CHAPTER 9

Commercial Code—Secured Transactions

Editor’s Note

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LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES

Testing the reach of UCC Article 9: The question of tax credit collateral in secured transactions. Christopher K. Odinet, 64 S.C. L. Rev. 143 (Autumn 2012).

Part 1

General Provisions

Subpart 1

Short Title, Definitions, and General Concepts

**SECTION 36‑9‑101.** Short title.

This chapter may be cited as “Uniform Commercial Code‑Secured Transactions”.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑101; 1966 (54) 2716; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12; 2013 Act No. 96, Section 1, eff July 1, 2013.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. This Article supersedes former Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Article 9. As did its predecessor, it provides a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of security interests in personal property and fixtures. For the most part this Article follows the general approach and retains much of the terminology of former Article 9. In addition to describing many aspects of the operation and interpretation of this Article, these Comments explain the material changes that this Article makes to former Article 9. Former Article 9 superseded the wide variety of pre‑UCC security devices. Unlike the Comments to former Article 9, however, these Comments dwell very little on the pre‑UCC state of the law. For that reason, the Comments to former Article 9 will remain of substantial historical value and interest. They also will remain useful in understanding the background and general conceptual approach of this Article.

Citations to the “Bankruptcy Code” in these Comments are to Title 11 of the United States Code as in effect on July 1, 2010.

2. Background and History. In 1990, the Permanent Editorial Board for the UCC with the support of its sponsors, The American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, established a committee to study Article 9 of the UCC. The study committee issued its report as of December 1, 1992, recommending the creation of a drafting committee for the revision of Article 9 and also recommending numerous specific changes to Article 9. Organized in 1993, a drafting committee met fifteen times from 1993 to 1998. This Article was approved by its sponsors in 1998. This Article was conformed to revised Article 1 in 2001 and to amendment to Article 7 in 2003. The sponsors approved amendments to selected section of this Article in 2010.

3. Reorganization and Renumbering; Captions; Style. This Article reflects a substantial reorganization of former Article 9 and renumbering of most sections. New Part 4 deals with several aspects of third‑party rights and duties that are unrelated to perfection and priority. Some of these were covered by Part 3 of former Article 9. Part 5 deals with filing (covered by former Part 4) and Part 6 deals with default and enforcement (covered by former Part 5). Appendix I contains conforming revisions to other articles of the UCC, and Appendix II contains model provisions for production‑money priority.

This Article also includes headings for the subsections as an aid to readers. Unlike Section captions, which are part of the UCC, see Section 1‑107, subsection headings are not a part of the official text itself and have not been approved by the sponsors. Each jurisdiction in which this Article is introduced may consider whether to adopt the headings as a part of the statute and whether to adopt a provision clarifying the effect, if any, to be given to the headings. This Article also has been conformed to current style conventions.

4. Summary of Revisions. Following is a brief summary of some of the more significant revisions of Article 9 that are included in the 1998 revision of this Article.

a. Scope of Article 9. This Article expands the scope of Article 9 in several respects.

Deposit accounts. Section 9‑109 includes within this Article’s scope deposit accounts as original collateral, except in consumer transactions. Former Article 9 dealt with deposit accounts only as proceeds of other collateral.

Sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes. Section 9‑109 also includes within the scope of this Article most sales of “payment intangibles” (defined in Section 9‑102 as general intangibles under which an account debtor’s principal obligation is monetary) and “promissory notes” (also defined in Section 9‑102). Former Article 9 included sales of accounts and chattel paper, but not sales of payment intangibles or promissory notes. In its inclusion of sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes, this Article continues the drafting convention found in former Article 9; it provides that the sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes creates a “security interest.” The definition of “account” in Section 9‑102 also has been expanded to include various rights to payment that were general intangibles under former Article 9.

Health‑care‑insurance receivables. Section 9‑109 narrows Article 9’s exclusion of transfers of interests in insurance policies by carving out of the exclusion “health‑care‑insurance receivables” (defined in Section 9‑102). A health‑care‑insurance receivable is included within the definition of “account” in Section 9‑102.

Nonpossessory statutory agricultural liens. Section 9‑109 also brings nonpossessory statutory agricultural liens within the scope of Article 9.

Consignments. Section 9‑109 provides that “true” consignments‑ bailments for the purpose of sale by the bailee‑are security interests covered by Article 9, with certain exceptions. See Section 9‑102 (defining “consignment”). Currently, many consignments are subject to Article 9’s filing requirements by operation of former Section 2‑326.

Supporting obligations and property securing rights to payment. This Article also addresses explicitly (i) obligations, such as guaranties and letters of credit, that support payment or performance of collateral such as accounts, chattel paper, and payment intangibles, and (ii) any property ( including real property) that secures a right to payment or performance that is subject to an Article 9 security interest. See Sections 9‑203, 9‑308.

Commercial tort claims. Section 9‑109 expands the scope of Article 9 to include the assignment of commercial tort claims by narrowing the exclusion of tort claims generally. However, this Article continues to exclude tort claims for bodily injury and other nonbusiness tort claims of a natural person. See Section 9‑102 (defining “commercial tort claim”).

Transfers by States and governmental units of States. Section 9‑109 narrows the exclusion of transfers by States and their governmental units. It excludes only transfers covered by another statute (other than a statute generally applicable to security interests) to the extent the statute governs the creation, perfection, priority, or enforcement of security interests.

Nonassignable general intangibles, promissory notes, health‑care‑ insurance receivables, and letter‑of‑credit rights. This Article enables a security interest to attach to letter‑of‑credit rights, health‑care‑insurance receivables, promissory notes, and general intangibles, including contracts, permits, licenses, and franchises, notwithstanding a contractual or statutory prohibition against or limitation on assignment. This Article explicitly protects third parties against any adverse effect of the creation or attempted enforcement of the security interest. See Sections 9‑408, 9‑409.

Subject to Sections 9‑408 and 9‑409 and two other exceptions (Sections 9‑406, concerning accounts, chattel paper, and payment intangibles, and 9‑407, concerning interests in leased goods), Section 9‑401 establishes a baseline rule that the inclusion of transactions and collateral within the scope of Article 9 has no effect on non‑Article 9 law dealing with the alienability or inalienability of property. For example, if a commercial tort claim is nonassignable under other applicable law, the fact that a security interest in the claim is within the scope of Article 9 does not override the other applicable law’s effective prohibition of assignment.

b. Duties of Secured Party. This Article provides for expanded duties of secured parties.

Release of control. Section 9‑208 imposes upon a secured party having control of a deposit account, investment property, or a letter‑of‑credit right the duty to release control when there is no secured obligation and no commitment to give value. Section 9‑209 contains analogous provisions when an account debtor has been notified to pay a secured party.

Information. Section 9‑210 expands a secured party’s duties to provide the debtor with information concerning collateral and the obligations that it secures.

Default and enforcement. Part 6 also includes some additional duties of secured parties in connection with default and enforcement. See, e.g., Section 9‑616 (duty to explain calculation of deficiency or surplus in a consumer‑goods transaction).

c. Choice of Law. The choice‑of‑law rules for the law governing perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and priority are found in Part 3, Subpart 1 (Sections 9‑301 through 9‑307). See also Section 9‑316.

Where to file: Location of debtor. This Article changes the choice‑of‑law rule governing perfection (i.e., where to file) for most collateral to the law of the jurisdiction where the debtor is located. See Section 9‑301. Under former Article 9, the jurisdiction of the debtor’s location governed only perfection and priority of a security interest in accounts, general intangibles, mobile goods, and, for purposes of perfection by filing, chattel paper and investment property.

Determining debtor’s location. As a baseline rule, Section 9‑307 follows former Section 9‑103, under which the location of the debtor is the debtor’s place of business (or chief executive office, if the debtor has more than one place of business). Section 9‑307 contains three major exceptions. First, a “registered organization,” such as a corporation or limited liability company, is located in the State under whose law the debtor is organized, e.g., a corporate debtor’s State of incorporation. Second, an individual debtor is located at his or her principal residence. Third, there are special rules for determining the location of the United States and registered organizations organized under the law of the United States.

Location of non‑U.S. debtors. If, applying the foregoing rules, a debtor is located in a jurisdiction whose law does not require public notice as a condition of perfection of a nonpossessory security interest, the entity is deemed located in the District of Columbia. See Section 9‑307. Thus, to the extent that this Article applies to non‑U.S. debtors, perfection could be accomplished in many cases by a domestic filing.

Priority. For tangible collateral such as goods and instruments, Section 9‑301 provides that the law applicable to priority and the effect of perfection or nonperfection will remain the law of the jurisdiction where the collateral is located, as under former Section 9‑103 (but without the confusing “last event” test). For intangible collateral, such as accounts, the applicable law for priority will be that of the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located.

Possessory security interests; agricultural liens. Perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and priority of a possessory security interest or an agricultural lien are governed by the law of the jurisdiction where the collateral subject to the security interest or lien is located. See Sections 9‑301, 9‑302.

Goods covered by certificates of title; deposit accounts; letter‑of‑credit rights; investment property. This Article includes several refinements to the treatment of choice‑of‑law matters for goods covered by certificates of title. See Section 9‑303. It also provides special choice‑of‑law rules, similar to those for investment property under current Articles 8 and 9, for deposit accounts (Section 9‑304), investment property (Section 9‑305), and letter‑of‑credit rights (Section 9‑306).

Change in applicable law. Section 9‑316 addresses perfection following a change in applicable law.

d. Perfection. The rules governing perfection of security interests and agricultural liens are found in Part 3, Subpart 2 (Sections 9‑308 through 9‑316).

Deposit accounts; letter‑of‑credit rights. With certain exceptions, this Article provides that a security interest in a deposit account or a letter‑of‑credit right may be perfected only by the secured party’s acquiring “control” of the deposit account or letter‑of‑credit right. See Sections 9‑312, 9‑314. Under Section 9‑104, a secured party has “control” of a deposit account when, with the consent of the debtor, the secured party obtains the depositary bank’s agreement to act on the secured party’s instructions (including when the secured party becomes the account holder) or when the secured party is itself the depositary bank. The control requirements are patterned on Section 8‑106, which specifies the requirements for control of investment property. Under Section 9‑107, “control” of a letter‑of‑credit right occurs when the issuer or nominated person consents to an assignment of proceeds under Section 5‑114.

Electronic chattel paper. Section 9‑102 includes a new defined term: “electronic chattel paper.” Electronic chattel paper is a record or records consisting of information stored in an electronic medium (i.e., it is not written). Perfection of a security interest in electronic chattel paper may be by control or filing. See Sections 9‑105 (sui generis definition of control of electronic chattel paper), 9‑312 (perfection by filing), 9‑314 (perfection by control).

Investment property. The perfection requirements for “investment property” (defined in Section 9‑102), including perfection by control under Section 9‑106, remain substantially unchanged. However, a new provision in Section 9‑314 is designed to ensure that a secured party retains control in “repledge” transactions that are typical in the securities markets.

Instruments, agricultural liens, and commercial tort claims. This Article expands the types of collateral in which a security interest may be perfected by filing to include instruments. See Section 9‑312. Agricultural liens and security interests in commercial tort claims also are perfected by filing, under this Article. See Sections 9‑308, 9‑310.

Sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes. Although former Article 9 covered the outright sale of accounts and chattel paper, sales of most other types of receivables also are financing transactions to which Article 9 should apply. Accordingly, Section 9‑102 expands the definition of “account” to include many types of receivables (including “health‑care‑insurance receivables,” defined in Section 9‑102) that former Article 9 classified as “general intangibles.” It thereby subjects to Article 9’s filing system sales of more types of receivables than did former Article 9. Certain sales of payment intangibles‑ primarily bank loan participation transactions‑should not be subject to the Article 9 filing rules. These transactions fall in a residual category of collateral, “payment intangibles” (general intangibles under which the account debtor’s principal obligation is monetary), the sale of which is exempt from the filing requirements of Article 9. See Sections 9‑102, 9‑109, 9‑309 (perfection upon attachment). The perfection rules for sales of promissory notes are the same as those for sales of payment intangibles.

Possessory security interests. Several provisions of this Article address aspects of security interests involving a secured party or a third party who is in possession of the collateral. In particular, Section 9‑313 resolves a number of uncertainties under former Section 9‑305. It provides that a security interest in collateral in the possession of a third party is perfected when the third party acknowledges in an authenticated record that it holds for the secured party’s benefit. Section 9‑313 also provides that a third party need not so acknowledge and that its acknowledgment does not impose any duties on it, unless it otherwise agrees. A special rule in Section 9‑313 provides that if a secured party already is in possession of collateral, its security interest remains perfected by possession if it delivers the collateral to a third party and the collateral is accompanied by instructions to hold it for the secured party or to redeliver it to the secured party. Section 9‑313 also clarifies the limited circumstances under which a security interest in goods covered by a certificate of title may be perfected by the secured party’s taking possession.

Automatic perfection. Section 9‑309 lists various types of security interests as to which no public‑notice step is required for perfection (e.g., purchase‑money security interests in consumer goods other than automobiles). This automatic perfection also extends to a transfer of a health‑care‑insurance receivable to a health‑care provider. Those transfers normally will be made by natural persons who receive health‑care services; there is little value in requiring filing for perfection in that context. Automatic perfection also applies to security interests created by sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes. Section 9‑308 provides that a perfected security interest in collateral supported by a “supporting obligation” (such as an account supported by a guaranty) also is a perfected security interest in the supporting obligation, and that a perfected security interest in an obligation secured by a security interest or lien on property (e.g., a real‑property mortgage) also is a perfected security interest in the security interest or lien.

e. Priority; Special Rules for Banks and Deposit Accounts. The rules governing priority of security interests and agricultural liens are found in Part 3, Subpart 3 (Sections 9‑317 through 9‑342). This Article includes several new priority rules and some special rules relating to banks and deposit accounts (Sections 9‑340 through 9‑342).

Purchase‑money security interests: General; consumer‑goods transactions; inventory. Section 9‑103 substantially rewrites the definition of purchase‑ money security interest (PMSI) (although the term is not formally “defined”). The substantive changes, however, apply only to non‑consumer‑goods transactions. (Consumer transactions and consumer‑goods transactions are discussed below in Comment 4.j.) For non‑consumer‑goods transactions, Section 9‑103 makes clear that a security interest in collateral may be (to some extent) both a PMSI as well as a non‑PMSI, in accord with the “dual status” rule applied by some courts under former Article 9 (thereby rejecting the “transformation” rule). The definition provides an even broader conception of a PMSI in inventory, yielding a result that accords with private agreements entered into in response to the uncertainty under former Article 9. It also treats consignments as purchase‑money security interests in inventory. Section 9‑324 revises the PMSI priority rules, but for the most part without material change in substance. Section 9‑324 also clarifies the priority rules for competing PMSIs in the same collateral.

Purchase‑money security interests in livestock; agricultural liens. Section 9‑324 provides a special PMSI priority, similar to the inventory PMSI priority rule, for livestock. Section 9‑322 (which contains the baseline first‑to‑file‑or‑perfect priority rule) also recognizes special non‑Article 9 priority rules for agricultural liens, which can override the baseline first‑in‑time rule.

Purchase‑money security interests in software. Section 9‑324 contains a new priority rule for a software purchase‑money security interest. (Section 9‑102 includes a definition of “software.”) Under Section 9‑103, a software PMSI includes a PMSI in software that is used in goods that are also subject to a PMSI. (Note also that the definition of “chattel paper” has been expanded to include records that evidence a monetary obligation and a security interest in specific goods and software used in the goods.)

Investment property. The priority rules for investment property are substantially similar to the priority rules found in former Section 9‑115, which was added in conjunction with the 1994 revisions to UCC Article 8. Under Section 9‑328, if a secured party has control of investment property ( Sections 8‑106, 9‑106), its security interest is senior to a security interest perfected in another manner (e.g., by filing). Also under Section 9‑328, security interests perfected by control generally rank according to the time that control is obtained or, in the case of a security entitlement or a commodity contract carried in a commodity account, the time when the control arrangement is entered into. This is a change from former Section 9‑115, under which the security interests ranked equally. However, as between a securities intermediary’s security interest in a security entitlement that it maintains for the debtor and a security interest held by another secured party, the securities intermediary’s security interest is senior.

Deposit accounts. This Article’s priority rules applicable to deposit accounts are found in Section 9‑327. They are patterned on and are similar to those for investment property in former Section 9‑115 and Section 9‑328 of this Article. Under Section 9‑327, if a secured party has control of a deposit account, its security interest is senior to a security interest perfected in another manner (i.e., as cash proceeds). Also under Section 9‑327, security interests perfected by control rank according to the time that control is obtained, but as between a depositary bank’s security interest and one held by another secured party, the depositary bank’s security interest is senior. A corresponding rule in Section 9‑340 makes a depositary bank’s right of set‑off generally senior to a security interest held by another secured party. However, if the other secured party becomes the depositary bank’s customer with respect to the deposit account, then its security interest is senior to the depositary bank’s security interest and right of set‑off. Sections 9‑327, 9‑340.

Letter‑of‑credit rights. The priority rules for security interests in letter‑of‑credit rights are found in Section 9‑329. They are somewhat analogous to those for deposit accounts. A security interest perfected by control has priority over one perfected in another manner (i.e., as a supporting obligation for the collateral in which a security interest is perfected). Security interests in a letter‑of‑credit right perfected by control rank according to the time that control is obtained. However, the rights of a transferee beneficiary or a nominated person are independent and superior to the extent provided in Section 5‑114. See Section 9‑109(c)(4).

Chattel paper and instruments. Section 9‑330 is the successor to former Section 9‑308. As under former Section 9‑308, differing priority rules apply to purchasers of chattel paper who give new value and take possession (or, in the case of electronic chattel paper, obtain control) of the collateral depending on whether a conflicting security interest in the collateral is claimed merely as proceeds. The principal change relates to the role of knowledge and the effect of an indication of a previous assignment of the collateral. Section 9‑330 also affords priority to purchasers of instruments who take possession in good faith and without knowledge that the purchase violates the rights of the competing secured party. In addition, to qualify for priority, purchasers of chattel paper, but not of instruments, must purchase in the ordinary course of business.

Proceeds. Section 9‑322 contains new priority rules that clarify when a special priority of a security interest in collateral continues or does not continue with respect to proceeds of the collateral. Other refinements to the priority rules for proceeds are included in Sections 9‑324 (purchase‑money security interest priority) and 9‑330 (priority of certain purchasers of chattel paper and instruments).

Miscellaneous priority provisions. This Article also includes (i) clarifications of selected good‑faith‑purchase and similar issues (Sections 9‑317, 9‑331); (ii) new priority rules to deal with the “double debtor” problem arising when a debtor creates a security interest in collateral acquired by the debtor subject to a security interest created by another person (Section 9‑325); (iii) new priority rules to deal with the problems created when a change in corporate structure or the like results in a new entity that has become bound by the original debtor’s after‑acquired property agreement (Section 9‑326); (iv) a provision enabling most transferees of funds from a deposit account or money to take free of a security interest (Section 9‑332); (v) substantially rewritten and refined priority rules dealing with accessions and commingled goods (Sections 9‑335, 9‑336); (vi) revised priority rules for security interests in goods covered by a certificate of title (Section 9‑337); and (vii) provisions designed to ensure that security interests in deposit accounts will not extend to most transferees of funds on deposit or payees from deposit accounts and will not otherwise “clog” the payments system (Sections 9‑341, 9‑342).

Model provisions relating to production‑money security interests. Appendix II to this Article contains model definitions and priority rules relating to “production‑money security interests” held by secured parties who give new value used in the production of crops. Because no consensus emerged on the wisdom of these provisions during the drafting process, the sponsors make no recommendation on whether these model provisions should be enacted.

f. Proceeds. Section 9‑102 contains an expanded definition of “proceeds” of collateral which includes additional rights and property that arise out of collateral, such as distributions on account of collateral and claims arising out of the loss or nonconformity of, defects in, or damage to collateral. The term also includes collections on account of “supporting obligations,” such as guarantees.

g. Part 4: Additional Provisions Relating to Third‑Party Rights. New Part 4 contains several provisions relating to the relationships between certain third parties and the parties to secured transactions. It contains new Sections 9‑401 (replacing former Section 9‑311) (alienability of debtor’s rights), 9‑402 (replacing former Section 9‑317) (secured party not obligated on debtor’s contracts), 9‑403 (replacing former Section 9‑206) (agreement not to assert defenses against assignee), 9‑404, 9‑405, and 9‑406 (replacing former Section 9‑318) (rights acquired by assignee, modification of assigned contract, discharge of account debtor, restrictions on assignment of account, chattel paper, promissory note, or payment intangible ineffective), 9‑407 (replacing some provisions of former Section 2A‑303) (restrictions on creation or enforcement of security interest in leasehold interest or lessor’ s residual interest ineffective). It also contains new Sections 9‑408 (restrictions on assignment of promissory notes, health‑care‑insurance receivables ineffective, and certain general intangibles ineffective) and 9‑409 (restrictions on assignment of letter‑of‑credit rights ineffective), which are discussed above.

h. Filing. Part 5 (formerly Part 4) of Article 9 has been substantially rewritten to simplify the statutory text and to deal with numerous problems of interpretation and implementation that have arisen over the years.

Medium‑neutrality. This Article is “medium‑neutral”; that is, it makes clear that parties may file and otherwise communicate with a filing office by means of records communicated and stored in media other than on paper.

Identity of person who files a record; authorization. Part 5 is largely indifferent as to the person who effects a filing. Instead, it addresses whose authorization is necessary for a person to file a record with a filing office. The filing scheme does not contemplate that the identity of a “filer” will be a part of the searchable records. This approach is consistent with, and a necessary aspect of, eliminating signatures or other evidence of authorization from the system (except to the extent that filing offices may choose to employ authentication procedures in connection with electronic communications). As long as the appropriate person authorizes the filing, or, in the case of a termination statement, the debtor is entitled to the termination, it is largely insignificant whether the secured party or another person files any given record.

Section 9‑509 collects in one place most of the rules that determine when a record may be filed. In general, the debtor’s authorization is required for the filing of an initial financing statement or an amendment that adds collateral. With one further exception, a secured party of record’s authorization is required for the filing of other amendments. The exception arises if a secured party has failed to provide a termination statement that is required because there is no outstanding secured obligation or commitment to give value. In that situation, a debtor is authorized to file a termination statement indicating that it has been filed by the debtor.

Financing statement formal requisites. The formal requisites for a financing statement are set out in Section 9‑502. A financing statement must provide the name of the debtor and the secured party and an indication of the collateral that it covers. Sections 9‑503 and 9‑506 address the sufficiency of a name provided on a financing statement and clarify when a debtor’s name is correct and when an incorrect name is insufficient. Section 9‑504 addresses the indication of collateral covered. Under Section 9‑504, a super‑generic description (e.g., “all assets” or “all personal property”) in a financing statement is a sufficient indication of the collateral. (Note, however, that a super‑generic description is inadequate for purposes of a security agreement. See Sections 9‑108, 9‑203.) To facilitate electronic filing, this Article does not require that the debtor’s signature or other authorization appear on a financing statement. Instead, it prohibits the filing of unauthorized financing statements and imposes liability upon those who violate the prohibition. See Sections 9‑509, 9‑626.

Filing‑office operations. Part 5 contains several provisions governing filing operations. First, it prohibits the filing office from rejecting an initial financing statement or other record for a reason other than one of the few that are specified. See Sections 9‑520, 9‑516. Second, the filing office is obliged to link all subsequent records (e.g., assignments, continuation statements, etc.) to the initial financing statement to which they relate. See Section 9‑519. Third, the filing office may delete a financing statement and related records from the files no earlier than one year after lapse (lapse normally is five years after the filing date), and then only if a continuation statement has not been filed. See Sections 9‑515, 9‑519, 9‑522. Thus, a financing statement and related records would be discovered by a search of the files even after the filing of a termination statement. This approach helps eliminate filing‑office discretion and also eases problems associated with multiple secured parties and multiple partial assignments. Fourth, Part 5 mandates performance standards for filing offices. See Sections 9‑519, 9‑520, 9‑523. Fifth, it provides for the promulgation of filing‑office rules to deal with details best left out of the statute and requires the filing office to submit periodic reports. See Sections 9‑526, 9‑527.

Defaulting or missing secured parties and fraudulent filings: Defaulting or missing secured parties and fraudulent filings. In some areas of the country, serious problems have arisen from fraudulent financing statements that are filed against public officials and other persons. This Article addresses the fraud problem by providing the opportunity for a debtor to file a termination statement when a secured party wrongfully refuses or fails to provide a termination statement. See Section 9‑509. This opportunity also addresses the problem of secured parties that simply disappear through mergers or liquidations. In addition, Section 9‑518 affords a statutory method by which a debtor who believes that a filed record is inaccurate or was wrongfully filed may indicate that fact in the files, albeit without affecting the efficacy, if any, of the challenged record.

Extended period of effectiveness for certain financing statements. Section 9‑515 contains an exception to the usual rule that financing statements are effective for five years unless a continuation statement is filed to continue the effectiveness for another five years. Under that Section, an initial financing statement filed in connection with a “public‑finance transaction” or a “manufactured‑home transaction” (terms defined in Section 9‑102) is effective for 30 years.

National form of financing statement and related forms. Section 9‑521 provides for uniform, national written forms of financing statements and related written records that must be accepted by a filing office that accepts written records.

i. Default and Enforcement. Part 6 of Article 9 extensively revises former Part 5. Provisions relating to enforcement of consumer‑goods transactions and consumer transactions are discussed in Comment 4.j.

Debtor, secondary obligor; waiver. Section 9‑602 clarifies the identity of persons who have rights and persons to whom a secured party owes specified duties under Part 6. Under that Section, the rights and duties are enjoyed by and run to the “debtor,” defined in Section 9‑102 to mean any person with a non‑lien property interest in collateral, and to any “obligor.” However, with one exception (Section 9‑616, as it relates to a consumer obligor), the rights and duties concerned affect non‑debtor obligors only if they are “secondary obligors.” “Secondary obligor” is defined in Section 9‑102 to include one who is secondarily obligated on the secured obligation, e.g., a guarantor, or one who has a right of recourse against the debtor or another obligor with respect to an obligation secured by collateral. However, under Section 9‑628, the secured party is relieved from any duty or liability to any person unless the secured party knows that the person is a debtor or obligor. Resolving an issue on which courts disagreed under former Article 9, this Article generally prohibits waiver by a secondary obligor of its rights and a secured party’s duties under Part 6. See Section 9‑602. However, Section 9‑624 permits a secondary obligor or debtor to waive the right to notification of disposition of collateral and, in a non‑consumer transaction, the right to redeem collateral, if the secondary obligor or debtor agrees to do so after default.

Rights of collection and enforcement of collateral. Section 9‑607 explains in greater detail than former 9‑502 the rights of a secured party who seeks to collect or enforce collateral, including accounts, chattel paper, and payment intangibles. It also sets forth the enforcement rights of a depositary bank holding a security interest in a deposit account maintained with the depositary bank. Section 9‑607 relates solely to the rights of a secured party vis‑a‑vis a debtor with respect to collections and enforcement. It does not affect the rights or duties of third parties, such as account debtors on collateral, which are addressed elsewhere (e.g., Section 9‑406). Section 9‑608 clarifies the manner in which proceeds of collection or enforcement are to be applied.

Disposition of collateral: Warranties of title. Section 9‑610 imposes on a secured party who disposes of collateral the warranties of title, quiet possession, and the like that are otherwise applicable under other law. It also provides rules for the exclusion or modification of those warranties.

Disposition of collateral: Notification, application of proceeds, surplus and deficiency, other effects. Section 9‑611 requires a secured party to give notification of a disposition of collateral to other secured parties and lienholders who have filed financing statements against the debtor covering the collateral. (That duty was eliminated by the 1972 revisions to Article 9.) However, that Section relieves the secured party from that duty when the secured party undertakes a search of the records and a report of the results is unreasonably delayed. Section 9‑613, which applies only to non‑consumer transactions, specifies the contents of a sufficient notification of disposition and provides that a notification sent 10 days or more before the earliest time for disposition is sent within a reasonable time. Section 9‑615 addresses the application of proceeds of disposition, the entitlement of a debtor to any surplus, and the liability of an obligor for any deficiency. Section 9‑619 clarifies the effects of a disposition by a secured party, including the rights of transferees of the collateral.

Rights and duties of secondary obligor. Section 9‑618 provides that a secondary obligor obtains the rights and assumes the duties of a secured party if the secondary obligor receives an assignment of a secured obligation, agrees to assume the secured party’s rights and duties upon a transfer to it of collateral, or becomes subrogated to the rights of the secured party with respect to the collateral. The assumption, transfer, or subrogation is not a disposition of collateral under Section 9‑610, but it does relieve the former secured party of further duties. Former Section 9‑504(5) did not address whether a secured party was relieved of its duties in this situation.

Transfer of record or legal title. Section 9‑619 contains a new provision making clear that a transfer of record or legal title to a secured party is not of itself a disposition under Part 6. This rule applies regardless of the circumstances under which the transfer of title occurs.

Strict foreclosure. Section 9‑620, unlike former Section 9‑505, permits a secured party to accept collateral in partial satisfaction, as well as full satisfaction, of the obligations secured. This right of strict foreclosure extends to intangible as well as tangible property. Section 9‑622 clarifies the effects of an acceptance of collateral on the rights of junior claimants. It rejects the approach taken by some courts‑deeming a secured party to have constructively retained collateral in satisfaction of the secured obligations‑in the case of a secured party’s unreasonable delay in the disposition of collateral. Instead, unreasonable delay is relevant when determining whether a disposition under Section 9‑610 is commercially reasonable.

Effect of noncompliance: “Rebuttable presumption” test. Section 9‑626 adopts the “rebuttable presumption” test for the failure of a secured party to proceed in accordance with certain provisions of Part 6. (As discussed in Comment 4.j., the test does not necessarily apply to consumer transactions.) Under this approach, the deficiency claim of a noncomplying secured party is calculated by crediting the obligor with the greater of the actual net proceeds of a disposition and the amount of net proceeds that would have been realized if the disposition had been conducted in accordance with Part 6 (e.g., in a commercially reasonable manner). For non‑consumer transactions, Section 9‑626 rejects the “absolute bar” test that some courts have imposed; that approach bars a noncomplying secured party from recovering any deficiency, regardless of the loss (if any) the debtor suffered as a consequence of the noncompliance.

“Low‑price” dispositions: Calculation of deficiency and surplus. Section 9‑615(f) addresses the problem of procedurally regular dispositions that fetch a low price. Subsection (f) provides a special method for calculating a deficiency if the proceeds of a disposition of collateral to a secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor are “ significantly below the range of proceeds that a complying disposition to a person other than the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor would have brought.” (“Person related to” is defined in Section 9‑102.) In these situations there is reason to suspect that there may be inadequate incentives to obtain a better price. Consequently, instead of calculating a deficiency (or surplus) based on the actual net proceeds, the deficiency (or surplus) would be calculated based on the proceeds that would have been received in a disposition to a person other than the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor.

j. Consumer Goods, Consumer‑Goods Transactions, and Consumer Transactions. This Article (including the accompanying conforming revisions (see Appendix I) ) includes several special rules for “consumer goods,” “consumer transactions,” and “consumer‑goods transactions.” Each term is defined in Section 9‑102.

(i) Revised Sections 2‑502 and 2‑716 provide a buyer of consumer goods with enhanced rights to possession of the goods, thereby accelerating the opportunity to achieve “buyer in ordinary course of business” status under Section 1‑201.

(ii) Section 9‑103(e) (allocation of payments for determining extent of purchase‑money status), (f) (purchase‑money status not affected by cross‑collateralization, refinancing, restructuring, or the like), and (g) (secured party has burden of establishing extent of purchase‑money status) do not apply to consumer‑goods transactions. Sections 9‑103 also provides that the limitation of those provisions to transactions other than consumer‑goods transactions leaves to the courts the proper rules for consumer‑goods transactions and prohibits the courts from drawing inferences from that limitation.

(iii) Section 9‑108 provides that in a consumer transaction a description of consumer goods, a security entitlement, securities account, or commodity account “only by [UCC‑defined] type of collateral” is not a sufficient collateral description in a security agreement.

(iv) Sections 9‑403 and 9‑404 make effective the Federal Trade Commission’s anti‑holder‑in‑due‑course rule (when applicable), 16 C.F.R. Part 433, even in the absence of the required legend.

(v) The 10‑day safe‑harbor for notification of a disposition provided by Section 9‑612 does not apply in a consumer transaction.

(vi) Section 9‑613 (contents and form of notice of disposition) does not apply to a consumer‑goods transaction.

(vii) Section 9‑614 contains special requirements for the contents of a notification of disposition and a safe‑harbor, “plain English” form of notification, for consumer‑goods transactions.

(viii) Section 9‑616 requires a secured party in a consumer‑goods transaction to provide a debtor with a notification of how it calculated a deficiency at the time it first undertakes to collect a deficiency.

(ix) Section 9‑620 prohibits partial strict foreclosure with respect to consumer goods collateral and, unless the debtor agrees to waive the requirement in an authenticated record after default, in certain cases requires the secured party to dispose of consumer goods collateral which has been repossessed.

(x) Section 9‑626 (“rebuttable presumption” rule) does not apply to a consumer transaction. Section 9‑626 also provides that its limitation to transactions other than consumer transactions leaves to the courts the proper rules for consumer transactions and prohibits the courts from drawing inferences from that limitation.

k. Good Faith. Section 9‑102 contains a new definition of “good faith” that includes not only “honesty in fact” but also “the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.” The definition is similar to the ones adopted in connection with other, recently completed revisions of the UCC.

l. Transition Provisions. Part 7 (Sections 9‑701 through 9‑707) contains transition provisions. Transition from former Article 9 to this Article will be particularly challenging in view of its expanded scope, its modification of choice‑of‑law rules for perfection and priority, and its expansion of the methods of perfection.

m. Conforming and Related Amendments to Other UCC Articles. Appendix I contains several proposed revisions to the provisions and Comments of other UCC articles. For the most part the revisions are explained in the Comments to the proposed revisions. Cross‑references in other UCC articles to Sections of Article 9 also have been revised.

ARTICLE 1. Revised Section 1‑201 contains revisions to the definitions of “buyer in ordinary course of business,” “purchaser,” and “security interest.”

Articles 2 and 2A. Sections 2‑210, 2‑326, 2‑502, 2‑716, 2A‑303, and 2A‑307 have been revised to address the intersection between Articles 2 and 2A and Article 9.

ARTICLE 5. New Section 5‑118 is patterned on Section 4‑210. It provides for a security interest in documents presented under a letter of credit in favor of the issuer and a nominated person on the letter of credit.

ARTICLE 8. Revisions to Section 8‑106, which deals with “control” of securities and security entitlements, conform it to Section 8‑302, which deals with “delivery.” Revisions to Section 8‑110, which deals with a “securities intermediary’s jurisdiction,” conform it to the revised treatment of a “commodity intermediary’s jurisdiction” in Section 9‑305. Sections 8‑301 and 8‑302 have been revised for clarification. Section 8‑510 has been revised to conform it to the revised priority rules of Section 9‑328. Several Comments in ARTICLE 8 also have been revised.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

The South Carolina Reporters Notes to Article 9 do not attempt to explain the substantive provisions of the statute or the changes effected by adopting 1999 Official Text. The Official Comment perform those functions. Rather, the South Carolina Reporters Notes address the effect of the 1999 Official Text upon South Carolina case law interpreted under former Article 9 and upon statutes other than the Uniform Commercial Code. See, e.g. Section 36‑9‑109, Note 2 addressing agricultural liens. In addition, the South Carolina Reporters Notes address Article 9 provisions enacted in South Carolina that are not consistent with the 1999 Official Text. See, e.g., Sections 36‑9‑109 and 36‑9‑317 addressing landlords’ liens.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Encyclopedias

S.C. Jur. Cooperative Credit Unions Section 139, South Carolina Uniform Commercial Code.

Forms

Am. Jur. Pl. & Pr. Forms Uniform Commercial Code Section 9:1 , Introductory Comments.

South Carolina Legal and Business Forms Section 9:1 , Legal Principles.

**SECTION 36‑9‑102.** Definitions and index of definitions.

(a) In this chapter:

(1) “Accession” means goods that are physically united with other goods in such a manner that the identity of the original goods is not lost.

(2) “Account” except as used in “account for”, means a right to payment of a monetary obligation, whether or not earned by performance, (i) for property that has been or is to be sold, leased, licensed, assigned, or otherwise disposed of, (ii) for services rendered or to be rendered, (iii) for a policy of insurance issued or to be issued, (iv) for a secondary obligation incurred or to be incurred, (v) for energy provided or to be provided, (vi) for the use or hire of a vessel under a charter or other contract, (vii) arising out of the use of a credit or charge card or information contained on or for use with the card, or (viii) as winnings in a lottery or other game of chance operated or sponsored by a State, governmental unit of a State, or person licensed or authorized to operate the game by a State or governmental unit of a State. The term includes health care insurance receivables. The term does not include (i) rights to payment evidenced by chattel paper or an instrument, (ii) commercial tort claims, (iii) deposit accounts, (iv) investment property, (v) letter‑of‑credit rights or letters of credit, or (vi) rights to payment for money or funds advanced or sold, other than rights arising out of the use of a credit or charge card or information contained on or for use with the card.

(3) “Account debtor” means a person obligated on an account, chattel paper, or general intangible. The term does not include persons obligated to pay a negotiable instrument, even if the instrument constitutes part of chattel paper.

(4) “Accounting”, except as used in “accounting for”, means a record:

(A) authenticated by a secured party;

(B) indicating the aggregate unpaid secured obligations as of a date not more than thirty‑five days earlier or thirty‑five days later than the date of the record; and

(C) identifying the components of the obligations in reasonable detail.

(5) “Agricultural lien” means an interest, other than a security interest, in farm products:

(A) which secures payment or performance of an obligation for:

(i) goods or services furnished in connection with a debtor’s farming operation; or

(ii) rent on real property leased by a debtor in connection with its farming operation;

(B) which is created by statute in favor of a person that:

(i) in the ordinary course of its business furnished goods or services to a debtor in connection with a debtor’s farming operation; or

(ii) leased real property to a debtor in connection with the debtor’s farming operation; and

(C) whose effectiveness does not depend on the person’s possession of the personal property.

(6) “As‑extracted collateral” means:

(A) oil, gas, or other minerals that are subject to a security interest that:

(i) is created by a debtor having an interest in the minerals before extraction; and

(ii) attaches to the minerals as extracted; or

(B) accounts arising out of the sale at the wellhead or minehead of oil, gas, or other minerals in which the debtor had an interest before extraction.

(7) “Authenticate” means:

(A) to sign; or

(B) with present intent to adopt or accept a record, to attach to or logically associate with the record an electronic sound, symbol, or process.

(8) “Bank” means an organization that is engaged in the business of banking. The term includes savings banks, savings and loan associations, credit unions, and trust companies.

(9) “Cash proceeds” means proceeds that are money, checks, deposit accounts, or the like.

(10) “Certificate of title” means a certificate of title with respect to which a statute provides for the security interest in question to be indicated on the certificate as a condition or result of the security interest’s obtaining priority over the rights of a lien creditor with respect to the collateral. The term includes another record maintained as an alternative to a certificate of title by the governmental unit that issues certificates of title if a statute permits the security interest in question to be indicated on the record as a condition or result of the security interest’s obtaining priority over the rights of a lien creditor with respect to the collateral.

(11) “Chattel paper” means a record or records that evidence both a monetary obligation and a security interest in specific goods, a security interest in specific goods and software used in the goods, a security interest in specific goods and license of software used in the goods, a lease of specific goods, or a lease of specific goods and license of software used in the goods. In this item, “monetary obligation” means a monetary obligation secured by the goods or owed under a lease of the goods and includes a monetary obligation with respect to software used in the goods.

The term does not include:

(A) charters or other contracts involving the use of hire of a vessel; or

(B) records that evidence a right to payment arising out of the use of a credit or charge card or information contained on or for use with the card.

If a transaction is evidenced by records that include an instrument or series of instruments, the group of records taken together constitutes chattel paper.

(12) “Collateral” means the property subject to a security interest or agricultural lien. The term includes:

(A) proceeds to which a security interest attaches;

(B) accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes that have been sold; and

(C) goods that are the subject of a consignment.

(13) “Commercial tort claim” means a claim arising in tort with respect to which:

(A) the claimant is an organization; or

(B) the claimant is an individual and the claim:

(i) arose in the course of the claimant’s business or profession; and

(ii) does not include damages arising out of personal injury to or the death of an individual.

(14) “Commodity account” means an account maintained by a commodity intermediary in which a commodity contract is carried for a commodity customer.

(15) “Commodity contract” means a commodity futures contract, an option on a commodity futures contract, a commodity option, or another contract if the contract or option is:

(A) traded on or subject to the rules of a board of trade that has been designated as a contract market for such a contract pursuant to federal commodities laws; or

(B) traded on a foreign commodity board of trade, exchange, or market, and is carried on the books of a commodity intermediary for a commodity customer.

(16) “Commodity customer” means a person for which a commodity intermediary carries a commodity contract on its books.

(17) “Commodity intermediary” means a person that:

(A) is registered as a futures commission merchant under federal commodities law; or

(B) in the ordinary course of its business provides clearance or settlement services for a board of trade that has been designated as a contract market pursuant to federal commodities law.

(18) “Communicate” means:

(A) to send a written or other tangible record;

(B) to transmit a record by any means agreed upon by the persons sending and receiving the record; or

(C) in the case of transmission of a record to or by a filing office, to transmit a record by any means prescribed by filing‑office rule.

(19) “Consignee” means a merchant to which goods are delivered in a consignment.

(20) “Consignment” means a transaction, regardless of its form, in which a person delivers goods to a merchant for the purpose of sale and:

(A) the merchant:

(i) deals in goods of that kind under a name other than the name of the person making delivery;

(ii) is not an auctioneer; and

(iii) is not generally known by its creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the goods of others;

(B) with respect to each delivery, the aggregate value of the goods is one thousand dollars or more at the time of delivery;

(C) the goods are not consumer goods immediately before delivery; and

(D) the transaction does not create a security interest that secures an obligation.

(21) “Consignor” means a person that delivers goods to a consignee in a consignment.

(22) “Consumer debtor” means a debtor in a consumer transaction.

(23) “Consumer goods” means goods that are used or bought for use primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.

(24) “Consumer‑goods transaction” means a consumer transaction in which:

(A) an individual incurs an obligation primarily for personal, family, or household purposes; and

(B) a security interest in consumer goods secures the obligation.

(25) “Consumer obligor” means an obligor who is an individual and who incurred the obligation as part of a transaction entered into primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.

(26) “Consumer transaction” means a transaction in which (i) an individual incurs an obligation primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, (ii) a security interest secures the obligation, and (iii) the collateral is held or acquired primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. The term includes consumer‑goods transactions.

(27) “Continuation statement” means an amendment of a financing statement which:

(A) identifies, by its file number, the initial financing statement to which it relates; and

(B) indicates that it is a continuation statement for, or that it is filed to continue the effectiveness of, the identified financing statement.

(28) “Debtor” means:

(A) a person having an interest, other than a security interest or other lien, in the collateral, whether or not the person is an obligor;

(B) a seller of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes; or

(C) a consignee.

(29) “Deposit account” means a demand, time, savings, passbook, or similar account maintained with a bank. The term does not include investment property or accounts evidenced by an instrument.

(30) “Document” means a document of title or a receipt of the type described in Section 36‑7‑201(b).

(31) “Electronic chattel paper” means chattel paper evidenced by a record or records consisting of information stored in an electronic medium.

(32) “Encumbrance” means a right, other than an ownership interest, in real property. The term includes mortgages and other liens on real property.

(33) “Equipment” means goods other than inventory, farm products, or consumer goods.

(34) “Farm products” means goods, other than standing timber, with respect to which the debtor is engaged in a farming operation and which are:

(A) crops grown, growing, or to be grown, including:

(i) crops produced on trees, vines, and bushes; and

(ii) aquatic goods produced in aquacultural operations;

(B) livestock, born or unborn, including aquatic goods produced in aquacultural operations;

(C) supplies used or produced in a farming operation; or

(D) products of crops or livestock in their unmanufactured states.

(35) “Farming operation” means raising, cultivating, propagating, fattening, grazing, or any other farming, livestock, or aquacultural operation.

(36) “File number” means the number assigned to an initial financing statement pursuant to Section 36‑9‑519(a).

(37) “Filing office” means an office designated in Section 36‑9‑501 as the place to file a financing statement.

(38) “Filing‑office rule” means a rule adopted pursuant to Section 36‑9‑526.

(39) “Financing statement” means a record or records composed of an initial financing statement and any filed record relating to the initial financing statement.

(40) “Fixture filing” means the filing of a financing statement covering goods that are or are to become fixtures and satisfying Section 36‑9‑502(a) and (b). The term includes the filing of a financing statement covering goods of a transmitting utility which are or are to become fixtures.

(41) “Fixtures” means goods that have become so related to particular real property that an interest in them arises under real property law.

(42) “General intangible” means any personal property, including things in action, other than accounts, chattel paper, commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, documents, goods, instruments, investment property, letter‑of‑credit rights, letters of credit, money, and oil, gas, or other minerals before extraction. The term includes payment intangibles and software.

(43) [Reserved].

(44) “Goods” means all things that are movable when a security interest attaches. The term includes (i) fixtures, (ii) standing timber that is to be cut and removed under a conveyance or contract for sale, (iii) the unborn young of animals, (iv) crops grown, growing, or to be grown, even if the crops are produced on trees, vines, or bushes, and (v) manufactured homes. The term also includes a computer program embedded in goods and any supporting information provided in connection with a transaction relating to the program if (i) the program is associated with the goods in such a manner that it customarily is considered part of the goods, or (ii) by becoming the owner of the goods, a person acquires a right to use the program in connection with the goods. The term does not include a computer program embedded in goods that consist solely of the medium in which the program is embedded. The term also does not include accounts, chattel paper, commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, documents, general intangibles, instruments, investment property, letter‑of‑credit rights, letters of credit, money, or oil, gas, or other minerals before extraction.

(45) “Governmental unit” means a subdivision, agency, department, county, parish, municipality, or other unit of the government of the United States, a State, or a foreign country. The term includes an organization having a separate corporate existence if the organization is eligible to issue debt on which interest is exempt from income taxation under the laws of the United States.

(46) “Health care insurance receivable” means an interest in or claim under a policy of insurance which is a right to payment of a monetary obligation for health care goods or services provided.

(47) “Instrument” means a negotiable instrument or any other writing that evidences a right to the payment of a monetary obligation, is not itself a security agreement or lease, and is of a type that in ordinary course of business is transferred by delivery with any necessary endorsement or assignment. The term does not include (i) investment property, (ii) letters of credit, or (iii) writings that evidence a right to payment arising out of the use of a credit or charge card or information contained on or for use with the card.

(48) “Inventory” means goods, other than farm products, which:

(A) are leased by a person as lessor;

(B) are held by a person for sale or lease or to be furnished under a contract of service;

(C) are furnished by a person under a contract of service; or

(D) consist of raw materials, work in process, or materials used or consumed in a business.

(49) “Investment property” means a security, whether certificated or uncertificated, security entitlement, securities account, commodity contract, or commodity account.

(50) “Jurisdiction of organization”, with respect to a registered organization, means the jurisdiction under whose law the organization is organized.

(51) “Letter‑of‑credit right” means a right to payment or performance under a letter of credit, whether or not the beneficiary has demanded or is at the time entitled to demand payment or performance. The term does not include the right of a beneficiary to demand payment or performance under a letter of credit.

(52) “Lien creditor” means:

(A) a creditor that has acquired a lien on the property involved by attachment, levy, or the like;

(B) an assignee for benefit of creditors from the time of assignment;

(C) a trustee in bankruptcy from the date of the filing of the petition; or

(D) a receiver in equity from the time of appointment.

(53) “Manufactured home” means a structure, transportable in one or more sections which, in the traveling mode, is eight body feet or more in width or forty body feet or more in length, or, when erected on site, is three hundred twenty or more square feet, and which is built on a permanent chassis and designed to be used as a dwelling with or without a permanent foundation when connected to the required utilities, and includes plumbing, heating, air‑conditioning, and electrical systems contained therein. The term includes any structure that meets all of the requirements of this item except the size requirements and with respect to which the manufacturer voluntarily files a certification required by the United States Secretary of Housing and Urban Development and complies with the standards established under Title 42 of the United States Code.

(54) “Manufactured‑home transaction” means a secured transaction:

(A) that creates a purchase‑money security interest in a manufactured home, other than a manufactured home held as inventory; or

(B) in which a manufactured home, other than a manufactured home held as inventory, is the primary collateral.

(55) “Mortgage” means a consensual interest in real property, including fixtures, which secures payment or performance of an obligation.

(56) “New debtor” means a person that becomes bound as debtor under Section 36‑9‑203(d) by a security agreement previously entered into by another person.

(57) “New value” means (i) money, (ii) money’s worth in property, services, or new credit, or (iii) release by a transferee of an interest in property previously transferred to the transferee. The term does not include an obligation substituted for another obligation.

(58) “Noncash proceeds” means proceeds other than cash proceeds.

(59) “Obligor” means a person that, with respect to an obligation secured by a security interest in or an agricultural lien on the collateral, (i) owes payment or other performance of the obligation, (ii) has provided property other than the collateral to secure payment or other performance of the obligation, or (iii) is otherwise accountable in whole or in part for payment or other performance of the obligation. The term does not include issuers or nominated persons under a letter of credit.

(60) “Original debtor”, except at used in Section 36‑9‑310(c), means a person that, as debtor, entered into a security agreement to which a new debtor has become bound under Section 36‑9‑203(d).

(61) “Payment intangible” means a general intangible under which the account debtor’s principal obligation is a monetary obligation.

(62) “Person related to”, with respect to an individual, means:

(A) the spouse of the individual;

(B) a brother, brother‑in‑law, sister, or sister‑in‑law of the individual;

(C) an ancestor or lineal descendant of the individual or the individual’s spouse; or

(D) any other relative, by blood or marriage, of the individual or the individual’s spouse who shares the same home with the individual.

(63) “Person related to”, with respect to an organization, means:

(A) a person directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under common control with the organization;

(B) an officer or director of, or a person performing similar functions with respect to, the organization;

(C) an officer or director of, or a person performing similar functions with respect to, a person described in subitem (A);

(D) the spouse of an individual described in subitem (A), (B), or (C); or

(E) an individual who is related by blood or marriage to an individual described in subitem (A), (B), (C), or (D) and shares the same home with the individual.

(64) “Proceeds”, except as used in Section 36‑9‑609(b), means the following property:

(A) whatever is acquired upon the sale, lease, license, exchange, or other disposition of collateral;

(B) whatever is collected on, or distributed on account of, collateral;

(C) rights arising out of collateral;

(D) to the extent of the value of collateral, claims arising out of the loss, nonconformity, or interference with the use of, defects or infringement of rights in, or damage to, the collateral; or

(E) to the extent of the value of collateral and to the extent payable to the debtor or the secured party, insurance payable by reason of the loss or nonconformity of, defects or infringement of rights in, or damage to, the collateral.

(65) “Promissory note” means an instrument that evidences a promise to pay a monetary obligation, does not evidence an order to pay, and does not contain an acknowledgment by a bank that the bank has received for deposit a sum of money or funds.

(66) “Proposal” means a record authenticated by a secured party which includes the terms on which the secured party is willing to accept collateral in full or partial satisfaction of the obligation it secures pursuant to Sections 36‑9‑620, 36‑9‑621, and 36‑9‑622.

(67) “Public‑finance transaction” means a secured transaction in connection with which:

(A) debt securities are issued;

(B) all or a portion of the securities issued have an initial stated maturity of at least twenty years; and

(C) the debtor, obligor, secured party, account debtor or other person obligated on collateral, assignor or assignee of a secured obligation, or assignor or assignee of a security interest is a State or a governmental unit of a State.

(68) “Public organic record” means a record that is available to the public for inspection and is:

(A) a record consisting of the record initially filed with or issued by a State or the United States to form or organize an organization and any record filed with or issued by the State or the United States which amends or restates the initial record;

(B) an organic record of a business trust consisting of the record initially filed with a State and any record filed with the State which amends or restates the initial record, if a statute of the State governing business trusts requires that the record be filed with the State; or

(C) a record consisting of legislation enacted by the legislature of a State or the Congress of the United States which forms or organizes an organization, any record amending the legislation, and any record filed with or issued by the State or the United States which amends or restates the name of the organization.

(69) “Pursuant to commitment”, with respect to an advance made or other value given by a secured party, means pursuant to the secured party’s obligation, whether or not a subsequent event of default or other event not within the secured party’s control has relieved or may relieve the secured party from its obligation.

(70) “Record”, except as used in “for record”, “of record”, “record or legal title”, and “record owner”, means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or which is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.

(71) “Registered organization” means an organization formed or organized solely under the law of a single State or the United States by the filing of a public organic record with, the issuance of a public organic record by, or the enactment of legislation by the State or the United States. The term includes a business trust that is formed or organized under the law of a single State if a statute of the State governing business trusts requires that the business trust’s organic record be filed with the State.

(72) “Secondary obligor” means an obligor to the extent that the:

(A) obligor’s obligation is secondary; or

(B) obligor has a right of recourse with respect to an obligation secured by collateral against the debtor, another obligor, or property of either.

(73) “Secured party” means a:

(A) person in whose favor a security interest is created or provided for under a security agreement, whether or not any obligation to be secured is outstanding;

(B) person that holds an agricultural lien;

(C) consignor;

(D) person to which accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes have been sold;

(E) trustee, indenture trustee, agent, collateral agent, or other representative in whose favor a security interest or agricultural lien is created or provided for; or

(F) person that holds a security interest arising under Section 36‑2‑401, 36‑2‑505, 36‑2‑711 (3), 36‑2A‑508(5), 36‑4‑210, or 36‑5‑118.

(74) “Security agreement” means an agreement that creates or provides for a security interest.

(75) “Send”, in connection with a record or notification, means to:

(A) deposit in the mail, deliver for transmission, or transmit by any other usual means of communication, with postage or cost of transmission provided for, addressed to any address reasonable under the circumstances; or

(B) cause the record or notification to be received within the time that it would have been received if properly sent under subitem (A).

(76) “Software” means a computer program and any supporting information provided in connection with a transaction relating to the program. The term does not include a computer program that is included in the definition of goods.

(77) “State” means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

(78) “Supporting obligation” means a letter‑of‑credit right or secondary obligation that supports the payment or performance of an account, chattel paper, a document, a general intangible, an instrument, or investment property.

(79) “Tangible chattel paper” means chattel paper evidenced by a record or records consisting of information that is inscribed on a tangible medium.

(80) “Termination statement” means an amendment of a financing statement which:

(A) identifies, by its file number, the initial financing statement to which it relates; and

(B) indicates either that it is a termination statement or that the identified financing statement is no longer effective.

(81) “Transmitting utility” means a person primarily engaged in the business of:

(A) operating a railroad, subway, street railway, or trolley bus;

(B) transmitting communications electrically, electromagnetically, or by light;

(C) transmitting goods by pipeline or sewer; or

(D) transmitting or producing and transmitting electricity, steam, gas, or water.

(b) “Control” as provided in Section 36‑7‑106 and the following definitions in other chapters apply to this chapter:

“Applicant” Section 36‑5‑102.

“Beneficiary” Section 36‑5‑102.

“Broker” Section 36‑8‑102.

“Certificated security” Section 36‑8‑102.

“Check” Section 36‑3‑104.

“Clearing corporation” Section 36‑8‑102.

“Contract for sale” Section 36‑2‑106.

“Customer” Section 36‑4‑104.

“Entitlement holder” Section 36‑8‑102.

“Financial asset” Section 36‑8‑102.

“Holder in due course” Section 36‑3‑302.

“Issuer” (with respect to a letter of credit or letter‑of‑credit right) Section 36‑5‑102.

“Issuer” (with respect to a security) Section 36‑8‑201.

“Issuer” (with respect to documents of title) Section 36‑7‑102.

“Lease” Section 36‑2A‑103.

“Lease agreement” Section 36‑2A‑103.

“Lease contract” Section 36‑2A‑103.

“Leasehold interest” Section 36‑2A‑103.

“Lessee” Section 36‑2A‑103.

“Lessee in ordinary course of business” Section 36‑2A‑103.

“Lessor” Section 36‑2A‑103.

“Lessor’s residual interest” Section 36‑2A‑103.

“Letter of credit” Section 36‑5‑102.

“Merchant” Section 36‑2‑104.

“Negotiable instrument” Section 36‑3‑104.

“Nominated person” Section 36‑5‑102.

“Note” Section 36‑3‑104.

“Proceeds of a letter of credit” Section 36‑5‑114.

“Sale” Section 36‑2‑106.

“Securities account” Section 36‑8‑501.

“Securities intermediary” Section 36‑8‑102.

“Security” Section 36‑8‑102.

“Security certificate” Section 36‑8‑102.

“Security entitlement” Section 36‑8‑102.

“Uncertificated security” Section 36‑8‑102.

(c) In this chapter:

(1) “Lease” means a transfer of the right to possession and use of goods for a period in return for consideration. The term includes a sublease unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. The term does include a sale, including a sale on approval or a sale or return, or retention or creation of a security interest.

(2) “Lease agreement” means the bargain, with respect to the lease, of the lessor and the lessee in fact as found in their language or by implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance. Unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, the term includes a sublease agreement.

(3) “Lease contract” means the total legal obligation that results from the lease agreement and applicable rules of law. Unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, the term includes a sublease contract.

(4) “Lessor interest” means the interest of the lessor or the lessee under a lease contract.

(5) “Lessee” means a person who acquires the right to possession and use of goods under a lease. Unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, the term includes a sublessee.

(6) “Lessee in ordinary course of business” means a person that leases goods in good faith, without knowledge that the lease violates the rights of another person, and in the ordinary course from a person, other than a pawn broker, in the business of selling or leasing goods of that kind. A person leases in ordinary course if the lease to the person comports with the usual or customary practices in the kind of business in which the lessor is engaged or with the lessor’s own usual or customary practices. A lessee in the ordinary course of business may lease for cash, by exchange of other property, or on security or unsecured credit, and may acquire goods or documents of title under a preexisting contract. Only a lessee that takes possession of the goods or has a right to recover the goods from the lessor may be a lessee in the ordinary course of business. A person that acquires goods in a transfer in bulk or has security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a money debt is not a lessee in the ordinary course of business.

(7) “Lessor” means the person who transfers the right to possession and use of goods under a lease. Unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, the term includes sublessor.

(8) “Lessor’s residual interest” means the lessor’s interest in the goods after expiration, termination, or cancellation of the lease contract.

(9) “Applicant” means a person at whose request or for whose account a letter of credit is issued. The term includes a person who requests an issuer to issue a letter of credit on behalf of another if the person making the request undertakes an obligation to reimburse the issuer.

(10) “Nominated person” means a person whom the issuer (i) designates or authorizes to pay, accept, negotiate, or otherwise give value under a letter of credit and (ii) undertakes by agreement or custom and practice to reimburse.

(11) “Proceeds of a letter of credit” means the cash, check accepted draft, or other item of value paid or delivered upon honor or giving of value by the issuer or any nominated person under the letter of credit. The term does not include a beneficiary’s drawing rights or documents presented by the beneficiary.

(12) “Prove” with respect to a fact means to meet the burden of establishing the fact (Section 36‑1‑201(8)).

(d) Chapter 1 contains general definitions and principles of construction and interpretation applicable throughout this chapter.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑102; 1966 (54) 2716; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12; 2013 Act No. 96, Section 2, eff July 1, 2013; 2014 Act No. 213 (S.343), Sections 33, 34, eff October 1, 2014.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. All terms that are defined in Article 9 and used in more than one Section are consolidated in this Section. Note that the definition of “security interest” is found in Section 1‑201, not in this Article, and has been revised. See Appendix I. Many of the definitions in this Section are new; many others derive from those in former Section 9‑105. The following Comments also indicate other Sections of former Article 9 that defined (or explained) terms.

2. Parties to Secured Transactions.

a. “Debtor”; “Obligor”; “Secondary Obligor.” Determining whether a person was a “debtor” under former Section 9‑105(1)(d) required a close examination of the context in which the term was used. To reduce the need for this examination, this Article redefines “debtor” and adds new defined terms, “secondary obligor” and “obligor.” In the context of Part 6 (default and enforcement), these definitions distinguish among three classes of persons: (i) those persons who may have a stake in the proper enforcement of a security interest by virtue of their non‑lien property interest (typically, an ownership interest) in the collateral, (ii) those persons who may have a stake in the proper enforcement of the security interest because of their obligation to pay the secured debt, and (iii) those persons who have an obligation to pay the secured debt but have no stake in the proper enforcement of the security interest. Persons in the first class are debtors. Persons in the second class are secondary obligors if any portion of the obligation is secondary or if the obligor has a right of recourse against the debtor or another obligor with respect to an obligation secured by collateral. One must consult the law of suretyship to determine whether an obligation is secondary. The Restatement (3d), Suretyship and Guaranty ‘1 (1996), contains a useful explanation of the concept. Obligors in the third class are neither debtors nor secondary obligors. With one exception (Section 9‑616, as it relates to a consumer obligor), the rights and duties provided by Part 6 affect non‑debtor obligors only if they are “secondary obligors.”

By including in the definition of “debtor” all persons with a property interest (other than a security interest in or other lien on collateral), the definition includes transferees of collateral, whether or not the secured party knows of the transfer or the transferee’s identity. Exculpatory provisions in Part 6 protect the secured party in that circumstance. See Sections 9‑605 and 9‑628. The definition renders unnecessary former Section 9‑112, which governed situations in which collateral was not owned by the debtor. The definition also includes a “consignee,” as defined in this Section, as well as a seller of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes.

Secured parties and other lienholders are excluded from the definition of “ debtor” because the interests of those parties normally derive from and encumber a debtor’s interest. However, if in a separate secured transaction a secured party grants, as debtor, a security interest in its own interest (i.e., its security interest and any obligation that it secures), the secured party is a debtor in that transaction. This typically occurs when a secured party with a security interest in specific goods assigns chattel paper.

Consider the following examples:

Example 1: Behnfeldt borrows money and grants a security interest in her Miata to secure the debt. Behnfeldt is a debtor and an obligor.

Example 2: Behnfeldt borrows money and grants a security interest in her Miata to secure the debt. Bruno co‑signs a negotiable note as maker. As before, Behnfeldt is the debtor and an obligor. As an accommodation party (see Section 3‑419), Bruno is a secondary obligor. Bruno has this status even if the note states that her obligation is a primary obligation and that she waives all suretyship defenses.

Example 3: Behnfeldt borrows money on an unsecured basis. Bruno co‑signs the note and grants a security interest in her Honda to secure her obligation. Inasmuch as Behnfeldt does not have a property interest in the Honda, Behnfeldt is not a debtor. Having granted the security interest, Bruno is the debtor. Because Behnfeldt is a principal obligor, she is not a secondary obligor. Whatever the outcome of enforcement of the security interest against the Honda or Bruno’s secondary obligation, Bruno will look to Behnfeldt for her losses. The enforcement will not affect Behnfeldt’s aggregate obligations.

When the principal obligor (borrower) and the secondary obligor (surety) each has granted a security interest in different collateral, the status of each is determined by the collateral involved.

Example 4: Behnfeldt borrows money and grants a security interest in her Miata to secure the debt. Bruno co‑signs the note and grants a security interest in her Honda to secure her obligation. When the secured party enforces the security interest in Behnfeldt’s Miata, Behnfeldt is the debtor, and Bruno is a secondary obligor. When the secured party enforces the security interest in the Honda, Bruno is the “debtor.” As in Example 3, Behnfeldt is an obligor, but not a secondary obligor.

b. “Secured Party.” The secured party is the person in whose favor the security interest has been created, as determined by reference to the security agreement. This definition controls, among other things, which person has the duties and potential liability that Part 6 imposes upon a secured party. The definition of “secured party” also includes a “consignee,” a person to which accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes have been sold, and the holder of an agricultural lien.

The definition of “secured party” clarifies the status of various types of representatives. Consider, for example, a multi‑bank facility under which Bank A, Bank B, and Bank C are lenders and Bank A serves as the collateral agent. If the security interest is granted to the banks, then they are the secured parties. If the security interest is granted to Bank A as collateral agent, then Bank A is the secured party.

c. Other Parties. A “consumer obligor” is defined as the obligor in a consumer transaction. Definitions of “new debtor” and “original debtor” are used in the special rules found in Sections 9‑326 and 9‑508.

3. Definitions Relating to Creation of a Security Interest.

a. “Collateral.” As under former Section 9‑105, “ collateral” is the property subject to a security interest and includes accounts and chattel paper that have been sold. It has been expanded in this Article. The term now explicitly includes proceeds subject to a security interest. It also reflects the broadened scope of the Article. It includes property subject to an agricultural lien as well as payment intangibles and promissory notes that have been sold.

b. “Security Agreement.” The definition of “security agreement” is substantially the same as under former Section 9‑105‑an agreement that creates or provides for a security interest. However, the term frequently was used colloquially in former Article 9 to refer to the document or writing that contained a debtor’s security agreement. This Article eliminates that usage, reserving the term for the more precise meaning specified in the definition.

Whether an agreement creates a security interest depends not on whether the parties intend that the law characterize the transaction as a security interest but rather on whether the transaction falls within the definition of “security interest” in Section 1‑201. Thus, an agreement that the parties characterize as a “lease” of goods may be a “security agreement,” notwithstanding the parties’ stated intention that the law treat the transaction as a lease and not as a secured transaction.

4. Goods‑Related Definitions.

a. “Goods”; “Consumer Goods”; “Equipment”; “Farm Products”; “Farming Operation”; “Inventory.” The definition of “goods” is substantially the same as the definition in former Section 9‑105. This Article also retains the four mutually‑exclusive “types” of collateral that consist of goods: “consumer goods,” “equipment,” “farm products,” and “inventory.” The revisions are primarily for clarification.

The classes of goods are mutually exclusive. For example, the same property cannot simultaneously be both equipment and inventory. In borderline cases‑a physician’s car or a farmer’s truck that might be either consumer goods or equipment‑the principal use to which the property is put is determinative. Goods can fall into different classes at different times. For example, a radio may be inventory in the hands of a dealer and consumer goods in the hands of a consumer. As under former Article 9, goods are “equipment” if they do not fall into another category.

The definition of “consumer goods” follows former Section 9‑109. The classification turns on whether the debtor uses or bought the goods for use “primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.”

Goods are inventory if they are leased by a lessor or held by a person for sale or lease. The revised definition of “inventory” makes clear that the term includes goods leased by the debtor to others as well as goods held for lease. (The same result should have obtained under the former definition.) Goods to be furnished or furnished under a service contract, raw materials, and work in process also are inventory. Implicit in the definition is the criterion that the sales or leases are or will be in the ordinary course of business. For example, machinery used in manufacturing is equipment, not inventory, even though it is the policy of the debtor to sell machinery when it becomes obsolete or worn. Inventory also includes goods that are consumed in a business (e.g., fuel used in operations). In general, goods used in a business are equipment if they are fixed assets or have, as identifiable units, a relatively long period of use, but are inventory, even though not held for sale or lease, if they are used up or consumed in a short period of time in producing a product or providing a service.

Goods are “farm products” if the debtor is engaged in farming operations with respect to the goods. Animals in a herd of livestock are covered whether the debtor acquires them by purchase or as a result of natural increase. Products of crops or livestock remain farm products as long as they have not been subjected to a manufacturing process. The terms “crops” and “livestock” are not defined. The new definition of “farming operations” is for clarification only.

Crops, livestock, and their products cease to be “farm products” when the debtor ceases to be engaged in farming operations with respect to them. If, for example, they come into the possession of a marketing agency for sale or distribution or of a manufacturer or processor as raw materials, they become inventory. Products of crops or livestock, even though they remain in the possession of a person engaged in farming operations, lose their status as farm products if they are subjected to a manufacturing process. What is and what is not a manufacturing operation is not specified in this Article. At one end of the spectrum, some processes are so closely connected with farming‑such as pasteurizing milk or boiling sap to produce maple syrup or sugar‑that they would not constitute manufacturing. On the other hand an extensive canning operation would be manufacturing. Once farm products have been subjected to a manufacturing operation, they normally become inventory.

The revised definition of “farm products” clarifies the distinction between crops and standing timber and makes clear that aquatic goods produced in aquacultural operations may be either crops or livestock. Although aquatic goods that are vegetable in nature often would be crops and those that are animal would be livestock, this Article leaves the courts free to classify the goods on a case‑by‑case basis. See Section 9‑324, Comment 11.

b. “Accession”; “Manufactured Home”; “Manufactured‑Home Transaction.” Other specialized definitions of goods include “accession” (see the special priority and enforcement rules in Section 9‑335), and “manufactured home” (see Section 9‑515, permitting a financing statement in a “manufactured‑home transaction” to be effective for 30 years). The definition of “manufactured home” borrows from the federal Manufactured Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. ‘5401 et seq., and is intended to have the same meaning.

c. “As‑Extracted Collateral.” Under this Article, oil, gas, and other minerals that have not been extracted from the ground are treated as real property, to which this Article does not apply. Upon extraction, minerals become personal property (goods) and eligible to be collateral under this Article. See the definition of “goods,” which excludes “oil, gas, and other minerals before extraction.” To take account of financing practices reflecting the shift from real to personal property, this Article contains special rules for perfecting security interests in minerals which attach upon extraction and in accounts resulting from the sale of minerals at the wellhead or minehead. See, e.g., Sections 9‑301(4) (law governing perfection and priority); 9‑501 (place of filing), 9‑502 (contents of financing statement), 9‑519 (indexing of records). The new term, “as‑extracted collateral,” refers to the minerals and related accounts to which the special rules apply. The term “at the wellhead” encompasses arrangements based on a sale of the produce at the moment that it issues from the ground and is measured, without technical distinctions as to whether title passes at the “Christmas tree” of a well, the far side of a gathering tank, or at some other point. The term “at... the minehead” is comparable.

The following examples explain the operation of these provisions.

Example 5: Debtor owns an interest in oil that is to be extracted. To secure Debtor’s obligations to Lender, Debtor enters into an authenticated agreement granting Lender an interest in the oil. Although Lender may acquire an interest in the oil under real‑property law, Lender does not acquire a security interest under this Article until the oil becomes personal property, i.e., until is extracted and becomes “goods” to which this Article applies. Because Debtor had an interest in the oil before extraction and Lender’s security interest attached to the oil as extracted, the oil is “as‑extracted collateral.”

Example 6: Debtor owns an interest in oil that is to be extracted and contracts to sell the oil to Buyer at the wellhead. In an authenticated agreement, Debtor agrees to sell to Lender the right to payment from Buyer. This right to payment is an account that constitutes “as‑extracted collateral.” If Lender then resells the account to Financer, Financer acquires a security interest. However, inasmuch as the debtor‑seller in that transaction, Lender, had no interest in the oil before extraction, Financer’s collateral (the account it owns) is not “as‑extracted collateral. “

Example 7: Under the facts of Example 6, before extraction, Buyer grants a security interest in the oil to Bank. Although Bank’s security interest attaches when the oil is extracted, Bank’s security interest is not in “as‑ extracted collateral,” inasmuch as its debtor, Buyer, did not have an interest in the oil before extraction.

5. Receivables‑related Definitions.

a. “Account”; “Health‑Care‑Insurance Receivable”; “As‑Extracted Collateral.” The definition of “account” has been expanded and reformulated. It is no longer limited to rights to payment relating to goods or services. Many categories of rights to payment that were classified as general intangibles under former Article 9 are accounts under this Article. Thus, if they are sold, a financing statement must be filed to perfect the buyer’s interest in them. As used in the definition of “account”, a right to payment “arising out of the use of a credit or charge card or information contained on or for use with the card” is the right of a card issuer to payment from its cardholder. A credit‑card or charge‑card transaction may give rise to other rights to payments; however, those other rights do not “arise out of the use” of the card or information contained on or for use with the card. Among the types of property that are expressly excluded from the definition of account is “a right to payment for money or funds advanced or sold.” As defined in Section 1‑201, “money” is limited essentially to currency. As used in the exclusion from the definition of “account,” however, “funds” is a broader concept (although the term is not defined). For example, when a bank‑lender credits a borrower’s deposit account for the amount of a loan, the bank’s advance of funds is not a transaction giving rise to an account.

The definition of “health‑care‑insurance receivable” is new. It is a subset of the definition of “account.” However, the rules generally applicable to account debtors on accounts do not apply to insurers obligated on health‑care‑insurance receivables. See Sections 9‑404(e), 9‑405(d), 9‑406(i).

Note that certain accounts also are “as‑extracted collateral.” See Comment 4.c., Examples 6 and 7.

b. “Chattel Paper”; “Electronic Chattel Paper”; “Tangible Chattel Paper.” “Chattel paper” consists of a monetary obligation together with a security interest in or a lease of specific goods if the obligation and security interest or lease are evidenced by “a record or records.” The definition has been expanded from that found in former Article 9 to include records that evidence a monetary obligation and a security interest in specific goods and software used in the goods, a security interest in specific goods and license of software used in the goods or a lease of specific goods and license of software used in the goods. The expanded definition covers transactions in which the debtor’s or lessee’s monetary obligation includes amounts owed with respect to software used in the goods. The monetary obligation with respect to the software need not be owed under a license from the secured party or lessor, and the secured party or lessor need not be a party to the license transaction itself. Among the types of monetary obligations that are included in “chattel paper” are amounts that have been advanced by the secured party or lessor to enable the debtor or lessee to acquire or obtain financing for a license of the software used in the goods.

Charters of vessels are expressly excluded from the definition of chattel paper; they are accounts. The term “charter” as used in this Section includes bareboat charters, time charters, successive voyage charters, contracts of affreightment, contracts of carriage, and all other arrangements for the use of vessels.

Under former Section 9‑105, only if the evidence of an obligation consisted of “a writing or writings” could an obligation qualify as chattel paper. In this Article, traditional, written chattel paper is included in the definition of “tangible chattel paper.” “Electronic chattel paper” is chattel paper that is stored in an electronic medium instead of in tangible form. The concept of an electronic medium should be construed liberally to include electrical, digital, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, or any other current or similar emerging technologies. Deleted paragraph here.

c. “Instrument”; “Promissory Note.” The definition of “instrument” includes a negotiable instrument. As under former Section 9‑105, it also includes any other right to payment of a monetary obligation that is evidenced by a writing of a type that in ordinary course of business is transferred by delivery (and, if necessary, an indorsement or assignment). Except in the case of chattel paper, the fact that an instrument is secured by a security interest or encumbrance on property does not change the character of the instrument as such or convert the combination of the instrument and collateral into a separate classification of personal property. The definition makes clear that rights to payment arising out of credit‑card transactions are not instruments. The definition of “promissory note” is new, necessitated by the inclusion of sales of promissory notes within the scope of Article 9. It explicitly excludes obligations arising out of “orders” to pay (e.g., checks) as opposed to “promises” to pay. See Section 3‑104.

d. “General Intangible”; “Payment Intangible.” “General intangible” is the residual category of personal property, including things in action, that is not included in the other defined types of collateral. Examples are various categories of intellectual property and the right to payment of a loan of funds that is not evidenced by chattel paper or an instrument. The definition has been revised to exclude commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, and letter‑of‑credit rights. Each of the three is a separate type of collateral. One important consequence of this exclusion is that tortfeasors (commercial tort claims), banks (deposit accounts), and persons obligated on letters of credit (letter‑of‑credit rights) are not “account debtors” having the rights and obligations set forth in Sections 9‑404, 9‑405, and 9‑406. In particular, tortfeasors, banks, and persons obligated on letters of credit are not obligated to pay an assignee (secured party) upon receipt of the notification described in Section 9‑404(a). See Comment 5.h. Another important consequence relates to the adequacy of the description in the security agreement. See Section 9‑108.

“Payment intangible” is a subset of the definition of “general intangible.” The sale of a payment intangible is subject to this Article. See Section 9‑109(a)(3). Virtually any intangible right could give rise to a right to payment of money once one hypothesizes, for example, that the account debtor is in breach of its obligation. The term “payment intangible,” however, embraces only those general intangibles “ under which the account debtor’s principal obligation is a monetary obligation.” (Emphasis added.) A debtor’s right to payment from another person of amounts received by the other person on the debtor’s behalf, including the right of a merchant in a credit‑card, debit‑card, prepaid card, or other payment‑card transaction to payment of amounts received by its bank from the card system in settlement of the transaction, is a “payment intangible”. (In contrast, the right of a credit‑card issuer to payment arising out of the use of a credit card is an “account.”)

In classifying intangible collateral, a court should begin by identifying the particular rights that have been assigned. The account debtor (promisor) under a particular contract may owe several types of monetary obligations as well as other, nonmonetary obligations. If the promisee’s right to payment of money is assigned separately, the right is an account or payment intangible, depending on how the account debtor’s obligation arose. When all the promisee’s rights are assigned together, an account, a payment intangible, and a general intangible all may be involved, depending on the nature of the rights.

A right to the payment of money is frequently buttressed by ancillary rights, such as rights arising from covenants in a purchase agreement, note, or mortgage requiring insurance on the collateral or forbidding removal of the collateral, rights arising from covenants to preserve the creditworthiness of the promisor, and the lessor’s rights with respect to leased goods that arise upon the lessee’s default (see Section 2A‑523). This Article does not treat these ancillary rights separately from the rights to payment to which they relate. For example, attachment and perfection of an assignment of a right to payment of a monetary obligation, whether it be an account or payment intangible, also carries these ancillary rights. Thus, an assignment of the lessor’s right to payment under a lease also transfers the lessor’s rights with respect to the leased goods under Section 2A‑523. If, taken together, the lessor’s rights to payment and with respect to the leased goods are evidenced by chattel paper, then, contrary to In re Commercial Money Center, Inc., 350 B.R. 465 (Bankr. App. 9th Cir. 2006), an assignment of the lessor’s right to payment constitutes an assignment of the chattel paper. Although an agreement excluding the lessor’s rights with respect to the leased goods from an assignment of the lessor’s right to payment may be effective between the parties, the agreement does not affect the characterization of the collateral to the prejudice of creditors of, and purchasers from the assignor.

Every “payment intangible” is also a “general intangible.” Likewise, “software” is a “general intangible” for purposes of this Article. See Comment 25. Accordingly, except as otherwise provided, statutory provisions applicable to general intangibles apply to payment intangibles and software.

e. “Letter‑of‑Credit Right.” The term “letter‑of‑credit right” embraces the rights to payment and performance under a letter of credit (defined in Section 5‑102). However, it does not include a beneficiary’s right to demand payment or performance. Transfer of those rights to a transferee beneficiary is governed by Article 5. See Sections 9‑107, Comment 4, and 9‑329, Comments 3 and 4.

f. “Supporting Obligation.” This new term covers the most common types of credit enhancements‑suretyship obligations (including guarantees) and letter‑ of‑credit rights that support one of the types of collateral specified in the definition. As explained in Comment 2.a., suretyship law determines whether an obligation is “secondary” for purposes of this definition. Section 9‑109 generally excludes from this Article transfers of interests in insurance policies. However, the regulation of a secondary obligation as an insurance product does not necessarily mean that it is a “policy of insurance” for purposes of the exclusion in Section 9‑109. Thus, this Article may cover a secondary obligation (as a supporting obligation), even if the obligation is issued by a regulated insurance company and the obligation is subject to regulation as an “insurance” product.

This Article contains rules explicitly governing attachment, perfection, and priority of security interests in supporting obligations. See Sections 9‑203, 9‑308, 9‑310, and 9‑322. These provisions reflect the principle that a supporting obligation is an incident of the collateral it supports.

Collections of or other distributions under a supporting obligation are “ proceeds” of the supported collateral as well as “proceeds” of the supporting obligation itself. See Section 9‑102 (defining “proceeds”) and Comment 13.b. As such, the collections and distributions are subject to the priority rules applicable to proceeds generally. See Section 9‑322. However, under the special rule governing security interests in a letter‑of‑credit right, a secured party’s failure to obtain control (Section 9‑107) of a letter‑of‑credit right supporting collateral may leave its security interest exposed to a priming interest of a party who does take control. See Section 9‑329 (security interest in a letter‑of‑credit right perfected by control has priority over a conflicting security interest).

g. “Commercial Tort Claim.” This term is new. A tort claim may serve as original collateral under this Article only if it is a “commercial tort claim.” See Section 9‑109(d). Although security interests in commercial tort claims are within its scope, this Article does not override other applicable law restricting the assignability of a tort claim. See Section 9‑401. A security interest in a tort claim also may exist under this Article if the claim is proceeds of other collateral.

h. “Account Debtor.” An “account debtor” is a person obligated on an account, chattel paper, or general intangible. The account debtor’s obligation often is a monetary obligation; however, this is not always the case. For example, if a franchisee uses its rights under a franchise agreement (a general intangible) as collateral, then the franchisor is an “account debtor.” As a general matter, Article 3, and not Article 9, governs obligations on negotiable instruments. Accordingly, the definition of “account debtor” excludes obligors on negotiable instruments constituting part of chattel paper. The principal effect of this change from the definition in former Article 9 is that the rules in Sections 9‑403, 9‑404, 9‑405, and 9‑406, dealing with the rights of an assignee and duties of an account debtor, do not apply to an assignment of chattel paper in which the obligation to pay is evidenced by a negotiable instrument. (Section 9‑406(d), however, does apply to promissory notes, including negotiable promissory notes.) Rather, the assignee’s rights are governed by Article 3. Similarly, the duties of an obligor on a nonnegotiable instrument are governed by non‑Article 9 law unless the nonnegotiable instrument is a part of chattel paper, in which case the obligor is an account debtor.

i. Receivables Under Government Entitlement Programs. This Article does not contain a defined term that encompasses specifically rights to payment or performance under the many and varied government entitlement programs. Depending on the nature of a right under a program, it could be an account, a payment intangible, a general intangible other than a payment intangible, or another type of collateral. The right also might be proceeds of collateral (e.g., crops).

6. Investment‑Property‑Related Definitions: “Commodity Account”; “Commodity Contract”; “Commodity Customer”; “Commodity Intermediary”; “Investment Property.” These definitions are substantially the same as the corresponding definitions in former Section 9‑115. “Investment property” includes securities, both certificated and uncertificated, securities accounts, security entitlements, commodity accounts, and commodity contracts. The term investment property includes a “securities account” in order to facilitate transactions in which a debtor wishes to create a security interest in all of the investment positions held through a particular account rather than in particular positions carried in the account. Former Section 9‑115 was added in conjunction with Revised Article 8 and contained a variety of rules applicable to security interests in investment property. These rules have been relocated to the appropriate Sections of Article 9. See, e.g., Sections 9‑203 (attachment), 9‑314 (perfection by control), 9‑328 (priority).

The terms “security,” “security entitlement,” and related terms are defined in Section 8‑102, and the term “securities account” is defined in Section 8‑501. The terms “commodity account,” “commodity contract,” “commodity customer,” and “commodity intermediary” are defined in this Section. Commodity contracts are not “securities” or “financial assets” under Article 8. See Section 8‑103(f). Thus, the relationship between commodity intermediaries and commodity customers is not governed by the indirect‑holding‑system rules of Part 5 of Article 8. For securities, Article 9 contains rules on security interests, and Article 8 contains rules on the rights of transferees, including secured parties, on such matters as the rights of a transferee if the transfer was itself wrongful and gives rise to an adverse claim. For commodity contracts, Article 9 establishes rules on security interests, but questions of the sort dealt with in Article 8 for securities are left to other law.

The indirect‑holding‑system rules of Article 8 are sufficiently flexible to be applied to new developments in the securities and financial markets, where that is appropriate. Accordingly, the definition of “commodity contract” is narrowly drafted to ensure that it does not operate as an obstacle to the application of the Article 8 indirect‑holding‑system rules to new products. The term “commodity contract” covers those contracts that are traded on or subject to the rules of a designated contract market and foreign commodity contracts that are carried on the books of American commodity intermediaries. The effect of this definition is that the category of commodity contracts that are excluded from Article 8 but governed by Article 9 is essentially the same as the category of contracts that fall within the exclusive regulatory jurisdiction of the federal Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

Commodity contracts are different from securities or other financial assets. A person who enters into a commodity futures contract is not buying an asset having a certain value and holding it in anticipation of increase in value. Rather the person is entering into a contract to buy or sell a commodity at set price for delivery at a future time. That contract may become advantageous or disadvantageous as the price of the commodity fluctuates during the term of the contract. The rules of the commodity exchanges require that the contracts be marked to market on a daily basis; that is, the customer pays or receives any increment attributable to that day’s price change. Because commodity customers may incur obligations on their contracts, they are required to provide collateral at the outset, known as “original margin,” and may be required to provide additional amounts, known as “variation margin,” during the term of the contract.

The most likely setting in which a person would want to take a security interest in a commodity contract is where a lender who is advancing funds to finance an inventory of a physical commodity requires the borrower to enter into a commodity contract as a hedge against the risk of decline in the value of the commodity. The lender will want to take a security interest in both the commodity itself and the hedging commodity contract. Typically, such arrangements are structured as security interests in the entire commodity account in which the borrower carries the hedging contracts, rather than in individual contracts.

One important effect of including commodity contracts and commodity accounts in Article 9 is to provide a clearer legal structure for the analysis of the rights of commodity clearing organizations against their participants and futures commission merchants against their customers. The rules and agreements of commodity clearing organizations generally provide that the clearing organization has the right to liquidate any participant’s positions in order to satisfy obligations of the participant to the clearing corporation. Similarly, agreements between futures commission merchants and their customers generally provide that the futures commission merchant has the right to liquidate a customer’s positions in order to satisfy obligations of the customer to the futures commission merchant.

The main property that a commodity intermediary holds as collateral for the obligations that the commodity customer may incur under its commodity contracts is not other commodity contracts carried by the customer but the other property that the customer has posted as margin. Typically, this property will be securities. The commodity intermediary’s security interest in such securities is governed by the rules of this Article on security interests in securities, not the rules on security interests in commodity contracts or commodity accounts.

Although there are significant analytic and regulatory differences between commodities and securities, the development of commodity contracts on financial products in the past few decades has resulted in a system in which the commodity markets and securities markets are closely linked. The rules on security interests in commodity contracts and commodity accounts provide a structure that may be essential in times of stress in the financial markets. Suppose, for example that a firm has a position in a securities market that is hedged by a position in a commodity market, so that payments that the firm is obligated to make with respect to the securities position will be covered by the receipt of funds from the commodity position. Depending upon the settlement cycles of the different markets, it is possible that the firm could find itself in a position where it is obligated to make the payment with respect to the securities position before it receives the matching funds from the commodity position. If cross‑margining arrangements have not been developed between the two markets, the firm may need to borrow funds temporarily to make the earlier payment. The rules on security interests in investment property would facilitate the use of positions in one market as collateral for loans needed to cover obligations in the other market.

7. Consumer‑Related Definitions: “Consumer Debtor”; “Consumer Goods”; “Consumer‑goods transaction”; “Consumer Obligor”; “Consumer Transaction.” The definition of “consumer goods” (discussed above) is substantially the same as the definition in former Section 9‑109. The definitions of “consumer debtor,” “ consumer obligor,” “consumer‑goods transaction,” and “consumer transaction” have been added in connection with various new (and old) consumer‑related provisions and to designate certain provisions that are inapplicable in consumer transactions.

“Consumer‑goods transaction” is a subset of “consumer transaction.” Under each definition, both the obligation secured and the collateral must have a personal, family, or household purpose. However, “mixed” business and personal transactions also may be characterized as a consumer‑goods transaction or consumer transaction. Subparagraph (A) of the definition of consumer‑goods transactions and clause (i) of the definition of consumer transaction are primary purposes tests. Under these tests, it is necessary to determine the primary purpose of the obligation or obligations secured. Subparagraph (B) and clause (iii) of these definitions are satisfied if any of the collateral is consumer goods, in the case of a consumer‑goods transaction, or “is held or acquired primarily for personal, family, or household purposes,” in the case of a consumer transaction. The fact that some of the obligations secured or some of the collateral for the obligation does not satisfy the tests (e.g., some of the collateral is acquired for a business purpose) does not prevent a transaction from being a “consumer transaction” or “consumer‑goods transaction.”

8. Filing‑Related Definitions: “Continuation Statement”; “File Number”; “Filing Office”; “ Filing‑office Rule”; “Financing Statement”; “Fixture Filing”; “Manufactured‑Home Transaction”; “New Debtor”; “Original Debtor”; “Public‑Finance Transaction”; “ Termination Statement”; “Transmitting Utility.” These definitions are used exclusively or primarily in the filing‑related provisions in Part 5. Most are self‑explanatory and are discussed in the Comments to Part 5. A financing statement filed in a manufactured‑home transaction or a public‑finance transaction may remain effective for 30 years instead of the 5 years applicable to other financing statements. See Section 9‑515(b). The definitions relating to medium neutrality also are significant for the filing provisions. See Comment 9.

The definition of “transmitting utility” has been revised to embrace the business of transmitting communications generally to take account of new and future types of communications technology. The term designates a special class of debtors for whom separate filing rules are provided in Part 5, thereby obviating the many local fixture filings that would be necessary under the rules of Section 9‑501 for a far‑flung public‑ utility debtor. A transmitting utility will not necessarily be regulated by or operating as such in a jurisdiction where fixtures are located. For example, a utility might own transmission lines in a jurisdiction, although the utility generates no power and has no customers in the jurisdiction.

9. Definitions Relating to Medium Neutrality.

a. “Record.” In many, but not all, instances, the term “ record” replaces the term “writing” and “written.” A “record” includes information that is in intangible form (e.g., electronically stored) as well as tangible form (e.g., written on paper). Given the rapid development and commercial adoption of modern communication and storage technologies, requirements that documents or communications be “written,” “in writing,’ ‘ or otherwise in tangible form do not necessarily reflect or aid commercial practices.

A “record” need not be permanent or indestructible, but the term does not include any oral or other communication that is not stored or preserved by any means. The information must be stored on paper or in some other medium. Information that has not been retained other than through human memory does not qualify as a record. Examples of current technologies commercially used to communicate or store information include, but are not limited to, magnetic media, optical discs, digital voice messaging systems, electronic mail, audio tapes, and photographic media, as well as paper. “Record” is an inclusive term that includes all of these methods of storing or communicating information. Any “writing” is a record. A record may be authenticated. See Comment 9.b. A record may be created without the knowledge or intent of a particular person.

Like the terms “written” or “in writing,” the term “record” does not establish the purposes, permitted uses, or legal effect that a record may have under any particular provision of law. Whatever is filed in the Article 9 filing system, including financing statements, continuation statements, and termination statements, whether transmitted in tangible or intangible form, would fall within the definition. However, in some instances, statutes or filing‑office rules may require that a paper record be filed. In such cases, even if this Article permits the filing of an electronic record, compliance with those statutes or rules is necessary. Similarly, a filer must comply with a statute or rule that requires a particular type of encoding or formatting for an electronic record.

This Article sometimes uses the terms “for record,” “of record,” “record or legal title,” and “record owner.” Some of these are terms traditionally used in real‑property law. The definition of “record” in this Article now explicitly excepts these usages from the defined term. Also, this Article refers to a record that is filed or recorded in real‑property recording systems to record a mortgage as a “record of a mortgage.” This usage recognizes that the defined term “mortgage” means an interest in real property; it does not mean the record that evidences, or is filed or recorded with respect to, the mortgage.

b. “Authenticate”; “Communicate”; “Send.” The terms “authenticate” and “ authenticated” generally replace “sign” and “signed.” “Authenticated” replaces and broadens the definition of “signed,” in Section 1‑201, to encompass authentication of all records, not just writings. (to authentication of, e.g., an agreement, demand, or notification mean, of course, authentication of a record containing an agreement, demand, or notification.) The terms “communicate” and “send” also contemplate the possibility of communication by nonwritten media. These definitions include the act of transmitting both tangible and intangible records. The definition of “send” replaces, for purposes of this Article, the corresponding term in Section 1‑201. The reference to “usual means of communication” in that definition contemplates an inquiry into the appropriateness of the method of transmission used in the particular circumstances involved.

10. Scope‑Related Definitions.

a. Expanded Scope of Article: “Agricultural Lien”; “Consignment”; “Payment Intangible”; “Promissory Note.” These new definitions reflect the expanded scope of Article 9, as provided in Section 9‑109(a).

b. Reduced Scope of Exclusions: “Governmental Unit”; “ Health‑Care‑Insurance Receivable”; “Commercial Tort Claims.” These new definitions reflect the reduced scope of the exclusions, provided in Section 9‑109(c) and (d), of transfers by governmental debtors and assignments of interests in insurance policies and commercial tort claims.

11. Choice‑of‑Law‑Related Definitions: “Certificate of Title”; “Governmental Unit”; “Jurisdiction of Organization”; ‘Public Organic Record’ “Registered Organization”; “State.” These new definitions reflect the changes in the law governing perfection and priority of security interests and agricultural liens provided in Part 3, Subpart 1.

Statutes often require applicants for a certificate of title to identify all security interests on the application and require the issuing agency to indicate the identified security interests on the certificate. Some of these statutes provide that priority over the rights of a lien creditor (i.e., perfection of a security interest) in goods covered by the certificate occurs upon indication of the security interest on the certificate; that is, they provide for the indication of the security interest on the certificate as a “condition” of perfection. Other statutes contemplate that perfection is achieved upon the occurrence of another act, e.g., delivery of the application to the issuing agency, that “ results” in the indication of the security interest on the certificate. A certificate governed by either type of statute can qualify as a “certificate of title” under this Article. The statute providing for the indication of a security interest need not expressly state the connection between the indication and perfection. For example, a certificate issued pursuant to a statute that requires applicants to identify security interests, requires the issuing agency to indicate the identified security interests on the certificate, but is silent concerning the legal consequences of the indication would be a “certificate of title” if, under a judicial interpretation of the statute, perfection of a security interest is a legal consequence of the indication. Likewise, a certificate would be a “certificate of title” if another statute provides, expressly or as interpreted, the requisite connection between the indication and perfection. The first sentence of the definition of “certificate of title” includes certificates consisting of tangible records, or electronic records, and of combinations of tangible and electronic records.

In many States, a certificate of title covering goods that are encumbered by a security interest is delivered to the secured party by the issuing authority. To eliminate the need for the issuance of a paper certificate under these circumstances, several States have revised their certificate‑of‑ title statutes to permit or require a State agency to maintain an electronic record that evidences ownership of the goods and in which a security interest in the goods may be noted. The second sentence of the definition provides that such a record is a certificate of title and even if the statute does not expressly state that the record is maintained instead of issuing a paper certificate.

Not every organization that may provide information about itself in the public records is a “registered organization.” For example, a general partnership is not a “registered organization,” even if it files a statement of partnership authority under Section 303 of the Uniform Partnership Act (1994) or an assumed name (“dba”) certificate. This is because such a partnership is not formed or organized by the filing of a record with, or the issuance of a record by, a State or the United States. In contrast, corporations, limited liability companies, and limited partnerships ordinarily are “registered organizations.”

Not every record concerning a registered organization that is filed with, or issued by, a State or the United State is a “public organic record”. For example, a certificate of good standing issued with respect to a corporation or a published index of domestic corporations would not be a “public organic record” because its issuance or publication does not form or organize the corporations named.

When collateral is held in a trust, one must look to non‑UCC law to determine whether the trust is a “registered organization.” Non‑UCC law typically distinguishes between statutory trusts and common‑law trusts. A statutory trust is formed by the filing of a record, commonly referred to as a certificate of trust, in a public office pursuant to a statute. See, e.g., Uniform Statutory Trust Entity Act Section 201 (2009); Delaware Statutory Trust Act, De. Code Ann. tit. 12, Section 3801 et seq. A statutory trust is a juridical entity, separate from its trustee and beneficial owners, that may sue and be sued, own property, and transact business in its own name. Inasmuch as a statutory trust is a “legal or commercial entity”, it qualifies as a “person other than an individual”, and therefore as an “organization”, under Section 1‑201. A statutory trust that is formed by the filing of a record in a public office is a “registered organization,” and the filed record is a ‘public organic record’ of the statutory trust, if the filed record is available to the public for inspection. (The requirement that a record be “available to the public for inspection” is satisfied if a copy of the relevant record is available for public inspection.)

Unlike a statutory trust, a common‑law trust‑whether its purpose is donative or commercial‑arises from private action without the filing of a record in a public office. See Uniform Trust Code Section 401 (2000); Restatement (Third) of Trusts Section 10 (2003). Moreover, under traditional law, a common‑law trust is not itself a juridical entity and therefore must sue and be sued, own property, and transact business in the name of the trustee acting in the capacity of trustee. A common‑law trust that is a “business trust”, i.e., that has a business or commercial purpose, is an “organization” under Section 1‑201. However, such a trust would not be a “registered organization” if, as is typically the case, the filing of a public record is not needed to form it.

In some states, however, the trustee of a common‑law trust that has a commercial or business purpose is required by statute to file a record in a public office following the trust’s formation. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 182, Section 2; Fla. Stat. Ann. Section 609.02. A business trust that is required to file its organic record in a public office is a “registered organization” under the second sentence of the definition if the filed record is available to the public for inspection. Any organic record required to be filed, and filed, with respect to a common‑law business trust after the trust is formed is a “public organic record” of the trust. Some statutes require a trust or other organization to file, after formation or organization, a record other than an organic record. See, e.g., N.Y. Gen. Assn’s Law, Section 18 (requiring associations doing business within New York to file a certificate designating the secretary of state as an agent upon process may be served). This requirement does not render the organization a “registered organization” under the second sentence of the definition, and the record is not a “public organic record”.

12. Deposit‑Account‑Related Definitions: “Deposit Account”; “Bank.” The revised definition of “deposit account” incorporates the definition of “bank,” which is new. The definition derives from the definitions of “bank” in Sections 4‑105(1) and 4A‑105(a)(2), which focus on whether the organization is “engaged in the business of banking.”

Deposit accounts evidenced by Article 9 “instruments” are excluded from the term “deposit account.” In contrast, former Section 9‑105 excluded from the former definition “an account evidenced by a certificate of deposit.” The revised definition clarifies the proper treatment of nonnegotiable or uncertificated certificates of deposit. Under the definition, an uncertificated certificate of deposit would be a deposit account (assuming there is no writing evidencing the bank’s obligation to pay) whereas a nonnegotiable certificate of deposit would be a deposit account only if it is not an “instrument” as defined in this Section (a question that turns on whether the nonnegotiable certificate of deposit is “of a type that in ordinary course of business is transferred by delivery with any necessary indorsement or assignment.”)

A deposit account evidenced by an instrument is subject to the rules applicable to instruments generally. As a consequence, a security interest in such an instrument cannot be perfected by “control” (see Section 9‑104), and the special priority rules applicable to deposit accounts (see Sections 9‑327 and 9‑340) do not apply.

The term “deposit account” does not include “investment property,” such as securities and security entitlements. Thus, the term also does not include shares in a money‑market mutual fund, even if the shares are redeemable by check.

13. Proceeds‑Related Definitions: “Cash Proceeds”; “Noncash Proceeds”; “Proceeds.” The revised definition of “proceeds” expands the definition beyond that contained in former Section 9‑306 and resolves ambiguities in the former Section.

a. Distributions on Account of Collateral. The phrase “whatever is collected on, or distributed on account of, collateral,” in subparagraph (B), is broad enough to cover cash or stock dividends distributed on account of securities or other investment property that is original collateral. Compare former Section 9‑306 (“Any payments or distributions made with respect to investment property collateral are proceeds.”). This Section rejects the holding of Hastie v. FDIC, 2 F.3d 1042 (10th Cir. 1993) (postpetition cash dividends on stock subject to a prepetition pledge are not “proceeds” under Bankruptcy Code Section 552(b)), to the extent the holding relies on the Article 9 definition of “proceeds.”

b. Distributions on Account of Supporting Obligations. Under subparagraph (B), collections on and distributions on account of collateral consisting of various credit‑support arrangements (“supporting obligations,” as defined in Section 9‑102) also are proceeds. Consequently, they are afforded treatment identical to proceeds collected from or distributed by the obligor on the underlying (supported) right to payment or other collateral. Proceeds of supporting obligations also are proceeds of the underlying rights to payment or other collateral.

c. Proceeds of Proceeds. The definition of “proceeds” no longer provides that proceeds of proceeds are themselves proceeds. That idea is expressed in the revised definition of “collateral” in Section 9‑102. No change in meaning is intended.

d. Proceeds Received by Person Who Did Not Create Security Interest. When collateral is sold subject to a security interest and the buyer then resells the collateral, a question arose under former Article 9 concerning whether the “debtor” had “received” what the buyer received on resale and, therefore, whether those receipts were “proceeds” under former Section 9‑306(2). This Article contains no requirement that property be “received” by the debtor for the property to qualify as proceeds. It is necessary only that the property be traceable, directly or indirectly, to the original collateral.

e. Cash Proceeds and Noncash Proceeds. The definition of “cash proceeds” is substantially the same as the corresponding definition in former Section 9‑306. The phrase “and the like” covers property that is functionally equivalent to “money, checks, or deposit accounts,” such as some money‑market accounts that are securities or part of securities entitlements. Proceeds other than cash proceeds are noncash proceeds.

14. Consignment‑Related Definitions: “Consignee”; “Consignment”; “Consignor.” The definition of “ consignment” excludes, in subparagraphs (B) and (C), transactions for which filing would be inappropriate or of insufficient benefit to justify the costs. A consignment excluded from the application of this Article by one of those subparagraphs may still be a true consignment; however, it is governed by non‑Article 9 law. The definition also excludes, in subparagraph (D), what have been called “consignments intended for security.” These “consignments” are not bailments but secured transactions. Accordingly, all of Article 9 applies to them. See Sections 1‑201(37), 9‑109(a)(1). The “consignor” is the person who delivers goods to the “consignee” in a consignment.

The definition of “consignment” requires that the goods be delivered “to a merchant for the purpose of sale.” If the goods are delivered for another purpose as well, such as milling or processing, the transaction is a consignment nonetheless because a purpose of the delivery is “sale.” On the other hand, if a merchant‑processor‑bailee will not be selling the goods itself but will be delivering to buyers to which the owner‑bailor agreed to sell the goods, the transaction would not be a consignment.

15. “Accounting.” This definition describes the record and information that a debtor is entitled to request under Section 9‑210.

16. “Document.” The definition of “document” incorporates both tangible and electronic documents of title. See Section 1‑201(16) and Comment 16.

17. “Encumbrance”; “Mortgage.” The definitions of “encumbrance” and “mortgage” are unchanged in substance from the corresponding definitions in former Section 9‑105. They are used primarily in the special real‑property‑related priority and other provisions relating to crops, fixtures, and accessions.

18. “Fixtures.” This definition is unchanged in substance from the corresponding definition in former Section 9‑313. See Section 9‑334 (priority of security interests in fixtures and crops).

19. “Good Faith.” This Article expands the definition of “good faith” to include “the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.” The definition in this Section applies when the term is used in this Article, and the same concept applies in the context of this Article for purposes of the obligation of good faith imposed by Section 1‑203. See subsection (c).

20. “Lien Creditor” This definition is unchanged in substance from the corresponding definition in former Section 9‑301.

21. “New Value.” This Article deletes former Section 9‑108. Its broad formulation of new value, which embraced the taking of after‑acquired collateral for a pre‑existing claim, was unnecessary, counterintuitive, and ineffective for its original purpose of sheltering after‑acquired collateral from attack as a voidable preference in bankruptcy. The new definition derives from Bankruptcy Code Section 547(a). The term is used with respect to temporary perfection of security interests in instruments, certificated securities, or negotiable documents under Section 9‑312(e) and with respect to chattel paper priority in Section 9‑330.

22. “Person Related To.” Section 9‑615 provides a special method for calculating a deficiency or surplus when “the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor” acquires the collateral at a foreclosure disposition. Separate definitions of the term are provided with respect to an individual secured party and with respect to a secured party that is an organization. The definitions are patterned on the corresponding definition in Section 1.301(32) of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (1974).

23. “Proposal.” This definition describes a record that is sufficient to propose to retain collateral in full or partial satisfaction of a secured obligation. See Sections 9‑620, 9‑621, 9‑622.

24. “Pursuant to Commitment.” This definition is unchanged in substance from the corresponding definition in former Section 9‑105. It is used in connection with special priority rules applicable to future advances. See Section 9‑323.

25. “Software.” The definition of “software” is used in connection with the priority rules applicable to purchase‑money security interests. See Sections 9‑103, 9‑324. Software, like a payment intangible, is a type of general intangible for purposes of this Article.

26. Terminology: “Assignment” and “Transfer.” In numerous provisions, this Article refers to the “assignment” or the “transfer” of property interests. These terms and their derivatives are not defined. This Article generally follows common usage by using the terms “assignment” and “assign” to refer to transfers of rights to payment, claims, and liens and other security interests. It generally uses the term “transfer” to refer to other transfers of interests in property. Except when used in connection with a letter‑of‑credit transaction (see Section 9‑107, Comment 4), no significance should be placed on the use of one term or the other. Depending on the context, each term may refer to the assignment or transfer of an outright ownership interest or to the assignment or transfer of a limited interest, such as a security interest.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENTS

The 2013 amendments defined a new term, “public organic record” and revised the definition of “registered organization.” These amendments revise and clarify the rules for determining both whether an organization qualifies as a registered organization for purposes of Section 36‑9‑307(e) and (f) and the name of the registered organization under Section 36‑9‑503(a)(1). Note that under the amended definition of registered organization a business trust subject to Section 33‑53‑10 qualifies as a registered organization.

Editor’s Note

2014 Act No. 213, Section 51, provides as follows:

“SECTION 51. This act becomes effective on October 1, 2014. It applies to transactions entered into and events occurring after that date.”

Effect of Amendment

2014 Act No. 213, Section 33, in subsection (a)(30), substituted “36‑7‑201(b)” for “36‑7‑201(2)”, and reserved subsection (a)(43), which formerly defined “good faith”.

2014 Act No. 213, Section 34, in subsection (b), inserted the definition of “control”, added “applicant”, changed the cross reference for “issuer (with respect to a letter of credit or letter‑of‑credit right”, added “issuer (with respect to documents of title)”, changed the cross reference for “letter of credit”, added “nominated person”, and added “proceeds of a letter of credit”.

CROSS REFERENCES

Course of dealing and trade usage, see Section 36‑1‑303.

“Goods” with reference to sales, see Section 36‑2‑105.

Investment securities, securities and financial assets, see Section 36‑8‑103.

Power to transfer, see Section 36‑2‑403.

Public records, generally, see Sections 30‑1‑10 et seq.

Right of seller’s creditor to treat sale or identification of goods to contract for sale as void, see Section 36‑2‑402.

Sale of goods that are to be severed from realty, see Section 36‑2‑107.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR Library

58 ALR 6th 289 , Consignment Transactions Under Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 on Secured Transactions.

LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES

ARTICLE 9 and the Bankruptcy Act. 19 S.C. L. Rev. 742.

Bankruptcy’s Challenge to the Floating Lien. 19 S.C. L. Rev. 773.

McCullough V. Goodrich & Pennington Mortgage Fund, Inc.: Are secured creditors really “secure” from third party impairment of collateral? R. Davis Rice, 59 S.C. L. Rev. 455 (Spring 2008).

Priorities. 19 S.C. L. Rev. 724.

Secured Party’s Rights on Disposition of Collateral. 22 S.C. L. Rev. 504.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 1

1. In general

Payments under federal payment‑in‑kind (PIK) program do not constitute “proceeds” of crop collateral under Security Agreements executed by farmers in favor of federal government. U.S. v. Carolina Eastern Chemical Co., Inc., 1986, 638 F.Supp. 521.

Section 36‑9‑306(4) eliminates common law doctrine of tracing; creditor therefore is not entitled to security interest in funds that it can trace. In re Jameson’s Foods, Inc. (Bkrtcy.D.S.C. 1983) 35 B.R. 433.

Manufacturer acquired title to gas collection equipment left on property by seller of carbon dioxide as bona fide purchaser for value of land on which equipment was located, without notice of seller’s interest; prior owner appeared to be rightful owner of equipment, since it had title to land on which equipment was situated, and equipment appeared to be fixtures that would ordinarily be conveyed with land. Praxair Inc. v. Vereen (C.A.4 (S.C.) 2002) 34 Fed.Appx. 918, 2002 WL 984308, Unreported. Fixtures 21

Member’s signing of personal promissory note with lender, in satisfaction of his share of loan paid by lender to member’s limited liability company (LLC), together with lender’s decision to write off member’s promissory note and its execution of confession of judgment against member, did not amount to payment of LLC’s loan under guaranty‑of‑loans provision of LLC’s operating agreement, whereby member could seek contribution from co‑members for paying more than member’s guaranty percentage of a guaranteed loan; promissory note was promise to pay, not actual payment of a debt, and, by signing the promissory note and satisfying LLC’s obligation to lender, member simply incurred a liability on LLC’s behalf. Jones v. Builders Inv. Group, LLC (S.C.App. 2015) 415 S.C. 321, 781 S.E.2d 737, rehearing denied, certiorari dismissed. Bills and Notes 1; Corporations and Business Organizations 3637

Minivan which owner had stored on dealership lot while attempting to sell minivan was a “consumer good,” as owner had purchased it for his personal use, including the transportation of his wife to cancer treatments, and thus minivan was not a consignment item and dealership’s financing company could not attach minivan after serving warrant of attachment due to dealership’s default on note; statute specifically excluded goods that were “consumer goods immediately before delivery” from definition of “consignment.” Mackela v. Bentley (S.C.App. 2005) 365 S.C. 44, 614 S.E.2d 648, rehearing denied, certiorari denied. Secured Transactions 221; Secured Transactions 242.1

In determining whether an item is a fixture, courts should consider the following factors: (1) mode of attachment; (2) character of the structure or article; (3) the intent of the parties making the annexation; and (4) the relationship of the parties. Carjow, LLC v. Simmons (S.C.App. 2002) 349 S.C. 514, 563 S.E.2d 359. Fixtures 1

In church purchaser’s conversion action against former pastor, evidence supported master‑in‑equity’s determination that, based on the intent of the parties, ceiling fans and lights were fixtures rather than personal property; items were attached to the property at the time of the sale and were necessary for the comfort of the building’s occupants, and the record reflected an assumption by the purchaser and the appraiser that the items would stay in place after the sale. Carjow, LLC v. Simmons (S.C.App. 2002) 349 S.C. 514, 563 S.E.2d 359. Fixtures 35(2)

Evidence supported master‑in‑equity’s determination that church pews were fixtures, so that purchaser was entitled to recover them in his conversion action against former pastor; it was undisputed that the pews were physically attached to the building when the church was bought, the only reason the pews were detached was because of hurricane damage, pastor testified that the intention was always that the pews would be reattached, and purchaser testified that the pew locations were clearly marked and that some holes and brackets still marred the floor. Carjow, LLC v. Simmons (S.C.App. 2002) 349 S.C. 514, 563 S.E.2d 359. Fixtures 35(2)

Creditor’s prior perfected security interest in tenant’s property took priority over landlord’s distress lien. In re J.M. Smith Corp. (S.C. 2000) 341 S.C. 442, 535 S.E.2d 131, rehearing denied. Secured Transactions 144

The penalty provision for breach of the notice requirements under Section 36‑9‑105 is applicable to co‑obligors of consumer goods security agreements. Crane v. Citicorp Nat. Services, Inc. (S.C. 1993) 313 S.C. 70, 437 S.E.2d 50.

The 1988 amendment to the Recording Act, Section 30‑7‑10, which required a statutory lien to be recorded to affect the rights of subsequent purchasers for value “except as otherwise provided by statute” did not relate to the recording of liens on real property, but related only to the recording of security interests in personal property, since the legislative intent behind the amendment was merely to conform the Recording Act to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, Section 36‑9‑101 et seq. The Lite House, Inc. v. J.C. Roy Co., Inc. (S.C.App. 1992) 309 S.C. 50, 419 S.E.2d 817. Mechanics’ Liens 197

Goods are not “held” for sale within the meaning of Section 36‑9‑109(4) when the right to possess them is lost. Thus, if possession is lawfully transferred to someone else, the goods are no longer “held” by the transferor and cease to be inventory for the purpose of subsequent transactions. As between any 2 parties, what goods constitute “inventory” under the statute is to be determined at the time of the transaction between them. Nichols Motorcycle Supply, Inc. v. Regency Kawasaki, Inc. (S.C.App. 1988) 295 S.C. 138, 367 S.E.2d 438. Fraudulent Conveyances 47

Where finance company, which financed purchase of boat and which took back boat when purchasers revoked acceptance, never had its lien noted on boat’s certificate of title, its security interest was unperfected at all times, and finance company therefore could not claim priority under Section 36‑9‑306(5)(d) over manufacturer’s security interest placed on inventory, including boat in question, of retail boat dealer. Finance America Corp. v. Galaxy Boat Mfg. Co., Inc. (S.C. 1987) 292 S.C. 494, 357 S.E.2d 460.

Goods are classified or defined for purposes of secured transactions under this section [Code 1962 Section 10.9‑109]. Kimbrell’s Furniture Co., Inc. v. Friedman (S.C. 1973) 261 S.C. 172, 198 S.E.2d 803.

Cited in State v. Pilot Life Ins. Co. (S.C. 1972) 257 S.C. 383, 186 S.E.2d 262.

Cited in Stephenson Finance Co. of Augusta, Inc. v. Bruce (S.C. 1970) 254 S.C. 249, 174 S.E.2d 750.

**SECTION 36‑9‑103.** Purchase‑money security interest; application of payments; burden of establishing.

(a) In this section:

(1) “purchase‑money collateral” means goods or software that secures a purchase‑money obligation incurred with respect to that collateral; and

(2) “purchase‑money obligation” means an obligation of an obligor incurred as all or part of the price of the collateral or for value given to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of the collateral if the value is in fact so used.

(b) A security interest in goods is a purchase‑money security interest:

(1) to the extent that the goods are purchase‑money collateral with respect to that security interest;

(2) if the security interest is in inventory that is or was purchase‑ money collateral, also to the extent that the security interest secures a purchase‑money obligation incurred with respect to other inventory in which the secured party holds or held a purchase‑money security interest; and

(3) also to the extent that the security interest secures a purchase‑ money obligation incurred with respect to software in which the secured party holds or held a purchase‑money security interest.

(c) A security interest in software is a purchase‑money security interest to the extent that the security interest also secures a purchase‑money obligation incurred with respect to goods in which the secured party holds or held a purchase‑money security interest if:

(1) the debtor acquired its interest in the software in an integrated transaction in which it acquired an interest in the goods; and

(2) the debtor acquired its interest in the software for the principal purpose of using the software in the goods.

(d) The security interest of a consignor in goods that are the subject of a consignment is a purchase‑money security interest in inventory.

(e) In a transaction other than a consumer‑goods transaction, if the extent to which a security interest is a purchase‑money security interest depends on the application of a payment to a particular obligation, the payment must be applied:

(1) in accordance with any reasonable method of application to which the parties agree;

(2) in the absence of the parties’ agreement to a reasonable method, in accordance with any intention of the obligor manifested at or before the time of payment; or

(3) in the absence of an agreement to a reasonable method and a timely manifestation of the obligor’s intention, in the following order:

(A) to obligations that are not secured; and

(B) if more than one obligation is secured, to obligations secured by purchase‑money security interests in the order in which those obligations were incurred.

(f) In a transaction other than a consumer‑goods transaction, a purchase‑money security interest does not lose its status as such, even if:

(1) the purchase‑money collateral also secures an obligation that is not a purchase‑money obligation;

(2) collateral that is not purchase‑money collateral also secures the purchase‑money obligation; or

(3) the purchase‑money obligation has been renewed, refinanced, consolidated, or restructured.

(g) In a transaction other than a consumer‑good transaction, a secured party claiming a purchase‑money security interest has the burden of establishing the extent to which the security interest is a purchase‑money security interest.

(h) The limitation of the rules in subsections (e), (f), and (g) to transactions other than consumer‑goods transactions is intended to leave to the court the determination of the proper rules in consumer‑goods transactions. The court may not infer from that limitation the nature of the proper rule in consumer‑goods transactions and may continue to apply established approaches.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑103; 1966 (54) 2716; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 1989 Act No. 25, Section 1; 1991 Act No. 161, Section 2(C), (D); 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑107.

2. Scope of This Section. Under Section 9‑309(1), a purchase‑money security interest in consumer goods is perfected when it attaches. Sections 9‑317 and 9‑324 provide special priority rules for purchase‑money security interests in a variety of contexts. This Section explains when a security interest enjoys purchase‑money status.

3. “Purchase‑Money Collateral”; “Purchase‑Money Obligation”; “Purchase‑Money Security Interest.” Subsection (a) defines “purchase‑money collateral” and “purchase‑money obligation.” These terms are essential to the description of what constitutes a purchase‑money security interest under subsection (b). As used in subsection (a)(2), the definition of “purchase‑money obligation,” the “price” of collateral or the “value given to enable” includes obligations for expenses incurred in connection with acquiring rights in the collateral, sales taxes, duties, finance charges, interest, freight charges, costs of storage in transit, demurrage, administrative charges, expenses of collection and enforcement, attorney’s fees, and other similar obligations.

The concept of “purchase‑money security interest” requires a close nexus between the acquisition of collateral and the secured obligation. Thus, a security interest does not qualify as a purchase‑money security interest if a debtor acquires property on unsecured credit and subsequently creates the security interest to secure the purchase price.

4. Cross‑Collateralization of Purchase‑Money Security Interests in Inventory. Subsection (b)(2) deals with the problem of cross‑collateralized purchase‑money security interests in inventory. Consider a simple example:

Example: Seller (S) sells an item of inventory (Item‑1) to Debtor (D), retaining a security interest in Item‑1 to secure Item‑1’s price and all other obligations, existing and future, of D to S. S then sells another item of inventory to D (Item‑2), again retaining a security interest in Item‑2 to secure Item‑2’s price as well as all other obligations of D to S. D then pays to S Item‑1’s price. D then sells Item‑2 to a buyer in ordinary course of business, who takes Item‑2 free of S’s security interest.

Under subsection (b)(2), S’s security interest in Item‑1 securing Item‑2’s unpaid price would be a purchase‑money security interest. This is so because S has a purchase‑money security interest in Item‑1, Item‑1 secures the price of (a “purchase‑money obligation incurred with respect to”) Item‑2 (“other inventory”), and Item‑2 itself was subject to a purchase‑money security interest. Note that, to the extent Item‑1 secures the price of Item‑2, S’s security interest in Item‑1 would not be a purchase‑money security interest under subsection (b)(1). The security interest in Item‑1 is a purchase‑money security interest under subsection (b)(1) only to the extent that Item‑1 is “purchase‑money collateral,” i.e., only to the extent that Item‑1 “secures a purchase‑money obligation incurred with respect to that collateral” (i.e., Item‑1). See subsection (a)(1).

5. Purchase‑Money Security Interests in Goods and Software. Subsections (b) and (c) limit purchase‑money security interests to security interests in goods, including fixtures, and software. Otherwise, no change in meaning from former Section 9‑107 is intended. The second sentence of former Section 9‑115(5)(f) made the purchase‑money priority rule (former Section 9‑312(4)) inapplicable to investment property. This Section’s limitation makes that provision unnecessary.

Subsection (c) describes the limited circumstances under which a security interest in goods may be accompanied by a purchase‑money security interest in software. The software must be acquired by the debtor in a transaction integrated with the transaction in which the debtor acquired the goods, and the debtor must acquire the software for the principal purpose of using the software in the goods. “Software” is defined in Section 9‑102.

6. Consignments. Under former Section 9‑114, the priority of the consignor’s interest is similar to that of a purchase‑money security interest. Subsection (d) achieves this result more directly, by defining the interest of a “consignor,” defined in Section 9‑102, to be a purchase‑money security interest in inventory for purposes of this Article. This drafting convention obviates any need to set forth special priority rules applicable to the interest of a consignor. Rather, the priority of the consignor’s interest as against the rights of lien creditors of the consignee, competing secured parties, and purchasers of the goods from the consignee can be determined by reference to the priority rules generally applicable to inventory, such as Sections 9‑317, 9‑320, 9‑322, and 9‑324. For other purposes, including the rights and duties of the consignor and consignee as between themselves, the consignor would remain the owner of goods under a bailment arrangement with the consignee. See Section 9‑319.

7. Provisions Applicable Only to Non‑Consumer‑Goods Transactions.

a. “Dual‑Status” Rule. For transactions other than consumer‑goods transactions, this Article approves what some cases have called the “dual‑status” rule, under which a security interest may be a purchase‑money security interest to some extent and a non‑ purchase‑money security interest to some extent. (Concerning consumer‑goods transactions, see subsection (h) and Comment 8.) Some courts have found this rule to be explicit or implicit in the words “to the extent,” found in former Section 9‑107 and continued in subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) . The rule is made explicit in subsection (e). For non‑consumer‑goods transactions, this Article rejects the “transformation” rule adopted by some cases, under which any cross‑collateralization, refinancing, or the like destroys the purchase‑money status entirely.

Consider, for example, what happens when a $10,000 loan secured by a purchase‑money security interest is refinanced by the original lender, and, as part of the transaction, the debtor borrows an additional $2,000 secured by the collateral. Subsection (f) resolves any doubt that the security interest remains a purchase‑money security interest. Under subsection (b), however, it enjoys purchase‑money status only to the extent of $10,000.

b. Allocation of Payments. Continuing with the example, if the debtor makes a $1,000 payment on the $12,000 obligation, then one must determine the extent to which the security interest remains a purchase‑money security interest‑$9,000 or $10,000. Subsection (e)(1) expresses the overriding principle, applicable in cases other than consumer‑goods transactions, for determining the extent to which a security interest is a purchase‑money security interest under these circumstances: freedom of contract, as limited by principle of reasonableness. An unconscionable method of application, for example, is not a reasonable one and so would not be given effect under subsection (e)(1). In the absence of agreement, subsection (e)( 2) permits the obligor to determine how payments should be allocated. If the obligor fails to manifest its intention, obligations that are not secured will be paid first. (As used in this Article, the concept of “obligations that are not secured” means obligations for which the debtor has not created a security interest. This concept is different from and should not be confused with the concept of an “unsecured claim” as it appears in Bankruptcy Code Section 506(a).) The obligor may prefer this approach, because unsecured debt is likely to carry a higher interest rate than secured debt. A creditor who would prefer to be secured rather than unsecured also would prefer this approach.

After the unsecured debt is paid, payments are to be applied first toward the obligations secured by purchase‑money security interests. In the event that there is more than one such obligation, payments first received are to be applied to obligations first incurred. See subsection (e)(3). Once these obligations are paid, there are no purchase‑money security interests and no additional allocation rules are needed.

Subsection (f) buttresses the dual‑status rule by making it clear that (in a transaction other than a consumer‑goods transaction) cross‑ collateralization and renewals, refinancings, and restructurings do not cause a purchase‑money security interest to lose its status as such. The statutory terms “renewed,” “refinanced,” and “restructured” are not defined. Whether the terms encompass a particular transaction depends upon whether, under the particular facts, the purchase‑money character of the security interest fairly can be said to survive. Each term contemplates that an identifiable portion of the purchase‑ money obligation could be traced to the new obligation resulting from a renewal, refinancing, or restructuring.

c. Burden of Proof. As is the case when the extent of a security interest is in issue, under subsection (g) the secured party claiming a purchase‑money security interest in a transaction other than a consumer‑goods transaction has the burden of establishing whether the security interest retains its purchase‑money status. This is so whether the determination is to be made following a renewal, refinancing, or restructuring or otherwise.

8. Consumer‑Goods Transactions; Characterization Under Other Law. Under subsection (h), the limitation of subsections (e), (f), and (g) to transactions other than consumer‑goods transactions leaves to the court the determination of the proper rules in consumer‑goods transactions. Subsection (h) also instructs the court not to draw any inference from this limitation as to the proper rules for consumer‑goods transactions and leaves the court free to continue to apply established approaches to those transactions.

This Section addresses only whether a security interest is a “purchase‑money security interest” under this Article, primarily for purposes of perfection and priority. See, e.g., Sections 9‑317, 9‑324. In particular, its adoption of the dual‑status rule, allocation of payments rules, and burden of proof standards for non‑consumer‑goods transactions is not intended to affect or influence characterizations under other statutes. Whether a security interest is a “purchase‑money security interest” under other law is determined by that law. For example, decisions under Bankruptcy Code Section 522(f) have applied both the dual‑status and the transformation rules. The Bankruptcy Code does not expressly adopt the state law definition of “purchase‑money security interest.” Where federal law does not defer to this Article, this Article does not, and could not, determine a question of federal law.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

The most significant litigated issues under the former definition of a purchase‑money security interest (former Section 36‑9‑107), were whether a security interest lost its purchase‑money status if the original purchase‑ money obligation was refinanced or cross collateralized. These issues did arise in the commercial context in cases where an inventory financer that had cross‑collateralized a series of purchase‑money obligations attempted to claim a purchase‑money priority under former Section 9‑312(3). See Southtrust Bank v. Borg‑Warner Acceptance Corp., 760 F. 2d 1240 (11th Cir. 1985) . The issues, however, were more frequently litigated in consumer bankruptcy cases when a debtor attempted to invoke Section 522(f)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. Section 522(f)(2) to avoid nonpossessory nonpurchase‑money security interests to the extent they impaired the debtor’s exemption in household goods.

ARTICLE 9 now clearly addresses the effect of refinancing and cross‑ collateralization upon purchase‑money security interests in non‑consumer goods transactions. Section 9‑103(b) overrules the Southtrust Bank decision and preserves the purchase‑money status of the security interest of an inventory floor‑planner who cross‑collateralizes its advances. See Section 36‑9‑103, Official Comment 4. In addition, in non‑consumer goods transactions, revised Section 9‑103(f) provides that neither the cross‑ collateralization or refinancing of purchase‑money obligations destroys the purchase‑money status of the security interest. The Comment to revised Section 9‑103 state that the provision adopts the “dual status” doctrine. Moreover, revised Section 9‑103(e) provides allocation rules when the purchase‑money status of a security interest in a non‑consumer goods transaction depends upon the application of a payment to a particular obligation.

ARTICLE 9 does not, however, provide rules governing the effect of refinancing or cross‑collateralization upon the purchase‑money status of security interests in consumer goods transactions. Section 9‑103(h) expressly leaves that determination to the courts. The appellate courts of South Carolina have not addressed these issues. There are, however, some federal decisions applying South Carolina law which do.

Two reported federal court decisions interpreting former Section 36‑9‑107 in the context of a debtor’s attempt to avoid a security interest under section 522(f)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code indicate that the refinancing or cross‑collateralization of a purchase‑money obligation may destroy the purchase money status of the security interest. Rosen v. Associates Financial Services Co., 17 B.R. 436 (D.S.C. 1982); Haus v. Barclays American Corp. (In re Haus), 18 B.R. 413 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1982). In Rosen the District Court held that any refinancing of a purchase money obligation extinguished the purchase‑money character of the security interest. This holding was subsequently adopted by the Fourth Circuit in Dominion Bank of the Cumberlands, NA v. Nuckolls, 780 F. 2d 408, 413 (4th Cir. 1985). In Haus, a case involving the cross‑collateralization of purchase money obligations for consumer goods that the debtor purchased in a series of independent transactions, the Bankruptcy Court held that, “if consumer goods secure any indebtedness other than their own and there is no formula for the application of payments, the security interest is not a purchase‑money security interest.” 18 B.R. at 417.

The Haus decision leaves open the possibility that a secured seller can retain a purchase money security interest in consumer goods despite cross‑collateralization if the secured party can allocate payments to the various items of collateral. The South Carolina Consumer Protection Code provides a formula for the application of payments on cross collateralization consumer credit sales. Section 367‑2‑409 S.C. Code Ann. ( Rev. 1989). Under this provision payments on cross‑collateralized sales are applied pro rata to the debts arising from the sales. The proration, however, is computed on the basis of the amounts of original debts secured by the various security interests. To illustrate assume that on January 1, 2002, Buyer purchased a television from seller for $600 and granted Seller a purchase money security interest in the television to secure her obligation to pay the price of the television in 12 monthly installments of $50. On July 1, 2002, and when the balance due on the television had been reduced to $300, Buyer purchased a VCR from Seller for $300. In conjunction with the purchase of the VCR Buyer executed a security agreement that granted Seller a security interest in the VCR to secure both the price of the VCR and the unpaid balance on the television and a security interest in the television to secure both the unpaid balance on the television and the price of the VCR. Under the terms of July 1, 2002 security agreement Buyer was obligated to make 12 monthly installments of $50. Under Section 37‑2‑409(1) of the monthly installments commencing on July 1, 202, $33.33 would be applied to the television and $16.67 would be applied to the VCR. As a result, under Section 37‑2‑409(1) Seller’s security interest on the television would terminate upon its receipt of the March 1, 2003 installment payment.

In an unreported case, Horlbeck v. Dixie Furniture, No. 81‑01782 (Bankr. D.S.C. July 9, 1982), the Bankruptcy Court invoked Section 37‑2‑409 to preserve, in part, a purchase money security interest of a secured seller that cross‑collateralized a series of consumer goods. See John B. Butler, II, Lien Avoidance Under Section 522(f) in the District of South Carolina, 35 S.C.L. Rev., 311, 324‑29 (1984). The impact of Horlbeck and Section 37‑2‑409 can be illustrated by assuming that in the above example that Buyer made all the installments through December 1, 2002, but filed for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on January 1, 2003. On the date of bankruptcy the total debt owned to Seller was $300. Under Section 37‑2‑409(1) the balance due on the television was $100 and the amount due on the VCR was $ 200. Under Horlbeck Seller’s security interest in the VCR would retain its purchase money status to the extent of $200 because even though the security interest in the VCR secured the debt arising from the television as well as the price of the VCR, Section 37‑2‑409(1) provides a formula for the application of payments. Nevertheless, under Horlbeck and despite the payment allocation formula of Section 37‑2‑409(1) Seller’s security interest in the television would be transformed into a nonpurchase‑money security interest. The Bankruptcy Court concluded in Horlbeck that Rosen and Haus would require this result because of the effect of the July 1, 2002 cross‑collateralization was to refinance the television, satisfying the debt for the price of the television and obligating the Buyer to pay a new loan secured by the television.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Consignor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(21) |
| “Consumer‑goods transactions” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(24) |
| “Inventory” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(98) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) |
| “Software” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(75) |

Cross References—

1. Automatic perfection of a purchase‑money security interest in consumer goods. Section 36‑9‑309(1).

2. Grace period for perfection of purchase‑money security interest by filing against lien creditors and buyers not in ordinary course, and lessees not in ordinary course. Section 36‑9‑317(e).

3. Purchase‑money priority in goods other than inventory and livestock. Section 36‑9‑324(a).

4. Purchase‑money priority in inventory. Section 36‑9‑329(b) and (c).

5. Purchase‑money priority in livestock. Section 36‑9‑324(d) and (e).

6. Purchase‑money priority in software. Section 36‑9‑324(f).

7. Conflicting purchase‑money security interests. Section 36‑9‑324(g).

8. Purchase‑money priority in fixtures. Section 36‑9‑334(d) and (h).

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Secured Transactions 19, 83, 118, 146.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak19; 349Ak83; 349Ak118; 349Ak146.

LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES

Lien Avoidance Under Section 522(f) in the District of South Carolina. 35 S.C. L. Rev. 311 (Winter 1984.)

