reported that she has taught the following law-related courses:
"(a)   Family Court Judges Annual Meeting, Computers in the Courtroom;
(b)   Speaker, Horry County Bar Family Court Annual Seminar, 1993;
(c)   Judge, various state and one national High School Mock Trial Competitions;
(d)   Speaker and co-panelist, various state and local Guardian ad Litem training seminars;
(e)   Bridge the Gap, 1996, Handling Family Court Appointments;
(f)   Chief Judges' Seminar, 1997, Scheduling Problems and Conflicts;
(g)   Family Court Judges Annual Meeting, 1998, Race and Gender Sensitive Issues;
(h)   South Carolina Trial Lawyers Association, co-panelist, 1998, Valuation of a Professional Practice;
(i)   South Carolina Bar Winter Meeting, 1998, co-panelist, Joint Custody Considerations;
(j)   Family Court Judges Annual Meeting, 1999, Post-Trial Motions in Juvenile Hearings;
(k)   Children's Law Office, CLE, 2000, Handling Court Appointments in Family Court;
(l)   Family Court Judges Annual Meeting, 2000, general facilitator;
(m)   Tips From the Bench, III, CLE, 2002, Ethics in Family Court."

Judge Buchan reported that she has not published any books or articles.
(4)   Character:

The Commission's investigation of Judge Buchan did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against her. The Commission's investigation of Judge Buchan did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Judge Buchan has handled her financial affairs responsibly.

The Commission also noted that Judge Buchan was punctual and attentive in her dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with her diligence and industry.
(5)   Reputation:

Judge Buchan reported that her last available Martindale-Hubbell rating was "BV."
(6)   Physical Health:

Judge Buchan appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office she seeks.
(7)   Mental Stability:

Judge Buchan appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office she seeks.
(8)   Experience:

Judge Buchan was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1980.

Judge Buchan provided the following account of her legal experience since graduation from law school:
"For a brief period after my graduation from law school, I continued to clerk for the Columbia law firm of Kennedy, Price, Kosko & Coffas.

From my admission to the bar until March 1982, I worked for Timothy G. Quinn in his Columbia office and managed his Marion office. Both his Columbia office and his Marion office engaged in the general practice of law.

In March 1982, I began practicing with Edward W. Whittington, Jr. in Mullins, South Carolina, as Whittington & Buchan, Attorneys. Although my practice dealt primarily with domestic matters, we were a general practice, and I also handled real estate, commercial, civil, criminal and probate matters."

Judge Buchan reported the frequency of her court appearances during the last five years prior to her election to the bench as follows:
"(a)   Federal:   only two cases;
(b)   State:     remaining cases."

Judge Buchan reported the percentage of her practice involving civil, criminal, and domestic matters during the last five years prior to her election to the bench as follows:
"(a)   Civil:     14%;
(b)   Criminal:   1%;
(c)   Domestic:   85%."

Judge Buchan reported the percentage of her practice in trial court during the last five years prior to her election to the bench as follows:
"(a)   Jury:     less than one-half a percentage point;
(b)   Non-jury:   remainder."

Judge Buchan provided that she most often served as sole counsel prior to election to the bench.

The following is Judge Buchan's account of her five most significant litigated matters:
"(a)   Prevatte v. Prevatte, 297 S.C. 345, 377 S.E.2d 114 (Ct. App. 1989): This case was handled from inception through an appellate remand and subsequent appeal. The issues included novel issues regarding common-law marriage, circumstantial proof necessary for a fault-ground divorce and alimony.

(b)   Marion County DSS v. Rowell. I was appointed counsel in this action for termination of the parental rights of a parent with limited intelligence. It is significant to me because the parent retained her parental rights and received substantial assistance to improve her living and parental skills.

(c)   Turner v. Turner. This case was important and difficult because my client suffered from residual difficulties and disabilities from a closed-head injury. Preparation and presentation was difficult and stressful because of the importance that she receive alimony and a fair share of the assets.

(d)   Riad v. Diamond. I was appointed as the Guardian ad Litem by the judge in a neighboring county for three children who were the subject of a custody action between extended family members. The children's mother had been killed by the father, who was incarcerated.

(e)   Rabon v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph, et al. This action was a wrongful death action in federal court where the Plaintiff's son had died when his dirt bike hit a guide wire. The case settled before trial."

The following is Judge Buchan's account of civil appeals she has personally handled:
"(a)   Prevatte v. Prevatte, 87-MO-08 (Ct. App. 1987);

(b)   Prevatte v. Prevatte, 297 S.C. 345, 277 S.E.2d 114 (Ct. App. 1989)."

Judge Buchan further reported regarding prior judicial service: "I have been a Family Court judge since May 1992. I was first appointed and then elected later the same month. Family Courts are of limited jurisdiction as set forth by statute. Our jurisdiction is with matters of divorce, separate support and maintenance, support and property issues incidental to the marriage relationship, child custody and visitation, child support, abuse and neglect of children and vulnerable adults, juveniles, minor abortions, name changes, and domestic violence."

Judge Buchan provided the following list of significant orders:
"(a)   Poston v. Poston, 331 S.C. 106, 502 S.E.2d 86 (1998);

(b)   Dixon v. Dixon, 336 S.C. 260, 519 S.E.2d 357 (Ct. App. 1999);

(c)   Holloran v. Holloran, 98-UP-533, filed November 30, 1998. This case continues to have significance because Mr. Holloran continues to be so very unhappy with the result.

(d)   Eisenmann v. Eisenmann. This case remains one of the most significant cases I have heard because it remains the most tragic. Two professionals were involved in a contested divorce and custody action after one of them was involved in a horrible automobile accident which left that party with significant residual disabilities. The injured party's family members got involved, with the divorce and custody action resulting. Both of the parties and their children suffered immeasurably.

(e)   Jane Doe and John Doe v. SCDSS. Fictitious names are used because this is an adoption case. The child adopted first came before the Court in a removal case against the biological mother for abuse and neglect. At that time, the child had such severe physical disabilities and developmental delays that medical experts felt she would not live past her first birthday. I heard most of the DSS abuse and neglect cases and was very familiar with the child's condition. In another county, this case was set before me as an adoption. I recognized the child's name. The love and faith and goodness of the Plaintiffs had truly transformed the child and that child's prognosis. The case is significant because it is one of the few with a truly happy ending in Family Court."

Regarding unsuccessful candidacies, Judge Buchan reported: "I was unsuccessful in my bid for the Court of Appeals, Seat 3, in 1999. Although I was found qualified by the Commission, I was not nominated. In 2002, I was unsuccessful in my bid for the Court of Appeals, Seat 6. Again, I was found qualified but was not nominated."
(9)   Judicial Temperament:

The Commission believes that Judge Buchan's temperament has been and would continue to be excellent.
(10)   Miscellaneous:

Jara Uzenda Gobbi, a pro se litigant, in an affidavit alleged three complaints against Judge Buchan arising out of her separation/divorce action. The three complaints, in sum, alleged five issues involving Judge Buchan as follows: 1) Judge Buchan improperly went forward on a motion to "unconsolidate" cases filed by her and her former husband (after counsel for her former husband made such a motion) on grounds that she was not given notice of the motion to un-consolidate the two cases; 2) Judge Buchan had an affirmative duty to turn Mr. Gobbi over to the police and have him arrested for adultery; 3) Judge Buchan improperly failed to grant her motion to reconsider as she should have considered evidence as well as retained that evidence in the court's file of a cassette tape and transcript of that tape of Mr. Gobbi's plan to intentionally force eight houses (which had been jointly owned) into foreclosure; 4) she was not served with an order from Justice Toal stating Judge Buchan was to preside over all matters involving her husband and her; and 5) Judge Buchan failed to rule on Ms. Gobbi's motion for recusal.

Judge Buchan sought permission of the Supreme Court to comment. Prior to the hearing, Justice Toal removed Judge Buchan from hearing Ms. Gobbi's case in order to allow Judge Buchan to testify. The Commission examined the complaint and heard testimony concerning the allegations. The Commission found no evidence of misconduct by Judge Buchan and that the allegations in the complaint were groundless.

The Pee Dee Citizens Advisory Committee reported: "Judge Buchan is qualified for election to the position of Judge of the South Carolina Court of Appeals, Seat 3. As a result of its investigation of and previous interview with Judge Buchan, the Committee recommends this candidate without reservation."

Judge Buchan is married to Ernest McCray Graham, Jr. She has three children: David McCray Graham (stepson), age 32; Rebecca Earl Graham (stepdaughter), age 28; and Martha Alison Graham, age 16.

Judge Buchan reported that she was a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
"(a)   South Carolina Bar Association;
(b)   National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges;
(c)   Family Court Judges Association;
(d)   South Carolina Women Lawyers Association."

Judge Buchan provided that she was a member of the following civic, charitable, education, social, or fraternal organizations:
"(a)   Marion Presbyterian Church: former deacon and elder; presently Sunday school teacher; Endowment;
(b)   Friends of the Marion County Museum;
(c)   Pee Dee Academy Parent Teacher Association."