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 1

1. In general

In absence of any definition of term in the Bankruptcy Code, court would look to state law to determine whether creditor that provided financing to Chapter 13 debtors within 910 days prior to their bankruptcy filing to allow them to acquire motor vehicle for their personal use had “purchase money security interest” in vehicle, so as to be protected by “hanging paragraph” from having its claim bifurcated for purposes of cramming down plan. In re Vinson (Bkrtcy.D.S.C. 2008) 391 B.R. 754. Bankruptcy 2575; Bankruptcy 3708(8)

Mere fact that sum advanced to Chapter 13 debtors in connection with prepetition motor vehicle financing transaction included money to pay off negative equity in trade‑in vehicle did not affect “purchase money” nature of security interest taken by creditor in debtors’ new vehicle, for purpose of deciding whether creditor, as one that provided this financing within 910 days prior to petition date, was protected by “hanging paragraph” from having its claim bifurcated for purposes of cramming down plan; payoff of debtors’ negative equity in trade‑in was integral part of purchase transaction, such that money advanced for this payoff was part of price of new vehicle or value given to enable debtors to acquire rights therein. In re Vinson (Bkrtcy.D.S.C. 2008) 391 B.R. 754. Bankruptcy 2575; Bankruptcy 3708(8); Secured Transactions 146

A lender did not have a properly perfected purchase money security interest in hotel furnishings and equipment where the lender failed to file a finance statement prior to the time the hotel received possession of the equipment and furniture or within 20 days thereafter. Goldome Realty Credit Corp. v. Conway Hotel Properties, Inc. (S.C.App. 1990) 303 S.C. 158, 399 S.E.2d 442. Secured Transactions 146

**SECTION 36‑9‑104.** Control of deposit account.

(a) A secured party has control of a deposit account if:

(1) the secured party is the bank with which the deposit account is maintained;

(2) the debtor, secured party, and bank have agreed in an authenticated record that the bank will comply with instructions originated by the secured party directing disposition of the funds in the deposit account without further consent by the debtor; or

(3) the secured party becomes the bank’s customer with respect to the deposit account.

(b) A secured party that has satisfied subsection (a) has control, even if the debtor retains the right to direct the disposition of funds from the deposit account.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑104; 1966 (54) 2716; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. New; derived from Section 8‑106.

2. Why “Control” Matters. This Section explains the concept of “control” of a deposit account. “Control” under this Section may serve two functions. First, “control . . . pursuant to the debtor’s agreement” may substitute for an authenticated security agreement as an element of attachment. See Section 9‑203(b)(3)(D). Second, when a deposit account is taken as original collateral, the only method of perfection is obtaining control under this Section. See Section 9‑312(b)(1).

3. Requirements for “Control.” This Section derives from Section 8‑106 of Revised Article 8, which defines “control” of securities and certain other investment property. Under subsection (a)(1), the bank with which the deposit account is maintained has control. The effect of this provision is to afford the bank automatic perfection. No other form of public notice is necessary; all actual and potential creditors of the debtor are always on notice that the bank with which the debtor’s deposit account is maintained may assert a claim against the deposit account.

Under subsection (a)(2), a secured party may obtain control by obtaining the bank’s authenticated agreement that it will comply with the secured party’s instructions without further consent by the debtor. The analogous provision in Section 8‑106 does not require that the agreement be authenticated. An agreement to comply with the secured party’s instructions suffices for “control” of a deposit account under this Section even if the bank’s agreement is subject to specified conditions, e.g. , that the secured party’s instructions are accompanied by a certification that the debtor is in default. (Of course, if the condition is the debtor’s further consent, the statute explicitly provides that the agreement would not confer control.) See revised Section 8‑106, Comment 7.

Under subsection (a)(3), a secured party may obtain control by becoming the bank’s “customer,” as defined in Section 4‑104. As the customer, the secured party would enjoy the right (but not necessarily the exclusive right) to withdraw funds from, or close, the deposit account. See Sections 4‑401(a), 4‑403(a).

Although the arrangements giving rise to control may themselves prevent, or may enable the secured party at its discretion to prevent, the debtor from reaching the funds on deposit, subsection (b) makes clear that the debtor’s ability to reach the funds is not inconsistent with “control.”

Perfection by control is not available for bank accounts evidenced by an instrument (e.g., certain certificates of deposit), which by definition are “instruments” and not “deposit accounts.” See Section 9‑102 (defining “deposit account” and “instrument”).

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Under prior law Article 9 did not apply to the transfer of an interest in deposit accounts except as provided with respect to proceeds. See former Section 36‑9‑104(1). Under the revised statute Article 9 applies to security interests in deposit accounts as original collateral in non‑consumer transactions. See Section 36‑9‑109(d)(13). Control of a deposit account under Section 36‑9‑104(a) can serve as a substitute for an authenticated security agreement for purposes satisfying the conditions for enforceability of a security interest under Section 36‑9‑203(b)(3)(D). Furthermore, control under section 36‑9‑104(a) is the exclusive method of perfecting a security interest in a deposit account as original collateral. See Sections 36‑9‑312( b)(1) and 36‑9‑314(a).

Cross References—

1. Definition of Deposit Account. Section 36‑9‑102(a)(29).

2. Exclusion of an assignment of a deposit account in a consumer transaction. Section 36‑9‑109(d)(13).

3. Requirements to enforceability of a security interest in a deposit account. Section 36‑9‑203(b)(3)(D).

4. Duties and Rights of secured party having control of a deposit account. Section 36‑9‑207(c).

5. Perfection of a security interest in a deposit account. Sections 36‑9‑312(b)(1) and 36‑9‑314(a).

6. Security interests in cash proceeds commingled with other funds in a deposit account Section 36‑9‑315(b)(2), (c), and (d)(2).

7. Priority rules governing security interests in deposit accounts. Section 36‑9‑327.

8. Rights of transferee of funds from a deposit account subject to a security interest. Section 36‑9‑332(b).

9. Bank’s right of recoupment or set‑off against a deposit account subject to a security interest. Section 36‑9‑340.

10. Bank’s duties with respect to a deposit account subject to a security interest. Section 36‑9‑341.

11. Bank’s right to refuse to enter into or disclose the existence of a control agreement. Section 36‑9‑342.

12. Rights and duties after default of a secured party in control of a deposit account. Section 36‑9‑601(c).

13. Enforcement by a secured party with a security interest in a deposit account perfected by control. Section 36‑9‑607 (a)(4) and (5).

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S.C. Jur. Shipping Law Section 55, Lien Under Ship Mortgage Act.

**SECTION 36‑9‑105.** Control of electronic chattel paper

(a) A secured party has control of electronic chattel paper if a system employed for evidencing the transfer of interests in the chattel paper reliably establishes the secured party as the person to which the chattel paper was assigned.

(b) A system satisfies subsection (a) if the record or records comprising the chattel paper are created, stored, and assigned in such a manner that:

(1) a single authoritative copy of the record or records exists which is unique, identifiable and, except as otherwise provided in items (4), (5), and (6), unalterable;

(2) the authoritative copy identifies the secured party as the assignee of the record or records;

(3) the authoritative copy is communicated to and maintained by the secured party or its designated custodian;

(4) copies or amendments that add or change an identified assignee of the authoritative copy can be made only with the consent of the secured party;

(5) each copy of the authoritative copy and any copy of a copy is readily identifiable as a copy that is not the authoritative copy; and

(6) any amendment of the authoritative copy is readily identifiable as authorized or unauthorized.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑105; 1966 (54) 2716; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 1991 Act No. 161, Section 2(E); 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12; 2013 Act No. 96, Section 3, eff July 1, 2013.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. New.

2. “Control” of Electronic Chattel Paper. This Article covers security interests in “electronic chattel paper,” a new term defined in Section 9‑102. This Section governs how “control” of electronic chattel paper may be obtained. Subsection (a), which derives from Section 16 of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, sets forth the general test for control. Subsection (b) sets forth a safe harbor test that, if satisfied, establishes control under the general test in subsection (a). A secured party’s control of electronic chattel paper (i) may substitute for an authenticated security agreement for purposes of attachment under Section 9‑203, (ii) is a method of perfection under Section 9‑314, and (iii) is a condition for obtaining special, nontemporal priority under Section 9‑330. Because electronic chattel paper cannot be transferred, assigned, or possessed in the same manner as tangible chattel paper, a special definition of control is necessary. In descriptive terms, this Section provides that control of electronic chattel paper is the functional equivalent of possession of “tangible chattel paper” (a term also defined in Section 9‑102).

3. Development of Control Systems. This Article leaves to the marketplace the development of systems and procedures, through a combination of suitable technologies and business practices, for dealing with control of electronic chattel paper in a commercial context. Systems that evolve for control of electronic chattel paper may or may not involve a third party custodian of the relevant records. As under UETA, a system must be shown to reliably establish that the secured party is the assignee of the chattel paper. Reliability is a high standard and encompasses the general principles of uniqueness, identifiability, and unalterability found in subsection (b) without setting forth specific guidelines as to how these principles must be achieved. However, these standards applied to determine whether a party is in control of electronic chattel paper should not be more stringent than the standards now applied to determine whether a party is in possession of tangible chattel paper. For example, just as a secured party does not lose possession of tangible chattel paper merely by virtue of the possibility that a person acting on its behalf could wrongfully redeliver the chattel paper to the debtor, so control of electronic chattel paper would not be defeated by the possibility that the secured party’s interest could be subverted by the wrongful conduct of a person (such as a custodian) acting on its behalf. This section and the concept of control of electronic chattel paper are not based on the same concepts as are control of deposit accounts (Section 9‑104), security entitlements, a type of investment property (Section 9‑106), and a letter of credit rights (Section 9‑107). The rules for control of those types of collateral are based on existing market practices and legal and regulatory regimes for institutions such as banks and securities intermediaries. Analogous practices for electronic chattel paper are developing nonetheless. The flexible approach adopted by this section, moreover, should not impede the development of these practices and, eventually legal and regulatory regimes, which may become analogous to those for, e.g., investment property.

4. “Authoritative Copy” of Electronic Chattel Paper. One requirement for establishing control under subsection (b) is that a particular copy be an “ authoritative copy.” Although other copies may exist, they must be distinguished from the authoritative copy. This may be achieved, for example, through the methods of authentication that are used or by business practices involving the marking of any additional copies. When tangible chattel paper is converted to electronic chattel paper, in order to establish that a copy of the electronic chattel paper is the authoritative copy it may be necessary to show that the tangible chattel paper no longer exists or has been permanently marked to indicate that it is not the authoritative copy.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑105 sets forth the requirements for control of electronic chattel paper. Section 36‑9‑102(a)(31) defines electronic chattel paper as chattel paper evidenced by a record or records consisting of information stored in an electronic medium. Under Section 36‑9‑314(a) a secured party can perfect a security interest in electronic chattel paper by obtaining control.

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|  | Definitional Cross: |  |
| “Chattel paper” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(11) |
| “Communicate” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(18) |
| “Electronic chattel paper” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(31) |
| “Record” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(70) |
|  | Cross— |  |

1. Control satisfies the evidentiary requirement for the creation of a security interest in electronic chattel paper. Section 36‑9‑203(b)(3)(D).

2. Control as a method of perfecting a security interest in electronic paper. Section 36‑9‑314(a).

3. Filing as a method of perfecting a security interest in electronic chattel paper. Section 36‑9‑312(a).

4. Priority of purchasers of chattel paper. Section 36‑9‑330.

Effect of Amendment

The 2013 amendment rewrote the section.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 89, 133.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak89; 349Ak133.

**SECTION 36‑9‑106.** Control of investment property.

(a) A person has control of a certificated security, uncertificated security, or security entitlement as provided in Section 36‑8‑106.

(b) A secured party has control of a commodity contract if:

(1) the secured party is the commodity intermediary with which the commodity contract is carried; or

(2) the commodity customer, secured party, and commodity intermediary have agreed that the commodity intermediary will apply any value distributed on account of the commodity contract as directed by the secured party without further consent by the commodity customer.

(c) A secured party having control of all security entitlements or commodity contracts carried in a securities account or commodity account has control over the securities account or commodity account.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑106; 1966 (54) 2716; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑115(e).

2. “Control” Under Article 8. For an explanation of “control” of securities and certain other investment property, see Section 8‑106, Comments 4 and 7.

3. “Control” of Commodity Contracts. This Section, as did former Section 9‑115(1)(e), contains provisions relating to control of commodity contracts which are analogous to those in Section 8‑106 for other types of investment property.

4. Securities Accounts and Commodity Accounts. For drafting convenience, control with respect to a securities account or commodity account is defined in terms of obtaining control over the security entitlements or commodity contracts. Of course, an agreement that provides that (without further consent of the debtor) the securities intermediary or commodity intermediary will honor instructions from the secured party concerning a securities account or commodity account described as such is sufficient. Such an agreement necessarily implies that the intermediary will honor instructions concerning all security entitlements or commodity contracts carried in the account and thus affords the secured party control of all the security entitlements or commodity contracts.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑106 sets forth the requirements for establishing control over investment property. With respect to securities and security entitlements subsection (a) incorporates the requirements of Section 36‑8‑106. Subsection (b) sets forth the requirements for control over a commodity contract. Subsection (c) addresses control over securities accounts and commodity accounts.

In 1994 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute issued a substantial revision to Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code with conforming amendments to Article 9. Article 8 governs investment securities. South Carolina did not adopt the 1994 revision of Article 8 until 2001 when the state adopted the 1999 revision of Article 9. The 1994 revision of Article 8 transferred the provisions on security interests in investment securities from Article 8 to Article 9. See Section 9‑115 (1994 Official Text). Because South Carolina did not adopt the 1994 revision to Article 8 before it adopted the 1999 revision to Article 9, the Official Comment to the provisions of revised Article 9 addressing investment securities may be misleading.

Definitional Cross References:

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| “Certificated security” | Section 36‑8‑102(a)(4) |
| “Commodity account” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(14) |
| “Commodity contract” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(15) |
| “Commodity intermediary” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(17) |
| “Securities account” | Section 36‑8‑501(a) |
| “Security entitlement” | Section 36‑8‑102(a)(17) |
| “Uncertificated security” | Section 36‑8‑102(a)(18) |

Cross References—

1. Choice of law rules governing security interests in investment property. Section 36‑9‑305.

2. The requirements for control of a certificated security, uncertificated security, or security entitlement are set forth in Section 36‑8‑106.

3. Under Section 36‑9‑203(b)(3) a secured party’s control of an investment property is sufficient to satisfy the evidentiary requirement for attachment of a security interest on the investment property. Section 36‑9‑102(a)(49) defines “investment property” as a security, whether certificated or uncertificated, security entitlement, securities account, commodity contract, or commodity account. Therefore, a secured party that has control of a collateral under Section 36‑9‑106 can enforce an oral security agreement.

4. Under Section 36‑9‑314(a) a security interest in investment property may be perfected by control. Under Section 6‑9‑312(a) a security party may also perfect a security interest in an investment property by filing. Moreover, under Section 36‑9‑313(a) a security interest in a certificated security can be perfected by taking delivery under Section 36‑8‑301.

5. Section 36‑9‑328 sets forth the rules governing the priority of conflicting security interests in investment properties. Under Section 36‑9‑328(a) a security interest perfected by control has priority over a security interest held by a secured party who does not have control.

6. Special priority rules on proceeds of investment property subject to a security interest perfected by control.

7. Rights of protected purchasers of securities. Section 36‑9‑331(a).

8. Preservation of protection against claims afforded under Article 8. Section 36‑9‑331(b).

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 89, 133.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak89; 349Ak133.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Encyclopedias

S.C. Jur. Assignments Section 13, Money Owed and Accounts.

**SECTION 36‑9‑107.** Control of letter‑of‑credit right.

A secured party has control of a letter‑of‑credit right to the extent of any right to payment or performance by the issuer or any nominated person if the issuer or nominated person has consented to an assignment of proceeds of the letter of credit under Section 36‑5‑114(c) or otherwise applicable law or practice.

HISTORY: 1962 Section 10.9‑107; 1966 (54) 2716; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. New.

2. “Control” of Letter‑of‑Credit Right. Whether a secured party has control of a letter‑of‑credit right may determine the secured party’s priority as against competing secured parties. See Section 9‑329. This Section provides that a secured party acquires control of a letter‑of‑credit right by receiving an assignment if the secured party obtains the consent of the issuer or any nominated person, such as a confirmer or negotiating bank, under Section 5‑114 or other applicable law or practice. Because both issuers and nominated persons may give or be obligated to give value under a letter of credit, this Section contemplates that a secured party obtains control of a letter‑of‑credit right with respect to the issuer or a particular nominated person only to the extent that the issuer or that nominated person consents to the assignment. For example, if a secured party obtains control to the extent of an issuer’s obligation but fails to obtain the consent of a nominated person, the secured party does not have control to the extent that the nominated person gives value. In many cases the person or persons who will give value under a letter of credit will be clear from its terms. In other cases, prudence may suggest obtaining consent from more than one person. The details of the consenting issuer’s or nominated person’s duties to pay or otherwise render performance to the secured party are left to the agreement of the parties.

3. “Proceeds of a Letter of Credit.” Section 5‑114 follows traditional banking terminology by referring to a letter of credit beneficiary’s assignment of its right to receive payment thereunder as an assignment of the “proceeds of a letter of credit.” However, as the seller of goods can assign its right to receive payment (an “account”) before it has been earned by delivering the goods to the buyer, so the beneficiary of a letter of credit can assign its contingent right to payment before the letter of credit has been honored. See Section 5‑114(b). If the assignment creates a security interest, the security interest can be perfected at the time it is created. An assignment of, including the creation of a security interest in, a letter‑of‑credit right is an assignment of a present interest.

4. “Transfer” vs. “Assignment.” Letter‑of‑credit law and practice distinguish the “transfer” of a letter of credit from an “assignment.” Under a transfer, the transferee itself becomes the beneficiary and acquires the right to draw. Whether a new, substitute credit is issued or the issuer advises the transferee of its status as such, the transfer constitutes a novation under which the transferee is the new, substituted beneficiary (but only to the extent of the transfer, in the case of a partial transfer).

Section 5‑114(e) provides that the rights of a transferee beneficiary or nominated person are independent of the beneficiary’s assignment of the proceeds of a letter of credit and are superior to the assignee’s right to the proceeds. For this reason, transfer does not appear in this Article as a means of control or perfection. Section 9‑109(c)(4) recognizes the independent and superior rights of a transferee beneficiary under Section 5‑114(e); this Article does not apply to the rights of a transferee beneficiary or nominated person to the extent that those rights are independent and superior under Section 5‑114.

5. Supporting Obligation: Automatic Attachment and Perfection. A letter‑of‑credit right is a type of “supporting obligation,” as defined in Section 9‑102. Under Sections 9‑203 and 9‑308, a security interest in a letter‑of‑credit right automatically attaches and is automatically perfected if the security interest in the supported obligation is a perfected security interest. However, unless the secured party has control of the letter‑of‑credit right or itself becomes a transferee beneficiary, it cannot obtain any rights against the issuer or a nominated person under Article 5. Consequently, as a practical matter, the secured party’s rights would be limited to its ability to locate and identify proceeds distributed by the issuer or nominated person under the letter of credit.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

This provision sets forth the requirements a secured party must meet to obtain control of a letter‑of‑credit right. Section 36‑9‑102(a)(51) defines a letter‑of‑credit right as “a right to payment or performance under a letter of credit. . .” Under revised Article 9 a letter‑of‑credit right is a distinct form of property upon which a secured party can establish a security interest. By obtaining control of a beneficiary’s letter‑of‑credit right a secured party can satisfy the evidentiary requirement for attachment of its security interest under Section 36‑9‑203(b)(3)(D); perfect its security interest under section 36‑9‑314(a); and establish priority of its security interest over conflicting security interests under Section 36‑9‑329.

For a secured party to obtain control of a beneficiary’s letter‑of‑credit right, Section 36‑9‑107 requires the beneficiary to assign the proceeds of the letter of credit to the secured party and for the issuer or the nominated party to consent to the assignment. In stating these requirements section 36‑9‑107 refers to consent under Section 36‑ 5‑114(c). This reference is misleading because it refers to a provision in the 1995 revision of Article 5 that has not been enacted in South Carolina. Section 5‑114(c) of the 1995 revision states the requirements for an effective assignment of the proceeds of a letter of credit. Under that provision an assignment of the right to the proceeds of a letter of credit is not effective unless the issuer or nominated person consents to the assignment.

The failure of South Carolina to enact the 1995 revision of Article 5 raises a number of problems under Section 36‑9‑107. First, there is no section 36‑5‑114 (c), the provision referenced in Section 36‑9‑107. The provision of the South Carolina Code addressing the assignment of proceeds of a letter of credit is Section 36‑5‑116. Second, and more significantly, Section 36‑5‑116 does not condition the effectiveness of an assignment of the proceeds of a letter of credit upon the issuer’s or nominated party’s consent to the assignment. These problems should not, however, affect the application of Section 36‑9‑107.

Section 36‑9‑107 by its own terms conditions control over a letter‑of‑ credit right upon the issuer’s or nominated party’s consent to the assignment of the proceeds of the letter of credit. The reference to Section 9‑114(c) does not impose the condition of consent. As a result, that Section 36‑5‑116 does not condition the effectiveness of an assignment of the proceeds of a letter of credit upon the issuer’s or nominated party’s consent to the assignment does not mean that a secured party can establish control under Section 36‑9‑107 without obtaining consent.

A more troubling issue is that a secured party can comply with the requirements of Section 36‑5‑116 for an effective assignment of the proceeds of a letter of credit, but not have control of the letter‑of‑credit right. For example, assume that SP‑1 obtained an assignment of Beneficiary’s rights to the proceeds of a letter of credit which met the requirements of Section 36‑5‑116(2), but failed to obtain Issuer’s consent to the assignment. Subsequently, SP‑2 took an assignment of Beneficiary’s right to the proceeds of the letter of credit and obtained Issuer’s consent to the assignment. Because SP‑2 had control of Beneficiary’s letter‑of‑credit right and SP‑1 did not, under Section 36‑9‑329(1) SP‑2 would be entitled to priority. Therefore, a secured party claiming a security interest in the proceeds of a letter of credit cannot rely upon compliance with Section 36‑5‑116 to establish priority. To establish priority, a secured party must have control under Section 36‑9‑107, which in turn requires the consent of the issuer or nominated party.

A distinct priority problem can arise when one secured party takes an assignment of the proceeds of a letter of credit in compliance with Section 36‑5‑116(2) and a second secured party claims a security interest in the letter‑of‑credit right as a “supporting obligation.” See Sections 36‑9‑102(a)(77), 36‑9‑203(f), and 36‑9‑308(d). Section 36‑5‑116(2)(b) provides that a secured party who takes an assignment of the proceeds of a letter of credit perfects its security interest under Article 9 by taking delivery of the letter of credit. Section 36‑9‑308(d) provides that perfection in the underlying collateral perfects a security interest in a supporting obligation. To illustrate this conflict assume that SP‑1 takes an assignment of a letter of credit issued by Bank to secure a debt Seller owes to SP‑1. SP‑1 obtains delivery of the letter of credit, but does not obtain Bank’s consent to the assignment. SP‑2 takes a security interest in Seller’s accounts which are backed by the letter of credit and SP‑2 files with respect to Seller’s accounts. SP‑1 has a perfected security interest in the proceeds of the letter of credit under Section 36‑5‑116(2)(6). SP‑2 has perfected security interest in the letter‑of‑credit rights as a supporting obligation under Section 36‑9‑308(d). Because neither secured party has control of the letter‑of‑credit rights, Section 36‑9‑329 does not govern the priority dispute. The applicable priority rule would be the first to file or perfect rule of Section 36‑9‑322(a)(1) and (b)(2). As a result, if SP‑2 filed covering Seller’s accounts before SP‑1 took delivery of the letter of credit, SP‑2 would be entitled to priority. Note, however, that if SP‑1 had obtained Bank’s consent to the assignment, it would have had control under Section 36‑9‑107 and priority over SP‑2 under Section 36‑9‑329 even if SP‑2 filed before SP‑1 obtained control.

The parties to a letter of credit transaction may be able to avoid the interpretative problems under South Carolina law by agreeing that the law of another jurisdiction will govern the rights of the parties. Section 36‑9‑306(a) provides that the law of the issuer’s jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection and the priority of a security interest in a letter‑of‑credit right if that jurisdiction is a State and if the security interest is perfected by control. Section 36‑9‑306(b) provides that an issuer’s jurisdiction is the jurisdiction whose law governs the liability of the issuer with respect to a letter‑of‑credit right as provided in Section 36‑5‑116. The reference to Section 36‑5‑116 is misleading. Section 5‑116 of the current Official Text is a choice of law provision that was included in the 1995 revision of Article 5. South Carolina has not enacted the 1995 revision and Section 36‑5‑116 is not a choice of law provision. Under Section 5‑116(a) the parties can establish the issuer’s jurisdiction by an agreement included in the letter of credit even if that jurisdiction bears no relationship to the transaction. Section 5‑116(a), therefore, invites the parties to a letter of credit to agree that the law of a jurisdiction that has enacted both the 1999 revision of Article 9 and the 1995 revision of Article 5 will be the law of the issuer’s jurisdiction. By doing so, the parties may be able to avoid the problems that can arise under South Carolina law. Because South Carolina has not enacted Section 5‑116 of the Official Text, a South Carolina court might not enforce a choice of law term made pursuant to that provision. Nevertheless, if the issuer’s jurisdiction agreed upon in the letter of credit “bears a reasonable relation” to the transaction, a South Carolina court should enforce the choice of law term under Section 36‑1‑105(1) [see now Section 36‑1‑301].

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Issuer” | Section 36‑5‑103(1)(c) |
| “Letter of Credit” | Section 36‑5‑103(1)(a) |
| “Letter‑of‑Credit Right” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(51) |
| “Nominated person” | See [Section 36‑5‑102(a)(22) 1995 Revision] |
| “Proceeds of Letter of Credit” | See Section 36‑5‑116 |

Cross References—

1. Attachment—Under Section 36‑9‑203(b)(3)(D) control of a letter‑of‑ credit right satisfies the evidentiary requirement for attachment of a security interest.

2. Perfection—Under Section 36‑9‑314(a) a secured party may perfect a security interest in a letter‑of‑credit right by obtaining control under section 36‑9‑107. Moreover, under Section 36‑9‑312(b)(2), unless the security interest in a letter‑of‑credit right is claimed as a “supporting obligation,” control is the exclusive method of perfection.

3. Supporting Obligations—Section 36‑9‑102(a)(77) defines supporting obligation to include a letter‑of‑credit right that supports payment of an account or chattel paper. Under Section 36‑9‑308(d), if the security interest in the original collateral is perfected, the security interest in the supporting obligation is also perfected. To illustrate, assume that Seller sells goods to Buyer on unsecured credit terms. To assure payment, Seller requires Buyer to obtain a standard letter of credit from Bank with Seller as beneficiary. SP takes a security interest in Seller’s accounts which it perfects by filing a financing statement. Under section 36‑9‑102(a)( 77) Seller’s rights under the letter of credit constitute a supporting obligation. Under section 36‑9‑203(f) SP’s security interest in Seller’s accounts extends to the letter‑of‑credit right. Moreover, under Section 36‑9‑308(d) SP’s filing cover Seller’s accounts perfect SP’s security interest the letter‑of‑credit right.

4. Priority—Under Section 36‑9‑329(1) a security interest in a letter‑of‑ credit right perfected by control has priority over a conflicting security interest perfected under Section 36‑9‑308(d). If multiple security interests in a letter‑of‑credit right are perfected by control, Section 36‑9‑329(1) provides that they rank in priority according to the time of obtaining control.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 89, 133.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak89; 349Ak133.

**SECTION 36‑9‑108.** Sufficiency of description.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (c), (d), and (e), a description of personal or real property is sufficient, whether or not it is specific, if it reasonably identifies what is described.

(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), a description of collateral reasonably identifies the collateral if it identifies the collateral by:

(1) specific listing;

(2) category;

(3) except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), a type of collateral defined in the Uniform Commercial Code;

(4) quantity;

(5) computational or allocational formula or procedure; or

(6) except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), any other method, if the identity of the collateral is objectively determinable.

(c) A description of collateral as “all the debtor’s assets” or “all the debtor’s personal property” or using words of similar import does not reasonably identify the collateral.

(d) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), a description of a security entitlement, securities account, or commodity account is sufficient if it describes:

(1) the collateral by those terms or as investment property; or

(2) the underlying financial asset or commodity contract.

(e) A description only by type of collateral defined in the Uniform Commercial Code is an insufficient description of:

(1) a commercial tort claim; or

(2) in a consumer transaction, consumer goods, a security entitlement, a securities account, or a commodity account.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑108; 1966 (54) 2716; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Sections 9‑110, 9‑115(3).

2. General Rules. Subsection (a) retains substantially the same formulation as former Section 9‑110. Subsection (b) expands upon subsection (a) by indicating a variety of ways in which a description might reasonably identify collateral. Whereas a provision similar to subsection (b) was applicable only to investment property under former Section 9‑115(3), subsection (b) applies to all types of collateral, subject to the limitation in subsection (d). Subsection (b) is subject to subsection (c), which follows prevailing case law and adopts the view that an “all assets” or “all personal property” description for purposes of a security agreement is not sufficient. Note, however, that under Section 9‑504, a financing statement sufficiently indicates the collateral if it “covers all assets or all personal property.”

The purpose of requiring a description of collateral in a security agreement under Section 9‑203 is evidentiary. The test of sufficiency of a description under this Section, as under former Section 9‑110, is that the description do the job assigned to it: make possible the identification of the collateral described. This Section rejects any requirement that a description is insufficient unless it is exact and detailed (the so‑called “serial number” test).

3. After‑Acquired Collateral. Much litigation has arisen over whether a description in a security agreement is sufficient to include after‑acquired collateral if tHe agreement does not explicitly so provide. This question is one of contract interpretation and is not susceptible to a statutory rule (other than a rule to the effect that it is a question of contract interpretation). Accordingly, this Section contains no reference to descriptions of after‑acquired collateral.

4. Investment Property. Under subsection (d), the use of the wrong Article 8 terminology does not render a description invalid (e.g., a security agreement intended to cover a debtor’s “security entitlements” is sufficient if it refers to the debtor’s “securities”). Note also that given the broad definition of “securities account” in Section 8‑501, a security interest in a securities account also includes all other rights of the debtor against the securities intermediary arising out of the securities account. For example, a security interest in a securities account would include credit balances due to the debtor from the securities intermediary, whether or not they are proceeds of a security entitlement. Moreover, describing collateral as a securities account is a simple way of describing all of the security entitlements carried in the account.

5. Consumer Investment Property; Commercial Tort Claims. Subsection (e) requires greater specificity of description in order to prevent debtors from inadvertently encumbering certain property. Subsection (e) requires that a description by defined “type” of collateral alone of a commercial tort claim or, in a consumer transaction, of a security entitlement, securities account, or commodity account, is not sufficient. For example, “all existing and after‑acquired investment property” or “all existing and after‑acquired security entitlements,” without more, would be insufficient in a consumer transaction to describe a security entitlement, securities account, or commodity account. The reference to “only by type” in subsection (e) means that a description is sufficient if it satisfies subsection (a) and contains a descriptive component beyond the “type” alone. Moreover, if the collateral consists of a securities account or commodity account, a description of the account is sufficient to cover all existing and future security entitlements or commodity contracts carried in the account. See Section 9‑203(h), (i).

Under Section 9‑204, an after‑acquired collateral clause in a security agreement will not reach future commercial tort claims. It follows that when an effective security agreement covering a commercial tort claim is entered into the claim already will exist. Subsection (e) does not require a description to be specific. For example, a description such as “all tort claims arising out of the explosion of debtor’s factory” would suffice, even if the exact amount of the claim, the theory on which it may be based, and the identity of the tortfeasor(s) are not described. (Indeed, those facts may not be known at the time.)

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑108 provides the rules for determining whether a description of property is sufficient. These rules will determine whether a security agreement contains a description of collateral sufficient to create an enforceable security interest under Section 36‑9‑203(b)(3)(A). Although subsection (a) retains the same “reasonable identifies” standard as former Section 36‑9‑110, subsection (b) sets forth a list of descriptions which are deemed sufficient. The most significant of these is that a description of a type of collateral defined in the Uniform Commercial Code is generally sufficient. Section 36‑9‑108 (b)(3) and (d). Section 36‑9‑103(c), however, provides that a supergeneric description such as “all the debtor’s personal property” does not reasonably identify collateral and is not sufficient.

Definitional Cross References:

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| “Commercial tort claim” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(13) |
| “Commodity account” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(14) |
| “Commodity contract” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(15) |
| “Consumer Goods” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(23) |
| “Consumer transaction” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(26) |
| “Financial asset” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(9) |
| “Investment property” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(49) |
| “Security account” | Section 36‑8‑501(a) |
| “Security entitlement” | Section 36‑8‑102(a)(17) |

Cross References—

1. Requirement that an authenticated security agreement contain a description of collateral in order for a security interest to attach. Section 36‑9‑203(b)(3)(A).

2. Types of collateral defined in the Uniform Commercial Code include:

Accessions. Section 36‑9‑102(a)(1).

Accounts. Section 36‑9‑102(a)(2).

Certificated securities. Section 36‑9‑102(a)(9).

Chattel paper. Section 36‑9‑102(a)(11).

Commercial tort claim. Section 36‑9‑102(a)(13) [generic description insufficient].

Commodity accounts. Section 36‑9‑102(a)(14).

Consumer goods. Section 36‑9‑102(a)(23) [generic description insufficient in consumer transactions].

Deposit accounts . Section 36‑9‑102(a)(29).

Documents. Section 36‑9‑102(a)(30).

Electronic chattel paper. Section 36‑9‑102(a)(31).

Equipment. Section 36‑9‑102(a)(33).

Farm products. Section 36‑9‑102(a)(34).

Financial assets. Section 36‑9‑102(a)(9).

Fixtures. Section 36‑9‑102(a)(41).

General intangibles. Section 36‑9‑102(a)(42).

Goods. Section 36‑9‑102(a)(44).

Health‑care‑insurance receivables. Section 36‑9‑102(a)(46).

Instruments. Section 36‑9‑102(a)(47).

Inventory. Section 36‑9‑102(a)(48).

Investment property. Section 36‑9‑102(a)(49).

Letter‑of‑credit rights . Section 36‑9‑102(a)(51).

Payment intangibles. Section 36‑9‑102(a)(61).

Promissory notes. Section 36‑9‑102(a)(65).

Securities. Section 36‑9‑102(a)(15). Securities account. Section 36‑8‑501(a).

Security entitlement. Section 36‑8‑102(a)(75).

Software. Section 36‑9‑102(a)(75).

Tangible chattel paper. Section 36‑9‑102 (a)(78).

Uncertificated security. Section 36‑8‑102(a)(18).

3. Whether a description of collateral must include an express after acquired property clause to create a security interest in after acquired collateral. See Section 36‑9‑108, Official Comment 3.

4. Indication of collateral in a financing statement. Section 36‑9‑504.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 43 to 45, 94.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak43 to 349Ak45; 349Ak94.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 1

1. In general

Considering Sections 36‑9‑203, 36‑9‑402 and 36‑9‑110 of the Uniform Commercial Code, both the security agreement and the financing statement must contain a sufficient description of the land on which crops are to be grown, to make possible the identification of the thing described. Citizens Bank v. Gregory’s Warehouse, Inc. (S.C.App. 1988) 297 S.C. 151, 375 S.E.2d 316. Secured Transactions 45; Secured Transactions 94

Subpart 2

Applicability of Article

**SECTION 36‑9‑109.** Scope.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (c) and (d), this chapter applies to:

(1) a transaction, regardless of its form, that creates a security interest in personal property or fixtures by contract;

(2) an agricultural lien;

(3) a sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes;

(4) a consignment;

(5) a security interest arising under Section 36‑2‑401, 36‑2‑505, 36‑2‑711(3), or 36‑2A‑508(5), as provided in Section 36‑9‑110; and

(6) a security interest arising under Section 36‑4‑208 or 36‑5‑118.

(b) The application of this chapter to a security interest in a secured obligation is not affected by the fact that the obligation is itself secured by a transaction or interest to which this chapter does not apply.

(c) This chapter does not apply to the extent that:

(1) a statute, regulation, or treaty of the United States preempts this chapter; or

(2) the rights of a transferee beneficiary or nominated person under a letter of credit are independent and superior under Section 36‑5‑114.

(d) This chapter does not apply to:

(1) a landlord’s lien, other than an agricultural lien, but Section 36‑9‑317 applies as to the priority of the landlord’s lien;

(2) a lien, other than an agricultural lien, given by statute or other rule of law for services or materials, but Section 36‑9‑333 applies with respect to priority of the lien;

(3) an assignment of a claim for wages, salary, or other compensation of an employee;

(4) a sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes as part of a sale of the business out of which they arose;

(5) an assignment of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes which is for the purpose of collection only;

(6) an assignment of a right to payment under a contract to an assignee that also is obligated to perform under the contract;

(7) an assignment of a single account, payment intangible, or promissory note to an assignee in full or partial satisfaction of a preexisting indebtedness;

(8) a transfer of an interest in or an assignment of a claim under a policy of insurance, other than an assignment by or to a health care provider of a health care insurance receivable and any subsequent assignment of the right to payment, but Sections 36‑9‑315 and 36‑9‑322 apply with respect to proceeds and priorities in proceeds;

(9) an assignment of a right represented by a judgment, other than a judgment taken on a right to payment that was collateral;

(10) a right of recoupment or set‑off, but:

(A) Section 36‑9‑340 applies with respect to the effectiveness of rights of recoupment or set‑off against deposit accounts; and

(B) Section 36‑9‑404 applies with respect to defenses or claims of an account debtor;

(11) the creation or transfer of an interest in or lien on real property, including a lease or rents thereunder, except to the extent that provision is made for:

(A) liens on real property in Sections 36‑9‑203 and 36‑9‑308;

(B) fixtures in Section 36‑9‑334;

(C) fixture filings in Sections 36‑9‑501, 36‑9‑502, 36‑9‑512, 36‑9‑516, and 36‑9‑519; and

(D) security agreements covering personal and real property in Section 36‑9‑604;

(12) an assignment of a claim arising in tort, other than a commercial tort claim, but Sections 36‑9‑315 and 36‑9‑322 apply with respect to proceeds and priorities in proceeds;

(13) an assignment of a deposit account in a consumer transaction, but Sections 36‑9‑315 and 36‑9‑322 apply with respect to proceeds and priorities in proceeds; or

(14) a transfer by a government or governmental unit.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑109; 1966 (54) 2716; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12; 2002 Act No. 192, Section 1, eff March 22, 2002.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Sections 9‑102, 9‑104.

2. Basic Scope Provision. Subsection (a)(1) derives from former Section 9‑102(1) and (2). These subsections have been combined and shortened. No change in meaning is intended. Under subsection (a)(1), all consensual security interests in personal property and fixtures are covered by this Article, except for transactions excluded by subsections (c) and (d). As to which transactions give rise to a “security interest,” the definition of that term in Section 1‑201 must be consulted. When a security interest is created, this Article applies regardless of the form of the transaction or the name that parties have given to it.

3. Agricultural Liens. Subsection (a)(2) is new. It expands the scope of this Article to cover agricultural liens, as defined in Section 9‑102.

4. Sales of Accounts, Chattel Paper, Payment Intangibles, Promissory Notes, and Other Receivables. Under subsection (a)(3), as under former Section 9‑102, this Article applies to sales of accounts and chattel paper. This approach generally has been successful in avoiding difficult problems of distinguishing between transactions in which a receivable secures an obligation and those in which the receivable has been sold outright. In many commercial financing transactions the distinction is blurred.

Subsection (a)(3) expands the scope of this Article by including the sale of a “payment intangible” (defined in Section 9‑102 as “a general intangible under which the account debtor’s principal obligation is a monetary obligation”) and a “promissory note” (also defined in Section 9‑102). To a considerable extent, this Article affords these transactions treatment identical to that given sales of accounts and chattel paper. In some respects, however, sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes are treated differently from sales of other receivables. See, e.g., Sections 9‑309 (automatic perfection upon attachment), 9‑408 (effect of restrictions on assignment). By virtue of the expanded definition of “account” (defined in Section 9‑102), this Article now covers sales of (and other security interests in) “health‑care‑insurance receivables” (also defined in Section 9‑102). Although this Article occasionally distinguishes between outright sales of receivables and sales that secure an obligation, neither this Article nor the definition of “security interest” (Section 1‑201(37)) delineates how a particular transaction is to be classified. That issue is left to the courts.

5. Transfer of Ownership in Sales of Receivables. A “sale” of an account, chattel paper, a promissory note, or a payment intangible includes a sale of a right in the receivable, such as a sale of a participation interest. The term also includes the sale of an enforcement right. For example, a “[p]erson entitled to enforce” a negotiable promissory note (Section 3‑301) may sell its ownership rights in the instrument. See Section 3‑203, Comment 1 (“Ownership rights in instruments may be determined by principles of the law of property, independent of Article 3, which do not depend upon whether the instrument was transferred under Section 3‑203.”). Also, the right under Section 3‑309 to enforce a lost, destroyed, or stolen negotiable promissory note may be sold to a purchaser who could enforce that right by causing the seller to provide the proof required under that Section. This Article rejects decisions reaching a contrary result, e.g., Dennis Joslin Co. v. Robinson Broadcasting, 977 F. Supp. 491 (D.D.C. 1997).

Nothing in this Section or any other provision of Article 9 prevents the transfer of full and complete ownership of an account, chattel paper, an instrument, or a payment intangible in a transaction of sale. However, as mentioned in Comment 4, neither this Article nor the definition of “security interest” in Section 1‑201 provides rules for distinguishing sales transactions from those that create a security interest securing an obligation. This Article applies to both types of transactions. The principal effect of this coverage is to apply this Article’s perfection and priority rules to these sales transactions. Use of terminology such as “security interest,” “debtor,” and “collateral” is merely a drafting convention adopted to reach this end, and its use has no relevance to distinguishing sales from other transactions. See PEB Commentary No. 14.

Following a debtor’s outright sale and transfer of ownership of a receivable, the debtor‑seller retains no legal or equitable rights in the receivable that has been sold. See Section 9‑318(a). This is so whether or not the buyer’s security interest is perfected. (A security interest arising from the sale of a promissory note or payment intangible is perfected upon attachment without further action. See Section 9‑309.) However, if the buyer’s interest in accounts or chattel paper is unperfected, a subsequent lien creditor, perfected secured party, or qualified buyer can reach the sold receivable and achieve priority over (or take free of) the buyer’s unperfected security interest under Section 9‑317. This is so not because the seller of a receivable retains rights in the property sold; it does not. Nor is this so because the seller of a receivable is a “debtor” and the buyer of a receivable is a “secured party” under this Article (they are). It is so for the simple reason that Sections 9‑318(b), 9‑317, and 9‑322 make it so, as did former Sections 9‑301 and 9‑312. Because the buyer’s security interest is unperfected, for purposes of determining the rights of creditors of and purchasers for value from the debtor‑seller, under Section 9‑318(b) the debtor‑seller is deemed to have the rights and title it sold. Section 9‑317 subjects the buyer’s unperfected interest in accounts and chattel paper to that of the debtor‑ seller’s lien creditor and other persons who qualify under that Section.

6. Consignments. Subsection (a)(4) is new. This Article applies to every “consignment.” The term, defined in Section 9‑102, includes many but not all “true” consignments (i.e., bailments for the purpose of sale). If a transaction is a “sale or return,” as defined in revised Section 2‑326, it is not a “consignment.” In a “sale or return” transaction, the buyer becomes the owner of the goods, and the seller may obtain an enforceable security interest in the goods only by satisfying the requirements of Section 9‑203.

Under common law, creditors of a bailee were unable to reach the interest of the bailor (in the case of a consignment, the consignor‑owner). Like former Section 2‑326 and former Article 9, this Article changes the common‑ law result; however, it does so in a different manner. For purposes of determining the rights and interests of third‑party creditors of, and purchasers of the goods from, the consignee, but not for other purposes, such as remedies of the consignor, the consignee is deemed to acquire under this Article whatever rights and title the consignor had or had power to transfer. See Section 9‑319. The interest of a consignor is defined to be a security interest under revised Section 1‑201(37), more specifically, a purchase‑money security interest in the consignee’s inventory. See Section 9‑103(d). Thus, the rules pertaining to lien creditors, buyers, and attachment, perfection, and priority of competing security interests apply to consigned goods. The relationship between the consignor and consignee is left to other law. Consignors also have no duties under Part 6. See Section 9‑601( g).

Sometimes parties characterize transactions that secure an obligation (other than the bailee’s obligation to returned bailed goods) as “consignments.” These transactions are not “consignments” as contemplated by Section 9‑109(a)(4). See Section 9‑102. This Article applies also to these transactions, by virtue of Section 9‑109(a)(1). They create a security interest within the meaning of the first sentence of Section 1‑201(37).

This Article does not apply to bailments for sale that fall outside the definition of “consignment” in Section 9‑102 and that do not create a security interest that secures an obligation.

7. Security Interest in Obligation Secured by Non‑Article 9 Transaction. Subsection (b) is unchanged in substance from former Section 9‑102(3). The following example provides an illustration.

Example 1: O borrows $10,000 from M and secures its repayment obligation, evidenced by a promissory note, by granting to M a mortgage on O’s land. This Article does not apply to the creation of the real‑property mortgage. However, if M sells the promissory note to X or gives a security interest in the note to secure M’s own obligation to X, this Article applies to the security interest thereby created in favor of X. The security interest in the promissory note is covered by this Article even though the note is secured by a real‑property mortgage. Also, X’s security interest in the note gives X an attached security interest in the mortgage lien that secures the note and, if the security interest in the note is perfected, the security interest in the mortgage lien likewise is perfected. See Sections 9‑203, 9‑308.

It also follows from subsection (b) that an attempt to obtain or perfect a security interest in a secured obligation by complying with non‑Article 9 law, as by an assignment of record of a real‑property mortgage, would be ineffective. Finally, it is implicit from subsection (b) that one cannot obtain a security interest in a lien, such as a mortgage on real property, that is not also coupled with an equally effective security interest in the secured obligation. This Article rejects cases such as In re Maryville Savings & Loan Corp., 743 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1984), clarified on reconsideration, 760 F.2d 119 (1985).

8. Federal Preemption. Former Section 9‑104(a) excluded from Article 9 “a security interest subject to any statute of the United States, to the extent that such statute governs the rights of parties to and third parties affected by transactions in particular types of property.” Some (erroneously) read the former Section to suggest that Article 9 sometimes deferred to federal law even when federal law did not preempt Article 9. Subsection (c)(1) recognizes explicitly that this Article defers to federal law only when and to the extent that it must‑i.e., when federal law preempts it.

9. Governmental Debtors. Former Section 9‑104(e) excluded transfers by governmental debtors. It has been revised and replaced by the exclusions in new paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (c). These paragraphs reflect the view that Article 9 should apply to security interests created by a State, foreign country, or a “governmental unit” (defined in Section 9‑102) of either except to the extent that another statute governs the issue in question. Under paragraph (2), this Article defers to all statutes of the forum State. (A forum cannot determine whether it should consult the choice‑of‑law rules in the forum’s UCC unless it first determines that its UCC applies to the transaction before it.) Paragraph (3) defers to statutes of another State or a foreign country only to the extent that those statutes contain rules applicable specifically to security interests created by the governmental unit in question.

Example 2: A New Jersey state commission creates a security interest in favor of a New York bank. The validity of the security interest is litigated in New York. The relevant security agreement provides that it is governed by New York law. To the extent that a New Jersey statute contains rules peculiar to creation of security interests by governmental units generally, to creation of security interests by state commissions, or to creation of security interests by this particular state commission, then that law will govern. On the other hand, to the extent that New Jersey law provides that security interests created by governmental units, state commissions, or this state commission are governed by the law generally applicable to secured transactions (i.e., New Jersey’s Article 9), then New York’s Article 9 will govern.

Example 3: An airline that is an instrumentality of a foreign country creates a security interest in favor of a New York bank. The analysis used in the previous example would apply here. That is, if the matter is litigated in New York, New York law would govern except to the extent that the foreign country enacted a statute applicable to security interests created by governmental units generally or by the airline specifically.

The fact that New York law applies does not necessarily mean that perfection is accomplished by filing in New York. Rather, it means that the court should apply New York’s Article 9, including its choice‑of‑law provisions. Under New York’s Section 9‑301, perfection is governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located. Section 9‑307 determines the debtor’s location for choice‑of‑law purposes.

If a transaction does not bear an appropriate relation to the forum State, then that State’s Article 9 will not apply, regardless of whether the transaction would be excluded by paragraph (3).

Example 4: A Belgian governmental unit grants a security interest in its equipment to a Swiss secured party. The equipment is located in Belgium. A dispute arises and, for some reason, an action is brought in a New Mexico state court. Inasmuch as the transaction bears no “appropriate relation” to New Mexico, New Mexico’s UCC, including its Article 9, is inapplicable. See Section 1‑105(1). New Mexico’s Section 9‑109(c) on excluded transactions should not come into play. Even if the parties agreed that New Mexico law would govern, the parties’ agreement would not be effective because the transaction does not bear a “reasonable relation” to New Mexico. See Section 1‑105(1).

Conversely, Article 9 will come into play only if the litigation arises in a UCC jurisdiction or if a foreign choice‑of‑law rule leads a foreign court to apply the law of a UCC jurisdiction. For example, if issues concerning a security interest granted by a foreign airline to a New York bank are litigated overseas, the court may be bound to apply the law of the debtor’s jurisdiction and not New York’s Article 9.

10. Certain Statutory and Common‑Law Liens; Interests in Real Property. With few exceptions (nonconsensual agricultural liens being one), this Article applies only to consensual security interests in personal property. Following former Section 9‑104(b) and (j), paragraphs (1) and (11) of subsection (d) exclude landlord’s liens and leases and most other interests in or liens on real property. These exclusions generally reiterate the limitations on coverage (i.e., “by contract,” “in personal property and fixtures”) made explicit in subsection (a)(1). Similarly, most jurisdictions provide special liens to suppliers of many types of services and materials, either by statute or by common law. With the exception of agricultural liens, it is not necessary for this Article to provide general codification of this lien structure, which is determined in large part by local conditions and which is far removed from ordinary commercial financing. As under former Section 9‑104(c), subsection (d)(2) excludes these suppliers’ liens (other than agricultural liens) from this Article. However, Section 9‑333 provides a rule for determining priorities between certain possessory suppliers’ liens and security interests covered by this Article.

11. Wage and Similar Claims. As under former Section 9‑104(d), subsection (d)(3) excludes assignments of claims for wages and the like from this Article. These assignments present important social issues that other law addresses. The Federal Trade Commission has ruled that, with some exceptions, the taking of an assignment of wages or other earnings is an unfair act or practice under the Federal Trade Commission Act. See 16 C.F.R. Part 444. State statutes also may regulate such assignments.

12. Certain Sales and Assignments of Receivables; Judgments. In general this Article covers security interests in (including sales of) accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes. Paragraphs (4), (5),(6), and (7) of subsection (d) exclude from the Article certain sales and assignments of receivables that, by their nature, do not concern commercial financing transactions. These paragraphs add to the exclusions in former Section 9‑104(f) analogous sales and assignments of payment intangibles and promissory notes. For similar reasons, subsection (d)(9) retains the exclusion of assignments of judgments under former Section 9‑104(h) (other than judgments taken on a right to payment that itself was collateral under this Article).

13. Insurance. Subsection (d)(8) narrows somewhat the broad exclusion of interests in insurance policies under former Section 9‑104(g). This Article now covers assignments by or to a health‑care provider of “health‑care‑insurance receivables” (defined in Section 9‑102).

14. Set‑Off. Subsection (d)(10) adds two exceptions to the general exclusion of set‑off rights from Article 9 under former Section 9‑104(i). The first takes account of new Section 9‑340, which regulates the effectiveness of a set‑off against a deposit account that stands as collateral. The second recognizes Section 9‑404, which affords the obligor on an account, chattel paper, or general intangible the right to raise claims and defenses against an assignee (secured party).

15. Tort Claims. Subsection (d)(12) narrows somewhat the broad exclusion of transfers of tort claims under former Section 9‑104(k). This Article now applies to assignments of “commercial tort claims” (defined in Section 9‑102) as well as to security interests in tort claims that constitute proceeds of other collateral (e.g., a right to payment for negligent destruction of the debtor’s inventory). Note that once a claim arising in tort has been settled and reduced to a contractual obligation to pay (as in, but not limited to, a structured settlement) the right to payment becomes a payment intangible and ceases to be a claim arising in tort.

This Article contains two special rules governing creation of a security interest in tort claims. First, a description of collateral in a security agreement as “all tort claims” is insufficient to meet the requirement for attachment. See Section 9‑108(e). Second, no security interest attaches under an after‑acquired property clause to a tort claim. See Section 9‑204(b). In addition, this Article does not determine whom the tortfeasor must pay to discharge its obligation. Inasmuch as a tortfeasor is not an “account debtor,” the rules governing waiver of defenses and discharge of an obligation by an obligor (Sections 9‑403, 9‑404, 9‑405, and 9‑406) are inapplicable to tort‑claim collateral.

16. Deposit Accounts. Except in consumer transactions, deposit accounts may be taken as original collateral under this Article. Under former Section 9‑104(l), deposit accounts were excluded as original collateral, leaving security interests in deposit accounts to be governed by the common law. The common law is nonuniform, often difficult to discover and comprehend, and frequently costly to implement. As a consequence, debtors who wished to use deposit accounts as collateral sometimes were precluded from doing so as a practical matter. By excluding deposit accounts from the Article’s scope as original collateral in consumer transactions, subsection (d)(13) leaves those transactions to law other than this Article. However, in both consumer and non‑consumer transactions, Sections 9‑315 and 9‑322 apply to deposit accounts as proceeds and with respect to priorities in proceeds.

This Article contains several safeguards to protect debtors against inadvertently encumbering deposit accounts and to reduce the likelihood that a secured party will realize a windfall from a debtor’s deposit accounts. For example, because “deposit account” is a separate type of collateral, a security agreement covering general intangibles will not adequately describe deposit accounts. Rather, a security agreement must reasonably identify the deposit accounts that are the subject of a security interest, e.g., by using the term “deposit accounts.” See Section 9‑108. To perfect a security interest in a deposit account as original collateral, a secured party (other than the bank with which the deposit account is maintained) must obtain “control” of the account either by obtaining the bank’s authenticated agreement or by becoming the bank’s customer with respect to the deposit account. See Sections 9‑312(b)(1), 9‑104. Either of these steps requires the debtor’s consent.

This Article also contains new rules that determine which State’s law governs perfection and priority of a security interest in a deposit account (Section 9‑304), priority of conflicting security interests in and set‑off rights against a deposit account (Sections 9‑327, 9‑340), the rights of transferees of funds from an encumbered deposit account (Section 9‑332), the obligations of the bank (Section 9‑341), enforcement of security interests in a deposit account (Section 9‑607(c)), and the duty of a secured party to terminate control of a deposit account (Section 9‑208(b)).

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT [amended—2002]

A. Transactions Creating a Security Interest in Personal Property

Section 36‑9‑109(1)(a) provides that unless subject a statutory exception, Article 9 applies to “a transaction, regardless of its form, that creates a security interest in personal property or fixtures by contract.” The breadth of this provision can be appreciated by examining the scope of the term “personal property.” Although the statute does not define the term, it is clear that the term includes a significantly broader range of collateral than prior law. The following lists types of personal property that can be subject to a security interest under Article 9. This classification of collateral should prove useful in a discussion of attachment, perfection, priority, and default because the statute draws distinctions in these areas based upon the type of collateral in issue.

1. Types of Personal Property which may be Subject to Article 9 Security Interest

a. Accounts—Section 36‑9‑102(a)(2)

Section 36‑9‑102(a)(2) defines “account” to mean a right to payment of a monetary obligation, whether or not earned by performance.

(1) for “property” sold, leased, licensed, assigned, or otherwise disposed of;

(2) for services rendered;

(3) for issuance of a policy of insurance;

(4) for incurring a secondary obligation such as a guarantee or issuing a letter of credit;

(5) for energy provided;

(6) for hiring a vessel;

(7) arising out of the use of a charge or credit card;

(8) as winnings in a government sponsored lottery or game of chance;

(9) health care insurance receivables which are defined in Section 36‑9‑102(a)(46) as claims under a policy of insurance for payment of an obligation for health care goods or services provided.

b. Chattel paper—Section 36‑9‑102(a)(11)

Chattel Paper is defined as a record that evidences a monetary obligation and a security interest in specific goods, a security interest in specific goods and software used in the goods, or a lease of specific goods. Chattel paper may either be “tangible chattel paper” as defined in Section 36‑9‑102(a)(78) as chattel paper consisting of information inscribed on a tangible form or “electronic chattel paper” defined in Section 36‑9‑102(a)(31) as chattel paper consisting of information stored in an electronic medium.

c. Commercial Tort Claims—Section 36‑9‑102(a)(13)

Commercial tort claims include all tort claims held by an “organization” and tort claims of individuals that arose in the course of the claimant’s business and do not cover damages for personal injury or death.

d. Deposit Accounts—Section 36‑9‑102(a)(29)

Deposit accounts are defined as time savings, passbook, or similar accounts maintained with a bank and which are not evidenced by an instrument.

e. Documents—Section 36‑9‑102(a)(30)

f. General Intangibles—Section 36‑9‑102(a)(44)

General intangibles is the catch all category of collateral and is defined to include “any personal property, including things in action, other than accounts, chattel paper, commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, documents, goods, instruments, investment property, letter‑of‑credit rights, letters of credit, money, and oil, gas, or other minerals before extraction.” Software is expressly included in the definition of general intangibles. Revised Article 9 has a subset of general intangibles referred to as ‘payment intangibles’ which are defined as general intangibles under which the account debtor’s principal obligation is a monetary obligation. See Section 36‑9‑102(a)(6).

g. Goods—Section 36‑9‑109(a)(44)

Goods are defined as “all things that are moveable when a security interest attaches.” The term expressly includes fixtures; standing timber to be cut under a conveyance or contract of sale; unborn animals; crops including crops produced on trees, vines, and bushes; and manufactured homes as defined in Section 36‑9‑102(a)(53). Goods also include a computer program embedded in goods if the program is customarily considered part of the goods or by becoming the order of the goods a person acquires the right to use the program.

The broad category of goods is divided into several subsets.

(1) Accessions—Section 36‑9‑102(a)(1)

Goods physically united to other goods but which do not lose their identity.

(2) As Extracted Collateral—Section 36‑9‑102(a)(6)(A)

As extracted collateral includes oil, gas, or other minerals that are subject to a security interest created by a person who owns the collateral before extraction and which attaches upon extraction.

(3) Consumer Goods—Section 36‑9‑102(a)(1)

Goods that are used or bought primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.

(4) Equipment—Section 36‑9‑102(a)(33)

Goods other than inventory, farm products or inventory.

(5) Farm Products—Section 36‑9‑102(a)(34)

Goods, excluding standing timber, owned by a debtor engaged in farming operations which are crops, aquatic goods produced in aquacultural operations, livestock, farming supplies, or products of crops or livestock in their unmanufactured state.

(6) Fixtures—Section 36‑9‑102(a)(41)

Goods so related to real property that an interest in them arises under real property law.

(7) Inventory—Section 36‑9‑102(a)(48)

Inventory includes goods other than farm products which are leased by a lessor, held for sale, lease, or to be furnished under a service contract, raw materials, work in progress, and materials used or consumed in a business.

h. Instruments—Section 36‑9‑102(a)(47)

Negotiable instruments and any other writing that evidences a right to payment and is a type that is transferred in the ordinary course by delivery and any necessary indorsement.

i. Investment Property—Section 36‑9‑102(a)(49)

Investment property includes:

(1) Certificated Securities—Section 36‑8‑102(a)(4)(1994)

(2) Uncertificated Securities—Section 36‑8‑102(a)(18)(1994)

(3) Securities Entitlements—Section 36‑8‑102(a)(7)(1994)

(4) Securities Accounts—Section 36‑8‑501(a)(1994)

(5) Commodity Contracts—Section 36‑9‑102(a)(15)

(6) Commodity Accounts—Section 36‑9‑102(a)(14)

j. Letter of Credit Rights—Section 36‑9‑102(a)(51)

A letter of credit right is a beneficiary’s right to payment under a letter of credit, but does not include the right of a beneficiary to demand payment under a letter of credit. To illustrate this definition assume that Buyer as applicant and Bank as issuer enter into a letter of credit naming Seller as beneficiary. The letter of credit provides that Bank will make payment to Seller upon presentation of documents evidencing Seller’s shipment of goods to Buyer. Seller’s letter of credit rights include the right to receive payment upon its presentation of documents. Seller’s letter of credit rights do not include the right to assign his status as beneficiary to another supplier of goods.

B. Landlord’s lien

Section 9‑109(d)(1) of the 1999 Official Text provides that Article 9 does not apply “to a landlord’s lien, other than an agricultural lien.” South Carolina has revised the Official Text of Sections 9‑109(d)(1) and 9‑317(a)(2) to clarify that Article 9 provides the priority rule governing a conflict between an Article 9 security interest and a landlord’s lien for distraint. The revision in Section 36‑9‑109(d)(1) provides that the priority conflict between a landlord’s lien and a security interest is governed by Section 36‑9‑317. The revision in Section 36‑9‑317(a)(2), in effect, provides that a secured party who files or perfects before a landlord levies a distress warrant has priority over the landlord.

Under Section 36‑9‑317(a)(2) a landlord’s lien for distraint will have priority over a security interest only if the landlord establishes its lien before the earlier of the time that the security interest is perfected or a financing statement covering the collateral is filed. A landlord seeking to collect rent through distraint does not obtain a lien until there is an actual levy of the distress warrant. Burnett v. Boukedes, 240 S.C. 144, 125 S.E. 2de 10, 115 (1962). Therefore, if a secured party files a financing statement or otherwise perfects its security interest before the landlord levies on the collateral pursuant to a distress warrant, the secured party will have priority over the landlord. The South Carolina revisions in Sections 36‑9‑109(d)(1) and 36‑9‑317(a)(2) are consistent with the decision in Ex Parte J.M. Smith Corp., Shearouse Advance Sheet No. 25169 (S.C., July 10, 2000)

C. Agricultural liens

Section 36‑9‑109(a)(2) provides that Article 9 extends to agricultural liens. Section 36‑9‑102(a)(5) defines an agricultural lien as an interest, other than a security interest, in farm products which meet three requirements. First, an agricultural lien must secure payment or performance of an obligation for either goods or services furnished in connection with a debtor’s farming operation or rent on real property leased by a debtor in connection with its farming operation. Second, an agricultural lien must be created by statute in favor of a person that either in the ordinary course of business provided goods or services to the debtor in connection with the debtor’s farming operation or leased real property to a debtor in connection with the debtor’s farming operation. Third, the effectiveness of an agricultural lien must not depend upon the lienholder’s possession of the encumbered property.

South Carolina has three statutory liens that qualify as agricultural liens under revised Section 36‑9‑102(a)(3). Section 39‑13‑10, S.C. Code Ann. (1976) provides that a landlord leasing land for agricultural purposes has “a prior and preferred lien” upon all crops raised on the leased land to secure the payment of rent. Under Section 29‑13‑10 no writing or recording is necessary to create a landlord’s lien for rent and the lien exists from the date of the lease contract whether the contract is verbal or in writing.

Section 29‑13‑20, S.C. Code Ann. (1976) provides that laborers who assist in making a crop have a lien upon the crop to the extent of the amount due for their labor.

Section 29‑13‑10, S.C. Code Ann. (1976) further provides that landlord has a lien on crops raised by a tenant for all advances that the landlord made to tenant during the year the crop was raised. Section 29‑3‑40, S.C. Code Ann. (Supp. 1999) provides that the landlord’s lien for advances must be indexed in the office of the register of deeds or clerk of court in the county in which the land is located. That section further provides that indexing of the lien constitutes notice to third parties from the date of the indexing and protects the lienholder against the claims of purchasers or creditors who obtain possession of the crop after the lien is indexed.

Section 29‑13‑30, S.C. Code Ann. (1976) provides priority rules for these three agricultural liens. Under that provision the landlord’s lien upon a crop for rent is “in preference to all other liens.” Next in priority is the laborer’s lien upon crop for the amount due for such labor. As between unpaid laborers, the statute provides that there shall be no preference. Finally, the third priority is awarded to the landlord’s lien for advances.

Including agricultural liens within the scope of Article 9 requires holders of such liens to meet the Code’s requirement for perfection. Significantly, an agricultural lien does not have to satisfy the requirements of Section 36‑9‑203 in order to attach and become enforceable. Therefore, the inclusion of agricultural liens within the scope of Article 9 does not render a verbal landlord’s lien for rent unenforceable. An agricultural lienholder, however, must meet the perfection requirements of revised Article 9. Under revised Section 36‑9‑302, South Carolina law controls the perfection of agricultural liens upon farm products located in the State. Section 36‑9‑310(a) provides that agricultural liens are perfected by filing a financing statement. Under Section 36‑9‑501(2) the Secretary of State’s Office is the place in which to file to perfect an agricultural lien.

ARTICLE 9 has a limited impact upon the priority of agricultural liens. If an agricultural lien is unperfected, Section 36‑9‑317 subordinates the lien to perfected agricultural liens and security interests, lien creditors, and buyers who give value and take delivery without knowledge of the lien. If a South Carolina agricultural lien is perfected, however, it is not subject to ARTICLE 9’s normal priority rules. Section 36‑9‑322(g) provides that a perfected agricultural lien has priority over a conflicting security interest or agricultural lien on the same collateral if the statute creating the agricultural lien so provides. Section 29‑13‑30 sets forth priority rules governing the agricultural liens created by Sections 29‑13‑10 and 29‑13‑20. Under these priority rules the landlord’s lien for rent in “preference to all other liens”, laborer’s liens are “next in priority”, and the landlord’s lien for advances “shall be paid next, after the satisfaction of the landlord’s lien for rent and the laborer’s lien for labor. . .” The priority rules of Section 29‑13‑30 should be read as displacing ARTICLE 9 general priority rules. See Poinsett Construction Co. v. Fischer, 301 S.C. 343, 391 S.E. 2d 875 (Ct. App. 1990) (statutory liens afforded ‘first lien’ status under the statutes creating the lien had priority over an earlier perfected security interest).

To illustrate the application of the priority rules governing agricultural liens consider the following:

On March 1, 2002, SP enters into a written security agreement with Farmer retaining a security interest in Farmer’s crop to secure a loan. On March 1, 2002, SP files a financing statement to perfect its security interest. On April 1, 2002, Landlord enters into verbal contract with Farmer under which Landlord leases land to Farmer to raise his crop. Under Section 29‑13‑10 Landlord obtains an agricultural lien upon Farmer’s crop to secure the rent arising under the lease. If Landlord perfects his agricultural lien by filing a financing statement, Landlord will have priority over SP under Sections 36‑9‑322(g) and 29‑13‑30. If Landlord fails to perfect his agricultural lien, SP will have priority over Sections 36‑9‑317(a)(1) and 36‑9‑322(a)(2).

D. Transfers by government and governmental units.

Subsection (14) was added after the revision of this section in 2000. Transfers by governments and governmental units lay outside of the scope of Article 9 prior to its 2000 revision. Subsection (14) was added to provide that as of the effective date of the 2000 revision transfers by government and governmental units will continue to lay outside the scope of Article 9.

Definitional Cross References:

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| --- | --- |
|  |  |
| “Account” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(2) |
| “Agricultural Lien” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(6) |
| “Chattel Paper” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(11) |
| “Commercial Tort Claim” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(13) |
| “Consignment” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(20) |
| “Deposit Account” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(29) |
| “Fixture” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(41) |
| “Health Care Insurance Receivable” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(46) |
| “Letter of Credit” | Section 36‑5‑103(1)(a) [Section 36‑5‑102(a)(10) 1995 Revision] |
| “Nominated Person” | [Section 36‑5‑102(a)(11) 1995 Revision] |
| “Payment Intangible” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(61) |
| “Promissory Note” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(65) |
| “Transferee Beneficiary” | See Section 36‑6‑116 [See Sections 36‑5‑112 and 36‑5‑114(e) 1995 Revision] |

Effect of Amendment

The 2002 amendment, in subsection (c), deleted paragraphs (2) and (3) relating to security interests expressly governed by another South Carolina statute and a statute of another State or foreign country, respectively, and renumbered paragraph (4) as (2), in subsection (d), added paragraph (14), and, in the South Carolina Reporter’s Comment, made organizational changes and added item D.

CROSS REFERENCES

Leases, security interest transfer prohibitions, see Section 36‑2A‑303.

Sale on approval and sale or return; consignment sales and rights of creditors, see Section 36‑2‑326.

Territorial application of code, see Section 36‑1‑301.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 1 to 26.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak1 to 349Ak26.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Forms

Am. Jur. Pl. & Pr. Forms Uniform Commercial Code Section 9:2 , Introductory Comments.

LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES

Conflicting security interests in inventory and proceeds under the revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 41 S.C. L. Rev. 247 (Winter 1990).

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 1

1. In general

Under South Carolina law, neither letter of credit payment and security agreement, nor letter of credit, nor partners’ collateral assignments of partnership interests were negotiable instruments, for purpose of statute freeing all parties from liability when one of the makers of an instrument pays the instrument and takes an assignment thereof. Williams v. Sandman (C.A.4 (S.C.) 1999) 187 F.3d 379. Bills And Notes 151

A statutory lien granted by Section 29‑7‑10, which requires building contractors to pay subcontractors out of the money received for the work the subcontractors are employed to perform, was a “first lien” according to the statute and, therefore, the statutory lien had priority over a perfected security interest in the general contractor’s accounts receivable. The imposition of criminal penalties under Section 29‑7‑20 was not the exclusive remedy against the contractor; if the statute were so construed, it would render meaningless the lien granted to subcontractors by Section 29‑7‑10. Additionally, Chapter 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code was not relevant to the statutory lien. Poinsett Const. Co., Inc. v. Fischer (S.C.App. 1990) 301 S.C. 343, 391 S.E.2d 875. Secured Transactions 144

**SECTION 36‑9‑110.** Security interests arising under Chapter 2.

A security interest arising under Section 36‑2‑401, 36‑2‑505, 36‑2‑711(3), or 36‑2A‑508(5) is subject to this chapter. However, until the debtor obtains possession of the goods:

(1) the security interest is enforceable, even if Section 36‑9‑203(b)(3) has not been satisfied;

(2) filing is not required to perfect the security interest;

(3) the rights of the secured party after default by the debtor are governed by Chapter 2 or 2A; and

(4) the security interest has priority over a conflicting security interest created by the debtor.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑110; 1966 (54) 2716; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑113.

2. Background. Former Section 9‑113, from which this Section derives, referred generally to security interests “arising solely under the Article on Sales (Article 2) or the Article on Leases (Article 2A).” Views differed as to the precise scope of that Section. In contrast, Section 9‑110 specifies the security interests to which it applies.

3. Security Interests Under Articles 2 and 2A. Section 2‑505 explains how a seller of goods may reserve a security interest in them. Section 2‑401 indicates that a reservation of title by the seller of goods, despite delivery to the buyer, is limited to reservation of a security interest. As did former Article 9, this Article governs a security interest arising solely under one of those Sections; however, until the buyer obtains possession of the goods, the security interest is enforceable even in the absence of a security agreement, filing is not necessary to perfect the security interest, and the seller‑secured party’s rights on the buyer’s default are governed by Article 2.

Sections 2‑711(3) and 2A‑508(5) create a security interest in favor of a buyer or lessee in possession of goods that were rightfully rejected or as to which acceptance was justifiably revoked. As did former Article 9, this Article governs a security interest arising solely under one of those Sections; however, until the seller or lessor obtains possession of the goods, the security interest is enforceable even in the absence of a security agreement, filing is not necessary to perfect the security interest, and the secured party’s (buyer’s or lessee’s) rights on the debtor’s (seller’s or lessor’s) default are governed by Article 2 or 2A, as the case may be.

4. Priority. This Section adds to former Section 9‑113 a priority rule. Until the debtor obtains possession of the goods, a security interest arising under one of the specified Sections of Article 2 or 2A has priority over conflicting security interests created by the debtor. Thus, a security interest arising under Section 2‑401 or 2‑505 has priority over a conflicting security interest in the buyer’s after‑acquired goods, even if the goods in question are inventory. Arguably, the same result would obtain under Section 9‑322, but even if it would not, a purchase‑money‑like priority is appropriate. Similarly, a security interest under Section 2‑711( 3) or 2A‑508(5) has priority over security interests claimed by the seller’s or lessor’s secured lender. This result is appropriate, inasmuch as the payments giving rise to the debt secured by the Article 2 or 2A security interest are likely to be included among the lender’s proceeds.

Example: Seller owns equipment subject to a security interest created by Seller in favor of Lender. Buyer pays for the equipment, accepts the goods, and then justifiably revokes acceptance. As long as Seller does not recover possession of the equipment, Buyer’s security interest under Section 2‑711(3) is senior to that of Lender.

In the event that a security interest referred to in this Section conflicts with a security interest that is created by a person other than the debtor, Section 9‑325 applies. Thus, if Lender’s security interest in the example was created not by Seller but by the person from whom Seller acquired the goods, Section 9‑325 would govern.

5. Relationship to Other Rights and Remedies Under Articles 2 and 2A. This Article does not specifically address the conflict between (i) a security interest created by a buyer or lessee and (ii) the seller’s or lessor’s right to withhold delivery under Section 2‑702(1), 2‑703(a), or 2A‑525, the seller’s or lessor’s right to stop delivery under Section 2‑705 or 2A‑526, or the seller’s right to reclaim under Section 2‑507(2) or 2‑702(2). These conflicts are governed by the first sentence of Section 2‑403(1), under which the buyer’s secured party obtains no greater rights in the goods than the buyer had or had power to convey, or Section 2A‑307(1), under which creditors of the lessee take subject to the lease contract.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑110 defines the extent to which security interests arising under Articles 2 and 2A are subject to Article 9. The security interests subject to Section 36‑9‑110 are: a seller’s security interest under Section 36‑2‑401 that arises when a seller reserves title in goods shipped or delivered to a buyer; a seller’s reservation of a security interest in a documentary sale under Section 36‑2‑404; a buyer’s security interest in goods under Section 36‑2‑711(3) that arise when a buyer rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance under Section 36‑2‑711(3); and a lessee’s security interest under Section 36‑2A‑508(5) that arise when the lessee rightfully rejects or on which the lessee justifiably revokes acceptance. Although Article 9 apples to these security interests, Section 36‑9‑110 provides that until the debtor obtains possession of the goods the secured party need not comply with Article 9’s attachment and perfection requirements to obtain priority over security interests created by the debtor.

Definitional Cross References:

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| --- | --- |
|  |  |
| “Debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “Secured party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |

Cross References—

1. Seller’s reservation of title in goods shipped or delivered to the debtor creates a security interest. Section 36‑2‑401(1).

2. Seller’s security interest in goods subject to a bill of lading. Section 36‑2‑505.

3. Buyer’s security interest in goods the buyer rightfully rejects or on which the buyer justifiably revokes acceptance.

4. Lessee’s security interest in goods the lessee rightfully rejects or on which the lessee justifiably revokes acceptance. Section 36‑2A‑508(5).

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Sales 300, 391.5.

Secured Transactions 11, 115.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 343k300; 343k391.5; 349Ak11; 349Ak115.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Forms

Am. Jur. Pl. & Pr. Forms Uniform Commercial Code Section 9:2 , Introductory Comments.

**SECTION 36‑9‑111.** UCC lien satisfaction.

Any licensed attorney admitted to practice in the State of South Carolina who can provide proof of payment of funds for a Uniform Commercial Code lien filed under the provisions of this chapter by evidence of payment made payable to the holder of record, servicer, or other party entitled to receive payment may record, or cause to be recorded, an affidavit, in writing, duly executed in the presence of two witnesses and probated or acknowledged, which states that full payment of the balance of the debt secured by the lien has been made and that evidence of payment from the servicer or lienholder exists. This affidavit, duly recorded in the appropriate county, shall serve as notice of satisfaction of the lien and release of the lien upon the collateral. The filing of the affidavit shall be sufficient to satisfy, release, or discharge the lien. Upon presentation of the instrument of satisfaction, release, or discharge, the officer or his deputy having charge of the recording of instruments shall record the same. This section may not be construed to create liability for failure to file such affidavit. The licensed attorney signing any such instrument which is false is guilty of perjury and subject to Section 16‑9‑10 and shall be liable for damages that any person may sustain as a result of the false affidavit, including reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in connection with the recovery of such damages. The affidavit referred to in this section shall be as follows:

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| --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |
| STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA |  | UCC LIEN |
| COUNTY OF |  | SATISFACTION AFFIDAVIT |
|  |  | PURSUANT TO SECTION 36‑9‑111 |
|  |  | OF SC CODE OF LAWS |
|  |  | FOR BOOK \_\_\_\_ PAGE \_\_\_\_\_ |

The undersigned on oath, being first duly sworn, hereby certifies as follows:

1. The undersigned is a licensed attorney admitted to practice in the State of South Carolina.

2. That with respect to the lien given by \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ dated \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ and recorded in the offices of the Register of Deeds or Clerk of Court in book \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ at page \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_:

a. [ ] that the undersigned was given written payoff information and made such payoff and is in possession of a canceled check to the holder of record or representative servicer;

b. [ ] that the undersigned was given written payoff information and made such pay off by wire transfer or other electronic means to the holder of record or representative servicer and has confirmation from the undersigned’s bank of the transfer to the account provided by the holder of record or representative servicer.

Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this affidavit this \_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_ and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, it is true, correct, and complete.

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| (Witness) | (Signature) |
|  |  |
| (Witness) | (Name—Please Print) |
|  |  |
|  | (Attorney’s S.C. Bar number) |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  | (Street Address) |
|  |  |
|  | (City, State, Zip Code) |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  | (Telephone) |
|  |  |
| SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO |  |
| before me this \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ day |  |
| of \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
| (Notary Public) |  |
|  |  |
| My commission expires: |  |

Upon presentation to the office of the Register of Deeds or Clerk of Court the Register or Clerk is directed to record pursuant to this section and mark the lien satisfied of record.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑111; 1966 (54) 2716; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

(None)

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

(None)

Part 2

Effectiveness of Security Agreement; Attachment of Security Interest; Rights of Parties to Security Agreement

Subpart 1

Effectiveness and Attachment

**SECTION 36‑9‑201.** General effectiveness of security agreement.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in the Uniform Commercial Code, a security agreement is effective according to its terms between the parties, against purchasers of the collateral, and against creditors.

(b) A transaction subject to this article is subject to any applicable rule of law which establishes a different rule for consumers and (i) Title 37 and (ii) any consumer‑protection statute or regulation.

(c) In case of conflict between this article and a rule of law, statute, or regulation described in subsection (b), the rule of law, statute, or regulation controls. Failure to comply with a statute or regulation described in subsection (b) has only the effect the statute or regulation specifies.

(d) This chapter does not:

(1) validate any rate, charge, agreement, or practice that violates a rule of law, statute, or regulation described in subsection (b); or

(2) extend the application of the rule of law, statute, or regulation to a transaction not otherwise subject to it.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑201; 1966 (54) 2716; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No; 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Sections 9‑201, 9‑203(4).

2. Effectiveness of Security Agreement. Subsection (a) provides that a security agreement is generally effective. With certain exceptions, a security agreement is effective between the debtor and secured party and is likewise effective against third parties. Note that “security agreement” is used here (and elsewhere in this Article) as it is defined in Section 9‑102: “an agreement that creates or provides for a security interest.” It follows that subsection (a) does not provide that every term or provision contained in a record that contains a security agreement or that is so labeled is effective. Properly read, former Section 9‑201 was to the same effect. Exceptions to the general rule of subsection (a) arise where there is an overriding provision in this Article or any other Article of the UCC. For example, Section 9‑317 subordinates unperfected security interests to lien creditors and certain buyers, and several provisions in Part 3 subordinate some security interests to other security interests and interests of purchasers.

3. Law, Statutes, and Regulations Applicable to Certain Transactions. Subsection (b) makes clear that certain transactions, although subject to this Article, also are subject to other applicable laws relating to consumers or specified in that subsection. Subsection (c) provides that the other law is controlling in the event of a conflict, and that a violation of other law does not ipso facto constitute a violation of this Article. Subsection (d) provides that this Article does not validate violations under or extend the application of the other applicable laws.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑201(b) provides that if a transaction is subject to both Article 9 and the South Carolina Consumer Protection Codes, S.C. Code Ann. Sections 37‑1‑101 et seq., and the two statutes impose rules, the provisions of the Consumer Protection Code Control.

Definitional Cross References:

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| --- | --- |
|  |  |
| “Security Agreement” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(73) |

CROSS REFERENCES

Default under security agreement, see Section 36‑9‑601 et seq.

Definitions, see Section 36‑9‑102.

Persons taking priority over unperfected security interests, see Sections 36‑9‑102, 36‑9‑317, 36‑9‑323.

Priorities as to conflicting security interests, see Section 36‑9‑317 et seq.

Protection of buyers of goods, see Sections 36‑9‑320, 36‑9‑323.

Sufficiency of description of property for creation of security interest, see Section 36‑9‑108.

Variance of provisions of this code by agreement, see Section 36‑1‑302.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 3, 61 to 67.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak3; 349Ak61 to 349Ak67.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 1

1. In general

Considering Sections 36‑9‑203, 36‑9‑402 and 36‑9‑110 of the Uniform Commercial Code, both the security agreement and the financing statement must contain a sufficient description of the land on which crops are to be grown, to make possible the identification of the thing described. Citizens Bank v. Gregory’s Warehouse, Inc. (S.C.App. 1988) 297 S.C. 151, 375 S.E.2d 316. Secured Transactions 45; Secured Transactions 94

**SECTION 36‑9‑202.** Title to collateral immaterial.

Except as otherwise provided with respect to consignments or sales of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes, the provisions of this chapter with regard to rights and obligations apply whether title to collateral is in the secured party or the debtor.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑202; 1966 (54) 2716; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No; 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑202.

2. Title Immaterial. The rights and duties of parties to a secured transaction and affected third parties are provided in this Article without reference to the location of “title” to the collateral. For example, the characteristics of a security interest that secures the purchase price of goods are the same whether the secured party appears to have retained title or the debtor appears to have obtained title and then conveyed title or a lien to the secured party.

3. When Title Matters.

a. Under This Article. This Section explicitly acknowledges two circumstances in which the effect of certain Article 9 provisions turns on ownership (title). First, in some respects sales of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes receive special treatment. See, e.g., Sections 9‑207(a), 9‑210(b), 9‑615(e). Buyers of receivables under former Article 9 were treated specially, as well. See, e.g., former Section 9‑502(2). Second, the remedies of a consignor under a true consignment and, for the most part, the remedies of a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes are determined by other law and not by Part 6. See Section 9‑601(g).

b. Under Other Law. This Article does not determine which line of interpretation (e.g., title theory or lien theory, retained title or conveyed title) should be followed in cases in which the applicability of another rule of law depends upon who has title. If, for example, a revenue law imposes a tax on the “legal” owner of goods or if a corporation law makes a vote of the stockholders prerequisite to a corporation “giving” a security interest but not if it acquires property “subject” to a security interest, this Article does not attempt to define whether the secured party is a “ legal” owner or whether the transaction “ gives” a security interest for the purpose of such laws. Other rules of law or the agreement of the parties determines the location and source of title for those purposes.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Definitional Cross References:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  |  |
| “Accounts” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(2) |
| “Chattel Paper” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(11) |
| “Consignment” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(20) |
| “Payment Intangible” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(65) |
| “Promissory Note” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(65) |

Cross References—

1. Duty to Respond for a Request for an Accounting, a List of Collateral, or a Statement of Account: Section 36‑9‑210(b) exempts a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, payment of intangibles, or promissory notes from the duty generally imposed upon secured parties to respond to requests of accounting, a list of collateral, or a statement of account.

2. Duties Upon Default: Section 36‑9‑601(g) provides consignors are not subject to the duties Part 6 imposes upon secured parties upon default. In addition, under Section 36‑9‑601(g) and 36‑9‑207(c) a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes is not subject to the duties under Part 6, unless the buyer undertakes to collect or enforce the obligation against an account debtor and has recourse against the debtor. In the event the buyer does not undertake to collect or enforce and has a right of recourse, the buyer must act in a commercially reasonable manner in collecting or enforcing the obligations.

3. Surplus or Deficiency: Section 36‑9‑615(e) provides that a debtor is not entitled to a surplus and the obligor is not liable for a deficiency if the underlying transactions is a sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangible, or promissory notes.

CROSS REFERENCES

Effect of seller’s tender; delivery on condition, see Section 36‑2‑507.

Passing of title, see Section 36‑2‑401.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 12, 117.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak12; 349Ak117.

**SECTION 36‑9‑203.** Attachment and enforceability of security interest; proceeds; supporting obligations; formal requisites.

(a) A security interest attaches to collateral when it becomes enforceable against the debtor with respect to the collateral, unless an agreement expressly postpones the time of attachment.

(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (c) through (i), a security interest is enforceable against the debtor and third parties with respect to the collateral only if:

(1) value has been given;

(2) the debtor has rights in the collateral or the power to transfer rights in the collateral to a secured party; and

(3) one of the following conditions is met:

(A) the debtor has authenticated a security agreement that provides a description of the collateral and, if the security interest covers timber to be cut, a description of the land concerned;

(B) the collateral is not a certificated security and is in the possession of the secured party under Section 36‑9‑313 pursuant to the debtor’s security agreement;

(C) the collateral is a certificated security in registered form and the security certificate has been delivered to the secured party under Section 36‑8‑301 pursuant to the debtor’s security agreement; or

(D) the collateral is deposit accounts, electronic chattel paper, investment property, letter‑of‑credit rights, or electronic documents and the secured party has control under Section 36‑7‑106, 36‑9‑104, 36‑9‑105, 36‑9‑106, or 36‑9‑107 pursuant to the debtor’s security agreement.

(c) Subsection (b) is subject to Section 36‑4‑208 on the security interest of a collecting bank, Section 36‑5‑118 on the security interest of a letter‑of‑credit issuer or nominated person, Section 36‑9‑110 on a security interest arising under Chapter 2 or 2A, and Section 36‑9‑206 on security interests in investment property.

(d) A person becomes bound as debtor by a security agreement entered into by another person if, by operation of law other than this chapter or by contract:

(1) the security agreement becomes effective to create a security interest in the person’s property; or

(2) the person becomes generally obligated for the obligations of the other person, including the obligation secured under the security agreement, and acquires or succeeds to all or substantially all of the assets of the other person.

(e) If a new debtor becomes bound as debtor by a security agreement entered into by another person:

(1) the agreement satisfies subsection (b)(3) with respect to existing or after‑acquired property of the new debtor to the extent the property is described in the agreement; and

(2) another agreement is not necessary to make a security interest in the property enforceable.

(f) The attachment of a security interest in collateral gives the secured party the rights to proceeds provided by Section 36‑9‑315 and is also attachment of a security interest in a supporting obligation for the collateral.

(g) The attachment of a security interest in a right to payment or performance secured by a security interest or other lien on personal or real property is also attachment of a security interest in the security interest, mortgage, or other lien.

(h) The attachment of a security interest in a securities account is also attachment of a security interest in the security entitlements carried in the securities account.

(i) The attachment of a security interest in a commodity account is also attachment of a security interest in the commodity contracts carried in the commodity account.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑203; 1966 (54) 2716; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 1991 Act No; 161, Section 2(F); 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12; 2014 Act No. 213 (S.343), Section 35, eff October 1, 2014.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Sections 9‑203, 9‑115(2), (6).

2. Creation, Attachment, and Enforceability. Subsection (a) states the general rule that a security interest attaches to collateral only when it becomes enforceable against the debtor. Subsection (b) specifies the circumstances under which a security interest becomes enforceable. Subsection (b) states three basic prerequisites to the existence of a security interest: value (paragraph (1)), rights or power to transfer rights in collateral (paragraph (2)), and agreement plus satisfaction of an evidentiary requirement (paragraph (3)). When all of these elements exist, a security interest becomes enforceable between the parties and attaches under subsection (a). Subsection (c) identifies certain exceptions to the general rule of subsection (b).

3. Security Agreement; Authentication. Under subsection (b)(3), enforceability requires the debtor’s security agreement and compliance with an evidentiary requirement in the nature of a Statute of Frauds. Paragraph (3)(A) represents the most basic of the evidentiary alternatives, under which the debtor must authenticate a security agreement that provides a description of the collateral. Under Section 9‑102, a “security agreement” is “an agreement that creates or provides for a security interest.” Neither that definition nor the requirement of paragraph (3)(A) rejects the deeply rooted doctrine that a bill of sale, although absolute in form, may be shown in fact to have been given as security. Under this Article, as under prior law, a debtor may show by parol evidence that a transfer purporting to be absolute was in fact for security. Similarly, a self‑styled “lease” may serve as a security agreement if the agreement creates a security interest. See Section 1‑201(37) (distinguishing security interest from lease).

4. Possession, Delivery, or Control Pursuant to Security Agreement. The other alternatives in subsection (b)(3) dispense with the requirement of an authenticated security agreement and provide alternative evidentiary tests. Under paragraph (3)(B), the secured party’s possession substitutes for the debtor’s authentication under paragraph (3)(A) if the secured party’s possession is “pursuant to the debtor’s security agreement.” That phrase refers to the debtor’s agreement to the secured party’s possession for the purpose of creating a security interest. The phrase should not be confused with the phrase “debtor has authenticated a security agreement,” used in paragraph (3)(A), which contemplates the debtor’s authentication of a record. In the unlikely event that possession is obtained without the debtor’s agreement, possession would not suffice as a substitute for an authenticated security agreement. However, once the security interest has become enforceable and has attached, it is not impaired by the fact that the secured party’s possession is maintained without the agreement of a subsequent debtor (e.g., a transferee). Possession as contemplated by Section 9‑313 is possession for purposes of subsection (b)(3)(B), even though it may not constitute possession “pursuant to the debtor’s agreement” and consequently might not serve as a substitute for an authenticated security agreement under subsection (b)(3)(A). Subsection (b)(3)(C) provides that delivery of a certificated security to the secured party under Section 8‑301 pursuant to the debtor’s security agreement is sufficient as a substitute for an authenticated security agreement. Similarly, under subsection (b)(3)(D), control of investment property, a deposit account, electronic chattel paper, a letter‑of‑credit right, or electronic documents satisfies the evidentiary test if control is pursuant to the debtor’s security agreement.

5. Collateral Covered by Other Statute or Treaty. One evidentiary purpose of the formal requisites stated in subsection (b) is to minimize the possibility of future disputes as to the terms of a security agreement (e.g., as to the property that stands as collateral for the obligation secured). One should distinguish the evidentiary functions of the formal requisites of attachment and enforceability (such as the requirement that a security agreement contain a description of the collateral) from the more limited goals of “notice filing” for financing statements under Part 5, explained in Section 9‑502, Comment 2. When perfection is achieved by compliance with the requirements of a statute or treaty described in Section 9‑311(a), such as a federal recording act or a certificate‑of‑title statute, the manner of describing the collateral in a registry imposed by the statute or treaty may or may not be adequate for purposes of this Section and Section 9‑108. However, the description contained in the security agreement, not the description in a public registry or on a certificate of title, controls for purposes of this Section.

6. Debtor’s Rights; Debtor’s Power to Transfer Rights. Subsection (b)(2) conditions attachment on the debtor’s having “rights in the collateral or the power to transfer rights in the collateral to a secured party.” A debtor’s limited rights in collateral, short of full ownership, are sufficient for a security interest to attach. However, in accordance with basic personal property conveyancing principles, the baseline rule is that a security interest attaches only to whatever rights a debtor may have, broad or limited as those rights may be.

Certain exceptions to the baseline rule enable a debtor to transfer, and a security interest to attach to, greater rights than the debtor has. See Part 3, Subpart 3 (priority rules). The phrase, “or the power to transfer rights in the collateral to a secured party,” accommodates those exceptions. In some cases, a debtor may have power to transfer another person’ s rights only to a class of transferees that excludes secured parties. See, e.g., Section 2‑403(2) (giving certain merchants power to transfer an entruster’s rights to a buyer in ordinary course of business). Under those circumstances, the debtor would not have the power to create a security interest in the other person’s rights, and the condition in subsection (b)(2) would not be satisfied.

7. New Debtors. Subsection (e) makes clear that the enforceability requirements of subsection (b)(3) are met when a new debtor becomes bound under an original debtor’s security agreement. If a new debtor becomes bound as debtor by a security agreement entered into by another person, the security agreement satisfies the requirement of Subsection (b)(3) as to the existing and after‑acquired property of the new debtor to the extent the property is described in the agreement.

Subsection (d) explains when a new debtor becomes bound. Persons who become bound under paragraph (2) are limited to those who both become primarily liable for the original debtor’s obligations and succeed to (or acquire) its assets. Thus, the paragraph excludes sureties and other secondary obligors as well as persons who become obligated through veil piercing and other non‑successorship doctrines. In many cases, paragraph (2) will exclude successors to the assets and liabilities of a division of a debtor. See also Section 9‑508, Comment 3.

8. Supporting Obligations. Under subsection (f), a security interest in a “supporting obligation” (defined in Section 9‑102) automatically follows from a security interest in the underlying, supported collateral. This result was implicit under former Article 9. Implicit in subsection (f) is the principle that the secured party’s interest in a supporting obligation extends to the supporting obligation only to the extent that it supports the collateral in which the secured party has a security interest. Complex issues may arise, however, if a supporting obligation supports many separate obligations of a particular account debtor and if the supported obligations are separately assigned as security to several secured parties. The problems may be exacerbated if a supporting obligation is limited to an aggregate amount that is less than the aggregate amount of the obligations it supports. This Article does not contain provisions dealing with competing claims to a limited supporting obligation. As under former Article 9, the law of suretyship and the agreements of the parties will control.

9. Collateral Follows Right to Payment or Performance. Subsection (g) codifies the common‑law rule that a transfer of an obligation secured by a security interest or other lien on personal or real property also transfers the security interest or lien. See Restatement (3d), Property (Mortgages) ‘5.4(a) (1997). See also Section 9‑308(e) (analogous rule for perfection).

10. Investment Property. Subsections (h) and (i) make clear that attachment of a security interest in a securities account or commodity account is also attachment in security entitlements or commodity contracts carried in the accounts.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Authenticate” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(7) |
| “Certificated Security” | Section 36‑8‑102(a)(4) |
| “Collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Commodity Account” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(15) |
| “Deposit Account” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(29) |
| “Electronic Chattel Paper” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(31) |
| “Investment Property” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(49) |
| “Letter‑of‑Credit Right” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(51) |
| “New Debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(56) |
| “Proceeds” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(64) |
| “Registered Form” | Section 36‑8‑102(a)(13) |
| “Securities Account” | Section 36‑8‑501(a) |
| “Security Agreement” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(73) |
| “Security Entitlement” | Section 36‑8‑102(a)(17) |
| “Supporting Obligation” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(77) |
| “Value” | Section 36‑1‑201(44) |

Cross References—

1. Control: The requirements for control sufficient to satisfy the evidentiary junction of Article 9’s Statute of Frauds under Section 36‑9‑203(b) are set forth in the following provisions: Section 36‑9‑104 ( deposit accounts); Section 36‑9‑105 (electronic chattel paper); Section 36‑9‑106 (investment property); Section 36‑9‑107 (letter‑of‑credit rights).

2. New Debtor: Section 36‑9‑508 provides the rules for determining when a financing statement naming the original debtor is effective to perfect a security interest in collateral acquired by the new debtor. Section 36‑9‑326 provides the rules for determining the priority of security interests created by a new debtor.

Editor’s Note

2014 Act No. 213, Section 51, provides as follows:

“SECTION 51. This act becomes effective on October 1, 2014. It applies to transactions entered into and events occurring after that date.”

Effect of Amendment

2014 Act No. 213, Section 35, in subsection (b)(3)(D), inserted “electronic documents”, added reference to “36‑7‑106”, and made other nonsubstantive changes.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 41 to 51, 133, 164.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak41 to 349Ak51; 349Ak133; 349Ak164.

**SECTION 36‑9‑204.** After‑acquired property; future advances.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), a security agreement may create or provide for a security interest in after‑acquired collateral.

(b) A security interest does not attach under a term constituting an after‑acquired property clause to:

(1) consumer goods, other than an accession when given as additional security, unless the debtor acquires rights in them within ten days after the secured party gives value; or

(2) a commercial tort claim.

(c) A security agreement may provide that collateral secures, or that accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes are sold in connection with, future advances or other value, whether or not the advances or value are given pursuant to commitment.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑204; 1966 (54) 2716; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No; 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑204.

2. After‑Acquired Property; Continuing General Lien. Subsection (a) makes clear that a security interest arising by virtue of an after‑acquired property clause is no less valid than a security interest in collateral in which the debtor has rights at the time value is given. A security interest in after‑acquired property is not merely an “equitable” interest; no further action by the secured party‑such as a supplemental agreement covering the new collateral‑is required. This Section adopts the principle of a “continuing general lien” or “floating lien.” It validates a security interest in the debtor’s existing and (upon acquisition) future assets, even though the debtor has liberty to use or dispose of collateral without being required to account for proceeds or substitute new collateral. See Section 9‑205. Subsection (a), together with subsection (c), also validates “cross‑collateral” clauses under which collateral acquired at any time secures advances whenever made.

3. After‑Acquired Consumer Goods. Subsection (b)(1) makes ineffective an after‑acquired property clause covering consumer goods (defined in Section 9‑109), except as accessions (see Section 9‑335), acquired more than ten days after the secured party gives value. Subsection (b)(1) is unchanged in substance from the corresponding provision in former Section 9‑204(2).

4. Commercial Tort Claims. Subsection (b)(2) provides that an after‑ acquired property clause in a security agreement does not reach future commercial tort claims. In order for a security interest in a tort claim to attach, the claim must be in existence when the security agreement is authenticated. In addition, the security agreement must describe the tort claim with greater specificity than simply “all tort claims.” See Section 9‑108(e).

5. Future Advances; Obligations Secured. Under subsection (c) collateral may secure future as well as past or present advances if the security agreement so provides. This is in line with the policy of this Article toward security interests in after‑acquired property under subsection (a). Indeed, the parties are free to agree that a security interest secures any obligation whatsoever. Determining the obligations secured by collateral is solely a matter of construing the parties’ agreement under applicable law. This Article rejects the holdings of cases decided under former Article 9 that applied other tests, such as whether a future advance or other subsequently incurred obligation was of the same or a similar type or class as earlier advances and obligations secured by the collateral.

6. Sales of Receivables. Subsections (a) and (c) expressly validate after‑acquired property and future advance clauses not only when the transaction is for security purposes but also when the transaction is the sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes.. This result was implicit under former Article 9.

7. Financing Statements. The effect of after‑acquired property and future advance clauses as components of a security agreement should not be confused with the requirements applicable to financing statements under this Article’s system of perfection by notice filing. The references to after‑acquired property clauses and future advance clauses in this Section are limited to security agreements. There is no need to refer to after‑acquired property or future advances or other obligations secured in a financing statement. See Section 9‑502, Comment 2.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Accession” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(1) |
| “Account” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(2) |
| “Chattel Paper” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(11) |
| “Collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Commercial Tort Claim” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(13) |
| “Consumer Goods” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(23) |
| “Payment Intangibles” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(61) |
| “Promissory Note” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(65) |
| “Security Agreement” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(73) |
| “Security Interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |

Cross References—

Sufficiency of Description of Collateral: Section 36‑9‑108 provides the rules for determining the sufficiency of a description of collateral in a security agreement. With the exception of commercial Tort claims and consumer goods, Section 36‑9‑108(b)(3) provides that a description of collateral is sufficient if it identifies the collateral by a type of collateral defined in the Uniform Commercial Code. Nevertheless, the Official Comment provide that whether a description of collateral by type, e. g. inventory, is sufficient to cover after acquired property is a question of contract interpretation. See Section 36‑9‑108, Official Comment 3.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 13, 20 to 26, 114 to 118, 148.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak13; 349Ak20 to 349Ak26; 349Ak114 to 349Ak118; 349Ak148.

**SECTION 36‑9‑205.** Use or disposition of collateral permissible.

(a) A security interest is not invalid or fraudulent against creditors solely because:

(1) the debtor has the right or ability to:

(A) use, commingle, or dispose of all or part of the collateral, including returned or repossessed goods;

(B) collect, compromise, enforce, or otherwise deal with collateral;

(C) accept the return of collateral or make repossessions; or

(D) use, commingle, or dispose of proceeds; or

(2) the secured party fails to require the debtor to account for proceeds or replace collateral.

(b) This section does not relax the requirements of possession if attachment, perfection, or enforcement of a security interest depends upon possession of the collateral by the secured party.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑205; 1966 (54) 2716; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No; 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑205.

2. Validity of Unrestricted “Floating Lien.” This Article expressly validates the “floating lien” on shifting collateral. See Sections 9‑201, 9‑204 and Comment 2. This Section provides that a security interest is not invalid or fraudulent by reason of the debtor’s liberty to dispose of the collateral without being required to account to the secured party for proceeds or substitute new collateral. As did former Section 9‑205, this Section repeals the rule of Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 ( 1925), and other cases which held such arrangements void as a matter of law because the debtor was given unfettered dominion or control over collateral. The Benedict rule did not effectively discourage or eliminate security transactions in inventory and receivables. Instead, it forced financing arrangements to be self‑liquidating. Although this Section repeals Benedict, the filing and other perfection requirements (see Part 3, Subpart 2, and Part 5) provide for public notice that overcomes any potential misleading effects of a debtor’s use and control of collateral. Moreover, nothing in this Section prevents the debtor and secured party from agreeing to procedures by which the secured party polices or monitors collateral or to restrictions on the debtor’s dominion. However, this Article leaves these matters to agreement based on business considerations, not on legal requirements.

3. Possessory Security Interests. Subsection (b) makes clear that this Section does not relax the requirements for perfection by possession under Section 9‑315. If a secured party allows the debtor access to and control over collateral its security interest may be or become unperfected.

4. Permissible Freedom for Debtor to Enforce Collateral. Former Section 9‑205 referred to a debtor’s “liberty . . . to collect or compromise accounts or chattel paper.” This Section recognizes the broader rights of a debtor to “enforce,” as well as to “collect” and “compromise” collateral. This Section’s reference to collecting, compromising, and enforcing “collateral” instead of “accounts or chattel paper” contemplates the many other types of collateral that a debtor may wish to “collect, compromise, or enforce”: e.g., deposit accounts, documents, general intangibles, instruments, investment property, and letter‑of‑credit rights.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “Goods” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(44) |
| “Proceeds” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(64) |
| “Security Interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |
| “Secured Party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |

Cross References—

Promissory Security Interests: Under Section 36‑9‑203(b)(3)(B) possession of collateral may satisfy the statute of frauds requirement for the attachment of a security interest. Section 36‑9‑313 provides for the perfection of security interests in some forms of collateral by possession.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 89, 132, 148, 164.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak89; 349Ak132; 349Ak148; 349Ak164.

**SECTION 36‑9‑206.** Security interest arising in purchase or delivery of financial asset.

(a) A security interest in favor of a securities intermediary attaches to a person’s security entitlement if:

(1) the person buys a financial asset through the securities intermediary in a transaction in which the person is obligated to pay the purchase price to the securities intermediary at the time of the purchase; and

(2) the securities intermediary credits the financial asset to the buyer’s securities account before the buyer pays the securities intermediary.

(b) The security interest described in subsection (a) secures the person’s obligation to pay for the financial asset.

(c) A security interest in favor of a person that delivers a certificated security or other financial asset represented by a writing attaches to the security or other financial asset if:

(1) the security or other financial asset:

(A) in the ordinary course of business is transferred by delivery with any necessary indorsement or assignment; and

(B) is delivered under an agreement between persons in the business of dealing with such securities or financial assets; and

(2) the agreement calls for delivery against payment.

(d) The security interest described in subsection (c) secures the obligation to make payment for the delivery.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑206; 1966 (54) 2716; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No; 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former 9‑116.

2. Codification of “Broker’s Lien.” Depending upon a securities intermediary’s arrangements with its entitlement holders, the securities intermediary may treat the entitlement holder as entitled to financial assets before the entitlement holder has actually made payment for them. For example, many brokers permit retail customers to pay for financial assets by check. The broker may not receive final payment of the check until several days after the broker has credited the customer’s securities account for the financial assets. Thus, the customer will have acquired a security entitlement prior to payment. Subsection (a) provides that, in such circumstances, the securities intermediary has a security interest in the entitlement holder’s security entitlement. Under subsection (b) the security interest secures the customer’s obligation to pay for the financial asset in question. Subsections (a) and (b) codify and adapt to the indirect holding system the so‑called “broker’s lien,” which has long been recognized. See Restatement, Security ‘12.

3. Financial Assets Delivered Against Payment. Subsection (c) creates a security interest in favor of persons who deliver certificated securities or other financial assets in physical form, such as money market instruments, if the agreed payment is not received. In some arrangements for settlement of transactions in physical financial assets, the seller’s securities custodian will deliver physical certificates to the buyer’s securities custodian and receive a time‑stamped delivery receipt. The buyer’s securities custodian will examine the certificate to ensure that it is in good order, and that the delivery matches a trade in which the buyer has instructed the seller to deliver to that custodian. If all is in order, the receiving custodian will settle with the delivering custodian through whatever funds settlement system has been agreed upon or is used by custom and usage in that market. The understanding of the trade, however, is that the delivery is conditioned upon payment, so that if payment is not made for any reason, the security will be returned to the deliverer. Subsection (c) clarifies the rights of persons making deliveries in such circumstances. It provides the person making delivery with a security interest in the securities or other financial assets; under subsection (d), the security interest secures the seller’s right to receive payment for the delivery. Section 8‑301 specifies when delivery of a certificated security occurs; that Section should be applied as well to other financial assets as well for purposes of this Section.

4. Automatic Attachment and Perfection. Subsections (a) and (c) refer to attachment of a security interest. Attachment under this Section has the same incidents (enforceability, right to proceeds, etc.) as attachment under Section 9‑203. This Section overrides the general attachment rules in Section 9‑203. See Section 9‑203(c). A securities intermediary’s security interest under subsection (a) is perfected by control without further action. See Section 8‑106 (control); 9‑314 (perfection). Security interests arising under subsection (c) are automatically perfected. See Section 9‑309(9) .

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Under Section 36‑9‑206(a) when a broker or other securities intermediary buys a financial asset for a buyer and credits the asset to the buyer’s security account before receiving payment a security interest in favor of the intermediary attaches to the buyer’s security entitlement. Under Section 36‑9‑206(b) the intermediary’s security interest secures the buyer’s obligation to pay for the financial asset.

Under sections 36‑9‑206(c) and (d) when a person delivers against payment a certificated security or other financial asset represented by a writing a security interest in favor of the person making delivery attaches to the security or other financial asset to secure the obligation to make payment.

Definitional Cross References:

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| “Financial Asset” | Sections 36‑8‑102(a)(9) and 36‑8‑103 |
| “Certificated Security” | Section 36‑8‑102(a)(4) |
| “Securities Account” | Section 36‑8‑501(a) |
| “Securities Intermediary” | Section 36‑8‑102(a)(14) |
| “Security Entitlement” | Section 36‑8‑102(a)(17) |
| “Security Interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |

Cross References

A security interest attaching under Section 36‑9‑206(a) is perfected by the intermediary’s control of the security entitlement under sections 36‑8‑106 and 36‑9‑106(a). See Section 36‑9‑314(a). A security interest attaching under Section 36‑9‑206(c) is automatically perfected under Section 36‑9‑309(9).

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 1 to 67.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak1 to 349Ak67.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Encyclopedias

S.C. Jur. Assignments Section 52, Defenses Against Assignee in Secured Transaction Context.

Subpart 2

Rights and Duties

**SECTION 36‑9‑207.** Rights and duties of secured party having possession or control of collateral.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), a secured party shall use reasonable care in the custody and preservation of collateral in the secured party’s possession. In the case of chattel paper or an instrument, reasonable care includes taking necessary steps to preserve rights against prior parties unless otherwise agreed.

(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), if a secured party has possession of collateral:

(1) reasonable expenses, including the cost of insurance and payment of taxes or other charges, incurred in the custody, preservation, use, or operation of the collateral are chargeable to the debtor and are secured by the collateral;

(2) the risk of accidental loss or damage is on the debtor to the extent of a deficiency in any effective insurance coverage;

(3) the secured party shall keep the collateral identifiable, but fungible collateral may be commingled; and

(4) the secured party may use or operate the collateral:

(A) for the purpose of preserving the collateral or its value;

(B) as permitted by an order of a court having competent jurisdiction; or

(C) except in the case of consumer goods, in the manner and to the extent agreed by the debtor.

(c) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), a secured party having possession of collateral or control of collateral under Section 36‑7‑106, 36‑9‑104, 36‑9‑105, 36‑9‑106, or 36‑9‑107:

(1) may hold as additional security any proceeds, except money or funds, received from the collateral;

(2) shall apply money or funds received from the collateral to reduce the secured obligation, unless remitted to the debtor; and

(3) may create a security interest in the collateral.

(d) If the secured party is a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes or a consignor:

(1) subsection (a) does not apply unless the secured party is entitled under an agreement:

(A) to charge back uncollected collateral; or

(B) otherwise to full or limited recourse against the debtor or a secondary obligor based on the nonpayment or other default of an account debtor or other obligor on the collateral; and

(2) subsections (b) and (c) do not apply.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑207; 1966 (54) 2716; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No; 67, Section 12; 2014 Act No. 213 (S.343), Section 36, eff October 1, 2014.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑207.

2. Duty of Care for Collateral in Secured Party’s Possession. Like former Section 9‑207, subsection (a) imposes a duty of care, similar to that imposed on a pledgee at common law, on a secured party in possession of collateral. See Restatement, Security ‘17, 18. In many cases a secured party in possession of collateral may satisfy this duty by notifying the debtor of action that should be taken and allowing the debtor to take the action itself. If the secured party itself takes action, its reasonable expenses may be added to the secured obligation. The revised definitions of “ collateral,” “debtor,” and “ secured party” in Section 9‑102 make this Section applicable to collateral subject to an agricultural lien if the collateral is in the lienholder’s possession. Under Section 1‑102 the duty to exercise reasonable care may not be disclaimed by agreement, although under that Section the parties remain free to determine by agreement standards that are not manifestly unreasonable as to what constitutes reasonable care. Unless otherwise agreed, for a secured party in possession of chattel paper or an instrument, reasonable care includes the preservation of rights against prior parties. The secured party’s right to have instruments or documents indorsed or transferred to it or its order is dealt with in the relevant Sections of Articles 3, 7, and 8. See Sections 3‑201, 7‑506, 8‑304(d).

3. Specific Rules When Secured Party in Possession or Control of Collateral. Subsections (b) and (c) provide rules following common‑law precedents which apply unless the parties otherwise agree. The rules in subsection (b) apply to typical issues that may arise while a secured party is in possession of collateral, including expenses, insurance, and taxes, risk of loss or damage, identifiable and fungible collateral, and use or operation of collateral. Subsection (c) contains rules that apply in certain circumstances that may arise when a secured party is in either possession or control of collateral. These circumstances include the secured party’s receiving proceeds from the collateral and the secured party’s creation of a security interest in the collateral.

4. Applicability Following Default. This Section applies when the secured party has possession of collateral either before or after default. See Sections 9‑601(b), 9‑609. Subsection (b)(4)(C) limits agreements concerning the use or operation of collateral to collateral other than consumer goods. Under Section 9‑602(1), a debtor cannot waive or vary that limitation.

5. “Repledges” and Right of Redemption. Subsection (c)(3) eliminates the qualification in former Section 9‑207 to the effect that the terms of a “repledge” may not “impair” a debtor’s “right to redeem” collateral. The change is primarily for clarification. There is no basis on which to draw from subsection (c)(3) any inference concerning the debtor’s right to redeem the collateral. The debtor enjoys that right under Section 9‑621; this Section need not address it. For example, if the collateral is a negotiable note that the secured party (SP‑1) repledges to SP‑2, nothing in this Section suggests that the debtor (D) does not retain the right to redeem the note upon payment to SP‑1 of all obligations secured by the note. But, as explained below, the debtor’s unimpaired right to redeem as against the debtor’s original secured party nevertheless may not be enforceable as against the new secured party.

In resolving questions that arise from the creation of a security interest by SP‑1, one must take care to distinguish D’s rights against SP‑1 from D’s rights against SP‑2. Once D discharges the secured obligation, D becomes entitled to the note; SP‑1 has no legal basis upon which to withhold it. If, as a practical matter, SP‑1 is unable to return the note because SP‑2 holds it as collateral for SP‑1’s unpaid debt, then SP‑1 is liable to D under the law of conversion.

Whether SP‑2 would be liable to D depends on the relative priority of SP‑2’s security interest and D’s interest. By permitting SP‑1 to create a security interest in the collateral (repledge), subsection (c)(3) provides a statutory power for SP‑1 to give SP‑2 a security interest (subject, of course, to any agreement by SP‑1 not to give a security interest). In the vast majority of cases where repledge rights are significant, the security interest of the second secured party, SP‑2 in the example, will be senior to the debtor’s interest. By virtue of the debtor’s consent or applicable legal rules, SP‑2 typically would cut off D’s rights in investment property or be immune from D’s claims. See Sections 9‑331, 3‑306 (holder in due course), 8‑303 (protected purchaser), 8‑502 (acquisition of a security entitlement), 8‑503(e) (action by entitlement holder). Moreover, the expectations and business practices in some markets, such as the securities markets, are such that D’s consent to SP‑2’s taking free of D’s rights inheres in D’s creation of SP‑1’s security interest which gives rise to SP‑1’s power under this Section. In these situations, D would have no right to recover the collateral or recover damages from SP‑2. Nevertheless, D would have a damage claim against SP‑1 if SP‑1 had given a security interest to SP‑2 in breach of its agreement with D. Moreover, if SP‑2’s security interest secures an amount that is less than the amount secured by SP‑1’s security interest (granted by D), then D’s exercise of its right to redeem would provide value sufficient to discharge SP‑1’s obligations to SP‑2.

For the most part this Section does not change the law under former Section 9‑207, although eliminating the reference to the debtor’s right of redemption may alter the secured party’s right to repledge in one respect. Former Section 9‑207 could have been read to limit the secured party’s statutory right to repledge collateral to repledge transactions in which the collateral did not secure a greater obligation than that of the original debtor. Inasmuch as this is a matter normally dealt with by agreement between the debtor and secured party, any change would appear to have little practical effect.

6. “Repledges” of Investment Property. The following example will aid the discussion of “repledges” of investment property.

Example. Debtor grants Alpha Bank a security interest in a security entitlement that includes 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock that Debtor holds through an account with Able & Co. Alpha does not have an account with Able. Alpha uses Beta Bank as its securities custodian. Debtor instructs Able to transfer the shares to Beta, for the account of Alpha, and Able does so. Beta then credits Alpha’s account. Alpha has control of the security entitlement for the 1000 shares under Section 8‑106(d). (These are the facts of Example 2, Section 8‑106, Comment 4.) Although, as between Debtor and Alpha, Debtor may have become the beneficial owner of the new securities entitlement with Beta, Beta has agreed to act on Alpha’s entitlement orders because, as between Beta and Alpha, Alpha has become the entitlement holder.

Next, Alpha grants Gamma Bank a security interest in the security entitlement with Beta that includes the 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock. In order to afford Gamma control of the entitlement, Alpha instructs Beta to transfer the stock to Gamma’s custodian, Delta Bank, which credits Gamma’s account for 1000 shares. At this point Gamma holds its securities entitlement for its benefit as well as that of its debtor, Alpha. Alpha’s derivative rights also are for the benefit of Debtor.

In many, probably most, situations and at any particular point in time, it will be impossible for Debtor or Alpha to “trace” Alpha’s “repledge” to any particular securities entitlement or financial asset of Gamma or anyone else. Debtor would retain, of course, a right to redeem the collateral from Alpha upon satisfaction of the secured obligation. However, in the absence of a traceable interest, Debtor would retain only a personal claim against Alpha in the event Alpha failed to restore the security entitlement to Debtor. Moreover, even in the unlikely event that Debtor could trace a property interest, in the context of the financial markets, normally the operation of this Section, Debtor’s explicit agreement to permit Alpha to create a senior security interest, or legal rules permitting Gamma to cut off Debtor’s rights or become immune from Debtor’s claims would effectively subordinate Debtor’s interest to the holder of a security interest created by Alpha. And, under the shelter principle, all subsequent transferees would obtain interests to which Debtor’s interest also would be subordinate.

7. Buyers of Chattel Paper and Other Receivables; Consignors. This Section has been revised to reflect the fact that a seller of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes retains no interest in the collateral and so is not disadvantaged by the secured party’s noncompliance with the requirements of this Section. Accordingly, subsection (d) provides that subsection (a) applies only to security interests that secure an obligation and to sales of receivables in which the buyer has recourse against the debtor. (Of course, a buyer of accounts or payment intangibles could not have “possession” of original collateral, but might have possession of proceeds, such as promissory notes or checks.) The meaning of “recourse” in this respect is limited to recourse arising out of the account debtor’s failure to pay or other default.

Subsection (d) makes subsections (b) and (c) inapplicable to buyers of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes and consignors. Of course, there is no reason to believe that a buyer of receivables or a consignor could not, for example, create a security interest or otherwise transfer an interest in the collateral, regardless of who has possession of the collateral. However, this Section leaves the rights of those owners to law other than Article 9.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

In Freshwater v. Colonial Production Credit Association, 286 S.C. 387, 344 S.E. 2d 172 (Ct. App. 1985), the court held that under former Section 36‑9‑207 a secured party that did not have possession of the collateral was under no obligation to insure it. The holding in Freshwater is unchanged under the current statute. Although Section 36‑9‑207(a) requires a secured party to use reasonable care to preserve collateral in its possession and Section 36‑9‑207(b)(1) provides that the debtor must bear the reasonable expenses of insurance procured by the secured party, the secured party has no duty to preserve collateral that is not in its possession or control.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Account” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(2) |
| “Chattel Paper” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(11) |
| “Collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Consignor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(21) |
| “Debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “Instrument” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(47) |
| “Payment Intangible” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(61) |
| “Promissory Note” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(65) |
| “Secondary Obligor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(71) |
| “Secured Party” | Section 26‑9‑102(a)(72) |

Cross References—

1. Possession of Collateral: Section 36‑9‑313 sets forth the rules on perfection of security interests by taking possession of collateral.

2. Control: The requirements for obtaining control of collateral are set forth in Section 36‑9‑104 (deposit accounts), Section 36‑9‑105 (electronic chattel paper), Section 36‑9‑106 (investment property), and Section 36‑9‑107 (letter‑of‑credit rights).

Editor’s Note

2014 Act No. 213, Section 51, provides as follows:

“SECTION 51. This act becomes effective on October 1, 2014. It applies to transactions entered into and events occurring after that date.”

Effect of Amendment

2014 Act No. 213, Section 36, in subsection (c), added reference to “36‑7‑106”.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 163 to 171.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak163 to 349Ak171.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 1

1. In general

When the collateral is in the secured party’s possession, unless otherwise agreed, the risk of accidental loss is on the debtor, not the secured party, to the extent of any deficiency in insurance coverage. Where the creditor was not in possession of the collateral, it had no duty under Section 36‑9‑207 to insure the collateral, and its failure to insure the collateral did not render it liable to one who claimed to be a subrogee to the creditor’s interest in the collateral. Freshwater v. Colonial Production Credit Ass’n (S.C.App. 1985) 286 S.C. 387, 334 S.E.2d 142.

**SECTION 36‑9‑208.** Additional duties of secured party having control of collateral.

(a) This section applies to cases in which there is no outstanding secured obligation and the secured party is not committed to make advances, incur obligations, or otherwise give value.

(b) Within ten days after receiving an authenticated demand by the debtor:

(1) a secured party having control of a deposit account under Section 36‑9‑104(a)(2) shall send to the bank with which the deposit account is maintained an authenticated statement that releases the bank from any further obligation to comply with instructions originated by the secured party;

(2) a secured party having control of a deposit account under Section 36‑9‑104(a)(3) shall:

(A) pay the debtor the balance on deposit in the deposit account; or

(B) transfer the balance on deposit into a deposit account in the debtor’s name;

(3) a secured party, other than a buyer, having control of electronic chattel paper under Section 36‑9‑105 shall:

(A) communicate the authoritative copy of the electronic chattel paper to the debtor or its designated custodian;

(B) if the debtor designates a custodian that is the designated custodian with which the authoritative copy of the electronic chattel paper is maintained for the secured party, communicate to the custodian an authenticated record releasing the designated custodian from any further obligation to comply with instructions originated by the secured party and instructing the custodian to comply with instructions originated by the debtor; and

(C) take appropriate action to enable the debtor or its designated custodian to make copies of or revisions to the authoritative copy which add or change an identified assignee of the authoritative copy without the consent of the secured party;

(4) a secured party having control of investment property under Section 36‑8‑106(d)(2) or 36‑9‑106(b) shall send to the securities intermediary or commodity intermediary with which the security entitlement or commodity contract is maintained an authenticated record that releases the securities intermediary or commodity intermediary from any further obligation to comply with entitlement orders or directions originated by the secured party;

(5) a secured party having control of a letter‑of‑credit right under Section 36‑9‑107 shall send to each person having an unfulfilled obligation to pay or deliver proceeds of the letter of credit to the secured party an authenticated release from any further obligation to pay or deliver proceeds of the letter of credit to the secured party; and

(6) a secured party having control of an electronic document shall:

(A) give control of the electronic document to the debtor or its designated custodian;

(B) if the debtor designates a custodian that is the designated custodian with which the authoritative copy of the electronic document is maintained for the secured party, communicate to the custodian an authenticated record releasing the designated custodian from any further obligation to comply with instructions originated by the secured party and instructing the custodian to comply with instructions originated by the debtor; and

(C) take appropriate action to enable the debtor or its designated custodian to make copies of or revisions to the authoritative copy which add or change an identified assignee of the authoritative copy without the consent of the secured party.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑208; 1966 (54) 2716; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No; 67, Section 12; 2014 Act No. 213 (S.343), Section 37, eff October 1, 2014.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. New.

2. Scope and Purpose. This Section imposes duties on a secured party who has control of a deposit account, electronic chattel paper, investment property, a letter‑of‑credit right, or electronic documents of title. The duty to terminate the secured party’s control is analogous to the duty to file a termination statement, imposed by Section 9‑513. Under subsection (a), it applies only when there is no outstanding secured obligation and the secured party is not committed to give value. The requirements of this Section can be varied by agreement under Section 1‑102(3). For example, a debtor could by contract agree that the secured party may release its control of investment property under subsection (a)(1) more than three days following demand. Also, duties under this Section should not be read to conflict with the terms of the collateral itself. For example, if the collateral is a time deposit account, subsection (b)(3) should not require a secured party with control to make an early withdrawal of the funds (assuming that were possible) in order to pay them over to the debtor or put them in an account in the debtor’s name.

3. Remedy for Failure to Relinquish Control. If a secured party fails to comply with the requirements of subsection (b), the debtor has the remedy set forth in Section 9‑625(e). This remedy is identical to that applicable to failure to provide or file a termination statement under Section 9‑513.

4. Duty to Relinquish Possession. Although Section 9‑207 addresses directly the duties of a secured party in possession of collateral, that Section does not require the secured party to relinquish possession when the secured party ceases to hold a security interest. Under common law, absent agreement to the contrary, the failure to relinquish possession of collateral upon satisfaction of the secured obligation would constitute a conversion. Inasmuch as problems apparently have not surfaced in the absence of statutory duties under former Article 9 and the common‑law duty appears to have been sufficient, this Article does not impose a statutory duty to relinquish possession.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑208 imposes upon a secured party in control of collateral the duty to terminate control when there is no outstanding secured obligation and the secured party is not committed to make advances.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Authenticate” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(7) |
| “Authoritative Copy” | See Section 36‑9‑105,  Official Comment 3 |
| “Commodity Contract” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(15) |
| “Commodity Intermediary” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(17) |
| “Deposit Account” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(29) |
| “Electronic Chattel Paper” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(31) |
| “Entitlement Order” | Section 36‑8‑102(a)(8) |
| “Investment property” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(49) |
| “Letter‑of‑Credit Right” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(51) |
| “Proceeds of a letter of credit” | See Section 36‑5‑116  [Section 36‑5‑114, 1995  Revision] |
| “Securities intermediary” | Section 36‑8‑102(a)(14) |
| “Security entitlement” | Section 36‑8‑102(a)(17) |

Cross References—

1. Requirements for Control: The requirements for obtaining control of collateral are set forth in Section 36‑9‑104 (deposit accounts), Section 36‑9‑105 (electronic chattel paper), Section 36‑9‑106 (investment property), and Section 36‑9‑107 (letter‑of‑credit rights).

2. Termination Statements: The duties Section 36‑9‑208 imposes upon a secured party in control of collateral are similar to the duty to file or send a termination statement that Section 36‑9‑513 imposes upon secured parties who have filed financing statements.

Editor’s Note

2014 Act No. 213, Section 51, provides as follows:

“SECTION 51. This act becomes effective on October 1, 2014. It applies to transactions entered into and events occurring after that date.”

Effect of Amendment

2014 Act No. 213, Section 37, added subsection (b)(6), and made other nonsubstantive changes.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 163 to 171.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak163 to 349Ak171.

**SECTION 36‑9‑209.** Duties of secured party if account debtor has been notified of assignment.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), this section applies if:

(1) there is no outstanding secured obligation; and

(2) the secured party is not committed to make advances, incur obligations, or otherwise give value.

(b) Within ten days after receiving an authenticated demand by the debtor, a secured party shall send to an account debtor that has received notification of an assignment to the secured party as assignee under Section 36‑9‑406(a) an authenticated record that releases the account debtor from any further obligation to the secured party.

(c) This section does not apply to an assignment constituting the sale of an account, chattel paper, or payment intangible.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. New.

2. Scope and Purpose. Like Sections 9‑208 and 9‑513, which require a secured party to relinquish control of collateral and to file or provide a termination statement for a financing statement, this Section requires a secured party to free up collateral when there no longer is any outstanding secured obligation or any commitment to give value in the future. This Section addresses the case in which account debtors have been notified to pay a secured party to whom the receivables have been assigned. It requires the secured party (assignee) to inform the account debtors that they no longer are obligated to make payment to the secured party. See subsection (b) . It does not apply to account debtors whose obligations on an account, chattel paper, or payment intangible have been sold. See subsection (c).

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Definitional Cross References:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  |  |
| “Account” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(2) |
| “Account debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(3) |
| “Authenticate” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(7) |
| “Chattel paper” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(11) |
| “Debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “Payment intangible” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(61) |
| “Record” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(69) |
| “Secured party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |

Cross References—

1. Assignees of Accounts, Chattel Paper, and Payment Intangibles: Section 36‑9‑209 apples when a secured party has taken an assignment of accounts, chattel paper, or payment intangibles to secure an obligation; the secured party has given the account debtors notification under Section 36‑9‑406(a) to make payments to the secured party; and the debtor has satisfied the obligation and the secured party is not committed to make additional advances. In this situation, Section 36‑9‑209 requires the secured party to provide the account debtors an authenticate record releasing the account debtors from liability to the secured party.

2. Termination Statement: When a secured party has filed a financing statement covering a debtor’s collateral and there is neither an obligation secured by the collateral nor a commitment to make advances, Section 36‑9‑513 requires the secured party to file or send to debtor a termination statement.

3. Release Control: When a secured party has control of a debtor’s collateral and there is neither an obligation secured by the collateral nor a commitment to make advances, Section 36‑9‑208 requires the secured party to release control of the collateral.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 184.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak184.

**SECTION 36‑9‑210.** Request for accounting; request regarding list of collateral or statement of account.

(a) In this section:

(1) “Request” means a record of a type described in item (2), (3), or (4).

(2) “Request for an accounting” means a record authenticated by a debtor requesting that the recipient provide an accounting of the unpaid obligations secured by collateral and reasonably identifying the transaction or relationship that is the subject of the request.

(3) “Request regarding a list of collateral” means a record authenticated by a debtor requesting that the recipient approve or correct a list of what the debtor believes to be the collateral securing an obligation and reasonably identifying the transaction or relationship that is the subject of the request.

(4) “Request regarding a statement of account” means a record authenticated by a debtor requesting that the recipient approve or correct a statement indicating what the debtor believes to be the aggregate amount of unpaid obligations secured by collateral as of a specified date and reasonably identifying the transaction or relationship that is the subject of the request.

(b) Subject to subsections (c), (d), (e), and (f), a secured party, other than a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes or a consignor, shall comply with a request within fourteen days after receipt:

(1) in the case of a request for an accounting, by authenticating and sending to the debtor an accounting; and

(2) in the case of a request regarding a list of collateral or a request regarding a statement of account, by authenticating and sending to the debtor an approval or correction.

(c) A secured party that claims a security interest in all of a particular type of collateral owned by the debtor may comply with a request regarding a list of collateral by sending to the debtor an authenticated record including a statement to that effect within fourteen days after receipt.

(d) A person that receives a request regarding a list of collateral, claims no interest in the collateral when it receives the request, and claimed an interest in the collateral at an earlier time shall comply with the request within fourteen days after receipt by sending to the debtor an authenticated record:

(1) disclaiming any interest in the collateral; and

(2) if known to the recipient, providing the name and mailing address of any assignee of or successor to the recipient’s interest in the collateral.

(e) A person that receives a request for an accounting or a request regarding a statement of account, claims no interest in the obligations when it receives the request, and claimed an interest in the obligations at an earlier time shall comply with the request within fourteen days after receipt by sending to the debtor an authenticated record:

(1) disclaiming any interest in the obligations; and

(2) if known to the recipient, providing the name and mailing address of any assignee of or successor to the recipient’s interest in the obligations.

(f) A debtor is entitled without charge to one response to a request under this section during any six‑month period. The secured party may require payment of a charge not exceeding twenty‑five dollars for each additional response.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑208.

2. Scope and Purpose. This Section provides a procedure whereby a debtor may obtain from a secured party information about the secured obligation and the collateral in which the secured party may claim a security interest. It clarifies and resolves some of the issues that arose under former Section 9‑208 and makes information concerning the secured indebtedness readily available to debtors, both before and after default. It applies to agricultural lien transactions (see the definitions of “debtor,” secured party,” and “collateral” in Section 9‑102), but generally not to sales of receivables. See subsection ( b).

3. Requests by Debtors Only. A financing statement filed under Part 5 may disclose only that a secured party may have a security interest in specified types of collateral. In most cases the financing statement will contain no indication of the obligation (if any) secured, whether any security interest actually exists, or the particular property subject to a security interest. Because creditors of and prospective purchasers from a debtor may have legitimate needs for more detailed information, it is necessary to provide a procedure under which the secured party will be required to provide information. On the other hand, the secured party should not be under a duty to disclose any details of the debtor’s financial affairs to any casual inquirer or competitor who may inquire. For this reason, this Section gives the right to request information to the debtor only. The debtor may submit a request in connection with negotiations with subsequent creditors and purchasers, as well as for the purpose of determining the status of its credit relationship or demonstrating which of its assets are free of a security interest.

4. Permitted Types of Requests for Information. Subsection (a) contemplates that a debtor may request three types of information by submitting three types of “requests” to the secured party. First, the debtor may request the secured party to prepare and send an “ accounting” (defined in Section 9‑102). Second, the debtor may submit to the secured party a list of collateral for the secured party’s approval or correction. Third, the debtor may submit to the secured party for its approval or correction a statement of the aggregate amount of unpaid secured obligations. Inasmuch as a secured party may have numerous transactions and relationships with a debtor, each request must identify the relevant transactions or relationships. Subsections (b) and (c) require the secured party to respond to a request within 14 days following receipt of the request.

5. Recipients Claiming No Interest in the Transaction. A debtor may be unaware that a creditor with whom it has dealt has assigned its security interest or the secured obligation. Subsections (d) and (e) impose upon recipients of requests under this Section the duty to inform the debtor that they claim no interest in the collateral or secured obligation, respectively, and to inform the debtor of the name and mailing address of any known assignee or successor. As under subsections (b) and (c), a response to a request under subsection (d) or (e) is due 14 days following receipt.

6. Waiver; Remedy for Failure to Comply. The debtor’s rights under this Section may not be waived or varied. See Section 9‑602(2). Section 9‑625(e) sets forth the remedy for noncompliance with the requirements of this Section.

7. Limitation on Free Responses to Requests. Under subsection (f), during a six‑month period a debtor is entitled to receive from the secured party one free response to a request. The debtor is not entitled to a free response to each type of request (i.e., three free responses) during a six‑month period.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑210 provides a mechanism that debtors can use to provide prospective secured lenders or purchasers detailed information concerning the status of an existing secured obligation. The provision is necessary because financing statements filed for the public record contain no indication of the amount of a secured obligation and do not establish whether particular property is subject to a security interest.

Prospective secured lenders, however, should not place undue reliance upon the information generated under Section 36‑9‑210. Consider the following illustration.

On February 1, SP‑1 entered into a security agreement with D that granted SP‑1 a security interest upon D’s equipment to secure a $100,000 loan. The value of D’s equipment was $500,000. On February 1, SP‑1 filed a financing statement covering D’s equipment.

In March, SP‑2 was considering making a loan to D secured by D’s equipment. After discovering SP‑1’s financing statement, SP‑2 had D submit a request for an accounting to SP‑1. The response to the request established the debt D owed to SP‑1 was $100,000.

On April 1 and in reliance upon SP‑1’s response to the request for an accounting, SP‑2 made a $400,000 loan secured by a security interest in D’s equipment. On April 1, SP‑2 filed a financing statement covering D’s equipment.

On May 1, SP‑1 entered into a second security agreement with D under which SP‑1 loaned D $400,000 secured by a security interest in D’s equipment.

On June 1, D defaulted upon its security agreements with SP‑1 and SP‑2. Sp‑1’s February 1 financing statement fixed SP‑1 priority for both the February 1 and April 1 loans. As a result, under Section 36‑9‑322(a)(1) SP‑1 would have priority over SP‑2 with respect to both the February 1 and April 1 loans. See Section 36‑9‑323, Official Comment 2, Example 1.

Definitional Cross References:

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| --- | --- |
|  |  |
| “Account” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(2) |
| “Authenticate” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(7) |
| “Chattel Paper” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(11) |
| “Collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Consigner” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(21) |
| “Debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “Payment intangible” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(61) |
| “Promissory note” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(65) |
| “Record” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(69) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |

Cross References—

Content of a financing statement. Section 36‑9‑502

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 162.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak162.

Part 3

Perfection and Priority

Subpart 1

Law Governing Perfection and Priority

**SECTION 36‑9‑301.** Law governing perfection and priority of security interests.

Except as otherwise provided in Sections 36‑9‑303 through 36‑9‑306, the following rules determine the law governing perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in collateral:

(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, while a debtor is located in a jurisdiction, the local law of that jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in collateral.

(2) While collateral is located in a jurisdiction, the local law of that jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a possessory security interest in that collateral.

(3) Except as otherwise provided in item (4), while tangible negotiable documents, goods, instruments, money, or tangible chattel paper is located in a jurisdiction, the local law of that jurisdiction governs:

(A) perfection of a security interest in the goods by filing a fixture filing;

(B) perfection of a security interest in timber to be cut; and

(C) the effect of perfection or nonperfection and the priority of a nonpossessory security interest in the collateral.

(4) The local law of the jurisdiction in which the wellhead or minehead is located governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in as‑extracted collateral.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑301; 1966 (54) 2716; 1979 Act No. 183 Section 1; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2000 Act No. 339, Section 1; 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12; 2014 Act No. 213 (S.343), Section 38, eff October 1, 2014.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Sections 9‑103(1)(a), (b), 9‑103(3)(a), (b), 9‑103(5), substantially modified.

2. Scope of This Subpart. Part 3, Subpart 1 (Sections 9‑301 through 9‑307) contains choice‑of‑law rules similar to those of former Section 9‑103. Former Section 9‑103 generally addresses which State’s law governs “perfection and the effect of perfection or non‑perfection of” security interests. See, e.g., former Section 9‑103(1)(b). This Article follows the broader and more precise formulation in former Section 9‑103(6)(b), which was revised in connection with the promulgation of Revised Article 8 in 1994: “perfection, the effect of perfection or non‑perfection, and the priority of” security interests. Priority, in this context, subsumes all of the rules in Part 3, including “cut off” or “take free” rules such as Sections 9‑317(b), (c), and (d), 9‑320(a), (b), and (d), and 9‑332. This subpart does not address choice of law for other purposes. For example, the law applicable to issues such as attachment, validity, characterization (e.g., true lease or security interest), and enforcement is governed by the rules in Section 1‑105; that governing law typically is specified in the same agreement that contains the security agreement. And, another jurisdiction’s law may govern other third‑ party matters addressed in this Article. See Section 9‑401, Comment 3.

3. Scope of Referral. In designating the jurisdiction whose law governs, this Article directs the court to apply only the substantive (“local”) law of a particular jurisdiction and not its choice‑of‑law rules.

Example 1: Litigation over the priority of a security interest in accounts arises in State X. State X has adopted the official text of this Article, which provides that priority is determined by the local law of the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located. See Section 9‑301(1). The debtor is located in State Y. Even if State Y has retained former Article 9 or enacted a nonuniform choice‑of‑law rule (e.g., one that provides that perfection is governed by the law of State Z), a State X court should look only to the substantive law of State Y and disregard State Y’s choice‑of‑law rule. State Y’s substantive law (e.g., its Section 9‑501) provides that financing statements should be filed in a filing office in State Y. Note, however, that if the identical perfection issue were to be litigated in State Y, the court would look to State Y’s former Section 9‑103 or nonuniform 9‑301 and conclude that a filing in State Y is ineffective.

Example 2: In the preceding Example, assume that State X has adopted the official text of this Article, and State Y has adopted a nonuniform Section 9‑301(1) under which perfection is governed by the whole law of State X, including its choice‑of‑law rules. If litigation occurs in State X, the court should look to the substantive law of State Y, which provides that financing statements are to be filed in a filing office in State Y. If litigation occurs in State Y, the court should look to the law of State X, whose choice‑of‑law rule requires that the court apply the substantive law of State Y. Thus, regardless of the jurisdiction in which the litigation arises, the financing statement should be filed in State Y.

4. Law Governing Perfection: General Rule. Paragraph (1) contains the general rule: the law governing perfection of security interests in both tangible and intangible collateral, whether perfected by filing or automatically, is the law of the jurisdiction of the debtor’s location, as determined under Section 9‑307.

Paragraph (1) substantially simplifies the choice‑of‑law rules. Former Section 9‑103 contained different choice‑of‑law rules for different types of collateral. Under Section 9‑301(1), the law of a single jurisdiction governs perfection with respect to most types of collateral, both tangible and intangible. Paragraph (1) eliminates the need for former Section 9‑103(1)(c), which concerned purchase‑money security interests in tangible collateral that is intended to move from one jurisdiction to the other. It is likely to reduce the frequency of cases in which the governing law changes after a financing statement is properly filed. (Presumably, debtors change their own location less frequently than they change the location of their collateral.) The approach taken in paragraph (1) also eliminates some difficult priority issues and the need to distinguish between “mobile” and “ordinary” goods, and it reduces the number of filing offices in which secured parties must file or search when collateral is located in several jurisdictions.

5. Law Governing Perfection: Exceptions. The general rule is subject to several exceptions. It does not apply to goods covered by a certificate of title (see Section 9‑303), deposit accounts (see Section 9‑304), investment property (see Section 9‑305), or letter‑of‑credit rights (see Section 9‑306). Nor does it apply to possessory security interests, i.e., security interests that the secured party has perfected by taking possession of the collateral (see paragraph (2)), security interests perfected by filing a fixture filing (see paragraph (3)(A)), security interests in timber to be cut (paragraph (3)(B)), or security interests in as‑extracted collateral (see paragraph (4)).

a. Possessory Security Interests. Paragraph (2) applies to possessory security interests and provides that perfection is governed by the local law of the jurisdiction in which the collateral is located. This is the rule of former Section 9‑103(1)(b), except paragraph (2) eliminates the troublesome “last event” test of former law.

The distinction between nonpossessory and possessory security interests creates the potential for the same jurisdiction to apply two different choice‑of‑law rules to determine perfection in the same collateral. For example, were a secured party in possession of an instrument or a tangible document to relinquish possession in reliance on temporary perfection, the applicable law immediately would change from that of the location of the collateral to that of the location of the debtor. The applicability of two different choice‑of‑law rules for perfection is unlikely to lead to any material practical problems. The perfection rules of one Article 9 jurisdiction are likely to be identical to those of another. Moreover, under paragraph (3), the relative priority of competing security interests in tangible collateral is resolved by reference to the law of the jurisdiction in which the collateral is located, regardless of how the security interests are perfected.

b. Fixtures. Application of the general rule in paragraph (1) to perfection of a security interest in fixtures would yield strange results. For example, perfection of a security interest in fixtures located in Arizona and owned by a Delaware corporation would be governed by the law of Delaware. Although Delaware law would send one to a filing office in Arizona for the place to file a financing statement as a fixture filing, see Section 9‑501, Delaware law would not take account of local, nonuniform, real‑ property filing and recording requirements that Arizona law might impose. For this reason, paragraph (3)(A) contains a special rule for security interests perfected by a fixture filing; the law of the jurisdiction in which the fixtures are located governs perfection, including the formal requisites of a fixture filing. Under paragraph (3)(C), the same law governs priority. Fixtures are “goods” as defined in Section 9‑102.

c. Timber to Be Cut. Application of the general rule in paragraph (1) to perfection of a security interest in timber to be cut would yield undesirable results analogous to those described with respect to fixtures. Paragraph (3)(B) adopts a similar solution: perfection is governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the timber is located. As with fixtures, under paragraph (3)(C), the same law governs priority. Timber to be cut also is “goods” as defined in Section 9‑102.

Paragraph (3)(B) applies only to “timber to be cut,” not to timber that has been cut. Consequently, once the timber is cut, the general choice‑of‑law rule in paragraph (1) becomes applicable. To ensure continued perfection, a secured party should file in both the jurisdiction in which the timber to be cut is located and in the state where the debtor is located. The former filing would be with the office in which a real property mortgage would be filed, and the latter would be a central filing. See Section 9‑501.

d. As‑Extracted Collateral. Paragraph (4) adopts the rule of former Section 9‑103(5) with respect to certain security interests in minerals and related accounts. Like security interests in fixtures perfected by filing a fixture filing, security interests in minerals that are as‑extracted collateral are perfected by filing in the office designated for the filing or recording of a mortgage on the real property. For the same reasons, the law governing perfection and priority is the law of the jurisdiction in which the wellhead or minehead is located.

6. Change in Law Governing Perfection. When the debtor changes its location to another jurisdiction, the jurisdiction whose law governs perfection under paragraph (1) changes, as well. Similarly, the law governing perfection of a possessory security interest in collateral under paragraph (2) changes when the collateral is removed to another jurisdiction. Nevertheless, these changes will not result in an immediate loss of perfection. See Section 9‑316(a), (b).

7. Law Governing Effect of Perfection and Priority: Goods, Documents, Instruments, Money, Negotiable Documents, and Tangible Chattel Paper. Under former Section 9‑103, the law of a single jurisdiction governed both questions of perfection and those of priority. This Article generally adopts that approach. See paragraph (1). But the approach may create problems if the debtor and collateral are located in different jurisdictions. For example, assume a security interest in equipment located in Pennsylvania is perfected by filing in Illinois, where the debtor is located. If the law of the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located were to govern priority, then the priority of an execution lien on goods located in Pennsylvania would be governed by rules enacted by the Illinois legislature.

To address this problem, paragraph (3)(C) divorces questions of perfection from questions of “the effect of perfection or nonperfection and the priority of a security interest.” Under paragraph (3)(C), the rights of competing claimants to tangible collateral are resolved by reference to the law of the jurisdiction in which the collateral is located. A similar bifurcation applied to security interests in investment property under former Section 9‑103(6). See Section 9‑305.

Paragraph (3)(C) applies the law of the situs to determine priority only with respect to goods (including fixtures), instruments, money, tangible negotiable documents, and tangible chattel paper. Compare former Section 9‑103(1), which applied the law of the location of the collateral to documents, instruments, and “ordinary” (as opposed to “mobile”) goods. This Article does not distinguish among types of goods. The ordinary/mobile goods distinction appears to address concerns about where to file and search, rather than concerns about priority. There is no reason to preserve this distinction under the bifurcated approach.

Particularly serious confusion may arise when the choice‑of‑law rules of a given jurisdiction result in each of two competing security interests in the same collateral being governed by a different priority rule. The potential for this confusion existed under former Section 9‑103(4) with respect to chattel paper: Perfection by possession was governed by the law of the location of the paper, whereas perfection by filing was governed by the law of the location of the debtor. Consider the mess that would have been created if the language or interpretation of former Section 9‑308 were to differ in the two relevant States, or if one of the relevant jurisdictions (e.g., a foreign country) had not adopted Article 9. The potential for confusion could have been exacerbated when a secured party perfected both by taking possession in the State where the collateral is located (State A) and by filing in the State where the debtor is located (State B)‑a common practice for some chattel paper financers. By providing that the law of the jurisdiction in which the collateral is located governs priority, paragraph (3) substantially diminishes this problem.

8. Non‑U.S. Debtors. This Article applies the same choice‑of‑law rules to all debtors, foreign and domestic. For example, it adopts the bifurcated approach for determining the law applicable to security interests in goods and other tangible collateral. See Comment 5.a., above. The Article contains a new rule specifying the location of non‑U.S. debtors for purposes of this Part. The rule appears in Section 9‑307 and is explained in the Reporters’ Comments following that Section. Former Section 9‑103(3)(c), which contained a special choice‑of‑law rule governing security interests created by debtors located in a non‑U.S. jurisdiction, proved unsatisfactory and was deleted.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑301 states the general rules for determining the law applicable to the perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest. These rules differ significantly from those provided in former Section 36‑9‑103. The most significant change is that the law of the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located rather than the law of the situs of the collateral will govern the perfection of most security interests perfected by filing.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “As‑extracted‑collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(6) |
| “Collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Document of title” | Section 36‑1‑201(15) |
| “Future filing” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(40) |
| “Goods” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(44) |
| “Instrument” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(47) |
| “Security Interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |
| “Tangible chattel paper” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(78) |

Cross References

1. Law governing perfection and priority of agricultural liens. Section 36‑9‑302.

2. Law governing perfection and priority of security interests in goods subject to Certificate of Title statute. Section 36‑9‑303.

3. Law governing perfection and priority of security interests in deposit accounts. Section 36‑9‑304.

4. Law governing perfections and priority of security interests in investment property. Section 36‑9‑305.

5. Law governing perfection and priority of security interests in letter‑of‑credit rights. Section 36‑9‑306.

6. Location of the debtor. Section 36‑9‑307.

7. Perfection provisions. Sections 36‑9‑308 to 36‑9‑316.

8. Perfection of possessory security interests. Section 36‑9‑313.

9. Priority provisions. Sections 36‑9‑317 to 36‑9‑339.

10. Real property‑related financing statements. Section 36‑9‑502(b).

Effect of Amendment

2014 Act No. 213, Section 38, in subsection (3), inserted “tangible” before “negotiable documents”.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 3, 81 to 102, 136, 148.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak3; 349Ak81 to 349Ak102; 349Ak136; 349Ak148.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Encyclopedias

S.C. Jur. Landlord and Tenant Section 47, Priority of Landlord’s Lien.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 1

1. In general

As explained in Section 36‑9‑103, Official Comment 1, where a security interest is perfected in one jurisdiction and then removed to another jurisdiction, term “last event” within Section 36‑9‑103 refers to maintenance of perfection in the latter jurisdiction or failure to do so; thus, by plain language of this section, in action brought by creditor with security interest in debtor’s inventory against seller of equipment to debtor, alleging conversion of equipment that debtor had returned to seller, California law governed issue of whether creditor failed to perfect its security interest in equipment after it was removed from South Carolina to California. Reedy River Ventures Ltd. Partnership v. SynOptics Communications, Inc., 1993, 818 F.Supp. 145, affirmed 38 F.3d 1213.

**SECTION 36‑9‑302.** Law governing perfection and priority of agricultural liens.

While farm products are located in a jurisdiction, the local law of that jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of an agricultural lien on the farm products.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑302; 1966 (54) 2716; 1967 (55) 862; 1968 (55) 3037; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 1991 Act No. 161, Section 2(G); 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. New.

2. Agricultural Liens. This Section provides choice‑of‑law rules for agricultural liens on farm products. Perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and priority all are governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the farm products are located. Other choice‑of‑law rules, including Section 1‑105, determine which jurisdiction’s law governs other matters, such as the secured party’s rights on default. See Section 9‑301, Comment 2. Inasmuch as no agricultural lien on proceeds arises under this Article, this Section does not expressly apply to proceeds of agricultural liens. However, if another statute creates an agricultural lien on proceeds, it may be appropriate for courts to apply the choice‑of‑law rule in this Section to determine priority in the proceeds.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑302 provides a special choice of law rule for agricultural liens. Under this provision the law of the jurisdiction where farm products are located governs the perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of agricultural liens.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Agricultural lien” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(7) |
| “Farm products” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(34) |

Cross References

1. Scope—Article 9 applies to agricultural liens.

2. South Carolina agricultural liens: Landlord’s lien for rent, section 29‑13‑10 S.C. Code Ann. (1976); landlord’s lien for advances, section 29‑13‑10 S.C. Code Ann (1976); and labor’s lien section 29‑13‑20 S.C. Code Ann (1976). See Section 36‑9‑109, South Carolina Reporter’s Comment.

3. Enforceability: An agricultural lien does not have to meet the requirements of Section 36‑9‑203 to be enforceable against the debtor.

4. Perfection: Section 36‑9‑310(a) provides that an agricultural lien must be perfected by filing a financing statement.

5. Proceeds: Under Section 36‑9‑315(a)(2) an agricultural lien does not continue in proceeds realized by the debtor. See Section 36‑9‑315, Official Comment 9.

6. Priority: Section 36‑9‑322(g) provides that the statute creating the agricultural lien controls priority conflicts between the agricultural lien and a security interest.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Agriculture 10.

Secured Transactions 3, 81 to 102, 138.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 23k10; 349Ak3; 349Ak81 to 349Ak102; 349Ak138.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Encyclopedias

S.C. Jur. Assignments Section 51, Assignments of Security Interests.

**SECTION 36‑9‑303.** Law governing perfection and priority of security interests in goods covered by a certificate of title.

(a) This section applies to goods covered by a certificate of title, even if there is no other relationship between the jurisdiction under whose certificate of title the goods are covered and the goods or the debtor.

(b) Goods become covered by a certificate of title when a valid application for the certificate of title and the applicable fee are delivered to the appropriate authority. Goods cease to be covered by a certificate of title at the earlier of the time the certificate of title ceases to be effective under the law of the issuing jurisdiction or the time the goods become covered subsequently by a certificate of title issued by another jurisdiction.

(c) The local law of the jurisdiction under whose certificate of title the goods are covered governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in goods covered by a certificate of title from the time the goods become covered by the certificate of title until the goods cease to be covered by the certificate of title.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑303; 1966 (54) 2716; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No; 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑103(2)(a), (b), substantially revised.

2. Scope of This Section. This Section applies to “goods covered by a certificate of title.” The new definition of “certificate of title” in Section 9‑102 makes clear that this Section applies not only to certificate‑of‑title statutes under which perfection occurs upon notation of the security interest on the certificate but also to those that contemplate notation but provide that perfection is achieved by another method, e.g., delivery of designated documents to an official. Subsection (a), which is new, makes clear that this Section applies to certificates of a jurisdiction having no other contacts with the goods or the debtor. This result comports with most of the reported cases on the subject and with contemporary business practices in the trucking industry.

3. Law Governing Perfection and Priority. Subsection (c) is the basic choice‑of‑law rule for goods covered by a certificate of title. Perfection and priority of a security interest are governed by the law of the jurisdiction under whose certificate of title the goods are covered from the time the goods become covered by the certificate of title until the goods cease to be covered by the certificate of title.

Normally, under the law of the relevant jurisdiction, the perfection step would consist of compliance with that jurisdiction’s certificate‑of‑title statute and a resulting notation of the security interest on the certificate of title. See Section 9‑311(b). In the typical case of an automobile or over‑the‑road truck, a person who wishes to take a security interest in the vehicle can ascertain whether it is subject to any security interests by looking at the certificate of title. But certificates of title cover certain types of goods in some States but not in others. A secured party who does not realize this may extend credit and attempt to perfect by filing in the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located. If the goods had been titled in another jurisdiction, the lender would be unperfected.

Subsection (b) explains when goods become covered by a certificate of title and when they cease to be covered. Goods may become covered by a certificate of title, even though no certificate of title has issued. Former Section 9‑103(2)(b) provided that the law of the jurisdiction issuing the certificate ceases to apply upon “surrender” of the certificate. This Article eliminates the concept of “surrender.” However, if the certificate is surrendered in conjunction with an appropriate application for a certificate to be issued by another jurisdiction, the law of the original jurisdiction ceases to apply because the goods became covered subsequently by a certificate of title from another jurisdiction. Alternatively, the law of the original jurisdiction ceases to apply when the certificate “ceases to be effective” under the law of that jurisdiction. Given the diversity in certificate‑of‑title statutes, the term “effective” is not defined.

4. Continued Perfection. The fact that the law of one State ceases to apply under subsection (b) does not mean that a security interest perfected under that law becomes unperfected automatically. In most cases, the security interest will remain perfected. See Section 9‑316(d), (e). Moreover, a perfected security interest may be subject to defeat by certain buyers and secured parties. See Section 9‑337.

5. Inventory. Compliance with a certificate‑of‑title statute generally is not the method of perfecting security interests in inventory. Section 9‑311( d) provides that a security interest created in inventory held by a person in the business of selling or leasing goods of that kind is subject to the normal filing rules; compliance with a certificate‑of‑title statute is not necessary or effective to perfect the security interest. Most certificate‑of‑ title statutes are in accord.

The following example explains the subtle relationship between this rule and the choice‑of‑law rules in Section 9‑303 and former Section 9‑103(2):

Example: Goods are located in State A and covered by a certificate of title issued under the law of State A. The State A certificate of title is “clean”; it does not reflect a security interest. Owner takes the goods to State B and sells (trades in) the goods to Dealer, who is located (within the meaning of Section 9‑307) in State B. As is customary, Dealer retains the duly assigned State A certificate of title pending resale of the goods. Dealer’s inventory financer, SP, obtains a security interest in the goods under its after‑acquired property clause.

Under Section 9‑311(d) of both State A and State B, Dealer’s inventory financer, SP, must perfect by filing instead of complying with a certificate‑of‑title statute. If Section 9‑303 were read to provide that the law applicable to perfection of SP’s security interest is that of State A, because the goods are covered by a State A certificate, then SP would be required to file in State A under State A’s Section 9‑501. That result would be anomalous, to say the least, since the principle underlying Section 9‑311(d) is that the inventory should be treated as ordinary goods.

Section 9‑303 (and former Section 9‑103(2)) should be read as providing that the law of State B, not State A, applies. A court looking to the forum’s Section 9‑303(a) would find that Section 9‑303 applies only if two conditions are met: (i) the goods are covered by the certificate as explained in Section 9‑303(b), i.e., application had been made for a State (here, State A) to issue a certificate of title covering the goods and (ii) the certificate is a “certificate of title” as defined in Section 9‑102, i.e., “a statute provides for the security interest in question to be indicated on the certificate as a condition or result of the security interest’s obtaining priority over the rights of a lien creditor.” Stated otherwise, Section 9‑303 applies only when compliance with a certificate‑of‑ title statute, and not filing, is the appropriate method of perfection. Under the law of State A, for purposes of perfecting SP’s security interest in the dealer’s inventory, the proper method of perfection is filing‑not compliance with State A’s certificate‑of‑title statute. For that reason, the goods are not covered by a “certificate of title,” and the second condition is not met. Thus, Section 9‑303 does not apply to the goods. Instead, Section 9‑301 applies, and the applicable law is that of State B, where the debtor (dealer) is located.

6. External Constraints on This Section. The need to coordinate Article 9 with a variety of nonuniform certificate‑of‑title statutes, the need to provide rules to take account of situations in which multiple certificates of title are outstanding with respect to particular goods, and the need to govern the transition from perfection by filing in one jurisdiction to perfection by notation in another all create pressure for a detailed and complex set of rules. In an effort to minimize complexity, this Article does not attempt to coordinate Article 9 with the entire array of certificate‑of‑ title statutes. In particular, Sections 9‑303, 9‑311, and 9‑316(d) and (e) assume that the certificate‑of‑title statutes to which they apply do not have relation‑back provisions (i.e., provisions under which perfection is deemed to occur at a time earlier than when the perfection steps actually are taken). A Legislative Note to Section 9‑311 recommends the elimination of relation‑back provisions in certificate‑of‑title statutes affecting perfection of security interests.

Ideally, at any given time, only one certificate of title is outstanding with respect to particular goods. In fact, however, sometimes more than one jurisdiction issues more than one certificate of title with respect to the same goods. This situation results from defects in certificate‑of‑title laws and the interstate coordination of those laws, not from deficiencies in this Article. As long as the possibility of multiple certificates of title remains, the potential for innocent parties to suffer losses will continue. At best, this Article can identify clearly which innocent parties will bear the losses in familiar fact patterns.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑303 provides a special choice law rule for goods covered by a certificate of title. Under this provision the local law of the jurisdiction that issued the certificate of title governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in the goods while the goods are covered by the certificate.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Certificate of title” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(10) |
| “Goods” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(44) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |

Cross References—

1. South Carolina Certificate of Title Statute: Section 50‑23‑10 et seq. S.C. Code Ann. (watercraft and outboard motors); section 56‑19‑10 et seq. (motor vehicles).

2. Perfection of security interests in goods covered by a certificate of title: sections 36‑9‑311, 36‑9‑313(b), and 36‑9‑316(d) and (e).

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 7, 87, 98, 135, 136.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak7; 349Ak87; 349Ak98; 349Ak135; 349Ak136.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 1

1. In general

As explained in Section 36‑9‑103, Official Comment 1, where a security interest is perfected in one jurisdiction and then removed to another jurisdiction, term “last event” within Section 36‑9‑103 refers to maintenance of perfection in the latter jurisdiction or failure to do so; thus, by plain language of this section, in action brought by creditor with security interest in debtor’s inventory against seller of equipment to debtor, alleging conversion of equipment that debtor had returned to seller, California law governed issue of whether creditor failed to perfect its security interest in equipment after it was removed from South Carolina to California. Reedy River Ventures Ltd. Partnership v. SynOptics Communications, Inc., 1993, 818 F.Supp. 145, affirmed 38 F.3d 1213.

**SECTION 36‑9‑304.** Law governing perfection and priority of security interests in deposit accounts.

(a) The local law of a bank’s jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in a deposit account maintained with that bank.

(b) The following rules determine a bank’s jurisdiction for purposes of this part:

(1) If an agreement between the bank and the debtor governing the deposit account expressly provides that a particular jurisdiction is the bank’s jurisdiction for purposes of this part, this chapter, or the Uniform Commercial Code, that jurisdiction is the bank’s jurisdiction.

(2) If item (1) does not apply and an agreement between the bank and its customer governing the deposit account expressly provides that the agreement is governed by the law of a particular jurisdiction, that jurisdiction is the bank’s jurisdiction.

(3) If neither item (1) nor item (2) applies and an agreement between the bank and its customer governing the deposit account expressly provides that the deposit account is maintained at an office in a particular jurisdiction, that jurisdiction is the bank’s jurisdiction.

(4) If none of the preceding items applies, the bank’s jurisdiction is the jurisdiction in which the office identified in an account statement as the office serving the customer’s account is located.

(5) If none of the preceding paragraphs applies, the bank’s jurisdiction is the jurisdiction in which the chief executive office of the bank is located.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑304; 1966 (54) 2716; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 1991 Act No. 161, Section 2(H); 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. New; derived from Section 8‑110(e) and former Section 9‑103(6).

2. Deposit Accounts. Under this Section, the law of the “bank’s jurisdiction” governs perfection and priority of a security interest in deposit accounts. Subsection (b) contains rules for determining the “bank’s jurisdiction.” The substance of these rules is substantially similar to that of the rules determining the “security intermediary’s jurisdiction” under former Section 8‑110(e), except that subsection (b)(1) provides more flexibility than the analogous provision in former Section 8‑110(e)(1). Subsection (b)(1) permits the parties to choose the law of one jurisdiction to govern perfection and priority of security interests and a different governing law for other purposes. The parties’ choice is effective, even if the jurisdiction whose law is chosen bears no relationship to the parties or the transaction. Section 8‑110(e)(1) has been conformed to subsection (b)(1) of this Section, and Section 9‑305(b)(1), concerning a commodity intermediary’s jurisdiction, makes a similar departure from former Section 9‑103(6)(e)(i).

3. Change in Law Governing Perfection. When the bank’s jurisdiction changes, the jurisdiction whose law governs perfection under subsection (a) changes, as well. Nevertheless, the change will not result in an immediate loss of perfection. See Section 9‑316(f), (g).

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑304 provides a special choice of law rule for deposit accounts. Under this provision the law of the bank’s jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in a deposit account maintained with that bank. The provision grants the parties the power to specify the bank’s jurisdiction by agreement.

Definitional Cross References:

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| --- | --- |
|  |  |
| “Agreement” | Section 36‑1‑201(3) |
| “Bank” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(7) |
| “Chief executive office” | See Section 36‑9‑307,  Official Comment 2 at ¶4. |
| “Customer” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(29) |

Cross References—

1. Control of a deposit account. Section 36‑9‑104.

2. Enforceability of a security interest in a deposit account. Section 36‑9‑203(b)(3)(D).

3. Perfection of a security interest in a deposit account. Sections 36‑9‑312(b)(1) and 36‑9‑314.

4. Priority of security interests in a deposit account. Section 36‑9‑327.

5. Enforcement of a security interest in a deposit account. Section 36‑9‑607(a)(4).

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Banks and Banking 136.

Secured Transactions 4, 81 to 102, 138.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 52k136; 349Ak4; 349Ak81 to 349Ak102; 349Ak138.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Encyclopedias

S.C. Jur. Mortgages Section 167, Validity.

**SECTION 36‑9‑305.** Law governing perfection and priority of security interests in investment property.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), the following rules apply:

(1) While a security certificate is located in a jurisdiction, the local law of that jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in the certificated security represented thereby.

(2) The local law of the issuer’s jurisdiction as specified in Section 36‑8‑110(d) governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in an uncertificated security.

(3) The local law of the securities intermediary’s jurisdiction as specified in Section 36‑8‑110(e) governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in a security entitlement or securities account.

(4) The local law of the commodity intermediary’s jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in a commodity contract or commodity account.

(b) The following rules determine a commodity intermediary’s jurisdiction for purposes of this part:

(1) If an agreement between the commodity intermediary and commodity customer governing the commodity account expressly provides that a particular jurisdiction is the commodity intermediary’s jurisdiction for purposes of this part, this chapter, or the Uniform Commercial Code, that jurisdiction is the commodity intermediary’s jurisdiction.

(2) If item (1) does not apply and an agreement between the commodity intermediary and commodity customer governing the commodity account expressly provides that the agreement is governed by the law of a particular jurisdiction, that jurisdiction is the commodity intermediary’s jurisdiction.

(3) If neither item (1) nor item (2) applies and an agreement between the commodity intermediary and commodity customer governing the commodity account expressly provides that the commodity account is maintained at an office in a particular jurisdiction, that jurisdiction is the commodity intermediary’s jurisdiction.

(4) If none of the preceding items applies, the commodity intermediary’s jurisdiction is the jurisdiction in which the office identified in an account statement as the office serving the commodity customer’s account is located.

(5) If none of the preceding items applies, the commodity intermediary’s jurisdiction is the jurisdiction in which the chief executive office of the commodity intermediary is located.

(c) The local law of the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located governs:

(1) perfection of a security interest in investment property by filing;

(2) automatic perfection of a security interest in investment property created by a broker or securities intermediary; and

(3) automatic perfection of a security interest in a commodity contract or commodity account created by a commodity intermediary.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑305; 1966 (54) 2716; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 1991 Act No. 161, Section 2(I); 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑103(6).

2. Investment Property: General Rules. This Section specifies choice‑of‑ law rules for perfection and priority of security interests in investment property. Subsection (a)(1) covers security interests in certificated securities. Subsection (a)(2) covers security interests in uncertificated securities. Subsection (a)(3) covers security interests in security entitlements and securities accounts. Subsection (a)(4) covers security interests in commodity contracts and commodity accounts. The approach of each of these paragraphs is essentially the same. They identify the jurisdiction’s law that governs questions of perfection and priority by using the same principles that Article 8 uses to determine other questions concerning that form of investment property. Thus, for certificated securities, the law of the jurisdiction in which the certificate is located governs. Cf. Section 8‑110(c). For uncertificated securities, the law of the issuer’s jurisdiction governs. Cf. Section 8‑110(a). For security entitlements and securities accounts, the law of the securities intermediary’s jurisdiction governs. Cf. Section 8‑110(b). For commodity contracts and commodity accounts, the law of the commodity intermediary’s jurisdiction governs. Because commodity contracts and commodity accounts are not governed by Article 8, subsection (b) contains rules that specify the commodity intermediary’s jurisdiction. These are analogous to the rules in Section 8‑110(e) specifying a securities intermediary’s jurisdiction. Subsection (b)(1) affords the parties greater flexibility than did former Section 9‑103(6)(3). See also Section 9‑304(b) (bank’s jurisdiction); Revised Section 8‑110(e)(1) (securities intermediary’s jurisdiction).

3. Investment Property: Exceptions. Subsection (c) establishes an exception to the general rules set out in subsection (a). It provides that perfection of a security interest by filing, automatic perfection of a security interest in investment property created by a debtor who is a broker or securities intermediary (see Section 9‑309(10)), and automatic perfection of a security interest in a commodity contract or commodity account of a debtor who is a commodity intermediary (see Section 9‑309(11) are governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located, as determined under Section 9‑307.

4. Examples: The following examples illustrate the rules in this Section:

Example 1: A customer residing in New Jersey maintains a securities account with Able & Co. The agreement between the customer and Able specifies that it is governed by Pennsylvania law but expressly provides that the law of California is Able’s jurisdiction for purposes of the Uniform Commercial Code. Through the account the customer holds securities of a Massachusetts corporation, which Able holds through a clearing corporation located in New York. The customer obtains a margin loan from Able. Subsection (a)(3) provides that California law‑the law of the securities intermediary’s jurisdiction‑governs perfection and priority of the security interest, even if California has no other relationship to the parties or the transaction.

Example 2: A customer residing in New Jersey maintains a securities account with Able & Co. The agreement between the customer and Able specifies that it is governed by Pennsylvania law. Through the account the customer holds securities of a Massachusetts corporation, which Able holds through a clearing corporation located in New York. The customer obtains a loan from a lender located in Illinois. The lender takes a security interest and perfects by obtaining an agreement among the debtor, itself, and Able, which satisfies the requirement of Section 8‑106(d)(2) to give the lender control. Subsection (a)(3) provides that Pennsylvania law‑the law of the securities intermediary’s jurisdiction‑governs perfection and priority of the security interest, even if Pennsylvania has no other relationship to the parties or the transaction.

Example 3: A customer residing in New Jersey maintains a securities account with Able & Co. The agreement between the customer and Able specifies that it is governed by Pennsylvania law. Through the account, the customer holds securities of a Massachusetts corporation, which Able holds through a clearing corporation located in New York. The customer borrows from SP‑1, and SP‑1 files a financing statement in New Jersey. Later, the customer obtains a loan from SP‑2. SP‑2 takes a security interest and perfects by obtaining an agreement among the debtor, itself, and Able, which satisfies the requirement of Section 8‑106(d)(2) to give the SP‑2 control. Subsection (c) provides that perfection of SP‑1’s security interest by filing is governed by the location of the debtor, so the filing in New Jersey was appropriate. Subsection (a)(3), however, provides that Pennsylvania law‑the law of the securities intermediary’s jurisdiction‑ governs all other questions of perfection and priority. Thus, Pennsylvania law governs perfection of SP‑2’s security interest, and Pennsylvania law also governs the priority of the security interests of SP‑1 and SP‑2.

5. Change in Law Governing Perfection. When the issuer’s jurisdiction, the securities intermediary’s jurisdiction, or commodity intermediary’s jurisdiction changes, the jurisdiction whose law governs perfection under subsection (a) changes, as well. Similarly, the law governing perfection of a possessory security interest in a certificated security changes when the collateral is removed to another jurisdiction, see subsection (a)(1), and the law governing perfection by filing changes when the debtor changes its location. See subsection (c). Nevertheless, these changes will not result in an immediate loss of perfection. See Section 9‑316.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑305 sets forth special choice of law rules applicable to investment property. Section 36‑9‑305(a) provides distinct rules for certificated securities, uncertificated securities, security entitlements and security accounts, and commodity contracts and commodities accounts. These rules govern the perfection, the effect of perfection or non perfection, and the priority of security interests in the various forms of investment property. Section 36‑9‑305(c) sets forth choice of law rules applicable to the perfection of security interests in investment property perfected by filing and the automatic perfection of certain security interests held by brokers, securities intermediaries, and commodity intermediaries.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Broker” | Section 36‑8‑102(a)(3) |
| “Certificated security” | Section 36‑8‑102(a)(4) |
| “Chief executive office” | See Section 39‑9‑307,  Official Comment 2, ¶4 |
| “Commodity account” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(14) |
| “Commodity contract” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(15) |
| “Commodity customer” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(16) |
| “Commodity intermediary” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(17) |
| “Issuer’s jurisdiction” | See Section 36‑8‑110(d) |
| “Securities account” | Section 36‑8‑501(a) |
| “Securities intermediary” | Section 36‑8‑102(a)(14) |
| “Security certificate” | Section 36‑8‑102(a)(16) |
| “Security entitlement” | Section 36‑8‑102(a)(17) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑8‑102(a)(17) |
| “Uncertificated security” | Section 36‑8‑102(a)(18) |

Cross References—

1. Control of certificated security. Sections 36‑9‑106, 36‑8‑106(a) and (b), 36‑8‑301(a).

2. Control of an uncertificated security. Sections 36‑9‑106(a), 36‑8‑106(c).

3. Control of a security entitlement. Sections 36‑9‑106(a), 36‑8‑106(d).

4. Control of a securities account. Section 36‑9‑106(c).

5. Control of a commodity contract. Section 36‑9‑106(b).

6. Control of a commodity account. Section 36‑9‑106(c).

7. Enforceability of security interests in investment property under the control of a secured party. Section 36‑9‑203(b)(3)(D).

8. Perfection of security interests in an investment property by filing. Section 36‑9‑312(a).

9. Temporary automatic perfection of security interests in certificated securities. Section 36‑9‑312(e) and (g).

10. Perfection of security interests in certificated securities by delivery. Sections 36‑9‑313(a) and 36‑8‑301(a).

11. Perfection of security interests in investment property by control. Section 36‑9‑314(a) and (c).

12. Priority of security interests in investment property. Section 36‑9‑328.

13. Priority of purchasers of securities protected under Article 8. Section 36‑9‑331.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 3, 81 to 102, 136.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak3; 349Ak81 to 349Ak102; 349Ak136.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 1

1. In general

As explained in Section 36‑9‑103, Official Comment 1, where a security interest is perfected in one jurisdiction and then removed to another jurisdiction, term “last event” within Section 36‑9‑103 refers to maintenance of perfection in the latter jurisdiction or failure to do so; thus, by plain language of this section, in action brought by creditor with security interest in debtor’s inventory against seller of equipment to debtor, alleging conversion of equipment that debtor had returned to seller, California law governed issue of whether creditor failed to perfect its security interest in equipment after it was removed from South Carolina to California. Reedy River Ventures Ltd. Partnership v. SynOptics Communications, Inc., 1993, 818 F.Supp. 145, affirmed 38 F.3d 1213.

**SECTION 36‑9‑306.** Law governing perfection and priority of security interests in letter‑of‑credit rights

(a) Subject to subsection (c), the local law of the issuer’s jurisdiction or a nominated person’s jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in a letter‑of‑credit right if the issuer’s jurisdiction or nominated person’s jurisdiction is a State.

(b) For purposes of this part, an issuer’s jurisdiction or nominated person’s jurisdiction is the jurisdiction whose law governs the liability of the issuer or nominated person with respect to the letter‑of‑credit right as provided in Section 36‑5‑116.

(c) This section does not apply to a security interest that is perfected only under Section 36‑9‑308(d).

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑306; 1966 (54) 2716; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No; 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. New; derived in part from Section 8‑110(e) and former Section 9‑103(6).

2. Sui Generis Treatment. This Section governs the applicable law for perfection and priority of security interests in letter‑of‑credit rights, other than a security interest perfected only under Section 9‑308(d) (i.e., as a supporting obligation). The treatment differs substantially from that provided in Section 9‑304 for deposit accounts. The basic rule is that the law of the issuer’s or nominated person’s (e.g., confirmer’s) jurisdiction, derived from the terms of the letter of credit itself, controls perfection and priority, but only if the issuer’s or nominated person’s jurisdiction is a State, as defined in Section 9‑102. If the issuer’s or nominated person’s jurisdiction is not a State, the baseline rule of Section 9‑301 applies‑ perfection and priority are governed by the law of the debtor’s location, determined under Section 9‑307. Export transactions typically involve a foreign issuer and a domestic nominated person, such as a confirmer, located in a State. The principal goal of this Section is to reduce the likelihood that perfection and priority would be governed by the law of a foreign jurisdiction in a transaction that is essentially domestic from the standpoint of the debtor‑beneficiary, its creditors, and a domestic nominated person.

3. Issuer’s or Nominated Person’s Jurisdiction. Subsection (b) defers to the rules established under Section 5‑116 for determination of an issuer’s or nominated person’s jurisdiction.

Example: An Italian bank issues a letter of credit that is confirmed by a New York bank. The beneficiary is a Connecticut corporation. The letter of credit provides that the issuer’s liability is governed by Italian law, and the confirmation provides that the confirmer’s liability is governed by the law of New York. Under Sections 9‑306(b) and 5‑116(a), Italy is the issuer’s jurisdiction and New York is the confirmer’s (nominated person’s) jurisdiction. Because the confirmer’s jurisdiction is a State, the law of New York governs perfection and priority of a security interest in the beneficiary’s letter‑of‑credit right against the confirmer. See Section 9‑306(a). However, because the issuer’s jurisdiction is not a State, the law of that jurisdiction does not govern. See Section 9‑306(a). Rather, the choice‑of‑law rule in Section 9‑301(1) applies to perfection and priority of a security interest in the beneficiary’s letter‑of‑credit right against the issuer. Under that Section, perfection and priority are governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the debtor (beneficiary) is located. That jurisdiction is Connecticut. See Section 9‑307.

4. Scope of this Section. This Section specifies only the law governing perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and priority of security interests. Section 5‑116 specifies the law governing the liability of, and Article 5 (or other applicable law) deals with the rights and duties of, an issuer or nominated person. Perfection, nonperfection, and priority have no effect on those rights and duties.

5. Change in Law Governing Perfection. When the issuer’s jurisdiction, or nominated person’s jurisdiction changes, the jurisdiction whose law governs perfection under subsection (a) changes, as well. Nevertheless, this change will not result in an immediate loss of perfection. See Section 9‑316(f), (g).

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

[Assuming adoption of 1995 revision to Article 5]

Section 36‑9‑306 provides a special choice of law rule governing letter‑of‑credit rights. Under this provision the local law of the issuer’s or nominated person’s jurisdiction governs perfection, the effects of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of security interest in letter‑of‑credit rights. The issuer’s or nominated person’s jurisdiction is the jurisdiction whose law governs the liability of the issuer or nominated person as provided in Section 36‑5‑116. This choice of law rule, however, does not apply if the security interest in the letter‑of‑credit right is a supporting obligation perfected only under Section 36‑9‑308(d).

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Issuer” | Section 36‑5‑102(a)(9) |
| “Letter‑of‑credit right” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(51) |
| “Nominated person” | Section 36‑5‑102(a)(11) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |

Cross References—

1. Determining the law governing the liability of an issuer or nominated person and thereby the issuer’s or nominated person’s jurisdiction.

2. Control of letter‑of‑credit rights. Sections 36‑9‑107, Section 36‑5‑114(c).

3. Enforceability of security interests in favor of secured parties in control of letter‑of‑credit rights. Section 36‑9‑203(b)(3)(D).

4. Perfection of security interests in letter‑of‑credit rights. Sections 36‑9‑321(b)(2), 36‑9‑314(a).

5. Letter‑of‑credit rights as supporting obligations. Section 36‑9‑102( a)(77).

6. Attachment of security interests in supporting obligations. Section 36‑9‑308(f).

7. Perfection of security interests in supporting obligations. Section 36‑9‑308(d).

8. Priority of security interests in letter‑of‑credit rights. Section 36‑9‑329.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Banks and Banking 191.

Secured Transactions 3, 81 to 102, 136.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 52k191; 349Ak3; 349Ak81 to 349Ak102; 349Ak136.

LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES

Secured Party’s Rights on Disposition of Collateral. 22 S.C. L. Rev. 504.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 1

1. In general

As explained in Section 36‑9‑103, Official Comment 1, where a security interest is perfected in one jurisdiction and then removed to another jurisdiction, term “last event” within Section 36‑9‑103 refers to maintenance of perfection in the latter jurisdiction or failure to do so; thus, by plain language of this section, in action brought by creditor with security interest in debtor’s inventory against seller of equipment to debtor, alleging conversion of equipment that debtor had returned to seller, California law governed issue of whether creditor failed to perfect its security interest in equipment after it was removed from South Carolina to California. Reedy River Ventures Ltd. Partnership v. SynOptics Communications, Inc., 1993, 818 F.Supp. 145, affirmed 38 F.3d 1213.

**SECTION 36‑9‑307.** Location of debtor

(a) In this section, “place of business” means a place where a debtor conducts its affairs.

(b) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the following rules determine a debtor’s location:

(1) A debtor who is an individual is located at the individual’s principal residence.

(2) A debtor that is an organization and has only one place of business is located at its place of business.

(3) A debtor that is an organization and has more than one place of business is located at its chief executive office.

(c) Subsection (b) applies only if a debtor’s residence, place of business, or chief executive office, as applicable, is located in a jurisdiction whose law generally requires information concerning the existence of a nonpossessory security interest to be made generally available in a filing, recording, or registration system as a condition or result of the security interest’s obtaining priority over the rights of a lien creditor with respect to the collateral. If subsection (b) does not apply, the debtor is located in the District of Columbia.

(d) A person that ceases to exist, have a residence, or have a place of business continues to be located in the jurisdiction specified by subsections (b) and (c).

(e) A registered organization that is organized under the law of a State is located in that State.

(f) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (i), a registered organization that is organized under the law of the United States and a branch or agency of a bank that is not organized under the law of the United States or a State are located in:

(1) the State that the law of the United States designates, if the law designates a State of location;

(2) the State that the registered organization, branch, or agency designates, if the law of the United States authorizes the registered organization, branch, or agency to designate its State of location, including by designating its main office, home office, or other compatible office; or

(3) the District of Columbia, if neither item (1) nor item (2) applies.

(g) A registered organization continues to be located in the jurisdiction specified by subsection (e) or (f) notwithstanding the:

(1) suspension, revocation, forfeiture, or lapse of the registered organization’s status as such in its jurisdiction of organization; or

(2) dissolution, winding up, or cancellation of the existence of the registered organization.

(h) The United States is located in the District of Columbia.

(i) A branch or agency of a bank that is not organized under the law of the United States or a State is located in the State in which the branch or agency is licensed, if all branches and agencies of the bank are licensed in only one State.

(j) A foreign air carrier under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, is located at the designated office of the agent upon which service of process may be made on behalf of the carrier.

(k) This section applies only for purposes of this part.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑307; 1966 (54) 2716; 1977 Act No. 134 Section 1; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 1993 Act No. 181, Section 525; 1996 Act No. 459, Section 57; 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12; 2013 Act No. 96, Section 4, eff July 1, 2013.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑103(3)(d), substantially revised.

2. General Rules. As a general matter, the location of the debtor determines the jurisdiction whose law governs perfection of a security interest. See Sections 9‑301(1), 9‑305(c). It also governs priority of a security interest in certain types of intangible collateral, such as accounts, electronic chattel paper, and general intangibles. This Section determines the location of the debtor for choice‑of‑law purposes, but not for other purposes. See subsection (k).

Subsection (b) states the general rules: An individual debtor is deemed to be located at the individual’s principal residence with respect to both personal and business assets. Any other debtor is deemed to be located at its place of business if it has only one, or at its chief executive office if it has more than one place of business.

As used in this Section, a “place of business” means a place where the debtor conducts its affairs. See subsection (a). Thus, every organization, even eleemosynary institutions and other organizations that do not conduct “for profit” business activities, has a “place of business.” Under subsection (d), a person who ceases to exist, have a residence, or have a place of business continues to be located in the jurisdiction determined by subsection (b).

The term “chief executive office” is not defined in this Section or elsewhere in the Uniform Commercial Code. “Chief executive office” means the place from which the debtor manages the main part of its business operations or other affairs. This is the place where persons dealing with the debtor would normally look for credit information, and is the appropriate place for filing. With respect to most multi‑state debtors, it will be simple to determine which of the debtor’s offices is the “chief executive office.” Even when a doubt arises, it would be rare that there could be more than two possibilities. A secured party in such a case may protect itself by perfecting under the law of each possible jurisdiction.

Similarly, the term “principal residence” is not defined. If the security interest in question is a purchase‑money security interest in consumer goods which is perfected upon attachment, see Section 9‑309(1), the choice of law may make no difference. In other cases, when a doubt arises, prudence may dictate perfecting under the law of each jurisdiction that might be the debtor’s “principal residence.”

Questions sometimes arise about the location of the debtor with respect to collateral held in a common‑law trust. A typical common‑law trust is not itself a juridical entity capable of owning property and so would not be a “debtor” as defined in Section 9‑102. Rather, the debtor with respect to property held in a common‑law trust typically is the trustee of the trust acting in the capacity of trustee. (The beneficiary would be a “debtor” with respect to its beneficial interest in the trust, but not with respect to the property held in the trust). If a common‑law trust has multiple trustees located in different jurisdictions, a secured party who perfects by filing would be well advised to file a financing statement in each jurisdiction in which a trustee is located, as determined under Section 9‑307. Filing in all relevant jurisdictions would insure perfection and minimize any priority complications that otherwise might arise.

The general rules are subject to several exceptions, each of which is discussed below.

3. Non‑U.S. Debtors. Under the general rules of this Section, a non‑U.S. debtor normally would be located in a foreign jurisdiction and, as a consequence, foreign law would govern perfection. When foreign law affords no public notice of security interests, the general rule yields unacceptable results.

Accordingly, subsection (c) provides that the normal rules for determining the location of a debtor (i.e., the rules in subsection (b)) apply only if they yield a location that is “a jurisdiction whose law generally requires information concerning the existence of a nonpossessory security interest to be made generally available in a filing, recording, or registration system as a condition or result of the security interest’s obtaining priority over the rights of a lien creditor with respect to the collateral.” The phrase “generally requires” is meant to include legal regimes that generally require notice in a filing or recording system as a condition of perfecting nonpossessory security interests, but which permit perfection by another method (e.g., control, automatic perfection, temporary perfection) in limited circumstances. A jurisdiction that has adopted this Article or an earlier version of this Article is such a jurisdiction. If the rules in subsection (b) yield a jurisdiction whose law does not generally require notice in a filing or registration system, and none of the special rules in subsections (e), (f), (i), and (j) applies, the debtor is located in the District of Columbia.

Example 1: Debtor is an English corporation with 7 offices in the United States and its chief executive office in London, England. Debtor creates a security interest in its accounts. Under subsection (b)(3), Debtor would be located in England. However, subsection (c) provides that subsection (b) applies only if English law generally conditions perfection on giving public notice in a filing, recording, or registration system. Otherwise, Debtor is located in the District of Columbia. Under Section 9‑301(1), perfection, the effect of perfection, and priority are governed by the law of the jurisdiction of the debtor’s location‑here, England or the District of Columbia (depending on the content of English law).

Example 2: Debtor is an English corporation with 7 offices in the United States and its chief executive office in London, England. Debtor creates a security interest in equipment located in London. Under subsection (b)(3) Debtor would be located in England. However, subsection (c) provides that subsection (b) applies only if English law generally conditions perfection on giving public notice in a filing, recording, or registration system. Otherwise, Debtor is located in the District of Columbia. Under Section 9‑301(1), perfection is governed by the law of the jurisdiction of the debtor’s location, whereas, under Section 9‑301(3), the law of the jurisdiction in which the collateral is located‑here, England‑governs priority.

The foregoing discussion assumes that each transaction bears an appropriate relation to the forum State. In the absence of an appropriate relation, the forum State’s entire UCC, including the choice‑of‑law provisions in Article 9 (Sections 9‑301 through 9‑307), will not apply. See Section 9‑109, Comment 9.

4. Registered Organizations Organized Under Law of a State. Under subsection (e), a registered organization (defined in Section 9‑102 so as to ordinarily include corporations, limited partnerships, limited liability companies, and statutory trusts) organized under the law of a “State” (defined in Section 9‑102) is located in its State of organization. The term “registered organization” includes a business trust described in the second sentence of the term’s definition. See Section 9‑102. The trust’s public organic record, typically the trust agreement, usually will indicate the jurisdiction under whose law the trust is organized. Subsection (g) makes clear that events affecting the status of a registered organization, such as the dissolution of a corporation or revocation of its charter, do not affect its location for purposes of subsection (e). However, certain of these events may result in, or be accompanied by, a transfer of collateral from the registered organization to another debtor. This Section does not determine whether a transfer occurs, nor does it determine the legal consequences of any transfer.

Determining the registered organization‑debtor’s location by reference to the jurisdiction of organization could provide some important side benefits for the filing systems. A jurisdiction could structure its filing system so that it would be impossible to make a mistake in a registered organization‑debtor’s name on a financing statement. For example, a filer would be informed if a filed record designated an incorrect corporate name for the debtor. Linking filing to the jurisdiction of organization also could reduce pressure on the system imposed by transactions in which registered organizations cease to exist‑as a consequence of merger or consolidation, for example. The jurisdiction of organization might prohibit such transactions unless steps were taken to ensure that existing filings were refiled against a successor or terminated by the secured party.

5. Registered Organizations Organized Under Law of United States; Branches and Agencies of Banks Not Organized Under Law of United States. Subsection (f) specifies the location of a debtor that is a registered organization organized under the law of the United States. It defers to law of the United States, to the extent that that law determines, or authorizes the debtor to determine, the debtor’s location. Thus, if the law of the United States designates a particular State as the debtor’s location, that State is the debtor’s location for purposes of this Article’s choice‑of‑law rules. Similarly, if the law of the United States authorizes the registered organization to designate its State of location, the State that the registered organization designates is the State in which it is located for purposes of this Article’s choice‑of‑law rules. In other cases, the debtor is located in the District of Columbia.

Subsection (f) also determines the location of branches and agencies of banks that are not organized under the law of the United States or a State. However, if all the branches and agencies of the bank are licensed only in one State, then they are located in that State. See subsection (i).

6. United States. To the extent that Article 9 governs (see Sections 1‑105, 9‑109(c)), the United States is located in the District of Columbia for purposes of this Article’s choice‑of‑law rules. See subsection (h).

7. Foreign Air Carriers. Subsection (j) follows former Section 9‑103(3)( d). To the extent that it is applicable, the Convention on the International Recognition of Rights in Aircraft (Geneva Convention) supersedes state legislation on this subject, as set forth in Section 9‑311(b), but some nations are not parties to that Convention.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑307 sets forth the rules for determining the location of the debtor. These rules are critical under current law because in most cases the debtor’s location will determine the jurisdiction in which a secured party must file to perfect a nonpossessory security interest. See Section 36‑9‑301(1). Perhaps the most significant location of the debtor rule is set forth in Section 36‑9‑307(e). Under that provision a registered organization, which includes corporations, limited partnerships, and limited liability companies see Section 36‑9‑102(a)(71) and Official Comment 11, is located in the State under the law of which the entity was organized. For example, a corporation incorporated under the law of South Carolina, but with its chief executive office and all of its equipment in North Carolina, is located in South Carolina. As a result, the law of South Carolina controls the perfection of a nonpossessory security interest upon the equipment and a secured party would be required to file its financing statement in South Carolina.

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|  |  |  |
|  | Definitional Cross: |  |
| “Chief executive office” | | See Section 36‑9‑307, |
|  | Official Comment 2 |  |
| “Debtor” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “Registered Organization” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(71) |
|  | Cross— |  |

Law applicable to perfection of nonpossessory security interest determined by location of the debtor. Section 36‑9‑301(1) and (3)(c).

Effect of Amendment

The 2013 amendment in subsection (f), in paragraph (2), inserted “, including by designating its main office, home office, or other compatible office;” and made other nonsubstantive changes.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Banks and Banking 136.

Secured Transactions 3, 81 to 102, 136.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 52k136; 349Ak3; 349Ak81 to 349Ak102; 349Ak136.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR Library

87 ALR 3rd 11 , Who is “Buyer in Ordinary Course of Business” Under Uniform Commercial Code.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 1

1. In general

As explained in Section 36‑9‑103, Official Comment 1, where a security interest is perfected in one jurisdiction and then removed to another jurisdiction, term “last event” within Section 36‑9‑103 refers to maintenance of perfection in the latter jurisdiction or failure to do so; thus, by plain language of this section, in action brought by creditor with security interest in debtor’s inventory against seller of equipment to debtor, alleging conversion of equipment that debtor had returned to seller, California law governed issue of whether creditor failed to perfect its security interest in equipment after it was removed from South Carolina to California. Reedy River Ventures Ltd. Partnership v. SynOptics Communications, Inc., 1993, 818 F.Supp. 145, affirmed 38 F.3d 1213.

Subpart 2

Perfection

**SECTION 36‑9‑308.** When security interest or agricultural lien is perfected; continuity of perfection.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section and Section 36‑9‑309, a security interest is perfected if it has attached and all of the applicable requirements for perfection in Sections 36‑9‑310 through 36‑9‑316 have been satisfied. A security interest is perfected when it attaches if the applicable requirements are satisfied before the security interest attaches.

(b) An agricultural lien is perfected if it has become effective and all of the applicable requirements for perfection in Section 36‑9‑310 have been satisfied. An agricultural lien is perfected when it becomes effective if the applicable requirements are satisfied before the agricultural lien becomes effective.

(c) A security interest or agricultural lien is perfected continuously if it is originally perfected by one method under this chapter and is later perfected by another method under this chapter, without an intermediate period when it was unperfected.

(d) Perfection of a security interest in collateral also perfects a security interest in a supporting obligation for the collateral.

(e) Perfection of a security interest in a right to payment or performance also perfects a security interest in a security interest, mortgage, or other lien on personal or real property securing the right.

(f) Perfection of a security interest in a securities account also perfects a security interest in the security entitlements carried in the securities account.

(g) Perfection of a security interest in a commodity account also perfects a security interest in the commodity contracts carried in the commodity account.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑308; 1966 (54) 2716; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No; 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Sections 9‑303, 9‑115(2).

2. General Rule. This Article uses the term “attach” to describe the point at which property becomes subject to a security interest. The requisites for attachment are stated in Section 9‑203. When it attaches, a security interest may be either perfected or unperfected. “ Perfected” means that the security interest has attached and the secured party has taken all the steps required by this Article as specified in Sections 9‑310 through 9‑316. A perfected security interest may still be or become subordinate to other interests. See, e.g., Sections 9‑320, 9‑322. However, in general, after perfection the secured party is protected against creditors and transferees of the debtor and, in particular, against any representative of creditors in insolvency proceedings instituted by or against the debtor. See, e.g., Section 9‑317.

Subsection (a) explains that the time of perfection is when the security interest has attached and any necessary steps for perfection, such as taking possession or filing, have been taken. The “except” clause refers to the perfection‑upon‑attachment rules appearing in Section 9‑309. It also reflects that other subsections of this Section, e.g., subsection (d), contain automatic‑perfection rules. If the steps for perfection have been taken in advance, as when the secured party files a financing statement before giving value or before the debtor acquires rights in the collateral, then the security interest is perfected when it attaches.

3. Agricultural Liens. Subsection (b) is new. It describes the elements of perfection of an agricultural lien.

4. Continuous Perfection. The following example illustrates the operation of subsection (c):

Example 1: Debtor, an importer, creates a security interest in goods that it imports and the documents of title that cover the goods. The secured party, Bank, takes possession of a negotiable bill of lading covering certain imported goods and thereby perfects its security interest in the bill of lading and the goods. See Sections 9‑313(a), 9‑312(c)(1). Bank releases the bill of lading to the debtor for the purpose of procuring the goods from the carrier and selling them. Under Section 9‑312(f), Bank continues to have a perfected security interest in the document and goods for 20 days. Bank files a financing statement covering the collateral before the expiration of the 20‑day period. Its security interest now continues perfected for as long as the filing is good.

If the successive stages of Bank’s security interest succeed each other without an intervening gap, the security interest is “perfected continuously,” and the date of perfection is when the security interest first became perfected (i.e., when Bank received possession of the bill of lading). If, however, there is a gap between stages‑for example, if Bank does not file until after the expiration of the 20‑day period specified in Section 9‑312(f) and leaves the collateral in the debtor’s possession‑ then, the chain being broken, the perfection is no longer continuous. The date of perfection would now be the date of filing (after expiration of the 20‑day period). Bank’s security interest would be vulnerable to any interests arising during the gap period which under Section 9‑317 take priority over an unperfected security interest.

5. Supporting Obligations. Subsection (d) is new. It provides for automatic perfection of a security interest in a supporting obligation for collateral if the security interest in the collateral is perfected. This is unlikely to effect any change in the law prior to adoption of this Article.

Example 2: Buyer is obligated to pay Debtor for goods sold. Buyer’s president guarantees the obligation. Debtor creates a security interest in the right to payment (account) in favor of Lender. Under Section 9‑203(f), the security interest attaches to Debtor’s rights under the guarantee (supporting obligation). Under subsection (d), perfection of the security interest in the account constitutes perfection of the security interest in Debtor’s rights under the guarantee.

6. Rights to Payment Secured by Lien. Subsection (e) is new. It deals with the situation in which a security interest is created in a right to payment that is secured by a security interest, mortgage, or other lien.

Example 3: Owner gives to Mortgagee a mortgage on Blackacre to secure a loan. Owner’s obligation to pay is evidenced by a promissory note. In need of working capital, Mortgagee borrows from Financer and creates a security interest in the note in favor of Financer. Section 9‑203(g) adopts the traditional view that the mortgage follows the note; i.e., the transferee of the note acquires the mortgage, as well. This subsection adopts a similar principle: perfection of a security interest in the right to payment constitutes perfection of a security interest in the mortgage securing it.

An important consequence of the rules in Section 9‑203(g) and subsection (e) is that, by acquiring a perfected security interest in a mortgage (or other secured) note, the secured party acquires a security interest in the mortgage (or other lien) that is senior to the rights of a person who becomes a lien creditor of the mortgagee (Article 9 debtor). See Section 9‑317(a)(2). This result helps prevent the separation of the mortgage (or other lien) from the note.

Under this Article, attachment and perfection of a security interest in a secured right to payment do not of themselves affect the obligation to pay. For example, if the obligation is evidenced by a negotiable note, then Article 3 dictates the person whom the maker must pay to discharge the note and any lien securing it. See Section 3‑602. If the right to payment is a payment intangible, then Section 9‑406 determines whom the account debtor must pay.

Similarly, this Article does not determine who has the power to release a mortgage of record. That issue is determined by real‑property law.

7. Investment Property. Subsections (f) and (g) follow former Section 9‑115(2).

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑308 sets forth the rules for determining when security interests and agricultural liens are perfected. Under the general rule in Section 36‑9‑308(a), a security interest is perfected when it has attached and all requirements for perfection have been completed. Under Section 36‑9‑308(b), an agricultural lien is perfected when it is effective and the filing requirements of Section 36‑9‑310 have been satisfied.

Section 36‑9‑308(d)—(g) sets forth special rules for determining the time of perfection of security interests in supporting obligations, lien securing rights to payment, securities entitlements carried in a securities account, and commodity contracts carried in a commodities accounts. Of the special rules, the provision liens securing rights to payment set forth in Section 36‑9‑308(e) is the most significant.

Section 36‑9‑308(e) provides that perfecting a security interest in a right to payment also perfects a security interest in a security interest, mortgage, or other lien securing a right to payment. This provision affects the manner in which a mortgage makes an effective assignment of a mortgage note secured by a mortgage lien upon real property. If the secured party obtains in note, Section 36‑9‑203(g) provides that the security interest also attaches to the mortgage. Moreover, Section 36‑9‑308(f) provides that if the secured party perfects its security interest in the note his security interest in the mortgage will also be perfected.

The significance of Section 36‑9‑308(f) is that it constitutes a major exception to the provision in the Recording Act conditioning the effectiveness of a mortgage assignment against subsequent purchases and lien creditors upon the recording of the assignment. Section 30‑7‑60 S.C. Code Ann. (1976). If a mortgagee assigns mortgage note in transactions within the scope of Article 9, the assignee obtains a perfected security interest in the mortgage without recording the mortgage assignment. The scope of this exception to the Recording Act is broad because Article 9 applies not only to security interest in promissory notes taken to secure an obligation, but also to sales of promissory notes. Section 36‑9‑109(a)(3).

Section 36‑9‑308(f), however, does not conflict with section 30‑7‑60. The latter provision conditions the effectiveness of a mortgage assignment upon the recording of the assignment “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute. . .” Section 36‑9‑308(f) is a statute that otherwise provides.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Agricultural lien” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(5) |
| “Commodity account” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(14) |
| “Commodity contract” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(15) |
| “Security account” | Section 36‑8‑501(a) |
| “Security entitlement” | Section 36‑8‑102(a)(17) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |
| “Supporting obligation” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(77) |

Cross References—

1. Attachment of security interests generally. Section 36‑9‑203(a) and (b).

2. Attachment of security interests in supporting obligations. Section 36‑9‑203(f).

3. Attachment of security interests in liens securing rights to payment. Section 36‑9‑203(g).

4. Attachment of security interests upon securities entitlements carried in a securities account. Section 36‑9‑203(h).

5. Attachment of a security interest upon commodities contracts carried in a commodities account. Section 36‑9‑203(i).

6. Perfection of security interests. Sections 36‑9‑309 to 36‑9‑316.

7. Perfection of agricultural liens. Section 36‑9‑310(a).

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Agriculture 10.

Secured Transactions 134, 135, 143.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 23k10; 349Ak134; 349Ak135; 349Ak143.

**SECTION 36‑9‑309.** Security interest perfected upon attachment.

The following security interests are perfected when they attach:

(1) a purchase‑money security interest in consumer goods, except as otherwise provided in Section 36‑9‑311(b) with respect to consumer goods that are subject to a statute or treaty described in Section 36‑9‑311(a);

(2) an assignment of accounts or payment intangibles which does not by itself or in conjunction with other assignments to the same assignee transfer a significant part of the assignor’s outstanding accounts or payment intangibles;

(3) a sale of a payment intangible;

(4) a sale of a promissory note;

(5) a security interest created by the assignment of a health‑care‑insurance receivable to the provider of the health‑care goods or services;

(6) a security interest arising under Section 36‑2‑401, 36‑2‑505, 36‑2‑711(3), or 36‑2A‑508(5), until the debtor obtains possession of the collateral;

(7) a security interest of a collecting bank arising under Section 36‑4‑210;

(8) a security interest of an issuer or nominated person arising under Section 36‑5‑118;

(9) a security interest arising in the delivery of a financial asset under Section 36‑9‑206(c);

(10) a security interest in investment property created by a broker or securities intermediary;

(11) a security interest in a commodity contract or a commodity account created by a commodity intermediary;

(12) an assignment for the benefit of all creditors of the transferor and subsequent transfers by the assignee thereunder; and

(13) a security interest created by an assignment of a beneficial interest in a decedent’s estate.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑309; 1966 (54) 2716; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 1991 Act No; 161, Section 2(J); 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Derived from former Sections 9‑302(1), 9‑115(4)(c), (d), 9‑116.

2. Automatic Perfection. This Section contains the perfection‑upon‑ attachment rules previously located in former Sections 9‑302(1), 9‑115(4)(c), (d), and 9‑116. Rather than continue to state the rule by indirection, this Section explicitly provides for perfection upon attachment.

3. Purchase‑Money Security Interest in Consumer Goods. Former Section 9‑302(1)(d) has been revised and appears here as paragraph (1). No filing or other step is required to perfect a purchase‑money security interest in consumer goods, other than goods, such as automobiles, that are subject to a statute or treaty described in Section 9‑311(a). However, filing is required to perfect a non‑purchase‑money security interest in consumer goods and is necessary to prevent a buyer of consumer goods from taking free of a security interest under Section 9‑320(b). A fixture filing is required for priority over conflicting interests in fixtures to the extent provided in Section 9‑334.

4. Rights to Payment. Paragraph (2) expands upon former Section 9‑302(1)( e) by affording automatic perfection to certain assignments of payment intangibles as well as accounts. The purpose of paragraph (2) is to save from ex post facto invalidation casual or isolated assignments‑assignments which no one would think of filing. Any person who regularly takes assignments of any debtor’s accounts or payment intangibles should file. In this connection Section 9‑109(d)(4) through (7), which excludes certain transfers of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes from this Article, should be consulted.

Paragraphs (3) and (4), which are new, afford automatic perfection to sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes, respectively. They reflect the practice under former Article 9. Under that Article, filing a financing statement did not affect the rights of a buyer of payment intangibles or promissory notes, inasmuch as the former Article did not cover those sales. To the extent that the exception in paragraph (2) covers outright sales of payment intangibles, which automatically are perfected under paragraph (3), the exception is redundant.

5. Health‑Care‑Insurance Receivables. Paragraph (5) extends automatic perfection to assignments of health‑care‑insurance receivables if the assignment is made to the health‑care provider that provided the health‑care goods or services. The primary effect is that, when an individual assigns a right to payment under an insurance policy to the person who provided health‑care goods or services, the provider has no need to file a financing statement against the individual. The normal filing requirements apply to other assignments of health‑care‑insurance receivables covered by this Article, e.g., assignments from the health‑care provider to a financer.

6. Investment Property. Paragraph (9) replaces the last clause of former Section 9‑116(2), concerning security interests that arise in the delivery of a financial asset.

Paragraphs (10) and (11) replace former Section 9‑115(4)(c) and (d), concerning secured financing of securities and commodity firms and clearing corporations. The former Sections indicated that, with respect to certain security interests created by a securities intermediary or commodity intermediary, “[t]he filing of a financing statement . . . has no effect for purposes of perfection or priority with respect to that security interest.” No change in meaning is intended by the deletion of the quoted phrase.

Secured financing arrangements for securities firms are currently implemented in various ways. In some circumstances, lenders may require that the transactions be structured as “hard pledges,” where the securities are transferred on the books of a clearing corporation from the debtor’s account to the lender’s account or to a special pledge account for the lender where they cannot be disposed of without the specific consent of the lender. In other circumstances, lenders are content with so‑called “agreement to pledge” or “agreement to deliver” arrangements, where the debtor retains the positions in its own account, but reflects on its books that the positions have been hypothecated and promises that the securities will be transferred to the secured party’s account on demand.

The perfection and priority rules of this Article are designed to facilitate current secured financing arrangements for securities firms as well as to provide sufficient flexibility to accommodate new arrangements that develop in the future. Hard pledge arrangements are covered by the concept of control. See Sections 9‑314, 9‑106, 8‑106. Non‑control secured financing arrangements for securities firms are covered by the automatic perfection rule of paragraph (10). Before the 1994 revision of Articles 8 and 9, agreement to pledge arrangements could be implemented under a provision that a security interest in securities given for new value under a written security agreement was perfected without filing or possession for a period of 21 days. Although the security interests were temporary in legal theory, the financing arrangements could, in practice, be continued indefinitely by rolling over the loans at least every 21 days. Accordingly, a knowledgeable creditor of a securities firm realizes that the firm’s securities may be subject to security interests that are not discoverable from any public records. The automatic‑perfection rule of paragraph (10) makes it unnecessary to engage in the purely formal practice of rolling over these arrangements every 21 days.

In some circumstances, a clearing corporation may be the debtor in a secured financing arrangement. For example, a clearing corporation that settles delivery‑versus‑payment transactions among its participants on a net, same‑day basis relies on timely payments from all participants with net obligations due to the system. If a participant that is a net debtor were to default on its payment obligation, the clearing corporation would not receive some of the funds needed to settle with participants that are net creditors to the system. To complete end‑of‑day settlement after a payment default by a participant, a clearing corporation that settles on a net, same‑day basis may need to draw on credit lines and pledge securities of the defaulting participant or other securities pledged by participants in the clearing corporation to secure such drawings. The clearing corporation may be the top‑tier securities intermediary for the securities pledged, so that it would not be practical for the lender to obtain control. Even where the clearing corporation holds some types of securities through other intermediaries, however, the clearing corporation is unlikely to be able to complete the arrangements necessary to convey “control” over the securities to be pledged in time to complete settlement in a timely manner. However, the term “securities intermediary” is defined in Section 8‑102(a)(14) to include clearing corporations. Thus, the perfection rule of paragraph (10) applies to security interests in investment property granted by clearing corporations.

7. Beneficial Interests in Trusts. Under former Section 9‑302(1)(c), filing was not required to perfect a security interest created by an assignment of a beneficial interest in a trust. Because beneficial interests in trusts are now used as collateral with greater frequency in commercial transactions, under this Article filing is required to perfect a security interest in a beneficial interest.

8. Assignments for Benefit of Creditors. No filing or other action is required to perfect an assignment for the benefit of creditors. These assignments are not financing transactions, and the debtor ordinarily will not be engaging in further credit transactions.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑309 enumerates the security interests that are automatically perfected when they attach. Under this provision security interests that were automatically perfected under former Section 36‑9‑302(1)(c)‑(g), continue to be perfected automatically. Section 36‑9‑309, however, expands the scope of automatic perfection. Security interests resulting from sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes are perfected on attachment as are security interests created by assignments of health‑care insurance receivables to providers of health care goods or services. In addition, some security interests that arise from transactions in investment properties are automatically perfected.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Account” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(2) |
| “Broker” | Section 36‑8‑102(a)(3) |
| “Commodity account” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(14) |
| “Commodity contract” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(15) |
| “Commodity intermediary” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(17) |
| “Consumer goods” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(23) |
| “Financial asset” | Section 36‑8‑102(a)(9) |
| “Health‑care‑insurance receivable” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)( 46) |
| “Investment property” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(49) |
| “Issuer” | Section 36‑5‑103(1)(c)  [Section 36‑5‑102(a)(9) 1995 Revision] |
| “Nominated person” | [Section 36‑5‑102(a)(11) 1995 Revision] |
| “Payment intangible” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(61) |
| “Promissory note” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(65) |
| “Purchase‑money security interest” | Section 36‑9‑103 |
| “Securities intermediary” | Section 36‑8‑102(a)(14) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |

Cross References—

1. Exclusion of certain assignments of accounts and payment intangibles from the scope of Article 9. Section 36‑9‑109(d)(4), (5), (6), and (7).

2. Inclusion within the scope of Article 9 of sales payment intangibles and promissory notes. Section 36‑9‑109(a)(3).

3. Attachment of security interest in favor of a securities intermediary Section 36‑9‑206.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 82 to 89, 134.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak82 to 349Ak89; 349Ak134.

LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES

Mandatory Recording of Personal Property Leases in South Carolina: An Examination of the South Carolina Bailment Statute as Affected by U.C.C. Article Nine. 30 S.C. L. Rev. 557.

Perfection of the Security Interest. 19 S.C. L. Rev. 700.

Attorney General’s Opinions

Under the Uniform Commercial Code a purchase money security interest in consumer goods is perfected without the necessity of filing a financial statement. 1969‑70 Op Atty Gen, No 2967, p 236.

Conditional seller of consumer goods is secure against landlord’s lien for rent or subsequent mortgage from the moment debtor receives possession of such goods, whether or not or regardless of when a financing statement is filed. 1969‑70 Op Atty Gen, No 2887, p 126.

As to effect of the Uniform Commercial Code on the general lien recording procedures as it affects the titling and registering of motor vehicles, see 1966‑67 Op Atty Gen, No 2355, p 195.

**SECTION 36‑9‑310.** When filing required to perfect security interest or agricultural lien; security interests and agricultural liens to which filing provisions do not apply.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) and Section 36‑9‑312(b), a financing statement must be filed to perfect all security interests and agricultural liens.

(b) The filing of a financing statement is not necessary to perfect a security interest:

(1) that is perfected under Section 36‑9‑308(d), (e), (f), or (g);

(2) that is perfected under Section 36‑9‑309 when it attaches;

(3) in property subject to a statute, regulation, or treaty described in Section 36‑9‑311(a);

(4) in goods in possession of a bailee which is perfected under Section 36‑9‑312(d)(1) or (2);

(5) in certificated securities, documents, goods, or instruments which are perfected without filing, control, or possession under Section 36‑9‑312(e), (f), or (g);

(6) in collateral in the secured party’s possession under Section 36‑9‑313;

(7) in a certificated security which is perfected by delivery of the security certificate to the secured party under Section 36‑9‑313;

(8) in deposit accounts, electronic chattel paper, electronic documents, investment property, or letter‑of‑credit rights which is perfected by control under Section 36‑9‑314;

(9) in proceeds which is perfected under Section 36‑9‑315; or

(10) that is perfected under Section 36‑9‑316.

(c) If a secured party assigns a perfected security interest or agricultural lien, a filing under this article is not required to continue the perfected status of the security interest against creditors of and transferees from the original debtor.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑310; 1966 (54) 2716; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No; 67, Section 12; 2014 Act No. 213 (S.343), Section 39, eff October 1, 2014.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑302(1), (2).

2. General Rule. Subsection (a) establishes a central Article 9 principle: Filing a financing statement is necessary for perfection of security interests and agricultural liens. However, filing is not necessary to perfect a security interest that is perfected by another permissible method, see subsection (b), nor does filing ordinarily perfect a security interest in a deposit account, letter‑of‑credit right, or money. See Section 9‑312(b). Part 5 of the Article deals with the office in which to file, mechanics of filing, and operations of the filing office.

3. Exemptions from Filing. Subsection (b) lists the security interests for which filing is not required as a condition of perfection, because they are perfected automatically upon attachment (subsections (b)(2) and (b)(9)) or upon the occurrence of another event (subsections (b)(1), (b)(5), and (b)(9)), because they are perfected under the law of another jurisdiction (subsection (b)(10)), or because they are perfected by another method, such as by the secured party’s taking possession or control (subsections (b)(3), (b)(4), (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7), and (b)(8)).

4. Assignments of Perfected Security Interests. Subsection (c) concerns assignment of a perfected security interest or agricultural lien. It provides that no filing is necessary in connection with an assignment by a secured party to an assignee in order to maintain perfection as against creditors of and transferees from the original debtor.

Example 1: Buyer buys goods from Seller, who retains a security interest in them. After Seller perfects the security interest by filing, Seller assigns the perfected security interest to X. The security interest, in X’s hands and without further steps on X’s part, continues perfected against Buyer’s transferees and creditors.

Example 2: Dealer creates a security interest in specific equipment in favor of Lender. After Lender perfects the security interest in the equipment by filing, Lender assigns the chattel paper (which includes the perfected security interest in Dealer’s equipment) to X. The security interest in the equipment, in X’s hands and without further steps on X’s part, continues perfected against Dealer’s transferees and creditors. However, regardless of whether Lender made the assignment to secure Lender’s obligation to X or whether the assignment was an outright sale of the chattel paper, the assignment creates a security interest in the chattel paper in favor of X. Accordingly, X must take whatever steps may be required for perfection in order to be protected against Lender’s transferees and creditors with respect to the chattel paper.

Subsection (c) applies not only to an assignment of a security interest perfected by filing but also to an assignment of a security interest perfected by a method other than by filing, such as by control or by possession. Although subsection (c) addresses explicitly only the absence of an additional filing requirement, the same result normally will follow in the case of an assignment of a security interest perfected by a method other than by filing. For example, as long as possession of collateral is maintained by an assignee or by the assignor or another person on behalf of the assignee, no further perfection steps need be taken on account of the assignment to continue perfection as against creditors and transferees of the original debtor. Of course, additional action may be required for perfection of the assignee’s interest as against creditors and transferees of the assignor.

Similarly, subsection (c) applies to the assignment of a security interest perfected by compliance with a statute, regulation, or treaty under Section 9‑311(b), such as a certificate‑of‑title statute. Unless the statute expressly provides to the contrary, the security interest will remain perfected against creditors of and transferees from the original debtor, even if the assignee takes no action to cause the certificate of title to reflect the assignment or to cause its name to appear on the certificate of title. See PEB Commentary No. 12, which discusses this issue under former Section 9‑302(3). Compliance with the statute is “equivalent to filing” under Section 9‑311(b).

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑310 states the general rule that a financing statement must be filed to perfect a security interest or agricultural lien and enumerates and references the exception to that rule.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Agricultural lien” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(5) |
| “Certificated securities” | Section 26‑8‑102(a)(4) |
| “Collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Deposit account” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(29) |
| “Document” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(30) |
| “Electronic chattel paper” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(31) |
| “Financing statement” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(39) |
| “Goods” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(44) |
| “Investment” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(47) |
| “Investment property” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(49) |
| “Letter‑of‑credit right” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(51) |
| “Proceeds” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(64) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |

Cross References—

1. Perfection of a security interest in supporting obligations by perfecting in the underlying collateral. Section 36‑9‑308(d).

2. Perfection of a security interest in a security interest, mortgage, or other lien securing a right to payment by perfecting in the right to payment. Section 36‑9‑308(e).

3. Perfection of a security interest upon securities entitlements or commodity contracts by perfecting in the securities account or commodity account in which the entitlements or contracts are titled. Section 36‑9‑308( f) and (g).

4. Automatic perfection of security interests upon attachment. Sections 36‑9‑309 and 36‑9‑312(e)‑(h).

5. Perfection of security interest by complying with statutes, regulations, or treaties of the United States or certificate of title statutes. Section 36‑9‑311.

6. Perfection of security interests by possession or delivery. Section 36‑9‑313 and 36‑9‑312(b)(1), (c) and (d).

7. Perfection of security interests by control. Sections 36‑9‑314 and 36‑9‑312(b)(1) and (2).

8. Attachment and perfection of security interests in proceeds. Section 36‑9‑315.

Editor’s Note

2014 Act No. 213, Section 51, provides as follows:

“SECTION 51. This act becomes effective on October 1, 2014. It applies to transactions entered into and events occurring after that date.”

Effect of Amendment

2014 Act No. 213, Section 39, in subsection (b)(5), substituted “which are perfected without filing, control,” for “which is perfected without filing”; and in subsection (b)(8), inserted “electronic documents”.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Agriculture 10.

Secured Transactions 82 to 89, 182.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 23k10; 349Ak82 to 349Ak89; 349Ak182.

LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES

Mandatory Recording of Personal Property Leases in South Carolina: An Examination of the South Carolina Bailment Statute as Affected by U.C.C. Article Nine. 30 S.C. L. Rev. 557.

Perfection of the Security Interest. 19 S.C. L. Rev. 700.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 1

1. In general

Installment sales contract for purchase of mobile home was a security device to which Article 9 of the Uniform Code (UCC) applied, as it expressly provided for title to remain in creditor until payment of purchase price by debtor, it required that debtor surrender mobile home to creditor in event of default, it required that debtor name creditor as loss payee in fire insurance policy, and provided that debtor could not assign his rights in the home without creditor’s prior written permission, that debtor could not move the home until repaying the loan in full, that debtor maintain the home, and that creditor could inspect it at any reasonable time. Brockbank v. Best Capital Corp. (S.C. 2000) 341 S.C. 372, 534 S.E.2d 688, rehearing denied. Secured Transactions 10

When financing statement must be filed. When filing is required to perfect a security interest, the UCC requires that a document designated as a financing statement must be filed. Kimbrell’s Furniture Co., Inc. v. Friedman (S.C. 1973) 261 S.C. 172, 198 S.E.2d 803.

The UCC does not require filing in order to perfect a purchase money security interest in consumer goods. Kimbrell’s Furniture Co., Inc. v. Friedman (S.C. 1973) 261 S.C. 172, 198 S.E.2d 803.

**SECTION 36‑9‑311.** Perfection of security interests in property subject to certain statutes, regulations, and treaties.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), the filing of a financing statement is not necessary or effective to perfect a security interest in property subject to:

(1) a statute, regulation, or treaty of the United States whose requirements for a security interest’s obtaining priority over the rights of a lien creditor with respect to the property preempt Section 36‑9‑310(a);

(2) Chapter 19, Title 56, Protection of title to and interests in motor vehicles, and Chapter 23, Title 50, Filing of watercraft and outboard motors, but during any period in which collateral is inventory held for sale by a person who is in the business of selling goods of that kind, the filing provisions of this chapter, Part 5, apply to a security interest in that collateral created by him as debtor; or

(3) a statute of another jurisdiction which provides for a security interest to be indicated on a certificate of title as a condition or result of the security interest’s obtaining priority over the rights of a lien creditor with respect to the property.

(b) Compliance with the requirements of a statute, regulation, or treaty described in subsection (a) for obtaining priority over the rights of a lien creditor is equivalent to the filing of a financing statement under this chapter. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d) and Sections 36‑9‑313 and 36‑9‑316(d) and (e) for goods covered by a certificate of title, a security interest in property subject to a statute, regulation, or treaty described in subsection (a) may be perfected only by compliance with those requirements, and a security interest so perfected remains perfected notwithstanding a change in the use or transfer of possession of the collateral.

(c) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d) and Section 36‑9‑316(d) and (e), duration and renewal of perfection of a security interest perfected by compliance with the requirements prescribed by a statute, regulation, or treaty described in subsection (a) are governed by the statute, regulation, or treaty. In other respects, the security interest is subject to this chapter.

(d) During any period in which collateral subject to a statute specified in subsection (a)(2) is inventory held for sale or lease by a person or leased by that person as lessor and that person is in the business of selling goods of that kind, this section does not apply to a security interest in that collateral created by that person.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑311; 1966 (54) 2716; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No; 67, Section 12; 2013 Act No. 96, Section 5, eff July 1, 2013.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑302(3), (4).

2. Federal Statutes, Regulations, and Treaties. Subsection (a)(1) exempts from the filing provisions of this Article transactions as to which a system of filing‑state or federal‑has been established under federal law. Subsection (b) makes clear that when such a system exists, perfection of a relevant security interest can be achieved only through compliance with that system (i.e., filing under this Article is not a permissible alternative).

An example of the type of federal statute referred to in subsection (a)(1) is 49 U.S.C. 44107‑11, for civil aircraft of the United States. The Assignment of Claims Act of 1940, as amended, provides for notice to contracting and disbursing officers and to sureties on bonds but does not establish a national filing system and therefore is not within the scope of subsection (a) (1). An assignee of a claim against the United States may benefit from compliance with the Assignment of Claims Act. But regardless of whether the assignee complies with that Act, the assignee must file under this Article in order to perfect its security interest against creditors and transferees of its assignor.

Subsection (a)(1) provides explicitly that the filing requirement of this Article defers only to federal statutes, regulations, or treaties whose requirements for a security interest’s obtaining priority over the rights of a lien creditor preempt Section 9‑310(a). The provision eschews reference to the term “perfection,” inasmuch as Section 9‑308 specifies the meaning of that term and a preemptive rule may use other terminology.

3. State Statutes. Subsections (a)(2) and (3) exempt from the filing requirements of this Article transactions covered by State certificate‑of‑title statutes covering motor vehicles and the like. The description of certificate‑of‑title statutes in subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3) tracks the language of the definition of “certificate of title” in Section 9‑102. For a discussion of the operation of state certificate‑of‑ title statutes in interstate contexts, see the Comments to Section 9‑303.

Some states have enacted central filing statutes with respect to secured transactions in kinds of property that are of special importance in the local economy. Subsection (a)(2) defers to these statutes with respect to filing for that property.

4. Inventory Covered by Certificate of Title. Under subsection (d), perfection of a security interest in the inventory of a dealer is governed by the normal perfection rules, even if the inventory is covered by a certificate of title. Under former Section 9‑302(3), a secured party who financed a dealer may have needed to perfect by filing for goods held for sale and by compliance with a certificate‑of‑title statute for goods held for lease. In some cases, this may have required notation on thousands of certificates. The problem would have been compounded by the fact that dealers, particularly of automobiles, often do not know whether a particular item of inventory will be sold or leased. Under subsection (d), notation is both unnecessary and ineffective.

The filing and other perfection provisions of this Article apply to goods covered by a certificate of title only “during any period in which collateral is inventory held for sale or lease or leased.” If the debtor takes goods of this kind out of inventory and uses them, say, as equipment, a filed financing statement would not remain effective to perfect a security interest.

5. Compliance with Perfection Requirements of Other Statute. Subsection (b) makes clear that compliance with the perfection requirements (i.e., the requirements for obtaining priority over a lien creditor), but not other requirements, of a statute, regulation, or treaty described in subsection (a) is sufficient for perfection under this Article. Perfection of a security interest under such a statute, regulation, or treaty has all the consequences of perfection under this Article.

The interplay of this Section with certain certificate‑of‑title statutes may create confusion and uncertainty. For example, statutes under which perfection does not occur until a certificate of title is issued will create a gap between the time that the goods are covered by the certificate under Section 9‑303 and the time of perfection. If the gap is long enough, it may result in turning some unobjectionable transactions into avoidable preferences under Bankruptcy Code Section 547. (The preference risk arises if more than thirty days passes between the time a security interest attaches (or the debtor receives possession of the collateral, in the case of a purchase‑money security interest) and the time it is perfected.) Accordingly, the Legislative Note to this Section instructs the legislature to amend the applicable certificate‑of‑title statute to provide that perfection occurs upon receipt by the appropriate State official of a properly tendered application for a certificate of title on which the security interest is to be indicated.

Under some certificate‑of‑title statutes, including the Uniform Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title and Anti‑Theft Act, perfection generally occurs upon delivery of specified documents to a state official but may, under certain circumstances, relate back to the time of attachment. This relation‑ back feature can create great difficulties for the application of the rules in Sections 9‑303 and 9‑311(b). Accordingly, the Legislative Note also recommends to legislatures that they remove any relation‑back provisions from certificate‑of‑title statutes affecting security interests.

6. Compliance with Perfection Requirements of Other Statute as Equivalent to Filing. Under Subsection (b), compliance with the perfection requirements (i.e., the requirements for obtaining priority over a lien creditor) of a statute, regulation, or treaty described in subsection (a) “is equivalent to the filing of a financing statement.”

The quoted phrase appeared in former Section 9‑302(3). Its meaning was unclear, and many questions arose concerning the extent to which and manner in which Article 9 rules referring to “filing” were applicable to perfection by compliance with a certificate‑of‑title statute. This Article takes a variety of approaches for applying Article 9’s filing rules to compliance with other statutes and treaties. First, as discussed above in Comment 5, it leaves the determination of some rules, such as the rule establishing time of perfection (Section 9‑516(a)), to the other statutes themselves. Second, this Article explicitly applies some Article 9 filing rules to perfection under other statutes or treaties. See, e.g., Section 9‑505. Third, this Article makes other Article 9 rules applicable to security interests perfected by compliance with another statute through the “equivalent to... filing” provision in the first sentence of Section 9‑311(b). The third approach is reflected for the most part in occasional Comments explaining how particular rules apply when perfection is accomplished under Section 9‑311(b). See, e.g., Section 9‑310, Comment 4; Section 9‑315, Comment 6; Section 9‑317, Comment 8. The absence of a Comment indicating that a particular filing provision applies to perfection pursuant to Section 9‑311(b) does not mean the provision is inapplicable.

7. Perfection by Possession of Goods Covered by Certificate‑of‑Title Statute. A secured party who holds a security interest perfected under the law of State A in goods that subsequently are covered by a State B certificate of title may face a predicament. Ordinarily, the secured party will have four months under State B’s Section 9‑316(c) and (d) in which to (re)perfect as against a purchaser of the goods by having its security interest noted on a State B certificate. This procedure is likely to require the cooperation of the debtor and any competing secured party whose security interest has been noted on the certificate. Comment 4(e) to former Section 9‑103 observed that “that cooperation is not likely to be forthcoming from an owner who wrongfully procured the issuance of a new certificate not showing the out‑of‑state security interest, or from a local secured party finding himself in a priority contest with the out‑of‑state secured party.” According to that Comment, “[t]he only solution for the out‑of‑state secured party under present certificate of title statutes seems to be to reperfect by possession, i.e., by repossessing the goods.” But the “solution” may not have worked: Former Section 9‑302(4) provided that a security interest in property subject to a certificate‑of‑title statute “can be perfected only by compliance therewith.”

Sections 9‑316(d) and (e), 9‑311(c), and 9‑313(b) of this Article resolve the conflict by providing that a security interest that remains perfected solely by virtue of Section 9‑316(e) can be (re)perfected by the secured party’s taking possession of the collateral. These Sections contemplate only that taking possession of goods covered by a certificate of title will work as a method of perfection. None of these Sections creates a right to take possession. Section 9‑609 and the agreement of the parties define the secured party’s right to take possession.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑311(a)(1) provides that statutes, regulations, or treaties of the United States which impose requirements for the priority of a security interest over a lien creditor preempt the perfection rules of Article 9. In addition, this sections 36‑9‑311(a)(2) and (3) provide that state certificate of title statutes govern the perfection of security interests in covered goods. With two exceptions, Section 36‑9‑311(b) provides that a security interest subject to a statute, regulation, or treaty described in subsection (a) can be perfected only by complying with the requirements of the statute, regulation, or treaty. The first exception to this rule applies when goods covered by a certificate of title statute entered this state subject to a security interest perfected under the law of another state. Section 36‑9‑311(b), 36‑9‑313(b), and 36‑9‑316(d) and (e) provide that the secured party can perfect in this state by taking possession of the goods. The second exception applies when goods covered by a certificate of title statute are inventory held for sale or lease by a person in the business of selling or leasing goods of that kind. Section 36‑9‑311(d)

South Carolina has two certificate of title statutes that control the perfection of security interests. Sections 56‑19‑610‑720, S.C. Code Ann. (2006 Revised, as amended) govern the perfection of security interests in motor vehicles. Section 50‑23‑140, S.C. Code Ann., as amended, governs the perfection of security interests on watercraft and outboard motors.

ARTICLE 9 envisions that a state certificate of title statute that provides that perfection occurs when the appropriate state authority receives an application for a certificate of title which discloses the security interest, rather than when the authority issues the certificate. See Section 36‑9‑311, Official Comment 5. The South Carolina certificate of title statutes conform to this exception. See Sections 56‑19‑230 and 50‑23‑140(c) S.C. Code Ann. (1976 and Supp. 1999).

ARTICLE 9 further envisions that when certificate of title legislation perfection will not relate back to a point in time earlier than the date upon which the State officials received the application. See Section 36‑9‑311, Official Comment 5. The current South Carolina certificate of title statutes do not conform to this expectation. Under section 56‑19‑630 S. C. Code Ann. (1976) the perfection of a security interest in a motor vehicle relates back to the date on which the security interest was created if delivery of the application to the Department of Highways and Public Transportation is completed within ten days after the creation of the security interest. Under section 50‑23‑140(c) S.C. Code Ann. (Supp. 1999) the perfection of a security interest in a watercraft or an outboard motor relates back to the date the security interest was created if delivery of the application is completed within twenty days after the creation of the security interest. The relation‑back for the perfection of non‑purchase‑money security interests and a twenty day relation back period measured from the date on which the debtor receives delivery of the collateral for purchase‑ money security interests. See Section 36‑9‑317(e)

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|  | Definitional Cross: |  |
| “Certificate of title” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(10) |
| “Financing statement” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(39) |
| “Inventory” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(48) |
| “Lien creditor” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(52) |
| “Security interest” | | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |
|  | Cross— |  |

1. Provisions of certificate‑of‑title statute relating to the perfection of security interests in motor vehicles. Sections 56‑19‑630 and 650. S.C. Code Ann. (1976 and Supp. 1999).

2. Provisions of certificate‑of‑title statute relating to the perfection of security interests in watercraft and outboard motors. Section 50‑23‑140 S. C. Code Ann. (Supp. 1999).

3. Perfection by possession of a security interest on goods subject to a certificate‑of‑title statute when the goods enter South Carolina subject to a security interest perfected under the law of another jurisdiction. Sections 36‑9‑313(b), 36‑9‑316(d) and (e).

Effect of Amendment

The 2013 amendment in subsection (a), in paragraph (3), deleted “certificate‑of‑title” preceding “statute” and inserted “of title” preceding “as a condition”; and made other nonsubstantive changes.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 81, 138.

States 18.15, 18.19.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak81; 349Ak138; 360k18.15; 360k18.19.

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Encyclopedias

S.C. Jur. Assignments Section 51, Assignments of Security Interests.

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Mandatory Recording of Personal Property Leases in South Carolina: An Examination of the South Carolina Bailment Statute as Affected by U.C.C. Article Nine. 30 S.C. L. Rev. 557.

Perfection of the Security Interest. 19 S.C. L. Rev. 700.

Attorney General’s Opinions

Under the Uniform Commercial Code a purchase money security interest in consumer goods is perfected without the necessity of filing a financial statement. 1969‑70 Op Atty Gen, No 2967, p 236.

Conditional seller of consumer goods is secure against landlord’s lien for rent or subsequent mortgage from the moment debtor receives possession of such goods, whether or not or regardless of when a financing statement is filed. 1969‑70 Op Atty Gen, No 2887, p 126.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 1

1. In general

Installment sales contract for purchase of mobile home was a security device to which Article 9 of the Uniform Code (UCC) applied, as it expressly provided for title to remain in creditor until payment of purchase price by debtor, it required that debtor surrender mobile home to creditor in event of default, it required that debtor name creditor as loss payee in fire insurance policy, and provided that debtor could not assign his rights in the home without creditor’s prior written permission, that debtor could not move the home until repaying the loan in full, that debtor maintain the home, and that creditor could inspect it at any reasonable time. Brockbank v. Best Capital Corp. (S.C. 2000) 341 S.C. 372, 534 S.E.2d 688, rehearing denied. Secured Transactions 10

Where finance company, which financed purchase of boat and which took back boat when purchasers revoked acceptance, never had its lien noted on boat’s certificate of title, its security interest was unperfected at all times, and finance company therefore could not claim priority under Section 36‑9‑306(5)(d) over manufacturer’s security interest placed on inventory, including boat in question, of retail boat dealer. Finance America Corp. v. Galaxy Boat Mfg. Co., Inc. (S.C. 1987) 292 S.C. 494, 357 S.E.2d 460.

When financing statement must be filed. When filing is required to perfect a security interest, the UCC requires that a document designated as a financing statement must be filed. Kimbrell’s Furniture Co., Inc. v. Friedman (S.C. 1973) 261 S.C. 172, 198 S.E.2d 803.

The UCC does not require filing in order to perfect a purchase money security interest in consumer goods. Kimbrell’s Furniture Co., Inc. v. Friedman (S.C. 1973) 261 S.C. 172, 198 S.E.2d 803.

**SECTION 36‑9‑312.** Perfection of security interests in chattel paper, deposit accounts, documents, goods covered by documents, instruments, investment property, letter‑of‑credit rights, and money; perfection by permissive filing; temporary perfection without filing or transfer of possession.

(a) A security interest in chattel paper, negotiable documents, instruments, or investment property may be perfected by filing.

(b) Except as otherwise provided in Section 36‑9‑315(c) and (d) for proceeds:

(1) a security interest in a deposit account may be perfected only by control under Section 36‑9‑314;

(2) and except as otherwise provided in Section 36‑9‑308(d), a security interest in a letter‑of‑credit right may be perfected only by control under Section 36‑9‑314; and

(3) a security interest in money may be perfected only by the secured party’s taking possession under Section 36‑9‑313.

(c) While goods are in the possession of a bailee that has issued a negotiable document covering the goods:

(1) a security interest in the goods may be perfected by perfecting a security interest in the document; and

(2) a security interest perfected in the document has priority over any security interest that becomes perfected in the goods by another method during that time.

(d) While goods are in the possession of a bailee that has issued a nonnegotiable document covering the goods, a security interest in the goods may be perfected by:

(1) issuance of a document in the name of the secured party;

(2) the bailee’s receipt of notification of the secured party’s interest; or

(3) filing as to the goods.

(e) A security interest in certificated securities, negotiable documents, or instruments is perfected without filing or the taking of possession or control for a period of twenty days from the time it attaches to the extent that it arises for new value given under an authenticated security agreement.

(f) A perfected security interest in a negotiable document or goods in possession of a bailee, other than one that has issued a negotiable document for the goods, remains perfected for twenty days without filing if the secured party makes available to the debtor the goods or documents representing the goods for the purpose of:

(1) ultimate sale or exchange; or

(2) loading, unloading, storing, shipping, transshipping, manufacturing, processing, or otherwise dealing with them in a manner preliminary to their sale or exchange.

(g) A perfected security interest in a certificated security or instrument remains perfected for twenty days without filing if the secured party delivers the security certificate or instrument to the debtor for the purpose of:

(1) ultimate sale or exchange; or

(2) presentation, collection, enforcement, renewal, or registration of transfer.

(h) After the twenty‑day period specified in subsection (e), (f), or (g) expires, perfection depends upon compliance with this chapter.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑312; 1966 (54) 2716; 1979 Act No. 183 Section 2; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 1991 Act No. 161, Section 2(k); 2000 Act No. 339, Section 2; 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12; 2014 Act No. 213 (S.343), Section 40, eff October 1, 2014.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑304, with additions and some changes.

2. Instruments. Under subsection (a), a security interest in instruments may be perfected by filing. This rule represents an important change from former Article 9, under which the secured party’s taking possession of an instrument was the only method of achieving long‑term perfection. The rule is likely to be particularly useful in transactions involving a large number of notes that a debtor uses as collateral but continues to collect from the makers. A security interest perfected by filing is subject to defeat by certain subsequent purchasers (including secured parties). Under Section 9‑330(d), purchasers for value who take possession of an instrument without knowledge that the purchase violates the rights of the secured party generally would achieve priority over a security interest in the instrument perfected by filing. In addition, Section 9‑331 provides that filing a financing statement does not constitute notice that would preclude a subsequent purchaser from becoming a holder in due course and taking free of all claims under Section 3‑306.

3. Chattel Paper; Negotiable Documents. Subsection (a) further provides that filing is available as a method of perfection for security interests in chattel paper and negotiable documents. Tangible chattel paper is sometimes delivered to the assignee, and sometimes left in the hands of the assignor for collection. Subsection (a) allows the assignee to perfect its security interest by filing in the latter case. Alternatively, the assignee may perfect by taking possession. See Section 9‑313(a). An assignee of electronic chattel paper may perfect by taking control. See Sections 9‑314(a), 9‑105. The security interest of an assignee who takes possession or control may qualify for priority over a competing security interest perfected by filing. See Section 9‑330.

Negotiable documents may be, and usually are, delivered to the secured party. See Article 1, Section 1‑201 (definition of “delivery”). The secured party’s taking possession of a tangible document or control of an electronic document will suffice as a perfection step. See Sections 9‑313(a), 9‑314 and 7‑106. However, as is the case with chattel paper, a security interest in a negotiable document may be perfected by filing.

4. Investment Property. A security interest in investment property, including certificated securities, uncertificated securities, security entitlements, and securities accounts, may be perfected by filing. However, security interests created by brokers, securities intermediaries, or commodity intermediaries are automatically perfected; filing is of no effect. See Section 9‑309(10), (11). A security interest in all kinds of investment property also may be perfected by control, see Sections 9‑314, 9‑106, and a security interest in a certificated security also may be perfected by the secured party’s taking delivery under Section 8‑301. See Section 9‑313(a). A security interest perfected only by filing is subordinate to a conflicting security interest perfected by control or delivery. See Section 9‑328(1), (5). Thus, although filing is a permissible method of perfection, a secured party who perfects by filing takes the risk that the debtor has granted or will grant a security interest in the same collateral to another party who obtains control. Also, perfection by filing would not give the secured party protection against other types of adverse claims, since the Article 8 adverse claim cut‑off rules require control. See Section 8‑510.

5. Deposit Accounts. Under new subsection (b)(1), the only method of perfecting a security interest in a deposit account as original collateral is by control. Filing is ineffective, except as provided in Section 9‑315 with respect to proceeds. As explained in Section 9‑104, “ control” can arise as a result of an agreement among the secured party, debtor, and bank, whereby the bank agrees to comply with instructions of the secured party with respect to disposition of the funds on deposit, even though the debtor retains the right to direct disposition of the funds. Thus, subsection (b)(1) takes an intermediate position between certain non‑UCC law, which conditions the effectiveness of a security interest on the secured party’s enjoyment of such dominion and control over the deposit account that the debtor is unable to dispose of the funds, and the approach this Article takes to securities accounts, under which a secured party who is unable to reach the collateral without resort to judicial process may perfect by filing. By conditioning perfection on “ control,” rather than requiring the secured party to enjoy absolute dominion to the exclusion of the debtor, subsection (b)(1) permits perfection in a wide variety of transactions, including those in which the secured party actually relies on the deposit account in extending credit and maintains some meaningful dominion over it, but does not wish to deprive the debtor of access to the funds altogether.

6. Letter‑of‑Credit Rights. Letter‑of‑credit rights commonly are “ supporting obligations,” as defined in Section 9‑102. Perfection as to the related account, chattel paper, document, general intangible, instrument, or investment property will perfect as to the letter‑ of‑credit rights. See Section 9‑308(d). Subsection (b)(2) provides that, in other cases, a security interest in a letter‑of‑credit right may be perfected only by control. “Control,” for these purposes, is explained in Section 9‑107.

7. Goods Covered by Document of Title. Subsection (c) applies to goods in the possession of a bailee who has issued a negotiable document covering the goods. Subsection (d) applies to goods in the possession of a bailee who has issued a nonnegotiable document of title, including a document of title that is “non‑negotiable” under Section 7‑104. Section 9‑313 governs perfection of a security interest in goods in the possession of a bailee who has not issued a document of title.

Subsection (c) clarifies the perfection and priority rules in former Section 9‑304(2). Consistently with the provisions of Article 7, subsection (c) takes the position that, as long as a negotiable document covering goods is outstanding, title to the goods is, so to say, locked up in the document. Accordingly, a security interest in goods covered by a negotiable document may be perfected by perfecting a security interest in the document. The security interest also may be perfected by another method, e.g., by filing. The priority rule in subsection (c) governs only priority between (i) a security interest in goods which is perfected by perfecting in the document and (ii) a security interest in the goods which becomes perfected by another method while the goods are covered by the document.

Example 1: While wheat is in a grain elevator and covered by a negotiable warehouse receipt, Debtor creates a security interest in the wheat in favor of SP‑1 and SP‑2. SP‑1 perfects by filing a financing statement covering “wheat.” Thereafter, SP‑2 perfects by filing a financing statement describing the warehouse receipt. Subsection (c)(1) provides that SP‑2’s security interest is perfected. Subsection (c)(2) provides that SP‑2’s security interest is senior to SP‑1’s.

Example 2: The facts are as in Example 1, but SP‑1’s security interest attached and was perfected before the goods were delivered to the grain elevator. Subsection (c)(2) does not apply, because SP‑1’s security interest did not become perfected during the time that the wheat was in the possession of a bailee. Rather, the first‑to‑file‑or‑perfect priority rule applies. See Section 9‑322 and 7‑503.

A secured party may become “a holder to whom a negotiable document of title has been duly negotiated” under Section 7‑501. If so, the secured party acquires the rights specified by Article 7. Article 9 does not limit those rights, which may include the right to priority over an earlier‑perfected security interest. See Section 9‑331(a).

Subsection (d) takes a different approach to the problem of goods covered by a nonnegotiable document. Here, title to the goods is not looked on as being locked up in the document, and the secured party may perfect its security interest directly in the goods by filing as to them. The subsection provides two other methods of perfection: issuance of the document in the secured party’s name (as consignee of a straight bill of lading or the person to whom delivery would be made under a non‑negotiable warehouse receipt) and receipt of notification of the secured party’s interest by the bailee. Perfection under subsection (d) occurs when the bailee receives notification of the secured party’s interest in the goods, regardless of who sends the notification. Receipt of notification is effective to perfect, regardless of whether the bailee responds. Unlike former Section 9‑304(3), from which it derives, subsection (d) does not apply to goods in the possession of a bailee who has not issued a document of title. Section 9‑313(c) covers that case and provides that perfection by possession as to goods not covered by a document requires the bailee’s acknowledgment.

8. Temporary Perfection Without Having First Otherwise Perfected. Subsection (e) follows former Section 9‑304(4) in giving perfected status to security interests in certificated securities, instruments, and negotiable documents for a short period (reduced from 21 to 20 days, which is the time period generally applicable in this Article), although there has been no filing and the collateral is in the debtor’s possession or control. The 20‑day temporary perfection runs from the date of attachment. There is no limitation on the purpose for which the debtor is in possession, but the secured party must have given “new value” (defined in Section 9‑102) under an authenticated security agreement.

9. Maintaining Perfection After Surrendering Possession. There are a variety of legitimate reasons‑many of them are described in subsection (f) and (g)‑why certain types of collateral must be released temporarily to a debtor. No useful purpose would be served by cluttering the files with records of such exceedingly short term transactions.

Subsection (f) affords the possibility of 20‑day perfection in negotiable documents and goods in the possession of a bailee but not covered by a negotiable document. Subsection (g) provides for 20‑day perfection in certificated securities and instruments. These subsections derive from former Section 9‑305(5). However, the period of temporary perfection has been reduced from 21 to 20 days, which is the time period generally applicable in this Article, and “enforcement” has been added in subsection (g) as one of the special and limited purposes for which a secured party can release an instrument or certificated security to the debtor and still remain perfected. The period of temporary perfection runs from the date a secured party who already has a perfected security interest turns over the collateral to the debtor. There is no new value requirement, but the turnover must be for one or more of the purposes stated in subsection (f) or (g). The 20‑day period may be extended by perfecting as to the collateral by another method before the period expires. However, if the security interest is not perfected by another method until after the 20‑day period expires, there will be a gap during which the security interest is unperfected.

Temporary perfection extends only to the negotiable document or goods under subsection (f) and only to the certificated security or instrument under subsection (g). It does not extend to proceeds. If the collateral is sold, the security interest will continue in the proceeds for the period specified in Section 9‑315.

Subsections (f) and (g) deal only with perfection. Other Sections of this Article govern the priority of a security interest in goods after surrender of possession or control of the document covering them. In the case of a purchase‑money security interest in inventory, priority may be conditioned upon giving notification to a prior inventory financer. See Section 9‑324.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑312 sets forth a series of perfection rules governing situations in which perfection by filing is an alternative method of perfection, unavailable to the secured party, or unnecessary. Subsection 36‑9‑312(a) provides that security interests in chattel paper, negotiable documents, instruments, and investment property may be perfected. Perfection by filing in such collateral, however, will not assure a secured party of priority over subsequent secured parties and transferees.

Subsection 36‑9‑312(b) provides that most security interests in deposit accounts and letter‑of‑credit rights can be perfected only by control. The subsection further provides that a security interest in money can be perfected only by possession.

Subsections 36‑9‑312(c) and (d) address the perfection of a security interest in goods in the possession of a bailee that has issued a document covering the goods. These provisions clarify former Section 36‑9‑304(2) and (3) which were applied in In re George B. Kerr, Inc., 25 B.R.2 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1981), aff’d. 696 F. 2d 924 (4th Cir. 1982). The clarifications effected by the current law would not change the result in the Kerr decision.

Subsections 36‑9‑312(e)—(h) clarify former sections 36‑9‑304(4) and (5) and provide for temporary automatic perfection of security interests in specified situations.

Definitional Cross References:

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| --- | --- |
|  |  |
| “Authenticate” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(7) |
| “Certificated security” | Section 36‑8‑102(a)(4) |
| “Chattel paper” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(11) |
| “Deposit account” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(29) |
| “Goods” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(44) |
| “Instrument” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(47) |
| “Investment property” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(49) |
| “Letter‑of‑credit right” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(51) |
| “Negotiable document” | See Sections 36‑9‑102(a)(30),  36‑7‑102(1)(e), 36‑1‑201(15), 36‑7‑104(1) |
| “New value” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(57) |
| “Nonnegotiable document” | See Sections 36‑9‑102(a)(30), 36‑7‑102(1)(e), 36‑1‑201(15), 36‑7‑104 |
| “Proceeds” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(64) |
| “Security agreement” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(73) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |

Cross References—

1. Perfection of a security interest in tangible chattel paper by possession. Section 36‑9‑313(a).

2. Perfection of a security interest in electronic chattel paper by control. Section 36‑9‑314(a) and 36‑9‑105.

3. Perfection of a security interest in chattel paper as proceeds. Section 36‑9‑315.

4. Priority of purchasers of chattel paper. Section 36‑9‑330.

5. Perfection of a security interest in a negotiable document by possession. Section 36‑9‑313(a).

6. Priority of purchasers of negotiable documents. Section 36‑9‑331.

7. Perfection of a security interest in an instrument by possession. Section 36‑9‑313(a).

8. Priority of purchasers of instruments. Sections 36‑9‑330(d) and 36‑9‑331.

9. Perfection of security interests in investment property by control. Sections 36‑9‑314(a), 36‑9‑106, 36‑8‑106.

10. Perfection of a security interest in certificated securities by taking delivery. Sections 36‑9‑313(a) and 36‑8‑301(a).

11. Priority of security interests in investment property. Section 36‑9‑328.

12. Perfection of a security interest in a deposit account by control. Sections 36‑9‑314(a) and 36‑9‑104.

13. Priority of security interests in deposit accounts. Section 36‑9‑327.

14. Perfection of a security interest in a letter‑of‑credit right by control. Sections 36‑9‑314(a) and 36‑9‑107.

15. Perfection of a security interest in a letter‑of‑credit right as a supporting obligation. Section 36‑9‑107.

16. Priority of security interests in letter‑of‑credit rights. Section 36‑9‑329.

Editor’s Note

2014 Act No. 213, Section 51, provides as follows:

“SECTION 51. This act becomes effective on October 1, 2014. It applies to transactions entered into and events occurring after that date.”

Effect of Amendment

2014 Act No. 213, Section 40, in subsection (e), inserted “or control”.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 88.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak88.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR Library

100 ALR 3rd 10 , Sufficiency of Description of Collateral in Financing Statement Under UCC Sections 9‑110 and 9‑402.

Encyclopedias

S.C. Jur. Landlord and Tenant Section 47, Priority of Landlord’s Lien.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 1

1. In general

Under South Carolina law, financing statements previously filed by purchase‑money lender, before lender provided financing for purchase of logging equipment in question, and before debtor acquired any rights therein, served to automatically perfect its purchase‑money security interests in this equipment as soon as debtor acquired rights therein, without necessity of any additional filing by lender; thus, lender’s purchase‑money security interest was perfected within 10 days of debtor’s acquisition of equipment, and was entitled to priority over another creditor’s floating equipment lien. In re K & P Logging, Inc. (Bkrtcy.D.S.C. 2001) 272 B.R. 867. Secured Transactions 134; Secured Transactions 146

There was neither legal transfer of notes under Section 36‑3‑202, nor perfection of security interest in notes under Section 36‑9‑304, where notes had never been assigned from decedent to wife and were thus property of estate of decedent, because assignment of mortgage as distinct from debt it secures is nugatory and confers no rights upon transferee absent some indication that parties also intended to transfer debt; there was no intent, based on record, that decedent intended to assign notes to wife to secure mortgage where record showed that decedent was aware that assignment of mortgage should also be accompanied by assignment of notes; most telling indication of decedent’s intention was fact that he did not give possession of notes to wife. South Carolina Nat. Bank v. Halter (S.C.App. 1987) 293 S.C. 121, 359 S.E.2d 74.

**SECTION 36‑9‑313.** When possession by or delivery to secured party perfects security interest without filing.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), a secured party may perfect a security interest in tangible negotiable documents, goods, instruments, money, or tangible chattel paper by taking possession of the collateral. A secured party may perfect a security interest in certificated securities by taking delivery of the certificated securities under Section 36‑8‑301.

(b) With respect to goods covered by a certificate of title issued by this State, a secured party may perfect a security interest in the goods by taking possession of the goods only in the circumstances described in Section 36‑9‑316(d).

(c) With respect to collateral other than certificated securities and goods covered by a document, a secured party takes possession of collateral in the possession of a person other than the debtor, the secured party, or a lessee of the collateral from the debtor in the ordinary course of the debtor’s business, when:

(1) the person in possession authenticates a record acknowledging that it holds possession of the collateral for the secured party’s benefit; or

(2) the person takes possession of the collateral after having authenticated a record acknowledging that it will hold possession of collateral for the secured party’s benefit.

(d) If perfection of a security interest depends upon possession of the collateral by a secured party, perfection occurs no earlier than the time the secured party takes possession and continues only while the secured party retains possession.

(e) A security interest in a certificated security in registered form is perfected by delivery when delivery of the certificated security occurs under Section 36‑8‑301 and remains perfected by delivery until the debtor obtains possession of the security certificate.

(f) A person in possession of collateral is not required to acknowledge that it holds possession for a secured party’s benefit.

(g) If a person acknowledges that it holds possession for the secured party’s benefit:

(1) the acknowledgment is effective under subsection (c) or Section 36‑8‑301(a), even if the acknowledgment violates the rights of a debtor; and

(2) unless the person otherwise agrees or law other than this chapter otherwise provides, the person does not owe any duty to the secured party and is not required to confirm the acknowledgment to another person.

(h) A secured party having possession of collateral does not relinquish possession by delivering the collateral to a person other than the debtor or a lessee of the collateral from the debtor in the ordinary course of the debtor’s business if the person was instructed before the delivery or is instructed contemporaneously with the delivery:

(1) to hold possession of the collateral for the secured party’s benefit; or

(2) to redeliver the collateral to the secured party.

(i) A secured party does not relinquish possession, even if a delivery under subsection (h) violates the rights of a debtor. A person to which collateral is delivered under subsection (h) does not owe any duty to the secured party and is not required to confirm the delivery to another person unless the person otherwise agrees or law other than this chapter otherwise provides.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑313; 1966 (54) 2716; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2000 Act No; 339, Section 3; 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12; 2014 Act No. 213 (S.343), Section 41, eff October 1, 2014.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Sections 9‑305, 9‑115(6).

2. Perfection by Possession. As under the common law of pledge, no filing is required by this Article to perfect a security interest if the secured party takes possession of the collateral. See Section 9‑310(b)(6).

This Section permits a security interest to be perfected by the taking of possession only when the collateral is goods, instruments, tangible negotiable documents, money, or tangible chattel paper. Accounts, commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, investment property, letter‑of‑credit rights, letters of credit, money, and oil, gas, or other minerals before extraction are excluded. (But see Comment 6, below, regarding certificated securities.) A security interest in accounts and payment intangibles‑property not ordinarily represented by any writing whose delivery operates to transfer the right to payment‑may under this Article be perfected only by filing. This rule would not be affected by the fact that a security agreement or other record described the assignment of such collateral as a “pledge.” Section 9‑309(2) exempts from filing certain assignments of accounts or payment intangibles which are out of the ordinary course of financing. These exempted assignments are perfected when they attach. Similarly, under Section 9‑309(3), sales of payment intangibles are automatically perfected.

3. “Possession.” This Section does not define “possession.” In determining whether a particular person has possession, the principles of agency apply. For example, if the collateral clearly is in possession of an agent of the secured party for the purposes of possessing on behalf of the secured party, and if the agent is not also an agent of the debtor, the secured party has taken actual possession without the need to rely on a third‑party acknowledgment. See subsection (c) and Comments 4 and 8. However, if the agent is an agent of both the secured party and the debtor, prudence might suggest that the secured party obtain the agent’s acknowledgment in order to ensure perfection by possession. The debtor cannot qualify as an agent for the secured party for purposes of the secured party’s taking possession. And, under appropriate circumstances, a court may determine that a third person in possession is so closely connected to or controlled by the debtor that the debtor has retained effective possession, even though the third person may have agreed to take possession on behalf of the secured party. If so, the third person’s taking possession would not constitute the secured party’s taking possession and would not be sufficient for perfection. See also Section 9‑205(b). In a typical escrow arrangement, where the escrowee holds possession of collateral as agent for both the secured party and the debtor, the debtor’s relationship to the escrowee is not such as to constitute retention of possession by the debtor.

4. Goods in Possession of Third Party: Perfection. Former Section 9‑305 permitted perfection of a security interest by notification to a bailee in possession of collateral. This Article distinguishes between goods in the possession of a bailee who has issued a document of title covering the goods and goods in the possession of a third party who has not issued a document. Section 9‑312(c) or (d) applies to the former, depending on whether the document is negotiable. Section 9‑313(c) applies to the latter. It provides a method of perfection by possession when the collateral is possessed by a third person who is not the secured party’s agent.

Notification of a third person does not suffice to perfect under Section 9‑313(c). Rather, perfection does not occur unless the third person authenticates an acknowledgment that it holds possession of the collateral for the secured party’s benefit. Compare Section 9‑312(d), under which receipt of notification of the security party’s interest by goods covered by a nonnegotiable document is sufficient to perfect, even if the bailee does not acknowledge receipt of the notification. A third person may acknowledge that it will hold for the secured party’s benefit goods to be received in the future. Under these circumstances, perfection by possession occurs when the third person obtains possession of the goods.

Under subsection (c), acknowledgment of notification by a “lessee . . . in . . . ordinary course of . . . business” (defined in Section 2A‑103) does not suffice for possession. The Section thus rejects the reasoning of In re Atlantic Systems, Inc., 135 B.R. 463 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that notification to debtor‑lessor’s lessee sufficed to perfect security interest in leased goods). See Steven O. Weise, Perfection by Possession: The Need for an Objective Test, 29 Idaho Law Rev. 705 (1992‑93) (arguing that lessee’s possession in ordinary course of debtor‑lessor’s business does not provide adequate public notice of possible security interest in leased goods). Inclusion of a per se rule concerning lessees is not meant to preclude a court, under appropriate circumstances, from determining that a third person is so closely connected to or controlled by the debtor that the debtor has retained effective possession. If so, the third person’s acknowledgment would not be sufficient for perfection.

5. No Relation Back. Former Section 9‑305 provided that a security interest is perfected by possession from the time possession is taken “without a relation back.” As the Comment to former Section 9‑305 observed, the relation‑back theory, under which the taking of possession was deemed to relate back to the date of the original security agreement, has had little vitality since the 1938 revision of the Federal Bankruptcy Act. The theory is inconsistent with former Article 9 and with this Article. See Section 9‑313(d) . Accordingly, this Article deletes the quoted phrase as unnecessary. Where a pledge transaction is contemplated, perfection dates only from the time possession is taken, although a security interest may attach, unperfected. The only exceptions to this rule are the short, 20‑day periods of perfection provided in Section 9‑312(e), (f), and (g), during which a debtor may have possession of specified collateral in which there is a perfected security interest.

6. Certificated Securities. The second sentence of subsection (a) reflects the traditional rule for perfection of a security interest in certificated securities. Compare Section 9‑115(6) (1994 Official Text); Sections 8‑321, 8‑313(1)(a) (1978 Official Text); Section 9‑305 (1972 Official Text). It has been modified to refer to “delivery” under Section 8‑301. Corresponding changes appear in Section 9‑203(b).

Subsections (e), (f), and (g), which are new, apply to a person in possession of security certificates or holding security certificates for the secured party’s benefit under Section 8‑301. For delivery to occur when a person other than a secured party holds possession for the secured party, the person may not be a securities intermediary.

Under subsection (e), a possessory security interest in a certificated security remains perfected until the debtor obtains possession of the security certificate. This rule is analogous to that of Section 9‑314(c), which deals with perfection of security interests in investment property by control. See Section 9‑314, Comment 3.

7. Goods Covered by Certificate of Title. Subsection (b) is necessary to effect changes to the choice‑of‑law rules governing goods covered by a certificate of title. These changes are described in the Comments to Section 9‑311. Subsection (b), like subsection (a), does not create a right to take possession. Rather, it indicates the circumstances under which the secured party’s taking possession of goods covered by a certificate of title is effective to perfect a security interest in the goods: the goods become covered by a certificate of title issued by this State at a time when the security interest is perfected by any method under the law of another jurisdiction.

8. Goods in Possession of Third Party: No Duty to Acknowledge; Consequences of Acknowledgment. Subsections (f) and (g) are new and address matters as to which former Article 9 was silent. They derive in part from Section 8‑106(g). Subsection (f) provides that a person in possession of collateral is not required to acknowledge that it holds for a secured party. Subsection (g)(1) provides that an acknowledgment is effective even if wrongful as to the debtor. Subsection (g)(2) makes clear that an acknowledgment does not give rise to any duties or responsibilities under this Article. Arrangements involving the possession of goods are hardly standardized. They include bailments for services to be performed on the goods (such as repair or processing), for use (leases), as security (pledges) , for carriage, and for storage. This Article leaves to the agreement of the parties and to any other applicable law the imposition of duties and responsibilities upon a person who acknowledges under subsection (c). For example, by acknowledging, a third party does not become obliged to act on the secured party’s direction or to remain in possession of the collateral unless it agrees to do so or other law so provides.

9. Delivery to Third Party by Secured Party. New subsections (h) and (i) address the practice of mortgage warehouse lenders. These lenders typically send mortgage notes to prospective purchasers under cover of letters advising the prospective purchasers that the lenders hold security interests in the notes. These lenders relied on notification to maintain perfection under former 9‑305. Requiring them to obtain authenticated acknowledgments from each prospective purchaser under subsection (c) could be unduly burdensome and disruptive of established practices. Under subsection (h), when a secured party in possession itself delivers the collateral to a third party, instructions to the third party would be sufficient to maintain perfection by possession; an acknowledgment would not be necessary. Under subsection (i), the secured party does not relinquish possession by making a delivery under subsection (h), even if the delivery violates the rights of the debtor. That subsection also makes clear that a person to whom collateral is delivered under subsection (h) does not owe any duty to the secured party and is not required to confirm the delivery to another person unless the person otherwise agrees or law other than this Article provides otherwise.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑313 sets forth the rules for perfection of security interests by possession or delivery. The most significant change from prior law relates to the perfection of a security interest in goods not covered by a document of title in the possession of a person other than the debtor. Under current law a secured party cannot perfect merely by giving the bailee notice of its security interest. Section 36‑9‑313(c) now conditions perfection upon the bailee acknowledging in an authenticated record that it holds possession of the collateral for the secured party’s benefit. Moreover, Section 36‑9‑313(f) provides that the bailee is not required to acknowledge that it holds collateral for the secured party’s benefit. Moreover, Section 36‑9‑313(f) provides that the bailee is not required to acknowledge that it holds collateral for the secured party’s benefit. Finally, even if the bailee acknowledges that it holds the collateral for the secured party’s benefit, Section 36‑9‑313(g)(2) provides that Article 9 does not impose upon the bailee in favor of the secured party.

Section 36‑9‑313(b) clarifies prior law by permitting a secured party to perfect by possession a security interest upon goods covered by a South Carolina certificate of title by possession when the goods enter South Carolina subject to a security interest perfected under the law of another jurisdiction.

Definitional Cross References:

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| --- | --- |
|  |  |
| “Authenticate” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(7) |
| “Certificated security” | Section 36‑8‑102(a)(4) |
| “Certificate of title” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(10) |
| “Collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(4) |
| “Delivery” | Section 36‑8‑301(a) |
| “Goods” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(44) |
| “Instrument” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(47) |
| “Negotiable document” | See Sections 36‑9‑102(a)(39),  36‑7‑102(1)(e), 36‑1‑201(15), 36‑7‑104(1) |
| “Record” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(69) |
| “Secured party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |
| “Tangible chattel paper” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(78) |

Editor’s Note

2014 Act No. 213, Section 51, provides as follows:

“SECTION 51. This act becomes effective on October 1, 2014. It applies to transactions entered into and events occurring after that date.”

Effect of Amendment

2014 Act No. 213, Section 41, in subsection (a), inserted “tangible” before “negotiable documents”.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 88, 89, 135.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak88; 349Ak89; 349Ak135.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR Library

53 ALR 6th 159 , Perfection of Security Interests by Possession, Delivery, or Control Under Revised Article 9 of Uniform Commercial Code.

Encyclopedias

S.C. Jur. Fixtures Section 3, Background.

Forms

South Carolina Legal and Business Forms Section 9:15 , Mortgage‑Construction Loan.

LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES

Secured Party’s Rights on Disposition of Collateral. 22 S.C. L. Rev. 504.

Cross References—

1. Perfection of a security interest in goods in the possession of a bailee that has issued a document of title. Section 36‑9‑312(c) and (d).

2. Perfection of a security interest in goods covered by a certificate of title. Sections 36‑9‑311, 36‑9‑316(d).

3. Delivery of a certificated security. Section 36‑8‑301(a).

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 1

1. In general

Bank did not convert certificate of deposit (CD), where customer had pledged certificate as collateral for a loan and borrower had defaulted on loan, and thus customer did not have a right to possession when certificate was liquidated. Regions Bank v. Schmauch (S.C.App. 2003) 354 S.C. 648, 582 S.E.2d 432. Secured Transactions 170

Bank had perfected its security interest in certificate of deposit (CD) when loan for which certificate served as collateral went into default and certificate was liquidated, as certificate had been properly pledged, and as such was in the possession of the bank. Regions Bank v. Schmauch (S.C.App. 2003) 354 S.C. 648, 582 S.E.2d 432. Secured Transactions 89

**SECTION 36‑9‑314.** Perfection by control.

(a) A security interest in investment property, deposit accounts, letter‑of‑credit rights, electronic chattel paper, or electronic documents may be perfected by control of the collateral under Section 36‑7‑106, 36‑9‑104, 36‑9‑105, 36‑9‑106, or 36‑9‑107.

(b) A security interest in deposit accounts, electronic chattel paper, letter‑of‑credit rights, or electronic documents is perfected by control under Section 36‑7‑106, 36‑9‑104, 36‑9‑105, or 36‑9‑107 when the secured party obtains control and remains perfected by control only while the secured party retains control.

(c) A security interest in investment property is perfected by control under Section 36‑9‑106 from the time the secured party obtains control and remains perfected by control until:

(1) the secured party does not have control; and

(2) one of the following occurs:

(A) if the collateral is a certificated security, the debtor has or acquires possession of the security certificate;

(B) if the collateral is an uncertificated security, the issuer has registered or registers the debtor as the registered owner; or

(C) if the collateral is a security entitlement, the debtor is or becomes the entitlement holder.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑314; 1966 (54) 2716; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No; 67, Section 12; 2014 Act No. 213 (S.343), Section 42, eff October 1, 2014.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Substantially new; derived in part from former Section 9‑115(4).

2. Control. This Section provides for perfection by control with respect to investment property, deposit accounts, letter‑of‑credit rights, electronic chattel paper, and electronic documents. For explanations of how a secured party takes control of these types of collateral, see Sections 9‑104 through 9‑107 and Section 7‑106. Subsection (b) explains when a security interest is perfected by control and how long a security interest remains perfected by control. Like Section 9‑313(d) and for the same reasons, subsection (b) makes no reference to the doctrine of “relation back.” See Section 9‑313, Comment 5. As to an electronic document that is reissued in a tangible medium, Section 7‑105, a secured party that is perfected by control in the electronic document should file as to the document before relinquishing control in order to maintain continuous perfection in the document. See Section 9‑308.

3. Investment Property. Subsection (c) provides a special rule for investment property. Once a secured party has control, its security interest remains perfected by control until the secured party ceases to have control and the debtor receives possession of collateral that is a certificated security, becomes the registered owner of collateral that is an uncertificated security, or becomes the entitlement holder of collateral that is a security entitlement. The result is particularly important in the “repledge” context. See Section 9‑207, Comment 5.