Judge Buchan further provided:
"I have both the ability and the desire to perform as an appellate judge. I am blessed with a logical mind and common sense. The requisite reading would be a joy, as would dealing with all areas of the law. I have had no contact with juries since becoming a Family Court judge almost eleven years ago, but I believe that I could bring myself up to speed on any jury issues."

The Commission found Judge Buchan to be very astute, of excellent judicial temperament, and with substantial experience on the Family Court bench. The Commission was very impressed by Judge Buchan's patient response to the complainant during the hearing process. Judge Buchan enjoys considerable and widespread respect within the legal community.

John C. Hayes III
Court of Appeals, Seat 3

Commission's Findings:   QUALIFIED AND NOMINATED
(1)   Constitutional Qualifications:

Based on the Commission's investigation, Judge Hayes meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service on the Court of Appeals.

Judge Hayes was born on October 18, 1945. He is 57 years old and a resident of York, South Carolina. Judge Hayes provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1971.
(2)   Ethical Fitness:

The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Judge Hayes.

Judge Hayes demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.

Judge Hayes reported that he has made $191.13 in campaign expenditures for Mail Right $83.40, postage $62.53, and Office Depot $45.20.

Judge Hayes testified he has not:
(a)   sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)   sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)   asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.

Judge Hayes testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
(3)   Professional and Academic Ability:

The Commission found Judge Hayes to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.

Judge Hayes described his continuing legal or judicial education during the past five years as follows:
"Over the past five years I have attended annually the S.C. Bar's January Criminal Law Seminar. In May of each year, I have participated in the Circuit Court Judges Conference and in August of each year the Supreme Court's Annual Judicial Conference." His specific continuing legal and judicial education courses are as follows:
01-09-98   Seminar of Circuit & Family Ct Judges for Administrative Purposes (5.25);
01-09-98         1997: That Was the Year That Was (4.00);
08-20-98   Judicial Conference (8.25);
09-27-98   1998 Solicitors Association Conference (14.75);
04-13-98   Circuit Court Judges Association Meeting (6.00);
01-22-99   14th Annual Criminal Law Update (7.00);
01-08-99   That Was The Year That Was (6.50);
05-12-99   Circuit Court Judges Meeting (6.00);
08-16-00   Annual Judicial Conference (7.75);
05-10-00 Circuit Court Judges Meeting (6.50);
01-21-00   15th Annual Criminal Law Update (6.00);
01-26-00   Criminal Law Update (6.00);
01-26-01   Criminal Law Update (6.00);
05-09-01   SC Circuit Ct Judges Conference (7.50);
08-23-01   Judicial Conference (8.25);
01-25-02   17th Annual Criminal Law Update (6.00);
05-08-02   Circuit Court Judges Annual Conference (7.00);
08-22-02   Judicial Conference (8.00);
09-29-02   2002 Solicitors Association Conference (14.50).

Judge Hayes reported the following regarding law-related courses he has taught: "I have been on programs for the Solicitors Association, the South Carolina Trial Lawyers Association, and the South Carolina Bar's CLE Division."

Judge Hayes reported that he has published the following:
"(a)   Mail Fraud - 22 SCLR 434 (1970);
(b)   Torts - IntraFamily Immunity 21 SCLR 813 (1969)."
(4)   Character:

The Commission's investigation of Judge Hayes did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against him. The Commission's investigation of Judge Hayes did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Judge Hayes has handled his financial affairs responsibly.

The Commission also noted that Judge Hayes was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5)   Reputation:

Judge Hayes reported that his last available Martindale-Hubbell rating was "BV."

Judge Hayes reported his military service as follows:
"U.S. Army, 1968-1974, Honorably Discharged, NCO of the Year (1973)."

Regarding public offices held, Judge Hayes reported:
"Solicitor, City of Rock Hill, appointed (approx. 1 year);
South Carolina House of Representatives, 1980-1984, elected;
South Carolina Senate, 1984-1991-Elected;
South Carolina Coastal Council (Fifth Congressional District), 1980, Elected."
(6)   Physical Health:

Judge Hayes appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7)   Mental Stability:

Judge Hayes appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8)   Experience:

Judge Hayes was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1971.

Judge Hayes gave the following account of his legal experience since graduation from law school:
"1971-1972     Law Clerk for Chief Justice Joseph R. Moss;

1972-1991     Hayes, Brunson, and Gatlin, General Practice;

My practice was primarily civil litigation. I also, throughout my practice, handled workers' compensation cases, social security disability cases, simple wills, and some estates. I have also handled real estate transactions including title searches and loan closings."

Judge Hayes reported the frequency of his court appearances during the last five years prior to his election to the bench as follows:
"(a)   Federal:   one to two cases a year;
(b)   State:     I had an active trial practice and was in Common Pleas court regularly."

Judge Hayes reported that the percentage of his practice involving civil, criminal, and domestic matters during the last five years prior to his election to the bench as follows:
"(a)   Civil:     85% (the other 15% was administrative and governmental)."

Judge Hayes reported the percentage of his practice in trial court during the last five years prior to his election to the bench as follows:
"(a)   Jury:     45%;
(b)   Non-jury:   20%."

Judge Hayes reported that he most often served as sole counsel prior to his election to the bench.

The following is Judge Hayes' account of his five most significant litigated matters:
"(a)   Duncan v. York County, 267 S.C. 327, 228 S.E.2d 92 (1976). The suit challenged the constitutionality of the Home Rule Act. I represented Plaintiff in the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

(b)   Eckerd v. Carpenter Decorating, U.S. District Court. This was a fire damage case where the ultimate damages exceeded 2 million dollars. I represented Carpenter Decorating. A verdict was returned by the jury in favor of Carpenter Decorating Company.

(c)   Belk v. Doe, Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas. This was a Tort case against an unknown uninsured motorist. I defended John Doe. The jury returned a verdict for Defendant.

(d)   State v. Littlejohn, York County Court of Common Pleas. This was a murder case. I defended Littlejohn, who was found guilty and sentenced to Life Imprisonment.

(e)   Bothelo v. Bycura, 282 S.C. 578, 320 S.E.2d 59 (Ct. App. 1984). This case established the requirement that a chiropractic expert must testify to the standard of care required of a chiropractor. (Now overturned)."

The following is Judge Hayes' account of civil appeals he has personally handled:
"(a)   Russell v. Ashe Brick Co., 267 S.C. 640, 230 S.E.2d 814 (1976). Novel issue of law;

(b)   Laney v. Hefley, 262 S.C. 54, 202 S.E.2d 12 (1974);

(c)   Giles v. Parker, Opinion No. 1621, S.C. Court of Appeals, February 4, 1991;

(d)   Belk v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 271 S.C. 24, 244 S.E.2d 744 (1978). Novel issue of law;

(e)   Stroud v. Stroud, 299 S.C. 394, 385 S.E.2d 744 (Ct. App. 1989)."

The following are criminal appeals handled personally by Judge Hayes:
"(a)   State v. Washington, Memorandum Opinion 77-98, S.C. Supreme Court, September 1, 1977, Numerous issues, unusual nature of client;

(b)   State v. Deese, 266 S.C. 543, 225 S.E.2d 175 (1976);

(c)   State v. Fields, 264 S.C. 260, 214 S.E.2d 320 (1974)."

Judge Hayes reported the following regarding prior judicial service:
"Circuit Court Judge, South Carolina, 1991 to present, a court of general jurisdiction."

Judge Hayes gave the following account of his most significant orders:
"(a)   Burbach v. Investors Management Corp., 326 S.C. 492, 484 S.E.2d 119 (Ct. App. 1997);

(b)   Glaze v. Grooms, 324 S.C. 249, 478 S.E.2d 841 (1996);

(c)   Blanket order and summary judgment orders in Greenville County asbestos cases set for November 2001. (Total: over 200);

(d)   Keith L. Simpson v. State, 97-CP-42-1911, unreported;

(e)   State v. Thurman O'Neil Smith, 2002-GS-46-2525 and 2526, unreported."
(9)   Judicial Temperament:

The Commission believes that Judge Hayes' temperament has been and would continue to be excellent.
(10)   Miscellaneous:

The Piedmont Citizens Advisory Committee reported: "Judge Hayes is held in high regard in the community by attorneys as well as other citizens. His district is one of the best circuit court systems in the State and has one of the lowest backlogs." The Piedmont Citizens Advisory Committee found "Judge Hayes to be eminently qualified for the position on the Court of Appeals."

Judge Hayes is married to Sarah Lynn Hayes. He has six children: John Calvin Hayes IV, age 31; Mary Scott McLaurin, age 29; Frances Green Hayes, age 27; Matthew Bowen Nance, age 26; Jessica Dorsey Nance, age 24; and Albert Tyler Nance, age 22.