In a transaction in which a secured party who has control grants a security interest in investment property or sells outright the investment property, by virtue of the debtor’s consent or applicable legal rules, a purchaser from the secured party typically will cut off the debtor’s rights in the investment property or be immune from the debtor’s claims. See Section 9‑207, Comments 5 and 6. If the investment property is a security, the debtor normally would retain no interest in the security following the purchase from the secured party, and a claim of the debtor against the secured party for redemption (Section 9‑623) or otherwise with respect to the security would be a purely personal claim. If the investment property transferred by the secured party is a financial asset in which the debtor had a security entitlement credited to a securities account maintained with the secured party as a securities intermediary, the debtor’s claim against the secured party could arise as a part of its securities account notwithstanding its personal nature. (This claim would be analogous to a “credit balance” in the securities account, which is a component of the securities account even though it is a personal claim against the intermediary.) In the case in which the debtor may retain an interest in investment property notwithstanding a repledge or sale by the secured party, subsection (c) makes clear that the security interest will remain perfected by control.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑314(a) provides that a secured party can perfect a security interest in investment property, deposit accounts, letter‑of‑credit rights, and electronic chattel paper by control of the collateral. Section 36‑9‑314(b) and (c) provide the rules for determining time during which control is effect to perfect.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Certificated security” | Section 36‑8‑102(a)(4) |
| “Deposit account” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(29) |
| “Electronic chattel paper” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(31) |
| “Entitlement holder” | Section 36‑8‑102(a)(7) |
| “Investment property” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(49) |
| “Letter‑of‑credit right” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(51) |
| “Security certificate” | Section 36‑8‑102(a)(16) |
| “Security entitlement” | Section 36‑8‑102(a)(17) |
| “Uncertificated security” | Section 36‑8‑102(a)(18) |

Cross References—

1. Requirements for control of deposit accounts. Section 36‑9‑104.

2. Requirements for control of electronic chattel paper. Section 36‑9‑105.

3. Requirements for control of investment property. Sections 36‑9‑106 and 36‑8‑106.

4. Requirements for control of letter‑of‑credit rights. Section 36‑9‑107.

5. Control as satisfying the evidentiary requirement for the attachment of a security interest. Section 36‑9‑203(b)(3)(D).

6. Attachment of a security interest in a letter‑of‑credit right as a supporting obligation. Section 36‑9‑203(f).

7. Control as the exclusive method of perfecting a security interest in a deposit account or a letter‑of‑credit right as original collateral.

8. Filing as a method of perfecting a security interest in electronic chattel paper and investment property. Section 36‑9‑312(a).

9. Perfection of a security interest in a letter‑of‑credit right as a supporting obligation. Section 36‑9‑308(d).

10. Priority of security interests in deposit accounts. Section 36‑9‑327.

11. Priority of security interests in investment property. Section 36‑9‑328.

12. Priority of security interests in letter‑of‑credit rights. Section 36‑9‑329.

13. Priority of purchases of chattel. Section 36‑9‑330.

Editor’s Note

2014 Act No. 213, Section 51, provides as follows:

“SECTION 51. This act becomes effective on October 1, 2014. It applies to transactions entered into and events occurring after that date.”

Effect of Amendment

2014 Act No. 213, Section 42, in subsections (a) and (b), inserted “electronic documents” and “36‑7‑106”.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 88, 135.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak88; 349Ak135.

**SECTION 36‑9‑315.** Secured party ‘ s rights on disposition of collateral and in proceeds.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this article and in Section 36‑2‑403(2):

(1) a security interest or agricultural lien continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, lease, license, exchange, or other disposition thereof unless the secured party authorized the disposition free of the security interest or agricultural lien; and

(2) a security interest attaches to any identifiable proceeds of collateral.

(b) Proceeds that are commingled with other property are identifiable proceeds:

(1) if the proceeds are goods, to the extent provided by Section 36‑9‑336; and

(2) if the proceeds are not goods, to the extent that the secured party identifies the proceeds by a method of tracing, including application of equitable principles, that is permitted under law other than this article with respect to commingled property of the type involved.

(c) A security interest in proceeds is a perfected security interest if the security interest in the original collateral was perfected.

(d) A perfected security interest in proceeds becomes unperfected on the twenty‑first day after the security interest attaches to the proceeds unless:

(1) the following conditions are satisfied:

(A) a filed financing statement covers the original collateral;

(B) the proceeds are collateral in which a security interest may be perfected by filing in the office in which the financing statement has been filed; and

(C) the proceeds are not acquired with cash proceeds;

(2) the proceeds are identifiable cash proceeds; or

(3) the security interest in the proceeds is perfected other than under subsection (c) when the security interest attaches to the proceeds or within twenty days thereafter.

(e) If a filed financing statement covers the original collateral, a security interest in proceeds which remains perfected under subsection (d)(1) becomes unperfected at the later of:

(1) when the effectiveness of the filed financing statement lapses under Section 36‑9‑515 or is terminated under Section 36‑9‑513; or

(2) the twenty‑first day after the security interest attaches to the proceeds.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑315; 1966 (54) 2716; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No; 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑306.

2. Continuation of Security Interest or Agricultural Lien Following Disposition of Collateral. Subsection (a)(1), which derives from former Section 9‑306(2), contains the general rule that a security interest survives disposition of the collateral. In these cases, the secured party may repossess the collateral from the transferee or, in an appropriate case, maintain an action for conversion. The secured party may claim both any proceeds and the original collateral but, of course, may have only one satisfaction.

In many cases, a purchaser or other transferee of collateral will take free of a security interest, and the secured party’s only right will be to proceeds. For example, the general rule does not apply, and a security interest does not continue in collateral, if the secured party authorized the disposition, in the agreement that contains the security agreement or otherwise. Subsection (a)(1) adopts the view of PEB Commentary No. 3 and makes explicit that the authorized disposition to which it refers is an authorized disposition “free of” the security interest or agricultural lien. The secured party’s right to proceeds under this Section or under the express terms of an agreement does not in itself constitute an authorization of disposition. The change in language from former Section 9‑306(2) is not intended to address the frequently litigated situation in which the effectiveness of the secured party’s consent to a disposition is conditioned upon the secured party’s receipt of the proceeds. In that situation, subsection (a) leaves the determination of authorization to the courts, as under former Article 9.

This Article contains several provisions under which a transferee takes free of a security interest or agricultural lien. For example, Section 9‑317 states when transferees take free of unperfected security interests; Sections 9‑320 and 9‑321 on goods, 9‑321 on general intangibles, 9‑330 on chattel paper and instruments, and 9‑331 on negotiable instruments, negotiable documents, and securities state when purchasers of such collateral take free of a security interest, even though perfected and even though the disposition was not authorized. Section 9‑332 enables most transferees (including non‑purchasers) of funds from a deposit account and most transferees of money to take free of a perfected security interest in the deposit account or money.

Likewise, the general rule that a security interest survives disposition does not apply if the secured party entrusts goods collateral to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind and the merchant sells the collateral to a buyer in ordinary course of business. Section 2‑403(2) gives the merchant the power to transfer all the secured party’s rights to the buyer, even if the sale is wrongful as against the secured party. Thus, under subsection (a)(1), an entrusting secured party runs the same risk as any other entruster.

3. Secured Party’s Right to Identifiable Proceeds. Under subsection (a)( 2), which derives from former Section 9‑306(2), a security interest attaches to any identifiable “proceeds,” as defined in Section 9‑102. See also Section 9‑203(f). Subsection (b) is new. It indicates when proceeds commingled with other property are identifiable proceeds and permits the use of whatever methods of tracing other law permits with respect to the type of property involved. Among the “equitable principles” whose use other law may permit is the “lowest intermediate balance rule.” See Restatement (2d), Trusts ‘202.

4. Automatic Perfection in Proceeds: General Rule. Under subsection (c), a security interest in proceeds is a perfected security interest if the security interest in the original collateral was perfected. This Article extends the period of automatic perfection in proceeds from 10 days to 20 days. Generally, a security interest in proceeds becomes unperfected on the 21st day after the security interest attaches to the proceeds. See subsection (d). The loss of perfected status under subsection (d) is prospective only. Compare, e.g., Section 9‑515(c) (deeming security interest unperfected retroactively).

5. Automatic Perfection in Proceeds: Proceeds Acquired with Cash Proceeds. Subsection (d)(1) derives from former Section 9‑306(3)(a). It carries forward the basic rule that a security interest in proceeds remains perfected beyond the period of automatic perfection if a filed financing statement covers the original collateral (e.g., inventory) and the proceeds are collateral in which a security interest may be perfected by filing in the office where the financing statement has been filed (e.g., equipment). A different rule applies if the proceeds are acquired with cash proceeds, as is the case if the original collateral (inventory) is sold for cash (cash proceeds) that is used to purchase equipment (proceeds). Under these circumstances, the security interest in the equipment proceeds remains perfected only if the description in the filed financing indicates the type of property constituting the proceeds (e.g., “equipment”).

This Section reaches the same result but takes a different approach. It recognizes that the treatment of proceeds acquired with cash proceeds under former Section 9‑306(3)(a) essentially was superfluous. In the example, had the filing covered “equipment” as well as “ inventory,” the security interest in the proceeds would have been perfected under the usual rules governing after‑acquired equipment (see former Sections 9‑302, 9‑303); paragraph (3)(a) added only an exception to the general rule. Subsection (d)(1)(C) of this Section takes a more direct approach. It makes the general rule of continued perfection inapplicable to proceeds acquired with cash proceeds, leaving perfection of a security interest in those proceeds to the generally applicable perfection rules under subsection (d)(3).

Example 1: Lender perfects a security interest in Debtor’s inventory by filing a financing statement covering “inventory.” Debtor sells the inventory and deposits the buyer’s check into a deposit account. Debtor draws a check on the deposit account and uses it to pay for equipment. Under the “lowest intermediate balance rule,” which is a permitted method of tracing in the relevant jurisdiction, see Comment 3, the funds used to pay for the equipment were identifiable proceeds of the inventory. Because the proceeds (equipment) were acquired with cash proceeds (deposit account), subsection (d)(1) does not extend perfection beyond the 20‑day automatic period.

Example 2: Lender perfects a security interest in Debtor’s inventory by filing a financing statement covering “all debtor’s property.” As in Example 1, Debtor sells the inventory, deposits the buyer’s check into a deposit account, draws a check on the deposit account, and uses the check to pay for equipment. Under the “lowest intermediate balance rule,” which is a permitted method of tracing in the relevant jurisdiction, see Comment 3, the funds used to pay for the equipment were identifiable proceeds of the inventory. Because the proceeds (equipment) were acquired with cash proceeds (deposit account), subsection (d)(1) does not extend perfection beyond the 20‑day automatic period. However, because the financing statement is sufficient to perfect a security interest in debtor’s equipment, under subsection (d)(3) the security interest in the equipment proceeds remains perfected beyond the 20‑day period.

6. Automatic Perfection in Proceeds: Lapse or Termination of Financing Statement During 20‑Day Period; Perfection Under Other Statute or Treaty. Subsection (e) provides that a security interest in proceeds perfected under subsection (d)(1) ceases to be perfected when the financing statement covering the original collateral lapses or is terminated. If the lapse or termination occurs before the 21st day after the security interest attaches, however, the security interest in the proceeds remains perfected until the 21st day. Section 9‑311(b) provides that compliance with the perfection requirements of a statute or treaty described in Section 9‑311(a) “is equivalent to the filing of a financing statement.” It follows that collateral subject to a security interest perfected by such compliance under Section 9‑311(b) is covered by a “filed financing statement” within the meaning of Section 9‑315(d) and (e).

7. Automatic Perfection in Proceeds: Continuation of Perfection in Cash Proceeds. Former Section 9‑306(3)(b) provided that if a filed financing statement covered original collateral, a security interest in identifiable cash proceeds of the collateral remained perfected beyond the ten‑day period of automatic perfection. Former Section 9‑306(3)(c) contained a similar rule with respect to identifiable cash proceeds of investment property. Subsection (d)(2) extends the benefits of former Sections 9‑306(3)(b) and (3)(c) to identifiable cash proceeds of all types of original collateral in which a security interest is perfected by any method. Under subsection (d)(2), if the security interest in the original collateral was perfected, a security interest in identifiable cash proceeds will remain perfected indefinitely, regardless of whether the security interest in the original collateral remains perfected. In many cases, however, a purchaser or other transferee of the cash proceeds will take free of the perfected security interest. See, e.g., Sections 9‑330(d) (purchaser of check), 9‑331 (holder in due course of check), 9‑332 (transferee of money or funds from a deposit account).

8. Insolvency Proceedings; Returned and Repossessed Goods. This Article deletes former Section 9‑306(4), which dealt with proceeds in insolvency proceedings. Except as otherwise provided by the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor’s entering into bankruptcy does not affect a secured party’s right to proceeds.

This Article also deletes former Section 9‑306(5), which dealt with returned and repossessed goods. Section 9‑330, Comments 9 to 11 explain and clarify the application of priority rules to returned and repossessed goods as proceeds of chattel paper.

9. Proceeds of Collateral Subject to Agricultural Lien. This Article does not determine whether a lien extends to proceeds of farm products encumbered by an agricultural lien. If, however, the proceeds are themselves farm products on which an “agricultural lien” (defined in Section 9‑102) arises under other law, then the agricultural‑lien provisions of this Article apply to the agricultural lien on the proceeds in the same way in which they would apply had the farm products not been proceeds.

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Section 36‑9‑315 addresses the rights of a secured party upon the disposition of collateral. Subsection (a)(1) provides that a security interest or agricultural lien continues in the collateral following a disposition unless the secured party authorized the disposition free of the security interest or lien, or the transferee is protected under Section 36‑2‑403(2) or another provision of Article 9. Subsection (a)(2) provides that the security interest also attaches to any identifiable proceeds of the collateral. Subsection (b) provides for the identification of proceeds that have been commingled with other property and authorizes the tracing of cash proceeds. Subsection (c)—(e) provide the rules for the perfection of security interests in proceeds.

Definitional Cross References:

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| “Agricultural lien” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(5) |
| “Cash proceeds” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(9) |
| “Collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Financing statement” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(39) |
| “Proceeds” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(64) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |

Cross References—

1. Requirements a buyer must meet to take free of an unperfected security interest. Section 36‑9‑317(b).

2. Requirements a buyer of goods must meet to take free of a perfected security interest. Section 36‑9‑320.

3. Requirements a licensee of a general intangible must meet to take free of a perfected security interest. Section 36‑9‑321(b).

4. Requirements a lessee must meet to take free of a perfected security interest created by the lessor. Section 36‑9‑321 (c).

5. Priority of purchases of chattel paper and instruments. Section 36‑9‑330.

6. Priority of holders in due course of instruments, holders of negotiable documents, and purchasers of securities. Section 36‑9‑331.

7. General rule for priority of a perfected security interest in proceeds. Section 36‑9‑322(a) and (b)(1).

8. Special priority rule for security interests in proceeds when a secured party established priority in the collateral under Section 36‑9‑327 (deposit accounts), Section 36‑9‑328 (investment accounts), Section 36‑9‑329 (letter‑of‑credit rights), Section 36‑9‑330 (chattel paper and instruments), or Section 36‑9‑331 (instruments, negotiable documents, and securities) and the proceeds are either cash proceeds or of the same type as the original collateral. Section 36‑9‑322(c).

9. Application of first‑to‑file priority rule to conflicting security interests in proceeds of chattel paper, deposit accounts, negotiable documents, instruments, investment property, or letter of credit rights when a security interest in the collateral was perfected by a method other than filing. Section 36‑9‑322(d) and (e).

10. Extent of purchase‑money priority in proceeds. Section 36‑9‑324 (a), (b), and (d).

11. Priority of a security interest in chattel paper claimed merely as proceeds of inventory. Section 36‑9‑330(a).

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**SECTION 36‑9‑316.** Continued perfection of security interest following change in governing law.

(a) A security interest perfected pursuant to the law of the jurisdiction designated in Section 36‑9‑301(1) or 36‑9‑305(c) remains perfected until the earliest of the:

(1) time perfection would have ceased under the law of that jurisdiction;

(2) expiration of four months after a change of the debtor’s location to another jurisdiction; or

(3) expiration of one year after a transfer of collateral to a person that thereby becomes a debtor and is located in another jurisdiction.

(b) If a security interest described in subsection (a) becomes perfected under the law of the other jurisdiction before the earliest time or event described in that subsection, it remains perfected thereafter. If the security interest does not become perfected under the law of the other jurisdiction before the earliest time or event, it becomes unperfected and is deemed never to have been perfected as against a purchaser of the collateral for value.

(c) A possessory security interest in collateral, other than goods covered by a certificate of title and as‑extracted collateral consisting of goods, remains continuously perfected if:

(1) the collateral is located in one jurisdiction and subject to a security interest perfected under the law of that jurisdiction;

(2) thereafter the collateral is brought into another jurisdiction; and

(3) upon entry into the other jurisdiction, the security interest is perfected under the law of the other jurisdiction.

(d) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), a security interest in goods covered by a certificate of title which is perfected by any method under the law of another jurisdiction when the goods become covered by a certificate of title from this State remains perfected until the security interest would have become unperfected under the law of the other jurisdiction had the goods not become so covered.

(e) A security interest described in subsection (d) becomes unperfected as against a purchaser of the goods for value and is deemed never to have been perfected as against a purchaser of the goods for value if the applicable requirements for perfection under Section 36‑9‑311(b) or 36‑9‑313 are not satisfied before the earlier of the:

(1) time the security interest would have become unperfected under the law of the other jurisdiction had the goods not become covered by a certificate of title from this State; or

(2) expiration of four months after the goods had become so covered.

(f) A security interest in deposit accounts, letter‑of‑credit rights, or investment property which is perfected under the law of the bank’s jurisdiction, the issuer’s jurisdiction, a nominated person’s jurisdiction, the securities intermediary’s jurisdiction, or the commodity intermediary’s jurisdiction, as applicable, remains perfected until the earlier of the:

(1) time the security interest would have become unperfected under the law of that jurisdiction; or

(2) expiration of four months after a change of the applicable jurisdiction to another jurisdiction.

(g) If a security interest described in subsection (f) becomes perfected under the law of the other jurisdiction before the earlier of the time or the end of the period described in that subsection, it remains perfected thereafter. If the security interest does not become perfected under the law of the other jurisdiction before the earlier of that time or the end of that period, it becomes unperfected and is deemed never to have been perfected as against a purchaser of the collateral for value.

(h) The following rules apply to collateral to which a security interest attaches within four months after the debtor changes its location to another jurisdiction:

(1) A financing statement filed before the change pursuant to the law of the jurisdiction designated in Section 36‑9‑301(1) or 36‑9‑305(c) is effective to perfect a security interest in the collateral if the financing statement would have been effective to perfect a security interest in the collateral had the debtor not changed its location.

(2) If a security interest perfected by a financing statement that is effective under item (1) becomes perfected under the law of the other jurisdiction before the earlier of the time the financing statement would have become ineffective under the law of the jurisdiction designated in Section 36‑9‑301(1) or 36‑9‑305(c) or the expiration of the four‑month period, it remains perfected thereafter. If the security interest does not become perfected under the law of the other jurisdiction before the earlier time or event, it becomes unperfected and is deemed never to have been perfected as against a purchaser of the collateral for value.

(i) If a financing statement naming an original debtor is filed pursuant to the law of the jurisdiction designated in Section 36‑9‑301(1) or 36‑9‑305(c) and the new debtor is located in another jurisdiction, the following rules apply:

(1) The financing statement is effective to perfect a security interest in collateral acquired by the new debtor before, and within four months after, the new debtor becomes bound under Section 36‑9‑203(d), if the financing statement would have been effective to perfect a security interest in the collateral had the collateral been acquired by the original debtor.

(2) A security interest perfected by the financing statement and which becomes perfected under the law of the other jurisdiction before the earlier of the time the financing statement would have become ineffective under the law of the jurisdiction designated in Section 36‑9‑301(1) or 36‑9‑305(c) or the expiration of the four‑month period remains perfected thereafter. A security interest that is perfected by the financing statement but which does not become perfected under the law of the other jurisdiction before the earlier time or event becomes unperfected and is deemed never to have been perfected as against a purchaser of the collateral for value.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑316; 1966 (54) 2716; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No; 67, Section 12; 2013 Act No. 96, Section 6, eff July 1, 2013.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑103(1)(d), (2)(b), (3)(e), as modified.

2. Continued Perfection. Subsections a‑g deal with continued perfection of security interests that have been perfected under the law of another jurisdiction. The fact that the law of a particular jurisdiction ceases to govern perfection under Sections 9‑301 through 9‑307 does not necessarily mean that a security interest perfected under that law automatically becomes unperfected. To the contrary: This Section generally provides that a security interest perfected under the law of one jurisdiction remains perfected for a fixed period of time (four months or one year, depending on the circumstances), even though the jurisdiction whose law governs perfection changes. However, cessation of perfection under the law of the original jurisdiction cuts short the fixed period. The four‑month and one‑year periods are long enough for a secured party to discover in most cases that the law of a different jurisdiction governs perfection and to reperfect (typically by filing) under the law of that jurisdiction. If a secured party properly reperfects a security interest before it becomes unperfected under subsection (a), then the security interest remains perfected continuously thereafter. See subsection (b).

Example 1: Debtor is a general partnership whose chief executive office is in Pennsylvania. Lender perfects a security interest in Debtor’s equipment by filing in Pennsylvania on May 15, 2002. On April 1, 2005, without Lender’s knowledge, Debtor moves its chief executive office to New Jersey. Lender’s security interest remains perfected for four months after the move. See subsection (a)(2).

Example 2: Debtor is a general partnership whose chief executive office is in Pennsylvania. Lender perfects a security interest in Debtor’s equipment by filing in Pennsylvania on May 15, 2002. On April 1, 2007, without Lender’s knowledge, Debtor moves its chief executive office to New Jersey. Lender’s security interest remains perfected only through May 14, 2007, when the effectiveness of the filed financing statement lapses. See subsection (a)(1). Although, under these facts, Lender would have only a short period of time to discover that Debtor had relocated and to reperfect under New Jersey law, Lender could have protected itself by filing a continuation statement in Pennsylvania before Debtor relocated. By doing so, Lender would have prevented lapse and allowed itself the full four months to discover Debtor’s new location and refile there or, if Debtor is in default, to perfect by taking possession of the equipment.

Example 3: Under the facts of Example 2, Lender files a financing statement in New Jersey before the effectiveness of the Pennsylvania financing statement lapses. Under subsection (b), Lender’s security interest is continuously perfected beyond May 14, 2007, for a period determined by New Jersey’s Article 9.

Subsection (a)(3) allows a one‑year period in which to reperfect. The longer period is necessary, because, even with the exercise of due diligence, the secured party may be unable to discover that the collateral has been transferred to a person located in another jurisdiction. In any event, the period is cut short if the financing statement becomes ineffective under the law of the jurisdiction in which it is filed.

Example 4: Debtor is a Pennsylvania corporation. On January 1, Lender perfects a security interest in Debtor’s equipment by filing in Pennsylvania. Debtor’s shareholders decide to “reincorporate” in Delaware. On March 1, they form a Delaware corporation (Newcorp) into which they merge Debtor. The merger effectuates a transfer of the collateral from Debtor to Newcorp, which thereby becomes a debtor and is located in another jurisdiction. Under subsection (a)(3), the security interest remains perfected for one year after the merger. If a financing statement is filed in Delaware against Newcorp within the year following the merger, then the security interest remains perfected thereafter for a period determined by Delaware’s Article 9.

Note that although Newcorp is a “new debtor” as defined in Section 9‑102, the application of subsection (a)(3) is not limited to transferees who are new debtors. Note also that, under Section 9‑507, the financing statement naming Debtor remains effective even though Newcorp has become the debtor.

Subsection (a) addresses security interests that are perfected (i.e., that have attached and as to which any required perfection step has been taken) before the debtor changes its location. Subsection (h) applies to security interests that have not attached before the location changes. See Comment 7.

3. Retroactive Unperfection. Subsection (b) sets forth the consequences of the failure to reperfect before perfection ceases under subsection (a): the security interest becomes unperfected prospectively and, as against purchasers for value, including buyers and secured parties, but not as against donees or lien creditors, retroactively. The rule applies to agricultural liens, as well. See also Section 9‑515 (taking the same approach with respect to lapse). Although this approach creates the potential for circular priorities, the alternative‑retroactive unperfection against lien creditors‑would create substantial and unjustifiable preference risks.

Example 5: Under the facts of Example 4, six months after the merger, Buyer bought from Newcorp some equipment formerly owned by Debtor. At the time of the purchase, Buyer took subject to Lender’s perfected security interest, of which Buyer was unaware. See Section 9‑315(a)(1). However, subsection (b) provides that if Lender fails to reperfect in Delaware within a year after the merger, its security interest becomes unperfected and is deemed never to have been perfected against Buyer. Having given value and received delivery of the equipment without knowledge of the security interest and before it was perfected, Buyer would take free of the security interest. See Section 9‑317(b).

Example 6: Under the facts of Example 4, one month before the merger, Debtor created a security interest in certain equipment in favor of Financer, who perfected by filing in Pennsylvania. At that time, Financer’s security interest is subordinate to Lender’s. See Section 9‑322(a)(1). Financer reperfects by filing in Delaware within a year after the merger, but Lender fails to do so. Under subsection (b), Lender’s security interest is deemed never to have been perfected against Financer, a purchaser for value. Consequently, under Section 9‑322(a)(2), Financer’s security interest is now senior.

Of course, the expiration of the time period specified in subsection (a) does not of itself prevent the secured party from later reperfecting under the law of the new jurisdiction. If the secured party does so, however, there will be a gap in perfection, and the secured party may lose priority as a result. Thus, in Example 7, if Lender perfects by filing in Delaware more than one year under the merger, it will have a new date of filing and perfection for purposes of Section 9‑322(a)(1). Financer’s security interest, whose perfection dates back to the filing in Pennsylvania under subsection (b), will remain senior.

4. Possessory Security Interests. Subsection (c) deals with continued perfection of possessory security interests. It applies not only to security interests perfected solely by the secured party’s having taken possession of the collateral. It also applies to security interests perfected by a method that includes as an element of perfection the secured party’s having taken possession, such as perfection by taking delivery of a certificated security in registered form, see Section 9‑313(a), and perfection by obtaining control over a certificated security. See Section 9‑314(a).

5. Goods Covered by Certificate of Title. Subsections (d) and (e) address continued perfection of a security interest in goods covered by a certificate of title. The following examples explain the operation of those subsections.

Example 7: Debtor’s automobile is covered by a certificate of title issued by Illinois. Lender perfects a security interest in the automobile by complying with Illinois’ certificate‑of‑title statute. Thereafter, Debtor applies for a certificate of title in Indiana. Six months thereafter, Creditor acquires a judicial lien on the automobile. Under Section 9‑303(b), Illinois law ceases to govern perfection; rather, once Debtor delivers the application and applicable fee to the appropriate Indiana authority, Indiana law governs. Nevertheless, under Indiana’s Section 9‑316(d), Lender’s security interest remains perfected until it would become unperfected under Illinois law had no certificate of title been issued by Indiana. (For example, Illinois’ certificate‑of‑title statute may provide that the surrender of an Illinois certificate of title in connection with the issuance of a certificate of title by another jurisdiction causes a security interest noted thereon to become unperfected.) If Lender’s security interest remains perfected, it is senior to Creditor’s judicial lien.

Example 8: Under the facts in Example 7, five months after Debtor applies for an Indiana certificate of title, Debtor sells the automobile to Buyer. Under subsection (e)(2), because Lender did not reperfect within the four months after the goods became covered by the Indiana certificate of title, Lender’s security interest is deemed never to have been perfected against Buyer. Under Section 9‑317(b), Buyer is likely to take free of the security interest. Lender could have protected itself by perfecting its security interest either under Indiana’s certificate‑of‑title statute, see Section 9‑311, or, if it had a right to do so under an agreement or Section 9‑610, by taking possession of the automobile. See Section 9‑313(b).

The results in Examples 7 and 8 do not depend on the fact that the original perfection was achieved by notation on a certificate of title. Subsection (d) applies regardless of the method by which a security interest is perfected under the law of another jurisdiction when the goods became covered by a certificate of title from this State.

Section 9‑337 affords protection to a limited class of persons buying or acquiring a security interest in the goods while a security interest is perfected under the law of another jurisdiction but after this State has issued a clean certificate of title.

6. Deposit Accounts, Letter‑of‑Credit Rights, and Investment Property. Subsections (f) and (g) address changes in the jurisdiction of a bank, issuer of an uncertificated security, issuer of or nominated person under a letter of credit, securities intermediary, and commodity intermediary. The provisions are analogous to those of subsections (a) and (b).

7. Security Interests that Attach after Debtor Changes Location. In contrast to subsections (a) and (b), which address security interests that are perfected (i.e., that have attached and as to which any required perfection step has been taken) before the debtor changes its location, subsection (h) addresses security interests that attach four months after the debtor changes its location. Under subsection (h), a filed financing statement that would have been effective to perfect a security interest in the collateral if the debtor had not changed its location is effective to perfect a security interest in collateral acquired within four months after the relocation.

Example 9: Debtor, an individual whose principal residence is in Pennsylvania, grants to Lender a security interest in Debtor’s existing and after‑acquired inventory. Lender perfects the security interest by filing a proper financing statement in Pennsylvania on January 2, 2014. On March 31, 2014, Debtor’s principal residence is relocated to New Jersey. Upon the relocation, New Jersey law governs perfection of a security interest in Debtor’s inventory. See Sections 9‑301, 9‑307. Under New Jersey’s Section 9‑316(a), Lender’s security interest in Debtor’s inventory on hand at the time of the relocation remains perfected for four months thereafter. Had Debtor not relocated, the financing statement filed in Pennsylvania would have been effective to perfect Lender’s security interest in inventory acquired by the Debtor after March 31, 2014. Accordingly, under subsection (h), the financing statement is effective to perfect Lender’s security interest in inventory that Debtor acquires within the four months after Debtor’s location changed. In Example 9, Lender’s security interest in the inventory acquired within the four months after Debtor’s relocation will be perfected when it attaches. It will remain perfected if, before the expiration of the four‑month period, the security interest is perfected under the law of New Jersey. Otherwise, the security interest will become unperfected at the end of the four‑month period and will be considered never to have been perfected as against a purchaser for value. See subsection (h)(2).

8. Collateral Acquired by New Debtor. Subsection (i) is similar to subsection (h). Whereas subsection (h) addresses security interests that attach within four months after a debtor changes its location, subsection (i) addresses security interests that attach within four months after a new debtor becomes bound as debtor by a security agreement entered into by another person. Subsection (i) also addresses collateral acquired by the new debtor before it becomes bound.

Example 10: Debtor, a Pennsylvania corporation, grants to Lender a security interest in Debtor’s existing and after‑acquired inventory. Lender perfects the security interest by filing a proper financing statement in Pennsylvania on January 2, 2014. On March 31, 2014, Debtor merges into Survivor, a Delaware corporation. Because Survivor is located in Delaware, Delaware law governs perfection of a security interest in Survivor’s inventory. See Sections 9‑301, 9‑307. Under Delaware’s Section 9‑316(a), Lender’s security interest in the inventory that Survivor acquired from Debtor remains perfected for one year after the transfer. See Comment 2. By virtue of the merger, Survivor becomes bound as debtor by Debtor’s security agreement. See Section 9‑203(d). As a consequence, Lender’s security interest attaches to all of Survivor’s inventory under Section 9‑203, and Lender’s collateral now includes inventory in which Debtor never had an interest. The financing statement filed in Pennsylvania against Debtor is effective under Delaware’s Section 9‑316(i) to perfect Lender’s security interest in inventory that Survivor acquired before, and within the four months after, becoming bound as debtor by Debtor’s security agreement. This is because the financing statement filed in Pennsylvania would have been effective to perfect Lender’s security interest in this collateral had Debtor, rather than Survivor, acquired it. If the financing statement is effective, Lender’s security interest in the collateral that Survivor acquired before, and within four months after, Survivor became bound as debtor will be perfected upon attachment. It will remain perfected if, before the expiration of the four‑month period, the security interest is perfected under Delaware law. Otherwise, the security interest will become unperfected at the end of the four‑month period and will be considered never to have been perfected as against a purchaser for value.

9. Agricultural Liens. This Section does not apply to agricultural liens.

Example 11: Supplier holds an agricultural lien on corn. The lien arises under an Iowa statute. Supplier perfects by filing a financing statement in Iowa, where the corn is located. See Section 9‑302. Debtor stores the corn in Missouri. Assume the Iowa agricultural lien survives or an agricultural lien arises under Missouri law (matters that this Article does not govern). Once the corn is located in Missouri, Missouri becomes the jurisdiction whose law governs perfection. See Section 9‑302. Thus, the agricultural lien will not be perfected unless Supplier files a financing statement in Missouri.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Subpart 1 of Part 3, Section 36‑9‑301 to 36‑9‑307, provides the choice of law rules for the perfection of security interests. Under Section 36‑9‑301(1) the law of the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located typically controls the perfection of security interests by filing. Under Section 36‑9‑301(2) the law of the jurisdiction in which the collateral is located controls the perfection of possessory security interests. Section 36‑9‑316 determines whether a security interest properly perfected in one jurisdiction continues perfected when there has been a change in the location of the debtor or of the collateral. When there has been a change in the debtor’s location, subsections 36‑9‑316(a)(1) and (2) provide that filing in the initial location is effective to perfect the security interest until the earlier of the time it lapsed in the new jurisdiction or four months. Under Subsection 36‑9‑316(a)(3) if the collateral is transferred to a “new debtor” located in another jurisdiction, a filing in the debtor’s jurisdiction remains effective for one year. Subsection 36‑9‑312(6) provides for the continuous perfection of possessory security interests when the collateral is relocated to another jurisdiction.

The 2013 amendments add two subsections to Section 33‑9‑316. Section 36‑9‑316(h) addresses the effect of a filed financing statement upon collateral acquired by a debtor within four months after the debtor changes its location to another jurisdiction. Section 36‑9‑316(i) addresses the effect of a financing statement filed in one jurisdiction against an original debtor upon collateral acquired by a new debtor located in a different jurisdiction. See Sections 36‑9‑203(d) and (2), 36‑9‑508, and 36‑9‑326.

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|  | Definitional Cross: |  |
| “As‑extracted collateral” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(6) |
| “Bank’s jurisdiction” | | Section 36‑9‑304(b) |
| “Certificate of title” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(10) |
| “Collateral” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Commodity intermediary’s jurisdiction” | | Section 36‑9‑305(b) |
| “Debtor” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “Debtor’s location” | | Section 36‑9‑307 |
| “Deposit account” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(29) |
| “Goods” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(44) |
| “Investment property” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(49) |
| “Issuer’s jurisdiction” | | See Section 36‑9‑306(b), |
|  | [Section 36‑5‑116 1995 Revision] |  |
| “Letter‑of‑credit rights” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(51) |
| “New debtor” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(56) |
| “Nominated person’s jurisdiction” | | See Section 36‑9‑306(b), |
|  | [Section 36‑5‑116 1995 Revision] |  |
| “Purchaser” | | Section 36‑1‑201(33) |
| “Securities intermediary’s jurisdiction” | | Section 36‑8‑110(e) |
| “Security interest” | | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |
| “Value” | | Section 36‑1‑201(44) [see now Section 36‑1‑204] |
|  | Cross— |  |

1. Choice of law rules for perfection of security interests by filing. Sections 36‑9‑301(1), (3), and (4).

2. Choice of rules for perfection of security interests by possession. Section 36‑9‑301(2).

3. Choice of law rules for perfection of security interests on goods covered by a certificate of title. Section 36‑9‑303.

4. Choice of law rules for perfection of security interests in deposit accounts. Section 36‑9‑304.

5. Choice of law rules for perfection of security interests in investment property. Section 36‑9‑305.

6. Choice of law rules for perfection of security interests in letter‑of‑ credit rights. Section 36‑9‑306.

7. Location of the debtor. Section 36‑9‑307.

8. When a person becomes bound as a “new debtor” Section 36‑9‑203(d).

9. The effect of being bound as a “new debtor” Section 36‑9‑203(e).

10. The effectiveness of a financing statement naming the original debtor to perfect a security interest in collateral acquired by the “new debtor” Section 36‑9‑508.

11. Priority of security interest in collateral of a “new debtor” perfected by a filing effective solely under Section 36‑9‑508. Section 36‑9‑326.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 98, 135, 136, 141.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak98; 349Ak135; 349Ak136; 349Ak141.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 1

1. In general

As explained in Section 36‑9‑103, Official Comment 1, where a security interest is perfected in one jurisdiction and then removed to another jurisdiction, term “last event” within Section 36‑9‑103 refers to maintenance of perfection in the latter jurisdiction or failure to do so; thus, by plain language of this section, in action brought by creditor with security interest in debtor’s inventory against seller of equipment to debtor, alleging conversion of equipment that debtor had returned to seller, California law governed issue of whether creditor failed to perfect its security interest in equipment after it was removed from South Carolina to California. Reedy River Ventures Ltd. Partnership v. SynOptics Communications, Inc., 1993, 818 F.Supp. 145, affirmed 38 F.3d 1213.

Subpart 3

Priority

**SECTION 36‑9‑317.** Interests that take priority over or take free of security interest or agricultural lien.

(a) A security interest or agricultural lien is subordinate to the rights of:

(1) a person entitled to priority under Section 36‑9‑322; and

(2) except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), a person that becomes a lien creditor before the earlier of the time:

(A) the security interest or agricultural lien is perfected; or

(B) one of the conditions specified in Section 36‑9‑203(b)(3) is met and a financing statement covering the collateral is filed.

(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), a buyer, other than a secured party, of tangible chattel paper, tangible documents, goods, instruments, or a certificated security takes free of a security interest or agricultural lien if the buyer gives value and receives delivery of the collateral without knowledge of the security interest or agricultural lien and before it is perfected.

(c) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), a lessee of goods takes free of a security interest or agricultural lien if the lessee gives value and receives delivery of the collateral without knowledge of the security interest or agricultural lien and before it is perfected.

(d) A licensee of a general intangible or a buyer, other than a secured party, of accounts, electronic chattel paper, electronic documents, general intangibles, or investment property other than a certificated security takes free of a security interest if the licensee or buyer gives value without knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected.

(e) Except as otherwise provided in Sections 36‑9‑320 and 36‑9‑321, if a person files a financing statement with respect to a purchase‑money security interest before or within twenty days after the debtor receives delivery of the collateral, the security interest takes priority over the rights of a buyer, lessee, or lien creditor which arise between the time the security interest attaches and the time of filing.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑317; 1966 (54) 2716; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No; 67, Section 12; 2013 Act No. 96, Section 7, eff July 1, 2013; 2014 Act No. 213 (S.343), Section 43, eff October 1, 2014.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Sections 9‑301, 2A‑307(2).

2. Scope of This Section. As did former Section 9‑301, this Section lists the classes of persons who take priority over, or take free of, an unperfected security interest. Section 9‑308 explains when a security interest or agricultural lien is “perfected.” A security interest that has attached (see Section 9‑203) but as to which a required perfection step has not been taken is “unperfected.” Certain provisions have been moved from former Section 9‑301. The definition of “lien creditor” now appears in Section 9‑102, and the rules governing priority in future advances are found in Section 9‑323.

3. Competing Security Interests. Section 9‑322 states general rules for determining priority among conflicting security interests and refers to other Sections that state special rules of priority in a variety of situations. The security interests given priority under Section 9‑322 and the other Sections to which it refers take priority in general even over a perfected security interest. A fortiori they take priority over an unperfected security interest.

4. Filed but Unattached Security Interest vs. Lien Creditor. Under former Section 9‑301(1)(b), a lien creditor’s rights had priority over an unperfected security interest. Perfection required attachment (former Section 9‑303) and attachment required the giving of value (former Section 9‑203). It followed that, if a secured party had filed a financing statement but had not yet given value, an intervening lien creditor whose lien arose after filing but before attachment of the security interest acquired rights that are senior to those of the secured party who later gives value. This result comported with the nemo dat concept: When the security interest attached, the collateral was already subject to the judicial lien.

On the other hand, this result treated the first secured advance differently from all other advances. The special rule for future advances in former Section 9‑301(4) (substantially reproduced in Section 9‑323(b)) afforded priority to a discretionary advance made by a secured party within 45 days after the lien creditor’s rights arose as long as the secured party was “perfected” when the lien creditor’s lien arose‑i.e., as long as the advance was not the first one and an earlier advance had been made.

Subsection (a)(2) revises former Section 9‑301(1)(b) and treats the first advance the same as subsequent advances. That is, a judicial lien that arises after a financing statement is filed and before the security interest attaches and becomes perfected is subordinate to all advances secured by the security interest, even the first advance, except as otherwise provided in Section 9‑323(b). However, if the security interest becomes unperfected (e.g., because the effectiveness of the filed financing statement lapses) before the judicial lien arises, the security interest is subordinate. If a financing statement is filed but a security interest does not attach, then no priority contest arises. The lien creditor has the only claim to the property.

5. Security Interest of Consignor or Receivables Buyer vs. Lien Creditor. Section 1‑201 defines “security interest” to include the interest of most true consignors of goods and the interest of most buyers of certain receivables (accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes). A consignee of goods or a seller of accounts or chattel paper each is deemed to have rights in the collateral which a lien creditor may reach, as long as the competing security interest of the consignor or buyer is unperfected. This is so even though, as between the consignor and the debtor‑consignee, the latter has only limited rights, and, as between the buyer and debtor‑seller, the latter does not have any rights in the collateral. See Sections 9‑318 (seller), 9‑319 (consignee). Security interests arising from sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes are automatically perfected. See Section 9‑309. Accordingly, a subsequent judicial lien always would be subordinate to the rights of a buyer of those types of receivables.

6. Purchasers Other Than Secured Parties. Subsections (b), (c), and (d) afford priority over an unperfected security interest to certain purchasers (other than secured parties) of collateral. They derive from former Sections 9‑301(1)(c), 2A‑307(2), and 9‑301(d). Former Section 9‑301(1)(c) and (1)(d) provided that unperfected security interests are “subordinate” to the rights of certain purchasers. But, as former Comment 9 suggested, the practical effect of subordination in this context is that the purchaser takes free of the security interest. To avoid any possible misinterpretation, subsections (b) and (d) of this Section use the phrase “takes free.”

Subsection (b) governs goods, as well as intangibles of the type whose transfer is effected by physical delivery of the representative piece of paper (tangible chattel paper, tangible documents, instruments, and security certificates). To obtain priority, a buyer must both give value and receive delivery of the collateral without knowledge of the existing security interest and before perfection. Even if the buyer gave value without knowledge and before perfection, the buyer would take subject to the security interest if perfection occurred before physical delivery of the collateral to the buyer. Subsection (c) contains a similar rule with respect to lessees of goods. Note that a lessee of goods in ordinary course of business takes free of all security interests created by the lessor, even if perfected. See Section 9‑321.

Normally, there will be no question when a buyer of tangible chattel paper, tangible documents, instruments, or security certificates “receives delivery” of the property. See Section 1‑201 (defining “ delivery”). However, sometimes a buyer or lessee of goods, such as complex machinery, takes delivery of the goods in stages and completes assembly at its own location. Under those circumstances, the buyer or lessee “receives delivery” within the meaning of subsections (b) and (c) when, after an inspection of the portion of the goods remaining with the seller or lessor, it would be apparent to a potential lender to the seller or lessor that another person might have an interest in the goods.

The rule of subsection (b) obviously is not appropriate where the collateral consists of intangibles and there is no representative piece of paper whose physical delivery is the only or the customary method of transfer. Therefore, with respect to such intangibles (including accounts, electronic chattel paper, electronic documents, general intangibles, and investment property other than certificated securities), subsection (d) gives priority to any buyer who gives value without knowledge, and before perfection, of the security interest. A licensee of a general intangible takes free of an unperfected security interest in the general intangible under the same circumstances. Note that a licensee of a general intangible in ordinary course of business takes rights under a nonexclusive license free of security interests created by the licensor, even if perfected. See Section 9‑321.

Unless Section 9‑109 excludes the transaction from this Article, a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes is a “secured party” (defined in Section 9‑102), and subsections (b) and (d) do not determine priority of the security interest created by the sale. Rather, the priority rules generally applicable to competing security interests apply. See Section 9‑322.

7. Agricultural Liens. Subsections (a), (b), and (c) subordinate unperfected agricultural liens in the same manner in which they subordinate unperfected security interests.

8. Purchase‑Money Security Interests. Subsection (e) derives from former Section 9‑301(2). It provides that, if a purchase‑money security interest is perfected by filing no later than 20 days after the debtor receives delivery of the collateral, the security interest takes priority over the rights of buyers, lessees, or lien creditors which arise between the time the security interest attaches and the time of filing. Subsection (e) differs from former Section 9‑301(2) in two significant respects. First, subsection (e) protects a purchase‑money security interest against all buyers and lessees, not just against transferees in bulk. Second, subsection (e) conditions this protection on filing within 20, as opposed to ten, days after delivery.

Section 9‑311(b) provides that compliance with the perfection requirements of a statute or treaty described in Section 9‑311(a) “is equivalent to the filing of a financing statement.” It follows that a person who perfects a security interest in goods covered by a certificate of title by complying with the perfection requirements of an applicable certificate‑of‑title statute “files a financing statement” within the meaning of subsection(e).

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑317 provides the priority rules applicable to unperfected security interests. South Carolina has adopted an inconsistent amendment to the Official Text of Section 9‑317.

Section 9‑317(a)(2) of the 1999 Official Text provides that an unperfected security interest is subordinate to the rights of a person who becomes a lien creditor before the earlier of (1) the time a security interest is perfected or (2) a financing statement is filed covering the collateral and the parties have satisfied the evidentiary requirement for attachment of a security interest under Section 9‑203(b)(3)(D). South Carolina has revised Section 9‑317(a)(2) to provide that an unperfected security interest is subordinate to both the holder of an unperfected security interest and a landlord who obtains a lien for distraint before the earlier of the time the secured party perfects or files a financing statement covering the collateral. See also Section 36‑9‑109(d)(1) (priority conflict between a landlord’s lien and a security interest is governed by Section 36‑9‑317). A landlord does not acquire a lien for distraint until there is actual levy of a distress warrant. Burnett v. Bourkedes, 240 S.C. 144, 125 S.C. 2d 10, 15 (1962). Therefore under Section 36‑9‑317(a)(2) a secured party will be entitled to priority over a landlord seeking to collect rent through distraint if the secured party files a financing statement covering the collateral or perfects its security interest before the actual levy of the distress warrant. The revision in Section 36‑9‑317(a)(2) was adopted to reaffirm the holding in In Re J.M. Smith Corp., 341 S.C. 442, 535 S.E. 2d 131 (2000).

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|  | Definitional Cross: |  |
| “Account” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(2) |
| “Agricultural lien” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(5) |
| “Certificated security” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(4) |
| “Collateral” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Delivery” | | Section 36‑1‑201(14) |
| “Document” | | Sections 36‑9‑102(a)(30) |
|  | 36‑7‑102(1)(e), 36‑1‑201(15) |  |
| “Electronic chattel paper” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(31) |
| “Financing statement” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(39) |
| “General intangible” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(42) |
| “Goods” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(44) |
| “Instrument” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(47) |
| “Investment property” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(49) |
| “Knowledge” | | Section 36‑1‑201(25) [see now Section 36‑1‑202] |
| “Lessee” | | Section 36‑2A‑103(1)(n) |
| “Licensee” | | See Section 36‑9‑321(a) |
| “Lien creditor” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(52) |
| “Purchase‑money security interest” | | Section 36‑9‑103 |
| “Security interest” | | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |
| “Tangible chattel paper” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(79) |
|  | Cross— |  |

1. A perfected security interest or agricultural lien has priority over an unperfected security interest or agricultural lien. Section 36‑9‑322(a)(2).

2. When a security interest is perfected. Section 36‑9‑308(a).

3. When a agricultural lien is perfected. Section 36‑9‑308(b).

4. Priority of perfected security interest over a lien creditor with respect to future advances. Section 36‑9‑323(b).

5. Priority of buyers of goods over perfected security interests. Section 36‑9‑320.

6. Priority of licensees in the ordinary course over perfected security interests. Section 36‑9‑321(b).

7. Priority of lessees in the ordinary course over perfected security interests. Section 36‑9‑321(c).

Editor’s Note

2014 Act No. 213, Section 51, provides as follows:

“SECTION 51. This act becomes effective on October 1, 2014. It applies to transactions entered into and events occurring after that date.”

Effect of Amendment

The 2013 amendment, in subsection (b), substituted “certificated security” for “security certificate”; and in subsection (d), substituted “of collateral other than tangible chattel paper, tangible documents, goods, instruments, or” for “accounts, electronic chattel paper, general intangibles, or investment property other than”.

2014 Act No. 213, Section 43, in subsection (b), inserted “tangible” before “documents”;reenacted subsection (c) with no apparent change; and in subsection (d), substituted “of accounts, electronic chattel paper, electronic documents, general intangibles, or investment property other than” for “of collateral other than tangible chattel paper, tangible documents, goods, instruments, or”.

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NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 1

1. In general

Where (1) five shipments of nylon yarn shipped from the Netherlands were delivered to and accepted by buyer in South Carolina on or before August 23, 1976, (2) buyer, after failing to pay major part of purchase price, filed petition in bankruptcy on August 31, 1976, and seller in adversary proceeding against bankruptcy trustee sought to reclaim goods or recover balance due thereon, (3) contract between seller and buyer provided that notwithstanding delivery of goods, title thereto remained in seller until full payment by buyer, that all disputes arising out of the contract were to be governed by English law, and that buyer accepted jurisdiction of any courts in England or elsewhere that seller might designate, (4) seller claimed (a) that under UCC Section 2‑401(1), such title‑retention clause created security interest in seller’s favor that must be deemed to have been perfected with regard to either the Netherlands or England because law of such countries did not provide for perfecting security interests by notice filing, (b) that as a result, seller had benefit of four‑month‑continuation‑of‑perfection provision set forth in UCC Section 9‑103(3), and (c) that because yarn had arrived at buyer’s plant in South Carolina within four months of August 31, 1976 (date on which buyer’s bankruptcy petition was filed and bankruptcy trustee’s lien arose), seller’s perfected security interest was superior to trustee’s lien, court held (1) that because seller relied on UCC Section 2‑401(1) to validate its security interest, court would conclude that seller had security interest in goods, (2) that under the Uniform Commercial Code, a consensual security interest that arises by virtue of UCC Section 2‑401(1) is subject to perfection and priority provisions of Article 9, as provided by UCC Section 9‑113, as long as the debtor lawfully has possession of goods, (3) that since buyer in present case had possession of goods, seller should have filed financing statement to perfect its security interest and thus render it superior to bankruptcy trustee’s lien, and (4) that since no such financing statement was filed, either before delivery of goods or before August 31, 1976, seller’s security interest had never been perfected and could not prevail over trustee’s lien under UCC Section 9‑301(1)(b), which provides that unperfected security interest is subordinate to rights of person who becomes lien creditor without knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected. In re Duplan Corp., 1978, 455 F.Supp. 926.

Creditor was not entitled to relief from automatic stay to permit it to record its purchase money security interest in Chapter 13 debtors’ motor vehicle, even though debtors filed for bankruptcy protection 32 days after purchasing vehicle, where creditor failed to record interest within ten‑day time period permitted under state law, debtors did not receive windfall, and there was no evidence of bad faith. In re Lewis (Bkrtcy.D.S.C. 2007) 363 B.R. 477. Bankruptcy 2422.5(4.1)

Creditor’s security interest in debtors’ motor vehicle was subordinate to Chapter 13 trustee’s rights, and thus was subject to avoidance, even though effective date of lien on certificate of title indicated that lien pre‑dated bankruptcy filing, where lender failed to record its security interest within ten days of delivery, as required under state statute, or before debtors filed bankruptcy petition. In re Lewis (Bkrtcy.D.S.C. 2007) 363 B.R. 477. Bankruptcy 2704

**SECTION 36‑9‑318.** No interest retained in right to payment that is sold; rights and title of seller of account or chattel paper with respect to creditors and purchasers.

(a) A debtor that has sold an account, chattel paper, payment intangible, or promissory note does not retain a legal or equitable interest in the collateral sold.

(b) For purposes of determining the rights of creditors of, and purchasers for value of an account or chattel paper from, a debtor that has sold an account or chattel paper, while the buyer’s security interest is unperfected, the debtor is deemed to have rights and title to the account or chattel paper identical to those the debtor sold.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑318; 1966 (54) 2716; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No; 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. New.

2. Sellers of Accounts, Chattel Paper, Payment Intangibles, and Promissory Notes. Section 1‑201(37) defines “security interest” to include the interest of a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes. See also Section 9‑109(a) and Comment 5. Subsection (a) makes explicit what was implicit, but perfectly obvious, under former Article 9: The fact that a sale of an account or chattel paper gives rise to a “security interest” does not imply that the seller retains an interest in the property that has been sold. To the contrary, a seller of an account or chattel paper retains no interest whatsoever in the property to the extent that it has been sold. Subsection (a) also applies to sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes, transactions that were not covered by former Article 9. Neither this Article nor the definition of “security interest” in Section 1‑201 provides rules for distinguishing sales transactions from those that create a security interest securing an obligation.

3. Buyers of Accounts and Chattel Paper. Another aspect of sales of accounts and chattel paper also was implicit, and equally obvious, under former Article 9: If the buyer’s security interest is unperfected, then for purposes of determining the rights of certain third parties, the seller (debtor) is deemed to have all rights and title that the seller sold. The seller is deemed to have these rights even though, as between the parties, it has sold all its rights to the buyer. Subsection (b) makes this explicit. As a consequence of subsection (b), if the buyer’s security interest is unperfected, the seller can transfer, and the creditors of the seller can reach, the account or chattel paper as if it had not been sold.

Example: Debtor sells accounts or chattel paper to Buyer‑1 and retains no interest in them. Buyer‑1 does not file a financing statement. Debtor then sells the same receivables to Buyer‑2. Buyer‑2 files a proper financing statement. Having sold the receivables to Buyer‑1, Debtor would not have any rights in the collateral so as to permit Buyer‑2’s security (ownership) interest to attach. Nevertheless, under this Section, for purposes of determining the rights of purchasers for value from Debtor, Debtor is deemed to have the rights that Debtor sold. Accordingly, Buyer‑2’s security interest attaches, is perfected by the filing, and, under Section 9‑322, is senior to Buyer‑1’s interest.

4. Effect of Perfection. If the security interest of a buyer of accounts or chattel paper is perfected the usual result would take effect: transferees from and creditors of the seller could not acquire an interest in the sold accounts or chattel paper. The same result would occur if payment intangibles or promissory notes were sold, inasmuch as the buyer’s security interest is automatically perfected under Section 9‑309.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑318 applies to sales of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles and promissory notes. Under Section 36‑9‑109(3) such transactions are subject to Article 9. Nevertheless, Subsection 36‑9‑318(a) provides that the debtor‑seller retains no legal or equitable interest in such collateral when sold. Subsection 36‑9‑318(b), however, provides thaT if a buyer of accounts or chattel paper fails to perfect its security interest, the debtor‑seller is deemed to have rights and title to the collateral that creditors and purchasers for value can reach.

Definitional Cross References:

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| “Account” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(2) |
| “Chattel paper” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(11) |
| “Debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “Payment intangible” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(61) |
| “Promissory note” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(65) |
| “Purchaser” | Section 36‑1‑201(33) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |
| “Value” | Section 36‑1‑201(44) [see now Section 36‑1‑204] |

Cross References—

1. Article 9 applies to sales of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes. Section 36‑9‑109(a)(3).

2. Certain sales of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes excluded from the scope of Article 9. Section 36‑9‑109(d)(4), (5), (6), and (7).

3. Automatic perfection of certain assignments of accounts and payment intangibles. Section 36‑9‑309(2).

4. Automatic perfection of a sale of a payment intangible. Section 36‑9‑309(2).

5. Automatic perfection of a sale of a promissory note. Section 36‑9‑304(4).

6. Perfection of a security interest in accounts by filing. Section 36‑9‑310(a) and (b)(2).

7. Perfection of a security interest in chattel paper by filing. Section 36‑9‑312(a).

8. Perfection of a security interest in tangible chattel paper by taking possession. Section 36‑9‑313(a).

9. Perfection of a security interest in electronic chattel paper by control. Sections 36‑9‑314(a) and 36‑9‑105.

10. Priority of lien creditors and purchasers for value over the holder of an unperfected security interest in accounts or chattel paper. Section 36‑9‑317(a) and (b).

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**SECTION 36‑9‑319.** Rights and title of consignee with respect to creditors and purchasers.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), for purposes of determining the rights of creditors of, and purchasers for value of goods from, a consignee, while the goods are in the possession of the consignee, the consignee is deemed to have rights and title to the goods identical to those the consignor had or had power to transfer.

(b) For purposes of determining the rights of a creditor of a consignee, law other than this article determines the rights and title of a consignee while goods are in the consignee’s possession if, under this part, a perfected security interest held by the consignor would have priority over the rights of the creditor.

HISTORY: 1978 Act No. 525; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 1990 Act No. 340, Section 1; 1993 Act No. 181, Section 526; 1996 Act No. 459, Section 58; 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. New.

2. Consignments. This Section takes an approach to consignments similar to that taken by Section 9‑318 with respect to buyers of accounts and chattel paper. Revised Section 1‑201(37) defines “security interest” to include the interest of a consignor of goods under many true consignments. Section 9‑319(a) provides that, for purposes of determining the rights of certain third parties, the consignee is deemed to acquire all rights and title that the consignor had, if the consignor’s security interest is unperfected. The consignee acquires these rights even though, as between the parties, it purchases a limited interest in the goods (as would be the case in a true consignment, under which the consignee acquires only the interest of a bailee). As a consequence of this Section, creditors of the consignee can acquire judicial liens and security interests in the goods.

Insofar as creditors of the consignee are concerned, this Article to a considerable extent reformulates the former law, which appeared in former Sections 2‑326 and 9‑114, without changing the results. However, neither Article 2 nor former Article 9 specifically addresses the rights of non‑ ordinary course buyers from the consignee. Former Section 9‑114 contained priority rules applicable to security interests in consigned goods. Under this Article, the priority rules for purchase‑money security interests in inventory apply to consignments. See Section 9‑103(d). Accordingly, a special Section containing priority rules for consignments no longer is needed. Section 9‑317 determines whether the rights of a judicial lien creditor are senior to the interest of the consignor, Sections 9‑322 and 9‑324 govern competing security interests in consigned goods, and Sections 9‑317, 9‑315, and 9‑320 determine whether a buyer takes free of the consignor’s interest.

The following example explains the operation of this Section:

Example 1: SP‑1 delivers goods to Debtor in a transaction constituting a “consignment” as defined in Section 9‑102. SP‑1 does not file a financing statement. Debtor then grants a security interest in the goods to SP‑2. SP‑2 files a proper financing statement. Assuming Debtor is a mere bailee, as in a “true” consignment, Debtor would not have any rights in the collateral (beyond those of a bailee) so as to permit SP‑2’s security interest to attach to any greater rights. Nevertheless, under this Section, for purposes of determining the rights of Debtor’s creditors, Debtor is deemed to acquire SP‑1’s rights. Accordingly, SP‑2’s security interest attaches, is perfected by the filing, and, under Section 9‑322, is senior to SP‑1’s interest.

3. Effect of Perfection. Subsection (b) contains a special rule with respect to consignments that are perfected. If application of this Article would result in the consignor having priority over a competing creditor, then other law determines the rights and title of the consignee.

Example 2: SP‑1 delivers goods to Debtor in a transaction constituting a “consignment” as defined in Section 9‑102. SP‑1 files a proper financing statement. Debtor then grants a security interest in the goods to SP‑2. Under Section 9‑322, SP‑1’s security interest is senior to SP‑2’s. Subsection (b) indicates that, for purposes of determining SP‑2’s rights, other law determines the rights and title of the consignee. If, for example, a consignee obtains only the special property of a bailee, then SP‑2’s security interest would attach only to that special property.

Example 3: SP‑1 obtains a security interest in all Debtor’s existing and after‑acquired inventory. SP‑1 perfects its security interest with a proper filing. Then SP‑2 delivers goods to Debtor in a transaction constituting a “consignment” as defined in Section 9‑102. SP‑2 files a proper financing statement but does not send notification to SP‑1 under Section 9‑324(b). Accordingly, SP‑2’s security interest is junior to SP‑1’s under Section 9‑322(a). Under Section 9‑319(a), Debtor is deemed to have the consignor’s rights and title, so that SP‑1’s security interest attaches to SP‑2’s ownership interest in the goods. Thereafter, Debtor grants a security interest in the goods to SP‑3, and SP‑3 perfects by filing. Because SP‑2’s perfected security interest is senior to SP‑3’s under Section 9‑322(a), Section 9‑319(b) applies: Other law determines Debtor’s rights and title to the goods insofar as SP‑3 is concerned, and SP‑3’s security interest attaches to those rights.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑319 applies to consignments and determines whether a consignee has rights in consigned goods that creditors of and purchasers from the consignee can reach. Under subsection (a) if the consignor fails to perfect in the consigned goods, the consignee is deemed to have all the consignor’s rights and title to the goods. As a result, creditors of and purchasers from the consignee can obtain priority in the goods. If the consignor perfected with respect to the consigned goods, subsection (b) provides that law other than Article 9 determines whether the consignee has rights in the consigned goods that the consignee’s creditors can reach. South Carolina has no case law on this point. The general common law rule, however, is that creditors of the consignee cannot reach consigned goods. See 6 Am. Jr. 2d. Attachment and Garnishment Section 139 (1999).

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Consignee” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(19) |
| “Consignment” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(20) |
| “Consignee” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(21) |
| “Creditor” | Section 36‑1‑201(12) |
| “Purchaser” | Section 36‑1‑201(33) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |
| “Value” | Section 36‑1‑201(44) [see now Section 36‑1‑204] |

Cross References—

1. Article 9 applies to consignments. Section 36‑9‑109(a)(4).

2. The interest of a consignor in goods subject to a consignment is a purchase‑money security interest. Sections 36‑9‑103(d) and 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203].

3. Priority of consignor’s purchase‑money security interest. Section 36‑9‑324(b).

4. Part 6 imposes no duties upon consignor in the event of default. Section 36‑9‑601(g).

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Factors 65.

Secured Transactions 131, 138.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 167k65; 349Ak131; 349Ak138.

**SECTION 36‑9‑320.** Buyer of goods.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), a buyer in ordinary course of business, other than a person buying farm products from a person engaged in farming operations, takes free of a security interest created by the buyer’s seller, even if the security interest is perfected and the buyer knows of its existence.

(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), a buyer of goods from a person who used or bought the goods for use primarily for personal, family, or household purposes takes free of a security interest, even if perfected, if the buyer buys:

(1) without knowledge of the security interest;

(2) for value;

(3) primarily for the buyer’s personal, family, or household purposes; and

(4) before the filing of a financing statement covering the goods.

(c) To the extent that it affects the priority of a security interest over a buyer of goods under subsection (b), the period of effectiveness of a filing made in the jurisdiction in which the seller is located is governed by Section 36‑9‑316(a) and (b).

(d) A buyer in ordinary course of business buying oil, gas, or other minerals at the wellhead or minehead or after extraction takes free of an interest arising out of an encumbrance.

(e) Subsections (a) and (b) do not affect a security interest in goods in the possession of the secured party under Section 36‑9‑313.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑307.

2. Scope of This Section. This Section states when buyers of goods take free of a security interest even though perfected. Of course, a buyer who takes free of a perfected security interest takes free of an unperfected one. Section 9‑317 should be consulted to determine what purchasers, in addition to the buyers covered in this Section, take free of an unperfected security interest. Article 2 states general rules on purchase of goods from a seller with defective or voidable title (Section 2‑403).

3. Buyers in Ordinary Course. Subsection (a) derives from former Section 9‑307(1). The definition of “buyer in ordinary course of business” in Section 1‑201 restricts its application to buyers “ from a person, other than a pawnbroker, in the business of selling goods of that kind.” Thus subsection (a) applies primarily to inventory collateral. The subsection further excludes from its operation buyers of “farm products” (defined in Section 9‑102) from a person engaged in farming operations. The buyer in ordinary course of business is defined as one who buys goods “in good faith, without knowledge that the sale violates the rights of another person and in the ordinary course.” Subsection (a) provides that such a buyer takes free of a security interest, even though perfected, and even though the buyer knows the security interest exists. Reading the definition together with the rule of law results in the buyer’s taking free if the buyer merely knows that a security interest covers the goods but taking subject if the buyer knows, in addition, that the sale violates a term in an agreement with the secured party.

As did former Section 9‑307(1), subsection (a) applies only to security interests created by the seller of the goods to the buyer in ordinary course. However, under certain circumstances a buyer in ordinary course who buys goods that were encumbered with a security interest created by a person other than the seller may take free of the security interest, as Example 2 explains. See also Comment 6, below.

Example 1: Manufacturer, who is in the business of manufacturing appliances, owns manufacturing equipment subject to a perfected security interest in favor of Lender. Manufacturer sells the equipment to Dealer, who is in the business of buying and selling used equipment. Buyer buys the equipment from Dealer. Even if Buyer qualifies as a buyer in the ordinary course of business, Buyer does not take free of Lender’s security interest under subsection (a), because Dealer did not create the security interest; Manufacturer did.

Example 2: Manufacturer, who is in the business of manufacturing appliances, owns manufacturing equipment subject to a perfected security interest in favor of Lender. Manufacturer sells the equipment to Dealer, who is in the business of buying and selling used equipment. Lender learns of the sale but does nothing to assert its security interest. Buyer buys the equipment from Dealer. Inasmuch as Lender’s acquiescence constitutes an “entrusting” of the goods to Dealer within the meaning of Section 2‑403(3) Buyer takes free of Lender’s security interest under Section 2‑403(2) if Buyer qualifies as a buyer in ordinary course of business.

4. Buyers of Farm Products. This Section does not enable a buyer of farm products to take free of a security interest created by the seller, even if the buyer is a buyer in ordinary course of business. However, a buyer of farm products may take free of a security interest under Section 1324 of the Food Security Act of 1985, 7 U.S.C. ‘ 1631.

5. Buyers of Consumer Goods. Subsection (b), which derives from former Section 9‑307(2), deals with buyers of collateral that the debtor‑seller holds as “consumer goods” (defined in Section 9‑102). Under Section 9‑309(1), a purchase‑money interest in consumer goods, except goods that are subject to a statute or treaty described in Section 9‑311(a) (such as automobiles that are subject to a certificate‑of‑title statute), is perfected automatically upon attachment. There is no need to file to perfect. Under subsection (b) a buyer of consumer goods takes free of a security interest, even though perfected, if the buyer buys (1) without knowledge of the security interest, (2) for value, (3) primarily for the buyer’s own personal, family, or household purposes, and (4) before a financing statement is filed.

As to purchase‑money security interests which are perfected without filing under Section 9‑309(1): A secured party may file a financing statement, although filing is not required for perfection. If the secured party does file, all buyers take subject to the security interest. If the secured party does not file, a buyer who meets the qualifications stated in the preceding paragraph takes free of the security interest.

As to security interests for which a perfection step is required: This category includes all non‑purchase‑money security interests, and all security interests, whether or not purchase‑money, in goods subject to a statute or treaty described in Section 9‑311(a), such as automobiles covered by a certificate‑of‑title statute. As long as the required perfection step has not been taken and the security interest remains unperfected, not only the buyers described in subsection (b) but also the purchasers described in Section 9‑317 will take free of the security interest. After a financing statement has been filed or the perfection requirements of the applicable certificate‑of‑title statute have been complied with (compliance is the equivalent of filing a financing statement; see Section 9‑311(b)), all subsequent buyers, under the rule of subsection (b), are subject to the security interest.

The rights of a buyer under subsection (b) turn on whether a financing statement has been filed against consumer goods. Occasionally, a debtor changes his or her location after a filing is made. Subsection (c), which derives from former Section 9‑103(1)(d)(iii), deals with the continued effectiveness of the filing under those circumstances. It adopts the rules of Sections 9‑316(a) and (b). These rules are explained in the Comments to that Section.

6. Authorized Dispositions. The limitations that subsections (a) and (b) impose on the persons who may take free of a security interest apply of course only to unauthorized sales by the debtor. If the secured party authorized the sale in an express agreement or otherwise, the buyer takes free under Section 9‑315(a) without regard to the limitations of this Section. (That Section also states the right of a secured party to the proceeds of a sale, authorized or unauthorized.) Moreover, the buyer also takes free if the secured party waived or otherwise is precluded from asserting its security interest against the buyer. See Section 1‑103.

7. Oil, Gas, and Other Minerals. Under subsection (d), a buyer in ordinary course of business of minerals at the wellhead or minehead or after extraction takes free of a security interest created by the seller. Specifically, it provides that qualified buyers take free not only of Article 9 security interests but also of interests “arising out of an encumbrance.” As defined in Section 9‑102, the term “encumbrance” means “a right, other than an ownership interest, in real property.” Thus, to the extent that a mortgage encumbers minerals not only before but also after extraction, subsection (d) enables a buyer in ordinary course of the minerals to take free of the mortgage. This subsection does not, however, enable these buyers to take free of interests arising out of ownership interests in the real property. This issue is significant only in a minority of states. Several of them have adopted special statutes and nonuniform amendments to Article 9 to provide special protections to mineral owners, whose interests often are highly fractionalized in the case of oil and gas. See Terry I. Cross, Oil and Gas Product Liens—Statutory Security Interests for Producers and Royalty Owners Under the Statutes of Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas and Wyoming, 50 Consumer Fin. L. Q. Rep. 418 (1996). Inasmuch as a complete resolution of the issue would require the addition of complex provisions to this Article, and there are good reasons to believe that a uniform solution would not be feasible, this Article leaves its resolution to other legislation.

8. Possessory Security Interests. Subsection (e) is new. It rejects the holding of Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 350 N.E.2d 590 (N. Y. 1976) and, together with Section 9‑317(b), prevents a buyer of goods collateral from taking free of a security interest if the collateral is in the possession of the secured party. “The secured party” referred in subsection (e) is the holder of the security interest referred to in subsection (a) or (b). Section 9‑313 determines whether a secured party is in possession for purposes of this Section. Under some circumstances, Section 9‑313 provides that a secured party is in possession of collateral even if the collateral is in the physical possession of a third party.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑320 provides that certain buyers of goods take free of perfected security interests. Under subsection (a) a buyer of goods other than farm products in ordinary course of business takes free of a perfected security interest created by the buyer’s seller even if the buyer knows of its existence. Under subsection (b) certain buyers of consumer goods take free of automatically perfected security interests. Subsection (e), however, provides that neither subsection (a) nor subsection (b) allow a buyer to take free of a security interest perfected by possession.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Buyer” | See Sections 36‑2‑103(1)(a), 36‑1‑201(9) |
| “Buyer in ordinary course of business” | Section 36‑9‑201(9) |
| “Consumer goods” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(23) |
| “Farm products” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(34) |
| “Farming operations” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(35) |
| “Goods” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(44) |
| “Knowledge” | Section 36‑1‑201(25) [see now Section 36‑1‑202] |
| “Knows” | Section 36‑1‑201(25) [see now Section 36‑1‑202] |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |
| “Seller” | See Section 36‑2‑103(1)(d) |
| “Value” | Section 36‑1‑201(44) [see now Section 36‑1‑204] |

Cross References—

1. A security interest does not continue in collateral if the secured party authorized the disposition of the collateral free of the security interest. Section 36‑9‑315(a)(1).

2. Buyers who take free of unperfected security interests. Section 36‑9‑317(b).

3. A buyer of goods in ordinary course of business takes free of a security interest not created by the buyer’s seller if the secured party entrusts the goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind. Sections 36‑2‑403(2) and (3) and 36‑9‑320, Official Comment 3, Example 2.

4. The effectiveness of a financing statement filed covering consumer goods a seller to protect the secured party under Section 36‑9‑320(b) following a sale to a consumer residing in another jurisdiction. Section 36‑9‑316(a)(3) and (b).

5. Perfection of security interests in goods by possession. Section 36‑9‑313.

CROSS REFERENCES

Document of title to goods defeated in certain cases, see Section 36‑7‑503.

Lien of warehouse, see Section 36‑7‑209.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 141.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak141.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 1

1. In general

Cited in Stephenson Finance Co. of Augusta, Inc. v. Bruce (S.C. 1970) 254 S.C. 249, 174 S.E.2d 750.

**SECTION 36‑9‑321.** Licensee of general intangible and lessee of goods in ordinary course of business.

(a) In this section, “licensee in ordinary course of business” means a person that becomes a licensee of a general intangible in good faith, without knowledge that the license violates the rights of another person in the general intangible, and in the ordinary course from a person in the business of licensing general intangibles of that kind. A person becomes a licensee in the ordinary course if the license to the person comports with the usual or customary practices in the kind of business in which the licensor is engaged or with the licensor’s own usual or customary practices.

(b) A licensee in ordinary course of business takes its rights under a nonexclusive license free of a security interest in the general intangible created by the licensor, even if the security interest is perfected and the licensee knows of its existence.

(c) A lessee in ordinary course of business takes its leasehold interest free of a security interest in the goods created by the lessor, even if the security interest is perfected and the lessee knows of its existence.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Derived from Sections 2A‑103(1)(o), 2A‑307(3).

2. Licensee in Ordinary Course. Like the analogous rules in Section 9‑320(a) with respect to buyers in ordinary course and subsection (c) with respect to lessees in ordinary course, the new rule in subsection (b) reflects the expectations of the parties and the marketplace: a licensee under a nonexclusive license takes subject to a security interest unless the secured party authorizes the license free of the security interest or other, controlling law such as that of this Section (protecting ordinary‑course licensees) dictates a contrary result. See Sections 9‑201, 9‑315. The definition of “licensee in ordinary course of business” in subsection (a) is modeled upon that of “buyer in ordinary course of business.”

3. Lessee in Ordinary Course. Subsection (c) contains the rule formerly found in Section 2A‑307(3). The rule works in the same way as that of Section 9‑320(a).

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑321 affords to licensees in ordinary course of business of general intangibles and to lessees in the ordinary course of business protection against perfected security interests analogous to the protection Section 36‑9‑320(a) provides to buyers in ordinary course of business.

Definitional Cross References:

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| “General intangible” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(42) |
| “Good faith” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(43) |
| “Knowledge” | Section 36‑1‑201(25) [see now Section 36‑1‑202] |
| “Lessee in ordinary course of business” | Section |
| “Lessee in ordinary course of business” | Section 36‑2A‑103(1)(n) |

Cross References—

1. A security interest continues in collateral not withstanding a lease or license unless the secured party authorized the disposition free of the security interest. Section 36‑9‑315(a)(1).

2. Lessees that take free of unperfected security interests. Section 36‑9‑317(c).

3. Licensees of general intangibles that take free of unperfected security interests. Section 36‑9‑317(d).

CROSS REFERENCES

Document of title to goods defeated in certain cases, see Section 36‑7‑503.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 138.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak138.

**SECTION 36‑9‑322.** Priorities among conflicting security interests in and agricultural liens on same collateral.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, priority among conflicting security interests and agricultural liens in the same collateral is determined according to the following rules:

(1) Conflicting perfected security interests and agricultural liens rank according to priority in time of filing or perfection. Priority dates from the earlier of the time a filing covering the collateral is first made or the security interest or agricultural lien is first perfected, if there is no period thereafter when there is neither filing nor perfection.

(2) A perfected security interest or agricultural lien has priority over a conflicting unperfected security interest or agricultural lien.

(3) The first security interest or agricultural lien to attach or become effective has priority if conflicting security interests and agricultural liens are unperfected.

(b) For the purposes of subsection (a)(1):

(1) the time of filing or perfection as to a security interest in collateral is also the time of filing or perfection as to a security interest in proceeds; and

(2) the time of filing or perfection as to a security interest in collateral supported by a supporting obligation is also the time of filing or perfection as to a security interest in the supporting obligation.

(c) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (f), a security interest in collateral which qualifies for priority over a conflicting security interest under Section 36‑9‑327, 36‑9‑328, 36‑9‑329 , 36‑9‑330, or 36‑9‑331 also has priority over a conflicting security interest in:

(1) any supporting obligation for the collateral; and

(2) proceeds of the collateral if:

(A) the security interest in proceeds is perfected;

(B) the proceeds are cash proceeds or of the same type as the collateral; and

(C) in the case of proceeds that are proceeds of proceeds, all intervening proceeds are cash proceeds, proceeds of the same type as the collateral, or an account relating to the collateral.

(d) Subject to subsection (e) and except as otherwise provided in subsection (f), if a security interest in chattel paper, deposit accounts, negotiable documents, instruments, investment property, or letter‑of‑credit rights is perfected by a method other than filing, conflicting perfected security interests in proceeds of the collateral rank according to priority in time of filing.

(e) Subsection (d) applies only if the proceeds of the collateral are not cash proceeds, chattel paper, negotiable documents, instruments, investment property, or letter‑of‑credit rights.

(f) Subsections (a) through (e) are subject to:

(1) subsection (g) and the other provisions of this part;

(2) Section 36‑4‑208 with respect to a security interest of a collecting bank;

(3) Section 36‑5‑118 with respect to a security interest of an issuer or nominated person; and

(4) Section 36‑9‑110 with respect to a security interest arising under Chapter 2 or 2A.

(g) A perfected agricultural lien on collateral has priority over a conflicting security interest in or agricultural lien on the same collateral if the statute creating the agricultural lien so provides.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑312(5), (6).

2. Scope of This Section. In a variety of situations, two or more people may claim a security interest in the same collateral. This Section states general rules of priority among conflicting security interests. As subsection (f) provides, the general rules in subsections (a) through (e) are subject to the rule in subsection (g) governing perfected agricultural liens and to the other rules in this Part of this Article. Rules that override this Section include those applicable to purchase‑money security interests (Section 9‑324) and those qualifying for special priority in particular types of collateral. See, e.g., Section 9‑327 (deposit accounts); Section 9‑328 (investment property); Section 9‑329 (letter‑of‑credit rights); Section 9‑330 (chattel paper and instruments); Section 9‑334 ( fixtures). In addition, the general rules of Sections (a) through (e) are subject to priority rules governing security interests arising under Articles 2, 2A, 4, and 5.

3. General Rules. Subsection (a) contains three general rules. Subsection (a)(1) governs the priority of competing perfected security interests. Subsection (a)(2) governs the priority of competing security interests if one is perfected and the other is not. Subsection (a)(3) governs the priority of competing unperfected security interests. The rules may be regarded as adaptations of the idea, deeply rooted at common law, of a race of diligence among creditors. The first two rules are based on precedence in the time as of which the competing secured parties either filed their financing statements or obtained perfected security interests. Under subsection (a)(1), the first secured party who files or perfects has priority. Under subsection (a)(2), which is new, a perfected security interest has priority over an unperfected one. Under subsection (a)(3), if both security interests are unperfected, the first to attach has priority. Note that Section 9‑708(b) may affect the application of subsection (a) to a filing that occurred before the effective date of this Article and which would be ineffective to perfect a security interest under former Article 9 but effective under this Article.

4. Competing Perfected Security Interests. When there is more than one perfected security interest, the security interests rank according to priority in time of filing or perfection. “Filing,” of course, refers to the filing of an effective financing statement. “Perfection” refers to the acquisition of a perfected security interest, i.e., one that has attached and as to which any required perfection step has been taken. See Section 9‑308.

Example 1: On February 1, A files a financing statement covering a certain item of Debtor’s equipment. On March 1, B files a financing statement covering the same equipment. On April 1, B makes a loan to Debtor and obtains a security interest in the equipment. On May 1, A makes a loan to Debtor and obtains a security interest in the same collateral. A has priority even though B’s loan was made earlier and was perfected when made. It makes no difference whether A knew of B’s security interest when A made its advance.

The problem stated in Example 1 is peculiar to a notice‑filing system under which filing may occur before the security interest attaches (see Section 9‑502). The justification for determining priority by order of filing lies in the necessity of protecting the filing system‑that is, of allowing the first secured party who has filed to make subsequent advances without each time having to check for subsequent filings as a condition of protection. Note, however, that this first‑to‑file protection is not absolute. For example, Section 9‑324 affords priority to certain purchase‑ money security interests, even if a competing secured party was the first to file or perfect.

Example 2: A and B make non‑purchase‑money advances secured by the same collateral. The collateral is in Debtor’s possession, and neither security interest is perfected when the second advance is made. Whichever secured party first perfects its security interest (by taking possession of the collateral or by filing) takes priority. It makes no difference whether that secured party knows of the other security interest at the time it perfects its own.

The rule of subsection (a)(1), affording priority to the first to file or perfect, applies to security interests that are perfected by any method, including temporarily (Section 9‑312) or upon attachment (Section 9‑309), even though there may be no notice to creditors or subsequent purchasers and notwithstanding any common‑law rule to the contrary. The form of the claim to priority, i.e., filing or perfection, may shift from time to time, and the rank will be based on the first filing or perfection as long as there is no intervening period without filing or perfection. See Section 9‑308(c).

Example 3: On October 1, A acquires a temporarily perfected (20‑day) security interest, unfiled, in a negotiable document in the debtor’s possession under Section 9‑312(e). On October 5, B files and thereby perfects a security interest that previously had attached to the same document. On October 10, A files. A has priority, even after the 20‑day period expires, regardless of whether A knows of B’s security interest when A files. A was the first to perfect and maintained continuous perfection or filing since the start of the 20‑day period. However, the perfection of A’s security interest extends only “to the extent it arises for new value given.” To the extent A’s security interest secures advances made by A beyond the 20‑day period, its security interest would be subordinate to B’s, inasmuch as B was the first to file.

In general, the rule in subsection (a)(1) does not distinguish among various advances made by a secured party. The priority of every advance dates from the earlier of filing or perfection. However, in rare instances, the priority of an advance dates from the time the advance is made. See Example 3 and Section 9‑323.

5. Priority in After‑Acquired Property. The application of the priority rules to after‑acquired property must be considered separately for each item of collateral. Priority does not depend only on time of perfection but may also be based on priority in filing before perfection.

Example 4: On February 1, A makes advances to Debtor under a security agreement covering “all Debtor’s machinery, both existing and after‑acquired.” A promptly files a financing statement. On April 1, B takes a security interest in all Debtor’s machinery, existing and after‑acquired, to secure an outstanding loan. The following day, B files a financing statement. On May 1, Debtor acquires a new machine. When Debtor acquires rights in the new machine, both A and B acquire security interests in the machine simultaneously. Both security interests are perfected simultaneously. However, A has priority because A filed before B.

When after‑acquired collateral is encumbered by more than one security interest, one of the security interests often is a purchase‑money security interest that is entitled to special priority under Section 9‑324.

6. Priority in Proceeds: General Rule. Subsection (b)(1) follows former Section 9‑312(6). It provides that the baseline rules of subsection (a) apply generally to priority conflicts in proceeds except where otherwise provided (e.g., as in subsections (c) through (e)). Under Section 9‑203, attachment cannot occur (and therefore, under Section 9‑308, perfection cannot occur) as to particular collateral until the collateral itself comes into existence and the debtor has rights in it. Thus, a security interest in proceeds of original collateral does not attach and is not perfected until the proceeds come into existence and the debtor acquires rights in them.

Example 5: On April 1, Debtor authenticates a security agreement granting to A a security interest in all Debtor’s existing and after‑acquired inventory. The same day, A files a financing statement covering inventory. On May 1, Debtor authenticates a security agreement granting B a security interest in all Debtor’s existing and future accounts. On June 1, Debtor sells inventory to a customer on 30‑day unsecured credit. When Debtor acquires the account, B’s security interest attaches to it and is perfected by B’s financing statement. At the very same time, A’s security interest attaches to the account as proceeds of the inventory and is automatically perfected. See Section 9‑315. Under subsection (b) of this Section, for purposes of determining A’s priority in the account, the time of filing as to the original collateral (April 1, as to inventory) is also the time of filing as to proceeds (account). Accordingly, A’s security interest in the account has priority over B’s. Of course, had B filed its financing statement before A filed (e.g., on March 1), then B would have priority in the accounts.

Section 9‑324 governs the extent to which a special purchase‑money priority in goods or software carries over into the proceeds of the original collateral.

7. Priority in Proceeds: Special Rules. Subsections (c), (d), and (e), which are new, provide additional priority rules for proceeds of collateral in situations where the temporal (first‑in‑time) rules of subsection (a)(1) are not appropriate. These new provisions distinguish what these Comments refer to as “non‑filing collateral” from what they call “ filing collateral.” As used in these Comments, non‑filing collateral is collateral of a type for which perfection may be achieved by a method other than filing (possession or control, mainly) and for which secured parties who so perfect generally do not expect or need to conduct a filing search. More specifically, non‑filing collateral is chattel paper, deposit accounts, negotiable documents, instruments, investment property, and letter‑of‑credit rights. Other collateral‑accounts, commercial tort claims, general intangibles, goods, nonnegotiable documents, and payment intangibles‑is filing collateral.

8. Proceeds of Non‑Filing Collateral: Non‑Temporal Priority. Subsection (c)(2) provides a baseline priority rule for proceeds of non‑filing collateral which applies if the secured party has taken the steps required for non‑temporal priority over a conflicting security interest in non‑filing collateral (e.g., control, in the case of deposit accounts, letter‑of‑credit rights, and investment property). This rule determines priority in proceeds of non‑filing collateral whether or not there exists an actual conflicting security interest in the original non‑filing collateral. Under subsection (c)( 2), the priority in the original collateral continues in proceeds if the security interest in proceeds is perfected and the proceeds are cash proceeds or non‑filing proceeds “of the same type” as the original collateral. As used in subsection (c)(2), “type” means a type of collateral defined in the Uniform Commercial Code and should be read broadly. For example, a security is “of the same type” as a security entitlement (i.e., investment property), and a promissory note is “of the same type” as a draft (i.e., an instrument).

Example 6: SP‑1 perfects its security interest in investment property by filing. SP‑2 perfects subsequently by taking control of a certificated security. Debtor receives cash proceeds of the security (e.g., dividends deposited into Debtor’s deposit account). If the first‑to‑file‑or‑perfect rule of subsection (a)(1) were applied, SP‑1’s security interest in the cash proceeds would be senior, although SP‑2’s security interest continues perfected under Section 9‑315 beyond the 20‑day period of automatic perfection. This was the result under former Article 9. Under subsection (c), however, SP‑2’s security interest is senior.

Note that a different result would obtain in Example 1 (i.e., SP‑1’s security interest would be senior) if SP‑1 were to obtain control of the deposit‑account proceeds. This is so because subsection (c) is subject to subsection (f), which in turn provides that the priority rules under subsections (a) through (e) are subject to “the other provisions of this part.” One of those “other provisions” is Section 9‑327, which affords priority to a security interest perfected by control. See Section 9‑327(1).

Example 7: SP‑1 perfects its security interest in investment property by filing. SP‑2 perfects subsequently by taking control of a certificated security. Debtor receives proceeds of the security consisting of a new certificated security issued as a stock dividend on the original collateral. Although the new security is of the same type as the original collateral (i.e., investment property), once the 20‑day period of automatic perfection expires (see Section 9‑315(d)), SP‑2’s security interest is unperfected. ( SP‑2 has not filed or taken delivery or control, and no temporary‑perfection rule applies.) Consequently, once the 20‑day period expires, subsection (c) does not confer priority, and, under subsection (a)(2), SP‑1’s security interest in the security is senior. This was the result under former Article 9.

Example 8: SP‑1 perfects its security interest in investment property by filing. SP‑2 perfects subsequently by taking control of a certificated security and also by filing against investment property. Debtor receives proceeds of the security consisting of a new certificated security issued as a stock dividend of the collateral. Because the new security is of the same type as the original collateral (i.e., investment property) and (unlike Example 7) SP‑2’s security interest is perfected by filing, SP‑2’s security interest is senior under subsection (c). If the new security were redeemed by the issuer upon surrender and yet another security were received by Debtor, SP‑2’s security interest would continue to enjoy priority under subsection (c). The new security would be proceeds of proceeds.

Example 9: SP‑1 perfects its security interest in instruments by filing. SP‑2 subsequently perfects its security interest in investment property by taking control of a certificated security and also by filing against investment property. Debtor receives proceeds of the security consisting of a dividend check that it deposits to a deposit account. Because the check and the deposit account are cash proceeds, SP‑1’s and SP‑2’s security interests in the cash proceeds are perfected under Section 9‑315 beyond the 20‑day period of automatic perfection. However, SP‑2’s security interest is senior under subsection (c).

Example 10: SP‑1 perfects its security interest in investment property by filing. SP‑2 perfects subsequently by taking control of a certificated security and also by filing against investment property. Debtor receives an instrument as proceeds of the security. (Assume that the instrument is not cash proceeds.) Because the instrument is not of the same type as the original collateral (i.e., investment property), SP‑2’s security interest, although perfected by filing, does not achieve priority under subsection (c). Under the first‑to‑file‑or‑perfect rule of subsection (a)(1), SP‑1’s security interest in the proceeds is senior.

The proceeds of proceeds are themselves proceeds. See Section 9‑102 (defining “proceeds” and “collateral”). Sometimes competing security interests arise in proceeds that are several generations removed from the original collateral. As the following example explains, the applicability of subsection (c) may turn on the nature of the intervening proceeds.

Example 11: SP‑1 perfects its security interest in Debtor’s deposit account by obtaining control. Thereafter, SP‑2 files against inventory, (presumably) searches, finds no indication of a conflicting security interest, and advances against Debtor’s existing and after‑acquired inventory. Debtor uses funds from the deposit account to purchase inventory, which SP‑1 can trace as identifiable proceeds of its security interest in Debtor’s deposit account, and which SP‑2 claims as original collateral. The inventory is sold and the proceeds deposited into another deposit account, as to which SP‑1 has not obtained control. Subsection (c) does not govern priority in this other deposit account. This deposit account is cash proceeds and is also the same type of collateral as SP‑1’s original collateral, as required by subsections (c)(2)(A) and (B). However, SP‑1’s security interest does not satisfy subsection (c)(2)(C) because the inventory proceeds, which intervened between the original deposit account and the deposit account constituting the proceeds at issue, are not cash proceeds, proceeds of the same type as the collateral (original deposit account), or an account relating to the collateral. Stated otherwise, once proceeds other than cash proceeds, proceeds of the same type as the original collateral, or an account relating to the original collateral intervene in the chain of proceeds, priority under subsection (c) is thereafter unavailable. The special priority rule in subsection (d) also is inapplicable to this case. See Comment 9, Example 13, below. Instead, the general first‑to‑file‑or‑perfect rule of subsections (a) and (b) apply. Under that rule, SP‑1 has priority unless its security interest in the inventory proceeds became unperfected under Section 9‑315(d). Had SP‑2 filed against inventory before SP‑1 obtained control of the original deposit account, the SP‑2 would have had priority even if SP‑1’s security interest in the inventory proceeds remained perfected.

9. Proceeds of Non‑Filing Collateral: Special Temporal Priority. Under subsections (d) and (e), if a security interest in non‑filing collateral is perfected by a method other than filing (e.g., control or possession), it does not retain its priority over a conflicting security interest in proceeds that are filing collateral. Moreover, it is not entitled to priority in proceeds under the first‑to file‑or‑perfect rule of subsections (a)(1) and (b). Instead, under subsection (d), priority is determined by a new first‑to‑file rule.

Example 12: SP‑1 perfects its security interest in Debtor’s deposit account by obtaining control. Thereafter, SP‑2 files against equipment, (presumably) searches, finds no indication of a conflicting security interest, and advances against Debtor’s equipment. SP‑1 then files against Debtor’s equipment. Debtor uses funds from the deposit account to purchase equipment, which SP‑1 can trace as proceeds of its security interest in Debtor’s deposit account. If the first‑to‑file‑or‑perfect rule were applied, SP‑1’s security interest would be senior under subsections (a)(1) and (b), because it was the first to perfect in the original collateral and there was no period during which its security interest was unperfected. Under subsection (d), however, SP‑2’s security interest would be senior because it filed first. This corresponds with the likely expectations of the parties.

Note that under subsection (e), the first‑to‑file rule of subsection (d) applies only if the proceeds in question are other than non‑filing collateral (i.e., if the proceeds are filing collateral). If the proceeds are non‑filing collateral, either the first‑to‑file‑or‑perfect rule under subsections (a) and (b) or the non‑temporal priority rule in subsection (c) would apply, depending on the facts.

Example 13: SP‑1 perfects its security interest in Debtor’s deposit account by obtaining control. Thereafter, SP‑2 files against inventory, (presumably) searches, finds no indication of a conflicting security interest, and advances against Debtor’s existing and after‑acquired inventory. Debtor uses funds from the deposit account to purchase inventory, which SP‑1 can trace as identifiable proceeds of its security interest in Debtor’s deposit account, and which SP‑2 claims as original collateral. The inventory is sold and the proceeds deposited into another deposit account, as to which SP‑1 has not obtained control. As discussed above in Comment 8, Example 11, subsection (c) does not govern priority in this deposit account. Subsection (d) also does not govern, because the proceeds at issue (the deposit account) are cash proceeds. See subsection (e). Rather, the general rules of subsections (a) and (b) govern.

10. Priority in Supporting Obligations. Under subsections (b)(2) and (c)(1), a security interest having priority in collateral also has priority in a supporting obligation for that collateral. However, the rules in these subsections are subject to the special rule in Section 9‑329 governing the priority of security interests in a letter‑of‑credit right. See subsection (f) . Under Section 9‑329, a secured party’s failure to obtain control (Section 9‑107) of a letter‑of‑credit right that serves as supporting collateral leaves its security interest exposed to a priming interest of a party who does take control.

11. Unperfected Security Interests. Under subsection (a)(3), if conflicting security interests are unperfected, the first to attach has priority. This rule may be of merely theoretical interest, inasmuch as it is hard to imagine a situation where the case would come into litigation without either secured party’s having perfected its security interest. If neither security interest had been perfected at the time of the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, ordinarily neither would be good against the trustee in bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Code.

12. Agricultural Liens. Statutes other than this Article may purport to grant priority to an agricultural lien as against a conflicting security interest or agricultural lien. Under subsection (g), if another statute grants priority to an agricultural lien, the agricultural lien has priority only if the same statute creates the agricultural lien and the agricultural lien is perfected. Otherwise, subsection (a) applies the same priority rules to an agricultural lien as to a security interest, regardless of whether the agricultural lien conflicts with another agricultural lien or with a security interest.

Inasmuch as no agricultural lien on proceeds arises under this Article, subsections (b) through (e) do not apply to proceeds of agricultural liens. However, if an agricultural lien has priority under subsection (g) and the statute creating the agricultural lien gives the secured party a lien on proceeds of the collateral subject to the lien, a court should apply the principle of subsection (g) and award priority in the proceeds to the holder of the perfected agricultural lien.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑322(a) sets forth the residual priority rules for conflicting security interests in the same collateral. If both security interests are perfected, subsection (a)(1) provides that the security interests rank in priority in time of filing or perfection. Section 36‑9‑322(b) provides the general priority rules for proceeds and supporting obligations. For purposes of the “first‑to‑file‑or‑perfect” rule of subsection (a)(1), subsection (b) provides a secured party’s time of filing or perfection with respect to the collateral is also its time of filing or perfection with respect to proceeds and supporting obligations.

Section 36‑9‑322(c) provides special rules for priority in supporting obligations and proceeds when a secured party has priority in the collateral because of control. Under subsection (c)(1) the secured party with priority in the collateral has priority in supporting obligations. Under subsection (c)(2) the secured party with priority in the collateral has priority in first generation proceeds if its security interest in the proceeds is perfected and the proceeds are either cash proceeds or of the same type as the collateral. The secured party also has priority in proceeds of proceeds if each generation is either cash proceeds or the same type of property as the collateral.

Section 36‑9‑322(d) and (e) impose a special priority rule for proceeds when a secured party perfects in chattel paper, deposit accounts, negotiable documents, instruments, investment property, or letter‑of‑credit rights in a manner other than filing and the proceeds are not cash proceeds, chattel paper, negotiable documents, instruments, investment property, or letter‑of‑credit rights. In this situation, subsection (d) provides that conflicting security interests in the proceeds rank according to the time of filing.

Section 36‑9‑322(g) provides that a perfected agricultural lien has priority over a conflicting security interest or agricultural lien if the statute creating the agricultural lien so provides. South Carolina has three agricultural liens: a landlord’s lien for rent under Section 29‑13‑10, S.C. Code Ann. (1976); a laborer’s lien for the amount due for labor under Section 29‑13‑20, S.C. Code Ann. (1976); and a landlord’s lien for advances under Section 29‑13‑10, S.C. Code Ann. (1976). Section 29‑13‑30, S.C. Code Ann. (1976) expressly orders the priority of these liens providing that the landlord’s lien for rent is “in preference to all other liens.” The statute awards priority to the laborer’s lien and third priority to the landlord’s lien for advances. Section 29‑13030 appears to be the type of priority rule contemplated in Section 36‑9‑322(g). As a result, the agricultural liens, if perfected have priority over conflicting perfected security interest without regard to the time of filing or perfection. See generally, Poinsett Construction Corp. v. Fischer, 301 S.C. 343, 391 S.E. 2d 875 (Ct. App. 1990) (a statutory lien afforded “first lien” status under the statute creating the lien had priority over an earlier perfected security interest).

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Agricultural lien” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(5) |
| “Chattel paper” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(11) |
| “Collecting bank” | Section 36‑4‑105(c) |
| “Deposit account” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(29) |
| “Issuer” | Section 36‑5‑103(1)(c)  [Section 36‑5‑102(a)(9) 1995 Revision] |
| “Instrument” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(47) |
| “Investment property” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(49) |
| “Letter‑of‑credit rights” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(51) |
| “Negotiable documents” | Sections 36‑9‑102(a)(30), 36‑7‑102(1)(e), 36‑1‑201(15), 36‑7‑104(1) |
| “Nominated person” | [Section 36‑5‑102(a)(11) 1995 Revision] |
| “Proceeds” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(64) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |
| “Supporting obligation” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(77) |

Cross References—

1. Time of perfection of a security interest. Section 36‑9‑308(1).

2. Time of perfection of an agricultural lien. Section 36‑9‑308(2).

3. Time security interest attaches. Section 36‑9‑203(a) and (b).

4. Attachment of a security interest in proceeds. Sections 36‑9‑203(f), 36‑9‑315(a)(2).

5. Attachment of a security interest in a supporting obligation. Section 36‑9‑203(f).

6. Perfection of a security interest in proceeds. Section 36‑9‑315(c)‑(e).

7. Perfection of a security interest in a supporting obligation. Section 36‑9‑308(d).

8. Special priority rule for security interests in deposit accounts perfected by control. Sections 36‑9‑327 and 36‑9‑104.

9. Special priority rule for security interests in investment property perfected by control. Sections 36‑9‑328 and 36‑9‑106.

10. Special priority rule for security interests in letter‑of‑credit rights perfected by control. Sections 36‑9‑329 and 36‑9‑107.

11. Special priority rule for security interests in chattel paper or instruments perfected by control or possession. Sections 36‑9‑330, 36‑9‑105, 36‑9‑313(a).

12. Special priority rule for purchasers of instruments, documents, and securities. Section 36‑9‑331.

13. Perfection of a security interest in electronic chattel paper by control. Sections 36‑9‑314(a) and 36‑9‑105.

14. Perfection of a security interest in tangible chattel by possession. Section 36‑9‑313(a).

15. Perfection of a security interest in a deposit account by control. Sections 36‑9‑314(a), 36‑9‑312(b)(1), 36‑9‑104.

16. Perfection of a security interest in negotiable documents by possession. Section 36‑9‑313(a).

17. Perfection of security interests in instruments by possession. Section 36‑9‑313(a).

18. Perfection of a security interest in investment property by control. Sections 36‑9‑314(a) and 36‑9‑106.

19. Perfection of a security interest in certificated securities by delivery. Sections 36‑9‑313(a) and 36‑8‑301(a).

20. Perfection of a security interest in letter‑of‑credit rights by control. Sections 36‑9‑314(a), 36‑9‑312(b)(2), 36‑9‑107.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Agriculture 10.

Secured Transactions 138 to 150.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 23k10; 349Ak138 to 349Ak150.

LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES

Priorities. 19 S.C. L. Rev. 724.

ARTICLE 9 and the Bankruptcy Act. 19 S.C. L. Rev. 742.

The Secured Creditor in South Carolina Versus the New Federal Tax Lien. 19 S.C. L. Rev. 759.

Attorney General’s Opinions

Conditional seller of consumer goods is secure against landlord’s lien for rent of subsequent mortgage from the moment debtor receives possession of such goods, whether or not or regardless of when a financing statement is filed. 1969‑70 Op Atty Gen, No 2887, p 126.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 1

1. In general

A lender did not have a properly perfected purchase money security interest in hotel furnishings and equipment where the lender failed to file a finance statement prior to the time the hotel received possession of the equipment and furniture or within 20 days thereafter. Goldome Realty Credit Corp. v. Conway Hotel Properties, Inc. (S.C.App. 1990) 303 S.C. 158, 399 S.E.2d 442. Secured Transactions 146

**SECTION 36‑9‑323.** Future advances.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), for purposes of determining the priority of a perfected security interest under Section 36‑9‑322(a)(1), perfection of the security interest dates from the time an advance is made to the extent that the security interest secures an advance that:

(1) is made while the security interest is perfected only:

(A) under Section 36‑9‑309 when it attaches; or

(B) temporarily under Section 36‑9‑312(e), (f), or (g); and

(2) is not made pursuant to a commitment entered into before or while the security interest is perfected by a method other than under Section 36‑9‑309 or 36‑9‑312(e), (f), or (g).

(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), a security interest is subordinate to the rights of a person that becomes a lien creditor to the extent that the security interest secures an advance made more than forty‑five days after the person becomes a lien creditor unless the advance is made:

(1) without knowledge of the lien; or

(2) pursuant to a commitment entered into without knowledge of the lien.

(c) Subsections (a) and (b) do not apply to a security interest held by a secured party that is a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes or a consignor.

(d) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), a buyer of goods other than a buyer in ordinary course of business takes free of a security interest to the extent that it secures advances made after the earlier of:

(1) the time the secured party acquires knowledge of the buyer’s purchase; or

(2) forty‑five days after the purchase.

(e) Subsection (d) does not apply if the advance is made pursuant to a commitment entered into without knowledge of the buyer’s purchase and before the expiration of the forty‑five‑day period.

(f) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (g), a lessee of goods, other than a lessee in ordinary course of business, takes the leasehold interest free of a security interest to the extent that it secures advances made after the earlier of:

(1) the time the secured party acquires knowledge of the lease; or

(2) forty‑five days after the lease contract becomes enforceable.

(g) Subsection (f) does not apply if the advance is made pursuant to a commitment entered into without knowledge of the lease and before the expiration of the forty‑five‑day period.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Sections 9‑312(7), 9‑301(4), 9‑307(3), 2A‑307(4).

2. Scope of This Section. A security agreement may provide that collateral secures future advances. See Section 9‑204(c). This Section collects all of the special rules dealing with the priority of advances made by a secured party after a third party acquires an interest in the collateral. Subsection (a) applies when the third party is a competing secured party. It replaces and clarifies former Section 9‑312(7). Subsection (b) deals with lien creditors and replaces former Section 9‑301(4). Subsections (d) and (e) deal with buyers and replace former Section 9‑307(3). Subsections (f) and (g) deal with lessees and replace former Section 2A‑307(4) .

3. Competing Security Interests. Under a proper reading of the first‑to‑ file‑or‑perfect rule of Section 9‑322(a)(1) (and former Section 9‑312(5)), it is abundantly clear that the time when an advance is made plays no role in determining priorities among conflicting security interests except when a financing statement was not filed and the advance is the giving of value as the last step for attachment and perfection. Thus, a secured party takes subject to all advances secured by a competing security interest having priority under Section 9‑322(a)(1). This result generally obtains regardless of how the competing security interest is perfected and regardless of whether the advances are made “pursuant to commitment” (Section 9‑102). Subsection (a) of this Section states the only other instance when the time of an advance figures in the priority scheme in Section 9‑322: when the security interest is perfected only automatically under Section 9‑309 or temporarily under Section 9‑312(e), (f), or (g), and the advance is not made pursuant to a commitment entered into while the security interest was perfected by another method. Thus, an advance has priority from the date it is made only in the rare case in which it is made without commitment and while the security interest is perfected only temporarily under Section 9‑312.

The new formulation in subsection (a) clarifies the result when the initial advance is paid and a new (“future”) advance is made subsequently. Under former Section 9‑312(7), the priority of the new advance turned on whether it was “made while a security interest is perfected.” This Section resolves any ambiguity by omitting the quoted phrase.

Example 1: On February 1, A makes an advance secured by machinery in the debtor’s possession and files a financing statement. On March 1, B makes an advance secured by the same machinery and files a financing statement. On April 1, A makes a further advance, under the original security agreement, against the same machinery. A was the first to file and so, under the first‑ to‑file‑or‑perfect rule of Section 9‑322(a)(1), A’s security interest has priority over B’s, both as to the February 1 and as to the April 1 advance. It makes no difference whether A knows of B’s intervening advance when A makes the second advance. Note that, as long as A was the first to file or perfect, A would have priority with respect to both advances if either A or B had perfected by taking possession of the collateral. Likewise, A would have priority if A’s April 1 advance was not made under the original agreement with the debtor, but was under a new agreement.

Example 2: On October 1, A acquires a temporarily perfected (20‑day) security interest, unfiled, in a negotiable document in the debtor’s possession under Section 9‑312(e) or (f). The security interest secures an advance made on that day as well as future advances. On October 5, B files and thereby perfects a security interest that previously had attached to the same document. On October 8, A makes an additional advance. On October 10, A files. Under Section 9‑322(a)(1), because A was the first to perfect and maintained continuous perfection or filing since the start of the 20‑day period, A has priority, even after the 20‑day period expires. See Section 9‑322, Comment 4, Example 3. However, under this Section, for purposes of Section 9‑322(a)(1), to the extent A’s security interest secures the October 8 advance, the security interest was perfected on October 8. Inasmuch as B perfected on October 5, B has priority over the October 8 advance.

The rule in subsection (a) is more liberal toward the priority of future advances than the corresponding rules applicable to intervening lien creditors (subsection (b)), buyers (subsections (d) and (e)), and lessees (subsections (f) and (g)).

4. Competing Lien Creditors. Subsection (b) replaces former Section 9‑301(4) and addresses the rights of a “lien creditor”, as defined in Section 9‑102. Under Section 9‑317(a)(2), a security interest is senior to the rights of a person who becomes a lien creditor, unless the person becomes a lien creditor before the security interest is perfected and before a financing statement covering the collateral is filed. Subsection (b) of this Section provides that a security interest is subordinate to those rights to the extent that the specified circumstances occur. Subsection (b) does not elevate the priority of a security interest that is subordinate to the rights of a lien creditor under Section 9‑317(a)(2); it is subordinates.

As under former Section 9‑301(4), a secured party’s knowledge does not cut short the 45‑day period during which future advances can achieve priority over an intervening lien creditor’s interest. Rather, because of the impact of the rule in subsection (b) on the question whether the security interest for future advances is “protected” under Section 6323(c)(2) and (d) of the Internal Revenue Code as amended by the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, the priority of the security interest for future advances over a lien creditor is made absolute for 45 days regardless of knowledge of the secured party concerning the lien. If, however, the advance is made after the 45 days, the advance will not have priority unless it was made or committed without knowledge of the lien.

5. Sales of Receivables; Consignments. Subsections (a) and (b) do not apply to outright sales of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes, nor do they apply to consignments.

6. Competing Buyers and Lessees. Under subsections (d) and (e), a buyer will not take subject to a security interest to the extent it secures advances made after the secured party has knowledge that the buyer has purchased the collateral or more than 45 days after the purchase unless the advances were made pursuant to a commitment entered into before the expiration of the 45‑day period and without knowledge of the purchase. Subsections (f) and (g) provide an analogous rule for lessees. Of course, a buyer in ordinary course who takes free of the security interest under Section 9‑320 and a lessee in ordinary course who takes free under Section 9‑321 are not subject to any future advances. Subsections (d) and (e) replace former Section 9‑307(3), and subsections (f) and (g) replace former Section 2A‑307(4). No change in meaning is intended.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑323 addresses a secured party’s priority with respect to advances the secured party makes after a third party establishes a conflicting claim to the collateral. The provision assumes that the secured party can establish priority over the conflicting claim with respect to advances made before the conflicting claim arose. The issue addressed is whether that priority extends to advances made after the third party establishes its claim to the collateral.

Section 36‑9‑323 is organized based upon the nature of the conflicting claim. Subsection (a) addresses a secured party’s priority for future advances over a conflicting Article 9 security interest. Subsection (b) addresses a second party’s priority with respect to advances made after a lien creditor’s lien attaches to the collateral. Subsection (d) and (e) address priority over the conflicting claim of a buyer of goods other than a buyer in ordinary course. Subsection (f) and (g) address priority over a lessee other than a lessee in ordinary course.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Account” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(2) |
| “Buyer in ordinary course of business” | Section 36‑1‑201(9) |
| “Buyer of goods” | Section 36‑2‑103(1)(a) |
| “Chattel paper” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(11) |
| “Consignor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(21) |
| “Goods” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(44) |
| “Knowledge” | Section 36‑1‑201(25) [see now Section 36‑1‑202] |
| “Lessee” | Section 36‑2A‑103(1)(n) |
| “Lessee in ordinary course of business” | Section 36‑2A‑103(1)(o) |
| “Lien creditor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(52) |
| “Payment intangible” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(61) |
| “Promissory note” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(65) |
| “Secured party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |

Cross References—

1. Validity of future advance clauses in security agreements. Section 36‑9‑204(3).

2. Under Section 36‑9‑323(a) a secured party’s time of filing or initial perfection in the collateral generally determines the secured party’s priority with respect to future advances. A secured party that perfected automatically under Section 36‑9‑309 or Section 36‑9‑312(e), (f), or (g), however, cannot use its date of initial perfection for purposes of claiming priority under Section 36‑9‑322(a). In such cases the secured party’s priority dates from the time of the advance. Section 36‑9‑309 lists the security interests that are perfected when they attach. In certain specified situations Section 36‑9‑312(e), (f), and (g) provides for temporary automatic perfection of security interests in certificated securities, negotiable documents, and instruments.

3. Priority rule for conflicts between a secured party and a lien creditor. Section 36‑9‑317(a)(2).

4. Sales of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes as well as consignments are subject to Article 9. Section 36‑9‑109(a)( 3) and (4). Subsection 36‑9‑323(c), however, provides that the priority rules of subsections 36‑9‑323(a) and (b) do not apply to advances made by a buyer of receivables or a consignor.

5. A buyer in ordinary course of business takes free of perfected security interests created by the buyer’s seller. Section 36‑9‑320(a). Therefore, a buyer in ordinary course of business necessarily takes free of a security interest to the extent it secures advances made after the buyer purchased the collateral.

6. Priority rule for conflicts between a secured party and a buyer other than a buyer in ordinary course of business. Section 36‑9‑317(b).

7. A lessee in ordinary course of business takes free of a perfected security interest created by the lessor. Section 36‑9‑321(c). Therefore, a lessee in ordinary course of business necessarily takes free of a security interest to the extent it secures advances made after the lessee acquired its interest in the collateral.

8. Priority rule for conflicts between a secured party and a lessee of the collateral. Section 36‑9‑317(c).

LIBRARY REFERENCES

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Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak134; 349Ak138 to 349Ak150.

LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES

ARTICLE 9 and the Bankruptcy Act. 19 S.C. L. Rev. 742.

Priorities. 19 S.C. L. Rev. 724.

The Secured Creditor in South Carolina Versus the New Federal Tax Lien. 19 S.C. L. Rev. 759.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 1

1. In general

A lender did not have a properly perfected purchase money security interest in hotel furnishings and equipment where the lender failed to file a finance statement prior to the time the hotel received possession of the equipment and furniture or within 20 days thereafter. Goldome Realty Credit Corp. v. Conway Hotel Properties, Inc. (S.C.App. 1990) 303 S.C. 158, 399 S.E.2d 442. Secured Transactions 146

Cited in Stephenson Finance Co. of Augusta, Inc. v. Bruce (S.C. 1970) 254 S.C. 249, 174 S.E.2d 750.

**SECTION 36‑9‑324.** Priority of purchase‑money security interests.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (g), a perfected purchase‑money security interest in goods other than inventory or livestock has priority over a conflicting security interest in the same goods, and, except as otherwise provided in Section 36‑9‑327, a perfected security interest in its identifiable proceeds also has priority, if the purchase‑money security interest is perfected when the debtor receives possession of the collateral or within twenty days thereafter.

(b) Subject to subsection (c) and except as otherwise provided in subsection (g), a perfected purchase‑money security interest in inventory has priority over a conflicting security interest in the same inventory, has priority over a conflicting security interest in chattel paper or an instrument constituting proceeds of the inventory and in proceeds of the chattel paper, if so provided in Section 36‑9‑330, and, except as otherwise provided in Section 36‑9‑327, also has priority in identifiable cash proceeds of the inventory to the extent the identifiable cash proceeds are received on or before the delivery of the inventory to a buyer, if:

(1) the purchase‑money security interest is perfected when the debtor receives possession of the inventory;

(2) the purchase‑money secured party sends an authenticated notification to the holder of the conflicting security interest;

(3) the holder of the conflicting security interest receives the notification within five years before the debtor receives possession of the inventory; and

(4) the notification states that the person sending the notification has or expects to acquire a purchase‑money security interest in inventory of the debtor and describes the inventory.

(c) Subsections (b)(2) through (4) apply only if the holder of the conflicting security interest had filed a financing statement covering the same types of inventory:

(1) if the purchase‑money security interest is perfected by filing, before the date of the filing; or

(2) if the purchase‑money security interest is temporarily perfected without filing or possession under Section 36‑9‑312 (f), before the beginning of the twenty‑day period thereunder.

(d) Subject to subsection (e) and except as otherwise provided in subsection (g), a perfected purchase‑money security interest in livestock that are farm products has priority over a conflicting security interest in the same livestock, and, except as otherwise provided in Section 36‑9‑327, a perfected security interest in their identifiable proceeds and identifiable products in their unmanufactured states also has priority, if:

(1) the purchase‑money security interest is perfected when the debtor receives possession of the livestock;

(2) the purchase‑money secured party sends an authenticated notification to the holder of the conflicting security interest;

(3) the holder of the conflicting security interest receives the notification within six months before the debtor receives possession of the livestock; and

(4) the notification states that the person sending the notification has or expects to acquire a purchase‑money security interest in livestock of the debtor and describes the livestock.

(e) Subsections (d)(2) through (4) apply only if the holder of the conflicting security interest had filed a financing statement covering the same types of livestock:

(1) if the purchase‑money security interest is perfected by filing, before the date of the filing; or

(2) if the purchase‑money security interest is temporarily perfected without filing or possession under Section 36‑9‑312 (f), before the beginning of the twenty‑day period thereunder.

(f) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (g), a perfected purchase‑money security interest in software has priority over a conflicting security interest in the same collateral, and, except as otherwise provided in Section 36‑9‑327, a perfected security interest in its identifiable proceeds also has priority, to the extent that the purchase‑money security interest in the goods in which the software was acquired for use has priority in the goods and proceeds of the goods under this section.

(g) If more than one security interest qualifies for priority in the same collateral under subsection (a), (b), (d), or (f):

(1) a security interest securing an obligation incurred as all or part of the price of the collateral has priority over a security interest securing an obligation incurred for value given to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral; and

(2) in all other cases, Section 36‑9‑322 (a) applies to the qualifying security interests.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑312(3), (4).

2. Priority of Purchase‑Money Security Interests. This Section contains the priority rules applicable to purchase‑money security interests, as defined in Section 9‑103. It affords a special, non‑temporal priority to those purchase‑money security interests that satisfy the statutory conditions. In most cases, priority will be over a security interest asserted under an after‑acquired property clause. See Section 9‑204 on the extent to which security interests in after‑acquired property are validated.

A purchase‑money security interest can be created only in goods and software. See Section 9‑103. Section 9‑324(a), which follows former Section 9‑312(4), contains the general rule for purchase‑money security interests in goods. It is subject to subsections (b) and (c), which derive from former Section 9‑312(3) and apply to purchase‑money security interests in inventory, and subsections (d) and (e), which apply to purchase‑money security interests in livestock that are farm products. Subsection (f) applies to purchase‑money security interests in software. Subsection (g) deals with the relatively unusual case in which a debtor creates two purchase‑money security interests in the same collateral and both security interests qualify for special priority under one of the other subsections.

Former Section 9‑312(2) contained a rule affording special priority to those who provided secured credit that enabled a debtor to produce crops. This rule proved unworkable and has been eliminated from this Article. Instead, model Section 9‑324A contains a revised production‑money priority rule. That Section is a model, not uniform, provision. The sponsors of the UCC have taken no position as to whether it should be enacted, instead leaving the matter for state legislatures to consider if they are so inclined.

3. Purchase‑Money Priority in Goods Other Than Inventory and Livestock. Subsection (a) states a general rule applicable to all types of goods except inventory and farm‑products livestock: the purchase‑money interest takes priority if it is perfected when the debtor receives possession of the collateral or within 20 days thereafter. (As to the 20‑day “grace period,” compare Section 9‑317(e). Former Sections 9‑312(4) and 9‑301(2) contained a 10‑day grace period.) The perfection requirement means that the purchase‑money secured party either has filed a financing statement before that time or has a temporarily perfected security interest in goods covered by documents under Section 9‑312(e) and (f) which is continued in a perfected status by filing before the expiration of the 20‑day period specified in that Section. A purchase‑money security interest qualifies for priority under subsection (a), even if the purchase‑ money secured party knows that a conflicting security interest has been created and/or that the holder of the conflicting interest has filed a financing statement covering the collateral.

Normally, there will be no question when “the debtor receives possession of the collateral” for purposes of subsection (a). However, sometimes a debtor buys goods and takes possession of them in stages, and then assembly and testing are completed (by the seller or debtor‑buyer) at the debtor’s location. Under those circumstances, the buyer “takes possession” within the meaning of subsection (a) when, after an inspection of the portion of the goods in the debtor’s possession, it would be apparent to a potential lender to the debtor that the debtor has acquired an interest in the goods taken as a whole.

A similar issue concerning the time when “the debtor receives possession” arises when a person acquires possession of goods under a transaction that is not governed by this Article and then later agrees to buy the goods on secured credit. For example, a person may take possession of goods as lessee under a lease contract and then exercise an option to purchase the goods from the lessor on secured credit. Under Section 2A‑307(1), creditors of the lessee generally take subject to the lease contract; filing a financing statement against the lessee is unnecessary to protect the lessor’s leasehold or residual interest. Once the lease is converted to a security interest, filing a financing statement is necessary to protect the seller’s (former lessor’s) security interest. Accordingly, the 20‑day period in subsection (a) does not commence until the goods become “collateral” (defined in Section 9‑102), i.e., until they are subject to a security interest.

4. Purchase‑Money Security Interests in Inventory. Subsections (b) and (c) afford a means by which a purchase‑money security interest in inventory can achieve priority over an earlier‑filed security interest in the same collateral. To achieve priority, the purchase‑money security interest must be perfected when the debtor receives possession of the inventory. For a discussion of when “the debtor receives possession,” see Comment 3, above. The 20‑day grace period of subsection (a) does not apply.

The arrangement between an inventory secured party and its debtor typically requires the secured party to make periodic advances against incoming inventory or periodic releases of old inventory as new inventory is received. A fraudulent debtor may apply to the secured party for advances even though it has already given a purchase‑money security interest in the inventory to another secured party. For this reason, subsections (b)(2) through (4) and (c) impose a second condition for the purchase‑money security interest’s achieving priority: the purchase‑money secured party must give notification to the holder of a conflicting security interest who filed against the same item or type of inventory before the purchase‑money secured party filed or its security interest became perfected temporarily under Section 9‑312(e) or (f). The notification requirement protects the non‑purchase‑money inventory secured party in such a situation: if the inventory secured party has received notification, it presumably will not make an advance; if it has not received notification (or if the other security interest does not qualify as purchase‑money), any advance the inventory secured party may make ordinarily will have priority under Section 9‑322. Inasmuch as an arrangement for periodic advances against incoming goods is unusual outside the inventory field, subsection (a) does not contain a notification requirement.

5. Notification to Conflicting Inventory Secured Party: Timing. Under subsection (b)(3), the perfected purchase‑money security interest achieves priority over a conflicting security interest only if the holder of the conflicting security interest receives a notification within five years before the debtor receives possession of the purchase‑money collateral. If the debtor never receives possession, the five‑year period never begins, and the purchase‑money security interest has priority, even if notification is not given. However, where the purchase‑money inventory financing began by the purchase‑money secured party’s possession of a negotiable document of title, to retain priority the secured party must give the notification required by subsection (b) at or before the usual time, i.e., when the debtor gets possession of the inventory, even though the security interest remains perfected for 20 days under Section 9‑312(e) or (f).

Some people have mistakenly read former Section 9‑312(3)(b) to require, as a condition of purchase‑money priority in inventory, that the purchase‑money secured party give the notification before it files a financing statement. Read correctly, the “before” clauses compare (i) the time when the holder of the conflicting security interest filed a financing statement with (ii) the time when the purchase‑money security interest becomes perfected by filing or automatically perfected temporarily. Only if (i) occurs before (ii) must notification be given to the holder of the conflicting security interest. Subsection (c) has been rewritten to clarify this point.

6. Notification to Conflicting Inventory Secured Party: Address. Inasmuch as the address provided as that of the secured party on a filed financing statement is an “address that is reasonable under the circumstances,” the holder of a purchase‑money security interest may satisfy the requirement to “send” notification to the holder of a conflicting security interest in inventory by sending a notification to that address, even if the address is or becomes incorrect. See Section 9‑102 (definition of “send”). Similarly, because the address is “held out by [the holder of the conflicting security interest] as the place for receipt of such communications [i.e., communications relating to security interests],” the holder is deemed to have “received” a notification delivered to that address. See Section 1‑201(26).

7. Consignments. Subsections (b) and (c) also determine the priority of a consignor’s interest in consigned goods as against a security interest in the goods created by the consignee. Inasmuch as a consignment subject to this Article is defined to be a purchase‑money security interest, see Section 9‑103(d), no inference concerning the nature of the transaction should be drawn from the fact that a consignor uses the term “ security interest” in its notice under subsection (b)(4). Similarly, a notice stating that the consignor has delivered or expects to deliver goods, properly described, “on consignment” meets the requirements of subsection (b)(4), even if it does not contain the term “ security interest,” and even if the transaction subsequently is determined to be a security interest. Cf. Section 9‑505 (use of “ consignor” and “consignee” in financing statement).

8. Priority in Proceeds: General. When the purchase‑money secured party has priority over another secured party, the question arises whether this priority extends to the proceeds of the original collateral. Subsections (a), (d), and (f) give an affirmative answer, but only as to proceeds in which the security interest is perfected (see Section 9‑315). Although this qualification did not appear in former Section 9‑312(4), it was implicit in that provision.

In the case of inventory collateral under subsection (b), where financing frequently is based on the resulting accounts, chattel paper, or other proceeds, the special priority of the purchase‑money secured interest carries over into only certain types of proceeds. As under former Section 9‑312(3), the purchase‑money priority in inventory under subsection (b) carries over into identifiable cash proceeds (defined in Section 9‑102) received on or before the delivery of the inventory to a buyer.

As a general matter, also like former Section 9‑312(3), the purchase‑ money priority in inventory does not carry over into proceeds consisting of accounts or chattel paper. Many parties financing inventory are quite content to protect their first‑priority security interest in the inventory itself. They realize that when the inventory is sold, someone else will be financing the resulting receivables (accounts or chattel paper), and the priority for inventory will not run forward to the receivables constituting the proceeds. Indeed, the cash supplied by the receivables financer often will be used to pay the inventory financing. In some situations, the party financing the inventory on a purchase‑money basis makes contractual arrangements that the proceeds of receivables financing by another be devoted to paying off the inventory security interest.

However, the purchase‑money priority in inventory does carry over to proceeds consisting of chattel paper and its proceeds (and also to instruments) to the extent provided in Section 9‑330. Under Section 9‑330(e), the holder of a purchase‑money security interest in inventory is deemed to give new value for proceeds consisting of chattel paper. Taken together, Sections 9‑324(b) and 9‑330(e) enable a purchase‑money inventory secured party to obtain priority in chattel paper constituting proceeds of the inventory, even if the secured party does not actually give new value for the chattel paper, provided the purchase‑money secured party satisfies the other conditions for achieving priority.

When the proceeds of original collateral (goods or software) consist of a deposit account, Section 9‑327 governs priority to the extent it conflicts with the priority rules of this Section.

9. Priority in Accounts Constituting Proceeds of Inventory. The application of the priority rules in subsection (b) is shown by the following examples:

Example 1: Debtor creates a security interest in its existing and after‑acquired inventory in favor of SP‑1, who files a financing statement covering inventory. SP‑2 subsequently takes a purchase‑money security interest in certain inventory and, under subsection (b), achieves priority in this inventory over SP‑1. This inventory is then sold, producing accounts. Accounts are not cash proceeds, and so the special purchase‑money priority in the inventory does not control the priority in the accounts. Rather, the first‑to‑file‑or‑perfect rule of Section 9‑322(a)(1) applies. The time of SP‑1’s filing as to the inventory is also the time of filing as to the accounts under Section 9‑322 (b). Assuming that each security interest in the accounts proceeds remains perfected under Section 9‑315, SP‑1 has priority as to the accounts.

Example 2: In Example 1, if SP‑2 had filed directly against accounts, the date of that filing as to accounts would be compared with the date of SP‑1’s filing as to the inventory. The first filed would prevail under Section 9‑322(a)(1).

Example 3: If SP‑3 had filed against accounts in Example 1 before either SP‑1 or SP‑2 filed against inventory, SP‑3’s filing against accounts would have priority over the filings of SP‑1 and SP‑2. This result obtains even though the filings against inventory are effective to continue the perfected status of SP‑1’s and SP‑2’s security interest in the accounts beyond the 20‑day period of automatic perfection. See Section 9‑315. SP‑1’s and SP‑2’s position as to the inventory does not give them a claim to accounts (as proceeds of the inventory) which is senior to someone who has filed earlier against accounts. If, on the other hand, either SP‑1’s or SP‑2’s filing against the inventory preceded SP‑3’s filing against accounts, SP‑1 or SP‑2 would outrank SP‑3 as to the accounts.

10. Purchase‑Money Security Interests in Livestock. New subsections (d) and (e) provide a purchase‑money priority rule for farm‑products livestock. They are patterned on the purchase‑money priority rule for inventory found in subsections (b) and (c) and include a requirement that the purchase‑money secured party notify earlier‑filed parties. Two differences between subsections (b) and (d) are noteworthy. First, unlike the purchase‑money inventory lender, the purchase‑money livestock lender enjoys priority in all proceeds of the collateral. Thus, under subsection (d), the purchase‑money secured party takes priority in accounts over an earlier‑filed accounts financer. Second, subsection (d) affords priority in certain products of the collateral as well as proceeds.

11. Purchase‑Money Security Interests in Aquatic Farm Products. Aquatic goods produced in aquacultural operations (e.g., catfish raised on a catfish farm) are farm products. See Section 9‑102 (definition of “farm products”). The definition does not indicate whether aquatic goods are “crops,” as to which the model production money security interest priority in Section 9‑324A applies, or “livestock,” as to which the purchase‑money priority in subsection (d) of this Section applies. This Article leaves courts free to determine the classification of particular aquatic goods on a case‑by‑case basis, applying whichever priority rule makes more sense in the overall context of the debtor’s business.

12. Purchase‑Money Security Interests in Software. Subsection (f) governs the priority of purchase‑money security interests in software. Under Section 9‑103(c), a purchase‑money security interest arises in software only if the debtor acquires its interest in the software for the principal purpose of using the software in goods subject to a purchase‑money security interest. Under subsection (f), a purchase‑money security interest in software has the same priority as the purchase‑money security interest in the goods in which the software was acquired for use. This priority is determined under subsections (b) and (c) (for inventory) or (a) (for other goods).

13. Multiple Purchase‑Money Security Interests. New subsection (g) governs priority among multiple purchase‑money security interests in the same collateral. It grants priority to purchase‑money security interests securing the price of collateral (i.e., created in favor of the seller) over purchase‑money security interests that secure enabling loans. Section 7.2(c) of the Restatement (3d) of the Law of Property (Mortgages) (1997) adopts this rule with respect to real property mortgages. As Comment d to that Section explains: the equities favor the vendor. Not only does the vendor part with specific real estate rather than money, but the vendor would never relinquish it at all except on the understanding that the vendor will be able to use it to satisfy the obligation to pay the price. This is the case even though the vendor may know that the mortgagor is going to finance the transaction in part by borrowing from a third party and giving a mortgage to secure that obligation. In the final analysis, the law is more sympathetic to the vendor’s hazard of losing real estate previously owned than to the third party lender’s risk of being unable to collect from an interest in real estate that never previously belonged to it.

The first‑to‑file‑or‑perfect rule of Section 9‑322 applies to multiple purchase‑money security interests securing enabling loans.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑324 sets forth special priority rules under which a secured party with a purchase money security interest can establish priority over a secured party who would have priority under the “first‑to‑file‑or‑perfect rule” of Section 36‑9‑322(a)(1). Subsection (a) states the requirements for obtaining a purchase‑money priority in goods other than inventory and livestock. Subsections (b) and (c) state the requirements for a purchase‑money priority in inventory. Subsections (d) and (e) state the requirements for a purchase money priority in livestock. Subsection (f) states the requirements for a purchase‑money priority in software. Subsection (g) provides a rule for resolving conflicts between two or more secured parties with purchase‑money security interests in the same collateral.

The provisions granting a purchase‑money priority in livestock and software are new. The purchase‑money priority provisions for goods other than inventory and livestock and for inventory are based on former sections 36‑9‑312(4) and (3). Subsection 36‑9‑324(b), however, increases the extent to which the purchase‑money priority in inventory applies to proceeds. Under subsection (b) a purchase‑money inventory financer can establish priority in chattel paper or instruments that constitute proceeds by meeting the requirements of Section 36‑9‑330.

Definitional Cross References:

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| “Authenticate” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(7) |
| “Cash proceeds” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(9) |
| “Chattel paper” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(11) |
| “Collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Farm products” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(34) |
| “Goods” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(44) |
| “Instrument” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(47) |
| “Inventory” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(48) |
| “Notification” | Section 36‑1‑201(25) [see now Section 36‑1‑202] |
| “Proceeds” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(64) |
| “Purchase‑money security interest in goods” | Section 36‑9‑103(c) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |
| “Software” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(75) |

Cross References—

1. Requirements for establishing a purchase money security interest. Section 36‑9‑103.

2. Priority rules applicable to a purchase‑money security interest which fails to qualify for priority under Section 36‑9‑324. Section 36‑9‑322(a).

3. Attachment of a security interest to proceeds. Sections 36‑9‑203(f) and 36‑9‑315(a)(2).

4. Identification of commingled cash proceeds. Section 36‑9‑315(b)(2).

5. Perfection of security interests in proceeds. Section 36‑9‑315(c)‑(e).

6. Priority rule for conflict between a purchase‑money secured party with a perfected security interest in identifiable cash proceeds commingled with other funds in a deposit account and the bank at which the account is maintained asserting security interest in the account. Sections 36‑9‑327(1)(A) and 36‑9‑104(a)(1).

7. Priority rule for conflict between a purchase‑money secured party with a perfected security interest in identifiable cash proceeds commingled with other funds in a deposit account and the bank at which the account is maintained asserting a right of set‑off. Section 36‑9‑340(a) and (c).

8. Requirements a purchase‑money inventory financer must meet to establish priority in chattel paper and instruments constituting proceeds of the inventory. 36‑9‑330.

9. Consignments deemed to create a purchase‑money security interest subject to Section 36‑9‑324(b) and(c). Section 36‑9‑103(d).

10. Purchase‑money priority in fixtures. Section 36‑9‑334(d).

11. Purchase‑money priority over a lien creditor, buyer, or lessee if the secured party files with 20 days after the debtor receives delivery of the collateral. Section 36‑9‑317(e).

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Secured Transactions 146.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak146.

LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES

ARTICLE 9 and the Bankruptcy Act. 19 S.C. L. Rev. 742.

Priorities. 19 S.C. L. Rev. 724.

The Secured Creditor in South Carolina Versus the New Federal Tax Lien. 19 S.C. L. Rev. 759.