Judge Hayes provided that he was a member of the following civic, charitable, education, social, or fraternal organizations:
"(a)   S.C. Bar;
(b)   American Bar Association, Judicial Division."

The Commission was favorably impressed with Judge Hayes' balanced judicial temperament, dignity, and great intellect. The Commission commented that Judge Hayes is noted for his insightfulness as well as his thorough preparation and review of the cases that come before him.

John W. Kittredge
Court of Appeals, Seat 3

Commission's Findings:   QUALIFIED AND NOMINATED
(1)   Constitutional Qualifications:

Based on the Commission's investigation, Judge Kittredge meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service on the Court of Appeals.

Judge Kittredge was born on September 28, 1956. He is 46 years old and a resident of Greenville, South Carolina. Judge Kittredge provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1982.
(2)   Ethical Fitness:

The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Judge Kittredge.

Judge Kittredge demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.

Judge Kittredge reported that he has made $70.23 in campaign expenditures for postage $62.90; paper $2.04; envelopes $4.06; large envelopes 72; and 1 disk 51.

Judge Kittredge testified he has not:
(a)   sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)   sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)   asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.

Judge Kittredge testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
(3)   Professional and Academic Ability:

The Commission found Judge Kittredge to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.

Judge Kittredge described his continuing legal or judicial education during the past five years as follows:
"I have regularly earned more than the minimum required JCLE hours. I have been a teacher/participant in many CLEs/JCLEs. In family court, I was for several years responsible for the program and/or a presenter at the annual judges' conference. Similarly, I organized and/or presented at the circuit judges' annual conference for the past several years. I have also been a speaker at the Annual Judicial Conference. I am a regular presenter at the Greenville Bar's annual CLE. I have also attended courses sponsored by the National Judicial College. I apologize for not having a complete list of all CLEs/JCLEs in which I have participated. There have been many occasions which I have attended a conference or continuing legal education program for the purpose of my presentation only. Under those circumstances, I certainly did not seek credit for JCLE/CLE hours. The following information comes from the annual judicial report of JCLE compliance.
Jan. 24, 1997   12th Annual Criminal Law Update;
Mar. 06, 1997   Governor's Conference on Youth Crime;
May 14, 1997   Circuit Judges' Spring Conference;
June 27, 1997   Seminar of Chief Judges for Circuit and Family Court;
Aug. 21, 1997   Annual Judicial Conference;
Jan. 09, 1998   Seminar of Circuit and Family Court Judges for Administrative Purposes;
Jan. 23, 1998   13th Annual Criminal Law Update;
May 13, 1998   Circuit Court Judges' Association Meeting;
Aug. 20, 1998   Annual Judicial Conference;
Jan. 22, 1999   14th Annual Criminal Update;
May 12, 1999   Circuit Court Judges' Association Meeting;
Aug. 19, 1999   Annual Judicial Conference;
Jan. 21, 2000   15th Annual Criminal Law Update;
May 10, 2000   Circuit Judges' Association Meeting;
Aug. 16, 2000   Annual Judicial Conference;
Jan. 26, 2001   16th Annual Criminal Law Update;
May 09, 2001   Circuit Judges' Association Conference;
Aug. 23, 2001   Annual Judicial Conference;
Jan. 25, 2002   17th Annual Criminal Law Update;
May 08, 2002   Circuit Judges' Association Conference;
Aug. 22, 2002   Annual Judicial Conference;

For the above years, I earned 143 hours of JCLE credit. This far exceeds the minimum requirement of 90 hours for this time period. Moreover, this does not include the many conferences for which I was a speaker/presenter and no continuing legal education credit hours were sought."

Judge Kittredge reported the following regarding law-related courses that he has taught: "Please see my response to #10 above. I have also spoken to schoolchildren, including middle and high school students. I have further spoken to college level students. I have lectured to law enforcement officers on a myriad of legal issues, such as search and seizure. I am frequently asked to speak to groups. I simply have not kept records of each occasion."

Judge Kittredge reported that he has published the following:
"(a)   Around 1978, I wrote a paper entitled The Inevitability of Police Discretion, which was published in the South Carolina Law Enforcement Officers Association magazine.
(b)   An article on juvenile justice was published in the Greenville News in December 1992.
(c)   I have also written an article on Judicial Activism, but it has not been published."
(4)   Character:

The Commission's investigation of Judge Kittredge did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against him. The Commission's investigation of Judge Kittredge did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Judge Kittredge has handled his financial affairs responsibly.

The Commission also noted that Judge Kittredge was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5)   Reputation:

Judge Kittredge reported that his last available Martindale-Hubbell rating was "BV."

(6)   Physical Health:

Judge Kittredge appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7)   Mental Stability:

Judge Kittredge appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8)   Experience:

Judge Kittredge was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1982.

Judge Kittredge gave the following account of his legal experience since graduation from law school:
"I served as law clerk to the Honorable William W. Wilkins, Jr., then United States District Judge, from August 1982 through 1984.

From September 1984 until July 1991, I worked at the law firm of Wilkins, Nelson and Kittredge. I had a litigation practice.

I also worked as a part-time assistant solicitor from 1984 until mid-1985, and then again for several months in 1986 to try several cases at the request of the Solicitor. As an assistant solicitor, I prosecuted many criminal cases.

I was elected by the General Assembly to the family court bench in 1991. In 1996, I was elected by the General Assembly to the circuit court bench."

Judge Kittredge reported the frequency of his court appearances during the last five years prior to his election to the bench as follows:
"(a)   Federal:   approximately twice annually;
(b)   State:     weekly."

Judge Kittredge reported that the percentage of his practice involving civil, criminal, and domestic matters during the last five years prior to his election to the bench as follows:
"(a)   Civil:     Approximately 30%;
(b)   Criminal:   Approximately 5%;
(c)   Domestic:   Approximately 65%."

Judge Kittredge reported the percentage of his practice in trial court during the last five years prior to his election to the bench as follows:
"(a)   Jury:     Approximately 10%;
(b)   Non-jury:       Approximately 90%."

Judge Kittredge provided that he most often served as sole or lead counsel in the majority of the cases prior to his election to the bench. He was associate counsel in approximately 25% of the cases.

The following is Judge Kittredge's account of his five most significant litigated matters:
"(a)   State v. Floyd McDuffie, (approximately 1985 Greenville County General Sessions Court). I prosecuted many cases as an Assistant Solicitor, and this case was significant to me. It involved a highly publicized robbery and murder. Interesting legal questions arose during the trial. The defendant was convicted of armed robbery and manslaughter and sentenced to jail.

(b)   State v. Donnie Robinson, (approximately 1985 Greenville County General Sessions Court). As an Assistant Solicitor, I prosecuted this defendant for armed robbery and kidnapping. This was a highly publicized case in which the defendant kidnapped the victim at gunpoint in the parking lot of Haywood Mall. He then forced her to withdraw money from her bank account. The victim escaped from the defendant. Defendant denied the charges. The jury convicted defendant on all counts and he received a life term.

(c)   Stogner v. City of Mauldin, 84-CP-23-680. Plaintiff filed a myriad of claims against the City of Mauldin, including a claim under 42 USC Section 1983. Plaintiff challenged the zoning ordinance of the city of Mauldin. I, along with my law partner, defended the City of Mauldin. The case was tried to a jury. Judgment for the City of Mauldin at the close of evidence.

(d)   Collins Music v. Terry, et al., 87-CP-23-2982. I represented Plaintiff in this Common Pleas action. This case received substantial publicity. Plaintiff alleged breech of contract, tortious interference with contractual relations and unfair trade practices. Plaintiff prevailed; judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiff in the approximate amount of $18,000 actual damages and $100,000 punitive damages. The case was appealed and affirmed by the Court of Appeals (303 S.C. 358, 400 S.E.2d 783 (Ct. App. 1991)). I handled the appeal, too.

(e)   First Baptist Church of Mauldin v. City of Mauldin, 90-CP-23-955. I represented the First Baptist Church of Mauldin on a pro bono basis, in its petition to close a road on its property. The closing of the road was necessary to enable the church to expand its facility to accommodate its growing membership. This was far more than a 'road closing' case. For political reasons, the church's petition was adamantly challenged by the City of Mauldin. Significant publicity surrounded the case and trial. Following a lengthy trial, judgment was entered in favor of the church closing the road. The lower court's decision was appealed by the City of Mauldin. I was elected to the Family Court Bench during the appeal. The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the trial court, 308 S.C. 226, 417 S.E.2d 592 (1992)."

The following is Judge Kittredge's account of civil appeals he has personally handled:
"(a)   Collins Music v. Terry, 303 S.C. 358, 400 S.E.2d 783 (Ct. App. 1991);

(b)   S.C. Tax Commission v. S.C. Tax Board of Review, 305 S.C. 183, 407 S.E.2d 627 (1991) (I did not write the brief; I only argued the case before the Supreme Court);

(c)   Watson v. Watson, 291 S.C. 13, 351 S.E.2d 883 (Ct. App. 1986);

(d)   Burns v. Burns, 293 S.C. 1, 358 S.E.2d 168 (Ct. App. 1987);

(e)   Lineberger v. Lineberger, 303 S.C. 248, 399 S.E.2d 786 (Ct. App. 1990);

(f)   Bible v. Bible, 89-MO-320 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed Dec. 15, 1989)."

Judge Kittredge further stated, "I have never handled a criminal appeal as a lawyer."

Regarding prior judicial service, Judge Kittredge reported:
"I was elected by the General Assembly to the family court bench on May 8, 1991, and reelected in May 1995. The family court is a court of limited jurisdiction; it is a statutory court. In 1996, I was elected to an at-large circuit court judgeship (seat 11). In 1998, I was elected to a resident circuit court judgeship (13th Circuit, Seat 4) and have served continuously since. The circuit court is South Carolina's general jurisdiction court, civil and criminal. It is as constitutional court."

Judge Kittredge reported the following most significant orders:
"In the approximate 12 years on the South Carolina trial bench, I have heard thousands of cases. To each litigant who has ever appeared in my court, that case was significant to them. Beyond my service as a trial judge, I have had the privilege of sitting on the South Carolina Supreme Court on many occasions. Moreover, the South Carolina Supreme Court appointed me to serve on the Court of Appeals in an en banc proceeding. The following represents a sample of my circuit court and appellate court experiences.
(a)   Murphy v. Owens-Corning, 346 S.C. 37, 550 S.C.2d 589 (Ct. App. 2001). I was appointed to the court of appeals en banc. The case involved an exception to the final judgment rule, thus permitting appeal of an interlocutory order since it affected a substantial right and struck part of a pleading. The gravamen of the appeal dealt with the applicability of the "door closing statute" in an asbestos induced injury. I wrote the opinion reversing the original panel decision. I believe the South Carolina Supreme Court has grant certiorari.

(b)   Simpson Enterprises v. Hanahan, 93-CP-23-1910. Declaratory judgment action regarding stock valuation, redemption rights, etc. I wrote the order setting the value of Defendant's stock in question and awarded Plaintiff damages pursuant to its counterclaim. The order and judgment were affirmed by the court of appeals in an unpublished opinion. Simpson v. Hanahan, Op. No. 99-up-651 (filed December 16, 1999). The South Carolina Supreme Court denied Defendant's request for a writ of certiorari.

(c)   Ray v. Catoe, 99-CP-42-662. This was a complex capital post-conviction relief case. Following a week-long hearing, I wrote an order granting the Application in part. The State sought a writ of certiorari from the South Carolina Supreme Court. The Supreme Court denied cert., thereby upholding my order, and the matter has been remanded for a new sentencing hearing.

(d)   Garris v. The Governing Board of The South Carolina Reinsurance Facility, 94-CP-40-4658. This was a complex matter involving a state agency and multiple constitutional issues. Following a lengthy hearing I issued an order addressing all issues. Because of the significant constitutional issues involved, the appeal went directly to the South Carolina Supreme Court. 333 S.C. 432, 511 S.E.2d 48 (1998).

(e)   State v. Freddie Eugene Owens, 98-GS-23-5220. This was a death penalty case. The original sentence of death was vacated by the South Carolina Supreme Court, and the matter of sentencing was remanded to the circuit court. The Supreme Court assigned the resentencing to me. Defendant subsequently waived his right to a jury trial. Following the sentencing hearing, I issued an order setting forth the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and imposed sentence.

(f)   Elliott Hatton v. State, 99-CP-23-3410. This was a post-conviction relief case. The case involved a challenge to the jurisdiction of the trial court due to an alleged variance between the indictment and proof at trial. I issued an order denying the post-conviction relief application. The Applicant is now seeking a writ of certiorari from the South Carolina Supreme Court.

(g)   Liberty Corporation v. GAMCO Investors, 2000-CP-23-6838. This was a complex declaratory judgment action involving the Dissenter's Rights Statute, S.C. Code Ann. Section 33-13-101, et seq. Following cross motions for summary judgment, I issued an order finding the purported "dissents" did not comply with the statute and were improper."
(9)   Judicial Temperament:

The Commission believes that Judge Kittredge's temperament has been and would continue to be excellent.
(10)   Miscellaneous:

The Upstate Citizens Advisory Committee reported: "Judge Kittredge is a well-liked, highly-respected jurist who is admired for his intellect and judicial skills." They found Judge Kittredge to be "extremely well-qualified to serve on the Court of Appeals."

Judge Kittredge is married to Lila Graham Hewell. He has three children: Lila M. Kittredge, age 18; John W. Kittredge, Jr., age 15; and Zay Jeffries Kittredge II, age 15.

Judge Kittredge reported that he was a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
"(a)   South Carolina Bar 1982-present;
(b)   Greenville County Bar 1982-present."

Judge Kittredge reported that he was a member of the following civic, charitable, education, social, or fraternal organizations:
"(a)   First Presbyterian Church of Greenville; Sunday School officer;
(b)   Greenville Saltwater Sportfishing Group;
(c)   Greenville Country Club;
(d)   Child Evangelism Fellowship."

Judge Kittredge further provided:

"The Court of Appeals offers a tremendous opportunity for service. I have enjoyed and benefited from my many years of service as a circuit court and family court judge. If I am unsuccessful in my bid for the Court of Appeals, I will continue to enjoy my service as a circuit court judge.

Beyond my educational background, which includes summa cum laude, (undergraduate), Phi Beta Kappa, Order of Wig and Robe, Order of the Coif, etc., I respectfully request the Commission consider my many years of service on the South Carolina trial bench.

I have: (1) served as chief administrative judge on numerous occasions in family and circuit court; (2) formed Bench/Bar committees in family and circuit court to facilitate productive and positive communication between judges and practicing attorneys on matters affecting the court; (3) assembled and participated in the committee which resulted in the implementation of the successful Alternate Dispute Resolution Program in Greenville County; (4) been assigned and tried many complex cases, including medical malpractice, products liability, constitutional challenges to state statutes, etc.; (5) been responsible for the organization, scheduling and presentation of many JCLEs at family court and circuit court conferences; (6) been assigned numerous death penalty cases by the Supreme Court, including death penalty post-conviction relief; (7) served on numerous occasions as an acting associate justice of the Supreme Court, most recently in November of 2002 and February of 2003; (8) served as an acting associate judge on the Court of Appeals in an en banc hearing in which I authored the majority opinion; and (9) been appointed many times by the Supreme Court as a special referee in matters in the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction and in all such cases the Supreme Court has unanimously adopted my Report and Recommendation in published opinions.

I believe my experience has equipped me to serve on the Court of Appeals. I have, through the years, increasingly prepared more of my orders without input from the prevailing attorney. I enjoy legal analysis, research and writing. I am no stranger to hard work. I am prepared for the Court of Appeals."

The Commission was very impressed with Judge Kittredge's outstanding reputation in the community and as a jurist on the Circuit Court bench. The Commission noted his great intellect, fair-mindedness to litigants and parties, as well as his diligence in discharging his responsibilities as a judge.

Alison Renee Lee
Court of Appeals, Seat 3

Commission's Findings:   QUALIFIED, BUT NOT NOMINATED
(1)   Constitutional Qualifications:

Based on the Commission's investigation, Judge Lee meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service on the Court of Appeals.

Judge Lee was born on September 17, 1958. She is 44 years old and a resident of Columbia, South Carolina. Judge Lee provided in her application that she has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1984.
(2)   Ethical Fitness:

The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Judge Lee.

Judge Lee demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.

Judge Lee reported that she has not made any campaign expenditures.

Judge Lee testified she has not:
(a)   sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)   sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)   asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.

Judge Lee testified that she is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
(3)   Professional and Academic Ability:

The Commission found Judge Lee to be intelligent and knowledgeable. Her performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.

Judge Lee described her continuing legal or judicial education during the past five years as follows:
"1998 - carried over credits from 1997:

Rules, Rules, Rules: S.C. Rules of Civil Procedure (3.0);

South Carolina Woman Advocate (4.25) - April;

Employment and Labor Law (3.0);

Ethics Seminar (3.0).
1999 - carried over credits from 1998:

Annual Criminal Law Update (7.0) - January;

Circuit Judges Orientation School (17.25) - June;

S.C. Judicial Conference (7.25) - August;

S.C. Circuit Judges Conference (6.0) - May.
2000 - carried over credits from 1999:

National Judicial College, General Jurisdiction (58.08) - April;

Annual Criminal Law Update (6.0) - January;

S.C. Circuit Judges Conference (6.5) - May;

S.C. Judicial Conference (7.75) - August.
2001 - carried over credits from 2000:

Annual Criminal Law Update (6.0) - January;

S.C. Circuit Judges Conference (7.5) - May;

S.C. Judicial Conference (8.25) - August.
2002 - carried over credits from 2001:

Annual Criminal Law Update (6.0) - January;

S.C. Circuit Judges Conference (7.5) - May;

S.C. Judicial Conference (8.25) - August."