Attorney General’s Opinions

Conditional seller of consumer goods is secure against landlord’s lien for rent of subsequent mortgage from the moment debtor receives possession of such goods, whether or not or regardless of when a financing statement is filed. 1969‑70 Op Atty Gen, No 2887, p 126.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 1

1. In general

A lender did not have a properly perfected purchase money security interest in hotel furnishings and equipment where the lender failed to file a finance statement prior to the time the hotel received possession of the equipment and furniture or within 20 days thereafter. Goldome Realty Credit Corp. v. Conway Hotel Properties, Inc. (S.C.App. 1990) 303 S.C. 158, 399 S.E.2d 442. Secured Transactions 146

**SECTION 36‑9‑325.** Priority of security interests in transferred collateral.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), a security interest created by a debtor is subordinate to a security interest in the same collateral created by another person if:

(1) the debtor acquired the collateral subject to the security interest created by the other person;

(2) the security interest created by the other person was perfected when the debtor acquired the collateral; and

(3) there is no period thereafter when the security interest is unperfected.

(b) Subsection (a) subordinates a security interest only if the security interest:

(1) otherwise would have priority solely under Section 36‑9‑322(a) or 36‑9‑324; or

(2) arose solely under Section 36‑2‑711(3) or 36‑2A‑508(5).

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. New.

2. “Double Debtor Problem.” This Section addresses the “ double debtor” problem, which arises when a debtor acquires property that is subject to a security interest created by another debtor.

3. Taking Subject to Perfected Security Interest. Consider the following scenario:

Example 1: A owns an item of equipment subject to a perfected security interest in favor of SP‑A. A sells the equipment to B, not in the ordinary course of business. B acquires its interest subject to SP‑A’s security interest. See Sections 9‑201, 9‑315(a)(1). Under this Section, if B creates a security interest in the equipment in favor of SP‑B, SP‑B’s security interest is subordinate to SP‑A’s security interest, even if SP‑B filed against B before SP‑A filed against A, and even if SP‑B took a purchase‑money security interest. Normally, SP‑B could have investigated the source of the equipment and discovered SP‑A’s filing before making an advance against the equipment, whereas SP‑A had no reason to search the filings against someone other than its debtor, A.

4. Taking Subject to Unperfected Security Interest. This Section applies only if the security interest in the transferred collateral was perfected when the transferee acquired the collateral. See subsection (a)(2). If this condition is not met, then the normal priority rules apply.

Example 2: A owns an item of equipment subject to an unperfected security interest in favor of SP‑A. A sells the equipment to B, who gives value and takes delivery of the equipment without knowledge of the security interest. B takes free of the security interest. See Section 9‑317(b). If B then creates a security interest in favor of SP‑B, no priority issue arises; SP‑B has the only security interest in the equipment.

Example 3: The facts are as in Example 2, except that B knows of SP‑A’s secuRity interest and therefore takes the equipment subject to it. If B creates a security interest in the equipment in favor of SP‑B, this Section does not determine the relative priority of the security interests. Rather, the normal priority rules govern. If SP‑B perfects its security interest, then, under Section 9‑322(a)(2), SP‑A’s unperfected security interest will be junior to SP‑B’s perfected security interest. The award of priority to SP‑B is premised on the belief that SP‑A’s failure to file could have misled SP‑B.

5. Taking Subject to Perfected Security Interest that Becomes Unperfected. This Section applies only if the security interest in the transferred collateral did not become unperfected at any time after the transferee acquired the collateral. See subsection (a)(3). If this condition is not met, then the normal priority rules apply.

Example 4: As in Example 1, A owns an item of equipment subject to a perfected security interest in favor of SP‑A. A sells the equipment to B, not in the ordinary course of business. B acquires its interest subject to SP‑A’s security interest. See Sections 9‑201, 9‑315(a)(1). B creates a security interest in favor of SP‑B, and SP‑B perfects its security interest. This Section provides that SP‑A’s security interest is senior to SP‑B’s. However, if SP‑A’s financing statement lapses while SP‑B’s security interest is perfected, then the normal priority rules would apply, and SP‑B’s security interest would become senior to SP‑A’s security interest. See Sections 9‑322(a)(2), 9‑515(c).

6. Unusual Situations. The appropriateness of the rule of subsection (a) is most apparent when it works to subordinate security interests having priority under the basic priority rules of Section 9‑322(a) or the purchase‑money priority rules of Section 9‑324. The rule also works properly when applied to the security interest of a buyer under Section 2‑711(3) or a lessee under Section 2A‑508(5). However, subsection (a) may provide an inappropriate resolution of the “double debtor” problem in some of the wide variety of other contexts in which the problem may arise. Although subsection (b) limits the application of subsection (a) to those cases in which subordination is known to be appropriate, courts should apply the rule in other settings, if necessary to promote the underlying purposes and policies of the Uniform Commercial Code. See Section 1‑102(1).

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑325 applies when a debtor acquires collateral subject to a perfected security interest created by another person and then creates a second security interest upon the collateral. This situation is commonly referred to as the “double debtor problem.” See Section 36‑9‑325, Official Comment 2. Section 36‑9‑325 clarifies the resolution of this conflict by subordinating the security interest created by the debtor to the security interest created by the other person.

Section 36‑9‑325 overrules Seebrite Corp. v. Transouth Finance Co., 272 S. C. 483, 252 S.E. 2d 873(1979). To illustrate the “double debtor” problem using facts suggested by Seebrite consider the following example:

Partnership is a general partnership engaged in the business of selling construction equipment. Partner is one of three general partners in Partnership. On February 1, Partnership entered into a security agreement with SP‑1 under which Partnership granted SP‑1 a security interest in Partnership’s inventory of construction equipment. The security agreement provided that any sale of an item of equipment without SP‑1’s prior written consent was unauthorized and would constitute an event of default. Also on February 1, SP‑1 filed a financing statement in the Secretary of State’s office covering Partnership’s inventory of construction equipment.

On April 1, and without obtaining SP‑1’s prior written consent, Partnership sold a piece of construction equipment to Partner for use in an unrelated construction business which Partner operated as a sole proprietorship. Partner paid for the equipment with funds advanced by SP‑2 under a security agreement that granted SP‑2 a purchase‑money security interest in the piece of equipment to secure the loan SP‑2 made to enable Partner to acquire the equipment. On April 1, SP‑2 filed a financing statement in the Secretary of State’s office covering the piece of equipment and listing Partner as the debtor. Neither Partnership nor Partner disclosed the sale of the piece of equipment to SP‑1.

When Partnership defaulted under its security agreement with SP‑1 and Partner defaulted under his security agreement with SP‑2, both SP‑1 and SP‑2 asserted security interests in the piece of equipment.

Under the holding in Seebrite, SP‑2 would be entitled to priority over SP‑1. The Court in Seebrite reasoned “[t]o hold that. . . an innocent retail lender [SP‑2] for valuable consideration . . . must investigate the right of the dealer to sell and give good title, would stagnate retail sales so necessary to commerce.” 272 S.C. at 487, 252 S.E. 2d at 875. The Court also asserted that its decision to award priority to the retail lender was consistent with the purchase‑money priority rule now codified at Section 36‑9‑324(a). 272 S.C. at 488, 252 S.E. 2d at 875.

Under Section 36‑9‑325, SP‑1 would be entitled to priority over SP‑2. To claim priority under Section 36‑9‑325, SP‑1 would be required to establish four facts. First, under Subsection 36‑9‑325(a)(1), SP‑1 must establish that Partner acquired the piece of equipment subject to SP‑1’s security interest. Because SP‑1 did not authorize Partnership to sell the piece of equipment to Partner, under Section 36‑9‑315(a)(1) the sale did not discharge SP‑1’s security interest. Furthermore, because Partner must have known that the sale to him violated SP‑1’s security interest, Partner cannot qualify as “a buyer in ordinary course of business” under Section 36‑1‑201(9) who would take free of SP‑1’s security interest under Section 36‑9‑320(a). Therefore, SP‑1 can establish that Partner acquired the piece of equipment subject to its security interest.

Second, under Subsection 36‑9‑325(a)(2), SP‑1 must establish that its security interest was perfected when Partner acquired the piece of equipment. SP‑1 can meet this requirement because its filing in the Secretary of State’s office was proper, the filing had not lapsed at the time of the sale to Partner, and under Section 36‑9‑507(a) SP‑1’s filed financing statement remains effective despite the sale of the piece of equipment to Partner.

Third, under Section 36‑9‑325(a)(3), SP‑1 must establish that there was no period of time that its security interest was unperfected. For the reasons noted in the previous paragraph, SP‑1 can satisfy this equipment.

Finally, under Subsection 36‑9‑325(b), SP‑1 must establish that SP‑2 would have priority solely under Section 36‑9‑322(a) (the first to file or perfect rule) or under Section 36‑9‑324 (the purchase‑money priority rule). SP‑1 can meet this condition because SP‑2’s sole basis for claiming priority is that it met the requirements under Section 36‑9‑324(a) for the purchase‑ money priority in goods other than inventory or livestock.

The practical effect of Section 36‑9‑325 and the overruling of Seebrite Corp. v. Transouth Financial Co. is to impose upon a secured party the same burden of inquiry imposed upon a buyer who does not qualify as “a buyer in ordinary course of business” protected under Section 36‑9‑320(a) The buyer not in ordinary course must determine whether the goods in the hands of his seller are encumbered and whether the secured party has authorized the sale. This problem is most likely to arise when a debtor not in the business of selling goods of that kind sells an item of collateral. In that context the buyer cannot qualify as a buyer in ordinary course under Section 36‑1‑301(9). For example, if Bank held a perfected security interest in a piece of equipment Debtor uses to manufacture a product and Debtor subsequently sells the piece of equipment to Used Equipment Dealer, Dealer cannot qualify as a buyer in ordinary course protected under sections 36‑9‑320 because Debtor was not in the business of selling used equipment. Therefore, whether Dealer acquired the goods subject to Bank’s security interest will turn on whether Bank authorized the sale. If the sale was unauthorized not only does Dealer acquire the equipment subject to Bank’s security interest but under Section 36‑9‑325 any security interest which Dealer grants in the equipment is also subject to Bank’s security interest.

Definitional Cross References:

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| “Collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |

Cross References—

1. A security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding a sale or other disposition unless the secured party authorized the disposition free of the security interest. Section 36‑9‑315(a)(1).

2. Buyers who take free of an unperfected security interest. Section 36‑9‑317(b).

3. Buyers in ordinary course who take free of a perfected security interest created by the buyer’s seller. Sections 36‑9‑320(a) and 36‑1‑201(9).

4. A filed financing statement remains effective with respect to collateral that is sold. Section 36‑9‑507(a). But if the buyer is located in another jurisdiction the security interest will remain perfected for only one year after the sale. Section 36‑9‑316(a)(3).

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 139, 145.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak139; 349Ak145.

**SECTION 36‑9‑326.** Priority of security interests created by new debtor.

(a) Subject to subsection (b), a security interest that is created by a new debtor in collateral in which the new debtor has or acquires rights and is perfected solely by a filed financing statement that would be ineffective to perfect the security interest but for the application of Section 36‑9‑316(i)(1) or Section 36‑9‑508 is subordinate to a security interest in the same collateral which is perfected other than by such a filed financing statement.

(b) The other provisions of this part determine the priority among conflicting security interests in the same collateral perfected by filed financing statements described in subsection (a). However, if the security agreements to which a new debtor became bound as debtor were not entered into by the same original debtor, the conflicting security interests rank according to priority in time of the new debtor’s having become bound.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12; 2013 Act No. 96, Section 8, eff July 1, 2013.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. New.

2. Subordination of Security Interests Created by New Debtor. This Section addresses the priority contests that may arise when a new debtor becomes bound by the security agreement of an original debtor and each debtor has a secured creditor.

Subsection (a) subordinates the original debtor’s secured party’s security interest perfected against the new debtor by a filed financing statement that would be ineffective to perfect the security interest but for Section 9‑508 or, if the original debtor and new debtor are located in different jurisdictions, Section 9‑316(i)(1). The security interest is subordinated to security interests in the same collateral perfected by another method, e.g., by filing against the new debtor. This section does not subordinate a security interest perfected by a new initial financing statement providing the name of the new debtor, even if the initial financing statement is filed to maintain the effectiveness of a financing statement under the circumstances described in Section 9‑508(b). Nor does it subordinate a security interest perfected by a financing statement filed against the original debtor which remains effective against collateral transferred by the original debtor to the new debtor. See Section 9‑508(c). Concerning priority contests involving transferred collateral, see Sections 9‑325 and 9‑507.

Example 1: SP‑X holds a perfected‑by‑filing security interest in X Corp’s existing and after‑acquired inventory, and SP‑Z holds a perfected‑by‑ possession security interest in an item of Z Corp’s inventory. Both X Corp and Z Corp are located in the same jurisdiction under Section 9‑307. Z Corp becomes bound as debtor by X Corp’s security agreement (e.g., Z Corp buys X Corp’s assets and assumes its security agreement). See Section 9‑203(d). But for Section 9‑508, SP‑X’s financing statement would be ineffective to perfect a security interest in the item of inventory in which Z Corp has rights. However, subsection (a) provides that SP‑X’s perfected security interest is subordinate to SP‑Z’s, regardless of whether SP‑X’s financing statement was filed before SP‑Z perfected its security interest.

Example 2: SP‑X holds a perfected‑by‑filing security interest in X Corp’s existing and after‑acquired inventory, and SP‑Z holds a perfected‑by‑filing security interest in Z Corp’s existing and after‑acquired inventory. Both X Corp and Z Corp are located in the same jurisdiction under Section 9‑307. Z Corp becomes bound as debtor by X Corp’s security agreement. Immediately thereafter, and before the effectiveness of SP‑X’s financing statement lapses, Z Corp acquires a new item of inventory. But for Section 9‑508, SP‑X’ s financing statement would be ineffective to perfect a security interest in the new item of inventory in which Z Corp has rights. However, because SP‑Z’s security interest was perfected by a filing whose effectiveness does not depend on Section 9‑316(i)(1) or 9‑508, subsection (a) subordinates SP‑X’s perfected security interest to SP‑Z’s. This would be the case even if SP‑Z filed after Z Corp became bound by X Corp’s security agreement, and regardless of which financing statement was filed first. The same result would obtain if X Corp and Z Corp were located in different locations. SP‑X’s security interest would be perfected by a financing statement that would be ineffective but for Section 9‑316(i)(1), whereas the effectiveness of SP‑Z’s filing does not depend on Section 9‑316(i)(1) or 9‑508.

3. Other Priority Rules. Subsection (b) addresses the priority among security interests created by the original debtor (X Corp). By invoking the other priority rules of this subpart, as applicable, subsection (b) preserves the relative priority of security interests created by the original debtor.

Example 3: Under the facts of Example 2, SP‑Y also holds a perfected‑by‑ filing security interest in X Corp’s existing and after‑acquired inventory. SP‑Y filed after SP‑X. Inasmuch as both SP‑X’s and SP‑Y’s security interests in inventory acquired by Z Corp after it became bound would be unperfected but for the application of Section 9‑508, the normal priority rules determine their relative priorities. Under the “first‑to‑file‑or‑perfect” rule of Section 9‑322(a)(1), SP‑X has priority over SP‑Y.

Example 4: Under the facts of Example 3, after Z Corp became bound by X Corp’s security agreement, SP‑Y promptly filed a new initial financing statement against Z Corp. SP‑X’s security interest remains perfected only by virtue of its original filing against X Corp which “would be ineffective to perfect the security interest but for the application of Section 9‑508.” Because SP‑Y’s security interest is perfected by the filing of a financing statement whose effectiveness does not depend on Section 9‑508 or Section 9‑316(i)(1), subsection (a) subordinates SP‑X’s security interest to SP‑Y’s. If both SP‑X and SP‑Y file a new initial financing statement against Z Corp, then the “first‑to‑file‑or‑perfect” rule of Section 9‑322(a)(1) governs their priority inter se as well as their priority against SP‑Z.

The second sentence of subsection (b) effectively limits the applicability of the first sentence to situations in which a new debtor has become bound by more than one security agreement entered into by the same original debtor. When the new debtor has become bound by security agreements entered into by different original debtors, the second sentence provides that priority is based on priority in time of the new debtor’s becoming bound.

Example 5: Under the facts of Example 2, SP‑W holds a perfected‑by‑filing security interest in W Corp’s existing and after‑acquired inventory. After Z Corp became bound by X Corp’s security agreement in favor of SP‑X, Z Corp became bound by W Corp’s security agreement. Under subsection (b), SP‑W’s security interest in inventory acquired by Z Corp is subordinate to that of SP‑X, because Z Corp became bound under SP‑X’s security agreement before it became bound under SP‑W’s security agreement. This is the result regardless of which financing statement (SP‑X’s or SP‑W’s) was filed first.

The second sentence of subsection (b) reflects the generally accepted view that priority based on the first‑to‑file rule is inappropriate for resolving priority disputes when the filings were made against different debtors. Like subsection (a) and the first sentence of subsection (b), however, the second sentence of subsection (b) relates only to priority conflicts among security interests that would be unperfected but for the application of Section 9‑316(i)(1) or Section 9‑508.

Example 6: Under the facts of Example 5, after Z Corp became bound by W Corp’s security agreement, SP‑W promptly filed a new initial financing statement against Z Corp. At that time, SP‑X’s security interest was perfected only pursuant to its original filing against X Corp which “would be ineffective to perfect the security interest but for the application of Section 9‑508.” Because SP‑W’s security interest is perfected by the filing of a financing statement whose effectiveness does not depend on Section 9‑316(i)(1) or Section 9‑508, subsection (a) subordinates SP‑X’s security interest to SP‑w’S. If both SP‑X and SP‑W file a new initial financing statement against Z Corp, then the “first‑to‑file‑or‑perfect” rule of Section 9‑322(a)(1) governs their priority inter se as well as their priority against SP‑Z.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑326 resolves priority conflicts that arise when a person becomes bound by a security agreement entered into by another person. To illustrate, assume that on February 1, A Corporation entered into a security agreement with SP‑1 that granted SP‑1 a security interest upon SP‑1’s current and after acquired inventory. On February 1, SP‑1 properly filed a financing statement covering A Corporation’s inventory. Effective April 1 A Corporation was merged with B Corporation with B Corporation surviving the merger. Under applicable corporate law B Corporation became generally obligated for A Corporation’s obligations including the debt owed to SP‑1. Under applicable corporate law B Corporation also acquired all of A Corporation’s assets. On May 1 B Corporation entered into a security agreement with SP‑2 granting SP‑2 a security interest upon B Corporation’s current and after acquired inventory. On May 1, SP‑2 properly filed a financing statement covering B Corporation’s inventory. On July 1, following defaults upon both the security agreement with SP‑1 and SP‑2 a priority dispute arose over inventory acquired by B Corporation after the effective date of the merger.

Under Section 36‑9‑203(d)(2) B Corporation qualified as a “new debtor” and was bound by the security agreement entered into by A Corporation and SP‑1. As a result, under Section 36‑9‑203(e) the security agreement entered into by A Corporation was effective to give SP‑1 a security interest in the post‑merger inventory acquired by B Corporation. Under Section 36‑9‑508 SP‑1’s filed financing statement was effective to perfect SP‑1’s security interest in inventory acquired by B Corporation for four months following the merger.

Although SP‑1 holds a perfected security interest in B Corporation’s post‑ merger inventory and SP‑1 filed before SP‑2, SP‑1’s financing statement is effective solely under section 9‑508. As a result, Section 36‑9‑325(a) subordinates SP‑1’s security interest to the security interest B Corporation granted SP‑2.

The 2013 amendments revised Section 36‑9‑326 to incorporate the amendment to Section 36‑9‑316(i) and clarifies when a security interest created by a new debtor is subordinated.

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|  | Definitional Cross: |  |
| “Collateral” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Debtor” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “Financing Statement” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(39) |
| “New debtor” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(56) |
| “Original debtor” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(60) |
| “Security interest” | | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |
|  | Cross— |  |

1. Requirements for becoming bound as a new debtor to a security agreement entered into by an original debtor. Section 36‑9‑203(d).

2. The effect of becoming bound as a new debtor. Section 36‑9‑203(e).

3. Effectiveness of a financing statement filed under the name of the original debtor to perfect a security interest in collateral acquired by the new debtor. Section 36‑9‑508.

4. When a financing statement filed under the name of the original debtor becomes seriously misleading. Section 36‑9‑506.

5. Effectiveness of financing statement with respect to collateral sold or otherwise disposed of. Section 36‑9‑325.

6. Priority of perfected security interest in collateral sold or otherwise disposed of. Section 36‑9‑325.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 98, 135, 138.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak98; 349Ak135; 349Ak138.

**SECTION 36‑9‑327.** Priority of security interests in deposit account.

The following rules govern priority among conflicting security interests in the same deposit account:

(1) A security interest held by a secured party having control of the deposit account under Section 36‑9‑104 has priority over a conflicting security interest held by a secured party that does not have control.

(2) Except as otherwise provided in items (3) and (4), security interests perfected by control under Section 36‑9‑314 rank according to priority in time of obtaining control.

(3) Except as otherwise provided in item (4), a security interest held by the bank with which the deposit account is maintained has priority over a conflicting security interest held by another secured party.

(4) A security interest perfected by control under Section 36‑9‑104(a)(3) has priority over a security interest held by the bank with which the deposit account is maintained.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. New; derived from former Section 9‑115(5).

2. Scope of This Section. This Section contains the rules governing the priority of conflicting security interests in deposit accounts. It overrides conflicting priority rules. See Sections 9‑322(f)(1), 9‑324(a), (b), (d), (f). This Section does not apply to accounts evidenced by an instrument (e.g., certain certificates of deposit), which by definition are not “deposit accounts.”

3. Control. Under paragraph (1), security interests perfected by control (Sections 9‑314, 9‑104) take priority over those perfected otherwise, e.g., as identifiable cash proceeds under Section 9‑315. Secured parties for whom the deposit account is an integral part of the credit decision will, at a minimum, insist upon the right to immediate access to the deposit account upon the debtor’s default (i.e., control). Those secured parties for whom the deposit account is less essential will not take control, thereby running the risk that the debtor will dispose of funds on deposit (either outright or for collateral purposes) after default but before the account can be frozen by court order or the secured party can obtain control.

Paragraph (2) governs the case (expected to be very rare) in which a bank enters into a Section 9‑104(a)(2) control agreement with more than one secured party. It provides that the security interests rank according to time of obtaining control. If the bank is solvent and the control agreements are well drafted, the bank will be liable to each secured party, and the priority rule will have no practical effect.

4. Priority of Bank. Under paragraph (3), the security interest of the bank with which the deposit account is maintained normally takes priority over all other conflicting security interests in the deposit account, regardless of whether the deposit account constitutes the competing secured party’s original collateral or its proceeds. A rule of this kind enables banks to extend credit to their depositors without the need to examine either the public record or their own records to determine whether another party might have a security interest in the deposit account.

A secured party who takes a security interest in the deposit account as original collateral can protect itself against the results of this rule in one of two ways. It can take control of the deposit account by becoming the bank’s customer. Under paragraph (4), this arrangement operates to subordinate the bank’s security interest. Alternatively, the secured party can obtain a subordination agreement from the bank. See Section 9‑339.

A secured party who claims the deposit account as proceeds of other collateral can reduce the risk of becoming junior by obtaining the debtor’s agreement to deposit proceeds into a specific cash‑collateral account and obtaining the agreement of that bank to subordinate all its claims to those of the secured party. But if the debtor violates its agreement and deposits funds into a deposit account other than the cash‑collateral account, the secured party risks being subordinated.

5. Priority in Proceeds of, and Funds Transferred from, Deposit Account. The priority afforded by this Section does not extend to proceeds of a deposit account. Rather, Section 9‑322(c) through (e) and the provisions referred to in Section 9‑322(f) govern priorities in proceeds of a deposit account. Section 9‑315(d) addresses continuation of perfection in proceeds of deposit accounts. As to funds transferred from a deposit account that serves as collateral, see Section 9‑332.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑327 provides the rules for resolving priority disputes between conflicting security interests in deposit accounts. Except in consumer transactions, a secured party can take a security interest in a deposit account as original collateral. See Section 36‑9‑109(d)(13). Such security interests can be perfected only by control under Section 36‑9‑104. See Section 36‑9‑314(a) and 36‑9‑312(b)(1). A secured party may also obtain a security interest in a deposit account by identifying cash proceeds that have been deposited into the account. See Section 36‑9‑315(a)(2) and (b).

Section 36‑9‑327(1) provides that a security interest in a deposit account perfected by control has priority over a security interest held by a secured party who does not have control. If the bank at which the deposit account is maintained has a security interest in the deposit account, the bank will have control of the account under Section 36‑9‑104(1). Moreover, under Section 36‑9‑327(3) a bank with a security interest perfected by control under Subsection 36‑9‑104(1) has priority over a conflicting security interest of a secured party who has control pursuant to a control agreement under Section 36‑9‑104(2). In contrast, under Section 36‑9‑327(4) the security interest of the bank at which the account is maintained will be subordinate to a security interest held by a secured party who established control by becoming a customer of the bank pursuant to Section 36‑9‑104(3). In the event that there is more than one security interest perfected by control and neither Subsection 36‑9‑327(3) nor (4) apply, subsection (2) provides that the security interests rank according to priority in time of obtaining control.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Bank” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(8) |
| “Control” | See Section 36‑9‑104 |
| “Deposit account” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(29) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |

Cross References—

1. Exclusion of security interests in deposit accounts in consumer transactions from the scope of Article 9. Section 36‑9‑109(d)(13).

2. The requirements for obtaining control of a deposit account. Section 36‑9‑104.

3. Control of a deposit account satisfies the evidentiary requirement for creation of an enforceable security interest. Section 36‑9‑203(b)(3)(D).

4. Control as the exclusive method of perfection of a security interest in a deposit account as original collateral. Sections 36‑9‑203(f), 36‑9‑312( b)(1).

5. Establishing a security interest in a deposit account by identifying cash proceeds. Sections 36‑9‑203(f), 36‑9‑315(a)(2) and (b).

6. Perfection of a security interest in identifiable cash proceeds. Section 36‑9‑315(c) and (d)(2).

7. A security interest that qualifies for priority under Section 36‑9‑327 has priority over a security interest in identifiable cash proceeds which qualifies for a purchase‑money priority. Section 36‑9‑324(a), (b), (d), and (f).

8. Special priority rules for proceeds of a deposit account. Section 36‑9‑322(c), (d), and (e).

9. Effectiveness of a bank’s right of set‑off or recoupment against a deposit account which is subject to a security interest. Section 36‑9‑340.

10. A bank’s rights and duties with respect to deposit accounts and control agreements. Sections 36‑9‑341 and 36‑9‑342.

11. Rights of transferees of funds from a deposit account that is subject to a security interest. Section 36‑9‑332.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Banks and Banking 136.

Secured Transactions 138 to 150.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 52k136; 349Ak138 to 349Ak150.

**SECTION 36‑9‑328.** Priority of security interests in investment property.

The following rules govern priority among conflicting security interests in the same investment property:

(1) A security interest held by a secured party having control of investment property under Section 36‑9‑106 has priority over a security interest held by a secured party that does not have control of the investment property.

(2) Except as otherwise provided in items (3) and (4), conflicting security interests held by secured parties each of which has control under Section 36‑9‑106 rank according to priority in time of:

(A) if the collateral is a security, obtaining control;

(B) if the collateral is a security entitlement carried in a securities account and:

(i) if the secured party obtained control under Section 36‑8‑106(d)(1), the secured party’s becoming the person for which the securities account is maintained;

(ii) if the secured party obtained control under Section 36‑8‑106(d)(2), the securities intermediary’s agreement to comply with the secured party’s entitlement orders with respect to security entitlements carried or to be carried in the securities account; or

(iii) if the secured party obtained control through another person under Section 36‑8‑106(d)(3), the time on which priority would be based under this paragraph if the other person were the secured party; or

(C) if the collateral is a commodity contract carried with a commodity intermediary, the satisfaction of the requirement for control specified in Section 36‑9‑106(b)(2) with respect to commodity contracts carried or to be carried with the commodity intermediary.

(3) A security interest held by a securities intermediary in a security entitlement or a securities account maintained with the securities intermediary has priority over a conflicting security interest held by another secured party.

(4) A security interest held by a commodity intermediary in a commodity contract or a commodity account maintained with the commodity intermediary has priority over a conflicting security interest held by another secured party.

(5) A security interest in a certificated security in registered form which is perfected by taking delivery under Section 36‑9‑313(a) and not by control under Section 36‑9‑314 has priority over a conflicting security interest perfected by a method other than control.

(6) Conflicting security interests created by a broker, securities intermediary, or commodity intermediary which are perfected without control under Section 36‑9‑106 rank equally.

(7) In all other cases, priority among conflicting security interests in investment property is governed by Sections 36‑9‑322 and 36‑9‑323.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑115(5).

2. Scope of This Section. This Section contains the rules governing the priority of conflicting security interests in investment property. Paragraph (1) states the most important general rule‑that a secured party who obtains control has priority over a secured party who does not obtain control. Paragraphs (2) through (4) deal with conflicting security interests each of which is perfected by control. Paragraph (5) addresses the priority of a security interest in a certificated security which is perfected by delivery but not control. Paragraph (6) deals with the relatively unusual circumstance in which a broker, securities intermediary, or commodity intermediary has created conflicting security interests none of which is perfected by control. Paragraph (7) provides that the general priority rules of Sections 9‑322 and 9‑323 apply to cases not covered by the specific rules in this Section. The principal application of this residual rule is that the usual first in time of filing rule applies to conflicting security interests that are perfected only by filing. Because the control priority rule of paragraph (1) provides for the ordinary cases in which persons purchase securities on margin credit from their brokers, there is no need For special rules for purchase‑money security interests. See also Section 9‑103 (limiting purchase‑money collateral to goods and software).

3. General Rule: Priority of Security Interest Perfected by Control. Under paragraph (1), a secured party who obtains control has priority over a secured party who does not obtain control. The control priority rule does not turn on either temporal sequence or awareness of conflicting security interests. Rather, it is a structural rule, based on the principle that a lender should be able to rely on the collateral without question if the lender has taken the necessary steps to assure itself that it is in a position where it can foreclose on the collateral without further action by the debtor. The control priority rule is necessary because the perfection rules provide considerable flexibility in structuring secured financing arrangements. For example, at the “retail” level, a secured lender to an investor who wants the full measure of protection can obtain control, but the creditor may be willing to accept the greater measure of risk that follows from perfection by filing. Similarly, at the “wholesale” level, a lender to securities firms can leave the collateral with the debtor and obtain a perfected security interest under the automatic perfection rule of Section 9‑309(10), but a lender who wants to be entirely sure of its position will want to obtain control. The control priority rule of paragraph (1) is an essential part of this system of flexibility. It is feasible to provide more than one method of perfecting security interests only if the rules ensure that those who take the necessary steps to obtain the full measure of protection do not run the risk of subordination to those who have not taken such steps. A secured party who is unwilling to run the risk that the debtor has granted or will grant a conflicting control security interest should not make a loan without obtaining control of the collateral.

As applied to the retail level, the control priority rule means that a secured party who obtains control has priority over a conflicting security interest perfected by filing without regard to inquiry into whether the control secured party was aware of the filed security interest. Prior to the 1994 revisions to Articles 8 and 9, Article 9 did not permit perfection of security interests in securities by filing. Accordingly, parties who deal in securities never developed a practice of searching the UCC files before conducting securities transactions. Although filing is now a permissible method of perfection, in order to avoid disruption of existing practices in this business it is necessary to give perfection by filing a different and more limited effect for securities than for some other forms of collateral. The priority rules are not based on the assumption that parties who perfect by the usual method of obtaining control will search the files. Quite the contrary, the control priority rule is intended to ensure that, with respect to investment property, secured parties who do obtain control are entirely unaffected by filings. To state the point another way, perfection by filing is intended to affect only general creditors or other secured creditors who rely on filing. The rule that a security interest perfected by filing can be primed by a control security interest, without regard to awareness, is a consequence of the system of perfection and priority rules for investment property. These rules are designed to take account of the circumstances of the securities markets, where filing is not given the same effect as for some other forms of property. No implication is made about the effect of filing with respect to security interests in other forms of property, nor about other Article 9 rules, e.g., Section 9‑330, which govern the circumstances in which security interests in other forms of property perfected by filing can be primed by subsequent perfected security interests.

The following examples illustrate the application of the priority rule in paragraph (1):

Example 1: Debtor borrows from Alpha and grants Alpha a security interest in a variety of collateral, including all of Debtor’s investment property. At that time Debtor owns 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock for which Debtor has a certificate. Alpha perfects by filing. Later, Debtor borrows from Beta and grants Beta a security interest in the 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock. Debtor delivers the certificate, properly indorsed, to Beta. Alpha and Beta both have perfected security interests in the XYZ Co. stock. Beta has control, see Section 8‑106(b)(1), and hence has priority over Alpha.

Example 2: Debtor borrows from Alpha and grants Alpha a security interest in a variety of collateral, including all of Debtor’s investment property. At that time Debtor owns 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock, held through a securities account with Able & Co. Alpha perfects by filing. Later, Debtor borrows from Beta and grants Beta a security interest in the 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock. Debtor instructs Able to have the 1000 shares transferred through the clearing corporation to Custodian Bank, to be credited to Beta’s account with Custodian Bank. Alpha and Beta both have perfected security interests in the XYZ Co. stock. Beta has control, see Section 8‑106(d)(1), and hence has priority over Alpha.

Example 3: Debtor borrows from Alpha and grants Alpha a security interest in a variety of collateral, including all of Debtor’s investment property. At that time Debtor owns 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock, which is held through a securities account with Able & Co. Alpha perfects by filing. Later, Debtor borrows from Beta and grants Beta a security interest in the 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock. Debtor, Able, and Beta enter into an agreement under which Debtor will continue to receive dividends and distributions, and will continue to have the right to direct dispositions, but Beta will also have the right to direct dispositions and receive the proceeds. Alpha and Beta both have perfected security interests in the XYZ Co. stock (more precisely, in the Debtor’s security entitlement to the financial asset consisting of the XYZ Co. stock). Beta has control, see Section 8‑106(d)(2), and hence has priority over Alpha.

Example 4: Debtor borrows from Alpha and grants Alpha a security interest in a variety of collateral, including all of Debtor’s investment property. At that time Debtor owns 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock, held through a securities account with Able & Co. Alpha perfects by filing. Debtor’s agreement with Able & Co. provides that Able has a security interest in all securities carried in the account as security for any obligations of Debtor to Able. Debtor incurs obligations to Able and later defaults on the obligations to Alpha and Able. Able has control by virtue of the rule of Section 8‑106(e) that if a customer grants a security interest to its own intermediary, the intermediary has control. Since Alpha does not have control, Able has priority over Alpha under the general control priority rule of paragraph (1).

4. Conflicting Security Interests Perfected by Control: Priority of Securities Intermediary or Commodity Intermediary. Paragraphs (2) through (4) govern the priority of conflicting security interests each of which is perfected by control. The following example explains the application of the rules in paragraphs (3) and (4):

Example 5: Debtor holds securities through a securities account with Able & Co. Debtor’s agreement with Able & Co. provides that Able has a security interest in all securities carried in the account as security for any obligations of Debtor to Able. Debtor borrows from Beta and grants Beta a security interest in 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock carried in the account. Debtor, Able, and Beta enter into an agreement under which Debtor will continue to receive dividends and distributions and will continue to have the right to direct dispositions, but Beta will also have the right to direct dispositions and receive the proceeds. Debtor incurs obligations to Able and later defaults on the obligations to Beta and Able. Both Beta and Able have control, so the general control priority rule of paragraph (1) does not apply. Compare Example 4. Paragraph (3) provides that a security interest held by a securities intermediary in positions of its own customer has priority over a conflicting security interest of an external lender, so Able has priority over Beta. (Paragraph (4) contains a parallel rule for commodity intermediaries.) The agreement among Able, Beta, and Debtor could, of course, determine the relative priority of the security interests of Able and Beta, see Section 9‑339, but the fact that the intermediary has agreed to act on the instructions of a secured party such as Beta does not itself imply any agreement by the intermediary to subordinate.

5. Conflicting Security Interests Perfected by Control: Temporal Priority. Former Section 9‑115 introduced into Article 9 the concept of conflicting security interests that rank equally. Paragraph (2) of this Section governs priority in those circumstances in which more than one secured party (other than a broker, securities intermediary, or commodity intermediary) has control. It replaces the equal‑priority rule for conflicting security interests in investment property with a temporal rule. For securities, both certificated and uncertificated, under paragraph (2)(A) priority is based on the time that control is obtained. For security entitlements carried in securities accounts, the treatment is more complex. Paragraph (2)(B) bases priority on the timing of the steps taken to achieve control. The following example illustrates the application of paragraph (2).

Example 6: Debtor borrows from Alpha and grants Alpha a security interest in a variety of collateral, including all of Debtor’s investment property. At that time Debtor owns a security entitlement that includes 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock that Debtor holds through a securities account with Able & Co. Debtor, Able, and Alpha enter into an agreement under which Debtor will continue to receive dividends and distributions, and will continue to have the right to direct dispositions, but Alpha will also have the right to direct dispositions and receive the proceeds. Later, Debtor borrows from Beta and grants Beta a security interest in all its investment property, existing and after‑acquired. Debtor, Able, and Beta enter into an agreement under which Debtor will continue to receive dividends and distributions, and will continue to have the right to direct dispositions, but Beta will also have the right to direct dispositions and receive the proceeds. Alpha and Beta both have perfected‑by‑control security interests in the security entitlement to the XYZ Co. stock by virtue of their agreements with Able. See Sections 9‑314(a), 9‑106(a), 8‑106(d)(2). Under paragraph (2)(B)(ii), the priority of each security interest dates from the time of the secured party’s agreement with Able. Because Alpha’s agreement was first in time, Alpha has priority. This priority applies equally to security entitlements to financial assets credited to the account after the agreement was entered into.

The priority rule is analogous to “first‑to‑file” priority under Section 9‑322 with respect to after‑acquired collateral. Paragraphs (2)(B)(i) and (2)(B)(iii) provide similar rules for security entitlements as to which control is obtained by other methods, and paragraph (2)(C) provides a similar rule for commodity contracts carried in a commodity account. Section 8‑510 also has been revised to provide a temporal priority conforming to paragraph (2)(B).

6. Certificated Securities. A long‑standing practice has developed whereby secured parties whose collateral consists of a security evidenced by a security certificate take possession of the security certificate. If the security certificate is in bearer form, the secured party’s acquisition of possession constitutes “delivery” under Section 8‑301(a)(1), and the delivery constitutes “control” under Section 8‑106(a). Comment 5 discusses the priority of security interests perfected by control of investment property.

If the security certificate is in registered form, the secured party will not achieve control over the security unless the security certificate contains an appropriate indorsement or is (re)registered in the secured party’s name. See Section 8‑106(b). However, the secured party’s acquisition of possession constitutes “delivery” of the security certificate under Section 8‑301 and serves to perfect the security interest under Section 9‑313(a), even if the security certificate has not been appropriately indorsed and has not been (re)registered in the secured party’s name. A security interest perfected by this method has priority over a security interest perfected other than by control (e.g., by filing). See paragraph (5).

The priority rule stated in paragraph (5) may seem anomalous, in that it can afford less favorable treatment to purchasers who buy collateral outright that to those who take a security interest in it. For example, a buyer of a security certificate would cut off a security interest perfected by filing only if the buyer achieves the status of a protected purchaser under Section 8‑303. The buyer would not be a protected purchaser, for example, if it does not obtain “control” under Section 8‑106 (e.g., if it fails to obtain a proper indorsement of the certificate) or if it had notice of an adverse claim under Section 8‑105. The apparent anomaly disappears, however, when one understands the priority rule not as one intended to protect careless or guilty parties, but as one that eliminates the need to conduct a search of the public records only insofar as necessary to serve the needs of the securities markets.

7. Secured Financing of Securities Firms. Priority questions concerning security interests granted by brokers and securities intermediaries are governed by the general control‑beats‑non‑control priority rule of paragraph (1), as supplemented by the special rules set out in paragraphs (2) (temporal priority‑first to control), (3) (special priority for securities intermediary), and (6) (equal priority for non‑control). The following examples illustrate the priority rules as applied to this setting. (In all cases it is assumed that the debtor retains sufficient other securities to satisfy all customers’ claims. This Section deals with the relative rights of secured lenders to a securities firm. Disputes between a secured lender and the firm’s own customers are governed by Section 8‑511.)

Example 7: Able & Co., a securities dealer, enters into financing arrangements with two lenders, Alpha Bank and Beta Bank. In each case the agreements provide that the lender will have a security interest in the securities identified on lists provided to the lender on a daily basis, that the debtor will deliver the securities to the lender on demand, and that the debtor will not list as collateral any securities which the debtor has pledged to any other lender. Upon Able’s insolvency it is discovered that Able has listed the same securities on the collateral lists provided to both Alpha and Beta. Alpha and Beta both have perfected security interests under the automatic‑perfection rule of Section 9‑309(10). Neither Alpha nor Beta has control. Paragraph (6) provides that the security interests of Alpha and Beta rank equally, because each of them has a non‑control security interest granted by a securities firm. They share pro‑rata.

Example 8: Able enters into financing arrangements, with Alpha Bank and Beta Bank as in Example 7. At some point, however, Beta decides that it is unwilling to continue to provide financing on a non‑control basis. Able directs the clearing corporation where it holds its principal inventory of securities to move specified securities into Beta’s account. Upon Able’s insolvency it is discovered that a list of collateral provided to Alpha includes securities that had been moved to Beta’s account. Both Alpha and Beta have perfected security interests; Alpha under the automatic‑perfection rule of Section 9‑309(10), and Beta under that rule and also the perfection‑ by‑control rule in Section 9‑314(a). Beta has control but Alpha does not. Beta has priority over Alpha under paragraph (1).

Example 9: Able & Co. carries its principal inventory of securities through Clearing Corporation, which offers a “shared control” facility whereby a participant securities firm can enter into an arrangement with a lender under which the securities firm will retain the power to trade and otherwise direct dispositions of securities carried in its account, but Clearing Corporation agrees that, at any time the lender so directs, Clearing Corporation will transfer any securities from the firm’s account to the lender’s account or otherwise dispose of them as directed by the lender. Able enters into financing arrangements with two lenders, Alpha and Beta, each of which obtains such a control agreement from Clearing Corporation. The agreement with each lender provides that Able will designate specific securities as collateral on lists provided to the lender on a daily or other periodic basis, and that it will not pledge the same securities to different lenders. Upon Able’s insolvency, it is discovered that Able has listed the same securities on the collateral lists provided to both Alpha and Beta. Both Alpha and Beta have control over the disputed securities. Paragraph (2) awards priority to whichever secured party first entered into the agreement with Clearing Corporation.

8. Relation to Other Law. Section 1‑103 provides that “unless displaced by particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity . . . shall supplement its provisions.” There may be circumstances in which a secured party’s action in acquiring a security interest that has priority under this Section constitutes conduct that is wrongful under other law. Though the possibility of such resort to other law may provide an appropriate “escape valve” for cases of egregious conduct, care must be taken to ensure that this does not impair the certainty and predictability of the priority rules. Whether a court may appropriately look to other law to impose liability upon or estop a secured party from asserting its Article 9 priority depends on an assessment of the secured party’s conduct under the standards established by such other law as well as a determination of whether the particular application of such other law is displaced by the UCC.

Some circumstances in which other law is clearly displaced by the UCC rules are readily identifiable. Common law “first in time, first in right” principles, or correlative tort liability rules such as common law conversion principles under which a purchaser may incur liability to a person with a prior property interest without regard to awareness of that claim, are necessarily displaced by the priority rules set out in this Section since these rules determine the relative ranking of security interests in investment property. So too, Article 8 provides protections against adverse claims to certain purchasers of interests in investment property. In circumstances where a secured party not only has priority under Section 9‑328, but also qualifies for protection against adverse claims under Section 8‑303, 8‑502, or 8‑510, resort to other law would be precluded.

In determining whether it is appropriate in a particular case to look to other law, account must also be taken of the policies that underlie the commercial law rules on securities markets and security interests in securities. A principal objective of the 1994 revision of Article 8 and the provisions of Article 9 governing investment property was to ensure that secured financing transactions can be implemented on a simple, timely, and certain basis. One of the circumstances that led to the revision was the concern that uncertainty in the application of the rules on secured transactions involving securities and other financial assets could contribute to systemic risk by impairing the ability of financial institutions to provide liquidity to the markets in times of stress. The control priority rule is designed to provide a clear and certain rule to ensure that lenders who have taken the necessary steps to establish control do not face a risk of subordination to other lenders who have not done so.

The control priority rule does not turn on an inquiry into the state of a secured party’s awareness of potential conflicting claims because a rule under which a person’s rights depended on that sort of after‑the‑fact inquiry could introduce an unacceptable measure of uncertainty. If an inquiry into awareness could provide a complete and satisfactory resolution of the problem in all cases, the priority rules of this Section would have incorporated that test. The fact that they do not necessarily means that resort to other law based solely on that factor is precluded, though the question whether a control secured party induced or encouraged its financing arrangement with actual knowledge that the debtor would be violating the rights of another secured party may, in some circumstances, appropriately be treated as a factor in determining whether the control party’s action is the kind of egregious conduct for which resort to other law is appropriate.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑328 sets forth the priority rules governing conflicting security interests in investment property. The most significant priority rule in Section 36‑9‑328 results from the availability of multiple methods of perfecting a security interest in investment property. Section 36‑9‑314(a) provides that a security interest in investment property can be perfected by control under sections 36‑9‑106 and 36‑8‑106. Under Section 36‑9‑312(a) a secured party can also perfect a security interest in investment property by filing. Moreover, under sections 36‑9‑309(11) and (12) security interests of brokers, securities intermediaries, and commodity intermediaries in investment property may be perfected automatically. Under Subsection 36‑9‑328(1) a secured party with control over investment property has priority over a secured party who does not have control.

If all conflicting security interests are perfected by control, subsections (2), (3), and (4) provide the applicable priority rules. Under subsections (3) a securities intermediary with control under Section 36‑9‑106(b)(1) has priority with respect to a security entitlement or securities account maintained with the securities intermediary. Subsection (4) provides a comparable rule for commodity intermediaries. If subsections (3) and (4) are inapplicable, subsection (2) orders priority between conflicting security interests perfected by control based upon the time of obtaining control or taking the steps to obtain control.

Paragraph (5) provides a special rule for certificated securities in registered form that awards priority to a secured party who takes delivery.

Paragraph (6) provides that conflicting security interests of brokers, securities intermediaries, and commodity intermediaries perfected without control rank equally.

Definitional Cross References:

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| “Broker” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(3) |
| “Certificated security” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(4) |
| “Collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Commodity account” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(14) |
| “Commodity contract” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(15) |
| “Commodity intermediary” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(17) |
| “Control” | See Sections 36‑9‑106, 36‑8‑106 |
| “Delivery” | Section 36‑8‑301 |
| “Entitlement order” | Section 36‑8‑102(a)(8) |
| “Investment property” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(49) |
| “Registered form” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(13) |
| “Secured party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |
| “Securities account” | Section 36‑8‑501(a) |
| “Securities intermediary” | Section 36‑8‑102(a)(14) |
| “Security” | Section 36‑8‑102(a)(15) |
| “Security entitlement” | Section 36‑8‑102(a)(17) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |

Cross References—

1. Requirements for control of a certificated security in bearer form. Section 36‑8‑106(a).

2. Requirements for control of a certificated security in registered form. Section 36‑8‑106(b).

3. Requirements for control of an uncertificated security. Section 36‑8‑106(c).

4. Requirements for control of a security entitlement. Section 36‑8‑106(d).

5. Requirements for control of a securities account. Section 36‑9‑106(c).

6. Requirements for control of a commodity contract. Section 36‑9‑106(b).

7. Requirements for control of a commodity account. Section 36‑9‑106(c).

8. Control satisfies the evidentiary requirement for creation of an enforceable security interest in investment property. Section 36‑9‑203(b)(3)( D).

9. Security interest in favor of a securities intermediary who buys a financial asset for a person’s security account attaches automatically to the person’s security entitlement to secure the person’s obligation to pay for the financial asset. Section 36‑9‑206(a) and (b).

10. A security interest in investment property can be perfected by control. Section 36‑9‑314(a).

11. A security interest in certificated securities can be perfected by delivery. Sections 36‑9‑313(a) and 36‑8‑301(a).

12. A security interest in investment property can be perfected by filing. Section 36‑9‑312(a).

13. A security interest of a broker or securities intermediary in investment property is automatically perfected. Section 36‑9‑309(10).

14. A security interest of a commodity intermediary in a commodity account or commodity contract is automatically perfected. Section 36‑9‑309(11) .

15. Temporary automatic perfection of a security interest in certificated securities. Section 36‑9‑312(e) and (g).

16. A security interest in favor of a person who delivers a certificated security or other financial asset against payment to secure the obligation to make payment attaches automatically and its automatically perfected. Sections 36‑9‑206(c) and 36‑9‑309(9).

17. Special priority rules for proceeds of investment property where the secured party has qualified for priority under Section 36‑9‑328. Section 36‑9‑322(c).

18. Special priority rule for proceeds of investment property when the secured party has perfected in a manner other than filing. Section 36‑9‑322( d) and (e).

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 138 to 150.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak138 to 349Ak150.

**SECTION 36‑9‑329.** Priority of security interests in letter‑of‑credit right.

The following rules govern priority among conflicting security interests in the same letter‑of‑credit right:

(1) A security interest held by a secured party having control of the letter‑of‑credit right under Section 36‑9‑107 has priority to the extent of its control over a conflicting security interest held by a secured party that does not have control.

(2) Security interests perfected by control under Section 36‑9‑314 rank according to priority in time of obtaining control.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. New; loosely modeled after former Section 9‑115(5).

2. General Rule. Paragraph (1) awards priority to a secured party who perfects a security interest directly in letter‑of‑credit rights (i.e., one that takes an assignment of proceeds and obtains consent of the issuer or any nominated person under Section 5‑114(c)) over another conflicting security interest (i.e., one that is perfected automatically in the letter‑of‑ credit rights as supporting obligations under Section 9‑308(d)). This is consistent with international letter‑of‑credit practice and provides finality to payments made to recognized assignees of letter‑of‑credit proceeds. If an issuer or nominated person recognizes multiple security interests in a letter‑ of‑credit right, resulting in multiple parties having control (Section 9‑107) , under paragraph (2) the security interests rank according to the time of obtaining control.

3. Drawing Rights; Transferee Beneficiaries. Drawing under a letter of credit is personal to the beneficiary and requires the beneficiary to perform the conditions for drawing under the letter of credit. Accordingly, a beneficiary’s grant of a security interest in a letter of credit includes the beneficiary’s “letter‑of‑credit right” as defined in Section 9‑102 and the right to “proceeds of [the] letter of credit” as defined in Section 5‑114(a), but does not include the right to demand payment under the letter of credit.

Section 5‑114(e) provides that the “[r]ights of a transferee beneficiary or nominated person are independent of the beneficiary’s assignment of the proceeds of a letter of credit and are superior to the assignee’s right to the proceeds.” To the extent the rights of a transferee beneficiary or nominated person are independent and superior, this Article does not apply. See Section 9‑109(c).

Under Article 5, there is in effect a novation upon the transfer with the issuer becoming bound on a new, independent obligation to the transferee. The rights of nominated persons and transferee beneficiaries under a letter of credit include the right to demand payment from the issuer. Under Section 5‑114(e), their rights to payment are independent of their obligations to the beneficiary (or original beneficiary) and superior to the rights of assignees of letter‑of‑credit proceeds (Section 5‑114(c)) and others claiming a security interest in the beneficiary’s (or original beneficiary’s) letter‑of‑credit rights.

A transfer of drawing rights under a transferable letter of credit establishes independent Article 5 rights in the transferee and does not create or perfect an Article 9 security interest in the transferred drawing rights. The definition of “letter‑of‑credit right” in Section 9‑102 excludes a beneficiary’s drawing rights. The exercise of drawing rights by a transferee beneficiary may breach a contractual obligation of the transferee to the original beneficiary concerning when and how much the transferee may draw or how it may use the funds received under the letter of credit. If, for example, drawing rights are transferred to support a sale or loan from the transferee to the original beneficiary, then the transferee would be obligated to the original beneficiary under the sale or loan agreement to account for any drawing and for the use of any funds received. The transferee’s obligation would be governed by the applicable law of contracts or restitution.

4. Secured Party‑Transferee Beneficiaries. As described in Comment 3, drawing rights under letters of credit are transferred in many commercial contexts in which the transferee is not a secured party claiming a security interest in an underlying receivable supported by the letter of credit. Consequently, a transfer of a letter of credit is not a method of “perfection” of a security interest. The transferee’s independent right to draw under the letter of credit and to receive and retain the value thereunder (in effect, priority) is not based on Article 9 but on letter‑of‑credit law and the terms of the letter of credit. Assume, however, that a secured party does hold a security interest in a receivable that is owned by a beneficiary‑debtor and supported by a transferable letter of credit. Assume further that the beneficiary‑debtor causes the letter of credit to be transferred to the secured party, the secured party draws under the letter of credit, and, upon the issuer’s payment to the secured party‑ transferee, the underlying account debtor’s obligation to the original beneficiary‑debtor is satisfied. In this situation, the payment to the secured party‑transferee is proceeds of the receivable collected by the secured party‑transferee. Consequently, the secured party‑transferee would have certain duties to the debtor and third parties under Article 9. For example, it would be obliged to collect under the letter of credit in a commercially reasonable manner and to remit any surplus pursuant to Sections 9‑607 and 9‑608.

This scenario is problematic under letter‑of‑credit law and practice, inasmuch as a transferee beneficiary collects in its own right arising from its own performance. Accordingly, under Section 5‑114, the independent and superior rights of a transferee control over any inconsistent duties under Article 9. A transferee beneficiary may take a transfer of drawing rights to avoid reliance on the original beneficiary’s credit and collateral, and it may consider any Article 9 rights superseded by its Article 5 rights. Moreover, it will not always be clear (i) whether a transferee beneficiary has a security interest in the underlying collateral, (ii) whether any security interest is senior to the rights of others, or (iii) whether the transferee beneficiary is aware that it holds a security interest. There will be clear cases in which the role of a transferee beneficiary as such is merely incidental to a conventional secured financing. There also will be cases in which the existence of a security interest may have little to do with the position of a transferee beneficiary as such. In dealing with these cases and less clear cases involving the possible application of Article 9 to a nominated person or a transferee beneficiary, the right to demand payment under a letter of credit should be distinguished from letter‑of‑ credit rights. The courts also should give appropriate consideration to the policies and provisions of Article 5 and letter‑of‑credit practice as well as Article 9.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑329 states the rules that govern priority conflicts between security interests in letter‑by‑credit rights. Section 36‑9‑312(b)(2) provides that security interests in letter‑of‑credit rights can be perfected only by control under Section 36‑9‑107 or automatically under Section 36‑9‑308(d). The latter provision states that perfection in collateral perfects a security interest in a supporting obligation. Section 36‑9‑102(a)( 77) defines supporting obligation to include a letter‑of‑credit right that supports payment of an account, chattel paper, a general intangible, or an instrument. Section 36‑9‑203(f) provides that attachment of a security interest in collateral is also attachment of a security interest in a supporting obligation. Therefore, for example, if a secured party obtains an enforceable security interest in a debtor’s accounts which are backed by a letter‑of‑credit and files with respect to the accounts, the secured party will acquire a perfected security interest in the debtor’s letter‑of‑credit rights.

Section 36‑9‑329(a) addresses priority conflicts between a secured party who has control of a letter‑of‑credit right and a secured party who perfected a security interest in the letter‑of‑credit right under Section 36‑9‑308(d) and awards priority to secured party with control.

Section 36‑9‑329(b) addresses conflicts among security interests perfected by control and provides the security interests rank in order of the time of obtaining control.

[Note that if South Carolina fails to enact the 1995 revision of Article 5, serious interpretive problems will arise with respect to letter‑of‑credit rights. See Section 36‑9‑107, South Carolina Reporter’s Comment for an analysis of these problems]

Definitional Cross References:

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| “Letter‑of‑credit right” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(51) |
| “Proceeds of a letter of credit” | See Section 36‑5‑116(2) |
| “Secured party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |
| “Supporting obligation” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(77) |

Cross References—

1. Requirements for control of a letter‑of‑credit right. Section 36‑9‑107.

2. Control satisfies the evidentiary requirement for creation of an enforceable security interest in a letter‑of‑credit right. Section 36‑9‑203( b)(3)(D).

3. Control as the exclusive method of perfecting a security interest in a letter‑of‑credit right as original collateral. Sections 36‑9‑314(a) and 36‑9‑312(b)(2).

4. Attachment of a security interest in a letter‑of‑credit right as a supporting obligation. Section 36‑9‑203(f).

5. Automatic perfection of a security interest in a letter‑of‑credit right as a supporting obligation. Section 36‑9‑308(d).

6. Distinction between a security interest in a letter‑of‑credit and a transfer of a letter of credit. Section 36‑5‑116, Section 36‑5‑112 [1995 revision], Section 36‑5‑116 [1995 revision], Section 36‑9‑329, Official Comment 4.

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Westlaw Key Number Searches: 52k191; 349Ak138 to 349Ak150.

**SECTION 36‑9‑330.** Priority of purchaser of chattel paper or instrument.

(a) A purchaser of chattel paper has priority over a security interest in the chattel paper which is claimed merely as proceeds of inventory subject to a security interest if:

(1) in good faith and in the ordinary course of the purchaser’s business, the purchaser gives new value and takes possession of the chattel paper or obtains control of the chattel paper under Section 36‑9‑105; and

(2) the chattel paper does not indicate that it has been assigned to an identified assignee other than the purchaser.

(b) A purchaser of chattel paper has priority over a security interest in the chattel paper which is claimed other than merely as proceeds of inventory subject to a security interest if the purchaser gives new value and takes possession of the chattel paper or obtains control of the chattel paper under Section 36‑9‑105 in good faith, in the ordinary course of the purchaser’s business, and without knowledge that the purchase violates the rights of the secured party.

(c) Except as otherwise provided in Section 36‑9‑327, a purchaser having priority in chattel paper under subsection (a) or (b) also has priority in proceeds of the chattel paper to the extent that:

(1) Section 36‑9‑322 provides for priority in the proceeds; or

(2) the proceeds consist of the specific goods covered by the chattel paper or cash proceeds of the specific goods, even if the purchaser’s security interest in the proceeds is unperfected.

(d) Except as otherwise provided in Section 36‑9‑331(a), a purchaser of an instrument has priority over a security interest in the instrument perfected by a method other than possession if the purchaser gives value and takes possession of the instrument in good faith and without knowledge that the purchase violates the rights of the secured party.

(e) For purposes of subsections (a) and (b), the holder of a purchase‑money security interest in inventory gives new value for chattel paper constituting proceeds of the inventory.

(f) For purposes of subsections (b) and (d), if chattel paper or an instrument indicates that it has been assigned to an identified secured party other than the purchaser, a purchaser of the chattel paper or instrument has knowledge that the purchase violates the rights of the secured party.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑308.

2. Non‑Temporal Priority. This Article permits a security interest in chattel paper or instruments to be perfected either by filing or by the secured party’s taking possession. This Section enables secured parties and other purchasers of chattel paper (both electronic and tangible) and instruments to obtain priority over earlier‑perfected security interests.

3. Chattel Paper. Subsections (a) and (b) follow former Section 9‑308 in distinguishing between earlier‑perfected security interests in chattel paper that is claimed merely as proceeds of inventory subject to a security interest and chattel paper that is claimed other than merely as proceeds. Like former Section 9‑308, this Section does not elaborate upon the phrase “merely as proceeds.” For an elaboration, see PEB Commentary No. 8.

This Section makes explicit the “good faith” requirement and retains the requirements of “the ordinary course of the purchaser’s business” and the giving of “new value” as conditions for priority. Concerning the last, this Article deletes former Section 9‑108 and adds to Section 9‑102 a completely different definitioN of the term “new value.” Under subsection (e), the holder of a purchase‑money security interest in inventory is deemed to give “new value” for chattel paper constituting the proceeds of the inventory. Accordingly, the purchase‑money secured party may qualify for priority in the chattel paper under subsection (a) or (b), whichever is applicable, even if it does not make an additional advance against the chattel paper.

If a possessory security interest in tangible chattel paper or a perfected‑by‑control security interest in electronic chattel paper does not qualify for priority under this Section, it may be subordinate to a perfected‑by‑filing security interest under Section 9‑322(a)(1).

4. Possession. The priority afforded by this Section turns in part on whether a purchaser “takes possession” of tangible chattel paper. Similarly, the governing law provisions in Section 9‑301 address both “possessory” and “nonpossessory” security interests. Two common practices have raised particular concerns. First, in some cases the parties create more than one copy or counterpart of chattel paper evidencing a single secured obligation or lease. This practice raises questions as to which counterpart is the “original” and whether it is necessary for a purchaser to take possession of all counterparts in order to “take possession” of the chattel paper. Second, parties sometimes enter into a single “master” agreement. The master agreement contemplates that the parties will enter into separate “schedules” from time to time, each evidencing chattel paper. Must a purchaser of an obligation or lease evidenced by a single schedule also take possession of the master agreement as well as the schedule in order to “take possession” of the chattel paper?

The problem raised by the first practice is easily solved. The parties may in the terms of their agreement and by designation on the chattel paper identify only one counterpart as the original chattel paper for purposes of taking possession of the chattel paper. Concerns about the second practice also are easily solved by careful drafting. Each schedule should provide that it incorporates the terms of the master agreement, not the other way around. This will make it clear that each schedule is a “stand alone” document.

5. Chattel Paper Claimed Merely as Proceeds. Subsection (a) revises the rule in former Section 9‑308(b) to eliminate reference to what the purchaser knows. Instead, a purchaser who meets the possession or control, ordinary course, and new value requirements takes priority over a competing security interest unless the chattel paper itself indicates that it has been assigned to an identified assignee other than the purchaser. Thus subsection (a) recognizes the common practice of placing a “legend” on chattel paper to indicate that it has been assigned. This approach, under which the chattel paper purchaser who gives new value in ordinary course can rely on possession of unlegended, tangible chattel paper without any concern for other facts that it may know, comports with the expectations of both inventory and chattel paper financers.

6. Chattel Paper Claimed Other Than Merely as Proceeds. Subsection (b) eliminates the requirement that the purchaser take without knowledge that the “specific paper” is subject to the security interest and substitutes for it the requirement that the purchaser take “without knowledge that the purchase violates the rights of the secured party.” This standard derives from the definition of “buyer in ordinary course of business” in Section 1‑201(9). The source of the purchaser’s knowledge is irrelevant. Note, however, that “knowledge” means “actual knowledge.” Section 1‑201(25).

In contrast to a junior secured party in accounts, who may be required in some special circumstances to undertake a search under the “good faith” requirement, see Comment 5 to Section 9‑331, a purchaser of chattel paper under this Section is not required as a matter of good faith to make a search in order to determine the existence of prior security interests. There may be circumstances where the purchaser undertakes a search nevertheless, either on its own volition or because other considerations make it advisable to do so, e.g., where the purchaser also is purchasing accounts. Without more, a purchaser of chattel paper who has seen a financing statement covering the chattel paper or who knows that the chattel paper is encumbered with a security interest, does not have knowledge that its purchase violates the secured party’s rights. However, if a purchaser sees a statement in a financing statement to the effect that a purchase of chattel paper from the debtor would violate the rights of the filed secured party, the purchaser would have such knowledge. Likewise, under new subsection (f), if the chattel paper itself indicates that it had been assigned to an identified secured party other than the purchaser, the purchaser would have wrongful knowledge for purposes of subsection (b), thereby preventing the purchaser from qualifying for priority under that subsection, even if the purchaser did not have actual knowledge. In the case of tangible chattel paper, the indication normally would consist of a written legend on the chattel paper. In the case of electronic chattel paper, this Article leaves to developing market and technological practices the manner in which the chattel paper would indicate an assignment.

7. Instruments. Subsection (d) contains a special priority rule for instruments. Under this subsection, a purchaser of an instrument has priority over a security interest perfected by a method other than possession (e.g., by filing, temporarily under Section 9‑312(e) or (g), as proceeds under Section 9‑315(d), or automatically upon attachment under Section 9‑309(4) if the security interest arises out of a sale of the instrument) if the purchaser gives value and takes possession of the instrument in good faith and without knowledge that the purchase violates the rights of the secured party. Generally, to the extent subsection (d) conflicts with Section 3‑306, subsection (d) governs. See Section 3‑102(b). For example, notice of a conflicting security interest precludes a purchaser from becoming a holder in due course under Section 3‑302 and thereby taking free of all claims to the instrument under Section 3‑306. However, a purchaser who takes even with knowledge of the security interest qualifies for priority under subsection (d) if it takes without knowledge that the purchase violates the rights of the holder of the security interest. Likewise, a purchaser qualifies for priority under subsection (d) if it takes for “value” as defined in Section 1‑201, even if it does not take for “value” as defined in Section 3‑303.

Subsection (d) is subject to Section 9‑331(a), which provides that Article 9 does not limit the rights of a holder in due course under Article 3. Thus, in the rare case in which the purchaser of an instrument qualifies for priority under subsection (d), but another person has the rights of a holder in due course of the instrument, the other person takes free of the purchaser’s claim. See Section 3‑306.

The rule in subsection (d) is similar to the rules in subsections (a) and (b), which govern priority in chattel paper. The observations in Comment 6 concerning the requirement of good faith and the phrase “without knowledge that the purchase violates the rights of the secured party” apply equally to purchasers of instruments. However, unlike a purchaser of chattel paper, to qualify for priority under this Section a purchaser of an instrument need only give “value” as defined in Section 1‑201; it need not give “new value.” Also, the purchaser need not purchase the instrument in the ordinary course of its business.

Subsection (d) applies to checks as well as notes. For example, to collect and retain checks that are proceeds (collections) of accounts free of a senior secured party’s claim to the same checks, a junior secured party must satisfy the good‑faith requirement (honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing) of this subsection. This is the same good‑faith requirement applicable to holders in due course. See Section 9‑331, Comment 5.

8. Priority in Proceeds of Chattel Paper. Subsection (c) sets forth the two circumstances under which the priority afforded to a purchaser of chattel paper under subsection (a) or (b) extends also to proceeds of the chattel paper. The first is if the purchaser would have priority under the normal priority rules applicable to proceeds. The second, which the following Comments discuss in greater detail, is if the proceeds consist of the specific goods covered by the chattel paper. Former Article 9 generally was silent as to the priority of a security interest in proceeds when a purchaser qualifies for priority under Section 9‑308 (but see former Section 9‑306(5)(b), concerning returned and repossessed goods).

9. Priority in Returned and Repossessed Goods. Returned and repossessed goods may constitute proceeds of chattel paper. The following Comments explain the treatment of returned and repossessed goods as proceeds of chattel paper. The analysis is consistent with that of PEB Commentary No. 5, which these Comments replace, and is based upon the following example:

Example: SP‑1 has a security interest in all the inventory of a dealer in goods (Dealer); SP‑1’s security interest is perfected by filing. Dealer sells some of its inventory to a buyer in the ordinary course of business ( BIOCOB) pursuant to a conditional sales contract (chattel paper) that does not indicate that it has been assigned to SP‑1. SP‑2 purchases the chattel paper from Dealer and takes possession of the paper in good faith, in the ordinary course of business, and without knowledge that the purchase violates the rights of SP‑1. Subsequently, BIOCOB returns the goods to Dealer because they are defective. Alternatively, Dealer acquires possession of the goods following BIOCOB’s default.

10. Assignment of Non‑Lease Chattel Paper.

a. Loan by SP‑2 to Dealer Secured by Chattel Paper (or Functional Equivalent Pursuant to Recourse Arrangement).

(1) Returned Goods. If BIOCOB returns the goods to Dealer for repairs, Dealer is merely a bailee and acquires thereby no meaningful rights in the goods to which SP‑1’s security interest could attach. (Although SP‑1’s security interest could attach to Dealer’s interest as a bailee, that interest is not likely to be of any particular value to SP‑1.) Dealer is the owner of the chattel paper (i.e., the owner of a right to payment secured by a security interest in the goods); SP‑2 has a security interest in the chattel paper, as does SP‑1 (as proceeds of the goods under Section 9‑315). Under Section 9‑330, SP‑2’s security interest in the chattel paper is senior to that of SP‑1. SP‑2 enjoys this priority regardless of whether, or when, SP‑2 filed a financing statement covering the chattel paper. Because chattel paper and goods represent different types of collateral, Dealer does not have any meaningful interest in goods to which either SP‑1’s or SP‑2’s security interest could attach in order to secure Dealer’s obligations to either creditor. See Section 9‑102 (defining “chattel paper” and “goods”).

Now assume that BIOCOB returns the goods to Dealer under circumstances whereby Dealer once again becomes the owner of the goods. This would be the case, for example, if the goods were defective and BIOCOB was entitled to reject or revoke acceptance of the goods. See Sections 2‑602 (rejection), 2‑608 (revocation of acceptance). Unless BIOCOB has waived its defenses as against assignees of the chattel paper, SP‑1’s and SP‑2’s rights against BIOCOB would be subject to BIOCOB’s claims and defenses. See Sections 9‑403, 9‑404. SP‑1’s security interest would attach again because the returned goods would be proceeds of the chattel paper. Dealer’s acquisition of the goods easily can be characterized as “proceeds” consisting of an “in kind” collection on or distribution on account of the chattel paper. See Section 9‑102 (definition of “proceeds”). Assuming that SP‑1’s security interest is perfected by filing against the goods and that the filing is made in the same office where a filing would be made against the chattel paper, SP‑1’s security interest in the goods would remain perfected beyond the 20‑day period of automatic perfection. See Section 9‑315(e).

Because Dealer’s newly reacquired interest in the goods is proceeds of the chattel paper, SP‑2’s security interest also would attach in the goods as proceeds. If SP‑2 had perfected its security interest in the chattel paper by filing (again, assuming that filing against the chattel paper was made in the same office where a filing would be made against the goods), SP‑2’s security interest in the reacquired goods would be perfected beyond 20 days. See Section 9‑315(e). However, if SP‑2 had relied only on its possession of the chattel paper for perfection and had not filed against the chattel paper or the goods, SP‑2’s security interest would be unperfected after the 20‑day period. See Section 9‑315(e). Nevertheless, SP‑2’s unperfected security interest in the goods would be senior to SP‑1’s security interest under Section 9‑330(c). The result in this priority contest is not affected by SP‑2’s acquiescence or non‑acquiescence in the return of the goods to Dealer.

(2) Repossessed Goods. As explained above, Dealer owns the chattel paper covering the goods, subject to security interests in favor of SP‑1 and SP‑2. In Article 9 parlance, Dealer has an interest in chattel paper, not goods. If Dealer, SP‑1, or SP‑2 repossesses the goods upon BIOCOB’s default, whether the repossession is rightful or wrongful as among Dealer, SP‑1, or SP‑2, Dealer’s interest will not change. The location of goods and the party who possesses them does not affect the fact that Dealer’s interest is in chattel paper, not goods. The goods continue to be owned by BIOCOB. SP‑1’s security interest in the goods does not attach until such time as Dealer reacquires an interest (other than a bare possessory interest) in the goods. For example, Dealer might buy the goods at a foreclosure sale from SP‑2 (whose security interest in the chattel paper is senior to that of SP‑1); that disposition would cut off BIOCOB’s rights in the goods. Section 9‑617.

In many cases the matter would end upon sale of the goods to Dealer at a foreclosure sale and there would be no priority contest between SP‑1 and SP‑2; Dealer would be unlikely to buy the goods under circumstances whereby SP‑2 would retain its security interest. There can be exceptions, however. For example, Dealer may be obliged to purchase the goods from SP‑2 and SP‑2 may be obliged to convey the goods to Dealer, but Dealer may fail to pay SP‑2. Or, one could imagine that SP‑2, like SP‑1, has a general security interest in the inventory of Dealer. In the latter case, SP‑2 should not receive the benefit of any special priority rule, since its interest in no way derives from priority under Section 9‑330. In the former case, SP‑2’s security interest in the goods reacquired by Dealer is senior to SP‑1’s security interest under Section 9‑330.

b. Dealer’s Outright Sale of Chattel Paper to SP‑2. Article 9 also applies to a transaction whereby SP‑2 buys the chattel paper in an outright sale transaction without recourse against Dealer. Sections 1‑201(37), 9‑109(a). Although Dealer does not, in such a transaction, retain any residual ownership interest in the chattel paper, the chattel paper constitutes proceeds of the goods to which SP‑1’s security interest will attach and continue following the sale of the goods. Section 9‑315(a). Even though Dealer has not retained any interest in the chattel paper, as discussed above BIOCOB subsequently may return the goods to Dealer under circumstances whereby Dealer reacquires an interest in the goods. The priority contest between SP‑1 and SP‑2 will be resolved as discussed above; Section 9‑330 makes no distinction among purchasers of chattel paper on the basis of whether the purchaser is an outright buyer of chattel paper or one whose security interest secures an obligation of Dealer.

11. Assignment of Lease Chattel Paper. As defined in Section 9‑102, “chattel paper” includes not only writings that evidence security interests in specific goods but also those that evidence true leases of goods.

The analysis with respect to lease chattel paper is similar to that set forth above with respect to non‑lease chattel paper. It is complicated, however, by the fact that, unlike the case of chattel paper arising out of a sale, Dealer retains a residual interest in the goods. See Section 2A‑103(1)(q) (defining “lessor’s residual interest”); In re Leasing Consultants, Inc., 486 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1973) (lessor’s residual interest under true lease is an interest in goods and is a separate type of collateral from lessor’s interest in the lease). If Dealer leases goods to a “lessee in ordinary course of business” (LIOCOB), then LIOCOB takes its interest under the lease (i.e., its “leasehold interest”) free of the security interest of SP‑1. See Sections 2A‑307(3), 2A‑103(1)(m) (defining “leasehold interest”), (1)(o) (defining “lessee in ordinary course of business”). SP‑1 would, however, retain its security interest in the residual interest. In addition, SP‑1 would acquire an interest in the lease chattel paper as proceeds. If Dealer then assigns the lease chattel paper to SP‑2, Section 9‑330 gives SP‑2 priority over SP‑1 with respect to the chattel paper, but not with respect to the residual interest in the goods. Consequently, assignees of lease chattel paper typically take a security interest in and file against the lessor’s residual interest in goods, expecting their priority in the goods to be governed by the first‑to‑file‑or‑perfect rule of Section 9‑322.

If the goods are returned to Dealer, other than upon expiration of the lease term, then the security interests of both SP‑1 and SP‑2 normally would attach to the goods as proceeds of the chattel paper. (If the goods are returned to Dealer at the expiration of the lease term and the lessee has made all payments due under the lease, however, then Dealer no longer has any rights under the chattel paper. Dealer’s interest in the goods consists solely of its residual interest, as to which SP‑2 has no claim.) This would be the case, for example, when the lessee rescinds the lease or when the lessor recovers possession in the exercise of its remedies under Article 2A. See, e.g., Section 2A‑525. If SP‑2 enjoyed priority in the chattel paper under Section 9‑330, then SP‑2 likewise would enjoy priority in the returned goods as proceeds. This does not mean that SP‑2 necessarily is entitled to the entire value of the returned goods. The value of the goods represents the sum of the present value of (i) the value of their use for the term of the lease and (ii) the value of the residual interest. SP‑2 has priority in the former, but SP‑1 ordinarily would have priority in the latter. Thus, an allocation of a portion of the value of the goods to each component may be necessary. Where, as here, one secured party has a security interest in the lessor’s residual interest and another has a priority security interest in the chattel paper, it may be advisable for the conflicting secured parties to establish a method for making such an allocation and otherwise to determine their relative rights in returned goods by agreement.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑330 provides special priority rules for purchasers of chattel paper and instruments. Secured parties may take a security interest in either chattel paper or instruments as initial collateral. In addition, secured parties that finance inventory may obtain security interests in chattel paper and instruments as proceeds. Finally, under Section 36‑9‑109(a)(3) sales of chattel paper and promissory notes are subject to Article 9. Section 36‑9‑330 applies when security interests created in these transactions conflict.

Section 36‑9‑330(a) addresses the priority conflict between an inventory financer claiming chattel paper “merely as proceeds” and a purchaser of chattel paper who purchases the chattel paper. If the purchaser purchases in good faith, in the ordinary course of its business, for new value and either takes possession of tangible chattel paper or control of electronic chattel paper, the purchaser will have priority, provided that the chattel paper does not indicate that it has been assigned to an identified assignee other than the purchaser. Section 36‑9‑330(a) changes prior law. Under former Section 36‑9‑308(b) a purchaser of chattel paper could establish priority over a security interest claimed merely as proceeds of inventory even though the purchaser knew that the specific chattel paper was subject to a security interest.

Section 36‑9‑330(b) addresses the priority conflict between a purchaser of chattel paper and a secured party claiming a security interest in the chattel paper other than merely as proceeds of inventory. Under subsection ( b) the purchaser is entitled to priority if the purchaser gives new and either takes possession of tangible chattel paper or control of electronic chattel paper in the ordinary course of its business, provided that the purchaser acts without knowledge that its purchase violates the rights of a secured party. For purposes of subsection (b), subsection (f) provides that a purchaser is deemed to have knowledge that its purchase of the chattel paper violates the rights of a secured party if the chattel paper indicates that it has been assigned to the secured party.

Neither the statute nor the Official Comment provide a standard for determining whether a security interest in chattel paper is “merely as proceeds of inventory.” The Official Comment refer to Permanent Editorial Board Commentary Number 8 for an elaboration on the term “merely as proceeds.”

Subsection (e) assists purchase‑money financers of inventory who want to be assured of priority in chattel paper under subsection (a) or (b). Subsection (e) provides that a holder of a purchase‑money security interest in inventory is deemed to give new value for chattel paper constituting proceeds of the inventory. Of course, to be protected under subsection (a) or (b) the purchase money inventory financer will have to take possession or control of the chattel paper.

Section 36‑9‑330(c) addresses a chattel paper purchaser’s priority in proceeds of the chattel paper. Subsection (c)(1) provides that the purchaser’s priority in the chattel paper extends to proceeds if the purchaser would have priority in the proceeds under Section 36‑9‑322. Since the purchaser qualifies for priority under Section 36‑9‑330 and will have perfected its security interest in the chattel paper by possession or control, the special priority rules of Section 36‑9‑322(c), (d), and (e) will apply.

Under subsection (c)(2) a purchaser with priority in the chattel paper who does not qualify for priority in proceeds under subsection (c)(1), nevertheless, has priority in proceeds that consist of the specific goods subject to the chattel paper even if the purchaser’s security interest in the goods as proceeds is unperfected. Subsection (c)(2) will apply to determine priority when a buyer of goods subject to the chattel paper returns the goods to the seller. See Section 36‑9‑330, Official Comment 9‑11.

Section 36‑9‑330(c)(2) overrules Finance America Corporation v. Galaxy Boat Manufacturing Company, 292 S.C. 494, 357 S.E. 2d 460 (1987). In that case the Court found that Galaxy Boat held a perfected security interest upon a dealer’s inventory of new boats. The dealer sold a boat to a buyer in ordinary course under a credit sales contract that constituted chattel paper. The dealer then sold the credit sales contract to Finance America which gave value for and took possession of the credit contract. Finance America, however, did not perfect its security interest in the boat against creditors of either the buyer or the dealer. Subsequently, the buyer revoked acceptance of the boat and returned it to the dealer. When the dealer defaulted under its security agreement with Galaxy Boat a priority dispute arose between Galaxy Boat and Finance America.

The Court applying former Section 36‑9‑306(5) held that Galaxy Boat was entitled to priority because Finance America had not perfected its security interest in the returned boat. Finance America based its claim on former Section 36‑9‑306 (5)(b) under which an unpaid transferee of chattel paper had a security interest in returned goods that was entitled to priority over a security interest claimed by an inventory financer if the chattel paper purchaser had priority in the chattel paper. Galaxy Boat based its claim on former Section 36‑9‑306(5)(d) under which a security interest of a chattel paper purchaser in returned goods must be perfected for protection against creditors of the dealer. The Court appeared to concede that Finance America had priority over Galaxy Boat in the chattel paper under former section 9‑36‑308. The Court, however, concluded that because Finance America had not perfected its security interest in the returned boat, former Section 36‑9‑306(5)(d) precluded Finance America from establishing priority with respect to the boat.

The interpretation of former Section 36‑9‑306(5) adopted in Finance America was rejected by the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code in PEB Commentary No. 5. (ALI 1990). Section 36‑9‑330(c)(2) codifies the conclusion reached in PEB Commentary No. 5.

Under Section 36‑9‑330(c)(2) if a purchaser of chattel paper has priority in the chattel paper, it also has priority in the proceeds of the chattel paper if “the proceeds consist of the specific goods covered by the chattel paper or the cash proceeds of the specific goods, even if the purchaser’s security interest in the proceeds is unperfected.” (emphasis supplied). When a buyer revokes acceptance of goods subject to chattel paper and returns the goods to the seller, the returned goods are proceeds of the chattel paper. See section 9‑330, Comment 10. Therefore, had Finance America been decided under Section 36‑9‑330, Finance America would have been entitled to priority in the returned boat if it had priority in the chattel paper even though its security interest in the returned boat was unperfected.

Section 36‑9‑330(d) addresses the rights of purchasers of instruments. Under subsection (d) the purchaser has priority over a security interest in the instrument perfected by a method other than possession if the purchaser gives value and takes possession of the instrument in good faith and without knowledge that the purchase violates the rights of the secured party.

Definitional Cross References:

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| “Chattel paper” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(11) |
| “Control” | See Section 36‑9‑105 |
| “Electronic Chattel paper” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(31) |
| “Good faith” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(43) |
| “Instrument” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(47) |
| “Inventory” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(48) |
| “Knowledge” | Section 36‑1‑201(25) [see now Section 36‑1‑202] |
| “Merely as proceeds” | See PEB Commentary No. 8 (ALI/NCCUSL 1991) |
| “New value” | Sections 36‑9‑102(a)(57) and 36‑9‑330(e) |
| “New value” | Sections 36‑9‑102(a)(57) and 36‑9‑330(e) |
| “Possession” | See Section 36‑9‑313 |
| “Proceeds” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(64) |
| “Purchaser‑money security interests” | Section 36‑9‑103 |
| “Purchaser” | Section 36‑1‑201(33) |
| “Secured Party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |
| “Tangible chattel paper” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(78) |
| “Value” | Section 36‑1‑201(44) [see now Section 36‑1‑204] |

Cross References—

1. Sales of chattel paper and promissory notes are subject to Article 9. Section 36‑9‑109.

2. Requirements for control of electronic chattel paper. Section 36‑9‑105.

3. Control satisfies evidentiary requirement for creation of an enforceable security interest in electronic chattel paper. Section 36‑9‑203( b)(3)(D).

4. A security interest in electronic chattel paper can be perfected by control. Section 36‑9‑314(a).

5. Possession satisfies evidentiary requirement for creation of an enforceable security interest in tangible chattel paper. Section 36‑9‑203(b)( 3)(B).

6. A security interest in tangible chattel paper can be perfected by possession. Section 36‑9‑313(a).

7. A security interest in chattel paper can be perfected by filing. Section 36‑9‑312(a).

8. A security interest in instruments can be perfected by possession. Section 36‑9‑312(a).

9. A security interest in instruments can be perfected by filing. Section 36‑9‑312(a).

10. Attachment of a security interest in proceeds. Sections 36‑9‑203(f) and 36‑9‑315(a)(2).

11. Perfection of a security interest in proceeds. Section 36‑9‑315(c)‑( e).

12. Whether a security interest in chattel paper is claimed merely as proceeds of inventory. See PEB Commentary No. 8 (ALI/NCCUSL 1991).

13. Special priority rule for proceeds when a security interest qualifies for priority under Section 36‑9‑330. Section 36‑9‑322(c).

14. Special priority rule for proceeds of chattel paper and instruments when a security interest in the collateral is perfected by a manner other than filing. Section 36‑9‑322(d) and (e).

15. Preservation of the rights of a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument. Section 36‑9‑331.

16. The effect of cross collateralization and refinancing upon purchase‑money security interests in inventory. Section 36‑9‑103(b) and (f).

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Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak142; 349Ak164.

LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES

Perfection of the Security Interest. 19 S.C. L. Rev. 700.

**SECTION 36‑9‑331.** Priority of rights of purchasers of instruments, documents, and securities under other articles; priority of interests in financial assets and security entitlements under Chapter 8.

(a) This chapter does not limit the rights of a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument, a holder to which a negotiable document of title has been duly negotiated, or a protected purchaser of a security. These holders or purchasers take priority over an earlier security interest, even if perfected, to the extent provided in Chapters 3, 7, and 8.

(b) This chapter does not limit the rights of or impose liability on a person to the extent that the person is protected against the assertion of a claim under Chapter 8.

(c) Filing under this chapter does not constitute notice of a claim or defense to the holders, or purchasers, or persons described in subsections (a) and (b).

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑309.

2. “Priority.” In some provisions, This Article distinguishes between claimants that take collateral free of a security interest (in the sense that the security interest no longer encumbers the collateral) and those that take an interest in the collateral that is senior to a surviving security interest. See, e.g., Section 9‑317. Whether a holder or purchaser referred to in this Section takes free or is senior to a security interest depends on whether the purchaser is a buyer of the collateral or takes a securitY interest in it. The term “priority” is meant to encompass both scenarios, as it does in Section 9‑330.

3. Rights Acquired by Purchasers. The rights to which this SectIon refers are set forth in Sections 3‑305 and 3‑306 (holder in due course), 7‑502 (holder to whom a negotiable document of title has been duly negotiated), and 8‑303 (protected purchaser). The holders and purchasers referred to in this Section do not always take priority over a security interest. See, e.g., Section 7‑503 (affording paramount rights to certain owners and secured parties as against holder to whom a negotiable document of title has been duly negotiated). Accordingly, this Section adds the clause, “to the extent provided in Articles 3, 7, and 8” to former Section 9‑309.

4. Financial Assets and Security Entitlements. New subsection (b) provides explicit protection for those who deal with financial assets and security entitlements and who are immunized from liability under Article 8. See, e.g., Sections 8‑502, 8‑503(e), 8‑510, 8‑511. The new subsection makes explicit in Article 9 what is implicit in former Article 9 and explicit in several provisions of Article 8. It does not change the law.

5. Collections by Junior Secured Party. Under this Section, a secured party with a junior security interest in receivables (accounts, chattel paper, promissory notes, or payment intangibles) may collect and retain the proceeds of those receivables free of the claim of a senior secured party to the same receivables, if the junior secured party is a holder in due course of the proceeds. In order to qualify as a holder in due course, the junior must satisfy the requirements of Section 3‑302, which include taking in “ good faith.” This means that the junior not only must act “honestly” but also must observe “reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing” under the particular circumstances. See Section 9‑102(a). Although “good faith” does not impose a general duty of inquiry, e.g., a search of the records in filing offices, there may be circumstances in which “reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing” would require such a search.

Consider, for example, a junior secured party in the business of financing or buying accounts who fails to undertake a search to determine the existence of prior security interests. Because a search, under the usages of trade of that business, would enable it to know or learn upon reasonable inquiry that collecting the accounts violated the rights of a senior secured party, the junior may fail to meet the good‑faith standard. See Utility Contractors Financial Services, Inc. v. Amsouth Bank, NA, 985 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1993). Likewise, a junior secured party who collects accounts when it knows or should know under the particular circumstances that doing so would violate the rights of a senior secured party, because the debtor had agreed not to grant a junior security interest in, or sell, the accounts, may not meet the good‑faith test. Thus, if a junior secured party conducted or should have conducted a search and a financing statement filed on behalf of the senior secured party states such a restriction, the junior’s collection would not meet the good‑faith standard. On the other hand, if there was a course of performance between the senior secured party and the debtor which placed no such restrictions on the debtor and allowed the debtor to collect and use the proceeds without any restrictions, the junior secured party may then satisfy the requirements for being a holder in due course. This would be more likely in those circumstances where the junior secured party was providing additional financing to the debtor on an on‑going basis by lending against or buying the accounts and had no notice of any restrictions against doing so. Generally, the senior secured party would not be prejudiced because the practical effect of such payment to the junior secured party is little different than if the debtor itself had made the collections and subsequently paid the secured party from the debtor’s general funds. Absent collusion, the junior secured party would take the funds free of the senior security interests. See Section 9‑332. In contrast, the senior secured party is likely to be prejudiced if the debtor is going out of business and the junior secured party collects the accounts by notifying the account debtors to make payments directly to the junior. Those collections may not be consistent with “reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.”

Whether the junior secured party qualifies as a holder in due course is fact‑sensitive and should be decided on a case‑by‑case basis in the light of those circumstances. Decisions such as Financial Management Services Inc. v. Familian, 905 P.2d 506 (Ariz. App. Div. 1995) (finding holder in due course status) could be determined differently under this application of the good‑ faith requirement.

The concepts addressed in this Comment are also applicable to junior secured parties as purchasers of instruments under Section 9‑330(d). See Section 9‑330, Comment 7.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Subsection (a) provides that Article 9 does not limit the rights of holders in due course, holders to which a negotiable document has been duly negotiated, or protected purchasers of securities. If these persons have priority over a perfected security interest under Article 3, 7, or 8, the retain that priority under Article 9. Subsection (b) provides that purchasers for financial assets or security entitlements that are protected from adverse claims under Article 8, retain that protection under Article 9. Subsection (c) provides that a secured party’s filing under Article 9 does not constitute notice of a claim or defense.

Official Comment 3 to Section 36‑9‑331 addresses the rights of a junior secured party to collect proceeds free from the claim of a senior secured party. In the course of this analysis the Comment asserts that if trade and usage in a particular business requires an assignee of an instrument to determine before taking the instrument whether there are adverse claims to be the instrument and the assignee fails to perform a search that would have disclosed a security interest, the assignee may not qualify as a holder‑in‑ due course. As a result, the assignee would take subject to the security interest. The foundation for this conclusion is the definition of “ good faith” in the 1990 revision of Article 3 which provides that “[g]ood faith” means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.” Section 3‑103(a)(4). South Carolina has not enacted the 1990 revision of Article 3. The general definition of good faith which applies when determining holder‑in‑course status under South Carolina law does not require the observation of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing. See Sections 36‑1‑201(9) and 36‑3‑302(1)(b). As a result, Comment 3 may not be accurate under South Carolina law.

Definitional Cross References:

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| “Due negotiation” | Section 36‑7‑501(4) |
| “Holder” | Section 36‑1‑201(20) |
| “Holder in due course” | Section 36‑3‑302 |
| “Negotiable document” | See Sections 36‑9‑102(a)(30), 36‑7‑102(1)(e), 36‑1‑201(15), 36‑7‑104(1) |
| “Negotiable instrument” | Sections 36‑9‑102(a)(47), 36‑3‑104 |
| “Notice of a claim or defense” | Sections 36‑3‑304, 36‑1‑201(25) [see now Section 36‑1‑202] |
| “Protected purchaser” | Section 36‑8‑303 |
| “Purchaser” | Section 36‑1‑201(33) |
| “Security” | Section 36‑8‑102(a)(15) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |

Cross Reference—

1. Requirements for obtaining holder in due course status. Sections 36‑3‑302 to 36‑3‑304.

2. Rights of a holder in due course. Section 36‑3‑305.

3. Requirements for obtaining the status of a holder to which a negotiable document of title has been duly negotiated. Section 36‑7‑501.

4. Rights acquired by due negotiation of a negotiable document of title. Sections 36‑7‑502 and 36‑7‑503.

5. Requirements for obtaining the status of a protected purchaser of a security. Section 36‑8‑303(a).

6. Rights of a protected purchaser. Sections 36‑8‑302 and 36‑8‑303(b).

7. Protection of persons who deal with financial assets and security entitlements from assertion of adverse claims. Sections 36‑8‑502, 36‑8‑503(e) and 36‑8‑510.

8. Notice of a claim or defense. Section 36‑3‑304.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 143.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak143.

**SECTION 36‑9‑332.** Transfer of money; transfer of funds from deposit account.

(a) A transferee of money takes the money free of a security interest unless the transferee acts in collusion with the debtor in violating the rights of the secured party.

(b) A transferee of funds from a deposit account takes the funds free of a security interest in the deposit account unless the transferee acts in collusion with the debtor in violating the rights of the secured party.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. New.

2. Scope of This Section. This Section affords broad protection to transferees who take funds from a deposit account and to those who take money. The term “transferee” is not defined; however, the debtor itself is not a transferee. Thus this Section does not cover the case in which a debtor withdraws money (currency) from its deposit account or the case in which a bank debits an encumbered account and credits another account it maintains for the debtor.

A transfer of funds from a deposit account, to which subsection (b) applies, normally will be made by check, by funds transfer, or by debiting the debtor’s deposit account and crediting another depositor’s account.

Example 1: Debtor maintains a deposit account with Bank A. The deposit account is subject to a perfected security interest in favor of Lender. Debtor draws a check on the account, payable to Payee. Inasmuch as the check is not the proceeds of the deposit account (it is an order to pay funds from the deposit account), Lender’s security interest in the deposit account does not give rise to a security interest in the check. Payee deposits the check into its own deposit account, and Bank A pays it. Unless Payee acted in collusion with Debtor in violating Lender’s rights, Payee takes the funds (the credits running in favor of Payee) free of Lender’s security interest. This is true regardless of whether Payee is a holder in due course of the check and even if Payee gave no value for the check.

Example 2: Debtor maintains a deposit account with Bank A. The deposit account is subject to a perfected security interest in favor of Lender. At Bank B’s suggestion, Debtor moves the funds from the account at Bank A to Debtor’s deposit account with Bank B. Unless Bank B acted in collusion with Debtor in violating Lender’s rights, Bank B takes the funds (the credits running in favor of Bank B) free from Lender’s security interest. See subsection (b). However, inasmuch as the deposit account maintained with Bank B constitutes the proceeds of the deposit account at Bank A, Lender’s security interest would attach to that account as proceeds. See Section 9‑315.

Subsection (b) also would apply if, in the example, Bank A debited Debtor’s deposit account in exchange for the issuance of Bank A’s cashier’s check. Lender’s security interest would attach to the cashier’s check as proceeds of the deposit account, and the rules applicable to instruments would govern any competing claims to the cashier’s check. See, e.g., Sections 3‑306, 9‑322, 9‑330, 9‑331.

If Debtor withdraws money (currency) from an encumbered deposit account and transfers the money to a third party, then subsection (a), to the extent not displaced by federal law relating to money, applies. It contains the same rule as subsection (b).

Subsection (b) applies to transfers of funds from a deposit account; it does not apply to transfers of the deposit account itself or of an interest therein. For example, this Section does not apply to the creation of a security interest in a deposit account. Competing claims to the deposit account itself are dealt with by other Article 9 priority rules. See Sections 9‑317(a), 9‑327, 9‑340, 9‑341. Similarly, a corporate merger normally would not result in a transfer of funds from a deposit account. Rather, it might result in a transfer of the deposit account itself. If so, the normal rules applicable to transferred collateral would apply; this Section would not.

3. Policy. Broad protection for transferees helps to ensure that security interests in deposit accounts do not impair the free flow of funds. It also minimizes the likelihood that a secured party will enjoy a claim to whatever the transferee purchases with the funds. Rules concerning recovery of payments traditionally have placed a high value on finality. The opportunity to upset a completed transaction, or even to place a completed transaction in jeopardy by bringing suit against the transferee of funds, should be severely limited. Although the giving of value usually is a prerequisite for receiving the ability to take free from third‑party claims, where payments are concerned the law is even more protective. Thus, Section 3‑418(c) provides that, even where the law of restitution otherwise would permit recovery of funds paid by mistake, no recovery may be had from a person “who in good faith changed position in reliance on the payment.” Rather than adopt this standard, this Section eliminates all reliance requirements whatsoever. Payments made by mistake are relatively rare, but payments of funds from encumbered deposit accounts (e.g., deposit accounts containing collections from accounts receivable) occur with great regularity. In most cases, unlike payment by mistake, no one would object to these payments. In the vast proportion of cases, the transferee probably would be able to show a change of position in reliance on the payment. This Section does not put the transferee to the burden of having to make this proof.

4. “Bad Actors.” To deal with the question of the “bad actor,” this Section borrows “collusion” language from Article 8. See, e.g., Sections 8‑115, 8‑503(e). This is the most protective (i.e., least stringent) of the various standards now found in the UCC. Compare, e.g., Section 1‑201(9) (“without knowledge that the sale . . . is in violation of the . . . security interest”); Section 1‑201(19) (“honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned”); Section 3‑302(a)( 2)(v) (“without notice of any claim”).

5. Transferee Who Does Not Take Free. This Section sets forth the circumstances under which certain transferees of money or funds take free of security interests. It does not determine the rights of a transferee who does not take free of a security interest.

Example 3: The facts are as in Example 2, but, in wrongfully moving the funds from the deposit account at Bank A to Debtor’s deposit account with Bank B, Debtor acts in collusion with Bank B. Bank B does not take the funds free of Lender’s security interest under this Section. If Debtor grants a security interest to Bank B, Section 9‑327 governs the relative priorities of Lender and Bank B. Under Section 9‑327(3), Bank B’s security interest in the Bank B deposit account is senior to Lender’s security interest in the deposit account as proceeds. However, Bank B’s senior security interest does not protect Bank B against any liability to Lender that might arise from Bank B’s wrongful conduct.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑332 applies when a secured party has a security interest in a debtor’s money or in a debtor’s deposit account and the debtor makes a transfer of the money or of funds drawn from the deposit account. The issue is whether the transferee takes the money or funds free of the security interest. Section 36‑9‑332 provides that the transferee can retain the money or funds free of the security interest provided that the transferee did not act in collusion with the debtor to violate the secured party’s rights.

Definitional Cross References:

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| “Debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “Deposit Account” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(29) |
| “Money” | Section 36‑1‑201(24) |
| “Secured party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |

Cross References—

1. A security interest in money as initial collateral can be perfected only by possession. Sections 36‑9‑313(a) and 36‑9‑312(b)(3).

2. A security interest in a deposit account as initial collateral can be perfected only by control. Sections 36‑9‑314(a) and 36‑9‑312(b)(1).

3. Requirements for control of a deposit account. Section 36‑9‑104.

4. Attachment of security interest in proceeds. Sections 36‑9‑203(f) and 36‑9‑315(a)(2).

5. Identification of commingled cash proceeds. Section 36‑9‑315(b)(2).

6. Perfection of a security interest in identifiable cash proceeds. Section 36‑9‑315(c) and (d)(2).

7. Priority of conflicting security interests in a deposit account. Section 36‑9‑327.

8. Priority of a bank’s rights of set‑off and recoupment. Section 36‑9‑340.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Banks and Banking 136.

Secured Transactions 138 to 150.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 52k136; 349Ak138 to 349Ak150.

**SECTION 36‑9‑333.** Priority of certain liens arising by operation of law.

(a) In this section, “possessory lien” means an interest, other than a security interest or an agricultural lien:

(1) which secures payment or performance of an obligation for services or materials furnished with respect to goods by a person in the ordinary course of the person’s business;

(2) which is created by statute or rule of law in favor of the person; and

(3) whose effectiveness depends on the person’s possession of the goods.

(b) A possessory lien on goods has priority over a security interest in the goods unless the lien is created by a statute that expressly provides otherwise.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑310.

2. “Possessory Liens.” This Section governs the relative priority of security interests arising under this Article and “possessory liens,” i.e., common‑law and statutory liens whose effectiveness depends on the lienor’s possession of goods with respect to which the lienor provided services or furnished materials in the ordinary course of its business. As under former Section 9‑310, the possessory lien has priority over a security interest unless the possessory lien is created by a statute that expressly provides otherwise. If the statute creating the possessory lien is silent as to its priority relative to a security interest, this Section provides a rule of interpretation that the possessory lien takes priority, even if the statute has been construed judicially to make the possessory lien subordinate.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑333 addresses priority conflicts between possessory liens and security interests. Subsection (a) defines the term possessory lien. A possessory lien is an interest in goods, other than a security interest or agricultural lien, which arises under a statute or rule of law, whose effectiveness depends upon the lienholder’s possession of the goods, and secures payment for services or materials that the lienholder furnished with respect to the goods in lienholder’s ordinary course of business. Subsection (b) provides that a possessory lien has priority over a security interest unless the possessory lien is created by statute and that statute expressly provides that the security interest has priority.

South Carolina has the following statutory liens that qualify as possessory liens under Section 36‑9‑333(a): (1) the lien for storage and repairs under Section 29‑15‑10 S.C. Code Ann (1976); (2) the lien upon animals for boarding expenses under section 29‑15‑60 S.C. Code Ann. (Supp. 1999); (3) the lien on textiles for labor performed on materials provided under section 29‑15‑70, S.C. Code Ann. (1976); and (4) the lien of laundries and dyers under section 29‑15‑90, S.C. Code Ann. (1976). The statutes creating these possessory liens do not expressly provide that the liens are subordinate to security interests. As a result, under subsection (b) these liens will be entitled to priority over a conflicting security interest.

Definitional Cross References:

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| “Agricultural lien” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(5) |
| “Goods” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(44) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |

Cross References—

Priorities among conflicting security interests. Section 36‑9‑122 to 36‑324.

Priority in accessions. Section 36‑9‑335.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 144.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak144.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Encyclopedias

22 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 763, Bankruptcy Preference Actions: Ordinary Course of Business Defense.

LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES

Priorities. 19 S.C. L. Rev. 724.

The Secured Creditor in South Carolina Versus the New Federal Tax Lien. 19 S.C. L. Rev. 759.

Attorney General’s Opinions

As to effect of Uniform Commercial Code on statutory liens relating to automobiles, see 1966‑67 Op Atty Gen, No 2355, p 195.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 1

1. In general

A statutory lien granted by Section 29‑7‑10, which requires building contractors to pay subcontractors out of the money received for the work the subcontractors are employed to perform, was a “first lien” according to the statute and, therefore, the statutory lien had priority over a perfected security interest in the general contractor’s accounts receivable. The imposition of criminal penalties under Section 29‑7‑20 was not the exclusive remedy against the contractor; if the statute were so construed, it would render meaningless the lien granted to subcontractors by Section 29‑7‑10. Additionally, Chapter 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code was not relevant to the statutory lien. Poinsett Const. Co., Inc. v. Fischer (S.C.App. 1990) 301 S.C. 343, 391 S.E.2d 875. Secured Transactions 144

Where finance company, which financed purchase of boat and which took back boat when purchasers revoked acceptance, never had its lien noted on boat’s certificate of title, its security interest was unperfected at all times, and finance company therefore could not claim priority under Section 36‑9‑306(5)(d) over manufacturer’s security interest placed on inventory, including boat in question, of retail boat dealer. Finance America Corp. v. Galaxy Boat Mfg. Co., Inc. (S.C. 1987) 292 S.C. 494, 357 S.E.2d 460.

**SECTION 36‑9‑334.** Priority of security interests in fixtures and crops.

(a) A security interest under this chapter may be created in goods that are fixtures or may continue in goods that become fixtures. A security interest does not exist under this chapter in ordinary building materials incorporated into an improvement on land.

(b) This chapter does not prevent creation of an encumbrance upon fixtures under real property law.

(c) In cases not governed by subsections (d) through (h), a security interest in fixtures is subordinate to a conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the related real property other than the debtor.

(d) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (h), a perfected security interest in fixtures has priority over a conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the real property if the debtor has an interest of record in or is in possession of the real property and:

(1) the security interest is a purchase‑money security interest;

(2) the interest of the encumbrancer or owner arises before the goods become fixtures; and

(3) the security interest is perfected by a fixture filing before the goods become fixtures or within twenty days thereafter.

(e) A perfected security interest in fixtures has priority over a conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the real property if:

(1) the debtor has an interest of record in the real property or is in possession of the real property and the security interest:

(A) is perfected by a fixture filing before the interest of the encumbrancer or owner is of record; and

(B) has priority over any conflicting interest of a predecessor in title of the encumbrancer or owner;

(2) before the goods become fixtures, the security interest is perfected by any method permitted by this chapter and the fixtures are readily removable:

(A) factory or office machines;

(B) equipment that is not primarily used or leased for use in the operation of the real property; or

(C) replacements of domestic appliances that are consumer goods;

(3) the conflicting interest is a lien on the real property obtained by legal or equitable proceedings after the security interest was perfected by any method permitted by this chapter; or

(4) the security interest is:

(A) created in a manufactured home in a manufactured‑home transaction; and

(B) perfected pursuant to a statute described in Section 36‑9‑311(a)(2).

(f) A security interest in fixtures, whether or not perfected, has priority over a conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the real property if:

(1) the encumbrancer or owner has, in an authenticated record, consented to the security interest or disclaimed an interest in the goods as fixtures; or

(2) the debtor has a right to remove the goods as against the encumbrancer or owner.

(g) The priority of the security interest under subsection (f)(2) continues for a reasonable time if the debtor’s right to remove the goods as against the encumbrancer or owner terminates.

(h) A mortgage is a construction mortgage to the extent that it secures an obligation incurred for the construction of an improvement on land, including the acquisition cost of the land, if a recorded record of the mortgage so indicates. Except as otherwise provided in subsections (e) and (f), a security interest in fixtures is subordinate to a construction mortgage if a record of the mortgage is recorded before the goods become fixtures and the goods become fixtures before the completion of the construction. A mortgage has this priority to the same extent as a construction mortgage to the extent that it is given to refinance a construction mortgage.

(i) A perfected security interest in crops growing on real property has priority over a conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the real property if the debtor has an interest of record in or is in possession of the real property.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑313.

2. Scope of This Section. This Section contains rules governing the priority of security interests in fixtures and crops as against persons who claim an interest in real property. Priority contests with other Article 9 security interests are governed by the other priority rules of this Article. The provisions with respect to fixtures follow those of former Section 9‑313. However, they have been rewritten to conform to Section 2A‑309 and to prevailing style conventions. Subsections (i) and (j), which apply to crops, are new.

3. Security Interests in Fixtures. Certain goods that are the subject of personal‑property (chattel) financing become so affixed or otherwise so related to real property that they become part of the real property. These goods are called “fixtures.” See Section 9‑102 (definition of “ fixtures”). Some fixtures retain their personal‑property nature: a security interest under this Article may be created in fixtures and may continue in goods that become fixtures. See subsection (a). However, if the goods are ordinary building materials incorporated into an improvement on land, no security interest in them exists. Rather, the priority of claims to the building materials are determined by the law governing claims to real property. (Of course, the fact that no security interest exists in ordinary building materials incorporated into an improvement on land does not prejudice any rights the secured party may have against the debtor or any other person who violated the secured party’s rights by wrongfully incorporating the goods into real property.)

Thus, this Section recognizes three categories of goods: (1) those that retain their chattel character entirely and are not part of the real property; (2) ordinary building materials that have become an integral part of the real property and cannot retain their chattel character for purposes of finance; and (3) an intermediate class that has become real property for certain purposes, but as to which chattel financing may be preserved.

To achieve priority under certain provisions of this Section, a security interest must be perfected by making a “fixture filing” (defined in Section 9‑102) in the real‑property records. Because the question whether goods have become fixtures often is a difficult one under applicable real‑property law, a secured party may make a fixture filing as a precaution. Courts should not infer from a fixture filing that the secured party concedes that the goods are or will become fixtures.

4. Priority in Fixtures: General. In considering priority problems under this Section, one must first determine whether real‑property claimants per se have an interest in the crops or fixtures as part of real property. If not, it is immaterial, so far as concerns real property parties as such, whether a security interest arising under this Article is perfected or unperfected. In no event does a real‑property claimant (e.g., owner or mortgagee) acquire an interest in a “pure” chattel just because a security interest therein is unperfected. If on the other hand real‑property law gives real‑property parties an interest in the goods, a conflict arises and this Section states the priorities.

5. Priority in Fixtures: Residual Rule. Subsection (c) states the residual priority rule, which applies only if one of the other rules does not: A security interest in fixtures is subordinate to a conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the related real property other than the debtor.

6. Priority in Fixtures: First to File or Record. Subsection (e)(1), which follows former Section 9‑313(4)(b), contains the usual priority rule of conveyancing, that is, the first to file or record prevails. In order to achieve priority under this rule, however, the security interest must be perfected by a “fixture filing” (defined in Section 9‑102), i.e., a filing for record in the real property records and indexed therein, so that it will be found in a real‑property search.. The condition in subsection (e)(1)(B), that the security interest must have had priority over any conflicting interest of a predecessor in title of the conflicting encumbrancer or owner, appears to limit to the first‑in‑time principle. However, this apparent limitation is nothing other than an expression of the usual rule that a person must be entitled to transfer what he has. Thus, if the fixture security interest is subordinate to a mortgage, it is subordinate to an interest of an assignee of the mortgage, even though the assignment is a later recorded instrument. Similarly if the fixture security interest is subordinate to the rights of an owner, it is subordinate to a subsequent grantee of the owner and likewise subordinate to a subsequent mortgagee of the owner.

7. Priority in Fixtures: Purchase‑Money Security Interests. Subsection (d), which follows former Section 9‑313(4)(a), contains the principal exception to the first‑to‑file‑or‑record rule of subsection (e)(1). It affords priority to purchase‑money security interests in fixtures as against prior recorded real‑property interests, provided that the purchase‑money security interest is filed as a fixture filing in the real‑property records before the goods become fixtures or within 20 days thereafter. This priority corresponds to the purchase‑money priority under Section 9‑324(a). (Like other 10‑day periods in former Article 9, the 10‑day period in this Section has been changed to 20 days.)

It should be emphasized that this purchase‑money priority with the 20‑day grace period for filing is limited to rights against real‑property interests that arise before the goods become fixtures. There is no such priority with the 20‑day grace period as against real‑property interests that arise subsequently. The fixture security interest can defeat subsequent real‑property interests only if it is filed first and prevails under the usual conveyancing rule in subsection (e)(1) or one of the other rules in this Section.

8. Priority in Fixtures: Readily Removable Goods. Subsection (e)(2), which derives from Section 2A‑309 and former Section 9‑313(4)(d), contains another exception to the usual first‑to‑file‑or‑perfect rule. It affords priority to the holders of security interests in certain types of readily removable goods‑factory and office machines, equipment that is not primarily used or leased for use in the operation of the real property, and (as discussed below) certain replacements of domestic appliances. This rule is made necessary by the confusion in the law as to whether certain machinery, equipment, and appliances become fixtures. It protects a secured party who, perhaps in the mistaken belief that the readily removable goods will not become fixtures, makes a UCC filing (or otherwise perfects under this Article) rather than making a fixture filing.

Frequently, under applicable law, goods of the type described in subsection (e)(2) will not be considered to have become part of the real property. In those cases, the fixture security interest does not conflict with a real‑property interest, and resort to this Section is unnecessary. However, if the goods have become part of the real property, subsection (e)( 2) enables a fixture secured party to take priority over a conflicting real‑ property interest if the fixture security interest is perfected by a fixture filing or by any other method permitted by this Article. If perfection is by fixture filing, the fixture security interest would have priority over subsequently recorded real‑property interests under subsection (e)(1) and, if the fixture security interest is a purchase‑money security interest (a likely scenario), it would also have priority over most real property interests under the purchase‑money priority of subsection (d). Note, however, that unlike the purchase‑money priority rule in subsection (d), the priority rules in subsection (e) override the priority given to a construction mortgage under subsection (h).

The rule in subsection (e)(2) is limited to readily removable replacements of domestic appliances. It does not apply to original installations. Moreover, it is limited to appliances that are “ consumer goods” (defined in Section 9‑102) in the hands of the debtor. The principal effect of the rule is to make clear that a secured party financing occasional replacements of domestic appliances in noncommercial, owner‑occupied contexts need not concern itself with real‑ property descriptions or records; indeed, for a purchase‑money replacement of consumer goods, perfection without any filing will be possible. See Section 9‑309(1).

9. Priority in Fixtures: Judicial Liens. Subsection (e)(3), which follows former Section 9‑313(4)(d), adopts a first‑in‑time rule applicable to conflicts between a fixture security interest and a lien on the real property obtained by legal or equitable proceedings. Such a lien is subordinate to an earlier‑perfected security interest, regardless of the method by which the security interest was perfected. Judgment creditors generally are not reliance creditors who search real‑property records. Accordingly, a perfected fixture security interest takes priority over a subsequent judgment lien or other lien obtained by legal or equitable proceedings, even if no evidence of the security interest appears in the relevant real‑property records. Subsection (e)(3) thus protects a perfected fixture security interest from avoidance by a trustee in bankruptcy under Bankruptcy Code Section 544(a), regardless of the method of perfection.

10. Priority in Fixtures: Manufactured Homes. A manufactured home may become a fixture. New subsection (e)(4) contains a special rule granting priority to certain security interests created in a “manufactured home” as part of a “manufactured‑home transaction” (both defined in Section 9‑102). Under this rule, a security interest in a manufactured home that becomes a fixture has priority over a conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the real property if the security interest is perfected under a certificate‑of‑title statute (see Section 9‑311). Subsection (e)(4) is only one of the priority rules applicable to security interests in a manufactured home that becomes a fixture. Thus, a security interest in a manufactured home which does not qualify for priority under this subsection may qualify under another.

11. Priority in Fixtures: Construction Mortgages. The purchase‑money priority presents a difficult problem in relation to construction mortgages. The latter ordinarily will have been recorded even before the commencement of delivery of materials to the job, and therefore would take priority over fixture security interests were it not for the purchase‑money priority. However, having recorded first, the holder of a construction mortgage reasonably expects to have first priority in the improvement built using the mortgagee’s advances. Subsection (g) expressly gives priority to the construction mortgage recorded before the filing of the purchase‑money security interest in fixtures. A refinancing of a construction mortgage has the same priority as the construction mortgage itself. The phrase “an obligation incurred for the construction of an improvement” covers both optional advances and advances pursuant to commitment. Both types of advances have the same priority under subsection (g).

The priority under this subsection applies only to goods that become fixtures during the construction period leading to the completion of the improvement. The construction priority will not apply to additions to the building made long after completion of the improvement, even if the additions are financed by the real‑property mortgagee under an open‑end clause of the construction mortgage. In such case, subsections (d), (e), and (f) govern.

Although this subsection affords a construction mortgage priority over a purchase‑money security interest that otherwise would have priority under subsection (d), the subsection is subject to the priority rules in subsections (e) and (f). Thus, a construction mortgage may be junior to a fixture security interest perfected by a fixture filing before the construction mortgage was recorded. See subsection (e)(1).

12. Crops. Growing crops are “goods” in which a security interest may be created and perfected under this Article. In some jurisdictions, a mortgage of real property may cover crops, as well. In the event that crops are encumbered by both a mortgage and an Article 9 security interest, subsection (i) provides that the security interest has priority. States whose real‑property law provides otherwise should either amend that law directly or override it by enacting subsection (j).

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑334 provides the priority rules governing conflicts between a real estate interest and an Article 9 security interest in fixtures and crops. Section 36‑9‑102(a)(41) defines fixtures as “goods that have become so related to particular real property that an interest in them arises under real property law.” As this definition indicates real property law rather than Article 9 determines whether goods become fixtures. Article 9, however, does provide some guidance on when goods become so related to real property that they lose their identity as personal property. Section 36‑9‑334(a) provides that an Article 9 security interest cannot exist in ordinary building materials after they have been incorporated into an improvement on land. On the other hand, Section 36‑9‑604(d) compels the conclusion that the fact that removal of the collateral would cause physical injury to the real property does not mean that the collateral has lost its identity as personal property.

Section 36‑9‑334 substantially reenacts the priority rules of former Section 36‑9‑313 governing the conflicts between real property interests and security interests in fixtures. As under prior law, in many cases, a secured party with a security interest in goods that are or become a fixture must make a fixture filing in order to establish priority over a conflicting real property interest. Sections 36‑9‑501(a)(1)(B) and 36‑9‑504(b) govern the place of filing and the requirements of a fixture filing.

The residual priority rule under Section 36‑9‑334(c) is that a security in fixtures is subordinate to a conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of real property. Therefore, in order to prime a real property interest, a fixture financer must establish priority under subsections (d)—(h) of Section 36‑9‑334. Those priority rules are outlined below.

1. First to File or Record

Under Section 36‑9‑334(e)(1) a fixture financer has priority over a conflicting interest of a real property owner or encumbrancer if the debtor has an interest of record or possession of the real property, the fixture financer perfects a fixture filing before the encumbrancer or owner records, and the fixture financer has priority over any predecessor in title of the encumbrancer or owner.

2. The Purchase‑Money Priority

Section 36‑9‑334(d) affords a purchase‑money priority for fixture financer. To establish priority under this provision the fixture financer must establish: (1) that the debtor has a record interest in or possession of the real estate; (2) that the fixture financer holds a purchase‑money security interest; (3) that the interest of the real property encumbrancer or owner arose before the goods became fixtures; and (4) that the security interest is perfected by a fixture filing before the goods became fixtures or within 20 days thereafter. While the provision enables a purchase‑money fixture financer to prime a prior recorded mortgage, the 20 day grace period does not apply to mortgages recorded after the goods became fixtures. To illustrate assume that Debtor owns unencumbered real estate. On July 1, SP makes a loan that enables Debtor to acquire goods that upon installation will become a fixture. SP retains a purchase‑money security interest in the goods. On July 5, the goods are installed on Debtors’s real property and become fixtures. On July 10, M makes a loan to Debtor secured by a mortgage upon the Debtor’s real property and records the mortgage. On July 20, SP makes a fixture filing to perfect its security interest. Because M’s mortgage lien arose after the goods became fixtures, SP cannot establish priority under Section 36‑9‑334(d). Moreover, bEcause M recorded its mortgage before SP made its fixture filing, SP cannot establish priority under Section 36‑9‑334(e)(1). As a result, M has priority under Section 36‑9‑334(c).

3. The Purchase‑Money Priority Cannot be Asserted Against Construction Mortgages

Section 36‑9‑334(h) precludes a fixture financer from establishing priority over a construction mortgage under Section 36‑9‑334(d). As a general rule, Section 36‑9‑334(h) provides that a security interest in fixtures is subordinate to a construction mortgage if the construction mortgage is recorded before the goods became fixtures and the goods became fixtures before the completion of the construction. A construction mortgage secures an obligation incurred for the construction of an improvemEnt on land including the acquisition costs of the land, if the recorded mortgage so indicates. Although a fixture financer is precluded from establishing a purchase‑money priority under Section 36‑9‑334(d) against an earlier recorded construction mortgage, the fixture financer can prime a construction mortgage under Section 36‑9‑334(e) and (f).

4. Readily Removable Fixtures

Section 36‑9‑334(e)(2) provides that a fixture financer can establish priority over a conflicting real property interest in certain types of readily removable fixtures by perfecting “any method permitted by this article” before the goods become fixtures. This provision may save a fixture financer who assumed that the collateral would not become a fixture and therefore, did not make a fixture filing. For this provision to apply the fixture must be readily removable and consist of a factory or office machine not primarily used or leased for use in the operation of the real property, or replacements of domestic appliances that are consumer goods.

5. Conflicting Judicial Liens

Under Section 36‑9‑334(e)(3) a security interest in a fixture perfected “by any method permitted by this article” is entitled to priority over a subsequent lien obtained in a legal or equitable proceeding. The principal function of this provision is to protect a fixture financer who fails to make a fixture filing from having its security interest avoided by the trustee under Section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code if the debtor files bankruptcy. See Section 36‑9‑334(e), Official Comment 9.

6. Manufactured Homes

Section 36‑9‑334(e)(4) provides that a security interest in a manufactured home arising from a manufactured‑home transaction has priority over a conflicting real property interest if the security interest is perfected pursuant to a certificate of title statute. Section 36‑9‑102(a)(53) defines manufactured home as a transportable structure of 320 or more square feet designed to be used as a dwelling when connected to required utilities. Section 36‑9‑102(a)(54) defines a manufactured‑home transaction as a secured transaction which creates a purchase money security interest in a manufactured home, which does not constitute inventory and which is the primary collateral. Manufactured homes for purposes of revised Article 9 includes “mobile homes” subject to the certificate of title statutes. See Section 56‑19‑10(39) S.C. Code Ann. (Supp. 1999). Therefore, perfection of security interests in manufactured homes will be under the certificate of title statute. Sections 56‑19‑220(9) and 56‑19‑620 S.C. Code Ann. (1976). The effect of Section 36‑9‑334(e)(4) to give a secured party who perfects a security interest in a manufactured home pursuant to the certificate of title statute priority over a real property mortgage in the event the manufactured home becomes a fixture.

7. Priority Based Upon Consent, Disclaimer, or Right to Remove

Section 36‑9‑334(f) provides that a security interest in fixtures, even if unperfected, has priority over a conflicting real property interest if the real property owner or encumbrancer has, in an authenticated record, consented to the security interest or disclaimed an interest in the goods as fixtures or the debtor has the right to remove the goods as in the case of trade fixtures.

8. The Limited Scope of Section 36‑9‑334 ‘s Priority Rules

The Official Comment to Section 9‑334 stress that Section 9‑334 governs only priority disputes between security interests in a fixture as against persons who claim an interest in real property. Section 36‑9‑334, Official Comment 2. The Comment further states that, “[p]riority contests with other Article 9 security interests are governed by the other priority rules of this Article.” Id To appreciate the significance of this point assume that M records a mortgage on D’s real property. SP‑1 files a financing statement in the Secretary of State’s office to perfect its security interest in D’s current and after acquired equipment. SP‑2 sells D a new piece of equipment which when installed upon D’s real property will become a fixture. SP‑2 retains a purchase money security interest in the new equipment. To establish priority over the conflicting claims of M and SP‑1, SP‑2 must comply with the requirements of both Section 36‑9‑334(d) and Section 36‑9‑324(a). To prime M, SP‑2 must make a fixture filing within 20 days after D receives possession of the new equipment. If SP‑2 makes only a fixture filing, it will prime M but be subordinate to SP‑1 creating the probability of a circular priority.

9. Crops

Section 36‑9‑334(i) provides that a perfected security interest in crops growing on real property has priority over a conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the real property if the debtor has an interest of record or possession of the real property.

Definitional Cross References:

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| “Authenticate” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(7) |
| “Equipment” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(33) |
| “Fixture filing” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(40) |
| “Fixtures” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(41) |
| “Goods” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(44) |
| “Manufactured home” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(53) |
| “Manufactured home transaction” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(54) |
| “Purchase money security interest” | Section 36‑9‑103 |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 138 to 150.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak138 to 349Ak150.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Forms

South Carolina Legal and Business Forms Section 9:15 , Mortgage‑Construction Loan.

LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES

Priorities. 19 S.C. L. Rev. 724.

ARTICLE 9 and the Bankruptcy Act. 19 S.C. L. Rev. 742.

Bankruptcy’s Challenge to the Floating Lien. 19 S.C. L. Rev. 773.

Cross References—

1. The law of the jurisdiction in which a fixture is located governs the perfection of a security interest by a fixture filing, effect of perfection or nonperfection and priority. Sections 36‑9‑301(3)(A) and (C).

2. A fixture filing is filed in the offer designated for recording a mortgage on the related real property. Section 36‑9‑501(a)(1)(B).

3. Requirements for content of a fixture filing. Section 36‑9‑502(a) and (b).

4. Recorded mortgage effective as a fixture filing. Section 36‑9‑502(c).

5. Duration of effectiveness of mortgage recorded as a fixture filing. Section 36‑9‑515(g).

6. Requirements to establish a purchase‑money security interest. Section 36‑9‑103.

7. Enforcement of security interests in fixtures. Section 36‑9‑604(b)—(d) .

**SECTION 36‑9‑335.** Accessions.

(a) A security interest may be created in an accession and continues in collateral that becomes an accession.

(b) If a security interest is perfected when the collateral becomes an accession, the security interest remains perfected in the collateral.

(c) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), the other provisions of this part determine the priority of a security interest in an accession.

(d) A security interest in an accession is subordinate to a security interest in the whole which is perfected by compliance with the requirements of a certificate‑of‑title statute under Section 36‑9‑311(b).

(e) After default, subject to Part 6, a secured party may remove an accession from other goods if the security interest in the accession has priority over the claims of every person having an interest in the whole.

(f) A secured party that removes an accession from other goods under subsection (e) shall promptly reimburse any holder of a security interest or other lien on, or owner of, the whole or of the other goods, other than the debtor, for the cost of repair of any physical injury to the whole or the other goods. The secured party need not reimburse the holder or owner for any diminution in value of the whole or the other goods caused by the absence of the accession removed or by any necessity for replacing it. A person entitled to reimbursement may refuse permission to remove until the secured party gives adequate assurance for the performance of the obligation to reimburse.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑314.

2. “Accession.” This Section applies to an “accession,” as defined in Section 9‑102, regardless of the cost or difficulty of removing the accession from the other goods, and regardless of whether the original goods have come to form an integral part of the other goods. This Section does not apply to goods whose identity has been lost. Goods of that kind are “commingled goods” governed by Section 9‑336. Neither this Section nor the following one addresses the case of collateral that changes form without the addition of other goods.

3. “Accession” vs. “Other Goods.” This Section distinguishes among the “accession,” the “other goods,” and the “whole.” The last term refers to the combination of the “accession” and the “other goods.” If one person’s collateral becomes physically united with another person’s collateral, each is an “accession.”

Example 1: SP‑1 holds a security interest in the debtor’s tractors (which are not subject to a certificate‑of‑title statute), and SP‑2 holds a security interest in a particular tractor engine. The engine is installed in a tractor. From the perspective of SP‑1, the tractor becomes an “accession” and the engine is the “other goods.” From the perspective of SP‑2, the engine is the “accession” and the tractor is the “other goods.” The completed tractor‑tractor cum engine constitutes the “whole.”

4. Scope. This Section governs only a few issues concerning accessions. Subsection (a) contains rules governing continuation of a security interest in an accession. Subsection (b) contains a rule governing continued perfection of a security interest in goods that become an accession. Subsection (d) contains a special priority rule governing accessions that become part of a whole covered by a certificate of title. Subsections (e) and (f) govern enforcement of a security interest in an accession.

5. Matters Left to Other Provisions of This Article: Attachment and Perfection. Other provisions of this Article often govern accession‑related issues. For example, this Section does not address whether a secured party acquires a security interest in the whole if its collateral becomes an accession. Normally this will turn on the description of the collateral in the security agreement.

Example 2: Debtor owns a computer subject to a perfected security interest in favor of SP‑1. Debtor acquires memory and installs it in the computer. Whether SP‑1’s security interest attaches to the memory depends on whether the security agreement covers it.

Similarly, this Section does not determine whether perfection against collateral that becomes an accession is effective to perfect a security interest in the whole. Other provisions of this Article, including the requirements for indicating the collateral covered by a financing statement, resolve that question.

6. Matters Left to Other Provisions of This Article: Priority. With one exception, concerning goods covered by a certificate of title (see subsection (d)), the other provisions of this Part, including the rules governing purchase‑money security interests, determine the priority of most security interests in an accession, including the relative priority of a security interest in an accession and a security interest in the whole. See subsection (c).

Example 3: Debtor owns an office computer subject to a security interest in favor of SP‑1. Debtor acquires memory and grants a perfected security interest in the memory to SP‑2. Debtor installs the memory in the computer, at which time (one assumes) SP‑1’s security interest attaches to the memory. The first‑to‑file‑or‑perfect rule of Section 9‑322 governs priority in the memory. If, however, SP‑2’s security interest is a purchase‑money security interest, Section 9‑324(a) would afford priority in the memory to SP‑2, regardless of which security interest was perfected first.

7. Goods Covered by Certificate of Title. This Section does govern the priority of a security interest in an accession that is or becomes part of a whole that is subject to a security interest perfected by compliance with a certificate‑of‑title statute. Subsection (d) provides that a security interest in the whole, perfected by compliance with a certificate‑of‑title statute, takes priority over a security interest in the accession. It enables a secured party to rely upon a certificate of title without having to check the UCC files to determine whether any components of the collateral may be encumbered. The subsection imposes a corresponding risk upon those who finance goods that may become part of goods covered by a certificate of title. In doing so, it reverses the priority that appeared reasonable to most pre‑UCC courts.

Example 4: Debtor owns an automobile subject to a security interest in favor of SP‑1. The security interest is perfected by notation on the certificate of title. Debtor buys tires subject to a perfected‑by‑filing purchase‑money security interest in favor of SP‑2 and mounts the tires on the automobile’s wheels. If the security interest in the automobile attaches to the tires, then SP‑1 acquires priority over SP‑2. The same result would obtain if SP‑1’s security interest attached to the automobile and was perfected after the tires had been mounted on the wheels.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑335 addresses a limited number of issues involving security interests in accessions. Accessions are defined in Section 36‑9‑102(a)(1) as “goods that are physically united with other goods in such a manner that the identity of the original goods is not lost.” Subsections 36‑9‑335(a) and (b) address the attachment and perfection of security interests in accessions. With one exception, Section 36‑9‑335 does not provide special priority rules for accessions. Under subsection (c) the priority rules of Part 3 generally determine the priority of a security interest in an accession. The exception is set forth in subsection (d) which provides that a security interest in an accession is subordinate to a security interest in the whole perfected under a certificate‑of‑title statute. Subsections (e) and (f) address the right of a secured party to remove an accession upon default.

Note that the priority provisions of subsections (c) and (d) effect a substantial change in the priority rules applicable to accessions. Under former Section 36‑9‑314(1) and (3)(c) an unperfected security interest which attaches to goods before they become an accession was entitled to priority over a prior perfected security interest in the whole except to the extent the holder of perfected security interest made an advance after the goods became an accession.

Definitional Cross References:

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| “Accession” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(1) |
| “Certificate‑of‑title” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(10) |
| “Collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Goods” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(44) |
| “Secured Party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |

Cross References—

1. Sufficiency of description of collateral to cover accessions. Section 36‑9‑108(b)(3).

2. Perfection of security interest in goods by complying with a certificate‑of‑title statute. Section 36‑9‑311(b).

3. Priority of possessory lien for materials furnished with respect to goods. Section 36‑9‑333. Note that a person installing goods that become an accession may have the right to retain a possessory lien as well as a security interest and that the possessory lien may be afforded higher priority than the security interest.

4. Rules governing security interests in commingled goods. Section 36‑9‑336.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 13, 116, 138 to 150.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak13; 349Ak116; 349Ak138 to 349Ak150.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 1

1. In general

Retained security interest in motor vehicle parts that might be added to the collateral in course of indebtedness under loan and security agreement executed in connection with automobile loan transaction is not governed by Code Section 36‑9‑204, which limits after acquired property interests to acquisitions occurring within ten days of loan advance, but by Code Section 36‑9‑314, which is universally understood to deal with automobile parts. Citizens and Southern Nat. Bank of South Carolina v. Sweet (S.C. 1983) 278 S.C. 644, 300 S.E.2d 733.

**SECTION 36‑9‑336.** Commingled goods.

(a) In this section, “commingled goods” means goods that are physically united with other goods in such a manner that their identity is lost in a product or mass.

(b) A security interest does not exist in commingled goods as such. However, a security interest may attach to a product or mass that results when goods become commingled goods.

(c) If collateral becomes commingled goods, a security interest attaches to the product or mass.

(d) If a security interest in collateral is perfected before the collateral becomes commingled goods, the security interest that attaches to the product or mass under subsection (c) is perfected.

(e) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (f), the other provisions of this part determine the priority of a security interest that attaches to the product or mass under subsection (c).

(f) If more than one security interest attaches to the product or mass under subsection (c), the following rules determine priority:

(1) A security interest that is perfected under subsection (d) has priority over a security interest that is unperfected at the time the collateral becomes commingled goods.

(2) If more than one security interest is perfected under subsection (d), the security interests rank equally in proportion to the value of the collateral at the time it became commingled goods.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑315.

2. “Commingled Goods.” Subsection (a) defines “commingled goods.” It is meant to include not only goods whose identity is lost through manufacturing or production (e.g., flour that has become part of baked goods) but also goods whose identity is lost by commingling with other goods from which they cannot be distinguished (e.g., ball bearings).

3. Consequences of Becoming “Commingled Goods.” By definition, the identity of the original collateral cannot be determined once the original collateral becomes commingled goods. Consequently, the security interest in the specific original collateral alone is lost once the collateral becomes commingled goods, and no security interest in the original collateral can be created thereafter except as a part of the resulting product or mass. See subsection (b).

Once collateral becomes commingled goods, the secured party’s security interest is transferred from the original collateral to the product or mass. See subsection (c). If the security interest in the original collateral was perfected, the security interest in the product or mass is a perfected security interest. See subsection (d). This perfection continues until lapse.