Judge Lee reported that she has taught the following law-related courses:
"(a)   JCLE - Basic Elements of Proof in the Family Court (August 1985). Topic: Settling the Family Court Record on Appeal.
(b)   Basic Federal Court Practice (September 1985). Topic: Pretrial Orders, Sanctions & Local Rules.
(c)   Bridge the Gap (May 1996, March 1997, May 1997, March 1998, May 1998). Topic: Practice Tips for the Administrative Law Judge Division.
(d)   1996 That Was the Year That Was (January 1997). Topic: 1996 Update for the Administrative Law Judge Division.
(e)   Rules, Rules, Rules: S.C. Practice & Procedure Update (March 1998). Topic: Rules of the Administrative Law Judge Division.
(f)   South Carolina Woman Advocate: Moving into the Millennium (May 1998).
(g)   Tips from the Bench (December 2002). Topics: Ethics - Circuit Court."

Judge Lee reported that she has not published any books and/or articles.
(4)   Character:

The Commission's investigation of Judge Lee did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against her. The Commission's investigation of Judge Lee did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Judge Lee has handled her financial affairs responsibly.

The Commission also noted that Judge Lee was punctual and attentive in her dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with her diligence and industry.
(5)   Reputation:

Judge Lee reported that she is not rated by Martindale-Hubbell.
(6)   Physical Health:

Judge Lee appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office she seeks.
(7)   Mental Stability:

Judge Lee appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office she seeks.
(8)   Experience:

Judge Lee was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1984.

Judge Lee reported the following legal experience since graduation from law school:
"1982-83   Law Clerk, Honorable Israel M. Augustine, Jr., Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.

1983-84   Law Clerk, Honorable C. Tolbert Goolsby, Jr., S.C. Court of Appeals.

1984-89   Associate, McNair Law Firm, P.A., primarily litigation in contract or consumer related issues. Last two years of practice consisted of labor and employment related litigation.

1989-94   Staff Counsel, S.C. Legislative Council, drafting legislation and amendments for members of the General Assembly in the areas of transportation, crime, corrections and prisons, and education.

1994-99   Administrative Law Judge presiding over administrative hearing relating to insurance, environmental permitting, alcoholic beverages, wages, taxes, video poker, bingo, appeals from occupational licensing boards, and hearings on regulations promulgated by certain state agencies.

1999-present.   Circuit Court Judge. Court of general jurisdiction in criminal and civil matters. Appellate jurisdiction over municipal, magistrate cases as well as administrative agencies and boards or commissions."

Judge Lee reported the frequency of her court appearances during the last five years prior to her election to the bench as follows:
"(a)   Federal:   90% of the cases I handles in private practice were in federal court (1984-89);
(b)   State:     10% of the cases I handled in private practice were in state court (1984-89)."

Judge Lee reported the percentage of her practice involving civil, criminal, and domestic matters during the last five years prior to her election to the bench as follows:
"(a)   Civil:     80%; (1984-89)
(b)   Criminal:     20%; (1984-89)
(c)   Domestic:   handled 2-3 court appointed cases between 1984 and 1989."

Judge Lee reported the percentage of her practice in trial court during the last five years prior to her election to the bench as follows:
"(a)   Jury:     10%; a majority of cases were resolved on motions or through settlement. (1984-89)
(b)   Non-jury:     no response."

Judge Lee provided that she most often served as associate counsel on cases that were actually tried prior to her election to the bench.

The following is Judge Lee's account of her five most significant litigated matters:
"(a)   Atkinson v. Citicorp Acceptance Co., (Federal district court). Case decided on summary judgment motion involving the Fair Debt Collection Act, then a new federal statute.

(b)   McClain v. Westinghouse, (Federal district court). Employment law case involving sex discrimination, sex harassment, equal pay, as well as other employment claims. Case decided on summary judgment.

(c)   State of South Carolina v. Norris Stroman, (state criminal case). Defendant (with limited intelligence) charged with murder and allegedly confessed. Jury acquitted.

(d)   Valerie Smith v. Kroger, (Federal district court). Either a slander or malicious prosecution case resulting from shoplifting."

The following is Judge Lee's account of civil appeals she has personally handled:
"(a)   Purdie v. Smalls, 293 S.C. 216, 359 S.E.2d 306 (Ct. App. 1987);

(b)   Hooten v. Carolina Treatment Center, Inc., 200 S.C. 37, 386 S.E.2d 287, (Ct. App. 1989) was not the lead attorney;

(c)   Condon v. Best View Cablevision, Inc., 292 S.C. 117, 355 S.E.2d 7 (Ct. App. 1987) was not the lead attorney;

(d)   Davis v. U.S. Steel Corp., 779 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1985) on brief."

Judge Lee reported:
"I did not handle any criminal appeals while in private practice. However, as a circuit court judge I have presided over appeals from magistrate and municipal court cases involving criminal matters."

Regarding prior judicial service, Judge Lee reported:
"Elected by the General Assembly in February 1994 to the office of Administrative Law Judge which is a quasi-judicial function within the executive branch of government. Jurisdiction is limited to fact finding within the context of administrative hearings involving taxes, licensing, permitting and ratemaking. Act as an appellate body in matters involving occupational licensing and foster care licensing, among others. Conduct public hearings and decide the reasonableness and need for regulations promulgated by certain state agencies.

Elected by the General Assembly in February 1999 to Circuit Court. Re-elected in February 2002. Court of general jurisdiction covering civil and criminal matters. Appellate jurisdiction over administrative agencies and boards and commissions within the executive branch. Also appellate jurisdiction over municipal and magistrate cases."

The following is Judge Lee's account of her most significant orders:
"(a)   Ward v. South Carolina, 98-CP-40-4069, reversed 538 S.E.2d 245 (S.C. 2000). Ward, a federal retiree, filed suit against the State seeking to have declared unconstitutional statutes enacted providing state retirees a "rebate" on income taxes in response to Davis v. Michigan. The State filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit which was granted on the basis that Ward failed to exhaust her administrative remedies before the Department of Revenue and the Administrative Law Judge Division. The Supreme Court reversed the decision stating that exhaustion of remedies was not required when the sole issue for determination involves the constitutionality of a statute. Neither the Department of Revenue nor the ALJD has jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of a statute.

(b)   Harmon v. American Amusement Co., et al., 97-CP-40-2799.

Harmon filed suit seeking damages when the video gaming machine he was playing malfunctioned and accrued credits in excess of $5 million. His claims involved breach of contract, fraud and deceit, conversion, civil conspiracy, negligent misrepresentation, and unfair trade practices. Each legal theory was considered and was dismissed.

(c)   Sloan v. Greenville County, et al., 99-CP-23-4464.

Mr. Sloan sued Greenville County seeking to declare its action unlawful in connection with the procured construction of the family court building expansion. The County sought dismissal of the lawsuit claiming Mr. Sloan did not have standing to bring the lawsuit. The decision found that Sloan had standing to bring the action against the County as a taxpayer when the legislative acts sought to be enjoined are unlawful.

(d)   Jordan, et al. v. Holt, et al., 96-CP-26-3792.

This was a non-jury trial in which partners in a failed restaurant venture sought dissolution of the partnership, an accounting of the assets and claims for damages from the operation of the business. The trial lasted one week and involved voluminous documents, checks, records and photographs.

(e)   Kenneth Curtis v. State of South Carolina, (Greenville County).

Mr. Curtis sought to enjoin the State from enforcing a statute prohibiting the sale of urine in interstate commerce and to declare the statute unconstitutional."

Judge Lee reported the following unsuccessful candidacies:
"(a)   Candidate for Court of Appeals, Seat 6. Screening held in December 2002. Found qualified but not nominated by the Commission;
(b)   Candidate for Circuit Court At-Large Seat 10. Election in April 1997, withdrew two days before the election. Seat won by James R. Barber, III.
(c)   Also candidate for Circuit Court At-Large Seats 1 and 7. Withdrew candidacy when Commission nominated me as a candidate for Seat 11 in February 1999."
(9)   Judicial Temperament:

The Commission believes that Judge Lee's temperament has been and would continue to be excellent.
(10)   Miscellaneous:

The Midlands Citizens Advisory Committee reported: "The Committee finds Judge Alison Renee Lee to be a qualified and highly-regarded judge, who would serve ably on the Court of Appeals."

Judge Lee is married to Kenzil Franklin Summey. She has two children: Julian Christopher Summey, age 14; and Amanda Leigh Summey, age 11.

Judge Lee reported that she was a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
"(a)   Permanent Member, U.S. Fourth Circuit Judicial Conference;
(b)   American Bar Association (1985-90);
(c)   South Carolina Bar Association;
(d)   South Carolina Woman Lawyers Association;
(e)   Richland County Bar Association;
(f)   Young Lawyers Division representative to the Committee on Continuing Legal Education (July 1987-June 1988);
(g)   Associate Commissioner, Board of Grievances and Discipline (1987-1989)."