4. Priority of Perfected Security Interests That Attach Under This Section. This Section governs the priority of competing security interests in a product or mass only when both security interests arise under this Section. In that case, if both security interests are perfected by operation of this Section (see subsections (c) and (d)), then the security interests rank equally, in proportion to the value of the collateral at the time it became commingled goods. See subsection (f)(2).

Example 1: SP‑1 has a perfected security interest in Debtor’s eggs, which have a value of $300 and secure a debt of $400, and SP‑2 has a perfected security interest in Debtor’s flour, which has a value of $500 and secures a debt of $600. Debtor uses the flour and eggs to make cakes, which have a value of $1000. The two security interests rank equally and share in the ratio of 3:5. Applying this ratio to the entire value of the product, SP‑1 would be entitled to $375 (i.e., 3/8 x $1000), and SP‑2 would be entitled to $625 (i.e., 5/8 x $1000).

Example 2: Assume the facts of Example 1, except that SP‑1’s collateral, worth $300, secures a debt of $200. Recall that, if the cake is worth $1000, then applying the ratio of 3:5 would entitle SP‑1 to $375 and SP‑2 to $625. However, SP‑1 is not entitled to collect from the product more than it is owed. Accordingly, SP‑1’s share would be only $200, SP‑2 would receive the remaining value, up to the amount it is owed ($600).

Example 3: Assume that the cakes in the previous examples have a value of only $600. Again, the parties share in the ratio of 3:5. If, as in Example 1, SP‑1 is owed $400, then SP‑1 is entitled to $225 (i.e., 3/8 x $600), and SP‑2 is entitled to $375 (i.e., 5/8 x $600). Debtor receives nothing. If, however, as in Example 2, SP‑1 is owed only $200, then SP‑2 receives $400.

The results in the foregoing examples remain the same, regardless of whether SP‑1 or SP‑2 (or each) has a purchase‑money security interest.

5. Perfection: Unperfected Security Interests. The rule explained in the preceding Comment applies only when both security interests in original collateral are perfected when the goods become commingled goods. If a security interest in original collateral is unperfected at the time the collateral becomes commingled goods, subsection (f)(1) applies.

Example 4: SP‑1 has a perfected security interest in the debtor’s eggs, and SP‑2 has an unperfected security interest in the debtor’s flour. Debtor uses the flour and eggs to make cakes. Under subsection (c), both security interests attach to the cakes. But since SP‑1’s security interest was perfected at the time of commingling and SP‑2’s was not, only SP‑1’s security interest in the cakes is perfected. See subsection (d). Under subsection (f)(1) and Section 9‑322(a)(2), SP‑1’s perfected security interest has priority over SP‑2’s unperfected security interest.

If both security interests are unperfected, the rule of Section 9‑322(a)( 3) would apply.

6. Multiple Security Interests. On occasion, a single input may be encumbered by more than one security interest. In those cases, the multiple secured parties should be treated like a single secured party for purposes of determining their collective share under subsection (f)(2). The normal priority rules would determine how that share would be allocated between them. Consider the following example, which is a variation on Example 1 above:

Example 5: SP‑1A has a perfected, first‑priority security interest in Debtor’s eggs. SP‑1B has a perfected, second‑priority security interest in the same collateral. The eggs have a value of $300. Debtor owes $200 to SP‑1A and $200 to SP‑1B. SP‑2 has a perfected security interest in Debtor’s flour, which has a value of $500 and secures a debt of $600. Debtor uses the flour and eggs to make cakes, which have a value of $1000.

For purposes of subsection (f)(2), SP‑1A and SP‑1B should be treated like a single secured party. The collective security interest would rank equally with that of SP‑2. Thus, the secured parties would share in the ratio of 3 (for SP‑1A and SP‑1B combined) to 5 (for SP‑2). Applying this ratio to the entire value of the product, SP‑1A and SP‑1B in the aggregate would be entitled to $375 (i.e., 3/8 x $1000), and SP‑2 would be entitled to $625 ( i.e., 5/8 x $1000).

SP‑1A and SP‑1B would share the $300 in accordance with their priority, as established under other rules. Inasmuch as SP‑1A has first priority, it would receive $200, and SP‑1B would receive $100.

7. Priority of Security Interests That Attach Other Than by Operation of This Section. Under subsection (e), the normal priority rules determine the priority of a security interest that attaches to the product or mass other than by operation of this Section. For example, assume that SP‑1 has a perfected security interest in Debtor’s existing and after‑acquired baked goods, and SP‑2 has a perfected security interest in Debtor’s flour. When the flour is processed into cakes, subsections (c) and (d) provide that SP‑2 acquires a perfected security interest in the cakes. If SP‑1 filed against the baked goods before SP‑2 filed against the flour, then SP‑1 will enjoy priority in the cakes. See Section 9‑322 (first‑to‑file‑or‑perfect). But if SP‑2 filed against the flour before SP‑1 filed against the baked goods, then SP‑2 will enjoy priority in the cakes to the extent of its security interest.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑336 provides the rules governing commingled goods. Subsection (a) provides that commingled goods are “goods that re physically united with other goods in such a manner that their identity is lost in a product or mass”. Thus, commingled goods are distinct from accessions defined in Section 36‑9‑335.

If a secured party holds a perfected security interest in goods that become commingled goods, under Subsection 36‑9‑336(b) its security interest will not continue in the commingled goods as such. Under subsection(c), however, the secured party’s security interest will attach to the product or Mass formed by commingling the goods. Moreover, because the secured party’s security interest was perfected before the goods were commingled, under subsection (d) its security interest in the product or mass is also perfected. Subsection (e) provides that generally provisions of Part 3 other than Section 36‑9‑336 determine the priority of security interests in the product or mass. Subsection (f), however, does provide rules for determining the priority of security interests in the product or mass when those security interests attached under subsection (c) because the secured parties’ original collateral was commingled. Under subsection (f)(1) a security interest that is perfected under subsection (d) has priority over an unperfected security interest. Under subsection (f)(2), if more than one security interest is perfected under subsection(d), the security interests rank equally in proportion to the value of the collateral at the time it became commingled goods.

Definitional Cross References:

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| “Collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Commingled goods” | Section 36‑9‑336(a) |
| “Goods” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(44) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |

Cross References—

1. Identification of commingled proceeds when the proceeds are goods. Section 36‑9‑203(b)(1).

2. Definition of an accession. Section 36‑9‑102(a)(1).

3. Attachment, perfection, and priority of security interests in accessions. Section 36‑9‑335.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 115, 138 to 150, 168.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak115; 349Ak138 to 349Ak150; 349Ak168.

LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES

Bankruptcy’s Challenge to the Floating Lien. 19 S.C. L. Rev. 773.

**SECTION 36‑9‑337.** Priority of security interests in goods covered by certificate of title.

If, while a security interest in goods is perfected by any method under the law of another jurisdiction, this State issues a certificate of title that does not show that the goods are subject to the security interest or contain a statement that they may be subject to security interests not shown on the certificate:

(1) a buyer of the goods, other than a person in the business of selling goods of that kind, takes free of the security interest if the buyer gives value and receives delivery of the goods after issuance of the certificate and without knowledge of the security interest; and

(2) the security interest is subordinate to a conflicting security interest in the goods that attaches, and is perfected under Section 36‑9‑311(b), after issuance of the certificate and without the conflicting secured party’s knowledge of the security interest.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Derived from former Section 9‑103(2)(d).

2. Protection for Buyers and Secured Parties. This Section affords protection to certain good‑faith purchasers for value who are likely to have relied on a “clean” certificate of title, i.e., one that neither shows that the goods are subject to a particular security interest nor contains a statement that they may be subject to security interests not shown on the certificate. Under this Section, a buyer can take free of, and the holder of a conflicting security interest can acquire priority over, a security interest that is perfected by any method under the law of another jurisdiction. The fact that the security interest has been reperfected by possession under Section 9‑313 does not of itself disqualify the holder of a conflicting security interest from protection under paragraph (2).

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑337 protects certain buyers and secured parties in South Carolina from security interests perfected under the law of another jurisdiction when the State of South Carolina issues a certificate‑of‑title covering goods that does not show that the goods are subject to the security interest or that they may be subject to security interests not shown on the certificate. Under subsection (a) a buyer, other than person in the business of selling goods of that kind, takes free of the security interests if the buyer gives value and receives delivery of the goods after issuance of a South Carolina certificate and without knowledge of the out‑of‑state security interest. Under subsection (b) the out‑of‑state security interest is subordinate to a security interest that attaches and is perfected under Section 36‑9‑311(b) after the issuance of the South Carolina certificate and without the South Carolina secured party’s knowledge of the out‑of‑state security interest.

Section 36‑9‑337 is based upon former Section 36‑9‑103(2)(d), but extends protection to secured parties as well as nonprofessional buyers.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Buyer” | Section 36‑2‑103(1)(a) |
| “Certificate‑of‑title” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(10) |
| “Goods” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(44) |
| “Knowledge” | Section 36‑1‑201(25) [see now Section 36‑1‑202] |
| “Receives delivery of goods” | See Section 36‑2‑103(1)(c) |
| “Secured party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |

Cross References—

1. Perfection of a security interest in goods subject to a certificate of title statute. Sections 36‑9‑311 and 36‑9‑313(b).

2. Extent to which a security interest perfected under the law of another jurisdiction continues perfected after the goods become subject to a South Carolina certificate‑of‑title. Section 36‑9‑316(d) and (e).

3. Buyers who take free of unperfected security interests. Section 36‑9‑317(b).

4. Buyers who take free of perfected security interests. Section 36‑9‑320.

5. South Carolina’s Certificate of Title Statute covering motor vehicles. Sections 56‑19‑10 et seq., S.C. Code Ann. (1976 and Supp. 1999).

6. South Carolina’s Certificate of Title Statute covering watercraft and outboard motors. Sections 50‑23‑10 et seq. S.C. Code Ann. (1976 and Supp. 1999).

CROSS REFERENCES

Definitions, see Section 36‑9‑102.

Persons taking priority over unperfected security interests, see Sections 36‑9‑102, 36‑9‑317, 36‑9‑323.

Place of filing for perfecting security interest, see Section 36‑9‑501.

Required filings, see Section 36‑11‑106.

Requisites of financing statement, see Sections 36‑9‑502 et seq.

Scope of this chapter, see Section 36‑9‑109.

Security interest to which filing provisions of this chapter do not apply, see Sections 36‑9‑309 to 36‑9‑311.

Territorial application of code and parties’ power to choose applicable law, see Section 36‑1‑301.

What constitutes filing, duration of filing, the effect of lapsed filing, and duties of the filing officer, see Sections 36‑9‑515 et seq.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 141.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak141.

**SECTION 36‑9‑338.** Priority of security interest or agricultural lien perfected by filed financing statement providing certain incorrect information.

If a security interest or agricultural lien is perfected by a filed financing statement providing information described in Section 36‑9‑516(b)(5) which is incorrect at the time the financing statement is filed:

(1) the security interest or agricultural lien is subordinate to a conflicting perfected security interest in the collateral to the extent that the holder of the conflicting security interest gives value in reasonable reliance upon the incorrect information; and

(2) a purchaser, other than a secured party, of the collateral takes free of the security interest or agricultural lien to the extent that, in reasonable reliance upon the incorrect information, the purchaser gives value and, in the case of tangible chattel paper, tangible documents, goods, instruments, or a security certificate, receives delivery of the collateral.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12; 2014 Act No. 213 (S.343), Section 44, eff October 1, 2014.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. New.

2. Effect of Incorrect Information in Financing Statement. Section 9‑520(a) requires the filing office to reject financing statements that do not contain information concerning the debtor as specified in Section 9‑516( b)(5). An error in this information does not render the financing statement ineffective. On rare occasions, a subsequent purchaser of the collateral (i.e., a buyer or secured party) may rely on the misinformation to its detriment. This Section subordinates a security interest or agricultural lien perfected by an effective, but flawed, financing statement to the rights of a buyer or holder of a perfected security interest to the extent that, in reasonable reliance on the incorrect information, the purchaser gives value and, in the case of tangible collateral, receives delivery of the collateral. A purchaser who has not made itself aware of the information in the filing office with respect to the debtor cannot act in “reasonable reliance” upon incorrect information.

3. Relationship to Section 9‑507. This Section applies to financing statements that contain information that is incorrect at the time of filing and imposes a small risk of subordination on the filer. In contrast, Section 9‑507 deals with financing statements containing information that is correct at the time of filing but which becomes incorrect later. Except as provided in Section 9‑507 with respect to changes in the debtor’s name, an otherwise effective financing statement does not become ineffective if the information contained in it becomes inaccurate.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑338 protects secured parties and other purchasers who give value in reasonable reliance upon certain information in a filed financing statement which was incorrect at the time the financing statement was filed. To trigger Section 36‑9‑338 the error must be with respect to information described in Section 36‑9‑516(b)(5). That provision requires that a financing statement provide the mailing address of the debtor; indicate whether the debtor is an individual or an organization; and, if the debtor is an organization, provide the type of organization, and the jurisdiction of organization, and either the debtor’s organizational identification number or an indication that the debtor does not have one.

Under Subsection 36‑9‑338(1) a security interest or agricultural lien perfected by a financing statement containing incorrect information of the type described above is subordinate to conflicting security interest in the collateral to the extent the secured party gave value in reasonable reliance upon the incorrect information.

Under Subsection 36‑9‑338(2) a purchaser, other than a secured party, takes free of a security interest or agricultural lien to the extent it gave value in reasonable reliance upon the incorrect information and, in the case of tangible property, received delivery of the collateral.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Agricultural lien” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(5) |
| “Chattel paper” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(11) |
| “Document” | Sections 36‑9‑102(a)(30), 36‑7‑102(1)(e), 36‑1‑201(15) |
| “Financing statement” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(39) |
| “Goods” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(44) |
| “Instrument” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(47) |
| “Reasonable reliance” | See Section 36‑9‑338,  Official Comment 2 |
| “Receives delivery of chattel paper, documents, instruments, security certificates” | Section 36‑1‑201(14) |
| “Receives delivery of goods” | See Section 36‑2‑103(1)(c) |
| “Security certificates” | Section 36‑8‑102(a)(16) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |
| “Value” | Section 36‑1‑201(44) [see now Section 36‑1‑204] |

Cross References—

1. Security interests that have priority over a security interest perfected by an earlier filing. Sections 36‑9‑324, 36‑9‑327(1), 36‑9‑328(1), 36‑9‑329 (1), 36‑9‑330, 36‑9‑331, and 36‑9‑334(d).

2. Buyers that take free of perfected security interests. Section 36‑9‑320.

3. Reasons a filing office is required to refuse to accept a financing statement for filing. Sections 36‑9‑520(a) and 36‑9‑516(b).

4. Effect of events subsequent to filing that render the information in financing statement incorrect. Section 36‑9‑507.

Editor’s Note

2014 Act No. 213, Section 51, provides as follows:

“SECTION 51. This act becomes effective on October 1, 2014. It applies to transactions entered into and events occurring after that date.”

Effect of Amendment

2014 Act No. 213, Section 44, in subsection (2), inserted “tangible” before “chattel paper” and “documents”.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Agriculture 10.

Secured Transactions 92, 138 to 150.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 23k10; 349Ak92; 349Ak138 to 349Ak150.

**SECTION 36‑9‑339.** Priority subject to subordination.

This chapter does not preclude subordination by agreement by a person entitled to priority.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑316.

2. Subordination by Agreement. The preceding Sections deal elaborately with questions of priority. This Section makes it entirely clear that a person entitled to priority may effectively agree to subordinate its claim. Only the person entitled to priority may make such an agreement: a person’s rights cannot be adversely affected by an agreement to which the person is not a party.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑339 provides that a person entitled to priority under the provisions of the Article can subordinate its priority by agreement.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Agreement” | Section 36‑1‑201(3) |

CROSS REFERENCES

Variation of provisions of this code by agreement, see Section 36‑1‑302.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 147.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak147.

LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES

ARTICLE 9 and the Bankruptcy Act. 19 S.C. L. Rev. 742.

Bankruptcy’s Challenge to the Floating Lien. 19 S.C. L. Rev. 773.

The Secured Creditor in South Carolina Versus the New Federal Tax Lien. 19 S.C. L. Rev. 759.

Subpart 4

Rights of Bank

**SECTION 36‑9‑340.** Effectiveness of right of recoupment or set‑off against deposit account.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), a bank with which a deposit account is maintained may exercise any right of recoupment or set‑off against a secured party that holds a security interest in the deposit account.

(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), the application of this chapter to a security interest in a deposit account does not affect a right of recoupment or set‑off of the secured party as to a deposit account maintained with the secured party.

(c) The exercise by a bank of a set‑off against a deposit account is ineffective against a secured party that holds a security interest in the deposit account which is perfected by control under Section 36‑9‑104(a)(3), if the set‑off is based on a claim against the debtor.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. New; subsection (b) is based on a nonuniform Illinois amendment.

2. Set‑off vs. Security Interest. This Section resolves the conflict between a security interest in a deposit account and the bank’s rights of recoupment and set‑off.

Subsection (a) states the general rule and provides that the bank may effectively exercise rights of recoupment and set‑off against the secured party. Subsection (c) contains an exception: if the secured party has control under Section 9‑104(a)(3) (i.e., if it has become the bank’s customer), then any set‑off exercised by the bank against a debt owed by the debtor (as opposed to a debt owed to the bank by the secured party) is ineffective. The bank may, however, exercise its recoupment rights effectively. This result is consistent with the priority rule in Section 9‑327(4), under which the security interest of a bank in a deposit account is subordinate to that of a secured party who has control under Section 9‑104(a)(3).

This Section deals with rights of set‑off and recoupment that a bank may have under other law. It does not create a right of set‑off or recoupment, nor is it intended to override any limitations or restrictions that other law imposes on the exercise of those rights.

3. Preservation of Set‑Off Right. Subsection (b) makes clear that a bank may hold both a right of set‑off against, and an Article 9 security interest in, the same deposit account. By holding a security interest in a deposit account, a bank does not impair any right of set‑off it would otherwise enjoy. This subsection does not pertain to accounts evidenced by an instrument (e.g., certain certificates of deposit), which are excluded from the definition of “deposit accounts.”

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑340 provides clear rules on the priority of a bank’s rights of recoupment and set‑off against a deposit account that is subject to a perfected security interest. Section 36‑9‑109(d)(10) provides that although Article 9 does not apply to a right of recoupment or set‑off, Section 36‑9‑340 does apply to determine the effectiveness of rights of recoupment or set‑off against deposit accounts. A bank’s rights of recoupment or set‑off may conflict with a security interest in a deposit account when a secured party claims security interest in the deposit account as original collateral perfected by control under Sections 36‑9‑314 and 36‑9‑104. The conflict may also arise when a second party can identify cash proceeds subject to its perfected security interest that have been deposited in the account.

Section 36‑9‑340(a) provides that, subject to one exception, a bank may exercise a right of set‑off or recoupment against a secured party that holds a security interest in the deposit account. The exception, provided in subsection (c), is that the exercise of a right of set‑off is not effective against a secured party that holds a security interest in the deposit account perfected by becoming a customer of the bank under Section 36‑9‑104(a)(3). Therefore, a bank’s right of recoupment always has priority over a secured party’s security interest in a deposit account. Moreover, a bank’s right of set‑off has priority over security interests in the deposit account as original collateral perfected by a control agreement under Section 36‑9‑104(a)(2) and over security interests claimed by the identification of cash proceeds.

Subsection 36‑9‑340(b) provides that the fact that a bank may have a security interest in a deposit account perfected under Section 36‑9‑104(a)(1) does not affect its rights of recoupment and set‑off.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Bank” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(8) |
| “Control” | See Section 36‑9‑104 |
| “Debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “Deposit account” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(29) |
| “Secured party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |

Cross References—

1. Requirements for obtaining control of a deposit account. Section 36‑9‑104.

2. Control as satisfying the evidentiary requirement for creating an enforceable security interest in a deposit account. Section 36‑9‑203(b)(3)(D).

3. Security interests in deposit accounts as original collateral can be perfected only by control. Sections 36‑9‑312(b)(1) and 36‑9‑314(a).

4. Attachment of a security interest on identifiable proceeds. Sections 36‑9‑203(f) and 36‑9‑315(a)(2).

5. Identification of commingled cash proceeds. Section 36‑9‑315(b)(2).

6. Perfection of a security interest in identifiable cash proceeds. Section 36‑9‑315(c) and (d)(2).

7. Priority of conflicting security interests in a deposit account. Section 36‑9‑327.

8. Transferee’s right to retain funds transferred from a deposit account free of a security interest in the deposit account. Section 36‑9‑332(b).

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Banks and Banking 134.

Secured Transactions 138.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 52k134; 349Ak138.

**SECTION 36‑9‑341.** Bank ‘ s rights and duties with respect to deposit account.

Except as otherwise provided in Section 36‑9‑340(c), and unless the bank otherwise agrees in an authenticated record, a bank’s rights and duties with respect to a deposit account maintained with the bank are not terminated, suspended, or modified by:

(1) the creation, attachment, or perfection of a security interest in the deposit account;

(2) the bank’s knowledge of the security interest; or

(3) the bank’s receipt of instructions from the secured party.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. New.

2. Free Flow of Funds. This Section is designed to prevent security interests in deposit accounts from impeding the free flow of funds through the payment system. Subject to two exceptions, it leaves the bank’s rights and duties with respect to the deposit account and the funds on deposit unaffected by the creation or perfection of a security interest or by the bank’s knowledge of the security interest. In addition, the Section permits the bank to ignore the instructions of the secured party unless it had agreed to honor them or unless other law provides to the contrary. A secured party who wishes to deprive the debtor of access to funds on deposit or to appropriate those funds for itself needs to obtain the agreement of the bank, utilize the judicial process, or comply with procedures set forth in other law. Section 4‑303(a), concerning the effect of notice on a bank’s right and duty to pay items, is not to the contrary. That Section addresses only whether an otherwise effective notice comes too late; it does not determine whether a timely notice is otherwise effective.

3. Operation of Rule. The general rule of this Section is subject to Section 9‑340(c), under which a bank’s right of set‑off may not be exercised against a deposit account in the secured party’s name if the right is based on a claim against the debtor. This result reflects current law in many jurisdictions and does not appear to have unduly disrupted banking practices or the payments system. The more important function of this Section, which is not impaired by Section 9‑340, is the bank’s right to follow the debtor’s (customer’s) instructions (e.g., by honoring checks, permitting withdrawals, etc.) until such time as the depository institution is served with judicial process or receives instructions with respect to the funds on deposit from a secured party who has control over the deposit account.

4. Liability of Bank. This Article does not determine whether a bank that pays out funds from an encumbered deposit is liable to the holder of a security interest. Although the fact that a secured party has control over the deposit account and the manner by which control was achieved may be relevant to the imposition of liability, whatever rule applies generally when a bank pays out funds in which a third party has an interest would determine liability to a secured party. Often, this rule is found in a non‑ UCC adverse claim statute.

5. Certificates of Deposit. This Section does not address the obligations of banks that issue instruments evidencing deposits (e.g., certain certificates of deposit).

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Subject to two exceptions, Section 36‑9‑341 provides that the creation of a perfected security interest in a deposit account, the bank’s knowledge of the security interest, or the bank’s receipt of instructions from the secured party does not affect the bank’s rights and duties with respect to the deposit account. The bank’s basic duty is follow the instructions of its customer concerning the disposition of funds in the deposit account. The purpose of this provision is to prevent security interests in deposit accounts from impeding the operation of the payment system.

The first exception to the general rule under Section 36‑9‑341 arises when a secured party has perfected a security interest upon a deposit account by becoming a customer of the bank. In that case, Section 36‑9‑341 confirms that the bank cannot set‑off against the secured party.

The second exception arises when the bank has agreed in an authenticated record to modify its duties with respect to a deposit account. This exception takes effect when the bank enters into an enforceable control agreement under Section 36‑9‑104(a)(2) to comply with the secured party’s instructions directing disposition of funds in the account.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Authenticate” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(7) |
| “Bank” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(8) |
| “Deposit account” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(29) |
| “Knowledge” | Section 36‑1‑201(25) [see now Section 36‑1‑202] |
| “Record” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(69) |
| “Secured party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |

Cross References—

1. Requirements for control of a deposit account. Section 36‑9‑104.

2. Control as satisfying the evidentiary requirement for an enforceable security interest in a deposit account. Section 36‑9‑203(b)(3)(D).

3. Perfection of a security interest in a deposit account. Sections 36‑9‑312(b)(1) and 36‑9‑314(a).

4. Priority of secured interests in deposit accounts. Section 36‑9‑327.

5. Priority of a banks rights of recoupment and set‑off. Section 36‑9‑340.

6. Bank’s right to refuse to enter into a control agreement. Section 36‑9‑342.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Banks and Banking 119, 128.

Secured Transactions 131.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 52k119; 52k128; 349Ak131.

**SECTION 36‑9‑342.** Bank ‘ s right to refuse to enter into or disclose existence of control agreement.

This chapter does not require a bank to enter into an agreement of the kind described in Section 36‑9‑104(a)(2), even if its customer so requests or directs. A bank that has entered into such an agreement is not required to confirm the existence of the agreement to another person unless requested to do so by its customer.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. New; derived from Section 8‑106(g).

2. Protection for Bank. This Section protects banks from the need to enter into agreements against their will and from the need to respond to inquiries from persons other than their customers.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑342 provides that a bank is not required to enter into a control agreement to enable a secured party to perfect a security interest in a deposit account even if the bank’s customer so requests. Moreover, a bank that has entered into a control agreement is not required to confirm the existence of the agreement unless the customer instructed the bank to do so.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Bank” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(8) |
| “Control agreement” | See Section 36‑9‑104(a)(2) |

Cross References—

Requirements for a control agreement. Section 36‑9‑104(a)(2).

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Banks and Banking 119.

Secured Transactions 89.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 52k119; 349Ak89.

Part 4

Rights of Third Parties

**SECTION 36‑9‑401.** Alienability of debtor ‘ s rights.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) and Sections 36‑9‑406, 36‑9‑407, 36‑9‑408, and 36‑9‑409, whether a debtor’s rights in collateral may be voluntarily or involuntarily transferred is governed by law other than this chapter.

(b) An agreement between the debtor and secured party which prohibits a transfer of the debtor’s rights in collateral or makes the transfer a default does not prevent the transfer from taking effect.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑401; 1966 (54) 2716; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 1997 Act No. 34, Section 1; 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑311.

2. Scope of This Part. This Part deals with several issues affecting third parties (i.e., parties other than the debtor and the secured party). These issues are not addressed in Part 3, Subpart 3, which deals with priorities. This Part primarily addresses the rights and duties of account debtors and other persons obligated on collateral who are not, themselves, parties to a secured transaction.

3. Governing Law. There was some uncertainty under former Article 9 as to which jurisdiction’s law (usually, which jurisdiction’s version of Article 9) applied to the matters that this Part addresses. Part 3, Subpart 1, does not determine the law governing these matters because they do not relate to perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, or priority. However, it might be inappropriate for a designation of applicable law by a debtor and secured party under Section 1‑105 to control the law applicable to an independent transaction or relationship between the debtor and an account debtor.

Consider an example under Section 9‑408.

Example 1: State X has adopted this Article; former Article 9 is the law of State Y. A general intangible (e.g., a franchise agreement) between a debtor‑franchisee, D, and an account debtor‑franchisor, AD, is governed by the law of State Y. D grants to SP a security interest in its rights under the franchise agreement. The franchise agreement contains a term prohibiting D’s assignment of its rights under the agreement. D and SP agree that their secured transaction is governed by the law of State X. Under State X’s Section 9‑408, the restriction on D’s assignment is ineffective to prevent the creation, attachment, or perfection of SP’s security interest. State Y’s former Section 9‑318(4), however, does not address restrictions on the creation of security interests in general intangibles other than general intangibles for money due or to become due. Accordingly, it does not address restrictions on the assignment to SP of D’s rights under the franchise agreement. The non‑Article‑9 law of State Y, which does address restrictions, provides that the prohibition on assignment is effective.

This Article does not provide a specific answer to the question of which State’s law applies to the restriction on assignment in the example. However, assuming that under non‑UCC choice‑of‑law principles the effectiveness of the restriction would be governed by the law of State Y, which governs the franchise agreement, the fact that State X’s Article 9 governs the secured transaction between SP and D would not override the otherwise applicable law governing the agreement. Of course, to the extent that jurisdictions eventually adopt identical versions of this Article and courts interpret it consistently, the inability to identify the applicable law in circumstances such as those in the example may be inconsequential.

4. Inalienability Under Other Law. Subsection (a) addresses the question whether property necessarily is transferable by virtue of its inclusion (i.e., its eligibility as collateral) within the scope of Article 9. It gives a negative answer, subject to the identified exceptions. The substance of subsection (a) was implicit under former Article 9.

5. Negative Pledge Covenant. Subsection (b) is an exception to the general rule in subsection (a). It makes clear that in secured transactions under this Article the debtor has rights in collateral (whether legal title or equitable) which it can transfer and which its creditors can reach. It is best explained with an example.

Example 2: A debtor, D, grants to SP a security interest to secure a debt in excess of the value of the collateral. D agrees with SP that it will not create a subsequent security interest in the collateral and that any security interest purportedly granted in violation of the agreement will be void. Subsequently, in violation of its agreement with SP, D purports to grant a security interest in the same collateral to another secured party.

Subsection (b) validates D’s creation of the subsequent (prohibited) security interest, which might even achieve priority over the earlier security interest. See Comment 7. However, unlike some other provisions of this Part, such as Section 9‑406, subsection (b) does not provide that the agreement restricting assignment itself is “ineffective.” Consequently, the debtor’s breach may create a default.

6. Rights of Lien Creditors. Difficult problems may arise with respect to attachment, levy, and other judicial procedures under which a debtor’s creditors may reach collateral subject to a security interest. For example, an obligation may be secured by collateral worth many times the amount of the obligation. If a lien creditor has caused all or a portion of the collateral to be seized under judicial process, it may be difficult to determine the amount of the debtor’s “equity” in the collateral that has been seized. The Section leaves resolution of this problem to the courts. The doctrine of marshaling may be appropriate.

7. Sale of Receivables. If a debtor sells an account, chattel paper, payment intangible, or promissory note outright, as against the buyer the debtor has no remaining rights to transfer. If, however, the buyer fails to perfect its interest, then solely insofar as the rights of certain third parties are concerned, the debtor is deemed to retain its rights and title. See Section 9‑318. The debtor has the power to convey these rights to a subsequent purchaser. If the subsequent purchaser (buyer or secured lender) perfects its interest, it will achieve priority over the earlier, unperfected purchaser. See Section 9‑322(a)(1).

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Subsection 36‑9‑401(a) states the general rule that law other than Article 9 determines the alienability of a debtor’s rights in collateral. This rule, however, is expressly subject to exceptions that constitute the most significant aspect of Part 4. The first exception to the general rule is set forth in subsection (b). Under this provision an agreement between a debtor and a secured party prohibiting a transfer of the debtor’s rights in the collateral does not prevent the transfer from taking effect. Subsection (b), however, does not invalidate a term under which a transfer of a debtor’s rights in the collateral constitutes a default.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Agreement” | Section 36‑1‑201(3) |
| “Collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “Default” | See Section 36‑9‑601,  Official Comment 2 |
| “Rights in collateral” | See Section 36‑9‑203,  Official Comment 6 |
| “Secured party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |

Cross References—

1. Contractual restrictions upon the transfer of accounts (other than health‑care‑insurance receivables) and chattel paper and upon creating, perfecting, or enforcing a non‑sale security interest in accounts, (other than health‑care‑insurance receivables), chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes are generally ineffective. Section 36‑9‑406(d), (e), and (i).

2. A rule of law, statute, or regulation that prohibits or restricts the transfer of or creating, perfecting, or enforcing a security interest in accounts (other than health‑care‑insurance receivables) and chattel paper is generally ineffective. Section 36‑9‑406(f) and (i).

3. Certain terms in leases restricting the transfer of or creating, perfecting, or enforcing a security interest in a party’s interest in the lease or the lessor’s interest in the goods are ineffective. Section 36‑9‑407.

4. Contractual terms that prohibit or restrict the transfer of promissory notes, general intangibles, and health‑care‑insurance receivables or the creation or perfection of non‑sale security interests general intangibles or health‑care‑insurance receivables are generally ineffective to prevent the attachment and perfection of a security interest; but may be effective to preclude enforcement against the account debtor or a person obligated under the note. Section 36‑9‑408(a), (b), and (d).

5. A rule of law, statute, or regulation that prohibits or restricts the transfer of or creation of a security interest in a promissory note, health‑ care‑insurance receivable, or a general intangible is generally ineffective to prevent the attachment and perfection of a security interest; but may be effective to prevent enforcement of the security interest against the account debtor or person obligated on the promissory note. Section 36‑9‑408(c) and (d).

6. Certain restriction’s upon a beneficiary’s right to assign or create a security interest upon letter‑of‑credit rights are ineffective to prevent the creation and perfection of a security interest; but may be effective to prevent enforcement against the applicant, issuer, nominated party, or transferee beneficiary. Section 36‑9‑409.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 166, 170.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak166; 349Ak170.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Encyclopedias

S.C. Jur. Clerks of Court Section 10, Duties.

S.C. Jur. Logs and Timber Section 5, Sale of Timber Treated as a Sale of Goods Under S. C. Code Ann. S36‑2‑107(2).

**SECTION 36‑9‑402.** Secured party not obligated on contract of debtor or in tort.

The existence of a security interest, agricultural lien, or authority given to a debtor to dispose of or use collateral, without more, does not subject a secured party to liability in contract or tort for the debtor’s acts or omissions.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑402; 1966 (54) 2716; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 1992 Act No. 357, Section 1; 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑317.

2. Nonliability of Secured Party. This Section, like former Section 9‑317, rejects theories on which a secured party might be held liable on a debtor’s contracts or in tort merely because a security interest exists or because the debtor is entitled to dispose of or use collateral. This Section expands former Section 9‑317 to cover agricultural liens.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑402 provides that a secured party cannot be held liable in contract or tort for the acts or omissions of the debtor merely because the secured party holds a security interest or agricultural lien and allows the debtor to dispose of or use the collateral.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Agricultural lien” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(5) |
| “Collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “Secured Party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |

CROSS REFERENCES

Delegation of performance of duties under sales contract by assignment thereof, see Section 36‑2‑210.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 169.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak169.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Encyclopedias

S.C. Jur. Logs and Timber Section 5, Sale of Timber Treated as a Sale of Goods Under S. C. Code Ann. S36‑2‑107(2).

LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES

Secured Party’s Rights on Disposition of Collateral. 22 S.C. L. Rev. 504.

**SECTION 36‑9‑403.** Agreement not to assert defenses against assignee.

(a) In this section, “value” has the meaning provided in Section 36‑3‑303.

(b) Except as otherwise provided in this section, an agreement between an account debtor and an assignor not to assert against an assignee any claim or defense that the account debtor may have against the assignor is enforceable by an assignee that takes an assignment:

(1) for value;

(2) in good faith;

(3) without notice of a claim of a property or possessory right to the property assigned; and

(4) without notice of a defense or claim in recoupment of the type that may be asserted against a person entitled to enforce a negotiable instrument under Section 36‑3‑305(2).

(c) Subsection (b) does not apply to defenses of a type that may be asserted against a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument under Section 36‑3‑305(2)(a)‑(e).

(d) In a consumer transaction, if a record evidences the account debtor’s obligation, law other than this chapter requires that the record include a statement to the effect that the rights of an assignee are subject to claims or defenses that the account debtor could assert against the original obligee, and the record does not include such a statement:

(1) the record has the same effect as if the record included such a statement; and

(2) the account debtor may assert against an assignee those claims and defenses that would have been available if the record included such a statement.

(e) This section is subject to law other than this chapter which establishes a different rule for an account debtor who is an individual and who incurred the obligation primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.

(f) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), this section does not displace law other than this chapter which gives effect to an agreement by an account debtor not to assert a claim or defense against an assignee.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑403; 1966 (54) 2716; 1967 (55) 862; 1968 (55) 3037; 1978 Act No. 644, Part II, Section 7; 1985 Act No. 201, Part II, Section 7A; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑206.

2. Scope and Purpose. Subsection (b), like former Section 9‑206, generally validates an agreement between an account debtor and an assignor that the account debtor will not assert against an assignee claims and defenses that it may have against the assignor. These agreements are typical in installment sale agreements and leases. However, this Section expands former Section 9‑206 to apply to all account debtors; it is not limited to account debtors that have bought or leased goods. This Section applies only to the obligations of an “account debtor,” as defined in Section 9‑102. Thus, it does not determine the circumstances under which and the extent to which a person who is obligated on a negotiable instrument is disabled from asserting claims and defenses. Rather, Article 3 must be consulted. See, e.g., Sections 3‑305, 3‑306. Article 3 governs even when the negotiable instrument constitutes part of chattel paper. See Section 9‑102 (an obligor on a negotiable instrument constituting part of chattel paper is not an “account debtor”).

3. Conditions of Validation; Relationship to Article 3. Subsection (b) validates an account debtor’s agreement only if the assignee takes an assignment for value, in good faith, and without notice of conflicting claims to the property assigned or of certain claims or defenses of the assignor. Like former Section 9‑206, this Section is designed to put the assignee in a position that is no better and no worse than that of a holder in due course of an negotiable instrument under Article 3. However, former Section 9‑206 left open certain issues, e.g., whether the Section incorporated the special Article 3 definition of “value” in Section 3‑303 or the generally applicable definition in Section 1‑201(44). Subsection (a) addresses this question; it provides that “ value” has the meaning specified in Section 3‑303(a). Similarly, subsection (c) provides that subsection (b) does not validate an agreement with respect to defenses that could be asserted against a holder in due course under Section 9‑305(b) (the so‑called “real” defenses). In 1990, the definition of “holder in due course’ ‘ (Section 3‑302) and the articulation of the rights of a holder in due course (Sections 3‑305 and 3‑306) were revised substantially. This Section tracks more closely the rules of Sections 3‑302, 3‑305, and 3‑306.

4. Relationship to Terms of Assigned Property. Former Section 9‑206(2), concerning warranties accompanying the sale of goods, has been deleted as unnecessary. This Article does not regulate the terms of the account, chattel paper, or general intangible that is assigned, except insofar as the account, chattel paper, or general intangible itself creates a security interest (as often is the case with chattel paper). Thus, Article 2, and not this Article, determines whether a seller of goods makes or effectively disclaims warranties, even if the sale is secured. Similarly, other law, and not this Article, determines the effectiveness of an account debtor’s undertaking to pay notwithstanding, and not to assert, any defenses or claims against an assignor‑e.g., a “hell‑or‑high‑water” provision in the underlying agreement that is assigned. If other law gives effect to this undertaking, then, under principles of nemo dat, the undertaking would be enforceable by the assignee (secured party). If other law prevents the assignor from enforcing the undertaking, this Section nevertheless might permit the assignee to do so. The right of the assignee to enforce would depend upon whether, under the particular facts, the account debtor’s undertaking fairly could be construed as an agreement that falls within the scope of this Section and whether the assignee meets the requirements of this Section.

5. Relationship to Federal Trade Commission Rule. Subsection (d) is new. It applies to rights evidenced by a record that is required to contain, but does not contain, the notice set forth in Federal Trade Commission Rule 433, 16 C.F.R. Part 433 (the “Holder‑in‑Due‑Course Regulations”). Under this subsection, an assignee of such a record takes subject to the consumer account debtor’s claims and defenses to the same extent as it would have if the writing had contained the required notice. Thus, subsection (d) effectively renders waiver‑of‑defense clauses ineffective in the transactions with consumers to which it applies.

6. Relationship to Other Law. Like former Section 9‑206(1), this Section takes no position on the enforceability of waivers of claims and defenses by consumer account debtors, leaving that question to other law. However, the reference to “law other than this article” in subsection (e) encompasses administrative rules and regulations; the reference in former Section 9‑206(1) that it replaces (“statute or decision”) arguably did not.

This Section does not displace other law that gives effect to a non‑ consumer account debtor’s agreement not to assert defenses against an assignee, even if the agreement would not qualify under subsection (b). See subsection (f). It validates, but does not invalidate, agreements made by a non‑consumer account debtor. This Section also does not displace other law to the extent that the other law permits an assignee, who takes an assignment with notice of a claim of a property or possessory right, a defense, or a claim in recoupment, to enforce an account debtor’s agreement not to assert claims and defenses against the assignor (e.g., a “hell‑or‑high‑water” agreement). See Comment 4. It also does not displace an assignee’s right to assert that an account debtor is estopped from asserting a claim or defense. Nor does this Section displace other law with respect to waivers of potential future claims and defenses that are the subject of an agreement between the account debtor and the assignee. Finally, it does not displace Section 1‑107, concerning waiver of a breach that allegedly already has occurred.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑403 addresses the Enforceability of an agreement between an account debtor and an assignor under which the account debtor agrees not to assert against an assignee claims and defenses it may have against the assignor. Subsections (b) and (c) place the assignee in the same position as a transferee of an instrument. If the assignee takes for value, in good faith, without notice of a claim or right to the property and without notice of a defense or claim of recoupment; the assignee may enforce the agreement to the extent it protects the assignee from “personal” as opposed to “real” defenses.

Subsection (e) provides that Section 36‑9‑403 does not displace law other than Article 9 which provides a different rule when the account debtor is an individual who incurred the obligation primarily for personal, family, and household purposes. As a result, assignees of consumer credit sales contracts and consumer leases will take subject to a consumer’s claims and defenses against the seller or lessor under Section 37‑2‑404, S.C. Code Ann. (1989 rev.). In addition, Section 36‑9‑403 does not displace the Federal Trade Commission Rule 433, 16 C.F.R. Part 433. Moreover, subsection (d) provides that if a contract in a consumer transaction fails to include the notice required under Rule 433, the contract will have the same effect as if the notice had been included. As a result, the account debtor may assert the claims and defenses against assignee that it would have asserted under the terms of the notice.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Account debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(3) |
| “Agreement” | Section 36‑1‑201(3) |
| “Consumer transactions” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(26) |
| “Good faith” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(43) |
| “Holder in due course” | Section 36‑3‑302 |
| “Negotiable instrument” | Section 36‑3‑104(1) |
| “Notice” | Section 36‑1‑201(25) [see now Section 36‑1‑202] |
| “Record” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(66) |
| “Value” | Section 36‑3‑303 |

Cross References—

1. Obtaining holder in due course status. Sections 36‑3‑302 to 36‑3‑304.

2. Rights of a holder in due course. Section 36‑3‑305.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 186, 189 to 191.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak186; 349Ak189 to 349Ak191.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Encyclopedias

S.C. Jur. Logs and Timber Section 5, Sale of Timber Treated as a Sale of Goods Under S. C. Code Ann. S36‑2‑107(2).

**SECTION 36‑9‑404.** Rights acquired by assignee; claims and defenses against assignee.

(a) Unless an account debtor has made an enforceable agreement not to assert defenses or claims, and subject to subsections (b) through (e), the rights of an assignee are subject to:

(1) all terms of the agreement between the account debtor and assignor and any defense or claim in recoupment arising from the transaction that gave rise to the contract; and

(2) any other defense or claim of the account debtor against the assignor which accrues before the account debtor receives a notification of the assignment authenticated by the assignor or the assignee.

(b) Subject to subsection (c) and except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), the claim of an account debtor against an assignor may be asserted against an assignee under subsection (a) only to reduce the amount the account debtor owes.

(c) This section is subject to law other than this chapter which establishes a different rule for an account debtor who is an individual and who incurred the obligation primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.

(d) In a consumer transaction, if a record evidences the account debtor’s obligation, law other than this chapter requires that the record include a statement to the effect that the account debtor’s recovery against an assignee with respect to claims and defenses against the assignor may not exceed amounts paid by the account debtor under the record, and the record does not include such a statement, the extent to which a claim of an account debtor against the assignor may be asserted against an assignee is determined as if the record included such a statement.

(e) This section does not apply to an assignment of a health‑care‑insurance receivable.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑404; 1966 (54) 2716; 1967 (55) 604; 1978 Act No. 644, Part II, Section 7; 1982 Act No. 385, Section 57(2)(e); 1985 Act No. 201, Part II, Section 7B; 1988 Act No; 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑318(1).

2. Purpose; Rights of Assignee in General. Subsection (a), like former Section 9‑318(1), provides that an assignee generally takes an assignment subject to defenses and claims of an account debtor. Under subsection (a)(1), if the account debtor’s defenses on an assigned claim arise from the transaction that gave rise to the contract with the assignor, it makes no difference whether the defense or claim accrues before or after the account debtor is notified of the assignment. Under subsection (a)(2), the assignee takes subject to other defenses or claims only if they accrue before the account debtor has been notified of the assignment. Of course, an account debtor may waive its right to assert defenses or claims against an assignee under Section 9‑403 or other applicable law. Subsection (a) tracks Section 3‑305(a)(3) more closely than its predecessor.

3. Limitation on Affirmative Claims. Subsection (b) is new. It limits the claim that the account debtor may assert against an assignee. Borrowing from Section 3‑305(a)(3) and cases construing former Section 9‑318, subsection (b) generally does not afford the account debtor the right to an affirmative recovery from an assignee.

4. Consumer Account Debtors; Relationship to Federal Trade Commission Rule. Subsections (c) and (d) also are new. Subsection (c) makes clear that the rules of this Section are subject to other law establishing special rules for consumer account debtors. An “account debtor who is an individual” as used in subsection (c) includes individuals who are jointly or jointly and severally obligated. Subsection (d) applies to rights evidenced by a record that is required to contain, but does not contain, the notice set forth in Federal Trade Commission Rule 433, 16 C.F.R. Part 433 ( the “Holder‑in‑Due‑Course Regulations”). Under subsection ( d), a consumer account debtor has the same right to an affirmative recovery from an assignee of such a record as the consumer would have had against the assignee had the record contained the required notice.

5. Scope; Application to “Account Debtor.” This Section deals only with the rights and duties of “account debtors”‑and for the most part only with account debtors on accounts, chattel paper, and payment intangibles. Subsection (e) provides that the obligation of an insurer with respect to a health‑care‑insurance receivable is governed by other law. References in this Section to an “account debtor” include account debtors on collateral that is proceeds. Neither this Section nor any other provision of this Article, including Sections 9‑408 and 9‑409, provides analogous regulation of the rights and duties of other obligors on collateral, such as the maker of a negotiable instrument (governed by Article 3), the issuer of or nominated person under a letter of credit (governed by Article 5), or the issuer of a security (governed by Article 8). Article 9 leaves those rights and duties untouched; however, Section 9‑409 deals with the special case of letters of credit. When chattel paper is composed in part of a negotiable instrument, the obligor on the instrument is not an “account debtor,” and Article 3 governs the rights of the assignee of the chattel paper with respect to the issues that this Section addresses. See, e.g., Section 3‑601 (dealing with discharge of an obligation to pay a negotiable instrument).

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑404 applies when an account debtor does not make an enforceable agreement not to assert claims and defenses against an assignee. Under subsection (a)(1) an assignee is subject to all terms of the agreement between the account debtor and assignor and to any claim or defense of recoupment. Under subsection (a)(2) the assignee also takes subject to other claims or defenses of the account debtor which accrue before the account debtor receives authenticated notice of the assignment from either the assignor or assignee. Subsections (c) and (d) provide that the general rules of subsection (a) are subject to different rules that apply under non‑Code law in transactions involving consumer obligations. These non‑Code rules include Federal Trade Commission Rule 433, 16 C.F.R. 3 Part 433. Subsection (e) provides that Section 36‑9‑404 does not apply to an assignment of a health‑care‑insurance receivable.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Account Debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(3) |
| “Agreement” | Section 36‑1‑201(3) |
| “Authenticate” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(7) |
| “Consumer transactions” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(26) |
| “Health‑care‑insurance receivable” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)( 46) |
| “Receives notification” | Section 36‑1‑201(26) [see now Section 36‑1‑202] |
| “Record” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(69) |

Cross References—

1. Enforceability of an agreement by an account debtor not to assert claims and defenses against an assignee. Section 36‑9‑403.

2. Requirements for notification of an assignment. Section 36‑4‑406(b).

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 181 to 191.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak181 to 349Ak191.

**SECTION 36‑9‑405.** Modification of assigned contract.

(a) A modification of or substitution for an assigned contract is effective against an assignee if made in good faith. The assignee acquires corresponding rights under the modified or substituted contract. The assignment may provide that the modification or substitution is a breach of contract by the assignor. This subsection is subject to subsections (b) through (d).

(b) Subsection (a) applies to the extent that:

(1) the right to payment or a part thereof under an assigned contract has not been fully earned by performance; or

(2) the right to payment or a part thereof has been fully earned by performance and the account debtor has not received notification of the assignment under Section 36‑9‑406(a).

(c) This section is subject to law other than this chapter which establishes a different rule for an account debtor who is an individual and who incurred the obligation primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.

(d) This section does not apply to an assignment of a health‑care‑insurance receivable.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑405; 1966 (54) 2716; 1967 (55) 605; 1978 Act No. 644, Part II, Section 7; 1985 Act No. 201, Part II, Sections 7C, 7D; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑318(2).

2. Modification of Assigned Contract. The ability of account debtors and assignors to modify assigned contracts can be important, especially in the case of government contracts and complex contractual arrangements (e.g., construction contracts) with respect to which modifications are customary. Subsections (a) and (b) provide that good‑faith modifications of assigned contracts are binding against an assignee to the extent that (i) the right to payment has not been fully earned or (ii) the right to payment has been earned and notification of the assignment has not been given to the account debtor. Former Section 9‑318(2) did not validate modifications of fully‑ performed contracts under any circumstances, whether or not notification of the assignment had been given to the account debtor. Subsection (a) protects the interests of assignees by (i) limiting the effectiveness of modifications to those made in good faith, (ii) affording the assignee with corresponding rights under the contract as modified, and (iii) recognizing that the modification may be a breach of the assignor’s agreement with the assignee.

3. Consumer Account Debtors. Subsection (c) is new. It makes clear that the rules of this Section are subject to other law establishing special rules for consumer account debtors.

4. Account Debtors on Health‑Care‑Insurance Receivables. Subsection (d) also is new. It provides that this Section does not apply to an assignment of a health‑care‑insurance receivable. The obligation of an insurer with respect to a health‑care‑insurance receivable is governed by other law.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑405 addresses whether a modification of an assigned contract by the account debtor and assignor is effective against the assignee. Under subsections (a) and (b)(1) a modification entered into in good faith is enforceable against the assignee to the extent that the right to payment under the assigned contract has not been fully earned by performance. Under subsections (a) and (b)(2) a good faith modification of a contract where the right to payment has been earned is enforceable if the account debtor has not received notification of the assignment. Section 36‑9‑405 is subject to rules under other law in the case of consumer obligations and does not apply to assignments of health‑care‑insurance receivables.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Good faith” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(43) |
| “Health‑care‑insurance receivable” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(46) |

CROSS REFERENCES

Assignment of letters of credit, see Section 36‑5‑112.

Delegation of performance by assignment of sales contract, see Section 36‑2‑210.

Purchase of chattel paper or instrument, see Section 36‑9‑330.

Use or disposition of collateral without accounting, see Section 36‑9‑205.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 187.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak187.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Encyclopedias

S.C. Jur. Assignments Section 51, Assignments of Security Interests.

**SECTION 36‑9‑406.** Discharge of account debtor; notification of assignment; identification and proof of assignment; restrictions on assignment of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes ineffective.

(a) Subject to subsections (b) through (i), an account debtor on an account, chattel paper, or a payment intangible may discharge its obligation by paying the assignor until, but not after, the account debtor receives a notification, authenticated by the assignor or the assignee, that the amount due or to become due has been assigned and that payment is to be made to the assignee. After receipt of the notification, the account debtor may discharge its obligation by paying the assignee and may not discharge the obligation by paying the assignor.

(b) Subject to subsection (h), notification is ineffective under subsection (a):

(1) if it does not reasonably identify the rights assigned;

(2) to the extent that an agreement between an account debtor and a seller of a payment intangible limits the account debtor’s duty to pay a person other than the seller and the limitation is effective under law other than this chapter; or

(3) at the option of an account debtor, if the notification notifies the account debtor to make less than the full amount of any installment or other periodic payment to the assignee, even if:

(A) only a portion of the account, chattel paper, or payment intangible has been assigned to that assignee;

(B) a portion has been assigned to another assignee; or

(C) the account debtor knows that the assignment to that assignee is limited.

(c) Subject to subsection (h), if requested by the account debtor, an assignee shall seasonably furnish reasonable proof that the assignment has been made. Unless the assignee complies, the account debtor may discharge its obligation by paying the assignor, even if the account debtor has received a notification under subsection (a).

(d) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e) and Sections 36‑2A‑303 and 36‑9‑407, and subject to subsection (h), a term in an agreement between an account debtor and an assignor or in a promissory note is ineffective to the extent that it:

(1) prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent of the account debtor or person obligated on the promissory note to the assignment or transfer of, or the creation, attachment, perfection, or enforcement of a security interest in, the account, chattel paper, payment intangible, or promissory note; or

(2) provides that the assignment or transfer or the creation, attachment, perfection, or enforcement of the security interest may give rise to a default, breach, right of recoupment, claim, defense, termination, right of termination, or remedy under the account, chattel paper, payment intangible, or promissory note.

(e) Subsection (d) does not apply to the sale of a payment intangible or promissory note, other than a sale under a disposition pursuant to Section 36‑9‑610 or an acceptance of collateral pursuant to Section 36‑9‑620.

(f) Except as otherwise provided in Sections 36‑2A‑303 and 36‑9‑407 and subject to subsections (h) and (i), a rule of law, statute, or regulation that prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent of a government, governmental body or official, or account debtor to the assignment or transfer of, or creation of a security interest in, an account or chattel paper is ineffective to the extent that the rule of law, statute, or regulation:

(1) prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent of the government, governmental body or official, or account debtor to the assignment or transfer of, or the creation, attachment, perfection, or enforcement of a security interest in the account or chattel paper; or

(2) provides that the assignment or transfer or the creation, attachment, perfection, or enforcement of the security interest may give rise to a default, breach, right of recoupment, claim, defense, termination, right of termination, or remedy under the account or chattel paper.

(g) Subject to subsection (h), an account debtor may not waive or vary its option under subsection (b)(3).

(h) This section is subject to law other than this chapter which establishes a different rule for an account debtor who is an individual and who incurred the obligation primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.

(i) This section does not apply to an assignment of a health care insurance receivable.

(j) Subsection (d) does not apply to the assignment, transfer, or creation of a security interest in a:

(1) claim or right to receive compensation for injuries or sickness as described in 26 U.S.C. Section 104(a)(1) or (2), as amended; or

(2) claim or right to receive benefits under a special needs trust as described in 42 U.S.C. Section 1396p(d)(4), as amended.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑406; 1966 (54) 2716; 1978 Act No. 644, Part II, Section 7; 1985 Act No. 201, Part II, Section 7E; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12; 2013 Act No. 96, Section 9, eff July 1, 2013.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑318(3), (4).

2. Account Debtor’s Right to Pay Assignor Until Notification. Subsection (a) provides the general rule concerning an account debtor’s right to pay the assignor until the account debtor receives appropriate notification. The revision makes clear that once the account debtor receives the notification, the account debtor cannot discharge its obligation by paying the assignor. It also makes explicit that payment to the assignor before notification, or payment to the assignee after notification, discharges the obligation. No change in meaning from former Section 9‑318 is intended. Nothing in this Section conditions the effectiveness of a notification on the identity of the person who gives it. An account debtor that doubts whether the right to payment has been assigned may avail itself of the procedures in subsection (c). See Comment 4.

An effective notification under subsection (a) must be authenticated. This requirement normally could be satisfied by sending notification on the notifying person’s letterhead or on a form on which the notifying person’s name appears. In each case the printed name would be a symbol adopted by the notifying person for the purpose of identifying the person and adopting the notification. See Section 9‑102 (defining “authenticate”).

Subsection (a) applies only to account debtors on accounts, chattel paper, and payment intangibles. (Section 9‑102 defines the term “account debtor” more broadly, to include those obligated on all general intangibles.) Although subsection (a) is more precise than its predecessor, it probably does not change the rule that applied under former Article 9. Former Section 9‑318(3) referred to the account debtor’s obligation to “pay,’ ‘ indicating that the subsection was limited to account debtors on accounts, chattel paper, and other payment obligations.

3. Limitations on Effectiveness of Notification. Subsection (b) contains some special rules concerning the effectiveness of a notification under subsection (a).

Subsection (b)(1) tracks former Section 9‑318(3) by making ineffective a notification that does not reasonably identify the rights assigned. A reasonable identification need not identify the right to payment with specificity, but what is reasonable also is not left to the arbitrary decision of the account debtor. If an account debtor has doubt as to the adequacy of a notification, it may not be safe in disregarding the notification unless it notifies the assignee with reasonable promptness as to the respects in which the account debtor considers the notification defective.

Subsection (b)(2), which is new, applies only to sales of payment intangibles. It makes a notification ineffective to the extent that other law gives effect to an agreement between an account debtor and a seller of a payment intangible that limits the account debtor’s duty to pay a person other than the seller. Payment intangibles are substantially less fungible than accounts and chattel paper. In some (e.g., commercial bank loans), account debtors customarily and legitimately expect that they will not be required to pay any person other than the financial institution that has advanced funds.

It has become common in financing transactions to assign interests in a single obligation to more than one assignee. Requiring an account debtor that owes a single obligation to make multiple payments to multiple assignees would be unnecessarily burdensome. Thus, under subsection (b)(3), an account debtor that is notified to pay an assignee less than the full amount of any installment or other periodic payment has the option to treat the notification as ineffective, ignore the notice, and discharge the assigned obligation by paying the assignor. Some account debtors may not realize that the law affords them the right to ignore certain notices of assignment with impunity. By making the notification ineffective at the account debtor’s option, subsection (b)(3) permits an account debtor to pay the assignee in accordance with the notice and thereby to satisfy its obligation pro tanto. Under subsection (g), the rights and duties created by subsection (b)(3) cannot be waived or varied.

4. Proof of Assignment. Subsection (c) links payment with discharge, as in subsection (a). It follows former Section 9‑318(3) in referring to the right of the account debtor to pay the assignor if the requested proof of assignment is not seasonably forthcoming. Even if the proof is not forthcoming, the notification of assignment would remain effective, so that, in the absence of reasonable proof of the assignment, the account debtor could discharge the obligation by paying either the assignee or the assignor. Of course, if the assignee did not in fact receive an assignment, the account debtor cannot discharge its obligation by paying a putative assignee who is a stranger. The observations in Comment 3 concerning the reasonableness of an identification of a right to payment also apply here. An account debtor that questions the adequacy of proof submitted by an assignee would be well advised to promptly inform the assignee of the defects.

An account debtor may face another problem if its obligation becomes due while the account debtor is awaiting reasonable proof of the assignment that it has requested from the assignee. This Section does not excuse the account debtor from timely compliance with its obligations. Consequently, an account debtor that has received a notification of assignment and who has requested reasonable proof of the assignment may discharge its obligation by paying the assignor at the time (or even earlier if reasonably necessary to avoid risk of default) when a payment is due, even if the account debtor has not yet received a response to its request for proof. On the other hand, after requesting reasonable proof of the assignment, an account debtor may not discharge its obligation by paying the assignor substantially in advance of the time that the payment is due unless the assignee has failed to provide the proof seasonably.

5. Contractual Restrictions on Assignment. Former Section 9‑318(4) rendered ineffective an agreement between an account debtor and an assignor which prohibited assignment of an account (whether outright or to secure an obligation) or prohibited a security assignment of a general intangible for the payment of money due or to become due. Subsection (d) essentially follows former Section 9‑318(4), but expands the rule of free assignability to chattel paper (subject to Sections 2A‑303 and 9‑407) and promissory notes and explicitly overrides both restrictions and prohibitions of assignment. The policies underlying the ineffectiveness of contractual restrictions under this Section build on common‑law developments that essentially have eliminated legal restrictions on assignments of rights to payment as security and other assignments of rights to payment such as accounts and chattel paper. Any that might linger for accounts and chattel paper are addressed by new subsection (f). See Comment 6.

Former Section 9‑318(4) did not apply to a sale of a payment intangible (as described in the former provision, “a general intangible for money due or to become due”) but did apply to an assignment of a payment intangible for security. Subsection (e) continues this approach and also makes subsection (d) inapplicable to sales of promissory notes. Section 9‑408 addresses anti‑ assignment clauses with respect to sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes.

Like former Section 9‑318(4), subsection (d) provides that anti‑assignment clauses are “ineffective.” The quoted term means that the clause is of no effect whatsoever; the clause does not prevent the assignment from taking effect between the parties and the prohibited assignment does not constitute a default under the agreement between the account debtor and assignor. However, subsection (d) does not override terms that do not directly prohibit, restrict, or require consent to an assignment but which might, nonetheless, present a practical impairment of the assignment. Properly read, however, subsection (d) reaches only covenants that prohibit, restrict, or require consents to assignments; it does not override all terms that might “impair” an assignment in fact.

Example: Buyer enters into an agreement with Seller to buy equipment that Seller is to manufacture according to Buyer’s specifications. Buyer agrees to make a series of prepayments during the construction process. In return, Seller agrees to set aside the prepaid funds in a special account and to use the funds solely for the manufacture of the designated equipment. Seller also agrees that it will not assign any of its rights under the sale agreement with Buyer. Nevertheless, Seller grants to Secured Party a security interest in its accounts. Seller’s antiassignment agreement is ineffective under subsection (d); its agreement concerning the use of prepaid funds, which is not a restriction or prohibition on assignment, is not. However, if Secured Party notifies Buyer to make all future payments directly to Secured Party, Buyer will be obliged to do so under subsection (a) if it wishes the payments to discharge its obligation. Unless Secured Party releases the funds to Seller so that Seller can comply with its use‑of‑ funds covenant, Seller will be in breach of that covenant.

In the example, there appears to be a plausible business purpose for the use‑of‑funds covenant. However, a court may conclude that a covenant with no business purpose other than imposing an impediment to an assignment actually is a direct restriction that is rendered ineffective by subsection (d).

6. Legal Restrictions on Assignment. Former Section 9‑318(4), like subsection (d) of this Section, addressed only contractual restrictions on assignment. The former Section was grounded on the reality that legal, as opposed to contractual, restrictions on assignments of rights to payment had largely disappeared. New subsection (f) codifies this principle of free assignability for accounts and chattel paper. For the most part the discussion of contractual restrictions in Comment 5 applies as well to legal restrictions rendered ineffective under subsection (f).

7. Multiple Assignments. This Section, like former Section 9‑318, is not a complete codification of the law of assignments of rights to payment. In particular, it is silent concerning many of the ramifications for an account debtor in cases of multiple assignments of the same right. For example, an assignor might assign the same receivable to multiple assignees (which assignments could be either inadvertent or wrongful). Or, the assignor could assign the receivable to assignee‑1, which then might re‑assign it to assignee‑2, and so forth. The rights and duties of an account debtor in the face of multiple assignments and in other circumstances not resolved in the statutory text are left to the common‑law rules. See, e.g., Restatement (2d), Contracts 338(3), 339. The failure of former Article 9 to codify these rules does not appear to have caused problems.

8. Consumer Account Debtors. Subsection (h) is new. It makes clear that the rules of this Section are subject to other law establishing special rules for consumer account debtors.

9. Account Debtors on Health‑Care‑Insurance Receivables. Subsection (i) also is new. The obligation of an insurer with respect to a health‑care‑ insurance receivable is governed by other law. Section 9‑408 addresses contractual and legal restrictions on the assignment of a health‑care‑ insurance receivable.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑406 addresses two issues. The first issue is to whom an account debtor must make payment in order to discharge its obligation. The second issue is the extent to which certain restrictions upon the assignment of an interest in accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes are ineffective.

Subsection (a) provides that an account debtor can discharge its obligation by paying the assignor until the account debtor receives an authenticated notification from the assignor or assignee that the right payment has been assigned. As a general rule, after receipt of the notification of assignment subsection (a) provides that an account debtor can discharge its obligation only by paying the assignee. Under subsection (c), however, the account debtor can request reasonable proof of the assignment from the assignee and until it receives the proof, the account debtor can discharge its obligation by paying the assignor. Subsection (b) sets forth the requirements for an effective notification of assignment.

Subsection (d) and (f) set forth the rules for determining whether restrictions upon certain assignments are ineffective. Subsection (d) addresses contractual restrictions and subsection (f) addresses restrictions imposed by a rule of law, statute, or regulation.

Under subsection (d)(1) terms in an agreement between an account debtor and assignor or in a promissory note are ineffective to the extent they prohibit, restrict, or require the account debtor or person obligated on a note to consent to an assignment transfer, or creation, perfection, or enforcement of a security interest in accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes. Subsection (d)(2) renders ineffective a contractual provision under which an assignment or transfer or creation, perfection, or enforcement of security interest in accounts,, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes a breach or event of default. The scope of subsection (d), however, is limited by subsections (e) and (i). Subsection (e) provides that subsection (d) does not apply to sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes. Moreover, subsection (i) provides that subsection (d) does not apply to assignments of accounts that constitute health‑care‑insurance receivables.

Subsection (f) renders ineffective a rule of law, statute, or regulation that prohibits, restricts, or requires a government official or the account debtor to consent to the assignment or transfer of, or creation of a security interest in an account or chattel paper. Under subsection (f)(1) such restrictions are ineffective to prevent the assignment or transfer of, or the creation, perfection, or enforcement of a security interest in an account or chattel paper. Under subsection (f)(2) such restrictions are ineffective to establish a default, breach, right to terminate, or provide remedy under the account or chattel paper. Subsection (i) limits the scope of subsection (f) by rendering it inapplicable to assignments of health‑care‑ insurance receivables. An example of a statutory restriction on assignments may be ineffective under subsection (f) is prohibition upon the assignment of a right to benefits under the Employment Security Law. Section 41‑3920, S.C. Code Ann. (1976). One could argue, however, that such assignments are excluded from Article 9 under Section 36‑9‑109(d)(3) and that Subsection 36‑9‑406(f) does not apply to render the restriction ineffective.

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|  | Definitional Cross: |  |
| “Account” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(2) |
| “Account debtor” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(3) |
| “Agreement” | | Section 36‑1‑201(3) |
| “Authenticate” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(7) |
| “Chattel paper” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(11) |
| “Health‑care‑insurance receivable” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(46) |
| “Notification” | | Section 36‑1‑201(26) [see now Section 36‑1‑202] |
| “Payment intangible” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(61) |
| “Promissory note” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(65) |

Effect of Amendment

The 2013 amendment in subsection (e), added “, other than a sale under a disposition pursuant to Section 36‑9‑610 or an acceptance of collateral pursuant to Section 36‑9‑620”; and made other nonsubstantive changes.

CROSS REFERENCES

Assignment of letters of credit, see Section 36‑5‑112.

Delegation of performance by assignment of sales contract, see Section 36‑2‑210.

Purchase of chattel paper or instrument, see Section 36‑9‑330.

Use or disposition of collateral without accounting, see Section 36‑9‑205.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 181 to 191.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak181 to 349Ak191.

**SECTION 36‑9‑407.** Restrictions on creation or enforcement of security interest in leasehold interest or in lessor’s residual interest.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), a term in a lease agreement is ineffective to the extent that it:

(1) prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent of a party to the lease to the assignment or transfer of, or the creation, attachment, perfection, or enforcement of a security interest in, an interest of a party under the lease contract or in the lessor’s residual interest in the goods; or

(2) provides that the assignment or transfer or the creation, attachment, perfection, or enforcement of the security interest may give rise to a default, breach, right of recoupment, claim, defense, termination, right of termination, or remedy under the lease.

(b) Except as otherwise provided in Section 36‑2A‑303(7), a term described in subsection (a)(2) is effective to the extent that there is:

(1) a transfer by the lessee of the lessee’s right of possession or use of the goods in violation of the term; or

(2) a delegation of a material performance of either party to the lease contract in violation of the term.

(c) The creation, attachment, perfection, or enforcement of a security interest in the lessor’s interest under the lease contract or the lessor’s residual interest in the goods is not a transfer that materially impairs the lessee’s prospect of obtaining return performance or materially changes the duty of or materially increases the burden or risk imposed on the lessee within the purview of Section 36‑2A‑303(4) unless, and then only to the extent that, enforcement actually results in a delegation of material performance of the lessor.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑407; 1966 (54) 2716; 1978 Act No. 644, Part II, Section 7; 1985 Act No. 201, Part II, Section 7F; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Section 2A‑303.

2. Restrictions on Assignment Generally Ineffective. Under subsection (a), as under former Section 2A‑303(3), a term in a lease agreement which prohibits or restricts the creation of a security interest generally is ineffective. This reflects the general policy of Section 9‑406(d) and former Section 9‑318(4). This section has been conformed in several respects to analogous provisions in Sections 9‑406, 9‑408, and 9‑409, including the substitution of “ineffective” for “not enforceable” and the substitution of “assignment or transfer of, or the” “creation, attachment, perfection, or enforcement of a security interest” for “creation or enforcement of a security interest.”

3. Exceptions for Certain Transfers and Delegations. Subsection (b) provides exceptions to the general ineffectiveness of restrictions under subsection (a). A term that otherwise is ineffective under subsection (a)(2) is effective to the extent that a lessee transfers its right to possession and use of goods or if either party delegates material performance of the lease contract in violation of the term. However, under subsection (c), as under former Section 2A‑303(3), a lessor’s creation of a security interest in its interest in a lease contract or its residual interest in the leased goods is not a material impairment under Section 2A‑303(4) (former Section 2A‑303(5)), absent an actual delegation of the lessor’s material performance. The terms of the lease contract determine whether the lessor, in fact, has any remaining obligations to perform. If it does, it is then necessary to determine whether there has been an actual delegation of “material performance.” See Section 2A‑303, Comments 3 and 4.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Subsection 36‑9‑407(a)(1) renders ineffective provisions in a lease that prohibit, restrict or require the consent of a party to assign or grant any enforceable security interest in a party’s interest in a lease or the lessor’s residual interest in the goods. Subsection (a)(2) renders ineffective provisions under which the assignment or transfer or the creation, perfection, or enforcement of a security constitutes a default or breach of the lease.

Subsection (b) provides two exceptions to the rules in subsection (a). A term described in subsection (a) is effective if the lessee transfers possession or use of goods in violation of a term in the lease or either party delegates a material performance in violation of the lease.

Definitional Cross References:

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| “Lease agreement” | Section 36‑2A‑103(1)(k) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |

Cross References—

Leases, security interest transfer prohibitions, see Section 36‑2A‑303.

Provisions of Article 2A on alienability of a party’s interest in a party’s interest in a lease. Section 36‑2A‑303.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 181.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak181.

**SECTION 36‑9‑408.** Restrictions on assignment of promissory notes, health care insurance receivables, and certain general intangibles ineffective.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), a term in a promissory note or in an agreement between an account debtor and a debtor which relates to a health care insurance receivable or a general intangible, including a contract, permit, license, or franchise, and which term prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent of the person obligated on the promissory note or the account debtor to, the assignment or transfer of, or creation, attachment, or perfection of a security interest in, the promissory note, health care insurance receivable, or general intangible, is ineffective to the extent that the term:

(1) would impair the creation, attachment, or perfection of a security interest; or

(2) provides that the assignment or transfer or the creation, attachment, or perfection of the security interest may give rise to a default, breach, right of recoupment, claim, defense, termination, right of termination, or remedy under the promissory note, health care insurance receivable, or general intangible.

(b) Subsection (a) applies to a security interest in a payment intangible or promissory note only if the security interest arises out of a sale of the payment intangible or promissory note, other than a sale under a disposition pursuant to Section 36‑9‑610 or an acceptance of collateral pursuant to Section 36‑9‑620.

(c) A rule of law, statute, or regulation that prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent of a government, governmental body or official, person obligated on a promissory note, or account debtor to the assignment or transfer of, or creation of a security interest in, a promissory note, health care insurance receivable, or general intangible, including a contract, permit, license, or franchise between an account debtor and a debtor, is ineffective to the extent that the rule of law, statute, or regulation:

(1) would impair the creation, attachment, or perfection of a security interest; or

(2) provides that the assignment or transfer or the creation, attachment, or perfection of the security interest may give rise to a default, breach, right of recoupment, claim, defense, termination, right of termination, or remedy under the promissory note, health care insurance receivable, or general intangible.

(d) To the extent that a term in a promissory note or in an agreement between an account debtor and a debtor which relates to a health care insurance receivable or general intangible or a rule of law, statute, or regulation described in subsection (c) would be effective under law other than this chapter but is ineffective under subsection (a) or (c), the creation, attachment, or perfection of a security interest in the promissory note, health care insurance receivable, or general intangible:

(1) is not enforceable against the person obligated on the promissory note or the account debtor;

(2) does not impose a duty or obligation on the person obligated on the promissory note or the account debtor;

(3) does not require the person obligated on the promissory note or the account debtor to recognize the security interest, pay or render performance to the secured party, or accept payment or performance from the secured party;

(4) does not entitle the secured party to use or assign the debtor’s rights under the promissory note, health care insurance receivable, or general intangible, including any related information or materials furnished to the debtor in the transaction giving rise to the promissory note, health care insurance receivable, or general intangible;

(5) does not entitle the secured party to use, assign, possess, or have access to any trade secrets or confidential information of the person obligated on the promissory note or the account debtor; and

(6) does not entitle the secured party to enforce the security interest in the promissory note, health care insurance receivable, or general intangible.

(e) Subsections (a) and (c) do not apply to the assignment, transfer, or creation of a security interest in a:

(1) claim or right to receive compensation for injuries or sickness as described in 26 U.S.C. Section 104(a)(1) or (2), as amended; or

(2) claim or right to receive benefits under a special needs trust as described in 42 U.S.C. Section 1396p(d)(4), as amended.

HISTORY: 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12; 2013 Act No. 96, Section 10, eff July 1, 2013.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. New.

2. Free Assignability. This Section makes ineffective any attempt to restrict the assignment of a general intangible, health‑care‑insurance receivable, or promissory note, whether the restriction appears in the terms of a promissory note or the agreement between an account debtor and a debtor (subsection (a)) or in a rule of law, including a statute or governmental rule or regulation (subsection (c)). This result allows the creation, attachment, and perfection of a security interest in a general intangible, such as an agreement for the nonexclusive license of software, as well as sales of certain receivables, such as a health‑care‑insurance receivable (which is an “account”), payment intangible, or promissory note, without giving rise to a default or breach by the assignor or from triggering a remedy of the account debtor or person obligated on a promissory note. This enhances the ability of certain debtors to obtain credit. On the other hand, subsection (d) protects the other party‑the “account debtor” on a general intangible or the person obligated on a promissory note‑from adverse effects arising from the security interest. It leaves the account debtor’s or obligated person’s rights and obligations unaffected in all material respects if a restriction rendered ineffective by subsection (a) or (c) would be effective under law other than Article 9.

Example 1: A term of an agreement for the nonexclusive license of computer software prohibits the licensee from assigning any of its rights as licensee with respect to the software. The agreement also provides that an attempt to assign rights in violation of the restriction is a default entitling the licensor to terminate the license agreement. The licensee, as debtor, grants to a secured party a security interest in its rights under the license and in the computers in which it is installed. Under this Section, the term prohibiting assignment and providing for a default upon an attempted assignment is ineffective to prevent the creation, attachment, or perfection of the security interest or entitle the licensor to terminate the license agreement. However, under subsection (d), the secured party (absent the licensor’s agreement) is not entitled to enforce the license or to use, assign, or otherwise enjoy the benefits of the licensed software, and the licensor need not recognize (or pay any attention to) the secured party. Even if the secured party takes possession of the computers on the debtor’s default, the debtor would remain free to remove the software from the computer, load it on another computer, and continue to use it, if the license so permits. If the debtor does not remove the software, other law may require the secured party to remove it before disposing of the computer. Disposition of the software with the computer could violate an effective prohibition on enforcement of the security interest. See subsection (d).

3. Nature of Debtor’s Interest. Neither this Section nor any other provision of this Article determines whether a debtor has a property interest. The definition of the term “security interest” provides that it is an “interest in personal property.” See Section 1‑201(37). Ordinarily, a debtor can create a security interest in collateral only if it has “rights in the collateral.” See Section 9‑203(b). Other law determines whether a debtor has a property interest (“rights in the collateral”) and the nature of that interest. For example, the nonexclusive license addressed in Example 1 may not create any property interest whatsoever in the intellectual property (e.g., copyright) that underlies the license and that effectively enables the licensor to grant the license. The debtor’s property interest may be confined solely to its interest in the promises made by the licensor in the license agreement (e.g., a promise not to sue the debtor for its use of the software).

4. Scope: Sales of Payment Intangibles and Other General Intangibles; Assignments Unaffected by this Section. Subsections (a) and (c) render ineffective restrictions on assignments only “to the extent” that the assignments restrict the “creation, attachment, or perfection of a security interest,” including sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes. This Section does not render ineffective a restriction on an assignment that does not create a security interest. For example, if the debtor in Comment 2, Example 1 purported to assign the license to another entity that would use the computer software itself, other law would govern the effectiveness of the anti‑assignment provisions.

Subsection (a) applies to a security interest in payment intangibles only if the security interest arises out of sale of the payment intangibles. Contractual restrictions directed to security interests in payment intangibles which secure an obligation are subject to Section 9‑406(d). Subsection (a) also deals with sales of promissory notes which also create security interests. See Section 9‑109(a). Subsection (c) deals with all security interests in payment intangibles or promissory notes, whether or not arising out of a sale.

Subsection (a) does not render ineffective any term, and subsection (c) does not render ineffective any law, statute or regulation, that restricts outright sales of general intangibles other than payment intangibles. They deal only with restrictions on security interests. The only sales of general intangibles that create security interests are sales of payment intangibles.

5.Terminology: “Account Debtor”; “Person Obligated on a Promissory Note.” This Section uses the term “account debtor” as it is defined in Section 9‑102. The term refers to the party, other than the debtor, to a general intangible, including a permit, license, franchise, or the like, and the person obligated on a health‑care‑insurance receivable, which is a type of account. The definition of “account debtor” does not limit the term to persons who are obligated to pay under a general intangible. Rather, the term includes all persons who are obligated on a general intangible, including those who are obligated to render performance in exchange for payment. In some cases, e.g., the creation of a security interest in a franchisee’s rights under a franchise agreement, the principal payment obligation may be owed by the debtor (franchisee) to the account debtor (franchisor). This Section also refers to a “person obligated on a promissory note,” inasmuch as those persons do not fall within the definition of “ account debtor.”

Example 2: A licensor and licensee enter into an agreement for the nonexclusive license of computer software. The licensee’s interest in the license agreement is a general intangible. If the licensee grants to a secured party a security interest in its rights under the license agreement, the licensee is the debtor and the licensor is the account debtor. On the other hand, if the licensor grants to a secured party a security interest in its right to payment (an account) under the license agreement, the licensor is the debtor and the licensee is the account debtor. (This Section applies to the security interest in the general intangible but not to the security interest in the account, which is not a health‑care‑insurance receivable.)

6. Effects on Account Debtors and Persons Obligated on Promissory Notes. Subsections (a) and (c) affect two classes of persons. These subsections affect account debtors on general intangibles and health‑care‑insurance receivables and persons obligated on promissory notes. Subsection (c) also affects governmental entities that enact or determine rules of law. However, subsection (d) ensures that these affected persons are not affected adversely. That provision removes any burdens or adverse effects on these persons for which any rational basis could exist to restrict the effectiveness of an assignment or to exercise any remedies. For this reason, the effects of subsections (a) and (c) are immaterial insofar as those persons are concerned.

Subsection (a) does not override terms that do not directly prohibit, restrict, or require consent to an assignment but which might, nonetheless, present a practical impairment of the assignment. Properly read, however, this Section, like Section 9‑406(d), reaches only covenants that prohibit, restrict, or require consents to assignments; it does not override all terms that might “impair” an assignment in fact.

Example 3: A licensor and licensee enter into an agreement for the nonexclusive license of valuable business software. The license agreement includes terms (i) prohibiting the licensee from assigning its rights under the license, (ii) prohibiting the licensee from disclosing to anyone certain information relating to the software and the licensor, and (iii) deeming prohibited assignments and prohibited disclosures to be defaults. The licensee wishes to obtain financing and, in exchange, is willing to grant a security interest in its rights under the license agreement. The secured party, reasonably, refuses to extend credit unless the licensee discloses the information that it is prohibited from disclosing under the license agreement. The secured party cannot determine the value of the proposed collateral in the absence of this information. Under this Section, the terms of the license prohibiting the assignment (grant of the security interest) and making the assignment a default are ineffective. However, the nondisclosure covenant is not a term that prohibits the assignment or creation of a security interest in the license. Consequently, the nondisclosure term is enforceable even though the practical effect is to restrict the licensee’s ability to use its rights under the license agreement as collateral.

The nondisclosure term also would be effective in the factual setting of Comment 2, Example 1. If the secured party’s possession of the computers loaded with software would put it in a position to discover confidential information that the debtor was prohibited from disclosing, the licensor should be entitled to enforce its rights against the secured party. Moreover, the licensor could have required the debtor to obtain the secured party’s agreement that (i) it would immediately return all copies of software loaded on the computers and that (ii) it would not examine or otherwise acquire any information contained in the software. This Section does not prevent an account debtor from protecting by agreement its independent interests that are unrelated to the “creation, attachment, or perfection” of a security interest. In Example 1, moreover, the secured party is not in possession of copies of software by virtue of its security interest or in connection with enforcing its security interest in the debtor’s license of the software. Its possession is incidental to its possession of the computers, in which it has a security interest. Enforcing against the secured party a restriction relating to the software in no way interferes with its security interest in the computers.

7. Effect in Assignor’s Bankruptcy. This Section could have a substantial effect if the assignor enters bankruptcy. Roughly speaking, Bankruptcy Code Section 552 invalidates security interests in property acquired after a bankruptcy petition is filed, except to the extent that the postpetition property constitutes proceeds of prepetition collateral.

Example 4: A debtor is the owner of a cable television franchise that, under applicable law, cannot be assigned without the consent of the municipal franchisor. A lender wishes to extend credit to the debtor, provided that the credit is secured by the debtor’s “going business” value. To secure the loan, the debtor grants a security interest in all its existing and after‑acquired property. The franchise represents the principal value of the business. The municipality refuses to consent to any assignment for collateral purposes. If other law were given effect, the security interest in the franchise would not attach; and if the debtor were to enter bankruptcy and sell the business, the secured party would receive but a fraction of the business’s value. Under this Section, however, the security interest would attach to the franchise. As a result, the security interest would attach to the proceeds of any sale of the franchise while a bankruptcy is pending. However, this Section would protect the interests of the municipality by preventing the secured party from enforcing its security interest to the detriment of the municipality.

8. Effect Outside of Bankruptcy. The principal effects of this Section will take place outside of bankruptcy. Compared to the relatively few debtors that enter bankruptcy, there are many more that do not. By making available previously unavailable property as collateral, this Section should enable debtors to obtain additional credit. For purposes of determining whether to extend credit, under some circumstances a secured party may ascribe value to the collateral to which its security interest has attached, even if this Section precludes the secured party from enforcing the security interest without the agreement of the account debtor or person obligated on the promissory note. This may be the case where the secured party sees a likelihood of obtaining that agreement in the future. This may also be the case where the secured party anticipates that the collateral will give rise to a type of proceeds as to which this Section would not apply.

Example 5: Under the facts of Example 4, the debtor does not enter bankruptcy. Perhaps in exchange for a fee, the municipality agrees that the debtor may transfer the franchise to a buyer. As consideration for the transfer, the debtor receives from the buyer its check for part of the purchase price and its promissory note for the balance. The security interest attaches to the check and promissory note as proceeds. See Section 9‑315(a)(2). This Section does not apply to the security interest in the check, which is not a promissory note, health‑care‑insurance receivable, or general intangible. Nor does it apply to the security interest in the promissory note, inasmuch as it was not sold to the secured party.

9. Contrary Federal Law. This Section does not override federal law to the contrary. However, it does reflect an important policy judgment that should provide a template for future federal law reforms.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑408 renders certain restrictions upon the assignment of promissory notes, health‑care‑insurance receivables, and general intangibles ineffective for limited purposes. Under Section 36‑9‑408 covered restrictions are ineffective to prevent the creation or perfection of a security interest, but remain effective to prevent the enforcement of the security interest. In this regard, Section 36‑9‑408 contrasts sharply with Section 36‑9‑406.

Subsection (a) addresses contractual restrictions upon alienation. It apples to terms that prohibit, restrict, or require consent to assign or transfer, or create or perfect a security interest in a promissory note, health‑care‑insurance receivable or general intangible. Subsection (b), however, limits the scope of subsection (a) by providing that subsection (a) applies to a security interest in a payment intangible or promissory note only if the security interest arose from a sale of the payment intangible or note. Under subsection (a)(1) such restrictions are ineffective to give rise to a default or breach.

Subsection (c) address restraints on alienation that arise from a rule of law, statute, or regulation. Subsection (c) applies to legal restraints that prohibit, restrict, or require the consent of a government official or account debtor to assign or transfer, or create a security interest in a promissory note, health‑care‑insurance receivable, or general intangible. Under subsection (c)(1) such restraints are ineffective to the extent they impair the creation, attachment, or perfection of a security interest. Under subsection (c)(2) the restraints are ineffective to give rise to a default or breach under the promissory note, health‑care‑insurance receivable, or general intangible. An example of a statutory restriction that is ineffective under subsection (c) is the prohibition against transferring a license to operate a cemetery company set forth in Section 39‑55‑205, S.C. Code Ann. (1976).

Subsection (d) makes clear the limited effect of finding a restraint ineffective under subsection (a) or (c). The intent of subsection (d) is to insure account debtors and persons obligated on promissory notes are not adversely affected. For example, although subsection (c)(1) renders Section 39‑55‑205 ineffective to prevent a secured party from taking a security interest in a debtor’s cemetery license, subsection (d)(6) precludes the secured party from enforcing the security interest.

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|  | Definitional Cross: |  |
| “Account debtor” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(3) |
| “Agreement” | | Section 36‑1‑201(3) |
| “General intangible” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(42) |
| “Health‑care‑insurance receivable” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(46) |
| “Promissory note” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(65) |
| “Security interest” | | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |
|  | Cross— |  |

Contractual and legal restrictions upon alienation of interests in accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes. Section 36‑9‑406(d)—(j).

Effect of Amendment

The 2013 amendment, in subsection (b), added “, other than a sale under a disposition pursuant to Section 36‑9‑610 or an acceptance of collateral pursuant to Section 36‑9‑620”; and made other nonsubstantive changes.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 181.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak181.

**SECTION 36‑9‑409.** Restrictions on assignment of letter‑of‑credit rights ineffective.

(a) A term in a letter of credit or a rule of law, statute, regulation, custom, or practice applicable to the letter of credit which prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent of an applicant, issuer, or nominated person to a beneficiary’s assignment of or creation of a security interest in a letter‑of‑credit right is ineffective to the extent that the term or rule of law, statute, regulation, custom, or practice:

(1) would impair the creation, attachment, or perfection of a security interest in the letter‑of‑credit right; or

(2) provides that the assignment or the creation, attachment, or perfection of the security interest may give rise to a default, breach, right of recoupment, claim, defense, termination, right of termination, or remedy under the letter‑of‑credit right.

(b) To the extent that a term in a letter of credit is ineffective under subsection (a) but would be effective under law other than this chapter or a custom or practice applicable to the letter of credit, to the transfer of a right to draw or otherwise demand performance under the letter of credit, or to the assignment of a right to proceeds of the letter of credit, the creation, attachment, or perfection of a security interest in the letter‑of‑credit right:

(1) is not enforceable against the applicant, issuer, nominated person, or transferee beneficiary;

(2) imposes no duties or obligations on the applicant, issuer, nominated person, or transferee beneficiary; and

(3) does not require the applicant, issuer, nominated person, or transferee beneficiary to recognize the security interest, pay or render performance to the secured party, or accept payment or other performance from the secured party.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. New.

2. Purpose and Relevance. This Section, patterned on Section 9‑408, limits the effectiveness of attempts to restrict the creation, attachment, or perfection of a security interest in letter‑of‑credit rights, whether the restriction appears in the letter of credit or a rule of law, custom, or practice applicable to the letter of credit. It protects the creation, attachment, and perfection of a security interest while preventing these events from giving rise to a default or breach by the assignor or from triggering a remedy or defense of the issuer or other person obligated on a letter of credit. Letter‑of‑credit rights are a type of supporting obligation. See Section 9‑102. Under Sections 9‑203 and 9‑308, a security interest in a supporting obligation attaches and is perfected automatically if the security interest in the supported obligation attaches and is perfected. See Section 9‑107, Comment 5. The automatic attachment and perfection under Article 9 would be anomalous or misleading if, under other law (e.g., Article 5), a restriction on transfer or assignment were effective to block attachment and perfection.

3. Relationship to Letter‑of‑Credit Law. Although restrictions on an assignment of a letter of credit are ineffective to prevent creation, attachment, and perfection of a security interest, subsection (b) protects the issuer and other parties from any adverse effects of the security interest by preserving letter‑of‑credit law and practice that limits the right of a beneficiary to transfer its right to draw or otherwise demand performance (Section 5‑112) and limits the obligation of an issuer or nominated person to recognize a beneficiary’s assignment of letter‑of‑credit proceeds (Section 5‑114). Thus, this Section’s treatment of letter‑of‑credit rights differs from this Article’s treatment of instruments and investment property. Moreover, under Section 9‑109(c)(4), this Article does not apply to the extent that the rights of a transferee beneficiary or nominated person are independent and superior under Section 5‑114, thereby preserving the “independence principle” of letter‑of‑credit law.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑409(a) provides that certain contractual and legal restraints upon the alienation of a debtor’s letter‑of‑credit rights are ineffective to prevent the attachment and perfection of a security interest in a letter‑of‑credit right or to give rise to a default or breach. Subsection (b), however, provides that if such restraints are valid under non‑Article 9 law, the restrictions effective to prevent the enforcement of the security interest and that applicant, issuer, nominated person, or transferee beneficiary is not required to render performance to the secured party.

Definitional Cross References:

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| “Applicant” | [Section 36‑5‑102(a)(2) 1995 Revision] |
| “Beneficiary” | [Section 36‑5‑102(a)(3) 1995 Revision]  Section 36‑5‑103(1)(d) |
| “Letter of credit” | [Section 36‑5‑102(a)(10) 1995 Revision]  Section 36‑5‑103(1)(a) |
| “Letter‑of‑credit right” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(51) |
| “Issuer” | [Section 36‑5‑102(a)(11) 1995 Revision]  Section 36‑5‑103(1)(c) |
| “Nominated person” | [Section 36‑5‑102(a)(11) 1995 Revision] |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |
| “Transferee beneficiary” | [Section 36‑5‑102(a)(3) 1995 Revision] See Section 36‑5‑116 |

Cross References—

1. Requirements for control of letter‑of‑credit rights. Section 36‑9‑107.

2. Choice of law governing perfection and priority of security interests in letter‑of‑credit rights. Section 36‑9‑306.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 181.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak181.

**SECTION 36‑9‑410.** Unlawful sale or disposal of personal property subject to security interest; exceptions; penalties.

(A) Notwithstanding Section 36‑9‑401, a person who intentionally or wilfully sells or disposes of personal property that is subject to a perfected security interest, with the intent to defraud the secured party, without the written consent of the secured party and without paying the debt secured by the perfected security interest within ten days after sale or disposal or, in that time, depositing the amount of the debt with the clerk of the court of common pleas for the county in which the secured party resides, is in violation of this section.

(B) This section does not apply:

(1) if the sale is made without the knowledge of or notice of the perfected security interest to the purchaser by the person selling the property;

(2) to the granting of subsequent security interests;

(3) if the loan secured by the personal property includes a charge for nonfiling insurance; or

(4) to personal property titled by the Department of Public Safety or the Law Enforcement Division of the South Carolina Department of Natural Resources.

(C) If the value of the personal property subject to a perfected security interest is worth:

(1) two thousand dollars or less, a person who violates the provisions of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor triable in the magistrates court or the municipal court, notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 22‑3‑540, 22‑3‑545, 22‑3‑550, and 14‑25‑65, and, upon conviction, must be fined not more than one thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than thirty days, or both;

(2) more than two thousand dollars but less than ten thousand dollars, a person who violates the provisions of this section is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, must be fined in the discretion of the court or imprisoned not more than five years, or both;

(3) ten thousand dollars or more, a person who violates the provisions of this section is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, must be fined in the discretion of the court or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.

HISTORY: 2004 Act No. 265, Section 1, eff July 6, 2004; 2010 Act No. 273, Section 16.Y, eff June 2, 2010.

Effect of Amendment

The 2010 amendment in subsection (C) rewrote item (1), in item (2) substituted “two thousand” for “one thousand” and “ten thousand” for “five thousand”, and in item (3) substituted “ten thousand” for “five thousand”.

Part 5

Filing

Subpart 1

Filing Office; Contents and Effectiveness Of Financing Statement

**SECTION 36‑9‑501.** Filing office.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), if the local law of this State governs perfection of a security interest or agricultural lien, the office in which to file a financing statement to perfect the security interest or agricultural lien is:

(1) the office designated for the filing or recording of a record of a mortgage on the related real property, if:

(A) the collateral is as‑extracted collateral or timber to be cut; or

(B) the financing statement is filed as a fixture filing and the collateral is goods that are or are to become fixtures; or

(2) the office of the Secretary of State or any office duly authorized by the Secretary of State, in all other cases, including a case in which the collateral is goods that are or are to become fixtures and the financing statement is not filed as a fixture filing.

(b) The office in which to file a financing statement to perfect a security interest in collateral, including fixtures, of a transmitting utility is the office of the Secretary of State. The financing statement also constitutes a fixture filing as to the collateral indicated in the financing statement which is or is to become fixtures.

(c) A person may not knowingly or intentionally file with the filing office as provided in subsections (a) or (b) a false or fraudulent financing statement or a financing statement filed for the purpose of hindering, harassing, or wrongfully interfering with another person or entity. In addition to another penalty provided by law, a violation of this subsection is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine of not more than two thousand five hundred dollars, or both. If the person is convicted of the violation, the court may find that the financing statement is ineffective, may order the filing office to terminate or purge the financing statement, and may order restitution to an aggrieved party.

(d) If a person files with the filing office pursuant to subsections(a) or (b) a false or fraudulent financing statement or a financing statement filed for the purpose of hindering, harassing, or wrongfully interfering with another person or entity, a debtor named in that financing statement may file an action against the person that filed the financing statement seeking appropriate equitable relief or damages including, but not limited to, an order declaring the financing statement ineffective, ordering the filing office to terminate or purge the financing statement, and awarding reasonable attorney fees.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑501; 1966 (54) 2716; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12; 2005 Act No. 161, Section 37.A, eff upon approval (became law without the Governor’s signature on June 9, 2005).

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Derived from former Section 9‑401.

2. Where to File. Subsection (a) indicates where in a given State a financing statement is to be filed. Former Article 9 afforded each State three alternative approaches, depending on the extent to which the State desires central filing (usually with the Secretary of State), local filing (usually with a county office), or both. As Comment 1 to former Section 9‑401 observed, “The principal advantage of state‑wide filing is ease of access to the credit information which the files exist to provide. Consider for example the national distributor who wishes to have current information about the credit standing of the thousands of persons he sells to on credit. The more completely the files are centralized on a state‑wide basis, the easier and cheaper it becomes to procure credit information; the more the files are scattered in local filing units, the more burdensome and costly.” Local filing increases the net costs of secured transactions also by increasing uncertainty and the number of required filings. Any benefit that local filing may have had in the 1950’s is now insubstantial. Accordingly, this Article dictates central filing for most situations, while retaining local filing for real‑estate‑related collateral and special filing provisions for transmitting utilities.

3. Minerals and Timber. Under subsection (a)(1), a filing in the office where a record of a mortgage on the related real property would be filed will perfect a security interest in as‑extracted collateral. Inasmuch as the security interest does not attach until extraction, the filing continues to be effective after extraction. A different result occurs with respect to timber to be cut, however. Unlike as‑extracted collateral, standing timber may be goods before it is cut. See Section 9‑102 (defining “ goods”). Once cut, however, it is no longer timber to be cut, and the filing in the real‑property‑mortgage office ceases to be effective. The timber then becomes ordinary goods, and filing in the office specified in subsection (a)(2) is necessary for perfection. Note also that after the timber is cut the law of the debtor’s location, not the location of the timber, governs perfection under Section 9‑301.

4. Fixtures. There are two ways in which a secured party may file a financing statement to perfect a security interest in goods that are or are to become fixtures. It may file in the Article 9 records, as with most other goods. See subsection (a)(2). Or it may file the financing statement as a “ fixture filing,” defined in Section 9‑102, in the office in which a record of a mortgage on the related real property would be filed. See subsection(a)(1)(B).

5. Transmitting Utilities. The usual filing rules do not apply well for a transmitting utility (defined in Section 9‑102). Many pre‑UCC statutes provided special filing rules for railroads and in some cases for other public utilities, to avoid the requirements for filing with legal descriptions in every county in which such debtors had property. Former Section 9‑401(5) recreated and broadened these provisions, and subsection (b) follows this approach. The nature of the debtor will inform persons searching the record as to where to make a search.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

When South Carolina law governs the perfection of a security interest or agricultural lien by filing, Section 36‑9‑501 specifies the office within the state in which the financing statement must be filed. The general rule under Subsection 36‑9‑501(a)(2) is that financing statements are filed in the Office of the Secretary of State. Subsection (a)(1), however, provides that if the collateral is as‑extracted collateral or timber to be cut or if a financing statement is filed as a fixture filing; the proper office for filing is the office in which a mortgage on the related real property would be recorded. Note that Section 36‑9‑501 changes prior law by providing for centralized, rather than local, filing for farm related collateral and consumer goods. See former Section 36‑9‑401(a).

Definitional Cross References:

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| “Agricultural lien” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(5) |
| “As‑extracted collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(6) |
| “Financing statement” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(39) |
| “Fixture filing” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(40) |
| “Fixtures” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(41) |
| “Goods” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(44) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |
| “Transmitting utility” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(80) |

Cross References—

1. General choice of law rules for perfection of a security interest by filing. Sections 36‑9‑301 and 36‑9‑307.

2. Choice of law rules for perfection of an agricultural lien by filing. Section 36‑9‑302.

3. Choice of law for perfection of a security interest in as‑extracted collateral by filing. Section 36‑9‑301(4).

4. Choice of law rule for perfection of a security interest in goods by a fixture filing. Sections 36‑9‑301(3)(A).

5. Choice of law rule for perfection by filing of a security interest in timber to be cut. Section 36‑9‑301(3)(B).

6. Collateral upon which a security interest may be perfected by filing. Sections 36‑9‑310 and 36‑9‑312(a).

Effect of Amendment

The 2005 amendment added subsection (c) and (d) relating to fraudulent financing statements.

CROSS REFERENCES

Filing of initial financing statement, requirements, see Section 36‑9‑806.

Pre‑effective‑date financing statement defined, addition or deletion of collateral, effect of pre‑effective‑date financing statement, see Section 36‑9‑807.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 90.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak90.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Forms

Am. Jur. Pl. & Pr. Forms Uniform Commercial Code Section 9:258 , Introductory Comments.

Attorney General’s Opinions

Only fees enumerated by statute may be charged in connection with filings under Article 9 of the UCC; a financing statement filing fee of $1.00 per page for each additional page over three is not authorized by statute and therefore may not be charged. 1978 Op Atty Gen, No 78‑192, p 216.

A financing statement relating to fixtures should be indexed in the real estate records and physically filed as all other financing statements are filed. 1967‑68 Op Atty Gen, No 2398, p 35.

Clerks of court and registers of mesne conveyances should file whatever is presented as a financing statement, regardless of form or sufficiency of such, and charge the appropriate filing fee according to whether the statement is a conforming or nonconforming one. 1967‑68 Op Atty Gen, No 2605, p 329.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 1

1. In general

Trustee in bankruptcy was properly ordered to turn over motor vehicle to plaintiff‑lessor who met filing requirements of Article 9 of Uniform Commercial Code (Code 1962 Sections 10.9‑401 et seq. [Code 1976 Sections 36‑9‑401 et seq.]) just as if leases were chattel mortgages even though both parties admitted that instruments in question were true leases and Code 1962 Sections 10.9‑102(2), 10.1‑201(37) [Code 1976 Sections 36‑9‑102(2), 36‑1‑201(37)] exclude true lease agreements from coverage of Article 9 of UCC since bailment statute, Code 1962 Section 57‑308 [Code 1976 Section 27‑23‑80] was not repealed by UCC general repealer, Code 1962 Section 10.10‑103 [Code 1976 Section 36‑10‑103]. In re Bazen (D.C.S.C. 1977) 425 F.Supp. 1184, affirmed 571 F.2d 574, affirmed 571 F.2d 575.

Creditor has no security interest in debtor’s checking account at time of debtor’s filing for bankruptcy, notwithstanding that portion of checking account could be attributed to sale of inventory which creditor had security interest in, where no cash proceeds were received or deposited by debtor during 10‑day period prior to time of filing for relief. In re Jameson’s Foods, Inc. (Bkrtcy.D.S.C. 1983) 35 B.R. 433.

**SECTION 36‑9‑502.** Contents of financing statement; record of mortgage as financing statement; time of filing financing statement.

(a) Subject to subsection (b), a financing statement is sufficient only if it:

(1) provides the name of the debtor;

(2) provides the name of the secured party or a representative of the secured party; and

(3) indicates the collateral covered by the financing statement.

(b) Except as otherwise provided in Section 36‑9‑501(b), to be sufficient, a financing statement that covers as‑extracted collateral or timber to be cut, or which is filed as a fixture filing and covers goods that are or are to become fixtures, must satisfy subsection (a) and also:

(1) indicate that it covers this type of collateral;

(2) indicate that it is to be filed for record in the real property records;

(3) provide a description of the real property to which the collateral is related sufficient to give constructive notice of a mortgage under the law of this State if the description were contained in a record of the mortgage of the real property; and

(4) if the debtor does not have an interest of record in the real property, provide the name of a record owner.

(c) A record of a mortgage is effective, from the date of recording, as a financing statement filed as a fixture filing or as a financing statement covering as‑extracted collateral or timber to be cut only if the:

(1) record indicates the goods or accounts that it covers;

(2) goods are or are to become fixtures related to the real property described in the record or the collateral is related to the real property described in the record and is as‑extracted collateral or timber to be cut;

(3) record satisfies the requirements for a financing statement in this section, but the:

(A) record need not indicate that it is to be filed in the real property records; and

(B) record sufficiently provides the name of a debtor who is an individual if it provides the individual name of the debtor or the surname and first personal name of the debtor, even if the debtor is an individual to whom Section 36‑9‑503(a)(6) applies; and

(4) record is duly recorded.

(d) A financing statement may be filed before a security agreement is made or a security interest otherwise attaches.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑502; 1966 (54) 2716; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001, Act No. 67, Section 12; 2013 Act No. 96, Section 11, eff July 1, 2013.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑402(1), (5), (6).

2. “Notice Filing.” This Section adopts the system of “notice filing.” What is required to be filed is not, as under pre‑UCC chattel mortgage and conditional sales acts, the security agreement itself, but only a simple record providing a limited amount of information (financing statement). The financing statement may be filed before the security interest attaches or thereafter. See subsection (d). See also Section 9‑308(a) (contemplating situations in which a financing statement is filed before a security interest attaches).

The notice itself indicates merely that a person may have a security interest in the collateral indicated. Further inquiry from the parties concerned will be necessary to disclose the complete state of affairs. Section 9‑210 provides a statutory procedure under which the secured party, at the debtor’s request, may be required to make disclosure. However, in many cases, information may be forthcoming without the need to resort to the formalities of that Section.

Notice filing has proved to be of great use in financing transactions involving inventory, accounts, and chattel paper, because it obviates the necessity of refiling on each of a series of transactions in a continuing arrangement under which the collateral changes from day to day. However, even in the case of filings that do not necessarily involve a series of transactions (e.g., a loan secured by a single item of equipment), a financing statement is effective to encompass transactions under a security agreement not in existence and not contemplated at the time the notice was filed, if the indication of collateral in the financing statement is sufficient to cover the collateral concerned. Similarly, a financing statement is effective to cover after‑acquired property of the type indicated and to perfect with respect to future advances under security agreements, regardless of whether after‑acquired property or future advances are mentioned in the financing statement and even if not in the contemplation of the parties at the time the financing statement was authorized to be filed.

3. Debtor’s Signature; Required Authorization. Subsection (a) sets forth the simple formal requirements for an effective financing statement. These requirements are: (1) the debtor’s name; (2) the name of a secured party or representative of the secured party; and (3) an indication of the collateral.

Whereas former Section 9‑402(1) required the debtor’s signature to appear on a financing statement, this Article contains no signature requirement. The elimination of the signature requirement facilitates paperless filing. (However, as PEB Commentary No. 15 indicates, a paperless financing statement was sufficient under former Article 9.) Elimination of the signature requirement also makes the exceptions provided by former Section 9‑402(2) unnecessary.

The fact that this Article does not require that an authenticating symbol be contained in the public record does not mean that all filings are authorized. Rather, Section 9‑509(a) entitles a person to file an initial financing statement, an amendment that adds collateral, or an amendment that adds a debtor only if the debtor authorizes the filing, and Section 9‑509(d) entitles a person other than the debtor to file a termination statement only if the secured party of record authorizes the filing. Of course, a filing has legal effect only to the extent it is authorized. See Section 9‑510.

Law other than this Article, including the law with respect to ratification of past acts, generally determines whether a person has the requisite authority to file a record under this Article. See Section 1‑103. However, under Section 9‑509(b), the debtor’s authentication of (or becoming bound by) a security agreement ipso facto constitutes the debtor’s authorization of the filing of a financing statement covering the collateral described in the security agreement. The secured party need not obtain a separate authorization.

Section 9‑625 provides a remedy for unauthorized filings. Making an unauthorized filing also may give rise to civil or criminal liability under other law. In addition, this Article contains provisions that assist in the discovery of unauthorized filings and the amelioration of their practical effect. For example, Section 9‑518 provides a procedure whereby a person may add to the public record a statement to the effect that a financing statement indexed under the person’s name was wrongfully filed, and Section 9‑509(d) entitles any person to file a termination statement if the secured party of record fails to comply with its obligation to file or send one to the debtor, the debtor authorizes the filing, and the termination statement so indicates. However, the filing office is neither obligated nor permitted to inquire into issues of authorization. See Section 9‑520(a).

4. Certain Other Requirements. Subsection (a) deletes other provisions of former Section 9‑402(1) because they seems unwise (real‑property description for financing statements covering crops), unnecessary (adequacy of copies of financing statements), or both (copy of security agreement as financing statement). In addition, the filing office must reject a financing statement lacking certain other information formerly required as a condition of perfection (e.g., an address for the debtor or secured party). See Sections 9‑516(b), 9‑520(a). However, if the filing office accepts the record, it is effective nevertheless. See Section 9‑520(c).

5. Real‑Property‑Related Filings. Subsection (b) contains the requirements for financing statements filed as fixture filings and financing statements covering timber to be cut or minerals and minerals‑related accounts constituting as‑extracted collateral. A description of the related real property must be sufficient to reasonably identify it. See Section 9‑108. This formulation rejects the view that the real property description must be by metes and bounds, or otherwise conforming to traditional real‑property practice in conveyancing, but, of course, the incorporation of such a description by reference to the recording data of a deed, mortgage or other instrument containing the description should suffice under the most stringent standards. The proper test is that a description of real property must be sufficient so that the financing statement will fit into the real‑property search system and be found by a real‑property searcher. Under the optional language in subsection (b)(3), the test of adequacy of the description is whether it would be adequate in a record of a mortgage of the real property. As suggested in the Legislative Note, more detail may be required if there is a tract indexing system or a land registration system.

If the debtor does not have an interest of record in the real property, a real‑property‑related financing statement must show the name of a record owner, and Section 9‑519(d) requires the financing statement to be indexed in the name of that owner. This requirement also enables financing statements covering as‑extracted collateral or timber to be cut and financing statements filed as fixture filings to fit into the real‑property search system.

6. Record of Mortgage Effective as Financing Statement. Subsection (c) explains when a record of a mortgage is effective as a financing statement filed as a fixture filing or to cover timber to be cut or as‑extracted collateral. Use of the term “record of a mortgage” recognizes that in some systems the record actually filed is not the record pursuant to which a mortgage is created. Moreover, “mortgage” is defined in Section 9‑102 as an “interest in real property,” not as the record that creates or evidences the mortgage or the record that is filed in the public recording systems. A record creating a mortgage may also create a security interest with respect to fixtures (or other goods) in conformity with this Article. A single agreement creating a mortgage on real property and a security interest in chattels is common and useful for certain purposes. Under subsection (c), the recording of the record evidencing a mortgage (if it satisfies the requirements for a financing statement) constitutes the filing of a financing statement as to the fixtures (but not, of course, as to other goods). Section 9‑515(g) makes the usual five‑year maximum life for financing statements inapplicable to mortgages that operate as fixture filings under Section 9‑502(c). Such mortgages are effective for the duration of the real‑property recording.

Of course, if a combined mortgage covers chattels that are not fixtures, a regular financing statement filing is necessary with respect to the chattels, and subsection (c) is inapplicable. Likewise, a financing statement filed as a “fixture filing” is not effective to perfect a security interest in personal property other than fixtures.

In some cases it may be difficult to determine whether goods are or will become fixtures. Nothing in this Part prohibits the filing of a “precautionary” fixture filing, which would provide protection in the event goods are determined to be fixtures. The fact of filing should not be a factor in the determining whether goods are fixtures. Cf. Section 9‑505(b).

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑502 sets forth the requirements for a sufficient financing statement. Subsection (a) states the requirements all financing statements must meet. Subsection (b) sets forth additional requirements for fixture filings and financing statements covering as‑extracted collateral and timber to be cut.

Subsection (a) provides that a financing statement is sufficient only if it provides the name of the debtor, provides the name of the secured party or representative of the secured party, and indicates the collateral covered. Note that in contrast to former Section 36‑9‑402(1), current law does not condition the effectiveness of a financing statement upon its being signed by the debtor. Subsection (a), however, must be read in conjunction with Section 36‑9‑516(b) and Section 36‑9‑520(a). Under Section 36‑9‑520(a) a filing office is required to refuse to accept a financing statement for filing if the financing statement fails to meet the requirements of Section 36‑9‑516(b). Therefore, a filing office must refuse to accept a financing statement that meets the requirements of Section 36‑9‑502(a) but fails to meet the requirements of Section 36‑9‑516(b). If the filing office refuses to accept such a financing statement for filing, the financing statement will not be effective to perfect a security interest. Nevertheless, if the filing office accepts such a financing statement for filing, under Section 36‑9‑520(c) the financing statement is effective. The priority of a security interest perfected by a filed financing statement that does not meet the requirements of Section 36‑9‑516(b) may be subordinated under Section 36‑9‑338.

The 2013 amendments amended the provisions of Section 36‑9‑502(c) that define the requirements that a mortgage recorded in the office of the register of deeds must meet in order to be effective as a financing statement filed as a fixture filing or covering as extracted collateral. Under revised Section 36‑9‑502(c)(3)(B), if the debtor is an individual, a mortgage sufficiently provides the name of the debtor if it provides that individual name of the debtor or the debtor’s surname and first personal name, even if the debtor is an individual subject to the “drivers license” rule of Section 36‑9‑504(a)(4).

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|  | Definitional Cross: |  |
| “Account” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(2) |
| “As‑extracted collateral” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(6) |
| “Collateral” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Debtor” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “Financing statement” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(39) |
| “Fixture filing” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(40) |
| “Fixtures” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(41) |
| “Goods” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(44) |
| “Mortgage” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(55) |
| “Secured party” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(73) |
| “Security agreement” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(74) |
|  | Cross— |  |

1. Sufficiency of the name of the debtor. Section 36‑9‑503(a)—(c).

2. Failure to indicate the representative capacity of a secured party or representative of a secured party does not affect the sufficiency of a financing statement. Section 36‑9‑503(d).

3. Sufficiency of indication of type of collateral covered. Section 36‑9‑504.

4. Effect of errors and omissions upon the sufficiency of a financing statement. Section 36‑9‑505.

5. Duration of the effectiveness of a financing statement. Section 36‑9‑515.

6. Grounds upon which a filing office is required to refuse to accept a financing statement for filing. Sections 36‑9‑516(b) and 36‑9‑520(a).

7. Priority of security interests perfected by filing a financing statement which was effective under Section 36‑9‑502, but failed to meet the requirements of Section 36‑9‑516(b). Section 36‑9‑338.

8. Form of a financing statement. Section 36‑9‑521.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 82, 92.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak82; 349Ak92.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Forms

South Carolina Legal and Business Forms Section 9:9 , Mortgage‑General Long Form‑Commercial Orientated.

South Carolina Legal and Business Forms Section 9:13 , Mortgage‑Leasehold.

Attorney General’s Opinions

Under the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code in South Carolina, mere use of the letters “HHG” in a financing statement does not adequately identify the collateral covered by such financing statement. 1970‑71 Op Atty Gen, No 3156, p 117.

Clerks of court and registers of mesne conveyances should file whatever is presented as a financing statement, regardless of form or sufficiency of such, and charge the appropriate filing fee according to whether the statement is a conforming or nonconforming one. 1967‑68 Op Atty Gen, No 2605, p 329.

Financing statements are filed to give notice that an obligation exists between the debtor and the secured party; consequently, documentary stamps are not required on the financing statement but are, instead, required on the instrument of obligation. 1966‑67 Op Atty Gen, No 2380, p 229.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 1

1. In general

Considering Sections 36‑9‑203, 36‑9‑402 and 36‑9‑110 of the Uniform Commercial Code, both the security agreement and the financing statement must contain a sufficient description of the land on which crops are to be grown, to make possible the identification of the thing described. Citizens Bank v. Gregory’s Warehouse, Inc. (S.C.App. 1988) 297 S.C. 151, 375 S.E.2d 316. Secured Transactions 45; Secured Transactions 94

**SECTION 36‑9‑503.** Name of debtor and secured party.

(a) A financing statement sufficiently provides the name of the debtor:

(1) except as otherwise provided in item (3), if the debtor is a registered organization or the collateral is held in a trust that is a registered organization, only if the financing statement provides the name that is stated to be the registered organization’s name on the public organic record most recently filed with or issued or enacted by the registered organization’s jurisdiction of organization which purports to state, amend, or restate the registered organization’s name;

(2) subject to subsection (f), if the collateral is being administered by the personal representative of a decedent, only if the financing statement provides, as the name of the debtor, the name of the decedent and, in a separate part of the financing statement, indicates that the collateral is being administered by a personal representative;

(3) if the collateral is held in a trust that is not a registered organization, only if the financing statement:

(A) provides, as the name of the debtor, if:

(i) the organic record of the trust specifies a name for the trust, the name specified; or

(ii) the organic record of the trust does not specify a name for the trust, the name of the settlor or testator; and

(B) in a separate part of the financing statement if:

(i) the name is provided in accordance with subparagraph (A)(i), indicates that the collateral is held in a trust; or

(ii) the name is provided in accordance with subitem (A)(ii), provides additional information sufficient to distinguish the trust from other trusts having one or more of the same settlors or the same testator and indicates that the collateral is held in a trust, unless the additional information so indicates;

(4) subject to subsection (g), if the debtor is an individual to whom this State has issued a driver’s license or identification card that has not expired, only if the financing statement provides the name of the individual that is indicated on the driver’s license or identification card;

(5) if the debtor is an individual to whom item (4) does not apply, only if the financing statement provides the individual name of the debtor or the surname and first personal name of the debtor; and

(6) in other cases:

(A) if the debtor has a name, only if the financing statement provides the organization’s name of the debtor; and

(B) if the debtor does not have a name, only if it provides the names of the partners, members, associates, or other persons comprising the debtor, in a manner that each name provided would be sufficient if the person named were the debtor.

(b) A financing statement that provides the name of the debtor in accordance with subsection (a) is not rendered ineffective by the absence of:

(1) a trade name or other name of the debtor; or

(2) unless required under subsection (a)(6)(B), names of partners, members, associates, or other persons comprising the debtor.

(c) A financing statement that provides only the debtor’s trade name does not sufficiently provide the name of the debtor.

(d) Failure to indicate the representative capacity of a secured party or representative of a secured party does not affect the sufficiency of a financing statement.

(e) A financing statement may provide the name of more than one debtor and the name of more than one secured party.

(f) The name of the decedent indicated on the order appointing the personal representative of the decedent issued by the court having jurisdiction over the collateral is sufficient as the “name of the decedent” under subsection (a)(2).

(g) If this State has issued to an individual more than one driver’s license or identification card of a kind described in subsection (a)(4), the one that was issued most recently is the one to which subsection (a)(4) refers.

(h) In this section, the “name of the settlor or testator” means:

(1) if the settlor is a registered organization, the name that is stated to be the settlor’s name on the public organic record most recently filed with or issued or enacted by the settlor’s jurisdiction of organization which purports to state, amend, or restate the settlor’s name; or

(2) in other cases, the name of the settlor or testator indicated in the trust’s organic record.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑503; 1966 (54) 2716; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12; 2013 Act No. 96, Section 12, eff July 1, 2013.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Subsections (a)(6)(A), (b), and (c) derive from former Section 9‑402(7); otherwise, new.

2. Debtor’s Name. The requirement that a financing statement provide the debtor’s name is particularly important. Financing statements are indexed under the name of the debtor, and those who wish to find financing statements search for them under the debtor’s name. Subsection (a) explains what the debtor’s name is for purposes of a financing statement.

a. Registered Organizations. As a general matters, if the debtor is a “registered organization” (defined in Section 9‑102 so as to ordinarily include corporations, limited partnerships, limited liability companies, and statutory trusts), then the debtor’s name is the name shown on the “public organic record” of the debtor’s “jurisdiction of organization” (both also defined in Section 9‑102). Subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3) contain special rules for decedent’s estates and common‑law trusts. (Subsection (a)(1) applies to business trusts that are registered organizations.) Note that, even if the name provided in an initial financing statement is correct, the filing office nevertheless must reject the financing statement if it does not identify an individual debtor’s last name (e.g., if it is not clear whether the debtor’s name is Perry Mason or Mason Perry). See Section 9‑516(b)(3)(C).

b. Collateral Held in a Trust. When a financing statement covers collateral that is held in a trust that is a registered organization, subsection (a)(1) governs the name of the debtor. If, however, the collateral is held in a trust that is not a registered organization, subsection (a)(3) applies. (As used in this Article, collateral “held in a trust” includes collateral as to which the trust is the debtor as well as collateral as to which the trustee is the debtor.) This subsection adopts a convention that generally results in the name of the trust or the name of the trust’s settlor being provided as the name of the debtor on the financing statement, even if, as typically is the case with common‑law trusts, the “debtor” (defined in Section 9‑102) is a trustee acting with respect to the collateral. This convention provides more accurate information and eases the burden for searchers, who otherwise would have difficulty with respect to debtor trustees that are large financial institutions. More specifically, if a trust’ s organic record specifies a name for the trust, subsection (a)(3) requires the financing statement to provide, as the name of the debtor, the name for the trust specified in the organic record. In addition, the financing statement must indicate, in a separate part of the financing statement, that the collateral is held in a trust. If the organic record of the trust does not specify a name for the trust, the name required for the financing statement is the name of the settlor or, in the case of a testamentary trust, the testator, in each case as determined under subsection (h). In addition, the financing statement must provide sufficient additional information to distinguish the trust from other trusts having one or more of the same settlors or the same testator. In many cases, an indication of the date on which the trust was settled will satisfy this requirement. If neither the name nor the additional information indicates that the collateral is held in a trust, the financing statement must indicate that fact, but not as part of the debtor’s name. Neither the indication that the collateral held in a trust nor the additional information that distinguishes the trust from other trusts having one or more of the same settlors or the same testator is part of the debtor’s name. Nevertheless, a financing statement that fails to provide, in a separate part of the financing statement, any required indication or additional information does not sufficiently provide the name of the debtor under Sections 9‑502(a) and 9‑503(a)(3), does not “substantially satisfy the requirements” of Part 5 within the meaning of Section 9‑506(a) and so is ineffective.

d. Individuals. This Article provides alternative approaches towards the requirement for providing the name of a debtor who is an individual.

Alternative A. Alternative A distinguishes between two groups of individual debtors. For debtors holding an unexpired driver’s license issued by the State where the financing statement is filed (ordinarily the State where the debtor maintains the debtor’s principal residence), Alternative A requires that a financing statement provide the name indicated on the license. When a debtor does not hold an unexpired driver’s license issued by the relevant State, the requirement can be satisfied in either of two ways. A financing statement is sufficient if it provides the “individual name” of the debtor. Alternatively, a financing statement is sufficient if it provides the debtor’ s surname (i.e., family name) and first personal name (i.e., first name other than the surname).

Alternative B. Alternative B provides three ways in which a financing statement may sufficiently provide the name of an individual who is a debtor. The “individual name” of the debtor is sufficient, as is the debtor’s surname and first personal name. If the individual holds an unexpired driver’s license issued by the State where the financing statement is filed (ordinarily the State of the debtor’s principal residence), the name indicated on the driver’s license also is sufficient. Name indicated on the driver’s license. A financing statement does not “provide the name of the individual which is indicated” on the debtor’s driver’s license unless the name it provides is the same as the name indicated on the license. This is the case even if the name indicated on the debtor’s driver’s license contains an error.

Example 1: Debtor, an individual whose principal residence is in Illinois, grants a security interest to SP in certain business equipment. SP files a financing statement with the Illinois filing office. The financing statement provides the name appearing on Debtor’s Illinois driver’s license, “Joseph Allan Jones.” Regardless of which Alternative is in effect in Illinois, this filing would be sufficient under Illinois’ Section 9‑503(a),even if Debtor’s correct middle name is Alan, not Allan. A filing against “Joseph A. Jones” or “Joseph Jones” would not “provide the name of the individual which is indicated” on the debtor’s driver’s license. However, these filings might be sufficient if Alternative A is in effect in Illinois and Jones has no current (i.e., unexpired) Illinois driver’s license, or if Illinois has enacted Alternative B.

Determining the name that should be provided on the financing statement must not be done mechanically. The order in which the components of an individual’s name appear on a driver’s license differs among the States. Had the debtor in Example 1 obtained a driver’s license from a different State, the license might have indicated the name as “Jones Joseph Allan.” Regardless of the order on the driver’s license, the debtor’s surname must be provided in the part of the financing statement designated for the surname.

Alternatives A and B both refer to a license issued by “this State.” Perfection of a security interest by filing ordinarily is determined by the law of the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located. Sec Section 9‑301(1). (Exceptions to the general rule are found in Section 9‑301(3) and (4), concerning fixture filings, timber to be cut, and as‑extracted collateral.) A debtor who is an individual ordinarily is located at the individual’s principal residence. See Section 9‑307(b). (An exception appears in Section 9‑307(c).) Thus, a given State’s Section 9‑503 ordinarily will apply during any period when the debtor’s principal residence is located in that State, even if during that time the debtor holds or acquires a driver’s license from another State.

When a debtor’s principal residence changes, the location of the debtor under Section 9‑307 also changes and perfection by filing ordinarily will be governed by the law of the debtor’s new location. As a consequence of the application of that jurisdiction’s Section 9‑316, a security interest that is perfected by filing under the law of the debtor’s former location will remain perfected for four months after the relocation, and thereafter if the secured party perfects under the law of the debtor’s new location. Likewise, a financing statement filed in the former location may be effective to perfect a security interest that attaches after the debtor relocates. See Section 9‑316(h).

Individual name of the debtor. Article 9 does not determine the “individual name” of a debtor. Nor does it determine which element or elements in a debtor’s name constitute the surname. In some cases, determining the “individual name” of a debtor may be difficult, as may determining the debtor’ s surname. This is because in the case of individuals, unlike registered organizations, there is no public organic record to which reference can be made and from which the name and its components can be definitively determined. Names can take many forms in the United States. For example, whereas a surname is often colloquially referred to as a “last name,” the sequence in which the elements of a name are presented is not determinative. In some cultures, the surname appears first, while in others it may appear in a location that is neither first nor last. In addition, some surnames are composed of multiple elements that, taken together, constitute a single surname. These elements may or may not be separated by a space or connected by a hyphen, “i,” or “y.” In other instances, some or all of the same elements may not be part of the surname. In some cases, a debtor’s entire name might be composed of only a single clement, which should be provided in the part of the financing statement designated for the surname.

In disputes as to whether a financing statement sufficiently provides the “ individual name” of a debtor, a court should refer to any non‑UCC law concerning names. However, case law about names may have developed in contexts that implicate policies different from those of Article 9. A court considering an individual’s name for purposes of determining the sufficiency of a financing statement is not necessarily bound by cases that were decided in other contexts and for other purposes. Individuals are asked to provide their names on official documents such as tax returns and bankruptcy petitions. An individual may provide a particular name on an official document in response to instructions relating to the document rather than because the name is actually the individual’s name. Accordingly, a court should not assume that the name an individual provides on an official document necessarily constitutes the “individual name” for purposes of the sufficiency of the debtor’s name on a financing statement. Likewise, a court should not assume that the name as presented on an individual’s birth certificate is necessarily the individual’s current name.

In applying non‑UCC law for purposes of determining the sufficiency of a debtor’s name on a financing statement, a court should give effect to the instruction in Section l‑103(a)(l) that the UCC “must be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies,” which include simplifying and clarifying the law governing commercial transactions. Thus, determination of a debtor’s name in the context of the Article 9 filing system must take into account the needs of both filers and searchers. Filers need a simple and predictable system in which they can have a reasonable degree of confidence that, without undue burden, they can determine a name that will be sufficient so as to permit their financing statements to be effective. Likewise, searchers need a simple and predictable system in which they can have a reasonable degree of confidence that, without undue burden, they will discover all financing statements pertaining to the debtor in question. The court also should take into account the purpose of the UCC to make the law uniform among the various jurisdictions. See Section l‑103(a)(3). Of course, once an individual debtor’s name has been determined to be sufficient for purposes of Section 9‑503, a financing statement that provides a variation of that name, such as a “nickname” that does not constitute the debtor’s name, does not sufficiently provide the name of the debtor under this section. Cf. Section 9‑503(c) (a financing statement providing only a debtor’s trade name is not sufficient). If there is any doubt about an individual debtor’s name, a secured party may choose to file one or more financing statements that provide a number of possible names for the debtor and a searcher may similarly choose to search under a number of possible names. Note that, even if the name provided in an initial financing statement is correct, the filing office nevertheless must reject the financing statement if it does not identify an individual debtor’s surname (e.g., if it is not clear whether the debtor’s surname is Perry or Mason). See Section 9‑516(b)(3)(C).

3. Secured Party’s Name. New subsection (d) makes clear that when the secured party is a representative, a financing statement is sufficient if it names the secured party, whether or not it indicates any representative capacity. Similarly, a financing statement that names a representative of the secured party is sufficient, even if it does not indicate the representative capacity.

Example 2: Debtor creates a security interest in favor of Bank X, Bank Y, and Bank Z, but not to their representative, the collateral agent (Bank A). The collateral agent is not itself a secured party. See Section 9‑102. Under Sections 9‑502(a) and 9‑503(d), however, a financing statement is effective if it names as secured party Bank A and not the actual secured parties, even if it omits Bank A’s representative capacity.

Each person whose name is provided in an initial financing statement as the name of the secured party or representative of the secured party is a secured party of record. See Section 9‑511.

4. Multiple Names. Subsection (e) makes explicit what is implicit under former Article 9: a financing statement may provide the name of more than one debtor and secured party. See Section 1‑102(5)(a) (words in the singular include the plural). With respect to records relating to more than one debtor, see Section 9‑520(d). With respect to financing statements providing the name of more than one secured party, see Sections 9‑509(e) and 9‑510(b).

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑503 sets forth the standards for determining whether a financing statement sufficiently provides the name of the debtor. Subsection (a)(1) provides that if a debtor is a registered corporation, such as a corporation, limited partnership, or limited liability company, the financing statement is sufficient only if it provides the name of the debtor indicated on the public record which establishes that debtor was organized. Subsection (c) clarifies former law by expressly providing that a financing statement that provides only the debtor’s trade name is not sufficient.

The 2013 amendments substantially revised the requirements in Section 36‑9‑503 that a financing statement must meet to sufficiently provide the name of the debtor. The amendments utilize Alternative A from the Uniform Code Commissioners for determining the requirements for providing the name of a debtor who is an individual.

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|  | Definitional Cross: |  |
| “Debtor” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “Financing statement” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(39) |
| “Organization” | | Section 36‑1‑201(28) |
| “Registered organization” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(71) |
| “Secured party” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(73) |

CROSS REFERENCES

Effect of previous filing of financing statement, see Section 36‑9‑805.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 92.1.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak92.1.

Attorney General’s Opinions

Clerks of court and registers of mesne conveyances should file whatever is presented as a financing statement, regardless of form or sufficiency of such, and charge the appropriate filing fee according to whether the statement is a conforming or nonconforming one. 1967‑68 Op Atty Gen, No 2605, p 329.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 1

1. In general

Considering Sections 36‑9‑203, 36‑9‑402 and 36‑9‑110 of the Uniform Commercial Code, both the security agreement and the financing statement must contain a sufficient description of the land on which crops are to be grown, to make possible the identification of the thing described. Citizens Bank v. Gregory’s Warehouse, Inc. (S.C.App. 1988) 297 S.C. 151, 375 S.E.2d 316. Secured Transactions 45; Secured Transactions 94

**SECTION 36‑9‑504.** Indication of collateral.

A financing statement sufficiently indicates the collateral that it covers if the financing statement provides:

(1) a description of the collateral pursuant to Section 36‑9‑108; or

(2) an indication that the financing statement covers all assets or all personal property.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑504; 1966 (54) 2716; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑402(1).

2. Indication of Collateral. To comply with Section 9‑502(a), a financing statement must “indicate” the collateral it covers. This Section explains what suffices for an indication.

Paragraph (1) provides that a “description” of the collateral (as the term is explained in Section 9‑108) suffices as an indication for purposes of the sufficiency of a financing statement.

Debtors sometimes create a security interest in all, or substantially all, of their assets. To accommodate this practice, paragraph (2) expands the class of sufficient collateral references to embrace “an indication that the financing statement covers all assets or all personal property.” If the property in question belongs to the debtor and is personal property, any searcher will know that the property is covered by the financing statement. Of course, regardless of its breadth, a financing statement has no effect with respect to property indicated but to which a security interest has not attached. Note that a broad statement of this kind (e.g., “all debtor’s personal property”) would not be a sufficient “description” for purposes of a security agreement. See Sections 9‑203(b)(3)(A), 9‑108. It follows that a somewhat narrower description than “all assets,” e.g., “all assets other than automobiles,” is sufficient for purposes of this Section, even if it does not suffice for purposes of a security agreement.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑504 provides the rules for determining whether a financing statement sufficiently indicates the collateral it covers. A financing statement is sufficient if it provides a description of collateral pursuant to Section 36‑9‑108. A financing statement is also sufficient if it provides that it covers all of the debtor’s assets or personal property. Note that these “super generic” descriptions would not sufficiently describe collateral in a security agreement. See Section 36‑9‑108(c) and 36‑9‑203(b)(3)(A).

Definitional Cross References:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  |  |
| “Collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Financing statement” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(39) |

CROSS REFERENCES

Assignment and release of certain liens on personal property, see Sections 30‑7‑60 to 30‑7‑80.

Recordation of liens on real property, see Section 30‑7‑20.

Transactions entered into before effective date of the Commercial Code, see Section 36‑10‑102.

Transition provision on change of place of filing, see Section 36‑11‑105.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 94.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak94.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Encyclopedias

S.C. Jur. Action of Debt Section 26, Nil Debet.

S.C. Jur. Action Section 26, Notice.

Attorney General’s Opinions

Under the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code in South Carolina, mere use of the letters “HHG” in a financing statement does not adequately identify the collateral covered by such financing statement. 1970‑71 Op Atty Gen, No 3156, p 117.