Judge Lee provided that she was a member of the following civic, charitable, education, social, or fraternal organizations:
"(a)     Columbia Chapter of The Links, Inc. (1987-present); President 1994-98, Vice President 1993-94, Corresponding Secretary 1990-93;

(b)   Columbia Chapter, Jack and Jill of America, Inc. (1992-present); Parliamentarian 1995-97, 2001-2003;

(c)   St. Peter's Catholic School Board (1993-97), Chairperson 1995-96;

(d)   St. Peter's Catholic Church Parish Pastoral Council (1998-2001)."

Judge Lee further provided: "I was honored by the S.C. Chapter of the National Association of Bench and Bar Spouses in April 1999. I was a participant in Leadership South Carolina, Class of 1999."

The Commission found Judge Lee to have provided significant and valuable service to the State as an Administrative Law Judge and Circuit Court Judge and to be qualified for election as a Judge on the Court of Appeals.

Paul E. Short, Jr.
Court of Appeals, Seat 3

Commission's Findings:   QUALIFIED, BUT NOT NOMINATED
(1)   Constitutional Qualifications:

Based on the Commission's investigation, Judge Short meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service on the Court of Appeals.

Judge Short was born on January 13, 1947. He is 56 years old and a resident of Chester, South Carolina. Judge Short provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1971.
(2)   Ethical Fitness:

The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Judge Short.

Judge Short demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.

Judge Short reported that he has not made any campaign expenditures.

Judge Short testified he has not:
(a)   sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)   sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)   asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.

Judge Short testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
(3)   Professional and Academic Ability:

The Commission found Judge Short to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.

Judge Short described his continuing legal or judicial education during the past five years as follows:
"2001:
1/26   S.C. Bar, Criminal Law Update, 6.00 hrs.;
1/5   York County Bar Assoc., Sticks & Stones, Appointed, 3.00 hrs.;
5/9   S.C. Assoc. Circuit Judges Conference, 7.50 hrs.;
7/9   National Judicial College, Reno, NV, Law & the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 64.00 hrs.;
8/23   S.C. Circuit Court Assoc. Judicial Conference, 8.25 hrs.
2000:
1/21   S.C. Bar, Criminal Law Update, 6.00 hrs.;
5/10   S.C. Assoc. Circuit Judges Conference, 6.50 hrs.;
8/7   National Judicial College, Reno, NV, Media and the Courts, 52.00 hrs.
1999:
1/22   S.C. Bar, Criminal Law Update, 7.00 hrs.;
5/12   S.C. Assoc. Circuit Judges Conference, 6.00 hrs.;
7/19-23   National Judicial College, Reno, NV, Constitutional Criminal Procedure, History and Theory of Jurisprudence, 76.00 hrs.;
7/26   National Judicial College, Reno, NV, Judicial Writing, 27.80 hrs.;
8/5   S.C. Trial Lawyers Assoc., Annual Convention, 12.00 hrs.;
8/19   S.C. Circuit Court Assoc., Judicial Conference, 7.25 hrs.
1998:
1/9   S.C. Circuit Court Judges Assoc., Seminar of Chief Judges for Circuit and Family Court, 5.25 hrs.;
1/23   S.C. Bar, Criminal Law Update, 6.50 hrs.;
5/13   S.C. Assoc. of Circuit Judges Meeting, 6.00 hrs.;
8/13   S.C. Trial Lawyers Assoc., Annual Convention, 14.50 hrs.;
8/20   S.C. Circuit Court Assoc., Judicial Conference, 8.25 hrs.
1997:
1/24   S.C. Bar, Criminal Law Update, 6.50 hrs.;
5/14   Circuit Judges' Spring Conference, 7.50 hrs.;
6/27   S.C. Circuit Court Judges Assoc., Seminar of Chief Judges for Circuit and Family Court, 5.25 hrs.;
8/21   S.C. Circuit Court Assoc., Judicial Conference, 8.00 hrs.;
9/28   S.C. Solicitors' Assoc., Judicial Conference, 15.00 hrs."

Judge Short reported that he has taught the following law-related courses:
"(a)   September 15, 1995: South Carolina Legal Secretaries Association. I was the instructor for a Seminar on Rules of Civil Procedure.
(b)   September 30-October 18, 1996: National Judicial College/Reno, Nevada. I served as a Group Facilitator with the faculty for the General Jurisdiction Course for new Judges. I led group discussions four hours each day on a wide variety of legal topics.
(c)   September 29, 1997: South Carolina Solicitor's Conference, Myrtle Beach, South Carolina. I spoke on the topic 'Case File Development and Review, A View from the Judiciary'."

Judge Short reported that he has not published any books. However, with the exception of writing his thesis, he has completed the Master of Judicial Studies Program sponsored by the National Judicial College at the University of Nevada, Reno and has written several research papers to complete the course work requirement of the program.

(4)   Character:

The Commission's investigation of Judge Short did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against him. The Commission's investigation of Judge Short did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Judge Short has handled his financial affairs responsibly.

The Commission also noted that Judge Short was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5)   Reputation:

Judge Short reported that his last available Martindale-Hubbell rating was "AV."

Judge Short gave the following account of his military service:
"U.S. Army, June 1968; entered active duty August 1971; discharged from active duty November 1971; served S.C. National Guard until 1973; Discharged U.S. Army Reserve, 1974; Highest rank attained was 1st Lieutenant; Present Status, Inactive Reserve; Honorably Discharged as Captain."

Judge Short reported the following regarding public offices held:
"(a)   South Carolina House of Representatives, elected, 1982-1991;
(b)   Chester County Airport Commission, appointed, 1978-1980;
(c)   Chester County Attorney, appointed, 1980-1982."
(6)   Physical Health:

Judge Short appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7)   Mental Stability:

Judge Short appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8)   Experience:

Judge Short was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1971. He gave the following account of his legal experience since graduation from law school:
"I began the general practice of law in November 1971, in Chester, South Carolina with Mr. Fred H. Strickland and Mr. E.K. Hardin. I practiced law continuously in the same firm. In late 1972, I became a partner in the firm and in approximately June 1973, Mr. Hardin left the firm to become Probate Judge of Chester County. In July 1973, Mr. Strickland was tragically killed in a house fire and I became senior partner at the age of 26. Mr. William C. Keels graduated from law school in June 1973, and he and I began practicing law together at that time.

I was honored to have been elected to the South Carolina Circuit Court At-Large Seat #8 on February 1, 1991, and have served continuously until February 1999, when I was elected Resident Judge of the Sixth Judicial Circuit."

Judge Short reported the frequency of his court appearances during the last five years prior to his election to the bench as follows:
"(a)   Federal:     Occasionally;
(b)   State:     Often--on a regular basis."

Judge Short reported that the percentage of his practice involving civil, criminal, and domestic matters during the last five years prior to his election to the bench as follows:
"(a)   Civil:     20%;
(b)   Criminal:   50%;
(c)   Domestic:   30%."

Judge Short reported the percentage of his practice in trial court during the last five years prior to his election to the bench as follows:
"(a)   Jury:     95%;
(b)   Non-jury:   5%."

Judge Short provided that he most often served as sole counsel and occasionally chief counsel prior to his election to the bench.

The following is Judge Short's account of his five most significant litigated matters:
"(a)   Walter Neal and Industrial Chemical Company, Inc. v. J. Simpson Darby, L.H. Schwieterman, John Archie Lucas, Donald B. Murray, Marion M. Thomas, and J.F. Martin as members of the Chester County Council and the County of Chester, (1984) Court of Appeals Opinion #0207 filed June 22, 1984. I was Chester County Attorney in 1980 and the Chester County Council was in the process of adopting an ordinance pertaining to the handling and storage of hazardous chemicals in Chester County. Mr. Neal brought suit in Common Pleas Court to question the constitutionality of the ordinance and the county counter-claimed on the ground that Mr. Neal's landfill site was a public nuisance. The case was significant both at the trial level and the appellate level, because a small rural county was attempting to protect its citizens and their environment from the disposal of out-of-state hazardous waste. The trial judge and the Court of Appeals both found that the landfill constituted a public nuisance by virtue of its location and upheld the permanent injunction to prevent further disposal of hazardous chemical waste at the site.