Clerks of court and registers of mesne conveyances should file whatever is presented as a financing statement, regardless of form or sufficiency of such, and charge the appropriate filing fee according to whether the statement is a conforming or nonconforming one. 1967‑68 Op Atty Gen, No 2605, p 329.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 1

1. In general

Considering Sections 36‑9‑203, 36‑9‑402 and 36‑9‑110 of the Uniform Commercial Code, both the security agreement and the financing statement must contain a sufficient description of the land on which crops are to be grown, to make possible the identification of the thing described. Citizens Bank v. Gregory’s Warehouse, Inc. (S.C.App. 1988) 297 S.C. 151, 375 S.E.2d 316. Secured Transactions 45; Secured Transactions 94

**SECTION 36‑9‑505.** Filing and compliance with other statutes and treaties for consignments, leases, other bailments, and other transactions.

(a) A consignor, lessor, or other bailor of goods, a licensor, or a buyer of a payment intangible or promissory note may file a financing statement, or may comply with a statute or treaty described in Section 36‑9‑311(a), using the terms “consignor”, “consignee”, “lessor”, “lessee”, “bailor”, “bailee”, “licensor”, “licensee”, “owner”, “registered owner”, “buyer”, “seller”, or words of similar import, instead of the terms “secured party” and “debtor”.

(b) This part applies to the filing of a financing statement under subsection (a) and, as appropriate, to compliance that is equivalent to filing a financing statement under section 36‑9‑311(b), but the filing or compliance is not of itself a factor in determining whether the collateral secures an obligation. If it is determined for another reason that the collateral secures an obligation, a security interest held by the consignor, lessor, bailor, licensor, owner, or buyer which attaches to the collateral is perfected by the filing or compliance.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑505; 1966 (54) 2716; 1980 Act No. 413; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑408.

2. Precautionary Filing. Occasionally, doubts arise concerning whether a transaction creates a relationship to which this Article or its filing provisions apply. For example, questions may arise over whether a “ lease” of equipment in fact creates a security interest or whether the “sale” of payment intangibles in fact secures an obligation, thereby requiring action to perfect the security interest. This Section, which derives from former Section 9‑408, affords the option of filing of a financing statement with appropriate changes of terminology but without affecting the substantive question of classification of the transaction.

3. Changes from Former Section 9‑408. This Section expands the rule of Section 9‑408 to embrace more generally other bailments and transactions, as well as sales transactions, primarily sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes. It provides the same benefits for compliance with a statute or treaty described in Section 9‑311(a) that former Section 9‑408 provided for filing, in connection with the use of terms such as “lessor,” consignor,” etc. The references to “owner” and “registered owner” are intended to address, for example, the situation where a putative lessor is the registered owner of an automobile covered by a certificate of title and the transaction is determined to create a security interest. Although this Section provides that the security interest is perfected, the relevant certificate‑of‑title statute may expressly provide to the contrary or may be ambiguous. If so, it may be necessary or advisable to amend the certificate‑ of‑title statute to ensure that perfection of the security interest will be achieved.

As does Section 1‑201, former Article 9 referred to transactions, including leases and consignments, “intended as security.” This misleading phrase created the erroneous impression that the parties to a transaction can dictate how the law will classify it (e.g., as a bailment or as a security interest) and thus affect the rights of third parties. This Article deletes the phrase wherever it appears. Subsection (b) expresses the principle more precisely by referring to a security interest that “secures an obligation.”

4. Consignments. Although a “true” consignment is a bailment, the filing and priority provisions of former Article 9 applied to “true” consignments. See former Sections 2‑326(3), 9‑114. A consignment “intended as security” created a security interest that was in all respects subject to former Article 9. This Article subsumes most true consignments under the rubric of “security interest.” See Sections 9‑102 (definition of “consignment”), 9‑109(a)( 4), 1‑201(37) (definition of “security interest”). Nevertheless, it maintains the distinction between a (true) “consignment,” as to which only certain aspects of Article 9 apply, and a so‑called consignment that actually “secures an obligation,” to which Article 9 applies in full. The revisions to this Section reflect the change in terminology.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑505 accommodates the parties to a variety of transactions that may give rise to a security interest which must be perfected by filing. For example, some transactions characterized as equipment leases may, in fact, be secured sales of the equipment. In such a transaction Section 36‑9‑505 permits the lessor to file a financing statement using the terms lessor and lessee rather than secured party and debtor. If the transaction is subsequently found to be a secured sale, subsection (b) provides that the financing statement will perfect the lessor’s security interest.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Consignee” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(19) |
| “Consignor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(21) |
| “Debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “Financing statement” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(39) |
| “Lessee” | Section 36‑2A‑103(1)(n) |
| “Lessor” | Section 36‑2A‑103(1)(o) |
| “Payment intangible” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(61) |
| “Promissory note” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(65) |
| “Secured party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |

Cross References—

1. Article 9 applies to consignments. Section 36‑9‑109(a)(4).

2. Sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes are subject to Article 9. Section 36‑9‑109(a)(3).

3. Security interests created by sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes are automatically perfected. Section 36‑9‑309(3) and (4).

4. Perfection systems that preempt filing under Article 9. Section 36‑9‑311.

5. Standards for determining whether a transaction is a “true lease” or creates a security interest. Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203].

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 92.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak92.

**SECTION 36‑9‑506.** Effect of errors or omissions.

(a) A financing statement substantially satisfying the requirements of this part is effective, even if it has minor errors or omissions, unless the errors or omissions make the financing statement seriously misleading.

(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), a financing statement that fails sufficiently to provide the name of the debtor in accordance with Section 36‑9‑503(a) is seriously misleading.

(c) If a search of the records of the filing office under the debtor’s correct name, using the filing office’s standard search logic, if any, would disclose a financing statement that fails sufficiently to provide the name of the debtor in accordance with Section 36‑9‑503(a), the name provided does not make the financing statement seriously misleading.

(d) For purposes of Section 36‑9‑508(b), the “debtor’s correct name” in subsection (c) means the correct name of the new debtor.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑506; 1966 (54) 2716; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑402(8).

2. Errors. Like former Section 9‑402(8), subsection (a) is in line with the policy of this Article to simplify formal requisites and filing requirements. It is designed to discourage the fanatical and impossibly refined reading of statutory requirements in which courts occasionally have indulged themselves. Subsection (a) provides the standard applicable to indications of collateral. Subsections (b) and (c), which are new, concern the effectiveness of financing statements in which the debtor’s name is incorrect. Subsection (b) contains the general rule: a financing statement that fails sufficiently to provide the debtor’s name in accordance with Section 9‑503(a) is seriously misleading as a matter of law. Subsection (c) provides an exception: If the financing statement nevertheless would be discovered in a search under the debtor’s correct name, using the filing office’s standard search logic, if any, then as a matter of law the incorrect name does not make the financing statement seriously misleading. A financing statement that is seriously misleading under this Section is ineffective even if it is disclosed by (i) using a search logic other than that of the filing office to search the official records, or (ii) using the filing office’s standard search logic to search a data base other than that of the filing office.

In addition to requiring the debtor’s name and an indication of the collateral, Section 9‑502(a) requires a financing statement to provide the name of the secured party or a representative of the secured party. Inasmuch as searches are not conducted under the secured party’s name, and no filing is needed to continue the perfected status of security interest after it is assigned, an error in the name of the secured party or its representative will not be seriously misleading. However, in an appropriate case, an error of this kind may give rise to an estoppel in favor of a particular holder of a conflicting claim to the collateral. See Section 1‑103.

3. New Debtors. Subsection (d) provides that, in determining the extent to which a financing statement naming an original debtor is effective against a new debtor, the sufficiency of the financing statement should be tested against the name of the new debtor.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Subsection 36‑9‑506(a) provides that minor errors and omissions do not render a financing statement ineffective, unless the error or omission renders the financing statement seriously misleading. Under subsections (b) and (c) a failure to provide the debtor’s name in accordance with Section 36‑9‑503 is seriously misleading unless a search under the debtor’s correct name using the filing officer’s standard search logic would disclose the financing statement.

Definitional Cross References:

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| --- | --- |
|  |  |
| “Financing statement” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(39) |

CROSS REFERENCES

Recordation of liens on real property, see Section 30‑7‑20.

Assignment and release of certain liens on personal property, see Sections 30‑7‑60 to 30‑7‑80.

Transactions entered into before effective date of the Commercial Code, see Section 36‑10‑102.

Transition provision on change of place of filing, see Section 36‑11‑105.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 92.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak92.

Attorney General’s Opinions

Under the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code in South Carolina, mere use of the letters “HHG” in a financing statement does not adequately identify the collateral covered by such financing statement. 1970‑71 Op Atty Gen, No 3156, p 117.

Clerks of court and registers of mesne conveyances should file whatever is presented as a financing statement, regardless of form or sufficiency of such, and charge the appropriate filing fee according to whether the statement is a conforming or nonconforming one. 1967‑68 Op Atty Gen, No 2605, p 329.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 1

1. In general

Considering Sections 36‑9‑203, 36‑9‑402 and 36‑9‑110 of the Uniform Commercial Code, both the security agreement and the financing statement must contain a sufficient description of the land on which crops are to be grown, to make possible the identification of the thing described. Citizens Bank v. Gregory’s Warehouse, Inc. (S.C.App. 1988) 297 S.C. 151, 375 S.E.2d 316. Secured Transactions 45; Secured Transactions 94

**SECTION 36‑9‑507.** Effect of certain events on effectiveness of financing statement.

(a) A filed financing statement remains effective with respect to collateral that is sold, exchanged, leased, licensed, or otherwise disposed of and in which a security interest or agricultural lien continues, even if the secured party knows of or consents to the disposition.

(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c) and Section 36‑9‑508, a financing statement is not rendered ineffective if, after the financing statement is filed, the information provided in the financing statement becomes seriously misleading under Section 36‑9‑506.

(c) If the name that a filed financing statement provides for a debtor becomes insufficient as the name of the debtor pursuant to Section 36‑9‑503(a) so that the financing statement becomes seriously misleading pursuant to Section 36‑9‑506:

(1) the financing statement is effective to perfect a security interest in collateral acquired by the debtor before, or within four months after, the filed financing statement becomes seriously misleading; and

(2) the financing statement is not effective to perfect a security interest in collateral acquired by the debtor more than four months after the filed financing statement becomes seriously misleading, unless an amendment to the financing statement which renders the financing statement not seriously misleading is filed within four months after the financing statement became seriously misleading.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 10.9‑507; 1966 (54) 2716; 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12; 2013 Act No. 96, Section 13, eff July 1, 2013.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑402(7).

2. Scope of Section. This Section deals with situations in which the information in a proper financing statement becomes inaccurate after the financing statement is filed. Compare Section 9‑338, which deals with situations in which a financing statement contains a particular kind of information concerning the debtor (i.e., the information described in Section 9‑516(b)(5)) that is incorrect at the time it is filed.

3. Post‑Filing Disposition of Collateral. Under subsection (a), a financing statement remains effective even if the collateral is sold or otherwise disposed of. This subsection clarifies the third sentence of former Section 9‑402(7) by providing that a financing statement remains effective following the disposition of collateral only when the security interest or agricultural lien continues in that collateral. This result is consistent with the conclusion of PEB Commentary No. 3. Normally, a security interest does continue after disposition of the collateral. See Section 9‑315(a). Law other than this Article determines whether an agricultural lien survives disposition of the collateral.

As a consequence of the disposition, the collateral may be owned by a person other than the debtor against whom the financing statement was filed. Under subsection (a), the secured party remains perfected even if it does not correct the public record. For this reason, any person seeking to determine whether a debtor owns collateral free of security interests must inquire as to the debtor’s source of title and, if circumstances seem to require it, search in the name of a former owner. Subsection (a) addresses only the sufficiency of the information contained in the financing statement. A disposition of collateral may result in loss of perfection for other reasons. See Section 9‑316.

Example: Dee Corp. is an Illinois corporation. It creates a security interest in its equipment in favor of Secured Party. Secured Party files a proper financing statement in Illinois. Dee Corp. sells an item of equipment to Bee Corp., a Pennsylvania corporation, subject to the security interest. The security interest continues, see Section 9‑315(a), and remains perfected, see Section 9‑507(a), notwithstanding that the financing statement is filed under “D” (for Dee Corp.) and not under “B.” However, because Bee Corp. is located in Pennsylvania and not Illinois, see Section 9‑307, unless Secured Party perfects under Pennsylvania law within one year after the transfer, its security interest will become unperfected and will be deemed to have been unperfected against purchasers of the collateral. See Section 9‑316.

4. Other Post‑Filing Changes. Subsection (b) provides that, as a general matter, post‑filing changes that render a financing statement seriously misleading have no effect on a financing statement. The financing statement remains effective. It is subject to two exceptions: Section 9‑508 and Section 9‑507(c). Section 9‑508 addresses the effectiveness of a financing statement filed against an original debtor when a new debtor becomes bound by the original debtor’s security agreement. It is discussed in the Comments to that Section. Section 9‑507(c) addresses cases in which a filed financing statement provides a name that, at the time of filing, satisfies the requirements of Section 9‑503(a) with respect to the named debtor but, at a later time, no longer does so.

Example 1: Debtor, an individual whose principal residence is in California, grants a security interest to SP in certain business equipment. SP files a financing statement with the California filing office. Alternative A is in effect in California. The financing statement provides the name appearing on Debtor’s California driver’s license, “James McGinty,” Debtor obtains a court order changing his name to “Roger McGuinn” but does not change his driver’s license. Even after the court order issues, the name provided for the debtor in the financing statement is sufficient under Section 9‑503(a). Accordingly, Section 9‑507(c) does not apply.

The same result would follow if Alternative B is in effect in California.

Under Section 9‑503(a)(6) (Alternative A), if the debtor holds a current (i.e., unexpired) driver’s license issued by the State where the financing statement is filed, the name required for the financing statement is the name indicated on the license that was issued most recently by that State. If the debtor does not have a current driver’s license issued by that State, then the debtor’s name is determined under subsection (a)(5). It follows that a debtor’s name may change, and a financing statement providing the name on the debtor’s then‑current driver’s license may become seriously misleading, if the license expires and the debtor’s name under subsection (a)(5) is different. The same consequences may follow if a debtor’s driver’s license is renewed and the names on the licenses differ.

Example 2: The facts are as in Example I. Debtor’s driver’s license expires one year after the entry of the court order changing Debtor’s name. Debtor does not renew the license. Upon expiration of the license, the name required for sufficiency by Section 9‑503(a) is the individual name of the debtor or the debtor’s surname and first personal name. The name “James McGinty” has become insufficient.

Example 3: The facts are as in Example I. Before the license expires, Debtor renews the license. The name indicated on the new license is “Roger McGuinn.” Upon issuance of the new license, “James McGinty” becomes insufficient as the debtor’s name under Section 9‑503(a).

The same results would follow if Alternative B is in effect in California (assuming that, following the issuance of the court order, “James McGinty” is neither the individual name of the debtor nor the debtor’s surname and first personal name).

Even if the name provided as the name of the debtor becomes insufficient under Section 9‑503(a), the filed financing statement does not become seriously misleading, and Section 9‑507(c) does not apply, if the financing statement can be found by searching under the debtor’s “correct” name, using the filing office’s standard search logic. See Section 9‑506. Any name that satisfies Section 9‑503(a) at the time of the search is a “correct name” for these purposes. Thus, assuming that a search of the records of the California filing office under “Roger McGuinn,” using the filing office’s standard search logic, would not disclose a financing statement naming “James McGinty,” the financing statement in Examples 2 and 3 has become seriously misleading and Section 9‑507(c) applies.

If a filed financing statement becomes seriously misleading because the name it provides for a debtor becomes insufficient, the financing statement, unless amended to provide a sufficient name for the debtor, is effective only to perfect a security interest in collateral acquired by the debtor before, or within four months after, the change. If an amendment that provides a sufficient name is filed within four months after the change, the financing statement as amended would be effective also with respect to collateral acquired more than four months after the change. If an amendment that provides a sufficient name is filed more than four months after the change, the financing statement as amended would be effective also with respect to collateral acquired more than four months after the change, but only from the time of the filing of the amendment.

If a name change renders a filed financing statement seriously misleading, the financing statement is not effective as to collateral acquired more than four months after the change, unless before the expiration of the four months an amendment is filed that specifies the debtor’s new correct name (or provides an incorrect name that renders the financing statement not seriously misleading under Section 9‑506). As under former Section 9‑402(7), the original financing statement would continue to be effective with respect to collateral acquired before the name change as well as collateral acquired within the four‑month period.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑507 addresses the effect that certain post‑filing events have upon the continued effectiveness of a filed financing statement. Subsection (a) provides that a financing statement remains effective to perfect a security interest that continues in collateral that a debtor has sold or otherwise disposed of. With two exceptions, subsection (b) provides that a filed financing statement is not rendered ineffective because after the filing the information provided in the financing statement became seriously misleading. The first exception arises when a debtor so changes its name that it filed financing statement becomes seriously misleading under Section 36‑9‑506. In that situation the filed financing statement is not effective to perfect a security interest in collateral acquired more than four months after the name change. The second exception can arise when a new debtor becomes bound by a security agreement entered into by the original debtor and the secured party has filed under the name of the original debtor. Section 36‑9‑508(b) provides that if the difference between the names of original debtor and the new debtor causes the filed financing statement to be seriously misleading, that financing statement is not effective to perfect a security interest in collateral acquired by the new debtor more than four months after it became bound as a new debtor.

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|  | Definitional Cross: |  |
| “Agricultural lien” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(5) |
| “Collateral” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Debtor” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “Financing statement” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(39) |
| “New debtor” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(56) |
| “Original debtor” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(60) |
| “Security interest” | | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |
|  | Cross— |  |

1. A security interest or agricultural lien continues in collateral notwithstanding a sale or other disposition unless the secured party has authorized the disposition free of the security interest or agricultural lien. Section 36‑9‑315(a).

2. If the collateral is transferred to a person located in another jurisdiction a secured party who filed against the transferor in the jurisdiction where the transferor was located must file against the transferee in the jurisdiction where the transferee is located within one year of the transfer in order to retain a perfected security interest in the transferred collateral. Section 36‑9‑316(a)(3). Note that a transferee who takes subject to a security interest under Section 36‑9‑315(a)(1) becomes a debtor. See Section 36‑9‑315(a)(1) Section 36‑9‑102, Official Comment 2.a. As a debtor, the transferee authorized the secured party to file an initial financing statement against the transferee. Section 36‑9‑509 (c).

3. Buyer in ordinary course of business takes free of a perfected security interest created by the buyer’s seller. Section 36‑9‑320(a).

4. A licensee in ordinary course of business takes its rights in a nonexclusive license free of a security interest created by the licensor. Section 36‑9‑321(b).

5. A lessee in ordinary course of business takes free of a perfected security interest created by the lessor. Section 36‑9‑321(c).

6. Priority of security interests in transferred collateral. Section 36‑9‑325.

7. Rules for determining whether a change in the debtor’s name renders a filed financing statement seriously misleading. Section 36‑9‑506(b) and (c).

8. When a new debtor becomes bound by a security agreement entered into by an original debtor. Section 36‑9‑203(d) and (e).

9. When a filing against an original debtor perfects a security interest in collateral acquired by a new debtor. Section 36‑9‑508.

10. Priority of security interests created by a new debtor. Section 36‑9‑326.

Effect of Amendment

The 2013 amendment rewrote subsection (c).

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 92, 98.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak92; 349Ak98.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Encyclopedias

S.C. Jur. Action of Debt Section 26, Nil Debet.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 1

Construction and application 2

1. In general

Considering Sections 36‑9‑203, 36‑9‑402 and 36‑9‑110 of the Uniform Commercial Code, both the security agreement and the financing statement must contain a sufficient description of the land on which crops are to be grown, to make possible the identification of the thing described. Citizens Bank v. Gregory’s Warehouse, Inc. (S.C.App. 1988) 297 S.C. 151, 375 S.E.2d 316. Secured Transactions 45; Secured Transactions 94

2. Construction and application

Prior to 2001 statutory amendment, debtors who had signed sales contract making each jointly and severally liable for debt each had statutory right to recover from secured party for secured party’s failure to comply with requirement to give notice of sale of repossessed collateral. Singleton v. Stokes Motors, Inc. (S.C. 2004) 358 S.C. 369, 595 S.E.2d 461, rehearing denied. Secured Transactions 242.1

Facts necessary to establish that car dealership violated Unfair Trade Practices Act were not inconsistent with facts required to establish that car dealership violated Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), and thus customers were entitled to bring claims against car dealership under both statutes; car dealership violated Unfair Trade Practices Act by deceiving customers concerning their credit approval and having customers sign both an unconditional sales contract and a conditional bailment agreement, and violated UCC by failing to give customers notice of sale of repossessed collateral. Singleton v. Stokes Motors, Inc. (S.C. 2004) 358 S.C. 369, 595 S.E.2d 461, rehearing denied. Antitrust And Trade Regulation 193; Secured Transactions 242.1

**SECTION 36‑9‑508.** Effectiveness of financing statement if new debtor becomes bound by security agreement.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a filed financing statement naming an original debtor is effective to perfect a security interest in collateral in which a new debtor has or acquires rights to the extent that the financing statement would have been effective had the original debtor acquired rights in the collateral.

(b) If the difference between the name of the original debtor and that of the new debtor causes a filed financing statement that is effective under subsection (a) to be seriously misleading under Section 36‑9‑506:

(1) the financing statement is effective to perfect a security interest in collateral acquired by the new debtor before, and within four months after, the new debtor becomes bound under Section 36‑9‑203(d); and

(2) the financing statement is not effective to perfect a security interest in collateral acquired by the new debtor more than four months after the new debtor becomes bound under Section 36‑9‑203(d) unless an initial financing statement providing the name of the new debtor is filed before the expiration of that time.

(c) This section does not apply to collateral as to which a filed financing statement remains effective against the new debtor under Section 36‑9‑507(a).

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. New.

2. The Problem. Section 9‑203(d) and (e) and this Section deal with situations where one party (the “new debtor”) becomes bound as debtor by a security agreement entered into by another person (the “original debtor”). These situations often arise as a consequence of changes in business structure. For example, the original debtor may be an individual debtor who operates a business as a sole proprietorship and then incorporates it. Or, the original debtor may be a corporation that is merged into another corporation. Under both former Article 9 and this Article, collateral that is transferred in the course of the incorporation or merger normally would remain subject to a perfected security interest. See Sections 9‑315(a), 9‑507(a). Former Article 9 was less clear with respect to whether an after‑acquired property clause in a security agreement signed by the original debtor would be effective to create a security interest in property acquired by the new corporation or the merger survivor and, if so, whether a financing statement filed against the original debtor would be effective to perfect the security interest. This Section and Sections 9‑203(d) and (e) are a clarification.

3. How New Debtor Becomes Bound. Normally, a security interest is unenforceable unless the debtor has authenticated a security agreement describing the collateral. See Section 9‑203(b). New Section 9‑203(e) creates an exception, under which a security agreement entered into by one person is effective with respect to the property of another. This excepTion comes into play if a “new debtor” becomes bound as debtor by a security agreement entered into by another person (the “ original debtor”). (The quoted terms are defined in Section 9‑102.) If a new debtor does become bound, then the security agreement entered into by the original debtor satisfies the security‑agreement requirement of Section 9‑203(b)(3) as to existing or after‑acquired property of the new debtor to the extent the property is described in the security agreement. In that case, no other agreement is necessary to make a security interest enforceable in that property. See Section 9‑203(e).

Section 9‑203(d) explains when a new debtor becomes bound by an original debtor’s security agreement. Under Section 9‑203(d)(1), a new debtor becomes bound as debtor if, by contract or operation of other law, the security agreement becomes effective to create a security interest in the new debtor’s property. For example, if the applicable corporate law of mergers provides that when A Corp merges into B Corp, B Corp becomes a debtor under A Corp’s security agreement, then B Corp would become bound as debtor following such a merger. Similarly, B Corp would become bound as debtor if B Corp contractually assumes A’s obligations under the security agreement.

Under certain circumstances, a new debtor becomes bound for purposes of this Article even though it would not be bound under other law. Under Section 9‑203(d)(2), a new debtor becomes bound when, by contract or operation of other law, it (i) becomes obligated not only for the secured obligation but also generally for the obligations of the original debtor and (ii) acquires or succeeds to substantially all the assets of the original debtor. For example, some corporate laws provide that, when two corporations merge, the surviving corporation succeeds to the assets of its merger partner and “has all liabilities” of both corporations. In the case where, for example, A Corp merges into B Corp (and A Corp ceases to exist), some people have questioned whether A Corp’s grant of a security interest in its existing and after‑acquired property becomes a “ liability” of B Corp, such that B Corp’s existing and after‑ acquired property becomes subject to a security interest in favor of A Corp’s lender. Even if corporate law were to give a negative answer, under Section 9‑203(d)(2), B Corp would become bound for purposes of Section 9‑203(e) and this Section. The “substantially all of the assets” requirement of Section 9‑203(d)(2) excludes sureties and other secondary obligors as well as persons who become obligated through veil piercing and other non‑successorship doctrines. In most cases, it will exclude successors to the assets and liabilities of a division of a debtor.

4. When Financing Statement Effective Against New Debtor. Subsection (a) provides that a filing against the original debtor is effective to perfect a security interest in collateral that a new debtor has at the time it becomes bound by the original debtor’s security agreement and collateral that it acquires before the expiration of four months after the new debtor becomes bound. Under subsection (b), however, if the filing against the original debtor is seriously misleading as to the new debtor’s name, the filing is effective as to collateral acquired by the new debtor after the four‑month period only if a person files during the four‑month period an initial financing statement providing the name of the new debtor. Compare Section 9‑507(c) (four‑month period of effectiveness with respect to collateral acquired by a debtor after the debtor changes its name).

5. Transferred Collateral. This Section does not apply to collateral transferred by the original debtor to a new debtor. Under those circumstances, the filing against the original debtor continues to be effective until it lapses. See subsection (c); Section 9‑507(a).

6. Priority. Section 9‑326 governs the priority contest between a secured creditor of the original debtor and a secured creditor of the new debtor.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑508 applies in situations in which a “new debtor” becomes bound by a security agreement entered into by an “original debtor” and the secured party has filed under the name of the original debtor. Subsection (a) provides the general rule that the filing against the original debtor is effective to perfect a security interest in collateral owned or acquired by the new debtor.

Subsection (b) limits this general rule when the difference between the names of the original debtor and the new debtor cause the financing statement filed against the original debtor to be seriously misleading. In that event, subsection (b)(2) provides that the financing statement filed against the original debtor is not effective to perfect a security interest in collateral that the new debtor acquired more than four months after becoming bound as a new debtor.

Section 36‑9‑508(b)(2) assumes that a secured party who filed against the original debtor can file an initial financing statement against the new debtor when the difference between the names of the original debtor and new debtor render the filing against the original debtor seriously misleading. The authority to file against the new debtor rests on Section 36‑9‑509(b) that provides that by becoming a debtor under a security agreement a new debtor authorizes the filing of an initial financing statement.

Subsection (c) provides that Section 36‑9‑508 does not apply to a transferred collateral on which a security interest remains perfected under Section 36‑9‑507 (a). To illustrate, the interplay of Sections 36‑9‑507 and 36‑9‑508 consider the following example.

On February 1, SP took a security interest in the current and after acquired inventory and equipment of ABC, Inc., a South Carolina corporation. Also on February 1, SP filed a financing statement in the Secretary of State’s Office in South Carolina naming ABC, Inc. as the debtor and covering ABC, Inc.’s inventory and equipment.

On March 1, ABC,. Inc. merged into XYZ, Inc. with XYZ, Inc. surviving the merger. XYZ, Inc. is a South Carolina corporation. As a part of the merger XYZ, Inc., acquired ABC, Inc.’s equipment. As a result of the merger, XYZ, Inc. became a new debtor. SP never filed against the XYZ, Inc.

On November 1, XYZ, Inc. filed for relief under the Bankruptcy Code. XYZ, Inc.’s only assets at that time were the equipment originally owned by ABC, Inc. and inventory that XYZ, Inc. had purchased during the months of September and October.

Although SP can claim a security interest in the inventory, its security interest is unperfected. The difference between ABC, Inc.’s name and XYZ, Inc.’s name rendered the filing against ABC, Inc. seriously misleading. As a result under Section 36‑9‑508(b)(2) SP’s filing was not effective to perfect its security interest in the inventory which was acquired more than four months after the merger.

SP’s security interest in the equipment, however, remained perfected. Assuming that SP’s security interest continued in the equipment under Section 36‑9‑315(a) and 36‑9‑320(a), Section 36‑9‑507 (a) provides that the filing against ABC, Inc. remains effective. Therefore, under Section 36‑9‑508(c), the provisions of Section 36‑9‑508 do not apply to the transferred equipment. As a result, SP remains perfected in the equipment even though its filing against ABC, Inc. becomes seriously misleading.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Financing statement” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(39) |
| “New debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(56) |
| “Original debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(60) |

Cross References—

1. When a person becomes bound as a new debtor by a security agreement entered into by an original debtor. Section 36‑9‑203(d).

2. Effect of becoming bound as a new debtor. Section 36‑9‑203(e).

3. Priority of a security interest in collateral created by a new debtor and perfected by a financing statement filed against the original debtor which is effective solely under Section 36‑9‑508. Section 36‑9‑326.

4. Rules for determining whether the difference between the names of the original debtor and the new debtor render the financing statement filed against the original debtor seriously misleading. Section 36‑9‑506(b) and (c).

5. Authority of a secured party that filed against the original debtor to file against the new debtor when the filing against the original debtor becomes seriously misleading. Section 36‑9‑509(b)(1).

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 98.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak98.

**SECTION 36‑9‑509.** Persons entitled to file a record.

(a) A person may file an initial financing statement, amendment that adds collateral covered by a financing statement, or amendment that adds a debtor to a financing statement only if:

(1) the debtor authorizes the filing in an authenticated record or pursuant to subsection (b) or (c); or

(2) the person holds an agricultural lien that has become effective at the time of filing and the financing statement covers only collateral in which the person holds an agricultural lien.

(b) By authenticating or becoming bound as debtor by a security agreement, a debtor or new debtor authorizes the filing of an initial financing statement, and an amendment, covering:

(1) the collateral described in the security agreement; and

(2) property that becomes collateral under Section 36‑9‑315(a)(2), whether or not the security agreement expressly covers proceeds.

(c) By acquiring collateral in which a security interest or agricultural lien continues under Section 36‑9‑315(a)(1), a debtor authorizes the filing of an initial financing statement, and an amendment, covering the collateral and property that becomes collateral under Section 36‑9‑315(a)(2).

(d) A person may file an amendment other than an amendment that adds collateral covered by a financing statement or an amendment that adds a debtor to a financing statement only if:

(1) the secured party of record authorizes the filing; or

(2) the amendment is a termination statement for a financing statement as to which the secured party of record has failed to file or send a termination statement as required by Section 36‑9‑513(a) or (c), the debtor authorizes the filing, and the termination statement indicates that the debtor authorized it to be filed.

(e) If there is more than one secured party of record for a financing statement, each secured party of record may authorize the filing of an amendment under subsection (d).

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. New.

2. Scope and Approach of This Section. This Section collects in one place most of the rules determining whether a record may be filed. Section 9‑510 explains the extent to which a filed record is effective. Under these Sections, the identity of the person who effects a filing is immaterial. The filing scheme contemplated by this Part does not contemplate that the identity of a “filer” will be a part of the searchable records. This is consistent with, and a necessary aspect of, eliminating signatures or other evidence of authorization from the system. (Note that the 1972 amendments to this Article eliminated the requirement that a financing statement contain the signature of the secured party.) As long as the appropriate person authorizes the filing, or, in the case of a termination statement, the debtor is entitled to the termination, it is insignificant whether the secured party or another person files any given record. The question of authorization is one for the court, not the filing office. However, a filing office may choose to employ authentication procedures in connection with electronic communications, e.g., to verify the identity of a filer who seeks to charge the filing fee.

3. Unauthorized Filings. Records filed in the filing office do not require signatures for their effectiveness. Subsection (a)(1) substitutes for the debtor’s signature on a financing statement the requirement that the debtor authorize in an authenticated record the filing of an initial financing statement or an amendment that adds collateral. Also, under subsection (a)(1), if an amendment adds a debtor, the debtor who is added must authorize the amendment. A person who files an unauthorized record in violation of subsection (a)(1) is liable under Section 9‑625 for actual and statutory damages. Of course, a filed financing statement is ineffective to perfect a security interest if the filing is not authorized. See Section 9‑510(a). Law other than this Article, including the law with respect to ratification of past acts, generally determines whether a person has the requisite authority to file a record under this Section. See Sections 1‑103, 9‑502, Comment 3.

4. Ipso Facto Authorization. Under subsection (b), the authentication of a security agreement ipso facto constitutes the debtor’s authorization of the filing of a financing statement covering the collateral described in the security agreement. The secured party need not obtain a separate authorization. Similarly, a new debtor’s becoming bound by a security agreement ipso facto constitutes the new debtor’s authorization of the filing of a financing statement covering the collateral described in the security agreement by which the new debtor has become bound. And, under subsection (c), the acquisition of collateral in which a security interest continues after disposition under Section 9‑315(a)(1) ipso facto constitutes an authorization to file an initial financing statement against the person who acquired the collateral. The authorization to file an initial financing statement also constitutes an authorization to file a record covering actual proceeds of the original collateral, even if the security agreement is silent as to proceeds.

Example 1: Debtor authenticates a security agreement creating a security interest in Debtor’s inventory in favor of Secured Party. Secured Party files a financing statement covering inventory and accounts. The financing statement is authorized insofar as it covers inventory and unauthorized insofar as it covers accounts. (Note, however, that the financing statement will be effective to perfect a security interest in accounts constituting proceeds of the inventory to the same extent as a financing statement covering only inventory.)

Example 2: Debtor authenticates a security agreement creating a security interest in Debtor’s inventory in favor of Secured Party. Secured Party files a financing statement covering inventory. Debtor sells some inventory, deposits the buyer’s payment into a deposit account, and withdraws the funds to purchase equipment. As long as the equipment can be traced to the inventory, the security interest continues in the equipment. See Section 9‑315(a)(2). However, because the equipment was acquired with cash proceeds, the financing statement becomes ineffective to perfect the security interest in the equipment on the 21st day after the security interest attaches to the equipment unless Secured Party continues perfection beyond the 20‑day period by filing a financing statement against the equipment or amending the filed financing statement to cover equipment. See Section 9‑315(d). Debtor’s authentication of the security agreement authorizes the filing of an initial financing statement or amendment covering the equipment, which is “property that becomes collateral under Section 9‑315(a)(2).” See Section 9‑509(b)(2).

5. Agricultural Liens. Under subsection (a)(2), the holder of an agricultural lien may file a financing statement covering collateral subject to the lien without obtaining the debtor’s authorization. Because the lien arises as matter of law, the debtor’s consent is not required. A person who files an unauthorized record in violation of this subsection is liable under Section 9‑625(e) for a statutory penalty and damages.

6. Amendments; Termination Statements Authorized by Debtor. Most amendments may not be filed unless the secured party of record, as determined under Section 9‑511, authorizes the filing. See subsection (d)(1). However, under subsection (d)(2), the authorization of the secured party of record is not required for the filing of a termination statement if the secured party of record failed to send or file a termination statement as required by Section 9‑513, the debtor authorizes it to be filed, and the termination statement so indicates.

7. Multiple Secured Parties of Record. Subsection (e) deals with multiple secured parties of record. It permits each secured party of record to authorize the filing of amendments. However, Section 9‑510(b) protects the rights and powers of one secured party of record from the effects of filings made by another secured party of record. See Section 9‑510, Comment 3.

8. Successor to Secured Party of Record. A person may succeed to the powers of the secured party of record by operation of other law, e.g., the law of corporate mergers. In that case, the successor has the power to authorize filings within the meaning of this Section.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

The current statute changes the requirements for an effective financing statement by eliminating the requirement that the debtor sign the financing statement. See Section 36‑9‑502(a) and former Section 36‑9‑402(a). The requirement that the debtor sign a financing statement operated to protect debtors from unauthorized filings. To provide debtors some protection against unauthorized filings under the current law, Section 36‑9‑509(a)(1) provides that a person may file an initial financing statement only if the debtor authorized the filing.

Under Section 36‑9‑509 there are three methods for establishing authority to file an initial financing statement. First, under subsection (a)(1) the debtor may authorize the filing in an authenticated record. Second, under subsection (b) a debtor who authenticates a security agreement or becomes bound as a new debtor, authorizes the filing of an initial financing statement covering the collateral described in the security agreement and any proceeds. Third, under subsection (c) a person who becomes a debtor by acquiring collateral subject to a security interest under Section 36‑9‑315(a) authorizes the secured party to file against the collateral and any proceeds.

Amendments that add a debtor or add collateral are generally subject to the same authentication requirements as initial financing statements.

Subsection (d) addresses the authority to file amendments other than those which add collateral or a debtor. Generally, a person may file such amendments only if the secured party of record authorizes the filing. If a secured party of record fails to honor its obligation with respect to a termination statement, subsection (d)(2) authorizes the debtor to file the termination statement.

Subsection (a)(2) provides a special rule for filing a financing statement to perfect on agricultural liens that does not require contractual consent of the debtor.

Definitional Cross References:

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| “Agricultural lien” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(5) |
| “Authenticate” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(7) |
| “Collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “Financing statement” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(39) |
| “Record” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(69) |
| “Secured party of record” | Section 36‑9‑511 |
| “Security agreement” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(73) |
| “Termination statement” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(79) |

Cross References—

1. Requirements for an effective security agreement. Section 36‑9‑203(b).

2. When a security interest continues in transferred collateral. Section 36‑9‑315(a)(1).

3. Requirements for status of secured party of record. Section 36‑9‑511.

4. Secured party’s obligations with respect to termination statements. Section 36‑9‑513.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 92.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak92.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Forms

South Carolina Legal and Business Forms Section 9:9 , Mortgage‑General Long Form‑Commercial Orientated.

South Carolina Legal and Business Forms Section 9:13 , Mortgage‑Leasehold.

**SECTION 36‑9‑510.** Effectiveness of filed record.

(a) A filed record is effective only to the extent that it was filed by a person that may file it under Section 36‑9‑509 .

(b) A record authorized by one secured party of record does not affect the financing statement with respect to another secured party of record.

(c) A continuation statement that is not filed within the six‑month period prescribed by Section 36‑9‑515(d) is ineffective.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. New.

2. Ineffectiveness of Unauthorized or Overbroad Filings. Subsection (a) provides that a filed financing statement is effective only to the extent it was filed by a person entitled to file it.

Example 1: Debtor authorizes the filing of a financing statement covering inventory. Under Section 9‑509, the secured party may file a financing statement covering only inventory; it may not file a financing statement covering other collateral. The secured party files a financing statement covering inventory and equipment. This Section provides that the financing statement is effective only to the extent the secured party may file it. Thus, the financing statement is effective to perfect a security interest in inventory but ineffective to perfect a security interest in equipment.

3. Multiple Secured Parties of Record. Section 9‑509(e) permits any secured party of record to authorize the filing of most amendments. Subsection (b) of this Section prevents a filing authorized by one secured party of record from affecting the rights and powers of another secured party of record without the latter’s consent.

Example 2: Debtor creates a security interest in favor of A and B. The filed financing statement names A and B as the secured parties. An amendment deleting some collateral covered by the financing statement is filed pursuant to B’s authorization. Although B’s security interest in the deleted collateral becomes unperfected, A’s security interest remains perfected in all the collateral.

Example 3: Debtor creates a security interest in favor of A and B. The financing statement names A and B as the secured parties. A termination statement is filed pursuant to B’s authorization. Although the effectiveness of the financing statement terminates with respect to B’s security interest, A’s rights are unaffected. That is, the financing statement continues to be effective to perfect A’s security interest.

4. Continuation Statements. A continuation statement may be filed only within the six months immediately before lapse. See Section 9‑515(d). The filing office is obligated to reject a continuation statement that is filed outside the six‑month period. See Sections 9‑520(a), 9‑516(b)(7). Subsection (c) provides that if the filing office fails to reject a continuation statement that is not filed in a timely manner, the continuation statement is ineffective nevertheless.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Subsection 36‑9‑510(a) provides that a filed record is effective only if the person who made the filing was authorized to do so. Subsection (c) provides that untimely continuation statements are ineffective.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Continuation statement” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(27) |
| “Financing statement” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(39) |
| “Record” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(69) |
| “Secured party of record” | Section 36‑9‑511 |

Cross References—

1. Conditions for establishing authority to file an initial financing statement or an amendment. Section 36‑9‑509.

2. Requirements for obtaining status as secured party of record. Section 36‑9‑511.

3. Requirements for and effect of filing a continuation statement. Section 36‑9‑513(d) and (e).

4. The filing office is neither obligated nor permitted to inquire into the issue of whether a person presenting a record for filing is authorized to do so. Section 36‑9‑502, Official Comment 2.

5. Debtor’s right to obtain and file a termination statement rendering an unauthorized financing statement ineffective. Section 36‑9‑513.

6. Debtor’s right to recover actual damages from a person who filed an unauthorized financing statement. Section 36‑9‑625(b).

7. Debtor’s right to recover statutory damages from person who filed an unauthorized financing statement. Section 36‑9‑625(e)(3).

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 97, 98.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak97; 349Ak98.

**SECTION 36‑9‑511.** Secured party of record.

(a) A secured party of record with respect to a financing statement is a person whose name is provided as the name of the secured party or a representative of the secured party in an initial financing statement that has been filed. If an initial financing statement is filed under Section 36‑9‑514(a), the assignee named in the initial financing statement is the secured party of record with respect to the financing statement.

(b) If an amendment of a financing statement which provides the name of a person as a secured party or a representative of a secured party is filed, the person named in the amendment is a secured party of record. If an amendment is filed under Section 36‑9‑514(b), the assignee named in the amendment is a secured party of record.

(c) A person remains a secured party of record until the filing of an amendment of the financing statement which deletes the person.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. New.

2. Secured Party of Record. This new Section explains how the secured party of record is to be determined. If SP‑1 is named as the secured party in an initial financing statement, it is the secured party of record. Similarly, if an initial financing statement reflects a total assignment from SP‑0 to SP‑1, then SP‑1 is the secured party of record. See subsection (a). If, subsequently, an amendment is filed assigning SP‑1’s status to SP‑2, then SP‑2 becomes the secured party of record in place of SP‑1. The same result obtains if a subsequent amendment deletes the reference to SP‑1 and substitutes therefore a reference to SP‑2. If, however, a subsequent amendment adds SP‑2 as a secured party but does not purport to remove SP‑1 as a secured party, then SP‑2 and SP‑1 each is a secured party of record. See subsection (b). An amendment purporting to remove the only secured party of record without providing a successor is ineffective. See Section 9‑512(e). At any point in time, all effective records that comprise a financing statement must be examined to determine the person or persons that have the status of secured party of record.

3. Successor to Secured Party of Record. Application of other law may result in a person succeeding to the powers of a secured party of record. For example, if the secured party of record (A) merges into another corporation (B) and the other corporation (B) survives, other law may provide that B has all of A’s powers. In that case, B is authorized to take all actions under this Part that A would have been authorized to take. Similarly, acts taken by a person who is authorized under generally applicable principles of agency to act on behalf of the secured party of record are effective under this Part.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑511 provides the rules for determining the secured party of record. Identifying the secured party of record is significant because the secured party of record can authorize the amendments to a filed financing statement and is obligated to file or provide termination statements.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Financing statement” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(39) |
| “Secured party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |

Cross References—

1. Secured party of record’s authority to authorize the filing of amendments to a financing statement other than amendments which add collateral or a debtor. Section 36‑9‑509(d)(1).

2. Secured party of record’s obligations with respect to termination statements. Section 36‑9‑513.

3. Assignment of powers of secured party of record. Section 36‑9‑514.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 92.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak92.

**SECTION 36‑9‑512.** Amendment of financing statement.

(a) Subject to Section 36‑9‑509, a person may add or delete collateral covered by, continue or terminate the effectiveness of, or, subject to subsection (e), otherwise amend the information provided in, a financing statement by filing an amendment that:

(1) identifies, by its file number, the initial financing statement to which the amendment relates; and

(2) if the amendment relates to an initial financing statement filed or recorded in a filing office described in Section 36‑9‑501(a)(1), provides the date and time that the initial financing statement was filed or recorded and the information specified in Section 36‑9‑502(b).

(b) Except as otherwise provided in Section 36‑9‑515, the filing of an amendment does not extend the period of effectiveness of the financing statement.

(c) A financing statement that is amended by an amendment that adds collateral is effective as to the added collateral only from the date of the filing of the amendment.

(d) A financing statement that is amended by an amendment that adds a debtor is effective as to the added debtor only from the date of the filing of the amendment.

(e) An amendment is ineffective to the extent it:

(1) purports to delete all debtors and fails to provide the name of a debtor to be covered by the financing statement; or

(2) purports to delete all secured parties of record and fails to provide the name of a new secured party of record.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former 9‑402(4).

2. Changes to Financing Statements. This Section addresses changes to financing statements, including addition and deletion of collateral. Although termination statements, assignments, and continuation statements are types of amendment, this Article follows former Article 9 and contains separate Sections containing additional provisions applicable to particular types of amendments. See Section 9‑513 (termination statements); 9‑514 (assignments); 9‑515 (continuation statements). One should not infer from this separate treatment that this Article requires a separate amendment to accomplish each change. Rather, a single amendment would be legally sufficient to, e.g., add collateral and continue the effectiveness of the financing statement.

3. Amendments. An amendment under this Article may identify only the information contained in a financing statement that is to be changed; alternatively, it may take the form of an amended and restated financing statement. The latter would state, for example, that the financing statement “is amended and restated to read as follows: . . .” References in this Part to an “amended financing statement” are to a financing statement as amended by an amendment using either technique.

This Section revises former Section 9‑402(4) to permit secured parties of record to make changes in the public record without the need to obtain the debtor’s signature. However, the filing of an amendment that adds collateral or adds a debtor must be authorized by the debtor or it will not be effective. See Sections 9‑509(a), 9‑510(a).

4. Amendment Adding Debtor. An amendment that adds a debtor is effective, provided that the added debtor authorizes the filing. See Section 9‑509(a). However, filing an amendment adding a debtor to a previously filed financing statement affords no advantage over filing an initial financing statement against that debtor and may be disadvantageous. With respect to the added debtor, for purposes of determining the priority of the security interest, the time of filing is the time of the filing of the amendment, not the time of the filing of the initial financing statement. See subsection (d). However, the effectiveness of the financing statement lapses with respect to added debtor at the time it lapses with respect to the original debtor. See subsection (b).

5. Deletion of All Debtors or Secured Parties of Record. Subsection (e) assures that there will be a debtor and secured party of record for every financing statement.

Example: A filed financing statement names A and B as secured parties of record and covers inventory and equipment. An amendment deletes equipment and purports to delete A and B as secured parties of record without adding a substitute secured party. The amendment is ineffective to the extent it purports to delete the secured parties of record but effective with respect to the deletion of collateral. As a consequence, the financing statement, as amended, covers only inventory, but A and B remain as secured parties of record.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑512 provides the manner and effect of amending financing statements. Subsection (a)(1) provides the basic rule that the amendment must refer to the initial financing statement by its file number. To be effective, however, an amendment must be authorized under Section 36‑9‑509. Amendments constituting termination statements, assignments, or continuation statements must satisfy additional statutory requirements.

Definitional Cross References:

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| --- | --- |
|  |  |
| “Collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “File number” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(36) |
| “Financing statement” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(39) |
| “Secured party of record” | Section 36‑9‑511 |

Cross References—

1. Authorization to file amendments to financing statements. Section 36‑9‑509.

2. An unauthorized amendment is ineffective. Section 36‑9‑510(a).

3. Termination statements. Section 36‑9‑513.

4. Assignments. Section 36‑9‑514.

5. Continuation statements. Section 36‑9‑515(c)—(e).

6. Requirement that filing office assign a file number to an initial financing statement. Sections 36‑9‑519(a) and 36‑9‑102(a)(36).

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 92, 98, 99.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak92; 349Ak98; 349Ak99.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 1

1. In general

Considering Sections 36‑9‑203, 36‑9‑402 and 36‑9‑110 of the Uniform Commercial Code, both the security agreement and the financing statement must contain a sufficient description of the land on which crops are to be grown, to make possible the identification of the thing described. Citizens Bank v. Gregory’s Warehouse, Inc. (S.C.App. 1988) 297 S.C. 151, 375 S.E.2d 316. Secured Transactions 45; Secured Transactions 94

**SECTION 36‑9‑513.** Termination statement.

(a) A secured party shall cause the secured party of record for a financing statement to file a termination statement for the financing statement if the financing statement covers consumer goods and:

(1) there is no obligation secured by the collateral covered by the financing statement and no commitment to make an advance, incur an obligation, or otherwise give value; or

(2) the debtor did not authorize the filing of the initial financing statement.

(b) To comply with subsection (a), a secured party shall cause the secured party of record to file the termination statement:

(1) within one month after there is no obligation secured by the collateral covered by the financing statement and no commitment to make an advance, incur an obligation, or otherwise give value; or

(2) if earlier, within twenty days after the secured party receives an authenticated demand from a debtor.

(c) In cases not governed by subsection (a), within twenty days after a secured party receives an authenticated demand from a debtor, the secured party shall cause the secured party of record for a financing statement to send to the debtor a termination statement for the financing statement or file the termination statement in the filing office if:

(1) except in the case of a financing statement covering accounts or chattel paper that has been sold or goods that are the subject of a consignment, there is no obligation secured by the collateral covered by the financing statement and no commitment to make an advance, incur an obligation, or otherwise give value;

(2) the financing statement covers accounts or chattel paper that has been sold but as to which the account debtor or other person obligated has discharged its obligation;

(3) the financing statement covers goods that were the subject of a consignment to the debtor but are not in the debtor’s possession; or

(4) the debtor did not authorize the filing of the initial financing statement.

(d) Except as otherwise provided in Section 36‑9‑510, upon the filing of a termination statement with the filing office, the financing statement to which the termination statement relates ceases to be effective. Except as otherwise provided in Section 36‑9‑510, for purposes of Sections 36‑9‑519(g), 36‑9‑522(a), and 36‑9‑523(c), the filing with the filing office of a termination statement relating to a financing statement that indicates that the debtor is a transmitting utility also causes the effectiveness of the financing statement to lapse.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑404.

2. Duty to File or Send. This Section specifies when a secured party must cause the secured party of record to file or send to the debtor a termination statement for a financing statement. Because most financing statements expire in five years unless a continuation statement is filed (Section 9‑515), no compulsion is placed on the secured party to file a termination statement unless demanded by the debtor, except in the case of consumer goods. Because many consumers will not realize the importance to them of clearing the public record, an affirmative duty is put on the secured party in that case. But many purchase‑money security interests in consumer goods will not be filed, except for motor vehicles. See Section 9‑309(1). Under Section 9‑311(b), compliance with a certificate‑of‑title statute is “equivalent to the filing of a financing statement under this article.” Thus, this Section applies to a certificate of title unless the Section is superseded by a certificate‑of‑title statute that contains a specific rule addressing a secured party’s duty to cause a notation of a security interest to be removed from a certificate of title. In the context of a certificate of title, however, the secured party could comply with this Section by causing the removal itself or providing the debtor with documentation sufficient to enable the debtor to effect the removal.

Subsections (a) and (b) apply to a financing statement covering consumer goods. Subsection (c) applies to other financing statements. Subsection (a) and (c) each makes explicit what was implicit under former Article 9: If the debtor did not authorize the filing of a financing statement in the first place, the secured party of record should file or send a termination statement. The liability imposed upon a secured party that fails to comply with subsection (a) or (c) is identical to that imposed for the filing of an unauthorized financing statement or amendment. See Section 9‑625(e).

3. “Bogus” Filings. A secured party’s duty to send a termination statement arises when the secured party “receives” an authenticated demand from the debtor. In the case of an unauthorized financing statement, the person named as debtor in the financing statement may have no relationship with the named secured party and no reason to know the secured party’s address. Inasmuch as the address in the financing statement is “held out by [the person named as secured party in the financing statement] as the place for receipt of such communications [i.e., communications relating to security interests],” the putative secured party is deemed to have “received” a notification delivered to that address. See Section 1‑201(26). If a termination statement is not forthcoming, the person named as debtor itself may authorize the filing of a termination statement, which will be effective if it indicates that the person authorized it to be filed. See Sections 9‑509( d)(2), 9‑510(c).

4. Buyers of Receivables. Applied literally, former Section 9‑404(1) would have required many buyers of receivables to file a termination statement immediately upon filing a financing statement because “there is no outstanding secured obligation and no commitment to make advances, incur obligations, or otherwise give value.” Subsections (c)(1) and (2) remedy this problem. While the security interest of a buyer of accounts or chattel paper (B‑1) is perfected, the debtor is not deemed to retain an interest in the sold receivables and thus could transfer no interest in them to another buyer (B‑2) or to a lien creditor (LC). However, for purposes of determining the rights of the debtor’s creditors and certain purchasers of accounts or chattel paper from the debtor, while B‑1’s security interest is unperfected, the debtor‑seller is deemed to have rights in the sold receivables, and a competing security interest or judicial lien may attach to those rights. See Sections 9‑318, 9‑109, Comment 5. Suppose that B‑1’s security interest in certain accounts and chattel paper is perfected by filing, but the effectiveness of the financing statement lapses. Both before and after lapse, B‑1 collects some of the receivables. After lapse, LC acquires a lien on the accounts and chattel paper. B‑1’s unperfected security interest in the accounts and chattel paper is subordinate to LC’s rights. See Section 9‑317(a)(2). But collections on accounts and chattel paper are not “accounts” or “chattel paper.” Even if B‑1’s security interest in the accounts and chattel paper is or becomes unperfected, neither the debtor nor LC acquires rights to the collections that B‑1 collects (and owns) before LC acquires a lien.

5. Effect of Filing. Subsection (d) states the effect of filing a termination statement: the related financing statement ceases to be effective. If one of several secured parties of record files a termination statement, subsection (d) applies only with respect to the rights of the person who authorized the filing of the termination statement. See Section 9‑510(b). The financing statement remains effective with respect to the rights of the others. However, even if a financing statement is terminated (and thus no longer is effective) with respect to all secured parties of record, the financing statement, including the termination statement, will remain of record until at least one year after it lapses with respect to all secured parties of record. See Section 9‑519(g).

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑513 addresses the obligations of secured parties and secured parties of record with respect to termination statements. Subsection (a) applies when a filed financing statement covers consumer goods. Under that provision a secured party is required to cause the secured party of record to file a termination statement when there is no obligation or commitment to make an advance secured by collateral covered in the financing statement or when the debtor did not authorize the filing of the financing statement. Subsection (b) requires a secured party to perform its obligation under subsection (a) within one month after the debtor’s obligation is satisfied or, if earlier, within 20 days after receipt of an authenticated demand from the debtor.

Subsection (c) applies when a filed financing statement covers collateral other than consumer goods. A secured party can meet its obligation under subsection (c) by causing the secured party of record either to file or send to the debtor a termination statement. The secured party must act within 20 days after receipt of an authenticated demand from the debtor.

The right of a debtor to demand a termination statement depends, in part, upon the nature of the underlying transaction. As a general rule, subsection (c)(1) provides that a secured party must honor a debtor’s demand if there is no obligation or commitment to make an advance secured by collateral described in the financing statement. Subsection (c)(2) applies to sales of accounts and chattel paper and entitles the debtor to a termination statement when the obligation of the account debtor has been discharged. Section (c)(3) applies to consignments and entitles the debtor to a termination statement when the goods covered by the financing statement are no longer in the debtor’s possession. Subsection (c)(4) provides that in any transaction in which the debtor did not authorize the filing of a financing statement, the debtor is entitled to a termination statement.

Subsection (d) provides upon filing a termination statement, the financing statement to which it relates ceases to be effective.

Definitional Cross References:

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| “Account” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(2) |
| “Account debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(3) |
| “Authenticate” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(7) |
| “Chattel paper” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(11) |
| “Collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Consignment” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(20) |
| “Filing office” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(37) |
| “Financing statement” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(39) |
| “Goods” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(44) |
| “Secured party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |
| “Secured party of record” | Section 36‑9‑511 |
| “Termination statement” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(79) |
| “Transmitting utility” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(80) |
| “Value” | Section 36‑1‑201(44) [see now Section 36‑1‑204] |

Cross References—

1. Authority to file an initial financing statement. Section 36‑9‑509(a)( 1).

2. Debtor’s right to file a termination statement when the secured party of record fails to file or send a termination statement. Section 36‑9‑509(d)( 2).

3. Form for termination statement. Section 36‑9‑521.

4. Debtor’s right to recover actual damages for a failure to file or send a termination statement. Section 36‑9‑625(b).

5. Debtor’s right to recover statutory damages for a failure to file or send a termination statement. Section 36‑9‑625(e)(4).

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 100.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak100.

**SECTION 36‑9‑514.** Assignment of powers of secured party of record.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), an initial financing statement may reflect an assignment of all of the secured party’s power to authorize an amendment to the financing statement by providing the name and mailing address of the assignee as the name and address of the secured party.

(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), a secured party of record may assign of record all or part of its power to authorize an amendment to a financing statement by filing in the filing office an amendment of the financing statement which:

(1) identifies, by its file number, the initial financing statement to which it relates;

(2) provides the name of the assignor; and

(3) provides the name and mailing address of the assignee.

(c) An assignment of record of a security interest in a fixture covered by a record of a mortgage which is effective as a financing statement filed as a fixture filing under Section 36‑9‑502(c) may be made only by an assignment of record of the mortgage in the manner provided by law of this State other than the Uniform Commercial Code.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑405.

2. Assignments. This Section provides a permissive device whereby a secured party of record may effectuate an assignment of its power to affect a financing statement. It may also be useful for a secured party who has assigned all or part of its security interest or agricultural lien and wishes to have the fact noted of record, so that inquiries concerning the transaction would be addressed to the assignee. See Section 9‑502, Comment 2. Upon the filing of an assignment, the assignee becomes the “secured party of record” and may authorize the filing of a continuation statement, termination statement, or other amendment. Note that under Section 9‑310(c) no filing of an assignment is required as a condition of continuing the perfected status of the security interest against creditors and transferees of the original debtor. However, if an assignment is not filed, the assignor remains the secured party of record, with the power (even if not the right) to authorize the filing of effective amendments. See Sections 9‑511(c), 9‑509(d).

Where a record of a mortgage is effective as a financing statement filed as a fixture filing (Section 9‑502(c)), then an assignment of record of the security interest may be made only in the manner in which an assignment of record of the mortgage may be made under local real‑property law.

3. Comparison to Prior Law. Most of the changes reflected in this Section are for clarification or to embrace medium‑neutral drafting. As a general matter, this Section preserves the opportunity given by former Section 9‑405 to assign a security interest of record in one of two different ways. Under subsection (a), a secured party may assign all of its power to affect a financing statement by naming an assignee in the initial financing statement. The secured party of record may accomplish the same result under subsection (b) by making a subsequent filing. Subsection (b) also may be used for an assignment of only some of the secured party of record’s power to affect a financing statement, e.g., the power to affect the financing statement as it relates to particular items of collateral or as it relates to an undivided interest in a security interest in all the collateral. An initial financing statement may not be used to change the secured party of record under these circumstances. However, an amendment adding the assignee as a secured party of record may be used.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑514 provides the procedures under which a secured party of record can assign its power to authorize the amendment of a financing statement. Subsection (a) provides the procedures for effecting the assignment in the initial financing statement. Subsection (b) provides the procedure assigning the secured party of record’s interest by an amendment to the financing statement. Subsection (c) provides that when a secured party has recorded a mortgage to perfect a security interest in fixtures, the validity of an assignment of the secured party’s interest is governed by real property law.

A secured party that has filed a financing statement to perfect a security interest can assign the perfected security interest to a third party without complying with Section 36‑9‑514. Under Section 36‑9‑310(c) no filing is necessary to continue the perfection of the assigned security interest against creditors and transferees of the debtor. When an assignment of a perfected security interest is made without complying with Section 36‑9‑514, however, the assignee is not empowered to amend the financing statement.

Definitional Cross References:

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| “Filing office” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(37) |
| “Financing statement” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(39) |
| “Fixture filing” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(40) |
| “Mortgage” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(55) |
| “Secured party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |

Cross References—

1. Only a secured party of record is authorized to file an amendment to a financing statement other than an amendment which adds a debtor or collateral. Section 36‑9‑509(d)(1).

2. A secured party of record has the obligation to file or send termination statements. Section 36‑9‑513.

3. Form of financing statement including an assignment of the secured party’s interest. Section 36‑9‑521.

4. Form for an amendment to a financing statement assigned the secured party’s interest. Section 36‑9‑521.

5. If a secured party assigns a perfected security interest, no filing is necessary to continue the perfected status of the security interest against creditors of or transferees from the debtor. Section 36‑9‑310(c).

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 181 to 191.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak181 to 349Ak191.

**SECTION 36‑9‑515.** Duration and effectiveness of financing statement; effect of lapsed financing statement.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (b), (e), (f), and (g), a filed financing statement is effective for a period of five years after the date of filing.

(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (e), (f), and (g), an initial financing statement filed in connection with a public‑finance transaction or manufactured‑home transaction is effective for a period of thirty years after the date of filing if it indicates that it is filed in connection with a public‑finance transaction or manufactured‑home transaction.

(c) The effectiveness of a filed financing statement lapses on the expiration of the period of its effectiveness unless before the lapse a continuation statement is filed pursuant to subsection (d). Upon lapse, a financing statement ceases to be effective and any security interest or agricultural lien that was perfected by the financing statement becomes unperfected, unless the security interest is perfected otherwise. If the security interest or agricultural lien becomes unperfected upon lapse, it is deemed never to have been perfected as against a purchaser of the collateral for value.

(d) A continuation statement may be filed only within six months before the expiration of the five‑year period specified in subsection (a) or the thirty‑year period specified in subsection (b), whichever is applicable.

(e) Except as otherwise provided in Section 36‑9‑510, upon timely filing of a continuation statement, the effectiveness of the initial financing statement continues for a period of five years commencing on the day on which the financing statement would have become ineffective in the absence of the filing. Upon the expiration of the five‑year period, the financing statement lapses in the same manner as provided in subsection (c), unless, before the lapse, another continuation statement is filed pursuant to subsection (d). Succeeding continuation statements may be filed in the same manner to continue the effectiveness of the initial financing statement.

(f) If a debtor is a transmitting utility and a filed initial financing statement so indicates, the financing statement is effective until a termination statement is filed.

(g) A record of a mortgage that is effective as a financing statement filed as a fixture filing under Section 36‑9‑502(c) remains effective as a financing statement filed as a fixture filing until the mortgage is released or satisfied of record or its effectiveness otherwise terminates as to the real property.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12; 2013 Act No. 96, Section 14, eff July 1, 2013.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑403(2), (3), (6).

2. Period of Financing Statement’s Effectiveness. Subsection (a) states the general rule: a financing statement is effective for a five‑year period unless its effectiveness is continued under this Section or terminated under Section 9‑513. Subsection (b) provides that if the financing statement relates to a public‑finance transaction or a manufactured‑home transaction and so indicates, the financing statement is effective for 30 years. These financings typically extend well beyond the standard, five‑year period. Under subsection (f), a financing statement filed against a transmitting utility remains effective indefinitely, until a termination statement is filed. Likewise, under subsection (g), a mortgage effective as a fixture filing remains effective until its effectiveness terminates under real‑property law.

3. Lapse. When the period of effectiveness under subsection (a) or (b) expires, the effectiveness of the financing statement lapses. The last sentence of subsection (c) addresses the effect of lapse. The deemed retroactive unperfection applies only with respect to purchasers for value; unlike former Section 9‑403(2), it does not apply with respect to lien creditors.

Example 1: SP‑1 and SP‑2 both hold security interests in the same collateral. Both security interests are perfected by filing. SP‑1 filed first and has priority under Section 9‑322(a)(1). The effectiveness of SP‑1’s filing lapses. As long as SP‑2’s security interest remains perfected thereafter, SP‑2 is entitled to priority over SP‑1’s security interest, which is deemed never to have been perfected as against a purchaser for value (SP‑2). See Section 9‑322(a)(2).

Example 2: SP holds a security interest perfected by filing. On July 1, LC acquires a judicial lien on the collateral. Two weeks later, the effectiveness of the financing statement lapses. Although the security interest becomes unperfected upon lapse, it was perfected when LC acquired its lien. Accordingly, notwithstanding the lapse, the perfected security interest has priority over the rights of LC, who is not a purchaser. See Section 9‑317(a)(2).

4. Effect of Debtor’s Bankruptcy. Under former Section 9‑403(2), lapse was tolled if the debtor entered bankruptcy or another insolvency proceeding. Nevertheless, being unaware that insolvency proceedings had been commenced, filing offices routinely removed records from the files as if lapse had not been tolled. Subsection (c) deletes the former tolling provision and thereby imposes a new burden on the secured party: to be sure that a financing statement does not lapse during the debtor’s bankruptcy. The secured party can prevent lapse by filing a continuation statement, even without first obtaining relief from the automatic stay. See Bankruptcy Code Section 362(b)( 3). Of course, if the debtor enters bankruptcy before lapse, the provisions of this Article with respect to lapse would be of no effect to the extent that federal bankruptcy law dictates a contrary result (e.g., to the extent that the Bankruptcy Code determines rights as of the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition).

5. Continuation Statements. Subsection (d) explains when a continuation statement may be filed. A continuation statement filed at a time other than that prescribed by subsection (d) is ineffective, see Section 9‑510(c), and the filing office may not accept it. See Sections 9‑520(a), 9‑516(b). Subsection (e) specifies the effect of a continuation statement and provides for successive continuation statements.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑515 addresses issues concerning the duration of the effectiveness of a filed financing statement. As a general rule, subsection (a) provides that a financing statement remains effective for five years from the date of filing. This rule, however, is subject to a number of exceptions. Under subsection (b) an initial financing statement filed in a public‑financing transactions or a manufactured‑home transaction is effective for 30 years. Moreover, in a manufactured‑home transaction a secured party would typically perfect under the certificate of title statute in which case that statute rather than Article 9 would control the duration of the perfected status of the security interest. See Section 36‑9‑311(c). Under subsection (f) if a debtor is a transmitting utility, a filed financing statement remains effective until a termination statement is filed. Under subsection (g) a mortgage recorded in lieu of a fixture filing remains effective until the mortgage is released or satisfied of record.

Subsection (c) provides that the effectiveness of a filed financing statement lapses upon the expiration of its period of effectiveness unless a continuation statement is properly filed. Upon the lapse of its financing statement a secured party’s security interest or agricultural lien becomes unperfected. Moreover, a security interest or agricultural lien that becomes unperfected upon lapse, is deemed to have never been perfected against a purchaser of the collateral for value.

Under subsections (d) and (e) a secured party can avoid lapse by filing a continuation statement. The continuation statement must be filed within the final six months of the effective period of the financing statement. The continuation statement will extend the effectiveness of the financing statement for five years. Succeeding continuation statements may be filed.

Section 36‑9‑515 does not include a provision comparable to former Section 36‑9‑403(2) that tolled the lapse of a financing statement when a debtor entered a bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding.

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|  | Definitional Cross: |  |
| “Agricultural lien” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(5) |
| “Collateral” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Continuation statement” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(27) |
| “Financing statement” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(39) |
| “Fixture filing” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(40) |
| “Manufactured‑home transaction” | | Sections 36‑9‑102(a)(54) |
| “Mortgage” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(55) |
| “Public‑finance transaction” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(67) |
| “Purchaser” | | Section 36‑1‑201(33) |
| “Termination statement” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(80) |
| “Transmitting utility” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(81) |
| “Value” | | Section 36‑1‑201(44) [see now Section 36‑1‑204] |
|  | Cross— |  |

1. A continuation statement not filed within the six‑month period proscribed by Section 36‑9‑515(d) is ineffective. Section 36‑9‑510(c).

2. A “manufactured home” as defined in Section 36‑9‑102(a)(53) would qualify as either a “house trailer” under Section 56‑19‑10(10), S.C. Code Ann. (Supp. 1999) or as a “mobile home” under Section 56‑19‑10(30), S.C. Code Ann. (Supp. 1999). In either case, a security interest would be perfected under the Certificate of Title Statute. See Section 56‑19‑620, S.C. Code Ann. (1976). As a result, under Section 36‑9‑311(c) the Certificate of Title Statute rather than Section 36‑9‑515(b) would control the duration of the perfection of a security interest in a manufactured home. The Certificate of Title Statute does not limit the duration of a perfected security interest.

Effect of Amendment

The 2013 amendment, in subsection (f), inserted “initial”.

CROSS REFERENCES

Filing of initial financing statement, requirements, see Section 36‑9‑806.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 98.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak98.

Attorney General’s Opinions

The Department of Archives may not destroy chattel mortgages or financial statements until such time as they either have been terminated or have lapsed. The statutory procedure of 36‑9‑403(3) determines when a financial statement will lapse, but the point at which a chattel mortgage will lapse can only be determined on a county‑by‑county basis, because of the variation in renewal periods. 1976‑77 Op Atty Gen, No 77‑221, p 170.

A chattel mortgage which was recorded prior to January 1, 1968, is to be continued or renewed as set forth in this section [Code 1962 Section 10.9‑403], just as if the uniform Commercial Code had not been enacted. 1967‑68 Op Atty Gen, No 2450, p 110.

**SECTION 36‑9‑516.** What constitutes filing; effectiveness of filing.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), communication of a record to a filing office and tender of the filing fee or acceptance of the record by the filing office constitutes filing.

(b) Filing does not occur with respect to a record that a filing office refuses to accept because:

(1) the record is not communicated by a method or medium of communication authorized by the filing office;

(2) an amount equal to or greater than the applicable filing fee is not tendered;

(3) the filing office is unable to index the record because:

(A) in the case of an initial financing statement, the record does not provide a name for the debtor;

(B) in the case of an amendment or information statement, the record:

(i) does not identify the initial financing statement as required by Section 36‑9‑512 or 36‑9‑518, as applicable; or

(ii) identifies an initial financing statement whose effectiveness has lapsed under Section 36‑9‑515;

(C) in the case of an initial financing statement that provides the name of a debtor identified as an individual or an amendment that provides a name of a debtor identified as an individual which was not previously provided in the financing statement to which the record relates, the record does not identify the debtor’s surname; or

(D) in the case of a record filed or recorded in the filing office described in Section 36‑9‑501(a)(1), the record does not provide a sufficient description of the real property to which it relates;

(4) in the case of an initial financing statement or an amendment that adds a secured party of record, the record does not provide a name and mailing address for the secured party of record;

(5) in the case of an initial financing statement or an amendment that provides a name of a debtor which was not previously provided in the financing statement to which the amendment relates, the record does not:

(A) provide a mailing address for the debtor;

(B) indicate whether the name provided as the name of the debtor is the name of an individual or an organization;

(6) in the case of an assignment reflected in an initial financing statement under Section 36‑9‑514(a) or an amendment filed under Section 36‑9‑514(b), the record does not provide a name and mailing address for the assignee;

(7) in the case of a continuation statement, the record is not filed within the six‑month period prescribed by Section 36‑9‑515(d);

(8) in the case of a record presented for filing at the Office of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of State determines that the record is not created pursuant to this chapter or is otherwise intended for an improper purpose, such as to defraud, hinder, harass, or otherwise wrongfully interfere with a person; or

(9) in the case of a record presented for filing at the Office of the Secretary of State, the same person or entity is listed as both debtor and secured party, the collateral described is not within the scope of this chapter, or that the record is being filed for a purpose other than a transaction that is within the scope of this chapter.

(c) For purposes of subsection (b):

(1) a record does not provide information if the filing office is unable to read or decipher the information; and

(2) a record that does not indicate that it is an amendment or identify an initial financing statement to which it relates, as required by Section 36‑9‑512, 36‑9‑514, or 36‑9‑518, is an initial financing statement.

(d) A record that is communicated to the filing office with tender of the filing fee, but which the filing office refuses to accept for a reason other than one set forth in subsection (b), is effective as a filed record except as against a purchaser of the collateral which gives value in reasonable reliance upon the absence of the record from the files.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12; 2005 Act No. 161, Section 37.B, eff upon approval (became law without the Governor’s signature on June 9, 2005); 2013 Act No. 96, Section 15, eff July 1, 2013.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Subsection (a): former Section 9‑403(1); the remainder is new.

2. What Constitutes Filing. Subsection (a) deals generically with what constitutes filing of a record, including an initial financing statement and amendments of all kinds (e.g., assignments, termination statements, and continuation statements). It follows former Section 9‑403(1), under which either acceptance of a record by the filing office or presentation of the record and tender of the filing fee constitutes filing.

3. Effectiveness of Rejected Record. Subsection (b) provides an exclusive list of grounds upon which the filing office may reject a record. See Section 9‑520(a). Although some of these grounds would also be grounds for rendering a filed record ineffective (e.g., an initial financing statement does not provide a name for the debtor), many others would not be (e.g., an initial financing statement does not provide a mailing address for the debtor or secured party of record). Neither this Section nor Section 9‑520 requires or authorizes the filing office to determine, or even consider, the accuracy of information provided in a record.

A financing statement or other record that is communicated to the filing office but which the filing office refuses to accept provides no public notice, regardless of the reason for the rejection. However, this Section distinguishes between records that the filing office rightfully rejects and those that it wrongfully rejects. A filer is able to prevent a rightful rejection by complying with the requirements of subsection (b). No purpose is served by giving effect to records that justifiably never find their way into the system, and subsection (b) so provides.

Subsection (d) deals with the filing office’s unjustified refusal to accept a record. Here, the filer is in no position to prevent the rejection and as a general matter should not be prejudiced by it. Although wrongfully rejected records generally are effective, subsection (d) contains a special rule to protect a third‑party purchaser of the collateral (e.g., a buyer or competing secured party) who gives value in reliance upon the apparent absence of the record from the files. As against a person who searches the public record and reasonably relies on what the public record shows, subsection (d) imposes upon the filer the risk that a record failed to make its way into the filing system because of the filing office’s wrongful rejection of it. (Compare Section 9‑517, under which a misindexed financing statement is fully effective.) This risk is likely to be small, particularly when a record is presented electronically, and the filer can guard against this risk by conducting a postfiling search of the records. Moreover, Section 9‑520(b) requires the filing office to give prompt notice of its refusal to accept a record for filing.

4. Method or Medium of Communication. Rejection pursuant to subsection (b)(1) for failure to communicate a record properly should be understood to mean noncompliance with procedures relating to security, authentication, or other communication‑related requirements that the filing office may impose. Subsection (b)(1) does not authorize a filing office to impose additional substantive requirements. See Section 9‑520, Comment 2.

5. Address for Secured Party of Record. Under subsection (b)(4) and Section 9‑520(a), the lack of a mailing address for the secured party of record requires the filing office to reject an initial financing statement. The failure to include an address for the secured party of record no longer renders a financing statement ineffective. See Section 9‑502(a). The function of the address is not to identify the secured party of record but rather to provide an address to which others can send required notifications, e.g., of a purchase‑money security interest in inventory or of the disposition of collateral. Inasmuch as the address shown on a filed financing statement is an “address that is reasonable under the circumstances,” a person required to send a notification to the secured party may satisfy the requirement by sending a notification to that address, even if the address is or becomes incorrect. See Section 9‑102 ( definition of “send”). Similarly, because the address is “held out by [the secured party] as the place for receipt of such communications [i.e., communications relating to security interests],” the secured party is deemed to have received a notification delivered to that address. See Section 1‑201(26).

6. Uncertainty Concerning Individual Debtor’s Surname. Subsection (b)(3)(C) requires the filing office to reject an initial financing statement or amendment adding an individual debtor if the office cannot index the record because it does not identify the debtor’s surname (e.g., it is unclear whether the debtor’s name is Elton or John).

7. Inability of Filing Office to Read or Decipher Information. Under subsection (c)(1), if the filing office cannot read or decipher information, the information is not provided by a record for purposes of subsection (b).

8. Classification of Records. For purposes of subsection (b), a record that does not indicate it is an amendment or identify an initial financing statement to which it relates is deemed to be an initial financing statement. See subsection (c)(2).

9. Effectiveness of Rejectable But Unrejected Record. Section 9‑520(a) requires the filing office to refuse to accept an initial financing statement for a reason set forth in subsection (b). However, if the filing office accepts such a financing statement nevertheless, the financing statement generally is effective if it complies with the requirements of Section 9‑502(a) and (b). See Section 9‑520(c). Similarly, an otherwise effective financing statement generally remains so even though the information in the financing statement becomes incorrect. See Section 9‑507(b). (Note that if the information required by subsection (b)(5) is incorrect when the financing statement is filed, Section 9‑338 applies.)

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑516(b) sets forth the requirements an initial financing statement or other record must meet in order to be accepted for filing. Section 36‑9‑520 (a) provides that a filing office must refuse to accept for filing a record that fails to meet those requirements. Section 36‑9‑520(a) further provides that the filing office can refuse to accept a record for filing only for the reasons listed in Section 36‑9‑516(b).

The requirements of Section 36‑9‑516(b) are more demanding than the requirements for a sufficient financing statement under Section 36‑9‑502(a). If a filing office accepts and files a financing statement which is sufficient under Section 36‑9‑502(a) but fails to meet the requirements of Section 36‑9‑516(b), Section 36‑9‑520(c) provides that the filing is effective.

Section 36‑9‑516(d) applies when a filing office wrongfully refuses to accept a sufficient financing statement or other record for filing for a reason other than one listed in subsection (b). Under subsection (d) the financing statement or other record is effective as a filed record except against a purchaser which gave value in reasonable reliance upon the absence of a filed record.

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|  | Definitional Cross: |  |
| “Collateral” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Continuation statement” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(27) |
| “Debtor” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “Filing office” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(37) |
| “Financing statement” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(39) |
| “Jurisdiction of organization” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(50) |
| “Organization” | | Section 36‑1‑201(28) |
| “Purchaser” | | Section 36‑1‑201(33) |
| “Record” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(70) |
| “Secured party of record” | | Section 36‑9‑511 |
| “Value” | | Section 36‑9‑201(44) |
|  | Cross— |  |

1. Requirements for a sufficient financing statement. Section 36‑9‑502(a) and (b).

2. A filing office is required to refuse to file a record that fails to meet the requirements of Section 36‑9‑516(b). Section 36‑9‑520(a).

3. A filing office is required to accept for filing a sufficient record which meets the requirements of Section 36‑9‑516(b). Section 36‑9‑520(a).

4. Limitations on priority afforded to a security interest perfected by a financing statement which failed to meet the requirements of Section 36‑9‑516(b) but was accepted for filing. Sections 36‑9‑520(c) and 36‑9‑338.

Effect of Amendment

The 2005 amendment added paragraphs (b)(8) and (b)(9) relating to records outside the scope of the chapter.

The 2013 amendment, in subsection (b)(3)(B), substituted “information” for “correction”; in subsection (b)(3)(C), substituted “surname” for “last name”; in subsection (b)(5)(B), inserted “name provided as the name of the” and “the name of”; deleted subsection (b)(5)(C); and made other nonsubstantive changes.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 96.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak96.

**SECTION 36‑9‑517.** Effect of indexing errors

The failure of the filing office to index a record correctly does not affect the effectiveness of the filed record.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. New.

2. Effectiveness of Mis‑Indexed Records. This Section provides that the filing office’s error in mis‑indexing a record does not render ineffective an otherwise effective record. As did former Section 9‑401, this Section imposes the risk of filing‑office error on those who search the files rather than on those who file.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑517 places the risk of indexing error by the filing office upon the person searching the files.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Filing office” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(37) |
| “Record” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(69) |

Cross References—

Obligation of filing office to index filed records. Section 36‑9‑519(a)( 4), (c), (d), and (e).

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 92.1.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak92.1.

**SECTION 36‑9‑518.** Claim concerning inaccurate or wrongfully filed record.

(a) A person may file in the filing office an information statement with respect to a record indexed there under the person’s name if the person believes that the record is inaccurate or was wrongfully filed.

(b) An information statement under subsection (a) must:

(1) identify the record to which it relates by:

(A) the file number assigned to the initial financing statement to which the record relates; and

(B) if the information statement relates to a record filed or recorded in a filing office described in Section 36‑9‑501(a)(1), the date and time that the initial financing statement was filed or recorded and the information specified in Section 36‑9‑502(b);

(2) indicate that it is an information statement; and

(3) provide the basis for the person’s belief that the record is inaccurate and indicate the manner in which the person believes the record should be amended to cure any inaccuracy or provide the basis for the person’s belief that the record was wrongfully filed.

(c) A person may file in the filing office an information statement with respect to a record filed there if the person is a secured party of record with respect to the financing statement to which the record relates and believes that the person that filed the record was not entitled to do so under Section 36‑9‑509(d). The filing of an information statement does not affect the effectiveness of an initial financing statement or other filed record.

(d) An information statement under subsection (c) must:

(1) identify the record to which it relates by:

(A) the file number assigned to the initial financing statement to which the record relates; and

(B) if the information statement relates to a record filed or recorded in a filing office described in Section 36‑9‑501(a)(1), the date and time that the initial financing statement was filed or recorded and the information specified in Section 36‑9‑502(b);

(2) indicate that it is an information statement; and

(3) provide the basis for the person’s belief that the person that filed the record was not entitled to do so pursuant to Section 36‑9‑509(d).

(e) In the case of an information statement alleging that a previously filed record was filed wrongfully and that it should have been rejected pursuant to Section 36‑9‑516(b)(8) or (9), the Secretary of State, without undue delay, shall determine if the contested record was filed wrongfully and should have been rejected. To determine if the record was filed wrongfully, the Secretary of State may require the person filing the information statement and the secured party to provide additional relevant information requested by the Secretary of State including an original or a copy of a security agreement that is related to the record. If the Secretary of State finds that the record was filed wrongfully and should have been rejected pursuant to Section 36‑9‑516(b)(8) or (9), the Secretary of State shall cancel the record and it is void and of no effect.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12; 2005 Act No. 161, Section 37.C, eff upon approval (became law without the Governor’s signature on June 9, 2005); 2013 Act No. 96, Section 16, eff July 1, 2013.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. New.

2. Information Statements. Former Article 9 did not afford a nonjudicial means for a debtor to indicate that a financing statement or other record was inaccurate or wrongfully filed. Subsection (a) affords the debtor the right to file an information statement. Among other requirements, the information statement must provide the basis for the debtor’s belief that the public record should be corrected. See subsection (b). These provisions, which resemble the analogous remedy in the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S. C. ‘1681i, afford an aggrieved person the opportunity to state its position on the public record. They do not permit an aggrieved person to change the legal effect of the public record. Thus, although a filed information statement becomes part of the “financing statement,” as defined in Section 9‑102, the filing does not affect the effectiveness of the initial financing statement or any other filed record. See subsection (e). Sometimes a person files a termination statement or other record relating to a filed financing statement without being entitled to do so. A secured party of record with respect to the financing statement who believes that such a record has been filed may, but need not, file an information statement indicating that the person that filed the record was not entitled to do so. See subsection (c). An information statement has no legal effect. Its sole purpose is to provide some limited public notice that the efficacy of a filed record is disputed. If the person that filed the record was not entitled to do so, the filed record is ineffective, regardless of whether the secured party of record files an information statement. Likewise, if the person that filed the record was entitled to do so, the filed record is effective, even if the secured party of record—even one who is aware of the unauthorized filing of a record—has no duty to file one. Just as searchers bear the burden of determining whether the filing of initial financing statement was authorized, searchers bear the burden of determining whether the filing of every subsequent record was authorized. Inasmuch as the filing of an information statement has no legal effect, this section does not provide a mechanism by which a secured party can correct an error that it discovers in its own financing statement.

This Section does not displace other provisions of this Article that impose liability for making unauthorized filings or failing to file or send a termination statement (see Section 9‑625(e)), nor does it displace any available judicial remedies.

3. Resort to Other Law. This Article cannot provide a satisfactory or complete solution to problems caused by misuse of the public records. The problem of “bogus” filings is not limited to the UCC filing system but extends to the real‑property records, as well. A summary judicial procedure for correcting the public record and criminal penalties for those who misuse the filing and recording systems are likely to be more effective and put less strain on the filing system than provisions authorizing or requiring action by filing and recording offices.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Under Section 36‑9‑518 a person who believes that a record indexed under the person’s name is inaccurate or was wrongfully filed can file a correction statement. A correction statement sets forth the basis for the person’s belief that the filed record is inaccurate or improperly filed. The filing of a correction statement does not affect the effectiveness of an initial financing statement or other filed record.

The 2013 amendments provide for the filing of “information statements” instead of “correction statements.” Under revised Section 36‑9‑518, both debtors and secured parties of record may file information statements.

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|  | Definitional Cross: |  |
| “Correction statement” | | Section 36‑9‑518(b) |
| “File number” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(36) |
| “Filing office” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(37) |
| “Financing statement” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(39) |
| “Person” | | Section 36‑1‑201(3) |
| “Record” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(70) |
|  | Cross— |  |

Grounds on which filing office is required to refuse to accept a record for filing. Section 36‑9‑516(b).

Debtor’s right to recover damages for an unauthorized filing or the refusal to send or file a termination statement. Section 36‑9‑625(b), (c)(3), and (4).

Effect of Amendment

The 2005 amendment added subsection (d) relating to records wrongly filed.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 92.1.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak92.1.

Subpart 2

Duties and Operation of Filing Office

**SECTION 36‑9‑519.** Numbering, maintaining, and indexing records; communicating information provided in records.

(a) For each record filed in a filing office, the filing office shall:

(1) assign a unique number to the filed record;

(2) create a record that bears the number assigned to the filed record and the date and time of filing;

(3) maintain the filed record for public inspection; and

(4) index the filed record in accordance with subsections (c), (d), and (e).

(b) A file number assigned after January 1, 2002, must include a digit that:

(1) is mathematically derived from or related to the other digits of the file number; and

(2) aids the filing office in determining whether a number communicated as the file number includes a single‑digit or transpositional error.

(c) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (d) and (e), the filing office shall:

(1) index an initial financing statement according to the name of the debtor and index all filed records relating to the initial financing statement in a manner that associates with one another an initial financing statement and all filed records relating to the initial financing statement; and

(2) index a record that provides a name of a debtor which was not previously provided in the financing statement to which the record relates also according to the name that was not previously provided.

(d) If a financing statement is filed as a fixture filing or covers as‑extracted collateral or timber to be cut, it must be filed for record and the filing office shall index it:

(1) under the names of the debtor and of each owner of record shown on the financing statement as if they were the mortgagors under a mortgage of the real property described; and

(2) to the extent that the law of this State provides for indexing of records of mortgages under the name of the mortgagee, under the name of the secured party as if the secured party were the mortgagee thereunder, or, if indexing is by description, as if the financing statement were a record of a mortgage of the real property described.

(e) If a financing statement is filed as a fixture filing or covers as‑extracted collateral or timber to be cut, the filing office shall index an assignment filed under Section 36‑9‑514(a) or an amendment filed under Section 36‑9‑514(b):

(1) under the name of the assignor as grantor; and

(2) to the extent that the law of this State provides for indexing a record of the assignment of a mortgage under the name of the assignee.

(f) The filing office shall maintain a capability:

(1) to retrieve a record by the name of the debtor and:

(A) if the filing office is described in Section 36‑9‑501(a)(1), by the file number assigned to the initial financing statement to which the record relates and the date and time that the record was filed or recorded; or

(B) if the filing office is described in Section 36‑9‑501(a)(2), by the file number assigned to the initial financing statement to which the record relates; and

(2) to associate and retrieve with one another an initial financing statement and each filed record relating to the initial financing statement.

(g) The filing office may not remove a debtor’s name from the index until one year after the effectiveness of a financing statement naming the debtor lapses under Section 36‑9‑515 with respect to all secured parties of record.

(h) The filing office shall perform the acts required by subsections (a) through (e) at the time and in the manner prescribed by filing‑office rule, but not later than two business days after the filing office receives the record in question.

(i) Subsections (b) and (h) do not apply to a filing office described in Section 36‑9‑501(a)(1).

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Sections 9‑403(4), (7), 9‑405(2).

2. Filing Office’s Duties. Subsections (a) through (e) set forth the duties of the filing office with respect to filed records. Subsection (h), which is new, imposes a minimum standard of performance for those duties. Prompt indexing is crucial to the effectiveness of any filing system. An accepted but un‑indexed record affords no public notice. Subsection (f) requires the filing office to maintain appropriate storage and retrieval facilities, and subsection (g) contains minimum requirements for the retention of records.

3. File Number. Subsection (a)(1) requires the filing office to assign a unique number to each filed record. That number is the “file number” only if the record is an initial financing statement. See Section 9‑102.

4. Time of Filing. Subsection (a)(2) and Section 9‑523 refer to the “date and time” of filing. The statutory text does not contain any instructions to a filing office as to how the time of filing is to be determined. The method of determining or assigning a time of filing is an appropriate matter for filing‑office rules to address.

5. Related Records. Subsections (c) and (f) are designed to ensure that an initial financing statement and all filed records relating to it are associated with one another, indexed under the name of the debtor, and retrieved together. To comply with subsection (f), a filing office (other than a real‑property recording office in a State that enacts subsection (f), Alternative B) must be capable of retrieving records in each of two ways: by the name of the debtor and by the file number of the initial financing statement to which the record relates.

6. Prohibition on Deleting Names from Index. This Article contemplates that the filing office will not delete the name of a debtor from the index until at least one year passes after the effectiveness of the financing statement lapses as to all secured parties of record. See subsection (g). This rule applies even if the filing office accepts an amendment purporting to delete or modify the name of a debtor or terminate the effectiveness of the financing statement. If an amendment provides a modified name for a debtor, the amended name should be added to the index, see subsection (c)(2), but the pre‑amendment name should remain in the index.

Compared to former Article 9, the rule in subsection (g) increases the amount of information available to those who search the public records. The rule also contemplates that searchers‑not the filing office‑will determine the significance and effectiveness of filed records.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑519 defines the duties of a filing office with respect to each record filed in the filing office. Subsection (a) sets forth the basic duties to assign a unique number to each filed record, to create a record that provides the time of filing for each numbered record, to maintain the filed record for public inspection, and to index the filed record. Subsections (c)—(e) set forth the requirements for indexing. Subsection (f) sets forth the required retrieval capacity of the filing office.

Subsection (h) requires the Secretary of State’s office to number, index, and make a filed record available for public inspection not later than two business days after the office receives the record. A delay in performing these duties, however, may be excused under Section 36‑9‑524. Under subsection (i) the two business day requirement does not apply to a real property related filing filed locally in a Register of Deeds office.

Subsection (g) precludes the filing office from removing a debtor’s name from the index until one year after the effectiveness of a financing statement filed against the debtor has lapsed.

Definitional Cross References:

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| “As‑extracted collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(6) |
| “Debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “File number” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(36) |
| “Filing office” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(37) |
| “Filing office rule” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(38) |
| “Financing statement” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(39) |
| “Fixture filing” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(40) |
| “Mortgage” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(55) |
| “Record” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(69) |

Cross References—

1. Name of the debtor. Section 36‑9‑503.

2. Duration of effectiveness of a filed financing statement. Section 36‑9‑515.

3. Grounds for excusing a delay by a filing office. Section 36‑9‑524.

4. The Secretary of State is required to adopt filing‑office rules to implement Article 9. Section 36‑9‑526.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 92.1.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak92.1.

**SECTION 36‑9‑520.** Acceptance and refusal to accept record.

(a) A filing office shall refuse to accept a record for filing for a reason set forth in Section 36‑9‑516(b) and may refuse to accept a record for filing only for a reason set forth in Section 36‑9‑516(b).

(b) If a filing office refuses to accept a record for filing, it shall communicate to the person that presented the record the fact of and reason for the refusal and the date and time the record would have been filed had the filing office accepted it. The communication must be made at the time and in the manner prescribed by filing‑office rule but, in the case of a filing office described in Section 36‑9‑501(a)(2), in no event more than two business days after the filing office receives the record.

(c) A filed financing statement satisfying Section 36‑9‑502(a) and (b) is effective, even if the filing office is required to refuse to accept it for filing under subsection (a). However, Section 36‑9‑338 applies to a filed financing statement providing information described in Section 36‑9‑516(b)(5) which is incorrect at the time the financing statement is filed.

(d) If a record communicated to a filing office provides information that relates to more than one debtor, this part applies as to each debtor separately.

(e)(1) If the Secretary of State refuses to accept a record for filing pursuant to Section 36‑9‑516 (b)(8) or (9) or cancels a wrongfully filed record pursuant to Section 36‑9‑518(d) the secured party may file an appeal within thirty days after the refusal or cancellation in the Administrative Law Court consistent with the Administrative Law Court rules.

(2) The Administrative Law Court’s final decision may be appealed as in accordance with Administrative Law Court rules.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12; 2005 Act No. 161, Section 37.D, eff upon approval (became law without the Governor’s signature on June 9, 2005).

Effect of Amendment

The 2005 amendment added subsection (e) relating to appeals from the Secretary of State’s refusal to file or cancellation of filing.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. New.

2. Refusal to Accept Record for Filing. In some States, filing offices considered themselves obligated by former Article 9 to review the form and content of a financing statement and to refuse to accept those that they determine are legally insufficient. Some filing offices imposed requirements for or conditions to filing that do not appear in the statute. Under this Section, the filing office is not expected to make legal judgments and is not permitted to impose additional conditions or requirements.

Subsection (a) both prescribes and limits the bases upon which the filing office must and may reject records by reference to the reasons set forth in Section 9‑516(b). For the most part, the bases for rejection are limited to those that prevent the filing office from dealing with a record that it receives‑because some of the requisite information (e.g., the debtor’s name) is missing or cannot be deciphered, because the record is not communicated by a method (e.g., it is MIME‑ rather than UU‑encoded) or medium (e.g., it is written rather than electronic) that the filing office accepts, or because the filer fails to tender an amount equal to or greater than the filing fee.

3. Consequences of Accepting Rejectable Record. Section 9‑516(b) includes among the reasons for rejecting an initial financing statement the failure to give certain information that is not required as a condition of effectiveness. In conjunction with Section 9‑516(b)(5), this Section requires the filing office to refuse to accept a financing statement that is legally sufficient to perfect a security interest under Section 9‑502 but does not contain a mailing address for the debtor, does not disclose whether the debtor is an individual or an organization (e.g., a partnership or corporation) or, if the debtor is an organization, does not give certain specified information concerning the organization. The information required by Section 9‑516(b)(5) assists searchers in weeding out “false positives,” i.e., records that a search reveals but which do not pertain to the debtor in question. It assists filers by helping to ensure that the debtor’s name is correct and that the financing statement is filed in the proper jurisdiction.

If the filing office accepts a financing statement that does not give this information at all, the filing is fully effective. Section 9‑520(c). The financing statement also generally is effective if the information is given but is incorrect; however, Section 9‑338 affords protection to buyers and holders of perfected security interests who gives value in reasonable reliance upon the incorrect information.

4. Filing Office’s Duties with Respect to Rejected Record. Subsection (b) requires the filing office to communicate the fact of rejection and the reason therefore within a fixed period of time. Inasmuch as a rightfully rejected record is ineffective and a wrongfully rejected record is not fully effective, prompt communication concerning any rejection is important.

5. Partial Effectiveness of Record. Under subsection (d), the provisions of this Part apply to each debtor separately. Thus, a filing office may reject an initial financing statement or other record as to one named debtor but accept it as to the other.

Example: An initial financing statement is communicated to the filing office. The financing statement names two debtors, John Smith and Jane Smith. It contains all of the information described in Section 9‑516(b)(5) with respect to John but lacks some of the information with respect to Jane. The filing office must accept the financing statement with respect to John, reject it with respect to Jane, and notify the filer of the rejection.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Subsection (a) requires a filing office to refuse to accept for filing any record that does not meet the requirements of Section 36‑9‑516(b). Subsection (a) further establishes that a failure to meet the requirements of Section 36‑9‑516 (b) is the only basis on which a filing office may properly refuse to accept a record for filing.

If a filing office refuses to accept a record for filing, subsection (b) requires the filing office to communicate the fact of and the reason for its refusal to the person who presented the record. The communication must also note the date and time the record would have been filed if it had been accepted. Filing office rules to be adopted by the Secretary of State will define the time and manner of the communication. Nevertheless, subsection (b) requires the Secretary of State’s Office to make the communication within two business days after it receives the record. A delay in communicating, however, may be excused under Section 36‑9‑524.

Subsection (c) provides that if a filing office accepts and files a record that is sufficient under Section 9‑502(a) and (b) but fails to meet the requirements of Section 36‑9‑516(b), the filing is effective. Section 36‑9‑338, however, may limit the priority of a security interest perfected in this manner.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Communicate” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(18) |
| “Debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “Filing office” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(37) |
| “Filing office rule” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(38) |
| “Financing statement” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(39) |
| “Person” | Section 36‑9‑201(30) |
| “Record” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(69) |

Cross References—

1. Requirements for a sufficient financing statement. Section 36‑9‑502(a) and (b).

2. Grounds on which a filing office is required to refuse to accept a record for filing. Section 36‑9‑516(b).

3. Adoption of filing‑office rules. Section 36‑9‑526.

4. Excuse of delay by filing office in communicating fact of and basis for refusing to accept a record for filing. Section 36‑9‑524.

5. Effect of a record that a filing office improperly refuses to accept for filing. Section 36‑9‑516(d).

6. Limitation upon priority of a security interest perfected by a filing that contains incorrect information required under Section 36‑9‑516(b)(5). Section 36‑9‑338.

**SECTION 36‑9‑521.** Uniform form of written financing statement and amendment.

(a) A filing office that accepts written records may not refuse to accept a written initial financing statement in the following form and format except for a reason set forth in Section 36‑9‑516(b):

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|  |  |
| UCC FINANCING STATEMENT | |
| FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS | |
| A. NAME & PHONE OF CONTACT AT FILER (optional) | |
|  | |
| B. EMAIL CONTACT AT FILER (optional) | |
|  | |
| C. SEND ACKNOWLEDGMENT TO: (Name and Address) | |
|  | |
| THE ABOVE SPACE IS FOR | |
| FILING OFFICE USE ONLY | |
| 1. DEBTOR’S NAME: Provide only one Debtor name (1a or 1b) (use exact, full name; do not omit, modify, or abbreviate any part of the Debtor’ s name); if any part of the Individual Debtor’s name will not fit in line 1b, leave all of item 1 blank, check here [ ] and provide the Individual Debtor information in item 10 of the Financing Statement Addendum (Form UCC1Ad) | |
| 1a. ORGANIZATION’S NAME | |
|  | |
| 1b. INDIVIDUAL’S SURNAME | FIRST PERSONAL NAME |
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| ADDITIONAL NAME(S)/INITIAL(S) THAT ARE PART OF THE NAME OF THIS | |
| DEBTOR | SUFFIX |
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| 1c. MAILING ADDRESS | | | |
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| CITY | STATE | POSTAL CODE | COUNTRY |
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| 2. DEBTOR’S NAME: Provide only one Debtor name (2a or 2b) (use exact, full name; do not omit, modify, or abbreviate any part of the Debtor’ s name); if any part of the Individual Debtor’s name will not fit in line 2b, leave all of item 2 blank, check here [ ] and provide the Individual Debtor information in item 10 of the Financing Statement Addendum (Form UCC1Ad) | | | |
| 2a. ORGANIZATION’S NAME | | | |
|  | | | |
| OR | | | |

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| 2b. INDIVIDUAL’S SURNAME | FIRST PERSONAL NAME |
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| ADDITIONAL NAME(S)/INITIAL(S) THAT ARE PART OF THE NAME OF THIS | |
| DEBTOR | SUFFIX |
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| 2c. MAILING ADDRESS | |
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| CITY | STATE | POSTAL CODE | COUNTRY |
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| 3. SECURED PARTY’S NAME (or NAME of ASSIGNEE of ASSIGNOR SECURED PARTY): Provide only one Secured Party name (3a or 3b) | | | |
| 3a. ORGANIZATION’S NAME | | | |
|  | | | |
| OR | | | |

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| 3b. INDIVIDUAL’S SURNAME | FIRST PERSONAL NAME |
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| 3c. MAILING ADDRESS | |
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| CITY | STATE | POSTAL CODE | COUNTRY |
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| 4. COLLATERAL: This financing statement covers the following collateral: | | | |
|  | | | |
| 5. Check only if applicable and check only one box: | | | |
| Collateral is | | | |
| [ ] held in a Trust (see UCC1Ad, Item 17 and Instructions) | | | |
| [ ] being administered by a Decedent’s Personal Representative | | | |
| 6a. Check only if applicable and check only one box: | | | |
| [ ] Public‑Finance Transaction | | | |
| [ ] Manufactured‑Home Transaction | | | |
| [ ] A Debtor is a Transmitting Utility | | | |
| 6b. Check only if applicable and check only one box: | | | |
| [ ] Agricultural Lien | | | |
| [ ] Non‑UCC Filing | | | |
| 7. ALTERNATIVE DESIGNATION (if applicable): | | | |
| [ ] Lessee/Lessor | | | |
| [ ] Consignee/Consignor | | | |
| [ ] Seller/Buyer | | | |
| [ ] Bailee/Bailor | | | |
| [ ] Licensee/Licensor | | | |
| 8. OPTIONAL FILER REFERENCE DATA: | | | |
|  | | | |
| [UCC FINANCING STATEMENT (Form UCC1)] | | | |
| UCC FINANCING STATEMENT ADDENDUM | | | |
| FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS | | | |
| 9. NAME OF FIRST DEBTOR: Same as item 1a or 1b on Financing Statement; if line 1b was left blank because Individual Debtor name did not fit, check here [ ] | | | |
| 9a. ORGANIZATION’S NAME | | | |
|  | | | |
| OR | | | |
| 9b. INDIVIDUAL’S SURNAME | | | |
|  | | | |
| FIRST PERSONAL NAME | | | |
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| ADDITIONAL NAME(S)/INITIAL(S) | SUFFIX |
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| THE ABOVE SPACE IS FOR | |
| FILING OFFICE USE ONLY | |
| 10. DEBTOR’S NAME: Provide (10a or 10b) only one additional Debtor name or Debtor name that did not fit in line 1b or 2b of the Financing Statement (Form UCC1)(use exact, full name; do not omit, modify, or abbreviate any part of the Debtor’s name) and enter the mailing address in line 10c | |
| 10a. ORGANIZATION’S NAME | |
|  | |
| OR | |
| 10b. INDIVIDUAL’S SURNAME | FIRST PERSONAL NAME |
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| ADDITIONAL NAME(S)/INITIAL(S) THAT ARE PART OF THE NAME OF THIS | |
| DEBTOR | SUFFIX |
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| 10c. MAILING ADDRESS | |
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| CITY | STATE | POSTAL CODE | COUNTRY |
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| 11. [ ] ADDITIONAL SECURED PARTY’S NAME or | | | |
| [ ] ASSIGNOR SECURED PARTY’S NAME: Provide only one name (11a or 11b) | | | |
| 11a. ORGANIZATION’S NAME | | | |
|  | | | |
| OR | | | |

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| 11b. INDIVIDUAL’S SURNAME | FIRST PERSONAL NAME |
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| 11c. MAILING ADDRESS | |
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| CITY | STATE | POSTAL CODE | COUNTRY |
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| 12. ADDITIONAL SPACE FOR ITEM 4 (Collateral) | | | |
|  | | | |
| 13. [ ] This FINANCING STATEMENT is to be filed [for record] (or recorded) in the REAL ESTATE RECORDS (if applicable) | | | |
| 14. This FINANCING STATEMENT: | | | |
| [ ] covers timber to be cut [ ] covers as‑extracted collateral [ ] is filed as a fixture filing | | | |
| 15. Name and address of a RECORD OWNER of real estate described in item 16 (if Debtor does not have a record interest): | | | |
|  | | | |
| 16. DESCRIPTION OF REAL ESTATE | | | |
|  | | | |
| 17. MISCELLANEOUS | | | |
|  | | | |
| [UCC FINANCING STATEMENT ADDENDUM (Form UCC1Ad)] | | | |
| (b) A filing office that accepts written records may not refuse to accept a written record in the following form and format except for a reason set forth in Section 36‑9‑516(b): | | | |
| UCC FINANCING STATEMENT AMENDMENT | | | |
| FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS | | | |
| A. NAME & PHONE OF CONTACT AT FILER (optional) | | | |
|  | | | |
| B. EMAIL CONTACT AT FILER (optional) | | | |
|  | | | |
| C. SEND ACKNOWLEDGMENT TO: (Name and Address) | | | |
|  | | | |
| THE ABOVE SPACE IS FOR | | | |
| FILING OFFICE USE ONLY | | | |
| 1a. INITIAL FINANCING STATEMENT FILE NUMBER | | | |
|  | | | |
| 1b. [ ] This FINANCING STATEMENT AMENDMENT is to be filed [for record] (or recorded) in the REAL ESTATE RECORDS | | | |
| Filer: attach Amendment Addendum (Form UCC3Ad) and provide Debtor’ s name in item 13 | | | |
| 2. [ ] TERMINATION: Effectiveness of the Financing Statement identified above is terminated with respect to the security interest(s) of Secured Party authorizing this Termination Statement | | | |
| 3. [ ] ASSIGNMENT (full or partial): Provide name of Assignee in item 7a or 7b, and address of Assignee in item 7c and name of Assignor in item 9 For partial assignment, complete items 7 and 9 and also indicate affected collateral in item 8 | | | |
| 4. [ ] CONTINUATION: Effectiveness of the Financing Statement identified above with respect to the security interest(s) of Secured Party authorizing this Continuation Statement is continued for the additional period provided by applicable law | | | |
| 5. [ ] PARTY INFORMATION CHANGE: | | | |
| Check one of these two boxes: | | | |
| This Change affects [ ] Debtor or [ ] Secured Party of record | | | |
| AND | | | |
| Check one of these three boxes to: | | | |
| [ ] CHANGE name and/or address: Complete item 6a or 6b; and item 7a or 7b and item 7c | | | |
| [ ] ADD name: Complete item 7a or 7b, and item 7c | | | |
| [ ] DELETE name: Give record name to be deleted in item 6a or 6b | | | |
| 6. CURRENT RECORD INFORMATION: Complete for Party Information Change—provide only one name (6a or 6b) | | | |
| 6a. ORGANIZATION’S NAME | | | |
|  | | | |
| OR | | | |

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| 6b. INDIVIDUAL’S SURNAME | FIRST PERSONAL NAME |
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| ADDITIONAL NAME(S)/INITIAL(S) | SUFFIX |
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| 7. CHANGED OR ADDED INFORMATION: Complete for Assignment or Party Information Change—provide only one name (7a or 7b) (use exact full name; do not omit, modify, or abbreviate any part of the Debtor’s name) | |
| 7a. ORGANIZATION’S NAME | |
|  | |
| OR | |
| 7b. INDIVIDUAL’S SURNAME | FIRST PERSONAL NAME |
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| ADDITIONAL NAME(S)/INITIAL(S) THAT ARE PART OF THE NAME OF THIS | |
| DEBTOR | SUFFIX |
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| 7c. MAILING ADDRESS | |
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| 8. [ ] COLLATERAL CHANGE: | | | |
| Also check one of these four boxes: | | | |
| [ ] ADD collateral | | | |
| [ ] DELETE collateral | | | |
| [ ] RESTATE covered collateral | | | |
| [ ] ASSIGN collateral | | | |
| Indicate collateral: | | | |
| 9. NAME OF SECURED PARTY OF RECORD AUTHORIZING THIS AMENDMENT: Provide only one name (9a or 9b) (name of Assignor, if this is an Assignment) | | | |
| If this is an Amendment authorized by a DEBTOR, check here [ ] and provide name of authorizing Debtor | | | |
| 9a. ORGANIZATION’S NAME | | | |
|  | | | |
| OR | | | |

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| 9b. INDIVIDUAL’S SURNAME | FIRST PERSONAL NAME |
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| ADDITIONAL NAME(S)/INITIAL(S) | SUFFIX |
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| 10. OPTIONAL FILER REFERENCE DATA | |
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| [UCC FINANCING STATEMENT AMENDMENT (Form UCC3)] | |
| UCC FINANCING STATEMENT AMENDMENT ADDENDUM FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS | |
| 11. INITIAL FINANCING STATEMENT FILE NUMBER: Same as item 1a on Amendment form | |
|  | |
| 12. NAME OF PARTY AUTHORIZING THIS AMENDMENT: Same as item 9 on Amendment form | |
| 12a. ORGANIZATION’S NAME | |
|  | |
| OR | |
| 12b. INDIVIDUAL’S SURNAME | FIRST PERSONAL NAME |
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| ADDITIONAL NAME(S)/INITIAL(S) | SUFFIX |
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| THE ABOVE SPACE IS FOR | |
| FILING OFFICE USE ONLY | |
| 13. Name of DEBTOR on related financing statement (Name of a current Debtor of record required for indexing purposes only in some filing offices—see Instruction item 13): Provide only one Debtor name (13a or 13b) (use exact, full name; do not omit, modify, or abbreviate any part of the Debtor’s name); see Instructions if name does not fit | |
| 13a. ORGANIZATION’S NAME | |
|  | |
| OR | |
| 13b. INDIVIDUAL’S SURNAME | FIRST PERSONAL NAME |
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| ADDITIONAL NAME(S)/INITIAL(S) | SUFFIX |
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| 14. ADDITIONAL SPACE FOR ITEM 8 (Collateral) | |
|  | |
| 15. This FINANCING STATEMENT AMENDMENT: [ ] covers timber to be cut [ ] covers as‑extracted collateral [ ] is filed as a fixture filing | |
| 16. Name and address of a RECORD OWNER of real estate described in item 17 (if Debtor does not have a record interest): | |
|  | |
| 17. DESCRIPTION OF REAL ESTATE | |
|  | |
| 18. MISCELLANEOUS | |
|  | |
| [UCC FINANCING STATEMENT AMENDMENT ADDENDUM (Form UCC3Ad)] | |
| UCC FINANCING STATEMENT AMENDMENT | |
| FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS | |
| A. NAME & PHONE OF CONTACT AT FILER (optional) | |
|  | |
| B. EMAIL CONTACT AT FILER (optional) | |
|  | |
| C. SEND ACKNOWLEDGMENT TO: (Name and Address) | |
|  | |
| THE ABOVE SPACE IS FOR | |
| FILING OFFICE USE ONLY | |
| 1a. INITIAL FINANCING STATEMENT FILE NUMBER | |
|  | |
| 1b. [ ] This FINANCING STATEMENT AMENDMENT is to be filed [for record] (or recorded) in the REAL ESTATE RECORDS | |
| Filer: attach Amendment Addendum (Form UCC3Ad) and provide Debtor’ s name in item 13 | |
| 2. [ ] TERMINATION: Effectiveness of the Financing Statement identified above is terminated with respect to the security interest(s) of Secured Party authorizing this Termination Statement | |
| 3. [ ] ASSIGNMENT (full or partial): Provide name of Assignee in item 7a or 7b, and address of Assignee in item 7c and name of Assignor in item 9 For partial assignment, complete items 7 and 9 and also indicate affected collateral in item 8 | |
| 4. [ ] CONTINUATION: Effectiveness of the Financing Statement identified above with respect to the security interest(s) of Secured Party authorizing this Continuation Statement is continued for the additional period provided by applicable law | |
| 5. [ ] PARTY INFORMATION CHANGE: | |
| Check one of these two boxes: | |
| This Change affects [ ] Debtor or [ ] Secured Party of record | |
| AND | |
| Check one of these three boxes to: | |
| [ ] CHANGE name and/or address: Complete item 6a or 6b; and item 7a or 7b and item 7c | |
| [ ] ADD name: Complete item 7a or 7b, and item 7c | |
| [ ] DELETE name: Give record name to be deleted in item 6a or 6b | |
| 6. CURRENT RECORD INFORMATION: Complete for Party Information Change—provide only one name (6a or 6b) | |
| 6a. ORGANIZATION’S NAME | |
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| OR | |
| 6b. INDIVIDUAL’S SURNAME | FIRST PERSONAL NAME |
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| 7. CHANGED OR ADDED INFORMATION: Complete for Assignment or Party Information Change—provide only one name (7a or 7b) (use exact full name; do not omit, modify, or abbreviate any part of the Debtor’s name) | |
| 7a. ORGANIZATION’S NAME | |
|  | |
| OR | |
| 7b. INDIVIDUAL’S SURNAME | FIRST PERSONAL NAME |
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| ADDITIONAL NAME(S)/INITIAL(S) THAT ARE PART OF THE NAME OF THIS | |
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| 7c. MAILING ADDRESS | |
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| CITY | STATE | POSTAL CODE | COUNTRY |
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| 8. [ ] COLLATERAL CHANGE: | | | |
| Also check one of these four boxes: | | | |
| [ ] ADD collateral | | | |
| [ ] DELETE collateral | | | |
| [ ] RESTATE covered collateral | | | |
| [ ] ASSIGN collateral | | | |
| Indicate collateral: | | | |
| 9. NAME OF SECURED PARTY OF RECORD AUTHORIZING THIS AMENDMENT: Provide only one name (9a or 9b) (name of Assignor, if this is an Assignment) | | | |
| If this is an Amendment authorized by a DEBTOR, check here [ ] and provide name of authorizing Debtor | | | |
| 9a. ORGANIZATION’S NAME | | | |
|  | | | |
| OR | | | |

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| 9b. INDIVIDUAL’S SURNAME | FIRST PERSONAL NAME |
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| ADDITIONAL NAME(S)/INITIAL(S) | SUFFIX |
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| 10. OPTIONAL FILER REFERENCE DATA | |
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| [UCC FINANCING STATEMENT AMENDMENT (Form UCC3)] | |
| UCC FINANCING STATEMENT AMENDMENT ADDENDUM | |
| FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS | |
| 11. INITIAL FINANCING STATEMENT FILE NUMBER: Same as item 1a on Amendment form | |
|  | |
| 12. NAME OF PARTY AUTHORIZING THIS AMENDMENT: | |
| Same as item 9 on Amendment form | |
| 12a. ORGANIZATION’S NAME | |
|  | |
| OR | |
| 12b. INDIVIDUAL’S SURNAME | FIRST PERSONAL NAME |
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|  |  |
| THE ABOVE SPACE IS FOR | |
| FILING OFFICE USE ONLY | |
| 13. Name of DEBTOR on related financing statement (Name of a current Debtor of record required for indexing purposes only in some filing offices—see Instruction item 13): Provide only one Debtor name (13a or 13b) (use exact, full name; do not omit, modify, or abbreviate any part of the Debtor’s name); see Instructions if name does not fit | |
| 13a. ORGANIZATION’S NAME | |
|  | |
| OR | |
| 13b. INDIVIDUAL’S SURNAME | FIRST PERSONAL NAME |
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| ADDITIONAL NAME(S)/INITIAL(S) | SUFFIX |
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| 14. ADDITIONAL SPACE FOR ITEM 8 (Collateral) | |
|  | |
| 15. This FINANCING STATEMENT AMENDMENT: [ ] covers timber to be cut [ ] covers as‑extracted collateral [ ] is filed as a fixture filing | |
| 16. Name and address of a RECORD OWNER of real estate described in item 17 (if Debtor does not have a record interest): | |
|  | |
| 17. DESCRIPTION OF REAL ESTATE | |
|  | |
| 18. MISCELLANEOUS | |
|  | |
| [UCC FINANCING STATEMENT AMENDMENT ADDENDUM (Form UCC3Ad)] | |

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12; 2013 Act No. 96, Section 17, eff July 1, 2013.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. New.

2. “Safe Harbor” Written Forms. Although Section 9‑520 limits the bases upon which the filing office can refuse to accept records, this Section provides sample written forms that must be accepted in every filing office in the country, as long as the filing office’s rules permit it to accept written communications. By completing one of the forms in this Section, a secured party can be certain that the filing office is obligated to accept it.

The forms in this Section are based upon national financing statement forms that were in use under former Article 9. Those forms were developed over an extended period and reflect the comments and suggestions of filing officers, secured parties and their counsel, and service companies. The formatting of those forms and of the ones in this Section has been designed to reduce error by both filers and filing offices.

A filing office that accepts written communications may not reject, on grounds of form or format, a filing using these forms. Although filers are not required to use the forms, they are encouraged and can be expected to do so, inasmuch as the forms are well designed and avoid the risk of rejection on the basis of form or format. As their use expands, the forms will rapidly become familiar to both filers and filing‑office personnel. Filing offices may and should encourage the use of these forms by declaring them to be the “standard” (but not exclusive) forms for each jurisdiction, albeit without in any way suggesting that alternative forms are unacceptable.

The multi‑purpose form in subsection (b) covers changes with respect to the debtor, the secured party, the collateral, and the status of the financing statement (termination and continuation). A single form may be used for several different types of amendments at once (e.g., both to change a debtor’ s name and continue the effectiveness of the financing statement).

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑521 sets forth forms that a filing office is required to accept provided that the office accepts written records and the forms include the information required under Section 36‑9‑516(b).

Effect of Amendment

The 2013 amendment rewrote the section.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 92.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak92.

Attorney General’s Opinions

Clerks of court and registers of mesne conveyances should file whatever is presented as a financing statement, regardless of form or sufficiency of such, and charge the appropriate filing fee according to whether the statement is a conforming or nonconforming one. 1967‑68 Op Atty Gen, No 2605, p 329.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 1

1. In general

Considering Sections 36‑9‑203, 36‑9‑402 and 36‑9‑110 of the Uniform Commercial Code, both the security agreement and the financing statement must contain a sufficient description of the land on which crops are to be grown, to make possible the identification of the thing described. Citizens Bank v. Gregory’s Warehouse, Inc. (S.C.App. 1988) 297 S.C. 151, 375 S.E.2d 316. Secured Transactions 45; Secured Transactions 94

**SECTION 36‑9‑522.** Maintenance and destruction of records.

(a) The filing office shall maintain a record of the information provided in a filed financing statement for at least one year after the effectiveness of the financing statement has lapsed under Section 36‑9‑515 with respect to all secured parties of record. The record must be retrievable by using the name of the debtor and:

(1) if the record was filed or recorded in the filing office described in Section 36‑9‑501(a)(1), by using the file number assigned to the initial financing statement to which the record relates and the date and time that the record was filed or recorded; or

(2) if the record was filed in the filing office described in Section 36‑9‑501(a)(2), by using the file number assigned to the initial financing statement to which the record relates.

(b) Except to the extent that a statute governing disposition of public records provides otherwise, the filing office immediately may destroy any written record evidencing a financing statement. However, if the filing office destroys a written record, it shall maintain another record of the financing statement which complies with subsection (a).

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑403(3), revised substantially.

2. Maintenance of Records. Section 9‑523 requires the filing office to provide information concerning certain lapsed financing statements. Accordingly, subsection (a) requires the filing office to maintain a record of the information in a financing statement for at least one year after lapse. During that time, the filing office may not delete any information with respect to a filed financing statement; it may only add information. This approach relieves the filing office from any duty to determine whether to substitute or delete information upon receipt of an amendment. It also assures searchers that they will receive all information with respect to financing statements filed against a debtor and thereby be able themselves to determine the state of the public record.

The filing office may maintain this information in any medium. Subsection (b) permits the filing office immediately to destroy written records evidencing a financing statement, provided that the filing office maintains another record of the information contained in the financing statement as required by subsection (a).

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Subsection (a) provides that a filing office shall maintain a record of the information on a filed financing statement for at least one year after the financing has lapsed. Subject to statutes governing the disposition of public records, subsection (b) permits a filing office to destroy written records evidencing a financing statement if the filing office maintains another record which meets the requirements of subsection (a).

Definitional Cross References:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  |  |
| “Debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “Filing office” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(37) |
| “Financing statement” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(39) |
| “Record” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(69) |
| “Secured party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |

Cross References—

1. Duration and effectiveness of a financing statement. Section 36‑9‑515.

2. Prohibition upon a filing office removing a debtor’s name from an index until one year after the effectiveness of a financing statement naming the debtor has lapsed. Section 36‑9‑519(2).

3. Provisions of South Carolina Code relating to the destruction of public records. Sections 30‑1‑30, 30‑1‑110, 30‑1‑120, 30‑1‑130, S.C. Code Ann (1976 and Supp. 1999).

Attorney General’s Opinions

The Department of Archives may not destroy chattel mortgages or financial statements until such time as they either have been terminated or have lapsed. The statutory procedure of 36‑9‑403(3) determines when a financial statement will lapse, but the point at which a chattel mortgage will lapse can only be determined on a county‑by‑county basis, because of the variation in renewal periods. 1976‑77 Op Atty Gen, No 77‑221, p 170.

A chattel mortgage which was recorded prior to January 1, 1968, is to be continued or renewed as set forth in this section [Code 1962 Section 10.9‑403], just as if the uniform Commercial Code had not been enacted. 1967‑68 Op Atty Gen, No 2450, p 110.

**SECTION 36‑9‑523.** Information from filing office; sale or license of records.

(a) If a person that files a written record requests an acknowledgment of the filing, the filing office shall send to the person an image of the record showing the number assigned to the record pursuant to Section 36‑9‑519(a)(1) and the date and time of the filing of the record. However, if the person furnishes a copy of the record to the filing office, the filing office may instead:

(1) note upon the copy the number assigned to the record pursuant to Section 36‑9‑519(a)(1) and the date and time of the filing of the record; and

(2) send the copy to the person.

(b) If a person files a record other than a written record, the filing office shall communicate to the person an acknowledgment that provides:

(1) the information in the record;

(2) the number assigned to the record pursuant to Section 36‑9‑519(a)(1); and

(3) the date and time of the filing of the record.

(c) The Secretary of State’s office shall communicate or otherwise make available in a record the following information to any person that requests it:

(1) whether there is on file on a date and time specified by the filing office, but not a date earlier than three business days before the filing office receives the request, any financing statement that:

(A) designates a particular debtor or, if the request so states, designates a particular debtor at the address specified in the request;

(B) has not lapsed under Section 36‑9‑515 with respect to all secured parties of record; and

(C) if the request so states, has lapsed under Section 36‑9‑515 and a record of which is maintained by the filing office under Section 36‑9‑522(a);

(2) the date and time of filing of each financing statement; and

(3) the information provided in each financing statement.

(d) In complying with its duty under subsection (c), the filing office may communicate information in any medium. However, if requested, the filing office shall communicate information by issuing its written certificate or a record that can be admitted into evidence in the courts of this State without extrinsic evidence of its authenticity.

(e) The Secretary of State’s office described in Section 36‑9‑501(a)(2) shall perform the acts required by subsections (a) through (d) at the time and in the manner prescribed by filing‑office rule, but not later than two business days after the filing office receives the request.

(f) At least weekly, the filing office described in Section 36‑9‑501(a)(2) shall offer to sell or license to the public on a nonexclusive basis, in bulk, copies of all records filed in it under this part, in every medium from time to time available to the filing office.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑407; subsections (d) and (e) are new.

2. Filing Office’s Duty to Provide Information. Former Section 9‑407, dealing with obtaining information from the filing office, was bracketed to suggest to legislatures that its enactment was optional. Experience has shown that the method by which interested persons can obtain information concerning the public records should be uniform. Accordingly, the analogous provisions of this Article are not in brackets.

Most of the other changes from former Section 9‑407 are for clarification, to embrace medium‑neutral drafting, or to impose standards of performance on the filing office.

3. Acknowledgments of Filing. Subsections (a) and (b) require the filing office to acknowledge the filing of a record. Under subsection (a), the filing office is required to acknowledge the filing of a written record only upon request of the filer. Subsection (b) requires the filing office to acknowledge the filing of a non‑written record even in the absence of a request from the filer.

4. Response to Search Request. Subsection (c)(3) requires the filing office to provide “the information contained in each financing statement” to a person who requests it. This requirement can be satisfied by providing copies, images, or reports. The requirement does not in any manner inhibit the filing office from also offering to provide less than all of the information (presumably for a lower fee) to a person who asks for less. Thus, subsection (c) accommodates the practice of providing only the type of record (e.g., initial financing statement, continuation statement), number assigned to the record, date and time of filing, and names and addresses of the debtor and secured party when a requesting person asks for no more (i.e., when the person does not ask for copies of financing statements). In contrast, the filing office’s obligation under subsection (b) to provide an acknowledgment containing “the information contained in the record” is not defined by a customer’s request. Thus unless the filer stipulates otherwise, to comply with subsection (b) the filing office’s acknowledgment must contain all of the information in a record.

Subsection (c) assures that a minimum amount of information about filed records will be available to the public. It does not preclude a filing office from offering additional services.

5. Lapsed and Terminated Financing Statements. This Section reflects the policy that terminated financing statements will remain part of the filing office’s data base. The filing office may remove from the data base only lapsed financing statements, and then only when at least a year has passed after lapse. See Section 9‑519(g). Subsection (c)(1)(C) requires a filing office to conduct a search and report as to lapsed financing statements that have not been removed from the data base, when requested.

6. Search by Debtor’s Address. Subsection (c)(1)(A) contemplates that, by making a single request, a searcher will receive the results of a search of the entire public record maintained by any given filing office. Addition of the bracketed language in subsection (c)(1)(A) would permit a search report limited to financing statements showing a particular address for the debtor, but only if the search request is so limited. With or without the bracketed language, this subsection does not permit the filing office to compel a searcher to limit a request by address.

7. Medium of Communication; Certificates. Former Article 9 provided that the filing office respond to a request for information by providing a certificate. The principle of medium‑neutrality would suggest that the statute not require a written certificate. Subsection (d) follows this principle by permitting the filing office to respond by communicating “in any medium.” By permitting communication “in any medium,” subsection (d) is not inconsistent with a system in which persons other than filing office staff conduct searches of the filing office’s (computer) records.

Some searchers find it necessary to introduce the results of their search into evidence. Because official written certificates might be introduced into evidence more easily than official communications in another medium, subsection (d) affords States the option of requiring the filing office to issue written certificates upon request. The alternative bracketed language in subsection (d) recognizes that some States may prefer to permit the filing office to respond in another medium, as long as the response can be admitted into evidence in the courts of that State without extrinsic evidence of its authenticity.

8. Performance Standard. The utility of the filing system depends on the ability of searchers to get current information quickly. Accordingly, subsection (e) requires that the filing office respond to a request for information no later than two business days after it receives the request. The information contained in the response must be current as of a date no earlier than three business days before the filing office receives the request. See subsection (c)(1). The failure of the filing office to comply with performance standards, such as subsection (e), has no effect on the private rights of persons affected by the filing of records.

9. Sales of Records in Bulk. Subsection (f), which is new, mandates that the appropriate official or the filing office sell or license the filing records to the public in bulk, on a nonexclusive basis, in every medium available to the filing office. The details of implementation are left to filing‑office rules.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑523 sets forth the obligations of a filing office to acknowledge filings and respond to requests for information. Under subsection (a) a person who files a written record must request an acknowledgment. In contrast under subsection (b), the filing office is required to acknowledge the filing of a record submitted electronically. In either case, the acknowledgment must show the number assigned to the filing and the date and time of the filing.

Subsection (c) addresses the obligation of the filing office to respond to requests for information. Under this provision a person may request information on whether there are any financing statements filed against a named debtor or a debtor at a particular address on a date and time specified by the filing office. The date specified, however, cannot be earlier than three days before the filing office receives the request. If requested, the filing office must provide information on financing statements that have lapsed but are still on record as well as on financing statements that are effective. Subsection (c) does not require the filing office to provide a copy or image of filed financing statements. Under subsections (c)(2) and (3) the filing office meets its obligation by providing the date and time each financing statement was filed and the information in each financing statement.

Subsection (d) provides that the filing office can communicate information by any medium. But if so requested, the filing office is required to communicate information by issuing a written certificate or a record that can be admitted into evidence without extrinsic evidence of authenticity.

Subsection (e) requires the office of the Secretary of State to respond to requests for acknowledgments and for information in the manner and time prescribed in filing‑office rules, but not later than two business days after it receives the requests. South Carolina has adopted an inconsistent version of subsection (e) that does not require the Registers of Deeds to Act within a specified time.

Subsection (f) requires the Secretary of State’s office on a weekly basis to offer to sell or license in bulk copies of all records.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “Filing office” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(37) |
| “Filing‑office rule” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(88) |
| “Financing statement” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(39) |
| “Person” | Section 36‑1‑201(30) |
| “Record” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(69) |

Cross References—

1. Filing office’s obligation to number records accepted for filing. Section 36‑9‑519(a)(1).

2. Filing office’s obligation to maintain a record of the information provided in a filed financing statement for at least one year after the financing statement lapses. Section 36‑9‑522(a).

**SECTION 36‑9‑524.** Delay by filing office.

Delay by the filing office beyond a time limit prescribed by this part is excused if:

(1) the delay is caused by interruption of communication or computer facilities, war, emergency conditions, failure of equipment, or other circumstances beyond control of the filing office; and

(2) the filing office exercises reasonable diligence under the circumstances.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

Source. New; derived from Section 4‑109.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑524 excuses a failure of a filing office to act within the time limits provided in Part 5 if the delay resulted from certain causes beyond the control of the filing office and the filing office acted with reasonable diligence under the circumstances.

Definitional Cross References:

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| --- | --- |
|  |  |
| “Filing office” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(37) |

Cross References—

1. Time within which a filing office must number, make available for inspection, and index a filed record. Section 36‑9‑519(h).

2. Time within which a filing office must communicate the fact of and reason for refusing to accept a record for filing. Section 36‑9‑520(b).

3. Time within which a filing office must acknowledge filings and respond to requests for information. Section 36‑9‑523(e).

**SECTION 36‑9‑525.** Fees.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), the fee for filing and indexing a record under this part, other than an initial financing statement of the kind described in subsection (b), is the amount specified in subsection (c), if applicable, plus:

(1) eight dollars if the record is communicated in writing and consists of one or two pages;

(2) ten dollars if the record is communicated in writing and consists of three pages and one dollar for each additional page after the third page; and

(3) ten dollars if the record is communicated by another medium authorized by filing‑office rule.

(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), the fee for filing and indexing an initial financing statement of the following kind is the amount specified in subsection (c), if applicable, plus:

(1) twenty dollars if the financing statement indicates that it is filed in connection with a public‑finance transaction;

(2) twenty dollars if the financing statement indicates that it is filed in connection with a manufactured‑home transaction.

(c) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), if a record is communicated in writing, the fee for each name more than two required to be indexed is two dollars.

(d) The fee for responding to a request for information from the filing office, including for issuing a certificate showing whether there is on file any financing statement naming a particular debtor, is:

(1) five dollars if the request is communicated in writing; and

(2) five dollars if the request is communicated by another medium authorized by filing‑office rule.

(e) This section does not require a fee with respect to a record of a mortgage which is effective as a financing statement filed as a fixture filing or as a financing statement covering as‑extracted collateral or timber to be cut under Section 36‑9‑502(c). However, the recording and satisfaction fees that otherwise would be applicable to the record of the mortgage apply.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12; 2002 Act No. 329, Section 3E, eff July 1, 2002; 2003 Act No. 26, Section 1, eff May 14, 2003.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Various Sections of former Part 4.

2. Fees. This Section contains all fee requirements for filing, indexing, and responding to requests for information. Uniformity in the fee structure (but not necessarily in the amount of fees) makes this Article easier for secured parties to use and reduces the likelihood that a filed record will be rejected for failure to pay at least the correct amount of the fee. See Section 9‑516(b)(2).

The costs of processing electronic records are less than those with respect to written records. Accordingly, this Section mandates a lower fee as an incentive to file electronically and imposes the additional charge (if any) for multiple debtors only with respect to written records. When written records are used, this Article encourages the use of the uniform forms in Section 9‑521. The fee for filing these forms should be no greater than the fee for other written records.

To make the relevant information included in a filed record more accessible once the record is found, this Section mandates a higher fee for longer written records than for shorter ones. Finally, recognizing that financing statements naming more than one debtor are most often filed against a husband and wife, any additional charge for multiple debtors applies to records filed with respect to more than two debtors, rather than with respect to more than one.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑525 sets forth the fees for filing financing statements and other records and for responding to requests for information. The second paragraph of Official Comment 2 does not accurately describe South Carolina’s fee structure. Section 36‑9‑525(a)(3) does not impose lower fees for filings made in a medium other than writing.