(b)   Chester County Hospital and Nursing Center v. J.F. Martin, Simpson Darby, John Lucas, Marion M. Thomas, Don Murray, Carlisle Roddey, Lowell Schweiterman, individually and as members of the Chester County Council, and the Chester County Council, (1984) South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion #22053 filed March 6, 1984. In 1981, the Chester County Council was in the process of adopting an ordinance to increase the size of the Chester County Hospital Board and to provide that Council would appoint said Board members. This Board had previously been created by a local act of the General Assembly in 1947 which provided that vacancies would be filled by a two-thirds vote of the remaining Board members themselves. The Board petitioned the Circuit Court for an injunction to prevent the Council from enacting the ordinance. After an extensive hearing on the matter, which included the testimony of many respected leaders of the community such as U.S. District Court Judge Robert W. Hemphill, deceased, the lower Court issued a permanent injunction on the grounds that the County was attempting to exercise power beyond its limitations in violation of Section 4-9-170, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1976, as amended. The South Carolina Supreme Court remanded the case and vacated the injunction. The Court stated that it was well recognized that a Court could not restrain by injunction, the exercise of legislative power by counties. The Court cited 43A C.J.S., which states that the restraining power of a Court should be directed against enforcement rather than passage of ordinances. The case is very significant because the Court upheld the County's actions which were undertaken because of the Home Rule Act.

(c)   Vera B. Lawson, Executrix of the Estate of Robert Smith Lawson, deceased v. Bowaters Carolina Corporation, U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals #77-8320, Order filed October 31, 1977. In this case, I represented the Estate of a painter who was killed while painting the defendant's plant in Rock Hill, South Carolina. The plaintiff's husband was employed by Robert's Paint Company, which had a contract with Bowaters to paint their facility. The plaintiff's husband was killed when an employee of Bowaters drove a forklift into the scaffold supports, thereby knocking the deceased to the ground. A death claim against Robert's Paint Company was filed for Workman's Comp benefits before the South Carolina Industrial Commission and the claim was approved. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against Bowaters Carolina Corporation in U.S. District Court. The defendant moved for summary judgment contending that under the provisions of the S.C. Workman's Compensation Act, the plaintiff's deceased husband was the 'statutory employee' of the defendant, and therefore, the plaintiff's sole remedy would be under the provisions of that act. After considering the briefs filed by me and after oral arguments of counsel, Judge Hemphill issued his Order on September 15, 1977, in which he denied the Motion for Summary Judgment and ordered the case be calendared for jury trial. The defendant petitioned the United States Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals for permission to appeal Judge Hemphill's Order, basing its argument on the grounds that there was a conflict between interpretation of controlling State law between the United States Supreme Court and the South Carolina Supreme Court. They denied the defendant's petition and the case was later settled. This case was significant because it involved the question of the definition of a statutory employee under the South Carolina Workman's Compensation Act.

(d)   Canzadia White, as Administratrix of the Estate of Richard C. Carter, deceased v. Holsum Bakery, Inc., (1972). This was a wrongful death case and all of the witnesses of the accident of the plaintiff were minor children of the deceased. A lot of preparation was required to ensure that the minor children would be qualified by the Court to testify. A verdict was returned for the plaintiff, and it has been said that this was the highest jury verdict returned in Chester County for the wrongful death of a black man at that time.

(e)   Crystal J. Harmon, Committee for Benjamin Joseph Harmon, an Incompetent v. Aegis Corporation, Long Mill Rubber Company and Ryder Truck Rental Company, U.S. District Court, Greenville Division, Complaint filed August 1, 1985. The plaintiff, Benjamin J. Harmon, age 21, suffered a totally and permanently disabling brain injury on July 14, 1983, when the automobile he was driving was struck by the defendant who had disregarded a traffic control device. I began representing the plaintiff shortly after his accident, and successfully negotiated an agreement that the carrier would pay for immediate medical care. This was medically significant because it is essential that a brain-injured person receive extensive rehabilitation immediately after the injury to maximize potential improvement. During my representation, I traveled rather extensively and learned that there are not many facilities in the United States which can adequately care for the head injured. A jury was drawn for trial, however, approximately one week before the trial was scheduled to begin, the case was settled in 1986. It was a significant case in that it was the largest settlement I ever obtained and required more preparation than any other legal matter I ever handled."

The following is Judge Short's account of five civil appeals he has personally handled:
"(a)   Walter Neal and Industrial Chemical Company, Inc. v. J. Simpson Darby, L.H. Schwieterman, John Archie Lucas, Donald B. Murray, Marion M. Thomas, and J.F. Martin as members of the Chester County Council and the County of Chester, 282 S.C. 277; 318 S.E.2d 18 (Ct. App. 1984).

(b)   Chester County Hospital and Nursing Center v. J.F. Martin, Simpson Darby, John Lucas, Marion M. Thomas, Don Murray, Carlisle Roddey, Lowell Schweiterman, individually and as members of the Chester County Council, and the Chester County Council, 281 S.C. 25; 314 S.E.2d 25 (Ct. App. 1984).

(c)   Thomas Beckham v. Sara Kay B. Short, 380 S.E.2d 826; 298 S.C. 348 (1989); 365 S.E.2d. 42; 294 S.C. 415 Ct. App. 1988).

(d)   Patricia Moore Lucas v. Ernest Wendell Lucas, S.C. Supreme Court; May 9., 1983; 302 S.E.2d. 863 (1983);

(e)   Willie Mack Thomas, Sr. and Naomi F. Thomas v. George Wilson, individually and d/b/a Palmetto Mobile Homes, S.C. Court of Appeals; March 9, 1984; Memorandum Opinion No. 84-MO-007."

Regarding criminal appeals he has personally handled, Judge Short reported: "I have been serving as a Circuit Court Judge since July 1991, and have not practiced law since that time. I handled a number of criminal cases, however, I do not recall any of the cases being appealed to the Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals. I do recall several criminal appeals from the Magistrate Court to the Circuit Court, but I do not recall the names of the individual Defendants at this time."

Judge Short reported that he has held the following judicial offices:
"(a)   July 1991-February 1999; S.C. Circuit Court At-Large Seat #8;
(b)   February 1999-Present; Resident Judge, Sixth Judicial Circuit."

Judge Short provided the following list of most significant orders:
"(a)   Louis J. Truesdale v. Parker D. Evatt, and the South Carolina Department of Corrections, et al. The subject of this Order deals with the reimbursement of expenses incurred by expert witnesses called upon by Petitioner Truesdale in his death penalty case. The Appeal of his case is reported at 301 S.C. 546, 393 S.E.2d 168 (1990).

(b)   State of South Carolina v. Gary Allen Rimert, 315 S.C. 527, 446 S.E.2d 400 (1994). The issue addressed in this Order is whether or not a jury in a criminal case is entitled to hear evidence regarding the sentence a Defendant may receive if he is found guilty but mentally ill. I held that the jury's function was to determine guilt and that information about sentencing is irrelevant to such a determination. The Supreme Court affirmed.

(c)   Carol Ann Berkebile v. William C. Outen, 311 S.C. 50 and 426 S.E.2d 760 (1993). This Order holds that losses from video poker playing are not recoverable pursuant to Section 32-1-10, S.C. Code Ann. I held that Section 32-1-10 removed the common law bar to recovery of losses from engaging in illegal gambling. Therefore, if the loss resulted from legal gambling, Section 21-1-10 does not apply and a Plaintiff cannot recover. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court disagreed and I was reversed.

(d)   City of Folly Beach v. Atlantic House Properties, Opinion No. 24384, 321 S.C. 241, 467 S.E.2d 928 (1996). In this matter, I ordered that the defendants in a condemnation action pay the plaintiff's reasonable attorneys fee pursuant to Section 28-2-510 S.C. Code Ann. Supreme Court reversed.

(e)   Betty Williams, et al. v. The Zoning Board of Adjustment of the City of Rock Hill and New Hope Carolina, Inc. This Order affirms the City of Rock Hill Zoning Commission's issuance of a permit to New Hope Carolina allowing it to operate an institution to care for emotionally handicapped children."
(9)   Judicial Temperament:

The Commission believes that Judge Short's temperament has been and would continue to be excellent.
(10)   Miscellaneous:

The Piedmont Citizens Advisory Committee did not submit a report of its findings on this candidate to the Commission during the screening process.

Judge Short is married to Linda Huffstetler Short. He has two children: Lindy Lee Short Blanks, age 32; and Melanie Lynne Short Edwards, age 28.

Judge Short reported that he was a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
"(a)   Chester County Bar Association;
(b)   South Carolina Bar Association;
(c)   South Carolina Association of Circuit Court Judges, Past President, 2000-2001;
(d)   American Bar Association."

Judge Short provided that he was a member of the following civic, charitable, education, social, or fraternal organizations:
"(a)   Purity Presbyterian Church: Elder;
(b)   Sertoma International, Life Member;
(c)   Chester Shrine Club;
(d)   Chester Masonic Lodge;
(e)   American Legion;
(f)   Chester Men's Golf Association;
(g)   Phi Delta Phi."

Judge Short further reported:
"While I was practicing law, I had the pleasure to serve and to gain valuable experience on the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline."

The Commission found Judge Short to be of excellent judicial temperament. His control of the courtroom--in civil as well as criminal matter--is a model for other judges. His current service as a judge was preceded by a very successful career as a trial lawyer.

W. Jeffrey Young
Family Court for the Third Judicial Circuit, Seat 2

Commission's Findings:   QUALIFIED AND NOMINATED
(1)   Constitutional Qualifications:

Based on the Commission's investigation, Mr. Young meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as a Family Court judge.

Mr. Young was born on August 2, 1955. He is 47 years old and a resident of Sumter, South Carolina. Mr. Young provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1985.
(2)   Ethical Fitness:

The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Mr. Young.

Mr. Young demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.

Mr. Young reported that he has not made any campaign expenditures.

Mr. Young testified he has not:
(a)   sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)   sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)   asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.

Mr. Young testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
(3)   Professional and Academic Ability:

The Commission found Mr. Young to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.

Mr. Young described his continuing legal or judicial education during the past five years as follows:
"December 6, 2002   S.C. Family Court Bench/Bar;
December 20, 2002   20/20 An Optional View of 2002;
January 9, 2002     Sexual Harassment;
February 26, 2001     Redistricting Training Session;
August 2, 2001     SCTLA Annual Convention;
August 3, 2001     SCTLA Annual Convention;
November 29, 2000   Government Ethics;
August 5, 1999     SCTLA Annual Convention;
May 21, 1998     Family Court Judges Conference (Speaker);
December 11, 1998   S.C. Bar Expert Witness Cross Examination;
December 12, 1998   Ethics of Profession Responsibility Issues;
November 25, 1997   Internet and the Law;
December 5, 1997     Family Law Bench/Bar Update;
December 12, 1997   S.C. Bar Masters in Trial."

Mr. Young reported that he has taught the following law-related courses:
"(a)   USC-Sumter, 1988-1996, Business Law Adjunct Faculty;
(b)   Central Carolina Technical College, 1987-1992, Paralegal Instructor."

Mr. Young reported that he has not published any books and/or articles.
(4)   Character:

The Commission's investigation of Mr. Young did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against him. The Commission's investigation of Mr. Young did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Mr. Young has handled his financial affairs responsibly.

The Commission also noted that Mr. Young was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.

A complaint was filed with the Commission alleging misconduct by Mr. Young in his capacity as an attorney. The complainant, the husband, was a party to an action in which Mr. Young represented the opposing party, the wife, and the action involved issues of child support and custody/visitation arising out of the parties' divorce. The complainant alleged that Mr. Young intentionally misrepresented to the Court the amount of child support the complainant owed and failed to treat him in the manner due a member of the Bar. The Commission examined the complaint as well as heard testimony concerning these allegations. The Commission found no evidence of misconduct by Mr. Young and that the complaint was groundless.
(5)   Reputation:

Mr. Young reported that his Martindale-Hubbell rating is "BV."

Mr. Young provided the following account of his military service: "USAF-Active Duty, October 1977-September 1982, Honorable Discharge; USAF-Reserve, September 1982-Present, currently assigned to USCENTAF Contracting Office at Shaw AFB, S.C. Previous reserve assignment at National Security Agency, Fort Meade, MD. Current Rank: Lt. Colonel."

Mr. Young reported that he was elected to the South Carolina House of Representatives and served from 1994 until 1998 and from 2000 until 2002.
(6)   Physical Health:

Mr. Young appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7)   Mental Stability:

Mr. Young appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8)   Experience:

Mr. Young was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1985.

Mr. Young provided the following account of his legal experience since graduation from law school:
"Kenneth R. Young, Sumter, S.C., May 1985-June 1986, General Practice;

Young & Young, P.A., Sumter, S.C., June 1986-December 1990, General Practice;

Young, Young & Reiter, P.A., Sumter, S.C., January 1991-December 1997, General Practice;

W. Jeffrey Young, P.A., Sumter, S.C., January 1998-Present, General Practice with primary emphasis in Family Law."

Mr. Young reported the frequency of his court appearances during the last five years as follows:
"(a)   Federal:   1%;
(b)   State:     99%."

Mr. Young reported that the percentage of his practice involving civil, criminal, and domestic matters during the last five years as follows:
"(a)   Civil:     20%;
(b)   Criminal:   10%;
(c)   Domestic:   70%."

Mr. Young reported the percentage of his practice in trial court during the last five years as follows:
"(a)   Jury:     5%;
(b)   Non-jury:   95%."

Mr. Young provided that he most often served as sole counsel.

The following is Mr. Young's account of his five most significant litigated matters:
"(a)   Hemming v. Hemming, 1998-DR-43-1630. This case involved virtually all aspects of divorce litigation. Divorce, highly contested custody, psychological experts, equitable division and attorney fees. This case was tried over a 3-day period. Subsequent contempt actions were also required for enforcement of the order issued by the court.

(b)   Tiffault v. Tiffault, 1987-DR-43-1630. This case concerned separation, equitable distribution and support. This case is the landmark case of equitable division of military retirement in South Carolina.

(c)   Telford v. Schwab, et al., 2001-DR-43-2020. This case involved a surrogate mother's pregnancy that involved the implantation of the Plaintiff's (biological parents) zygote into the surrogate mother. This was the first case in South Carolina where an original birth certificate was issued, to the biological parents, without the birth mother's name being shown on the birth certificate.

(d)   Godfrey v. Green, 2000-DR-43-250. This was significant because it involved custody, visitation, support and out-of-state moving by the mother during the litigation. The parents of the child were never married, which added a variant to the situation.

(e)   Ursula Draper v. Draper. This was significant because it involved the issue of grandparent visitation, while the father of the child was away on military duty."

Mr. Young reported the following civil appeal he has personally handled:
"(a)   Tiffault v. Tiffault, 303 S.C. 391, 401 S.E.2d 157 (1991). This case is the landmark case of equitable division of military retirement in South Carolina."

Regarding unsuccessful candidacies, Mr. Young reported: "In 1998, I was defeated in my re-election bid for S.C. House Seat #67. In 2000, I ran again and was elected for my third term in the S.C. House of Representatives."
(9)   Judicial Temperament:

The Commission believes that Mr. Young's temperament would be excellent.
(10)   Miscellaneous:

The Pee Dee Citizens Advisory Committee reported: "Mr. Young is a well-respected member of the Bar and the Sumter community. He has a suitable judicial temperament as he is willing to listen to all parties on an issue and is not afraid to make a decision quickly, if necessary." The Committee found "Mr. Young to be of excellent temperament and good moral character, and that he exceeds the evaluative criteria established by the Commission." The Pee Dee Citizens Advisory Committee found Mr. Young "qualified for election to a Family Court judgeship."

Mr. Young is married to Sharon Steele Young. He has four children: Elizabeth R. Young, age 17; William R. Young, age 8; Robert S. Young, age 6; and Greyson S. Young, age 4.

Mr. Young reported that he was a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
"(a)   Sumter County Bar Association;
(b)   South Carolina Trial Lawyers Association;
(c)   South Carolina Bar."

Mr. Young provided that he was a member of the following civic, charitable, education, social, or fraternal organizations:
"(a)   Sumter Sunrise Rotary;
(b)   Sumter Sertoma-Past President;
(c)   Sumter Citadel Club - Past President;
(d)   Air Force Association;
(e)   Camellia Ball;
(f)   Aglaian Dance Club-Past President;
(g)   American Legion Post #15;
(h)   Sumter Chamber of Commerce-Governmental Affairs Committee;
(i)   Salvation Army Boys Club Board of Advisors;
(j)   First Presbyterian Church, Sumter, S.C. Clerk of Session."

Mr. Young further provided:
"As an Air Force officer, I have deployed to the Middle East on four occasions, including Operation Enduring Freedom. I have been awarded two Air Force Commendation Medals. In 1989, I was selected as a member of the Rotary Group Study Exchange to Norway where I concentrated on Norwegian law study."

The Commission noted that Mr. Young's quick intellect concerning family law issues as well as his personable demeanor would make him well-suited for the family court bench. The Commission commented on his substantial experience in the practice of family law. The Commission found Mr. Young eminently qualified for nomination as a Family Court judge.

CONCLUSION

The following candidates were found qualified and nominated:
Mary E. Buchan           Court of Appeals, Seat 3
John C. Hayes III     Court of Appeals, Seat 3
John W. Kittredge     Court of Appeals, Seat 3
W. Jeffrey Young       .....................................     Family Court for the Third

    Judicial Circuit, Seat 2

Respectfully submitted:

Members of the Judicial Merit Selection Commission
Senator Glenn F. McConnell, Chairman
Representative F.G. Delleney, Jr., Vice Chairman
Richard S. Fisher, Esquire
John P. Freeman, Esquire
Mrs. Amy Johnson McLester
Senator Thomas L. Moore
Senator James H. Ritchie, Jr.
Judge Curtis G. Shaw
Representative Doug Smith
Representative Fletcher N. Smith, Jr.

ADJOURNMENT

At 11:15 A.M., on motion of Senator SETZLER, the Senate adjourned to meet Tuesday, May 13, 2003, at 11:00 A.M.

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