Definitional Cross References:

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| --- | --- |
|  |  |
| “As‑extracted collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(6) |
| “Communicate” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(18) |
| “Debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “Filing office” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(37) |
| “Filing‑office rule” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(38) |
| “Financing statement” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(39) |
| “Fixture filing” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(40) |
| “Manufactured‑home transactions” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(54) |
| “Mortgage” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(55) |
| “Public‑finance transactions” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(67) |
| “Record” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(69) |

Cross References—

Filing office is required to refuse to accept a record for filing if an amount equal to or greater than the applicable filing fee is not tendered. Section 36‑9‑516(b)(2).

Effect of Amendment

The 2002 amendment, in subsection (a), deleted paragraphs (1) to (3) and added the last clause starting with “two dollars”.

The 2003 amendment, in subsection (a), substituted paragraphs (1) to (3) for “two dollars for the first page and one dollar for each additional page” at the end of the subsection.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 92.1.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak92.1.

Attorney General’s Opinions

Actual fees paid to a public official for filing a continuation statement pursuant to this section [Code 1962 Section 10.9‑403] may be charged to debtor under the Consumer Finance Act, Code 1962 Section 8‑800.10, subsection (e). 1970‑71 Op Atty Gen, No 3098, p 44.

The amendment of Code 1962 Section 10.9‑403 by Acts 1967, No. 486 (1967 (55) 862), making filing fees uniform in all counties, is not inconsistent with Code 1962 Section 27‑99.1, exempting certain classes of persons from payment of fees. 1967‑68 Op Atty Gen, No 2388, p 17.

**SECTION 36‑9‑526.** Filing‑office rules.

(a) The Secretary of State shall adopt and publish rules to implement this chapter. The filing‑office rules must be:

(1) consistent with this chapter; and

(2) adopted and published in accordance with the Administrative Procedures Act.

(b) To keep the filing‑office rules and practices of the filing office in harmony with the rules and practices of filing offices in other jurisdictions that enact substantially this part, and to keep the technology used by the filing office compatible with the technology used by filing offices in other jurisdictions that enact substantially this part, the Secretary of State, so far as is consistent with the purposes, policies, and provisions of this chapter, in adopting, amending, and repealing filing‑office rules, shall:

(1) consult with filing offices in other jurisdictions that enact substantially this part; and

(2) consult the most recent version of the Model Rules promulgated by the International Association of Corporate Administrators or any successor organization; and

(3) take into consideration the rules and practices of, and the technology used by, filing offices in other jurisdictions that enact substantially this part.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. New; subsection (b) derives in part from the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (1974).

2. Rules Required. Operating a filing office is a complicated business, requiring many more rules and procedures than this Article can usefully provide. Subsection (a) requires the adoption of rules to carry out the provisions of Article 9. The filing‑office rules must be consistent with the provisions of the statute and adopted in accordance with local procedures. The publication requirement informs secured parties about filing‑office practices, aids secured parties in evaluating filing‑related risks and costs, and promotes regularity of application within the filing office.

3. Importance of Uniformity. In today’s national economy, uniformity of the policies and practices of the filing offices will reduce the costs of secured transactions substantially. The International Association of Corporate Administrators (IACA), referred to in subsection (b), is an organization whose membership includes filing officers from every State. These individuals are responsible for the proper functioning of the Article 9 filing system and have worked diligently to develop model filing‑office rules, with a view toward efficiency and uniformity.

Although uniformity is an important desideratum, subsection (a) affords considerable flexibility in the adoption of filing‑office rules. Each State may adopt a version of subsection (a) that reflects the desired relationship between the statewide filing office described in Section 9‑501(a)(2) and the local filing offices described in Section 9‑501(a)(1) and that takes into account the practices of its filing offices. Subsection (a) need not designate a single official or agency to adopt rules applicable to all filing offices, and the rules applicable to the statewide filing office need not be identical to those applicable to the local filing office. For example, subsection (a) might provide for the statewide filing office to adopt filing‑office rules, and, if not prohibited by other law, the filing office might adopt one set of rules for itself and another for local offices. Or, subsection (a) might designate one official or agency to adopt rules for the statewide filing office and another to adopt rules for local filing offices.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑526 requires the Secretary of State to adopt and publish filing‑office rules.

Definitional Cross References:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  |  |
| “Filing‑office rule” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(38) |

Cross References—

The South Carolina Filing‑Office Rules are published in 30‑9‑10, et seq. S.C. Code Ann.

Part 6

Default

Subpart 1

Default and Enforcement of Security Interest

**SECTION 36‑9‑601.** Rights after default; judicial enforcement; consignor or buyer of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes.

(a) After default, a secured party has the rights provided in this part and, except as otherwise provided in Section 36‑9‑602, those provided by agreement of the parties. A secured party:

(1) may reduce a claim to judgment, foreclose, or otherwise enforce the claim, security interest, or agricultural lien by any available judicial procedure; and

(2) if the collateral is documents, may proceed either as to the documents or as to the goods they cover.

(b) A secured party in possession of collateral or control of collateral under Section 36‑7‑106, 36‑9‑104, 36‑9‑105, 36‑9‑106, or 36‑9‑107 has the rights and duties provided in Section 36‑9‑207.

(c) The rights under subsections (a) and (b) are cumulative and may be exercised simultaneously.

(d) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (g) and Section 36‑9‑605, after default, a debtor and an obligor have the rights provided in this part and by agreement of the parties.

(e) If a secured party has reduced its claim to judgment, the lien of any levy that may be made upon the collateral by virtue of an execution based upon the judgment relates back to the earliest of:

(1) the date of perfection of the security interest or agricultural lien in the collateral;

(2) the date of filing a financing statement covering the collateral; or

(3) any date specified in a statute under which the agricultural lien was created.

(f) A sale pursuant to an execution is a foreclosure of the security interest or agricultural lien by judicial procedure within the meaning of this Section. A secured party may purchase at the sale and thereafter hold the collateral free of any other requirements of this chapter.

(g) Except as otherwise provided in Section 36‑9‑607(c), this part imposes no duties upon a secured party that is a consignor or is a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes.

HISTORY: 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12; 2014 Act No. 213 (S.343), Section 45, eff October 1, 2014.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑501(1), (2), (5).

2. Enforcement: In General. The rights of a secured party to enforce its security interest in collateral after the debtor’s default are an important feature of a secured transaction. (Note that the term “rights,” as defined in Section 1‑201, includes “remedies.”) This Part provides those rights as well as certain limitations on their exercise for the protection of the defaulting debtor, other creditors, and other affected persons. However, subsections (a) and (d) make clear that the rights provided in this Part do not exclude other rights provided by agreement.

3. When Remedies Arise. Under subsection (a) the secured party’s rights arise “[a]fter default.” As did former Section 9‑501, this Article leaves to the agreement of the parties the circumstances giving rise to a default. This Article does not determine whether a secured party’s post‑default conduct can constitute a waiver of default in the face of an agreement stating that such conduct shall not constitute a waiver. Rather, it continues to leave to the parties’ agreement, as supplemented by law other than this Article, the determination whether a default has occurred or has been waived. See Section 1‑103.

4. Possession of Collateral; Section 9‑207. After a secured party takes possession of collateral following a default, there is no longer any distinction between a security interest that before default was nonpossessory and a security interest that was possessory before default, as under a common‑law pledge. This Part generally does not distinguish between the rights of a secured party with a nonpossessory security interest and those of a secured party with a possessory security interest. However, Section 9‑207 addresses rights and duties with respect to collateral in a secured party’s possession. Under subsection (b) of this Section, Section 9‑207 applies not only to possession before default but also to possession after default. Subsection (b) also has been conformed to Section 9‑207, which, unlike former Section 9‑207, applies to secured parties having control of collateral.

5. Cumulative Remedies. Former Section 9‑501(1) provided that the secured party’s remedies were cumulative, but it did not explicitly provide whether the remedies could be exercised simultaneously. Subsection (c) permits the simultaneous exercise of remedies if the secured party acts in good faith. The liability scheme of Subpart 2 affords redress to an aggrieved debtor or obligor. Moreover, permitting the simultaneous exercise of remedies under subsection (c) does not override any non‑UCC law, including the law of tort and statutes regulating collection of debts, under which the simultaneous exercise of remedies in a particular case constitutes abusive behavior or harassment giving rise to liability.

6. Judicial Enforcement. Under subsection (a) a secured party may reduce its claim to judgment or foreclose its interest by any available procedure outside this Article under applicable law. Subsection (e) generally follows former Section 9‑501(5). It makes clear that any judicial lien that the secured party may acquire against the collateral effectively is a continuation of the original security interest (if perfected) and not the acquisition of a new interest or a transfer of property on account of a preexisting obligation. Under former Section 9‑501(5), the judicial lien was stated to relate back to the date of perfection of the security interest. Subsection (e), however, provides that the lien relates back to the earlier of the date of filing or the date of perfection. This provides a secured party who enforces a security interest by judicial process with the benefit of the “first‑to‑file‑or‑perfect” priority rule of Section 9‑322(a)(1).

7. Agricultural Liens. Part 6 provides parallel treatment for the enforcement of agricultural liens and security interests. Because agricultural liens are statutory rather than consensual, this Article does draw a few distinctions between these liens and security interests. Under subsection (e), the statute creating an agricultural lien would govern whether and the date to which an execution lien relates back. Section 9‑606 explains when a “default” occurs in the agricultural lien context.

8. Execution Sales. Subsection (f) also follows former Section 9‑501(5). It makes clear that an execution sale is an appropriate method of foreclosure contemplated by this Part. However, the sale is governed by other law and not by this Article, and the limitations under Section 9‑610 on the right of a secured party to purchase collateral do not apply.

9. Sales of Receivables; Consignments. Subsection (g) provides that, except as provided in Section 9‑607(c), the duties imposed on secured parties do not apply to buyers of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes. Although denominated “secured parties,” these buyers own the entire interest in the property sold and so may enforce their rights without regard to the seller (“debtor”) or the seller’s creditors. Likewise, a true consignor may enforce its ownership interest under other law without regard to the duties that this Part imposes on secured parties. Note, however, that Section 9‑615 governs cases in which a consignee’s secured party (other than a consignor) is enforcing a security interest that is senior to the security interest (i.e., ownership interest) of a true consignor.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑601 provides an overview of a secured party’s rights in the event of default. Subsection (a) provides that a secured party has the rights provided in Part 6 and, except as provided in Section 36‑9‑602, the rights provided by agreement. Subsection (a)(1) authorizes the secured party to enforce its security interest through judicial procedures. When a secured party reduces its claim to judgment and proceeds to execution, subsection (e) preserves the priority of a perfected security interest or agricultural lien and subsection (f) authorizes the secured party to purchase at execution sale. Subsection (c) provides that a secured party’s rights are cumulative and may be exercised simultaneously.

Subsection 36‑9‑601(b) provides that secured parties in possession or control of collateral have the rights and duties imposed under Section 36‑9‑207.

Under subsection (g) a consignor or a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes has no duties under Part 6 unless that person has a right of recourse against the debtor or a secondary obligor.

Definitional Cross References:

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| --- | --- |
|  |  |
| “Account” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(2) |
| “Agreement” | Section 36‑1‑201(3) |
| “Agricultural lien” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(5) |
| “Chattel paper” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(11) |
| “Collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “Document” | Sections 36‑9‑102(a)(30), 36‑7‑102(1)(e), 36‑1‑201(15) |
| “Financing statement” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(39) |
| “Goods” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(44) |
| “Obligor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(59) |
| “Payment intangible” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(61) |
| “Promissory notes” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(65) |
| “Secured party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |

Cross References—

1. Requirements for control of a deposit account. Section 36‑9‑104.

2. Requirements for control of electronic chattel paper. Section 36‑9‑105.

3. Requirements for control of investment property. Sections 6‑9‑106 and 36‑8‑106.

4. Requirements for control of letter‑of‑credit rights. Section 36‑9‑107.

5. Possession of collateral. Sections 36‑9‑205(b) and 36‑9‑313.

6. Rights and duties of a secured party having possession or control of collateral. Section 36‑9‑207.

7. Article 9 applies to consignments and the security interest of a consignor is a purchase‑money security interest in inventory. Sections 36‑9‑109(a)(4) and 36‑9‑103(d).

8. Article 9 applies to the sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes. Section 36‑9‑102 (a)(3).

Editor’s Note

2014 Act No. 213, Section 51, provides as follows:

“SECTION 51. This act becomes effective on October 1, 2014. It applies to transactions entered into and events occurring after that date.”

Effect of Amendment

2014 Act No. 213, Section 45, in subsection (b), inserted “36‑7‑106”.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 221 to 243.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak221 to 349Ak243.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Forms

Am. Jur. Pl. & Pr. Forms Uniform Commercial Code Section 9:350 , Introductory Comments.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 1

Limitation of actions 2

1. In general

Holder of promissory note on which maker defaulted was authorized to bring action for deficiency judgment before liquidating collateral, under terms of security agreement and South Carolina’s Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), providing cumulative remedies for default and permitting secured party in possession of collateral to proceed on guarantee by seeking to reduce claim to judgment without first disposing of collateral. First Chatham Bank v. Landers, 2011, 890 F.Supp.2d 623. Secured Transactions 223; Secured Transactions 226

Quoted in Thompson v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (D.C.S.C. 1971) 324 F.Supp. 108.

ARTICLE 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) applies to an action for the recovery of a deficiency following the repossession and sale of collateral by a secured creditor who is also a party to the sales contract creating the security interest in the collateral. S.C. Code Ann. Section 36‑2‑101 et seq. Coastal Federal Credit Union v. Brown (S.C.App. 2016) 417 S.C. 544, 790 S.E.2d 417, rehearing denied. Sales 2422; Secured Transactions 240

Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) provision allowing that after default a secured party could exercise rights of debtor did not provide basis for secured creditor’s independent claim for negligent impairment of collateral against a third party, arising from debtor’s default on loan; the UCC offered a wide variety of remedies to a secured creditor, which counseled against recognition of a duty in tort between a third party and a secured creditor. McCullough v. Goodrich & Pennington Mortg. Fund, Inc. (S.C. 2007) 373 S.C. 43, 644 S.E.2d 43. Secured Transactions 170

A secured creditor’s simultaneous pursuit of the alternate remedies of repossessing the collateral and filing suit on the contract without first disposing of the collateral is proper under both the UCC and the security agreement where the value of the collateral at the time of repossession is less than the amount due. Andrews v. von Elten & Walker, Inc. (S.C.App. 1993) 315 S.C. 199, 432 S.E.2d 500.

A secured creditor may pursue alternate remedies under both the security agreement and the UCC because as a creditor, the plaintiff’s remedies are cumulative and he should not be required to reduce himself to the position of an unsecured creditor so long as he acts in a commercially reasonable manner and does not impair the position of his debtor. Andrews v. von Elten & Walker, Inc. (S.C.App. 1993) 315 S.C. 199, 432 S.E.2d 500.

The UCC does not prohibit a secured party in possession of collateral from proceeding judicially on a guaranty. Andrews v. von Elten & Walker, Inc. (S.C.App. 1993) 315 S.C. 199, 432 S.E.2d 500. Guaranty 77(1)

Once a default on an obligation has occurred, the secured party is authorized to take possession of the collateral, proceed to reduce the debt to judgment, foreclose on the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner, or retain the goods in satisfaction of his claim. Andrews v. von Elten & Walker, Inc. (S.C.App. 1993) 315 S.C. 199, 432 S.E.2d 500.

Section 36‑9‑501 creates no substantive cause of action in favor of a secured party; rather, the secured party must look to state law to determine any available judicial procedures other than foreclosure or securing a judgment against a debtor. National Bank of South Carolina v. Daniels (S.C.App. 1984) 283 S.C. 438, 322 S.E.2d 689. Secured Transactions 221

2. Limitation of actions

Six‑year statute of limitations in Article 2 of Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), rather than general three‑year statute of limitations, applied to breach of contract action brought by assignee of automobile financing contract against borrower to collect debt after assignee repossessed and sold automobile; even though assignee exercised its right to repossess under UCC Article 9, assignee had right to sue borrower for breach of contract, and assignee was entitled to exercise rights under both Article 2 and Article 9 simultaneously, so long as it did not obtain double recovery. Coastal Federal Credit Union v. Brown (S.C.App. 2016) 417 S.C. 544, 790 S.E.2d 417, rehearing denied. Sales 516; Secured Transactions 240

**SECTION 36‑9‑602.** Waiver and variance of rights and duties.

Except as otherwise provided in Section 36‑9‑624, to the extent that they give rights to a debtor or obligor and impose duties on a secured party, the debtor or obligor may not waive or vary the rules stated in the following listed sections:

(1) Section 36‑9‑207(b)(4)(C), which deals with use and operation of the collateral by the secured party;

(2) Section 36‑9‑210, which deals with requests for an accounting and requests concerning a list of collateral and statement of account;

(3) Section 36‑9‑607(c), which deals with collection and enforcement of collateral;

(4) Sections 36‑9‑608(a) and 36‑9‑615(c) to the extent that they deal with application or payment of noncash proceeds of collection, enforcement, or disposition;

(5) Sections 36‑9‑608(a) and 36‑9‑615(d) to the extent that they require accounting for or payment of surplus proceeds of collateral;

(6) Section 36‑9‑609 to the extent that it imposes upon a secured party that takes possession of collateral without judicial process the duty to do so without breach of the peace;

(7) Sections 36‑9‑610(b), 36‑9‑611, 36‑9‑613, and 36‑9‑614, which deal with disposition of collateral;

(8) Section 36‑9‑615(f), which deals with calculation of a deficiency or surplus when a disposition is made to the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor;

(9) Section 36‑9‑616, which deals with explanation of the calculation of a surplus or deficiency;

(10) Sections 36‑9‑620, 36‑9‑621, and 36‑9‑622, which deal with acceptance of collateral in satisfaction of obligation;

(11) Section 36‑9‑623, which deals with redemption of collateral;

(12) Section 36‑9‑624, which deals with permissible waivers; and

(13) Sections 36‑9‑625 and 36‑9‑626, which deal with the secured party’s liability for failure to comply with this chapter.

HISTORY: 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑501(3).

2. Waiver: In General. Section 1‑102(3) addresses which provisions of the UCC are mandatory and which may be varied by agreement. With exceptions relating to good faith, diligence, reasonableness, and care, immediate parties, as between themselves, may vary its provisions by agreement. However, in the context of rights and duties after default, our legal system traditionally has looked with suspicion on agreements that limit the debtor’s rights and free the secured party of its duties. As stated in former Section 9‑501, Comment 4, “no mortgage clause has ever been allowed to clog the equity of redemption.” The context of default offers great opportunity for overreaching. The suspicious attitudes of the courts have been grounded in common sense. This Section, like former Section 9‑501(3), codifies this long‑standing and deeply rooted attitude. The specified rights of the debtor and duties of the secured party may not be waived or varied except as stated. Provisions that are not specified in this Section are subject to the general rules in Section 1‑102(3).

3. Nonwaivable Rights and Duties. This Section revises former Section 9‑501(3) by restricting the ability to waive or modify additional specified rights and duties: (i) duties under Section 9‑207(b)(4)(C), which deals with the use and operation of consumer goods, (ii) the right to a response to a request for an accounting, concerning a list of collateral, or concerning a statement of account (Section 9‑210), (iii) the duty to collect collateral in a commercially reasonable manner (Section 9‑607), (iv) the implicit duty to refrain from a breach of the peace in taking possession of collateral under Section 9‑609, (v) the duty to apply noncash proceeds of collection or disposition in a commercially reasonable manner (Sections 9‑608 and 9‑615), (vi) the right to a special method of calculating a surplus or deficiency in certain dispositions to a secured party, a person related to secured party, or a secondary obligor (Section 9‑615), (vii) the duty to give an explanation of the calculation of a surplus or deficiency ( Section 9‑616), (viii) the right to limitations on the effectiveness of certain waivers (Section 9‑624), and (ix) the right to hold a secured party liable for failure to comply with this Article (Sections 9‑625 and 9‑626). For clarity and consistency, this Article uses the term “waive or vary” instead of “renounc[e] or modify[],” which appeared in former Section 9‑504(3).

This Section provides generally that the specified rights and duties “may not be waived or varied.” However, it does not restrict the ability of parties to agree to settle, compromise, or renounce claims for past conduct that may have constituted a violation or breach of those rights and duties, even if the settlement involves an express “waiver.”

4. Waiver by Debtors and Obligors. The restrictions on waiver contained in this Section apply to obligors as well as debtors. This resolves a question under former Article 9 as to whether secondary obligors, assuming that they were “debtors” for purposes of former Part 5, were permitted to waive, under the law of suretyship, rights and duties under that Part.

5. Certain Post‑Default Waivers. Section 9‑624 permits post‑default waivers in limited circumstances. These waivers must be made in agreements that are authenticated. Under Section 1‑201, an “‘agreement’ means the bargain of the parties in fact.” In considering waivers under Section 9‑624 and analogous agreements in other contexts, courts should carefully scrutinize putative agreements that appear in records that also address many additional or unrelated matters.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

As a general rule Section 36‑1‑102(3) [see now Section 36‑1‑302] permits the parties to a transaction within the scope of the Code to vary the effect of statutory provisions. Under that provision the only duties that cannot be disclaimed are the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness, and care. Section 36‑9‑602, however, further restricts the rights of the parties to vary the provisions of Article 9 relating to default. Section 36‑9‑602 renders unenforceable an agreement that purports to waive or vary specified provisions of Article 9 to the extent that the provisions give rights to a debtor or obligor or impose duties on a secured party.

The provisions of Section 36‑9‑602 include a statutory cross reference to the provisions of Article 9 that impose non‑waiveable rights or duties. The provisions of Section 36‑9‑602, however, are subject to Section 36‑9‑624 under which certain post‑default waivers by a debtor or obligor are enforceable. The effect of these two provisions is as follows:

1. Right to Notification of Disposition of Collateral

Section 36‑9‑611 requires a secured party to send reasonable authenticated notification of the disposition of collateral to the debtor, any secondary obligor, and certain secured parties holding conflicting security interests. Section 36‑9‑602(7) precludes the waiver of rules arising under Section 36‑9‑611 that give the debtor or secondary obligor rights or impose duties on a secured party. Section 36‑9‑624(1), however, provides that a debtor or secondary obligor may waive the right to notification of the disposition of collateral by an agreement entered into and authenticated after default. As a result, a term in a security agreement purporting to waive a debtor’s right to notification of the disposition of collateral would be unenforceable, but a post‑default authenticated agreement to waive notification would be effective.

2. Mandatory Disposition of Consumer Goods

Section 36‑9‑620(e) and (f)(1) require a secured party to dispose of certain repossessed consumer goods within 90 days of taking possession and, in effect, preclude acceptance of the goods in satisfaction of the secured obligation. Section 36‑9‑602(1) precludes the waiver of a debtor’s rights with respect to acceptance of collateral in satisfaction of an obligation under Section 36‑9‑620. Section 36‑9‑324(2), however, permits a debtor to waive the right to require the disposition of collateral under Section 36‑9‑620(e) by an agreement entered into and authenticated after default.

3. Redemption of Collateral

Section 36‑9‑623 grants debtors and secondary obligors the right to redeem collateral. Section 36‑9‑602(11) precludes the waiver of the right to redeem collateral. Section 36‑9‑324(3), however, provides that in a transaction other than a consumer‑goods transaction, a debtor or secondary obligor may waive the right to redeem collateral by an agreement entered into and authenticated after default.

Note that the preclusions on the waiver of rights under Section 36‑9‑602 extend to obligors as well as debtors. Under Section 36‑9‑611 a secured party is required to send secondary obligors notice of a disposition of collateral. The term “secondary obligor” includes guarantors of a secured obligation. Thus Section 36‑9‑602(5) renders a waiver of notification provision in a guaranty of a secured obligation unenforceable. See Section 36‑9‑602, Official Comment 4. This result is consistent with Crane v. Citicorp National Services, Inc., 313 S.C. 70, 437 S.E. 2d 50 (1993) in which the Court asserted that guarantors of secured obligations are entitled to notice of the disposition of collateral.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Accounting” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(4) |
| “Collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “Noncash proceeds” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(58) |
| “Obligor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(59) |
| “Proceeds” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(64) |
| “Request for an accounting” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(2) |
| “Request regarding a list of collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(4) |
| “Secondary obligor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(71) |
| “Secured party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |

Cross References—

The extent to which the parties can determine by agreement the standards for measuring the fulfillment of the rights and obligations listed in Section 36‑9‑602. Section 36‑9‑603.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 224.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak224.

Notes of Decisions

Limitation of actions 1

1. Limitation of actions

Six‑year statute of limitations in Article 2 of Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), rather than general three‑year statute of limitations, applied to breach of contract action brought by assignee of automobile financing contract against borrower to collect debt after assignee repossessed and sold automobile; even though assignee exercised its right to repossess under UCC Article 9, assignee had right to sue borrower for breach of contract, and assignee was entitled to exercise rights under both Article 2 and Article 9 simultaneously, so long as it did not obtain double recovery. Coastal Federal Credit Union v. Brown (S.C.App. 2016) 417 S.C. 544, 790 S.E.2d 417, rehearing denied. Sales 516; Secured Transactions 240

**SECTION 36‑9‑603.** Agreement on standards concerning rights and duties.

(a) The parties may determine by agreement the standards measuring the fulfillment of the rights of a debtor or obligor and the duties of a secured party under a rule stated in Section 36‑9‑602 if the standards are not manifestly unreasonable.

(b) Subsection (a) does not apply to the duty under Section 36‑9‑609 to refrain from breaching the peace.

HISTORY: 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑501(3).

2. Limitation on Ability to Set Standards. Subsection (a), like former Section 9‑501(3), permits the parties to set standards for compliance with the rights and duties under this Part if the standards are not “manifestly unreasonable.” Under subsection (b), the parties are not permitted to set standards measuring fulfillment of the secured party’s duty to take collateral without breaching the peace.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Although the parties cannot waive or vary the rights and duties listed in Section 36‑9‑602, subject to one exception, Section 36‑9‑603 provides that the parties can agree upon standards to measure fulfillment of those rights and duties. Subsection (a) provides that the agreed standards are valid unless manifestly unreasonable. Subsection (b) provides that the parties cannot establish by agreement the standards for determining a breach of the peace under Section 36‑9‑609.

Definitional Cross References:

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| “Agreement” | Section 36‑1‑201(3) |
| “Breach of the peace” | See Section 36‑9‑609, Official Comment 3 |
| “Debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “Obligor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(59) |
| “Secured party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |

Cross References—

List of statutory provisions conferring rights upon a debtor or obligor or duties upon a secured party that cannot be waived or varied by agreement. Section 36‑9‑602.

A secured party may take possession of collateral upon default without judicial process only if the repossession can be effected without a breach of the peace. Section 36‑9‑609(b)(2).

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 224.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak224.

**SECTION 36‑9‑604.** Procedure if security agreement covers real property or fixtures.

(a) If a security agreement covers both personal and real property, a secured party may proceed:

(1) under this part as to the personal property without prejudicing any rights with respect to the real property; or

(2) as to both the personal property and the real property in accordance with the rights with respect to the real property, in which case the other provisions of this part do not apply.

(b) Subject to subsection (c), if a security agreement covers goods that are or become fixtures, a secured party may proceed:

(1) under this part; or

(2) in accordance with the rights with respect to real property, in which case the other provisions of this part do not apply.

(c) Subject to the other provisions of this part, if a secured party holding a security interest in fixtures has priority over all owners and encumbrancers of the real property, the secured party, after default, may remove the collateral from the real property.

(d) A secured party that removes collateral shall promptly reimburse any encumbrancer or owner of the real property, other than the debtor, for the cost of repair of any physical injury caused by the removal. The secured party need not reimburse the encumbrancer or owner for any diminution in value of the real property caused by the absence of the goods removed or by any necessity of replacing them. A person entitled to reimbursement may refuse permission to remove until the secured party gives adequate assurance for the performance of the obligation to reimburse.

HISTORY: 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Sections 9‑501(4), 9‑313(8).

2. Real‑Property‑Related Collateral. The collateral in many transactions consists of both real and personal property. In the interest of simplicity, speed, and economy, subsection (a), like former Section 9‑501(4), permits (but does not require) the secured party to proceed as to both real and personal property in accordance with its rights and remedies with respect to the real property. Subsection (a) also makes clear that a secured party who exercises rights under Part 6 with respect to personal property does not prejudice any rights under real‑property law.

This Article does not address certain other real‑property‑related problems. In a number of States, the exercise of remedies by a creditor who is secured by both real property and non‑real property collateral is governed by special legal rules. For example, under some anti‑deficiency laws, creditors risk loss of rights against personal property collateral if they err in enforcing their rights against the real property. Under a “one‑form‑of‑action” rule (or rule against splitting a cause of action), a creditor who judicially enforces a real property mortgage and does not proceed in the same action to enforce a security interest in personalty may (among other consequences) lose the right to proceed against the personalty. Although statutes of this kind create impediments to enforcement of security interests, this Article does not override these limitations under other law.

3. Fixtures. Subsection (b) is new. It makes clear that a security interest in fixtures may be enforced either under real‑property law or under any of the applicable provisions of Part 6, including sale or other disposition either before or after removal of the fixtures (see subsection (c)). Subsection (b) also serves to overrule cases holding that a secured party’s only remedy aftEr default is the removal of the fixtures from the real property. See, e.g., Maplewood Bank & Trust v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 625 A.2d 537 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).

Subsection (c) generally follows former Section 9‑313(8). It gives the secured party the right to remove fixtures under certain circumstances. A secured party whose security interest in fixtures has priority over owners and encumbrancers of the real property may remove the collateral from the real property. However, subsection (d) requires the secured party to reimburse any owner (other than the debtor) or encumbrancer for the cost of repairing any physical injury caused by the removal. This right to reimbursement is implemented by the last sentence of subsection (d), which gives the owner or encumbrancer a right to security or indemnity as a condition for giving permission to remove.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑604 addresses a secured party’s right when the collateral consists of both personal and real property. Under subsection (a)(1) the secured party can enforce its security interest upon personal property under Part 6 without prejudicing any rights with respect to the real property. Under subsection (a)(2) the secured party can enforce its rights in both the personal property and real property under the law applicable to real property. If the secured party elects to proceed under real property law, it is not required to comply with Part 6.

Subsection (b) provides that with respect to fixtures a secured party can proceed under either Part 6 or under real property law. Subsection (b) clarifies the law and establishes that the remedy of a secured party with a security interest in fixtures is not limited to repossessing and selling the fixture under Article 9. Under subsection (b)(2) a secured party with a security interest in fixtures can enforce the security interest in a mortgagee’s action to foreclose on mortgage on the related real property.

Subsections (c) and (d) address the right of a secured party with a security interest in fixtures to remove the collateral from the real property. These provisions generally follow the requirements of former Section 36‑9‑313(8).

Definitional Cross References:

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| “Collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Encumbrance” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(32) |
| “Fixtures” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(41) |
| “Goods” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(44) |
| “Secured party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |
| “Security agreement” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(73) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |

Cross References—

1. Article 9 applies to security interests in fixtures. Section 36‑9‑109(a)(1).

2. Article 9 does not generally apply to transfers of interests in real property. Section 36‑9‑109(d)(11).

3. Choice of law rule governing the perfection of a security interest by fixture filing. Section 36‑9‑301(3)(A).

4. Office in which to file a fixture filing. Section 36‑9‑501(a)(1)(A).

5. Requirements for a sufficient fixture filing. Section 36‑9‑502(a) and (b).

6. Requirements for a recorded mortgage to be effective as a fixture filing. Section 36‑9‑502(c).

7. Priority of security interests in fixtures. Section 36‑9‑334.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 221 to 243.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak221 to 349Ak243.

LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES

ARTICLE 9 and the Bankruptcy Act. 19 S.C. L. Rev. 742.

Bankruptcy’s Challenge to the Floating Lien. 19 S.C. L. Rev. 773.

Priorities. 19 S.C. L. Rev. 724.

**SECTION 36‑9‑605.** Unknown debtor or secondary obligor.

A secured party does not owe a duty based on its status as secured party:

(1) to a person that is a debtor or obligor, unless the secured party knows:

(A) that the person is a debtor or obligor;

(B) the identity of the person; and

(C) how to communicate with the person; or

(2) to a secured party or lienholder that has filed a financing statement against a person, unless the secured party knows:

(A) that the person is a debtor; and

(B) the identity of the person.

HISTORY: 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. New.

2. Duties to Unknown Persons. This Section relieves a secured party from duties owed to a debtor or obligor, if the secured party does not know about the debtor or obligor. Similarly, it relieves a secured party from duties owed to a secured party or lienholder who has filed a financing statement against the debtor, if the secured party does not know about the debtor. For example, a secured party may be unaware that the original debtor has sold the collateral subject to the security interest and that the new owner has become the debtor. If so, the secured party owes no duty to the new owner (debtor) or to a secured party who has filed a financing statement against the new owner. This Section should be read in conjunction with the exculpatory provisions in Section 9‑628. Note that it relieves a secured party not only from duties arising under this Article but also from duties arising under other law by virtue of the secured party’s status as such under this Article, unless the other law otherwise provides.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

It is possible for a secured party to have a security interest in collateral without knowing the identity of a debtor. For example, assume that SP‑1 held a perfected security interest on a piece of construction equipment owned by D‑1. In an unauthorized sale, D‑1 sold the equipment to D‑2 who did not qualify as a buyer in ordinary course of business. Under Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) D‑2 qualifies as a debtor, but SP‑1 who after default discovers the equipment at a construction site may not know that D‑2 owns an interest in the equipment and qualifies as a debtor. This situation could present a problem for SP‑1 because under Part 6 a secured party has obligations to debtors and to other secured parties that have filed financing statements. See, e.g., Section 36‑9‑611(b) and (c) (duty to send notification of a disposition of collateral).

Section 36‑9‑605 extricates secured parties from such difficulties. Under subsection (1) a secured party owes no obligation to a person that is a debtor unless the secured party knows that the person is a debtor, knows that person’s identity, and knows how to communicate with that person. Therefore, in the above illustration, if SP‑1 did not know that D‑2 had purchased the equipment, SP would not have any obligation to D‑2 under Part 6 and could not be sanctioned for failing to give D‑2 notice of a disposition of the collateral.

Subsection (2) provides that a secured party does not owe a duty to another secured party or lienholder who has filed a financing statement against a person unless the secured party knows that the person is a debtor and the person’s identity. For example, if D‑2 in the illustration had granted a security interest in the equipment to SP‑2 and SP‑2 had filed a financing statement against D‑2, SP‑1 would not be required to send SP‑2 notice of the disposition of the equipment under Section 36‑9‑611(c)(3) if SP‑1 did not know that D‑2 had become a debtor by purchasing the equipment.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “Financing statement” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(39) |
| “Know” | Section 36‑1‑201(25) [see now Section 36‑1‑202] |
| “Obligor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(59) |
| “Secured party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |

Cross References—

1. A security interest or agricultural lien continues in collateral notwithstanding the sale or other disposition of the collateral unless the secured party has authorized the disposition free of the security interest or agricultural lien. Section 36‑9‑315(a)(1).

2. A buyer in ordinary course of business takes free of a perfected security interest created by the buyer’s seller. Section 36‑9‑320(a).

3. Secured party’s obligation to send notification of a disposition of collateral. Section 36‑9‑611.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 242.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak242.

**SECTION 36‑9‑606.** Time of default for agricultural lien.

For purposes of this part, a default occurs in connection with an agricultural lien at the time the secured party becomes entitled to enforce the lien in accordance with the statute under which it was created.

HISTORY: 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. New.

2. Time of Default. Remedies under this Part become available upon the debtor’s “default.” See Section 9‑601. This Section explains when “ default” occurs in the agricultural‑lien context. It requires one to consult the enabling statute to determine when the lienholder is entitled to enforce the lien

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑606 provides that a default occurs in connection with an agricultural lien at the time the secured party becomes entitled to enforce the lien under the statute giving rise to the lien. The statute giving rise to South Carolina’s agricultural liens appears to assume that as a general rule the liens become enforceable when the secured obligation becomes due. Section 29‑13‑60, S.C. Code Ann. (1976), however, provides that a landlord making advances can obtain a warrant from a clerk of court directing the sheriff to seize the crop upon submitting an affidavit establishing that the debtor is about to sell the crop or in any other way is about to defeat the lien.

Definitional Cross References:

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| “Agricultural lien” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(5) |
| “Secured party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |

Cross References—

1. Landlord’s lien for rent due for leasing land for agricultural purposes. Section 29‑13‑10, S.C. Code Ann. (1976).

2. Landlord’s lien for advances made to a tenant. Sections 29‑13‑10 and 29‑13‑40, S.C. Code Ann. (1976 and Supp. 1999).

3. Laborer’s lien for wages. Section 29‑13‑20, S.C. Code (1976).

4. Lien for advances in provisions, supplies, and other articles for agricultural purposes. Section 29‑13‑50, S.C. Code Ann. (1976).

5. Article 9 applies to agricultural liens. Section 36‑9‑109(a)(3).

6. Priority of agricultural liens. Sections 36‑9‑322(g) and 29‑13‑30, S.C. Code Ann. (1976).

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Agriculture 10.

Secured Transactions 222.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 23k10; 349Ak222.

**SECTION 36‑9‑607.** Collection and enforcement by secured party.

(a) If so agreed, and in any event after default, a secured party:

(1) may notify an account debtor or other person obligated on collateral to make payment or otherwise render performance to or for the benefit of the secured party;

(2) may take any proceeds to which the secured party is entitled under Section 36‑9‑315;

(3) may enforce the obligations of an account debtor or other person obligated on collateral and exercise the rights of the debtor with respect to the obligation of the account debtor or other person obligated on collateral to make payment or otherwise render performance to the debtor, and with respect to any property that secures the obligations of the account debtor or other person obligated on the collateral;

(4) if it holds a security interest in a deposit account perfected by control under Section 36‑9‑104(a)(1), may apply the balance of the deposit account to the obligation secured by the deposit account; and

(5) if it holds a security interest in a deposit account perfected by control under Section 36‑9‑104(a)(2) or (3), may instruct the bank to pay the balance of the deposit account to or for the benefit of the secured party.

(b) If necessary to enable a secured party to exercise under subsection (a)(3) the right of a debtor to enforce a mortgage nonjudicially, the secured party may record in the office in which a record of the mortgage is recorded:

(1) a copy of the security agreement that creates or provides for a security interest in the obligation secured by the mortgage; and

(2) the secured party’s sworn affidavit in recordable form stating that:

(A) a default has occurred with respect to the obligation secured by the mortgage; and

(B) the secured party is entitled to enforce the mortgage nonjudicially.

(c) A secured party shall proceed in a commercially reasonable manner if the secured party:

(1) undertakes to collect from or enforce an obligation of an account debtor or other person obligated on collateral; and

(2) is entitled to charge back uncollected collateral or otherwise to full or limited recourse against the debtor or a secondary obligor.

(d) A secured party may deduct from the collections made pursuant to subsection (c) reasonable expenses of collection and enforcement, including reasonable attorney’s fees and legal expenses incurred by the secured party.

(e) This section does not determine whether an account debtor, bank, or other person obligated on collateral owes a duty to a secured party.

HISTORY: 1988 Act No. 494, Section 5; 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12; 2013 Act No. 96, Section 18, eff July 1, 2013.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑502; subsections (b), (d), and (e) are new.

2. Collections: In General. Collateral consisting of rights to payment is not only the most liquid asset of a typical debtor’s business but also is property that may be collected without any interruption of the debtor’s business This situation is far different from that in which collateral is inventory or equipment, whose removal may bring the business to a halt. Furthermore, problems of valuation and identification, present with collateral that is tangible personal property, frequently are not as serious in the case of rights to payment and other intangible collateral. Consequently, this Section, like former Section 9‑502, recognizes that financing through assignments of intangibles lacks many of the complexities that arise after default in other types of financing. This Section allows the assignee to liquidate collateral by collecting whatever may become due on the collateral, whether or not the method of collection contemplated by the security arrangement before default was direct (i.e., payment by the account debtor to the assignee, “notification” financing) or indirect (i.e., payment by the account debtor to the assignor, “nonnotification” financing).

3. Scope. The scope of this Section is broader than that of former Section 9‑502. It applies not only to collections from account debtors and obligors on instruments but also to enforcement more generally against all persons obligated on collateral. It explicitly provides for the secured party’s enforcement of the debtor’s rights in respect of the account debtor’ s (and other third parties’) obligations and for the secured party’s enforcement of supporting obligations with respect to those obligations. (Supporting obligations are components of the collateral under Section 9‑203(f) .) The rights of a secured party under subsection (a) include the right to enforce claims that the debtor may enjoy against others. For example, the claims might include a breach‑ of‑warranty claim arising out of a defect in equipment that is collateral or a secured party’s action for an injunction against infringement of a patent that is collateral. Those claims typically would be proceeds of original collateral under Section 9‑315.

4. Collection and Enforcement Before Default. Like Part 6 generally, this Section deals with the rights and duties of secured parties following default. However, as did former Section 9‑502 with respect to collection rights, this Section also applies to the collection and enforcement rights of secured parties even if a default has not occurred, as long as the debtor has so agreed. It is not unusual for debtors to agree that secured parties are entitled to collect and enforce rights against account debtors prior to default.

5. Collections by Junior Secured Party. A secured party who holds a security interest in a right to payment may exercise the right to collect and enforce under this Section, even if the security interest is subordinate to a conflicting security interest in the same right to payment. Whether the junior secured party has priority in the collected proceeds depends on whether the junior secured party qualifies for priority as a purchaser of an instrument (e.g., the account debtor’s check) under Section 9‑330(d), as a holder in due course of an instrument under Sections 3‑305 and 9‑331(a), or as a transferee of money under Section 9‑332(a). See Sections 9‑330, Comment 7; 9‑331, Comment 5; and 9‑332.

6. Relationship to Rights and Duties of Persons Obligated on Collateral. This Section permits a secured party to collect and enforce obligations included in collateral in its capacity as a secured party. It is not necessary for a secured party first to become the owner of the collateral pursuant to a disposition or acceptance. However, the secured party’s rights, as between it and the debtor, to collect from and enforce collateral against account debtors and others obligated on collateral under subsection (a) are subject to Section 9‑341, Part 4, and other applicable law. Neither this Section nor former Section 9‑502 should be understood to regulate the duties of an account debtor or other person obligated on collateral. Subsection (e) makes this explicit. For example, the secured party may be unable to exercise the debtor’s rights under an instrument if the debtor is in possession of the instrument, or under a non‑transferable letter of credit if the debtor is the beneficiary. Unless a secured party has control over a letter‑of‑credit right and is entitled to receive payment or performance from the issuer or a nominated person under Article 5, its remedies with respect to the letter‑of‑credit right may be limited to the recovery of any identifiable proceeds from the debtor. This Section establishes only the baseline rights of the secured party vis‑a‑vis the debtor‑the secured party is entitled to enforce and collect after default or earlier if so agreed.

7. Deposit Account Collateral. Subsections (a)(4) and (5) set forth the self‑help remedy for a secured party whose collateral is a deposit account. Subsection (a)(4) addresses the rights of a secured party that is the bank with which the deposit account is maintained. That secured party automatically has control of the deposit account under Section 9‑104(a)(1). After default, and otherwise if so agreed, the bank/secured party may apply the funds on deposit to the secured obligation.

If a security interest of a third party is perfected by control (Section 9‑104(a)(2) or (a)(3)), then after default, and otherwise if so agreed, the secured party may instruct the bank to pay out the funds in the account. If the third party has control under Section 9‑104(a)(3), the depositary institution is obliged to obey the instruction because the secured party is its customer. See Section 4‑401. If the third party has control under Section 9‑104(a)(2), the control agreement determines the depositary institution’s obligation to obey.

If a security interest in a deposit account is unperfected, or is perfected by filing by virtue of the proceeds rules of Section 9‑315, the depositary institution ordinarily owes no obligation to obey the secured party’s instructions. See Section 9‑341. To reach the funds without the debtor’s cooperation, the secured party must use an available judicial procedure.

8. Rights Against Mortgagor of Real Property. Subsection (b) addresses the situation in which the collateral consists of a mortgage note (or other obligation secured by a mortgage on real property). After the debtor’s (mortgagee’s) default, the secured party (assignee) may wish to proceed with a nonjudicial foreclosure of the mortgage securing the note but may be unable to do so because it has not become the assignee of record. The assignee/ secured party may not have taken a recordable assignment at the commencement of the transaction (perhaps the mortgage note in question was one of hundreds assigned to the secured party as collateral). Having defaulted, the mortgagee may be unwilling to sign a recordable assignment. This Section enables the secured party (assignee) to become the assignee of record by recording in the applicable real‑property records the security agreement and an affidavit certifying default. Of course, the secured party’s rights derive from those of its debtor. Subsection (b) would not entitle the secured party to proceed with a foreclosure unless the mortgagor also were in default or the debtor (mortgagee) otherwise enjoyed the right to foreclose.

9. Commercial Reasonableness. Subsection (c) provides that the secured party’s collection and enforcement rights under subsection (a) must be exercised in a commercially reasonable manner. These rights include the right to settle and compromise claims against the account debtor. The secured party’s failure to observe the standard of commercial reasonableness could render it liable to an aggrieved person under Section 9‑625, and the secured party’s recovery of a deficiency would be subject to Section 9‑626. Subsection (c) does not apply if, as is characteristic of most sales of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes, the secured party (buyer) has no right of recourse against the debtor (seller) or a secondary obligor. However, if the secured party does have a right of recourse, the commercial‑reasonableness standard applies to collection and enforcement even though the assignment to the secured party was a “true” sale. The obligation to proceed in a commercially reasonable manner arises because the collection process affects the extent of the seller’s recourse liability, not because the seller retains an interest in the sold collateral (the seller does not).

10. Attorney’s Fees and Legal Expenses. The phrase “reasonable attorney’s fees and legal expenses,” which appears in subsection (d), includes only those fees and expenses incurred in proceeding against account debtors or other third parties. The secured party’s right to recover these expenses from the collections arises automatically under this Section. The secured party also may incur other attorney’s fees and legal expenses in proceeding against the debtor or obligor. Whether the secured party has a right to recover those fees and expenses depends on whether the debtor or obligor has agreed to pay them, as is the case with respect to attorney’s fees and legal expenses under Sections 9‑608(a)(1)(A) and 9‑615(a)(1). The parties also may agree to allocate a portion of the secured party’s overhead to collection and enforcement under subsection (d) or Section 9‑608(a).

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑607 addresses a secured party’s rights on default when the collateral consists of accounts, payment intangibles, promissory notes, and deposit accounts and when the secured party has a security interest in a supporting obligation. Under subsection (a)(1) the secured party is authorized to instruct an account debtor or other person obligated upon the collateral to make payment to or for the benefit of the secured party. Under subsection (a)(2) the secured party is authorized to take any proceeds to which it is entitled under Section 36‑9‑315. Under subsection (a)(3) the secured party is entitled to enforce the obligations of the account debtor or other person obligated upon the collateral. Under subsections (a)(4) and (5) a secured party with control of a deposit account may apply the balance of the deposit account toward the secured obligation or instruct the bank at which the account is maintained to pay the balance to or for the benefit of the secured party.

Subsection (b) provides a method by which a secured party holding a security interest in a promissory note secured by a real estate mortgage can obtain a nonjudicial foreclosure of the mortgage without obtaining and recording an assignment of the mortgage. The provision does not extend to a judicial foreclosure and to obtain that remedy the secured party would have to obtain an assignment of the mortgage.

Subsection (c) requires a secured party to proceed in commercially reasonable manner in collecting or enforcing an obligation of an account debtor or other person obligated upon the collateral unless the secured party has no right of recourse against the debtor or a secondary obligor.

Subsection (e) provides that Section 36‑9‑607 does not determine whether an account debtor, bank, or person obligated on the collateral owes a duty to the secured party. For example, a secured party who obtains a security interest in a letter of credit supporting a debtor’s accounts receivable because the letter of credit is a supporting obligation may not be entitled to receive payment from the issuer.

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|  | Definitional Cross: |  |
| “Account debtor” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(3) |
| “Collateral” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Debtor” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “Deposit account” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(29) |
| “Mortgage” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(55) |
| “Obligor” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(59) |
| “Notifies” | | Section 36‑1‑201(26) [see now Section 36‑1‑202] |
| “Proceeds” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(64) |
| “Secured party” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(73) |
| “Security agreement” | | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(74) |
|  | Cross— |  |

1. The attachment of a security interest in collateral gives the secured party a security interest in a supporting obligation for the collateral. Section 36‑9‑203(f).

2. Perfection of a security interest in collateral also perfects a security interest in a supporting obligation. Section 36‑9‑308(d).

3. A security interest attaches to identifiable proceeds of collateral. Sections 36‑9‑203(f) and 36‑9‑315(a)(2).

4. Perfection of a security interest in proceeds. Section 36‑9‑315(c)—(e).

5. Requirements for control of deposit accounts. Section 36‑9‑104.

6. The rights of an assignee of an account against an account debtor. Sections 36‑9‑403, 36‑9‑404, and 36‑9‑405.

7. Limits upon the rights of secured party with a security interest in a letter‑of‑credit right perfected by control to enforce the drawing rights of the beneficiary against the issuer or nominated person. See Section 36‑9‑329, Official Comment 3 and 4.

8. Application of proceeds realized upon enforcement or collection from account debtor’s or other persons obligated on the collateral. Section 36‑9‑608.

Effect of Amendment

The 2013 amendment, in subsection (b)(2)(A), inserted “with respect to the obligation secured by the mortgage”.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Encyclopedias

S.C. Jur. Cooperative Credit Unions Section 139, South Carolina Uniform Commercial Code.

LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES

McCullough V. Goodrich & Pennington Mortgage Fund, Inc.: Are secured creditors really “secure” from third party impairment of collateral? R. Davis Rice, 59 S.C. L. Rev. 455 (Spring 2008).

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 227.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak227.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 1

1. In general

Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) provision allowing that after default a secured party could exercise rights of debtor did not provide basis for secured creditor’s independent claim for negligent impairment of collateral against a third party, arising from debtor’s default on loan; the UCC offered a wide variety of remedies to a secured creditor, which counseled against recognition of a duty in tort between a third party and a secured creditor. McCullough v. Goodrich & Pennington Mortg. Fund, Inc. (S.C. 2007) 373 S.C. 43, 644 S.E.2d 43. Secured Transactions 170

A secured creditor’s simultaneous pursuit of the alternate remedies of repossessing the collateral and filing suit on the contract without first disposing of the collateral is proper under both the UCC and the security agreement where the value of the collateral at the time of repossession is less than the amount due. Andrews v. von Elten & Walker, Inc. (S.C.App. 1993) 315 S.C. 199, 432 S.E.2d 500.

A secured creditor may pursue alternate remedies under both the security agreement and the UCC because as a creditor, the plaintiff’s remedies are cumulative and he should not be required to reduce himself to the position of an unsecured creditor so long as he acts in a commercially reasonable manner and does not impair the position of his debtor. Andrews v. von Elten & Walker, Inc. (S.C.App. 1993) 315 S.C. 199, 432 S.E.2d 500.

**SECTION 36‑9‑608.** Application of proceeds of collection or enforcement; liability for deficiency and right to surplus.

(a) If a security interest or agricultural lien secures payment or performance of an obligation, the following rules apply:

(1) A secured party shall apply or pay over for application the cash proceeds of collection or enforcement under Section 36‑9‑607 in the following order to:

(A) the reasonable expenses of collection and enforcement and, to the extent provided for by agreement and not prohibited by law, reasonable attorney’s fees and legal expenses incurred by the secured party;

(B) the satisfaction of obligations secured by the security interest or agricultural lien under which the collection or enforcement is made; and

(C) the satisfaction of obligations secured by any subordinate security interest in or other lien on the collateral subject to the security interest or agricultural lien under which the collection or enforcement is made if the secured party receives an authenticated demand for proceeds before distribution of the proceeds is completed.

(2) If requested by a secured party, a holder of a subordinate security interest or other lien shall furnish reasonable proof of the interest or lien within a reasonable time. Unless the holder complies, the secured party need not comply with the holder’s demand under item (1)(C).

(3) A secured party need not apply or pay over for application noncash proceeds of collection and enforcement under Section 36‑9‑607 unless the failure to do so would be commercially unreasonable. A secured party that applies or pays over for application noncash proceeds shall do so in a commercially reasonable manner.

(4) A secured party shall account to and pay a debtor for any surplus, and the obligor is liable for any deficiency.

(b) If the underlying transaction is a sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes, the debtor is not entitled to any surplus, and the obligor is not liable for any deficiency.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Subsection (a) is new; subsection (b) derives from former Section 9‑502(2).

2. Modifications of Prior Law. Subsections (a) and (b) modify former Section 9‑502(2) by explicitly providing for the application of proceeds recovered by the secured party in substantially the same manner as provided in Section 9‑615(a) and (e) for dispositions of collateral.

3. Surplus and Deficiency. Subsections (a)(4) and (b) omit, as unnecessary, the references contained in former Section 9‑502(2) to agreements varying the baseline rules on surplus and deficiency. The parties are always free to agree that an obligor will not be liable for a deficiency, even if the collateral secures an obligation, and that an obligor is liable for a deficiency, even if the transaction is a sale of receivables. For parallel provisions, see Section 9‑615(d) and (e).

4. Noncash Proceeds. Subsection (a)(3) addresses the situation in which an enforcing secured party receives noncash proceeds.

Example: An enforcing secured party receives a promissory note from an account debtor who is unable to pay an account when it is due. The secured party accepts the note in exchange for extending the date on which the account debtor’s obligation is due. The secured party may wish to credit its debtor (the assignor) with the principal amount of the note upon receipt of the note, but probably will prefer to credit the debtor only as and when the note is paid.

Under subsection (a)(3), the secured party is under no duty to apply the note or its value to the outstanding obligation unless its failure to do so would be commercially unreasonable. If the secured party does apply the note to the outstanding obligation, however, it must do so in a commercially reasonable manner. The parties may provide for the method of application of noncash proceeds by agreement, if the method is not manifestly unreasonable. See Section 9‑603. This Section does not explain when the failure to apply noncash proceeds would be commercially unreasonable; it leaves that determination to case‑by‑case adjudication. In the example, the secured party appears to have accepted the account debtor’s note in order to increase the likelihood of payment and decrease the likelihood that the account debtor would dispute its obligation. Under these circumstances, it may well be commercially reasonable for the secured party to credit its debtor’s obligations only as and when cash proceeds are collected from the account debtor, especially given the uncertainty that attends the account debtor’s eventual payment. For an example of a secured party’s receipt of noncash proceeds in which it may well be commercially unreasonable for the secured party to delay crediting its debtor’s obligations with the value of noncash proceeds, see Section 9‑615, Comment 3.

When the secured party is not required to “apply or pay over for application noncash proceeds,” the proceeds nonetheless remain collateral subject to this Article. If the secured party were to dispose of them, for example, appropriate notification would be required (see Section 9‑611), and the disposition would be subject to the standards provided in this Part (see Section 9‑610). Moreover, a secured party in possession of the noncash proceeds would have the duties specified in Section 9‑207.

5. No Effect on Priority of Senior Security Interest. The application of proceeds required by subsection (a) does not affect the priority of a security interest in collateral which is senior to the interest of the secured party who is collecting or enforcing collateral under Section 9‑607. Although subsection (a) imposes a duty to apply proceeds to the enforcing secured party’s expenses and to the satisfaction of the secured obligations owed to it and to subordinate secured parties, that duty applies only among the enforcing secured party and those persons. Concerning the priority of a junior secured party who collects and enforces collateral, see Section 9‑607, Comment 5.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑608 provides the rules for application of the proceeds realized upon collection or enforcement under Section 36‑9‑607. Under subsection (a)(1) the secured party must apply cash proceeds: first to the reasonable expenses of collection and enforcement including reasonable attorney’s fees to the extent provided for by agreement and not prohibited by law; second to the satisfaction of the obligations secured by the security interest or agricultural lien under which the collection or enforcement was made; and third to the holder of any junior lien or security interest from whom the secured party received an authenticated demand before the distribution is complete. Subsection (a)(2) provides that the secured party can request a junior secured party or lienholder to provide reasonable proof within a reasonable time of its interest or lien and excuses the secured party from performing if the reasonable proof is not provided.

Subsection (a)(3) provides that a secured party is not required to apply noncash proceeds of collection or enforcement unless the failure to do so would be commercially unreasonable.

Subsection (a)(4) provides that generally a secured party is obligated to account to and pay a debtor any surplus realized upon collection and enforcement and that the debtor is liable for any deficiency. Subsection (b), however, provides that if the transaction was a sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes, the debtor is not entitled to a surplus or liable for a deficiency.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Account” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(2) |
| “Agreement” | Section 36‑1‑201(3) |
| “Agricultural lien” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(5) |
| “Authenticate” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(7) |
| “Cash proceeds” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(9) |
| “Chattel paper” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(11) |
| “Noncash proceeds” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(58) |
| “Payment intangibles” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(61) |
| “Proceeds” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(64) |
| “Promissory note” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(65) |
| “Secured party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |

Cross References—

1. Secured party’s right to collect and enforce upon default. Section 36‑9‑607.

2. Factors considered in determining whether a failure to apply noncash proceeds of collection and enforcement would be commercially unreasonable. See Section 36‑9‑608, Official Comment 4 and Section 36‑9‑615, Official Comment 3.

3. Article 9 applies to sales of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes. Section 36‑9‑109(a)(3).

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 237, 240.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak237; 349Ak240.

**SECTION 36‑9‑609.** Secured party ‘ s right to take possession after default.

(a) After default, a secured party:

(1) may take possession of the collateral; and

(2) without removal, may render equipment unusable and dispose of collateral on a debtor’s premises under Section 36‑9‑610.

(b) A secured party may proceed under subsection (a):

(1) pursuant to judicial process; or

(2) without judicial process, if it proceeds without breach of the peace.

(c) If so agreed, and in any event after default, a secured party may require the debtor to assemble the collateral and make it available to the secured party at a place to be designated by the secured party which is reasonably convenient to both parties.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑503.

2. Secured Party’s Right to Possession. This Section follows former Section 9‑503 and earlier uniform legislation. It provides that the secured party is entitled to take possession of collateral after default.

3. Judicial Process; Breach of Peace. Subsection (b) permits a secured party to proceed under this Section without judicial process if it does so “without breach of the peace.” Although former Section 9‑503 placed the same condition on a secured party’s right to take possession of collateral, subsection (b) extends the condition to the right provided in subsection (a)( 2) as well. Like former Section 9‑503, this Section does not define or explain the conduct that will constitute a breach of the peace, leaving that matter for continuing development by the courts. In considering whether a secured party has engaged in a breach of the peace, however, courts should hold the secured party responsible for the actions of others taken on the secured party’s behalf, including independent contractors engaged by the secured party to take possession of collateral.

This Section does not authorize a secured party who repossesses without judicial process to utilize the assistance of a law‑enforcement officer. A number of cases have held that a repossessing secured party’s use of a law‑ enforcement officer without benefit of judicial process constituted a failure to comply with former Section 9‑503.

4. Damages for Breach of Peace. Concerning damages that may be recovered based on a secured party’s breach of the peace in connection with taking possession of collateral, see Section 9‑625, Comment 3.

5. Multiple Secured Parties. More than one secured party may be entitled to take possession of collateral under this Section. Conflicting rights to possession among secured parties are resolved by the priority rules of this Article. Thus, a senior secured party is entitled to possession as against a junior claimant. Non‑UCC law governs whether a junior secured party in possession of collateral is liable to the senior in conversion. Normally, a junior who refuses to relinquish possession of collateral upon the demand of a secured party having a superior possessory right to the collateral would be liable in conversion.

6. Secured Party’s Right to Disable and Dispose of Equipment on Debtor’s Premises. In the case of some collateral, such as heavy equipment, the physical removal from the debtor’s plant and the storage of the collateral pending disposition may be impractical or unduly expensive. This Section follows former Section 9‑503 by providing that, in lieu of removal, the secured party may render equipment unusable or may dispose of collateral on the debtor’s premises. Unlike former Section 9‑503, however, this Section explicitly conditions these rights on the debtor’s default. Of course, this Section does not validate unreasonable action by a secured party. Under Section 9‑610, all aspects of a disposition must be commercially reasonable.

7. Debtor’s Agreement to Assemble Collateral. This Section follows former Section 9‑503 also by validating a debtor’s agreement to assemble collateral and make it available to a secured party at a place that the secured party designates. Similar to the treatment of agreements to permit collection prior to default under Section 9‑607 and former 9‑502, however, this Section validates these agreements whether or not they are conditioned on the debtor’s default. For example, a debtor might agree to make available to a secured party, from time to time, any instruments or negotiable documents that the debtor receives on account of collateral. A court should not infer from this Section’s validation that a debtor’s agreement to assemble and make available collateral would not be enforceable under other applicable law.

8. Agreed Standards. Subject to the limitation imposed by Section 9‑603(b), this Section’s provisions concerning agreements to assemble and make available collateral and a secured party’s right to disable equipment and dispose of collateral on a debtor’s premises are likely topics for agreement on standards as contemplated by Section 9‑603.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Subsection 36‑9‑609(a)(1) provides that upon default a secured party may take possession of the collateral. If the repossession can be effected without a breach of the peace, subsection (b)(2) authorizes the secured party proceed without judicial process. In other cases, subsection (b)(1) provides that the secured party can invoke judicial process which in South Carolina would be an action under the Claim and Delivery Statute, Section 15‑69‑10 et seq., S.C. Code Ann. (1976). As an alternative to taking possession of equipment upon default, subsection (a)(2) provides that the secured party may render equipment unusable and dispose of it at the debtor’s premises.

Subsection (c) provides that upon default the secured party can require the debtor to assemble the collateral and make it available to the secured party at a place designated by the secured party that is reasonably convenient to both parties.

The statute provides no definition for “breach of the peace.” The breach of the peace standard under Section 36‑9‑609(b)(2), however, is identical to the standard under former Section 36‑9‑503. Therefore, case law interpreting the former statute remains authoritative. See, e.g., Thompson v. Ford Motor Credit, Co., 324 F. Supp. 108 (D.S.C. 1971); Jordan v. Citizens and Southern National Bank, 278 S.C. 449, 298 S.E. 2d 213 (1982). The parties, however, may not agree to standards that determine whether a secured party’s conduct constitutes a breach of the peace. Section 36‑9‑603(b) .

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “Default” | See Section 36‑9‑601, Official Comment 3 |
| “Equipment” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(33) |
| “Secured party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |

Cross References—

1. The parties may not establish by agreement standards for determining whether a secured party’s conduct constitutes a breach of the peace. Section 36‑9‑603(b).

2. A debtor’s or obligor’s right to recover actual damages for loss resulting from a secured party’s failure to comply with Section 36‑9‑609. Section 36‑9‑625(b).

3.A debtor’s or obligor’s right to minimum damages for a secured party’s failure to comply with Section 36‑9‑609 when the collateral is consumer goods. Section 36‑9‑625(c)(2).

4. Elimination of a debtor’s liability for a deficiency in a transaction other than a consumer transaction. Section 36‑9‑626(a).

5. Elimination of a debtor’s liability for deficiency in a consumer transaction. Section 36‑9‑626(b).

6. A debtor’s right to recover tort damages for a breach of the peace. See Section 36‑9‑625, Official Comment 3.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 228.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak228.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 1

Limitation of actions 2

1. In general

This section [Code 1962 Section 10.9‑503] is identical with Code 1962 Section 440.9503, Compiled Laws of Michigan. Thompson v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (D.C.S.C. 1971) 324 F.Supp. 108.

This section [Code 1962 Section 10.9‑503] expresses the present common‑law rule which entitles the secured party upon default to take possession of the collateral without judicial process, provided he can do so peaceably and without breach of the peace. Thompson v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (D.C.S.C. 1971) 324 F.Supp. 108.

The only limitation upon a secured party’s right to possess the collateral is that it must be done without breach of the peace. Thompson v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (D.C.S.C. 1971) 324 F.Supp. 108.

The right to seize carries with it by necessary implication the right to do whatever is reasonably necessary to make the seizure, including the right to peaceably enter upon the premises of the mortgagor, but it must be exercised without provoking a breach of the peace; and, if the mortgagee finds that he cannot get possession without committing a breach of the peace, he must stay his hand, and resort to the law. Thompson v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (D.C.S.C. 1971) 324 F.Supp. 108.

The right of the mortgagee to seize mortgaged chattels after condition broken is a license coupled with an interest, which cannot be revoked by the mortgagor. Thompson v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (D.C.S.C. 1971) 324 F.Supp. 108.

After condition broken, the legal title to mortgaged chattels vests in the mortgagee. Thompson v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (D.C.S.C. 1971) 324 F.Supp. 108.

Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) provision allowing that after default a secured party could exercise rights of debtor did not provide basis for secured creditor’s independent claim for negligent impairment of collateral against a third party, arising from debtor’s default on loan; the UCC offered a wide variety of remedies to a secured creditor, which counseled against recognition of a duty in tort between a third party and a secured creditor. McCullough v. Goodrich & Pennington Mortg. Fund, Inc. (S.C. 2007) 373 S.C. 43, 644 S.E.2d 43. Secured Transactions 170

A secured creditor’s simultaneous pursuit of the alternate remedies of repossessing the collateral and filing suit on the contract without first disposing of the collateral is proper under both the UCC and the security agreement where the value of the collateral at the time of repossession is less than the amount due. Andrews v. von Elten & Walker, Inc. (S.C.App. 1993) 315 S.C. 199, 432 S.E.2d 500.

Once a default on an obligation has occurred, the secured party is authorized to take possession of the collateral, proceed to reduce the debt to judgment, foreclose on the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner, or retain the goods in satisfaction of his claim. Andrews v. von Elten & Walker, Inc. (S.C.App. 1993) 315 S.C. 199, 432 S.E.2d 500.

A secured party did not waive his claim to a deficiency judgment by failing to dispose of the collateral by sale after repossession pursuant to Section 36‑9‑505(1) since (1) the goods at hand consisted of photography equipment used in a photography business and thus were not consumer goods, and (2) there was no indication that the secured party proposed the retention of the collateral to be in satisfaction of the debt pursuant to Section 36‑9‑505(2). Skinner v. Elrod (S.C.App. 1992) 308 S.C. 239, 417 S.E.2d 599.

In an action brought by debtors to recover actual and punitive damages from creditors for having repossessed a pick‑up truck, the court properly granted summary judgment for the creditors where, even though the creditors’ alleged violations of the traffic laws may have amounted to a breach of the peace, the conduct was not incident to seizing the truck. Jordan v. Citizens and Southern Nat. Bank of South Carolina (S.C. 1982) 278 S.C. 449, 298 S.E.2d 213.

2. Limitation of actions

Six‑year statute of limitations in Article 2 of Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), rather than general three‑year statute of limitations, applied to breach of contract action brought by assignee of automobile financing contract against borrower to collect debt after assignee repossessed and sold automobile; even though assignee exercised its right to repossess under UCC Article 9, assignee had right to sue borrower for breach of contract, and assignee was entitled to exercise rights under both Article 2 and Article 9 simultaneously, so long as it did not obtain double recovery. Coastal Federal Credit Union v. Brown (S.C.App. 2016) 417 S.C. 544, 790 S.E.2d 417, rehearing denied. Sales 516; Secured Transactions 240

**SECTION 36‑9‑610.** Disposition of collateral after default.

(a) After default, a secured party may sell, lease, license, or otherwise dispose of any or all of the collateral in its present condition or following any commercially reasonable preparation or processing.

(b) Every aspect of a disposition of collateral, including the method, manner, time, place, and other terms, must be commercially reasonable. If commercially reasonable, a secured party may dispose of collateral by public or private proceedings, by one or more contracts, as a unit or in parcels, and at any time and place and on any terms.

(c) A secured party may purchase collateral:

(1) at a public disposition; or

(2) at a private disposition only if the collateral is of a kind that is customarily sold on a recognized market or the subject of widely distributed standard price quotations.

(d) A contract for sale, lease, license, or other disposition includes the warranties relating to title, possession, quiet enjoyment, and the like which by operation of law accompany a voluntary disposition of property of the kind subject to the contract.

(e) A secured party may disclaim or modify warranties under subsection (d):

(1) in a manner that would be effective to disclaim or modify the warranties in a voluntary disposition of property of the kind subject to the contract of disposition; or

(2) by communicating to the purchaser a record evidencing the contract for disposition and including an express disclaimer or modification of the warranties.

(f) A record is sufficient to disclaim warranties under subsection (e) if it indicates “there is no warranty relating to title, possession, quiet enjoyment, or the like in this disposition” or uses words of similar import.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑504(1), (3)

2. Commercially Reasonable Dispositions. Subsection (a) follows former Section 9‑504 by permitting a secured party to dispose of collateral in a commercially reasonable manner following a default. Although subsection (b) permits both public and private dispositions, “every aspect of a disposition . . . must be commercially reasonable.” This Section encourages private dispositions on the assumption that they frequently will result in higher realization on collateral for the benefit of all concerned. Subsection (a) does not restrict dispositions to sales; collateral may be sold, leased, licensed, or otherwise disposed. Section 9‑627 provides guidance for determining the circumstances under which a disposition is “commercially reasonable.”

3. Time of Disposition. This Article does not specify a period within which a secured party must dispose of collateral. This is consistent with this Article’s policy to encourage private dispositions through regular commercial channels. It may, for example, be prudent not to dispose of goods when the market has collapsed. Or, it might be more appropriate to sell a large inventory in parcels over a period of time instead of in bulk. Of course, under subsection (b) every aspect of a dispositIon of collateral must be commercially reasonable. This requirement explicitly includes the “method, manner, time, place and other terms.” For example, if a secured party does not proceed under Section 9‑620 and holds collateral for a long period of time without disposing of it, and if there is no good reason for not making a prompt disposition, the secured party may be determined not to have acted in a “commercially reasonable” manner. See also Section 1‑203 (general obligation of good faith).

4. Pre‑Disposition Preparation and Processing. Former Section 9‑504(1) appeared to give the secured party the choice of disposing of collateral either “in its then condition or following any commercially reasonable preparation or processing.” Some courts held that the “commercially reasonable” standard of former Section 9‑504(3) nevertheless could impose an affirmative duty on the secured party to process or prepare the collateral prior to disposition. Subsection (a) retains the substance of the quoted language. Although courts should not be quick to impose a duty of preparation or processing on the secured party, subsection (a) does not grant the secured party the right to dispose of the collateral “in its then condition” under all circumstances. A secured party may not dispose of collateral “in its then condition” when, taking into account the costs and probable benefits of preparation or processing and the fact that the secured party would be advancing the costs at its risk, it would be commercially unreasonable to dispose of the collateral in that condition.

5. Disposition by Junior Secured Party. Disposition rights under subsection (a) are not limited to first‑priority security interests. Rather, any secured party as to whom there has been a default enjoys the right to dispose of collateral under this subsection. The exercise of this right by a secured party whose security interest is subordinate to that of another secured party does not of itself constitute a conversion or otherwise give rise to liability in favor of the holder of the senior security interest. Section 9‑615 addresses application of the proceeds of a disposition by a junior secured party. Under Section 9‑615(a), a junior secured party owes no obligation to apply the proceeds of disposition to the satisfaction of obligations secured by a senior security interest. Section 9‑615(g) builds on this general rule by protecting certain juniors from claims of a senior concerning cash proceeds of the disposition. Even if a senior were to have a non‑Article 9 claim to proceeds of a junior’s disposition, Section 9‑615(g) would protect a junior that acts in good faith and without knowledge that its actions violate the rights of a senior party. Because the disposition by a junior would not cut off a senior’s security interest or other lien (see Section 9‑617), in many (probably most) cases the junior’s receipt of the cash proceeds would not violate the rights of the senior.

The holder of a senior security interest is entitled, by virtue of its priority, to take possession of collateral from the junior secured party and conduct its own disposition, provided that the senior enjoys the right to take possession of the collateral from the debtor. See Section 9‑609. The holder of a junior security interest normally must notify the senior secured party of an impending disposition. See Section 9‑611. Regardless of whether the senior receives a notification from the junior, the junior’s disposition does not of itself discharge the senior’s security interest. See Section 9‑617. Unless the senior secured party has authorized the disposition free and clear of its security interest, the senior’s security interest ordinarily will survive the disposition by the junior and continue under Section 9‑315(a). If the senior enjoys the right to repossess the collateral from the debtor, the senior likewise may recover the collateral from the transferee.

When a secured party’s collateral is encumbered by another security interest or other lien, one of the claimants may seek to invoke the equitable doctrine of marshaling. As explained by the Supreme Court, that doctrine “rests upon the principle that a creditor having two funds to satisfy his debt, may not by his application of them to his demand, defeat another creditor, who may resort to only one of the funds.” Meyer v. United States, 375 U.S. 233, 236 (1963), quoting Sowell v. Federal Reserve Bank, 268 U.S. 449, 456‑57 (1925). The purpose of the doctrine is “to prevent the arbitrary action of a senior lienor from destroying the rights of a junior lienor or a creditor having less security.” Id. at 237. Because it is an equitable doctrine, marshaling “is applied only when it can be equitably fashioned as to all of the parties” having an interest in the property. Id. This Article leaves courts free to determine whether marshaling is appropriate in any given case. See Section 1‑103.

6. Security Interests of Equal Rank. Sometimes two security interests enjoy the same priority. This situation may arise by contract, e.g., pursuant to “equal and ratable” provisions in indentures, or by operation of law. See Section 9‑328(6). This Article treats a security interest having equal priority like a senior security interest in many respects. Assume, for example, that SP‑X and SP‑Y enjoy equal priority, SP‑W is senior to them, and SP‑Z is junior. If SP‑X disposes of the collateral under this Section, then (i) SP‑W’s and SP‑Y’s security interests survive the disposition but SP‑Z’s does not, see Section 9‑617, and (ii) neither SP‑W nor SP‑Y is entitled to receive a distribution of proceeds, but SP‑Z is. See Section 9‑615(a)(3).

When one considers the ability to obtain possession of the collateral, a secured party with equal priority is unlike a senior secured party. As the senior secured party, SP‑W should enjoy the right to possession as against SP‑X. See Section 9‑609, Comment 5. If SP‑W takes possession and disposes of the collateral under this Section, it is entitled to apply the proceeds to satisfy its secured claim. SP‑Y, however, should not have such a right to take possession from SP‑X; otherwise, once SP‑Y took possession from SP‑X, SP‑X would have the right to get possession from SP‑Y, which would be obligated to redeliver possession to SP‑X, and so on. Resolution of this problem is left to the parties and, if necessary, the courts.

7. Public vs. Private Dispositions. This Part maintains two distinctions between “public” and other dispositions: (i) the secured party may buy at the former, but normally not at the latter (Section 9‑610(c)), and (ii) the debtor is entitled to notification of “the time and place of a public disposition” and notification of “the time after which” a private disposition or other intended disposition is to be made (Section 9‑613(1)(E)). It does not retain the distinction under former Section 9‑504(4), under which transferees in a noncomplying public disposition could lose protection more easily than transferees in other noncomplying dispositions. Instead, Section 9‑617(b) adopts a unitary standard. Although the term is not defined, as used in this Article, a “public disposition” is one at which the price is determined after the public has had a meaningful opportunity for competitive bidding. “Meaningful opportunity” is meant to imply that some form of advertisement or public notice must precede the sale (or other disposition) and that the public must have access to the sale (disposition).

8. Investment Property. Dispositions of investment property may be regulated by the federal securities laws. Although a “public” disposition of securities under this Article may implicate the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933, it need not do so. A disposition that qualifies for a “private placement” exemption under the Securities Act of 1933 nevertheless may constitute a “public” disposition within the meaning of this Section. Moreover, the “commercially reasonable” requirements of subsection (b) need not prevent a secured party from conducting a foreclosure sale without the issuer’s compliance with federal registration requirements.

9. “Recognized Market.” A “recognized market,” as used in subsection (c) and Section 9‑611(d), is one in which the items sold are fungible and prices are not subject to individual negotiation. For example, the New York Stock Exchange is a recognized market. A market in which prices are individually negotiated or the items are not fungible is not a recognized market, even if the items are the subject of widely disseminated price guides or are disposed of through dealer auctions.

10. Relevance of Price. While not itself sufficient to establish a violation of this Part, a low price suggests that a court should scrutinize carefully all aspects of a disposition to ensure that each aspect was commercially reasonable. Note also that even if the disposition is commercially reasonable, Section 9‑615(f) provides a special method for calculating a deficiency or surplus if (i) the transferee in the disposition is the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor, and (ii) the amount of proceeds of the disposition is significantly below the range of proceeds that a complying disposition to a person other than the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor would have brought.

11. Warranties. Subsection (d) affords the transferee in a disposition under this Section the benefit of any title, possession, quiet enjoyment, and similar warranties that would have accompanied the disposition by operation of non‑Article 9 law had the disposition been conducted under other circumstances. For example, the Article 2 warranty of title would apply to a sale of goods, the analogous warranties of Article 2A would apply to a lease of goods, and any common‑law warranties of title would apply to dispositions of other types of collateral. See, e.g., Restatement (2d), Contracts ‘333 (warranties of assignor).

Subsection (e) explicitly provides that these warranties can be disclaimed either under other applicable law or by communicating a record containing an express disclaimer. The record need not be written, but an oral communication would not be sufficient. See Section 9‑102 (definition of “record”). Subsection (f) provides a sample of wording that will effectively exclude the warranties in a disposition under this Section, whether or not the exclusion would be effective under non‑Article 9 law.

The warranties incorporated by subsection (d) are those relating to “title, possession, quiet enjoyment, and the like.” Depending on the circumstances, a disposition under this Section also may give rise to other statutory or implied warranties, e.g., warranties of quality or fitness for purpose. Law other than this Article determines whether such other warranties apply to a disposition under this Section. Other law also determines issues relating to disclaimer of such warranties. For example, a foreclosure sale of a car by a car dealer could give rise to an implied warranty of merchantability (Section 2‑314) unless effectively disclaimed or modified (Section 2‑316).

This Section’s approach to these warranties conflicts with the former Comment to Section 2‑312. This Article rejects the baseline assumption that commercially reasonable dispositions under this Section are out of the ordinary commercial course or peculiar. The Comment to Section 2‑312 has been revised accordingly.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Subsection (a) provides that after default a secured party may sell, lease, license, or otherwise dispose of collateral. Subsection (b) provides that every aspect of the disposition most be commercially reasonable. Although subsection (b) authorizes a secured party to dispose of collateral at a public or private proceeding, the election of the method of disposition must be commercially reasonable.

Subsection (c) provides that a secured party may purchase collateral only at a public disposition or when the collateral is of a kind customarily sold on a recognized market or subject to widely distributed price quotations. Collateral is sold on a recognized market only if items are fungible and prices are not subject to individual negotiations.

Subsection (d) provides that a disposition of collateral under Section 36‑9‑610 includes warranties relating to title, possession, and quiet enjoyment which by operation of law arise upon a voluntary disposition of property of the kind subject to the Section 36‑9‑610 disposition. Subsection (e), however, permits a secured party to disclaim these warranties and subsection (f) provides a language deemed effective to establish a disclaimer.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Communicate” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(18) |
| “Default” | See Section 36‑9‑601,  Official Comment 3 |
| “Public sale” | See Section 36‑9‑610,  Official Comment 7 |
| “Recognized market” | See Section 36‑9‑619,  Official Comment 9 |
| “Record” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(69) |
| “Secured party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |

Cross References—

1. Notification requirements for a disposition of collateral. Sections 36‑9‑611 to 36‑9‑614.

2. Application of proceeds from a disposition of collateral. Section 36‑9‑615(a)—(c).

3. Debtor’s liability for a deficiency and right to a surplus. Sections 36‑9‑615(d) and (e), 36‑9‑626.

4. Calculation of a surplus or deficiency in a disposition to the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or to a secondary obligor. Section 36‑9‑615(f).

5. Dispositions to enforce junior security interests. Sections 36‑9‑615(g) and 36‑9‑610, Official Comment 5.

6. Rights of transferees that acquire collateral at a disposition following a default. Section 36‑9‑617.

7. Transfer statements. Section 36‑9‑619 .

8. Standards for determining whether a disposition was commercially reasonable. Section 36‑9‑627.

9. Right to recover actual damages resulting from a commercially unreasonable disposition of collateral. Section 36‑9‑625(b).

10. Right to recover minimum damages for commercially unreasonable disposition of collateral consisting of consumer goods. Sections 36‑9‑625(c), 36‑9‑628(c), and 36‑9‑628(e).

11. Elimination of deficiency in transactions other than consumer transactions. Section 36‑9‑626(a).

12. Elimination of deficiency in consumer transactions. Section 36‑9‑626(b).

13. South Carolina’s Public Sale Procedures under which a disposition of collateral is conclusively presumed to be commercially reasonable. Sections 36‑9‑629 to 36‑9‑635.

CROSS REFERENCES

Discharge of account debtor, notification, identification, and proof of assignment, restrictions on assignment of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes ineffective, see Section 36‑9‑406.

Restrictions on assignment of promissory notes, health‑care‑insurance receivables, and certain general intangibles ineffective, see Section 36‑9‑408.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 229.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak229.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 1

Limitation of actions 2

1. In general

Transaction between finance company and automobile dealers involving repossessed automobiles was not a “sale” and no price, fixed or unfixed, was involved. Summey v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (D.C.S.C. 1976) 449 F.Supp. 132, affirmed 573 F.2d 1306.

A secured creditor’s simultaneous pursuit of the alternate remedies of repossessing the collateral and filing suit on the contract without first disposing of the collateral is proper under both the UCC and the security agreement where the value of the collateral at the time of repossession is less than the amount due. Andrews v. von Elten & Walker, Inc. (S.C.App. 1993) 315 S.C. 199, 432 S.E.2d 500.

Once a default on an obligation has occurred, the secured party is authorized to take possession of the collateral, proceed to reduce the debt to judgment, foreclose on the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner, or retain the goods in satisfaction of his claim. Andrews v. von Elten & Walker, Inc. (S.C.App. 1993) 315 S.C. 199, 432 S.E.2d 500.

2. Limitation of actions

Six‑year statute of limitations in Article 2 of Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), rather than general three‑year statute of limitations, applied to breach of contract action brought by assignee of automobile financing contract against borrower to collect debt after assignee repossessed and sold automobile; even though assignee exercised its right to repossess under UCC Article 9, assignee had right to sue borrower for breach of contract, and assignee was entitled to exercise rights under both Article 2 and Article 9 simultaneously, so long as it did not obtain double recovery. Coastal Federal Credit Union v. Brown (S.C.App. 2016) 417 S.C. 544, 790 S.E.2d 417, rehearing denied. Sales 516; Secured Transactions 240

**SECTION 36‑9‑611.** Notification before disposition of collateral.

(a) In this section, “notification date” means the earlier of the date on which:

(1) a secured party sends to the debtor and any secondary obligor an authenticated notification of disposition; or

(2) the debtor and any secondary obligor waive the right to notification.

(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), a secured party that disposes of collateral under Section 36‑9‑610 shall send to the persons specified in subsection (c) a reasonable authenticated notification of disposition.

(c) To comply with subsection (b), the secured party shall send an authenticated notification of disposition to:

(1) the debtor;

(2) any secondary obligor; and

(3) if the collateral is other than consumer goods:

(A) any other person from which the secured party has received, before the notification date, an authenticated notification of a claim of an interest in the collateral;

(B) any other secured party or lienholder that, ten days before the notification date, held a security interest in or other lien on the collateral perfected by the filing of a financing statement that:

(i) identified the collateral;

(ii) was indexed under the debtor’s name as of that date; and

(iii) was filed in the office in which to file a financing statement against the debtor covering the collateral as of that date; and

(C) any other secured party that, ten days before the notification date, held a security interest in the collateral perfected by compliance with a statute, regulation, or treaty described in Section 36‑9‑311(a).

(d) Subsection (b) does not apply if the collateral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market.

(e) A secured party complies with the requirement for notification prescribed by subsection (c)(3)(B) if:

(1) not later than twenty days or earlier than thirty days before the notification date, the secured party requests, in a commercially reasonable manner, information concerning financing statements indexed under the debtor’s name in the office indicated in subsection (c)(3)(B); and

(2) before the notification date, the secured party:

(A) did not receive a response to the request for information; or

(B) received a response to the request for information and sent an authenticated notification of disposition to each secured party or other lienholder named in that response whose financing statement covered the collateral.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑504(3).

2. Reasonable Notification. This Section requires a secured party who wishes to dispose of collateral under Section 9‑610 to send “a reasonable authenticated notification of disposition” to specified interested persons, subject to certain exceptions. The notification must be reasonable as to the manner in which it is sent, its timeliness (i.e., a reasonable time before the disposition is to take place), and its content. See Sections 9‑612 (timeliness of notification), 9‑613 (contents of notification generally), 9‑614 (contents of notification in consumer‑goods transactions).

3. Notification to Debtors and Secondary Obligors. This Section imposes a duty to send notification of a disposition not only to the debtor but also to any secondary obligor. Subsections (b) and (c) resolve an uncertainty under former Article 9 by providing that secondary obligors (sureties) are entitled to receive notification of an intended disposition of collateral, regardless of who created the security interest in the collateral. If the surety created the security interest, it would be the debtor. If it did not, it would be a secondary obligor. (This Article also resolves the question of the secondary obligor’s ability to waive, pre‑default, the right to notification‑waiver generally is not permitted. See Section 9‑602.) Section 9‑605 relieves a secured party from any duty to send notification to a debtor or secondary obligor unknown to the secured party.

Under subsection (b), the principal obligor (borrower) is not always entitled to notification of disposition.

Example: Behnfeldt borrows on an unsecured basis, and Bruno grants a security interest in her car to secure the debt. Behnfeldt is a primary obligor, not a secondary obligor. As such, she is not entitled to notification of disposition under this Section.

4. Notification to Other Secured Parties. Prior to the 1972 amendments to Article 9, former Section 9‑504(3) required the enforcing secured party to send reasonable notification of the disposition:

except in the case of consumer goods to any other person who has a security interest in the collateral and who has duly filed a financing statement indexed in the name of the debtor in this State or who is known by the secured party to have a security interest in the collateral.

The 1972 amendments eliminated the duty to give notice to secured parties other than those from whom the foreclosing secured party had received written notice of a claim of an interest in the collateral.

Many of the problems arising from dispositions of collateral encumbered by multiple security interests can be ameliorated or solved by informing all secured parties of an intended disposition and affording them the opportunity to work with one another. To this end, subsection (c)(3)(B) expands the duties of the foreclosing secured party to include the duty to notify (and the corresponding burden of searching the files to discover) certain competing secured parties. The subsection imposes a search burden that in some cases may be greater than the pre‑1972 burden on foreclosing secured parties but certainly is more modest than that faced by a new secured lender.

To determine who is entitled to notification, the foreclosing secured party must determine the proper office for filing a financing statement as of a particular date, measured by reference to the “notification date,” as defined in subsection (a). This determination requires reference to the choice‑of‑law provisions of Part 3. The secured party must ascertain whether any financing statements covering the collateral and indexed under the debtor’s name, as the name existed as of that date, in fact were filed in that office. The foreclosing secured party generally need not notify secured parties whose effective financing statements have become more difficult to locate because of changes in the location of the debtor, proceeds rules, or changes in the debtor’s name.

Under subsection (c)(3)(C), the secured party also must notify a secured party who has perfected a security interest by complying with a statute or treaty described in Section 9‑311(a), such as a certificate‑of‑title statute.

Subsection (e) provides a “safe harbor” that takes into account the delays that may be attendant to receiving information from the public filing offices. It provides, generally, that the secured party will be deemed to have satisfied its notification duty under subsection (c)(3)(B) if it requests a search from the proper office at least 20 but not more than 30 days before sending notification to the debtor and if it also sends a notification to all secured parties (and other lienholders) reflected on the search report. The secured party’s duty under subsection (c)(3)(B) also will be satisfied if the secured party requests but does not receive a search report before the notification is sent to the debtor. Thus, if subsection (e) applies, a secured party who is entitled to notification under subsection (c)(3)(B) has no remedy against a foreclosing secured party who does not send the notification. The foreclosing secured party has complied with the notification requirement. Subsection (e) has no effect on the requirements of the other paragraphs of subsection (c). For example, if the foreclosing secured party received a notification from the holder of a conflicting security interest in accordance with subsection (c)(3)(A) but failed to send to the holder a notification of the disposition, the holder of the conflicting security interest would have the right to recover any loss under Section 9‑625(b).

5. Authentication Requirement. Subsections (b) and (c) explicitly provide that a notification of disposition must be “authenticated.” Some cases read former Section 9‑504(3) as validating oral notification.

6. Second Try. This Article leaves to judicial resolution, based upon the facts of each case, the question whether the requirement of “reasonable notification” requires a “second try,” i.e., whether a secured party who sends notification and learns that the debtor did not receive it must attempt to locate the debtor and send another notification.

7. Recognized Market; Perishable Collateral. New subsection (d) makes it clear that there is no obligation to give notification of a disposition in the case of perishable collateral or collateral customarily sold on a recognized market (e.g., marketable securities). Former Section 9‑504(3) might be read (incorrectly) to relieve the secured party from its duty to notify a debtor but not from its duty to notify other secured parties in connection with dispositions of such collateral.

8. Failure to Conduct Notified Disposition. Nothing in this Article prevents a secured party from electing not to conduct a disposition after sending a notification. Nor does this Article prevent a secured party from electing to send a revised notification if its plans for disposition change. This assumes, however, that the secured party acts in good faith, the revised notification is reasonable, and the revised plan for disposition and any attendant delay are commercially reasonable.

9. Waiver. A debtor or secondary obligor may waive the right to notification under this Section only by a post‑default authenticated agreement. See Section 9‑624(a).

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑611 imposes a notification requirement upon secured parties who dispose of collateral under Section 36‑9‑610. The only dispositions exempt from these requirements are dispositions of collateral that is perishable, threatens to decline speedily in value, or is of a type customarily traded on a recognized market. Section 36‑9‑610(d). For other dispositions, subsection (b) requires the secured party to send a reasonable authenticated notification of disposition to the persons specified in subsection (c).

Unless they have made a post‑default waiver of their right to notification under Section 36‑9‑624(a), subsection (c) requires the secured party to send notification to the debtor and any secondary obligor. If the collateral subject to the disposition is consumer goods, these are the only persons to whom the secured party must send notification.

If the collateral is other than consumer goods, subsection (c)(3) requires the secured party to send notification to certain other persons who may have an interest in the collateral. Determining the additional persons entitled to notification is made with reference to the “notification date”. This term is defined in subsection (a) as the earlier of the date on which the secured party sends notification to the debtor and any secondary obligor or the date on which the debtor and any secondary obligor waive their right to notification.

Under subsection (c)(3)(A) the secured party is required to send the notification to any person from whom the secured party has received, before the notification date, an authenticated notification of a claim to the collateral. This notification obligation is consistent with the requirements of former Section 36‑9‑504(3).

Under subsections (c)(3)(B) and (C) the secured party is required to send notification to any secured party or lienholder who perfected in the collateral by properly filing against the debtor or pursuant to Section 36‑9‑311(a) (e.g. under a certificate of title statute) ten days prior to the notification date. These notification requirements constitute a significant change in the law. Under former Section 36‑9‑504(3) a secured party was not required to send notice of disposition to another secured party who had perfected by filing unless the secured party disposing of the collateral received a written claim of an interest in the collateral.

Subsection (e) assists a secured in meeting the notification requirements of subsection (c)(3)(B). Under subsection (e) if a secured party makes a timely request for information to a filing office, the secured party will satisfy subsection (c)(3)(B) by sending notification to the secured parties and lienholders named in the filing office’s response.

Note that a secured party meets its obligation by sending notification. The term “send” is defined in Section 36‑9‑102(a)(74) and does not require receipt by the person to whom the communication is sent. As a result, the holding in Altman Tractor and Equipment Co. v. Weaver, 288 S.C. 449, 343 S.E. 2d 444 (1986), that a properly dispatched notice of sale was effective even though never received, remains valid.

Also note that because subsection (c)(2) requires a secured party to send notification to a secondary obligor, the ruling in Crane v. Citicorp National Services, Inc., 313 S.C. 70, 437 S.E. 2d 50 (1993) that secured party must send a guarantor notification of a disposition is consistent with the current statute.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Authenticate” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(7) |
| “Collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Consumer goods” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(24) |
| “Debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “Debtor’s name” | Section 36‑9‑503(a) |
| “Financing statement” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(39) |
| “Notification” | Section 36‑1‑201(26) [see now Section 36‑1‑202] |
| “Notification date” | Section 36‑9‑611(a) |
| “Person” | Section 36‑1‑201(30) |
| “Recognized market” | See Section 36‑9‑610,  Official Comment 9 |
| “Secondary obligor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(71) |
| “Secured party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |
| “Send” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(74) |

Cross References—

1. Requirement of commercially reasonable disposition of collateral. Section 36‑9‑610.

2. A pre‑default waiver of the right to notification of disposition of collateral is unenforceable. Section 36‑9‑602(7).

3. Requirements for a post default waiver of the right to notification of the disposition of collateral. Section 36‑9‑624(a).

4. Perfection of security interests in certain collateral covered by statutes, regulations, or treaties of the United States and state certificate‑of‑title statutes. Section 36‑9‑311.

5. Requests for information from a filing office. Section 36‑9‑523(c)—(e).

6. Timeliness of notification of disposition of collateral. Section 36‑9‑612.

7. Contents of notification of disposition of collateral. Sections 36‑9‑613 and 36‑9‑614.

8. Right to recover actual damages resulting from a failure to send a proper notification of disposition of collateral. Section 36‑9‑625(b).

9. Right to recover minimum damages for a failure to send proper notification of the disposition of collateral consisting of consumer goods. Sections 6‑9‑625(c), 36‑9‑628(c), and 36‑9‑628(e).

10. Elimination of a deficiency in a transaction other than a consumer transaction. Section 36‑9‑626(a).

11. Elimination of a deficiency in a consumer transaction. Section 36‑9‑626(b).

12. Notification requirements under South Carolina’s Public Sale Procedures. Sections 36‑9‑630 and 36‑9‑631.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 230.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak230.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Encyclopedias

S.C. Jur. Limitation of Actions Section 38, General Provisions.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 1

1. In general

Even if three‑year, rather than one‑year, statute of limitations applied to debtor’s action seeking statutory penalty for secured creditor’s alleged failure to comply with Uniform Commercial Code’s (UCC) notice requirements in connection with sale of repossessed truck, debtor’s action accrued, and the applicable limitations period began to run, when debtor received the allegedly deficient notice of sale, not when the truck was sold; although the three‑year statute was silent as to accrual, under the UCC, debtors could ask the court to restrain disposition of collateral upon recipe of deficient notice and a secured party could elect not to dispose of the property after giving notice, thus suggesting that the sale date was not the accrual date. Delaney v. First Financial of Charleston, Inc. (S.C.App. 2016) 418 S.C. 209, 791 S.E.2d 546, rehearing denied. Limitation of Actions 95(9)

Borrowers’ claim for violation of the statutory notification provisions against lender, for allegedly repossessing borrowers’ mobile home without providing borrowers the notice required after borrowers defaulted on loan, arose out of the parties’ contract and was within the scope of the contract’s arbitration clause applicable to claims “arising out of or relating to” the contract; lender reclaimed the mobile home due to borrowers’ failure to comply with the terms of the contract. Hall v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC (S.C.App. 2015) 413 S.C. 267, 776 S.E.2d 91. Alternative Dispute Resolution 143

Debtor in default under terms of installment sales contract for purchase of mobile home was entitled under Article 9 of the Uniform Code (UCC) to notice of creditor’s resale of mobile home, regardless of debtor’s abandonment of home. Brockbank v. Best Capital Corp. (S.C. 2000) 341 S.C. 372, 534 S.E.2d 688, rehearing denied. Secured Transactions 230

The purpose of the notice requirement under Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) of disposition of repossessed goods is to allow the debtor to discharge the debt and redeem the collateral, produce another purchaser, or see that the sale is conducted in a commercially reasonable manner. Brockbank v. Best Capital Corp. (S.C. 2000) 341 S.C. 372, 534 S.E.2d 688, rehearing denied. Secured Transactions 230

Abandonment or voluntary surrender of the collateral by the debtor to the creditor does not waive the debtor’s right under Article 9 of the Uniform Code (UCC) to notice of resale of the collateral, and the statutory notice provision may not be waived or varied except in writing after default. Brockbank v. Best Capital Corp. (S.C. 2000) 341 S.C. 372, 534 S.E.2d 688, rehearing denied. Secured Transactions 224

Surplus clothing did not constitute a type of collateral sold on a recognized market, and thus a bank was required to give borrowers notice of the sale of such collateral under Section 36‑9‑504(3). Republic Nat. Bank v. DLP Industries, Inc. (S.C. 1994) 314 S.C. 108, 441 S.E.2d 827, rehearing denied. Secured Transactions 230

A bank was entitled to a deficiency judgment despite its failure to give borrowers notice of sale under Section 36‑9‑504(3), since it sufficiently rebutted the presumption that the value of the collateral was equivalent to the debt remaining on a $100,000 loan. Republic Nat. Bank v. DLP Industries, Inc. (S.C. 1994) 314 S.C. 108, 441 S.E.2d 827, rehearing denied.

The purpose of the notice required in Section 36‑9‑504(3) is to allow the debtor to discharge the debt and redeem the collateral, produce another purchaser, or see that the sale is conducted in a commercially reasonable manner. Crane v. Citicorp Nat. Services, Inc. (S.C. 1993) 313 S.C. 70, 437 S.E.2d 50. Secured Transactions 230

Guarantors are debtors under Section 36‑9‑504(3) and thus are entitled to notice under the statute. Crane v. Citicorp Nat. Services, Inc. (S.C. 1993) 313 S.C. 70, 437 S.E.2d 50.

Persons liable on the underlying obligation have a financial status in the creditor’s disposition or sale of the collateral that is identical to the debtor’s interest—liability for a deficiency; accordingly, they are entitled to the same notice protection. Crane v. Citicorp Nat. Services, Inc. (S.C. 1993) 313 S.C. 70, 437 S.E.2d 50. Secured Transactions 230

Guarantors are debtors under Section 36‑9‑504(3) and thus are entitled to notice under the statute. Crane v. Citicorp Nat. Services, Inc. (S.C. 1993) 313 S.C. 70, 437 S.E.2d 50.

Persons liable on the underlying obligation have a financial status in the creditor’s disposition or sale of the collateral that is identical to the debtor’s interest—liability for a deficiency; accordingly, they are entitled to the same notice protection. Crane v. Citicorp Nat. Services, Inc. (S.C. 1993) 313 S.C. 70, 437 S.E.2d 50. Secured Transactions 230

Secured creditor’s failure to give notice under Section 36‑9‑503(3) does not bar creditor from obtaining deficiency judgment; it creates rebuttable presumption that collateral was worth indebtedness, and burden is on secured party to overcome presumption with evidence that value of collateral was less than debt; only if creditor rebuts presumption may he maintain action for deficiency. Mathias v. Hicks (S.C.App. 1987) 294 S.C. 305, 363 S.E.2d 914.

In an action for deficiency judgment, a secured party has a burden of proving compliance with all statutory requirements conditioning his right to such judgment, including compliance with a notice provision of Section 36‑9‑504(3). General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Carter (S.C.App. 1986) 290 S.C. 216, 349 S.E.2d 342, vacated 293 S.C. 466, 361 S.E.2d 620, appeal dismissed 293 S.C. 465, 361 S.E.2d 620. Secured Transactions 240

The purpose of Section 36‑9‑504(3) is to enable a debtor to protect his interest in collateral by paying the debt, finding a buyer or being present at the sale to bid on the collateral or have others to do so, to the end that the secured party may not be sacrificed by sale at less than true value; the notice provision is to be construed and applied in a manner to effectuate its salutory purpose of protecting the debtor. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Carter (S.C.App. 1986) 290 S.C. 216, 349 S.E.2d 342, vacated 293 S.C. 466, 361 S.E.2d 620, appeal dismissed 293 S.C. 465, 361 S.E.2d 620.

Secured party failed to comply with the notice provisions of Section 36‑9‑504(3) where the letter sent by the secured party to the debtor after the secured party had obtained possession of the debtor’s automobile upon default in making payments, failed to state whether the sale of the automobile would be by public or private sale and failed to state that the automobile would be sold. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Carter (S.C.App. 1986) 290 S.C. 216, 349 S.E.2d 342, vacated 293 S.C. 466, 361 S.E.2d 620, appeal dismissed 293 S.C. 465, 361 S.E.2d 620. Secured Transactions 230

In secured creditor’s action for deficiency judgment following resale of repossessed car (collateral), court held (1) that creditor had burden of proving compliance with notice‑of‑sale‑of‑collateral provisions of UCC Section 36‑9‑504(3); (2) that since creditor’s notice in present case merely stated that car “might” be sold, rather than stating clearly that it “would” be sold, notice failed to comply with UCC Section 36‑9‑504(3); and (3) that notice also violated UCC Section 36‑9‑504(3) by failing to state whether car could be sold at public sale or private sale. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Carter (S.C.App. 1986) 290 S.C. 216, 349 S.E.2d 342, vacated 293 S.C. 466, 361 S.E.2d 620, appeal dismissed 293 S.C. 465, 361 S.E.2d 620.

Section 36‑9‑504(3) does not require that the debtor actually received notice concerning the disposition of collateral after default, but only requires that the secured party take reasonable steps to see that the debtor is notified. Altman Tractor and Equipment Co. v. Weaver (S.C. 1986) 288 S.C. 449, 343 S.E.2d 444. Secured Transactions 230

A secured party complied with Section 36‑9‑504(3) by sending notice with regard to disposition of the collateral by registered mail properly addressed to the debtor, and the fact that the return receipt was signed by a third person did not require further action on the part of the secured party. Altman Tractor and Equipment Co. v. Weaver (S.C. 1986) 288 S.C. 449, 343 S.E.2d 444. Secured Transactions 240

**SECTION 36‑9‑612.** Timeliness of notification before disposition of collateral.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), whether a notification is sent within a reasonable time is a question of fact.

(b) In a transaction other than a consumer transaction, a notification of disposition sent after default and ten days or more before the earliest time of disposition set forth in the notification is sent within a reasonable time before the disposition.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. New.

2. Reasonable Notification. Section 9‑611(b) requires the secured party to send a “reasonable authenticated notification.” Under that Section, as under former Section 9‑504(3), one aspect of a reasonable notification is its timeliness. This generally means that the notification must be sent at a reasonable time in advance of the date of a public disposition or the date after which a private disposition is to be made. A notification that is sent so near to the disposition date that a notified person could not be expected to act on or take account of the notification would be unreasonable.

3. Timeliness of Notification: Safe Harbor. The 10‑day notice period in subsection (b) is intended to be a “safe harbor” and not a minimum requirement. To qualify for the “safe harbor” the notification must be sent after default. A notification also must be sent in a commercially reasonable manner. See Section 9‑611(b) (“reasonable authenticated notification”). These requirements prevent a secured party from taking advantage of the “safe harbor” by, for example, giving the debtor a notification at the time of the original extension of credit or sending the notice by surface mail to a debtor overseas.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑612 addresses the timeliness of a reasonable notification of disposition of collateral sent pursuant to Section 36‑9‑611. Subsection (a) provides that whether a notification is sent within a reasonable time is a question of fact. Subsection (b), however, establishes a safe harbor in transactions other than consumer goods transactions. Under subsection (b) a notification of disposition sent after default and at least ten days before the earliest time set for the disposition is sent within a reasonable time.

The parties should be able to set by agreement the standards for determining whether notification is sent within a reasonable time and those standards should be enforceable unless manifestly unreasonable. See Section 36‑9‑603(a). Although Section 36‑9‑603(a) authorizes agreed standards for measuring rights and duties only under the rules stated in Section 36‑9‑602 and that provision does not refer to Section 36‑9‑612, a compelling argument can be advanced to support the parties’ authority to agree upon standards for the timeliness of a notification. The timeliness of a notification of disposition is one aspect of whether a notification is reasonable under Section 36‑9‑611(b). See Section 36‑9‑612, Official Comment 2. Moreover, Section 36‑9‑611 is expressly referenced in Section 36‑9‑602(7). Therefore, it follows that Section 36‑9‑603(a) authorizes agreements upon standards to determine whether notice was sent within a reasonable time. Furthermore, Section 36‑1‑204(1), which applies to transactions under Article 9 pursuant to Section 36‑9‑102(c), provides that “[w]henever this act requires any action to be taken within a reasonable time, any time which is not manifestly unreasonable may be fixed by agreement.”

Note that under South Carolina’s Public Sale Procedures a notice of sale is timely if it is posted and mailed by registered or certified mail at least five days prior to the sale. Section 36‑9‑631(1), (2), and (4).

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Consumer transaction” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(26) |
| “Notification” | Section 36‑1‑201(26) [see now Section 36‑1‑202] |
| “Reasonable time” | Section 36‑1‑204(2) [see now Section 36‑1‑205] |
| “Send” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(74) |

Cross References—

1. Requirement of reasonable authenticated notification of a disposition of collateral. Section 36‑9‑611.

2. Contents of a notification of a disposition of collateral. Sections 36‑9‑613 and 36‑9‑614.

3. Right to recover actual damages for losses caused by failure to send notification of a disposition of collateral within a reasonable time. Section 36‑9‑625(b).

4. Right to recover minimum damages for the failure to send notification of a disposition of collateral consisting of consumer goods within a reasonable time. Sections 36‑9‑625(c) and 36‑9‑628(c) and (e).

5. Elimination of a deficiency in a transaction other than a consumer transaction. Section 36‑9‑626(a).

6. Elimination of a deficiency in a consumer transaction. Section 36‑9‑626(b).

7. Timeliness requirement for a notice of sale under South Carolina’s Public Sale Procedures. Section 36‑9‑631.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 230.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak230.

Notes of Decisions

In general 1

1. In general

Borrowers’ claim for violation of the statutory notification provisions against lender, for allegedly repossessing borrowers’ mobile home without providing borrowers the notice required after borrowers defaulted on loan, arose out of the parties’ contract and was within the scope of the contract’s arbitration clause applicable to claims “arising out of or relating to” the contract; lender reclaimed the mobile home due to borrowers’ failure to comply with the terms of the contract. Hall v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC (S.C.App. 2015) 413 S.C. 267, 776 S.E.2d 91. Alternative Dispute Resolution 143

**SECTION 36‑9‑613.** Contents and form of notification before disposition of collateral: general.

Except in a consumer‑goods transaction, the following rules apply:

(1) The contents of a notification of disposition are sufficient if the notification:

(A) describes the debtor and the secured party;

(B) describes the collateral that is the subject of the intended disposition;

(C) states the method of intended disposition;

(D) states that the debtor is entitled to an accounting of the unpaid indebtedness and states the charge, if any, for an accounting; and

(E) states the time and place of a public disposition or the time after which any other disposition is to be made.

(2) Whether the contents of a notification that lacks any of the information specified in item (1) are nevertheless sufficient is a question of fact.

(3) The contents of a notification providing substantially the information specified in item (1) are sufficient, even if the notification includes:

(A) information not specified by that item; or

(B) minor errors that are not seriously misleading.

(4) A particular phrasing of the notification is not required.

(5) The following form of notification and the form appearing in Section 36‑9‑614(3), when completed, each provides sufficient information:

‘NOTIFICATION OF DISPOSITION OF COLLATERAL

To: [Name of debtor, obligor, or other person to which the notification is sent]

From: [Name, address, and telephone number of secured party]

Name of Debtor(s): [Include only if debtor(s) are not an addressee]

[For a public disposition:]

We will sell [or lease or license, as applicable] the [describe collateral] [to the highest qualified bidder] in public as follows:

Day and Date:

Time:

Place:

We will sell [or lease or license, as applicable] the [describe collateral] privately sometime after [day and date].

You are entitled to an accounting of the unpaid indebtedness secured by the property that we intend to sell [or lease or license, as applicable] [for a charge of $ ]. You may request an accounting by calling us at [telephone number]’.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. New.

2. Contents of Notification. To comply with the “reasonable authenticated notification” requirement of Section 9‑611(b), the contents of a notification must be reasonable. Except in a consumer‑goods transaction, the contents of a notification that includes the information set forth in paragraph (1) are sufficient as a matter of law, unless the parties agree otherwise. (The reference to “time” of disposition means here, as it did in former Section 9‑504(3), not only the hour of the day but also the date.) Although a secured party may choose to include additional information concerning the transaction or the debtor’s rights and obligations, no additional information is required unless the paRties agree otherwise. A notification that lacks some of the information set forth in paragraph (1) nevertheless may be sufficient if found to be reasonable by the trier of fact, under paragraph (2). A properly completed sample form of notification in paragraph (5) or in Section 9‑614(a)(3) is an example of a notification that would contain the information set forth in paragraph (1). Under paragraph (4), however, no particular phrasing of the notification is required.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Subsection 36‑9‑613(1) lists the information that must be provided in a notification of disposition of collateral In transactions other than consumer goods transactions. Subsection (5) provides a notification form which when completed provides sufficient information.

The requirements for a sufficient notification of disposition under Section 36‑9‑613(1) differ from those under Section 36‑9‑630 that apply to a public sale under South Carolina’s Public Sale Procedures. For a notification to be effective under the Public Sale Procedures it must meet the requirements of both Section 36‑9‑613 and Section 36‑9‑630.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Accounting” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(4) |
| “Consumer‑goods transaction” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(24) |
| “Debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “Secured party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |

Cross References—

1. Requirement that secured party send an authenticated notification of disposition of collateral and to whom that notification must be sent. Section 36‑9‑611.

2. Timeliness of notification of disposition of collateral. Section 36‑9‑612.

3. Contents of a notification of disposition of collateral in a consumer‑goods transaction. Section 36‑9‑614.

4. Requirements for contents of a notice of public sale under South Carolina’s Public Sale Procedures. Section 36‑9‑630.

5. Debtor’s right to request an accounting. Section 36‑9‑210.

6. Recovery of damages for loss resulting from a failure to send a sufficient notification of disposition of collateral. Section 36‑9‑625(b).

7. Recovery of minimum damages for failure to send a sufficient notification of disposition of collateral consisting of consumer goods. Sections 36‑9‑625(c) and 36‑9‑628(c) and (e).

8. Remedies for a failure to comply with a request for an accounting under Section 36‑9‑210. Section 36‑9‑625(f) and (g).

9. Elimination of a deficiency in transactions other than consumer transactions. Section 36‑9‑626(a).

10. Elimination of deficiency in consumer transactions. Section 36‑9‑626(b).

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 230.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak230.

**SECTION 36‑9‑614.** Contents and form of notification before disposition of collateral: consumer‑goods transaction.

In a consumer‑goods transaction, the following rules apply:

(1) A notification of disposition must provide the following information:

(A) the information specified in Section 36‑9‑613(1);

(B) a description of any liability for a deficiency of the person to which the notification is sent;

(C) a telephone number from which the amount that must be paid to the secured party to redeem the collateral under Section 36‑9‑623 is available; and

(D) a telephone number or mailing address from which additional information concerning the disposition and the obligation secured is available.

(2) A particular phrasing of the notification is not required.

(3) The following form of notification, when completed, provides sufficient information:

‘[Name and address of secured party]

[Date]

NOTICE OF OUR PLAN TO SELL PROPERTY

[Name and address of any obligor who is also a debtor]

Subject: [Identification of Transaction]

We have your [describe collateral], because you broke promises in our agreement.

[For a public disposition:]

We will sell [describe collateral] at public sale. A sale could include a lease or license. The sale will be held as follows:

Date:

Time:

Place:

You may attend the sale and bring bidders if you want.

[For a private disposition:]

We will sell [describe collateral] at private sale sometime after [date]. A sale could include a lease or license.

The money that we get from the sale (after paying our costs) will reduce the amount you owe. If we get less money than you owe, you [will or will not, as applicable] still owe us the difference. If we get more money than you owe, you will get the extra money, unless we must pay it to someone else.

You can get the property back at any time before we sell it by paying us the full amount you owe (not just the past due payments), including our expenses. To learn the exact amount you must pay, call us at [telephone number].

If you want us to explain to you in writing how we have figured the amount that you owe us, you may call us at [telephone number] [or write us at [secured party’s address] and request a written explanation. [We will charge you $ for the explanation if we sent you another written explanation of the amount you owe us within the last six months.]

If you need more information about the sale call us at [telephone number] [or write us at [secured party’s address].

We are sending this notice to the following other people who have an interest in [describe collateral] or who owe money under your agreement:

[Names of all other debtors and obligors, if any]’

(4) A notification in the form of item (3) is sufficient, even if additional information appears at the end of the form.

(5) A notification in the form of item (3) is sufficient, even if it includes errors in information not required by item (1), unless the error is misleading with respect to rights arising under this chapter.

(6) If a notification under this section is not in the form of item (3), law other than this chapter determines the effect of including information not required by item (1).

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. New.

2. Notification in Consumer‑Goods Transactions. Paragraph (1) sets forth the information required for a reasonable notification in a consumer‑goods transaction. A notification that lacks any of the information set forth in paragraph (1) is insufficient as a matter of law. Compare Section 9‑613(2), under which the trier of fact may find a notification to be sufficient even if it lacks some information listed in paragraph (1) of that Section.

3. Safe‑Harbor Form of Notification; Errors in Information. Although paragraph (2) provides that a particular phrasing of a notification is not required, paragraph (3) specifies a safe‑harbor form that, when properly completed, satisfies paragraph (1). Paragraphs (4), (5), and (6) contain special rules applicable to erroneous and additional information. Under paragraph (4), a notification in the safe‑harbor form specified in paragraph (3) is not rendered insufficient if it contains additional information at the end of the form. Paragraph (5) provides that non‑misleading errors in information contained in a notification are permitted if the safe‑harbor form is used and if the errors are in information not required by paragraph (1). Finally, if a notification is in a form other than the paragraph (3) safe‑harbor form, other law determines the effect of including in the notification information other than that required by paragraph (1).

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑614 lists the information that must be provided in a notification of a disposition of collateral in a consumer‑goods transaction. Subsection (1)(A) requires the notification to include all the information that Section 36‑9‑613(1) requires a secured party to include in the notification in a transaction other than a consumer‑goods transaction. Subsections (1)(B)—(D) require additional information that is not required under Section 36‑9‑613(1). Subsection (3) provides a notification form which when completed provides sufficient information for the disposition of collateral in a consumer‑goods transaction.

South Carolina’s Public Sale Procedures extend to the disposition of collateral in consumer‑goods transactions. The notice of public sale requirements in Section 36‑9‑630, however, differ from the requirements for an effective notification under Section 36‑9‑614. For a notification of the disposition of collateral in a consumer‑goods transaction to be effective under the Public Sale Procedures it must meet the requirements of both Sections 36‑9‑614 and Section 36‑9‑630.

Definitional Cross References:

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| “Consumer‑goods transaction” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(24) |

Cross References—

1. Requirement that the secured party send an authenticated notification of the disposition of collateral. Section 36‑9‑611(b).

2. Persons to whom the secured party must send notification of disposition of collateral consisting of consumer goods. Section 36‑9‑611(c)( 1) and (2).

3. Timeliness of notification of disposition of collateral. Section 36‑9‑612.

4. Information that must be included in a sufficient notification of disposition of collateral in a transaction other than a consumer‑goods transaction. Section 36‑9‑613(1).

5. Requirement that a secured party send to the debtor or consumer obligor an explanation of the calculation of a deficiency or surplus in a consumer‑goods transaction. Section 36‑9‑616.

6. Recovery of actual damages for losses resulting from a failure to send a sufficient notification of the disposition of collateral. Section 36‑9‑625(b).

7. Recovery of minimum damages for failure to send a sufficient notification of the disposition of collateral consisting of consumer goods. Sections 36‑9‑625(c) and 36‑9‑628(c) and (e).

8. Statutory damages for failing to comply with the requirements of Section 36‑9‑616. Sections 36‑9‑625(e)(5) and (6) and Section 36‑9‑628(d).

9. Elimination of a deficiency in consumer transactions. Section 36‑9‑626(b).

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 230.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak230.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Encyclopedias

S.C. Jur. Limitation of Actions Section 38, General Provisions.

Notes of Decisions

Construction and application 1

1. Construction and application

Even if three‑year, rather than one‑year, statute of limitations applied to debtor’s action seeking statutory penalty for secured creditor’s alleged failure to comply with Uniform Commercial Code’s (UCC) notice requirements in connection with sale of repossessed truck, debtor’s action accrued, and the applicable limitations period began to run, when debtor received the allegedly deficient notice of sale, not when the truck was sold; although the three‑year statute was silent as to accrual, under the UCC, debtors could ask the court to restrain disposition of collateral upon recipe of deficient notice and a secured party could elect not to dispose of the property after giving notice, thus suggesting that the sale date was not the accrual date. Delaney v. First Financial of Charleston, Inc. (S.C.App. 2016) 418 S.C. 209, 791 S.E.2d 546, rehearing denied. Limitation of Actions 95(9)

**SECTION 36‑9‑615.** Application of proceeds of disposition; liability for deficiency and right to surplus.

(a) A secured party shall apply or pay over for application the cash proceeds of disposition under Section 36‑9‑610 in the following order to:

(1) the reasonable expenses of retaking, holding, preparing for disposition, processing, and disposing, and, to the extent provided for by agreement and not prohibited by law, reasonable attorney’s fees and legal expenses incurred by the secured party;

(2) the satisfaction of obligations secured by the security interest or agricultural lien under which the disposition is made;

(3) the satisfaction of obligations secured by any subordinate security interest in or other subordinate lien on the collateral if:

(A) the secured party receives from the holder of the subordinate security interest or other lien an authenticated demand for proceeds before distribution of the proceeds is completed; and

(B) in a case in which a consignor has an interest in the collateral, the subordinate security interest or other lien is senior to the interest of the consignor; and

(4) a secured party that is a consignor of the collateral if the secured party receives from the consignor an authenticated demand for proceeds before distribution of the proceeds is completed.

(b) If requested by a secured party, a holder of a subordinate security interest or other lien shall furnish reasonable proof of the interest or lien within a reasonable time. Unless the holder does so, the secured party need not comply with the holder’s demand under subsection (a)(3).

(c) A secured party need not apply or pay over for application noncash proceeds of disposition under Section 36‑9‑610 unless the failure to do so would be commercially unreasonable. A secured party that applies or pays over for application noncash proceeds shall do so in a commercially reasonable manner.

(d) If the security interest under which a disposition is made secures payment or performance of an obligation, after making the payments and applications required by subsection (a) and permitted by subsection (c):

(1) unless subsection (a)(4) requires the secured party to apply or pay over cash proceeds to a consignor, the secured party shall account to and pay a debtor for any surplus; and

(2) the obligor is liable for any deficiency.

(e) If the underlying transaction is a sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes:

(1) the debtor is not entitled to any surplus; and

(2) the obligor is not liable for any deficiency.

(f) The surplus or deficiency following a disposition is calculated based on the amount of proceeds that would have been realized in a disposition complying with this part to a transferee other than the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor if:

(1) the transferee in the disposition is the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor; and

(2) the amount of proceeds of the disposition is significantly below the range of proceeds that a complying disposition to a person other than the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor would have brought.

(g) A secured party that receives cash proceeds of a disposition in good faith and without knowledge that the receipt violates the rights of the holder of a security interest or other lien that is not subordinate to the security interest or agricultural lien under which the disposition is made:

(1) takes the cash proceeds free of the security interest or other lien;

(2) is not obligated to apply the proceeds of the disposition to the satisfaction of obligations secured by the security interest or other lien; and

(3) is not obligated to account to or pay the holder of the security interest or other lien for any surplus.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑504(1), (2).

2. Application of Proceeds. This Section contains the rules governing application of proceeds and the debtor’s liability for a deficiency following a disposition of collateral. Subsection (a) sets forth the basic order of application. The proceeds are applied first to the expenses of disposition, second to the obligation secured by the security interest that is being enforced, and third, in the specified circumstances, to interests that are subordinate to that security interest.

Subsections (a) and (d) also address the right of a consignor to receive proceeds of a disposition by a secured party whose interest is senior to that of the consignor. Subsection (a) requires the enforcing secured party to pay excess proceeds first to subordinate secured parties or lienholders whose interests are senior to that of a consignor and, finally, to a consignor. Inasmuch as a consignor is the owner of the collateral, secured parties and lienholders whose interests are junior to the consignor’s interest will not be entitled to any proceeds. In like fashion, under subsection (d)(1) the debtor is not entitled to a surplus when the enforcing secured party is required to pay over proceeds to a consignor.

3. Noncash Proceeds. Subsection (c) addresses the application of noncash proceeds of a disposition, such as a note or lease. The explanation in Section 9‑608, Comment 4, generally applies to this subsection.

Example: A secured party in the business of selling or financing automobiles takes possession of collateral (an automobile) following its debtor’s default. The secured party decides to sell the automobile in a private disposition under Section 9‑610 and sends appropriate notification under Section 9‑611. After undertaking its normal credit investigation and in accordance with its normal credit policies, the secured party sells the automobile on credit, on terms typical of the credit terms normally extended by the secured party in the ordinary course of its business. The automobile stands as collateral for the remaining balance of the price. The noncash proceeds received by the secured party are chattel paper. The secured party may wish to credit its debtor (the assignor) with the principal amount of the chattel paper or may wish to credit the debtor only as and when the payments are made on the chattel paper by the buyer.

Under subsection (c), the secured party is under no duty to apply the noncash proceeds (here, the chattel paper) or their value to the secured obligation unless its failure to do so would be commercially unreasonable. If a secured party elects to apply the chattel paper to the outstanding obligation, however, it must do so in a commercially reasonable manner. The facts in the example indicate that it would be commercially unreasonable for the secured party to fail to apply the value of the chattel paper to the original debtor’s secured obligation. Unlike the example in Comment 4 to Section 9‑608, the noncash proceeds received in this example are of the type that the secured party regularly generates in the ordinary course of its financing business in nonforeclosure transactions. The original debtor should not be exposed to delay or uncertainty in this situation. Of course, there will be many situations that fall between the examples presented in the Comment to Section 9‑608 and in this Comment. This Article leaves their resolution to the court based on the facts of each case.

One would expect that where noncash proceeds are or may be material, the secured party and debtor would agree to more specific standards in an agreement entered into before or after default. The parties may agree to the method of application of noncash proceeds if the method is not manifestly unreasonable. See Section 9‑603.

When the secured party is not required to “apply or pay over for application noncash proceeds,” the proceeds nonetheless remain collateral subject to this Article. See Section 9‑608, Comment 4.

4. Surplus and Deficiency. Subsection (d) deals with surplus and deficiency. It revises former Section 9‑504(2) by imposing an explicit requirement that the secured party “pay” the debtor for any surplus, while retaining the secured party’s duty to “account.” Inasmuch as the debtor may not be an obligor, subsection (d) provides that the obligor (not the debtor) is liable for the deficiency. The special rule governing surplus and deficiency when receivables have been sold likewise takes into account the distinction between a debtor and an obligor. Subsection (d) also addresses the situation in which a consignor has an interest that is subordinate to the security interest being enforced.

5. Collateral Under New Ownership. When the debtor sells collateral subject to a security interest, the original debtor (creator of the security interest) is no longer a debtor inasmuch as it no longer has a property interest in the collateral; the buyer is the debtor. See Section 9‑102. As between the debtor (buyer of the collateral) and the original debtor (seller of the collateral), the debtor (buyer) normally would be entitled to the surplus following a disposition. Subsection (d) therefore requires the secured party to pay the surplus to the debtor (buyer), not to the original debtor (seller) with which it has dealt. But, because this situation typically arises as a result of the debtor’s wrongful act, this Article does not expose the secured party to the risk of determining ownership of the collateral. If the secured party does not know about the buyer and accordingly pays the surplus to the original debtor, the exculpatory provisions of this Article exonerate the secured party from liability to the buyer. See Sections 9‑605, 9‑628(a), (b). If a debtor sells collateral free of a security interest, as in a sale to a buyer in ordinary course of business (see Section 9‑320(a)), the property is no longer collateral and the buyer is not a debtor.

6. Certain “Low‑Price” Dispositions. Subsection (f) provides a special method for calculating a deficiency or surplus when the secured party, a person related to the secured party (defined in Section 9‑102), or a secondary obligor acquires the collateral at a foreclosure disposition. It recognizes that when the foreclosing secured party or a related party is the transferee of the collateral, the secured party sometimes lacks the incentive to maximize the proceeds of disposition. As a consequence, the disposition may comply with the procedural requirements of this Article (e.g., it is conducted in a commercially reasonable manner following reasonable notice) but nevertheless fetch a low price.

Subsection (f) adjusts for this lack of incentive. If the proceeds of a disposition of collateral to a secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor are “significantly below the range of proceeds that a complying disposition to a person other than the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor would have brought,” then instead of calculating a deficiency (or surplus) based on the actual net proceeds, the calculation is based upon the amount that would have been received in a commercially reasonable disposition to a person other than the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor. Subsection (f) thus rejects the view that the secured party’s receipt of such a price necessarily constitutes noncompliance with Part 6. However, such a price may suggest the need for greater judicial scrutiny. See Section 9‑610, Comment 10.

7. “Person Related To.” Section 9‑102 defines “person related to.” That term is a key element of the system provided in subsection (f) for low‑price dispositions. One part of the definition applies when the secured party is an individual, and the other applies when the secured party is an organization. The definition is patterned closely on the corresponding definition in Section 1.301(32) of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Subsection 36‑9‑615(a) sets forth the order in which a secured party is required to apply or pay the cash proceeds realized upon a disposition of collateral under Section 36‑9‑610. After covering the expenses of enforcement, including reasonable attorney’s fee to the extent provided by agreement and not prohibited by law, and satisfaction of the obligations secured by the security interest or agricultural lien under which the disposition was made, subsection (a)(3) requires the secured party to satisfy obligations secured by subordinate security interests or liens if the secured party receives an authenticated demand for proceeds before the distribution is complete. Subsection (b) provides that the secured party can request the holder of a subordinate security interest or lien to furnish reasonable proof of its interest within a reasonable time. If the holder of the subordinate interest fails to provide such proof, the secured party is not obligated to apply the proceeds to the holder of the subordinate interest under subsection (a)(3).

Subsection (c) provides that a secured party is not required to apply or pay over non‑cash proceeds of a disposition of collateral unless the failure to do so would be commercially unreasonable.

Under subsection (d) a secured party is generally obligated to account to and pay a debtor any surplus and an obligor is generally liable for any deficiency following the application of the proceeds of a disposition. If the underlying transaction was a sale of accounts, chattel paper, payments intangibles, or promissory notes, however, subsection (e) provides that the debtor is not entitled to a surplus and the obligor is not liable for a deficiency.

Subsection (f) effects a dramatic change in the law. If a secured party purchases the collateral at a commercially reasonable public sale, subsection (f) may limit the secured party’s right to recover a deficiency. For subsection (f) to apply two requirements must be satisfied. First, the transferee at the disposition must be the secured party, or “a person related to” the secured party as defined in Section 36‑9‑102(a)(62) and (63), or a secondary obligor. Second, the amount of the proceeds of the disposition must be significantly below the range of proceeds that would have been realized upon a commercially reasonable disposition to a person other than the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor. If these requirements are met, the calculation of a deficiency or surplus is based on the amount of proceeds that would have been realized in a commercially reasonable disposition to a person other than the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor.

Note that compliance with South Carolina’s Public Sale Procedure does not immunize a secured party’s right to a deficiency from attack under Section 36‑9‑615(f). Compliance with the Public Sale Procedures creates a conclusive presumption that the disposition of the collateral was commercially reasonable in all aspects. Section 36‑9‑629. Section 36‑9‑615(f), however, applies even though the disposition is commercially reasonable.

Subsection (g) provides some protection to a secured party who receives cash proceeds for a disposition of collateral in violation of the rights of a senior secured party or agricultural lienholder. If the junior secured party receives the cash proceeds in good faith and without knowledge that the receipt violates the rights of the senior interest, the junior secured party takes the proceeds free of the senior’s security interest or lien. Moreover, the junior secured party is not obligated to apply the proceeds toward satisfaction of the obligation secured by the senior’s security interest or lien or to pay the proceeds to the senior secured party or lienholder.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Account” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(2) |
| “Agreement” | Section 36‑1‑201(3) |
| “Agricultural lien” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(5) |
| “Authenticate” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(7) |
| “Cash proceeds” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(9) |
| “Chattel paper” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(11) |
| “Collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Consignor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(21) |
| “Knowledge” | Section 36‑1‑201(25) [see now Section 36‑1‑202] |
| “Noncash proceeds” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(58) |
| “Payment intangible” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(61) |
| “Person related to” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(62) and (63) |
| “Promissory note” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(65) |
| “Reasonable time” | Section 36‑1‑204(2) [see now Section 36‑1‑205] |
| “Secondary obligor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(71) |
| “Secured party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |

Cross References—

1. Requirement of a commercially reasonable disposition of collateral. Section 36‑9‑610.

2. Notification of a disposition of collateral. Section 36‑9‑611.

3. Timeliness of notification of a disposition of collateral. Section 36‑9‑612.

4. Contents of a notification of a disposition of collateral. Sections 36‑9‑613 and 36‑9‑614.

5. Notification of a disposition of collateral under South Carolina’s Public Sale Procedure. Section 36‑9‑630.

6. Elimination of a deficiency in transactions other than consumer transactions. Section 36‑9‑626(a).

7. Elimination of a deficiency in consumer transactions. Section 36‑9‑626(b).

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 237, 240.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak237; 349Ak240.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 1

Limitation of actions 2

1. In general

Under South Carolina law, agreement entered by individual partners in relation to bank’s issuance of letter of credit to partnership was guaranty agreement, not individual undertaking of primary liability on letter of credit by individual partners, notwithstanding language in agreement that it was guaranty of payment and not of collection and that liability undertaken would be primary and not secondary obligation and liability; thus, payment of outstanding balance by single partner, after default, did not free other partners from liability, and that partner could foreclose on collateral pledged by nonpaying partner. Williams v. Sandman (C.A.4 (S.C.) 1999) 187 F.3d 379. Guaranty 4

Where (1) plaintiffs sought damages in class action against automobile credit company and automobile dealers for fraudulent and deceptive trade practices allegedly carried on by defendants as part of illegal combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade, in violation of Federal Trade Commission Act and Sherman Anti‑Trust Act, and (2) plaintiffs’ complaint had as its sole thrust the claim that plaintiffs had been misled into not claiming surplus due them under Code Section 36‑9‑504(2) following repossession and resale, after default, of cars purchased by plaintiffs, court held that although plaintiffs might be asserting a wrong and might have a common‑law remedy by way of a tort or contract action, defendants’ alleged conduct clearly was not intended to restrict competition and did not have effect of restricting it. Summey v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (D.C.S.C. 1976) 449 F.Supp. 132, affirmed 573 F.2d 1306.

Sellers of stock, which was placed in escrow as security for full payment of purchase price, had statutory right to pursue deficiency judgment against purchasers if stock were to sell at a loss after purchaser’s default, as purchase agreement was silent on issue. Radalytic Labs, Inc. v. Culver (S.C. 1998) 329 S.C. 380, 495 S.E.2d 782. Secured Transactions 240

2. Limitation of actions

Six‑year statute of limitations in Article 2 of Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), rather than general three‑year statute of limitations, applied to breach of contract action brought by assignee of automobile financing contract against borrower to collect debt after assignee repossessed and sold automobile; even though assignee exercised its right to repossess under UCC Article 9, assignee had right to sue borrower for breach of contract, and assignee was entitled to exercise rights under both Article 2 and Article 9 simultaneously, so long as it did not obtain double recovery. Coastal Federal Credit Union v. Brown (S.C.App. 2016) 417 S.C. 544, 790 S.E.2d 417, rehearing denied. Sales 516; Secured Transactions 240

**SECTION 36‑9‑616.** Explanation of calculation of surplus or deficiency.

(a) In this section:

(1) “Explanation” means a writing that:

(A) states the amount of the surplus or deficiency;

(B) provides an explanation in accordance with subsection (c) of how the secured party calculated the surplus or deficiency;

(C) states, if applicable, that future debits, credits, charges, including additional credit service charges or interest, rebates, and expenses may affect the amount of the surplus or deficiency; and

(D) provides a telephone number or mailing address from which additional information concerning the transaction is available.

(2) “Request” means a record:

(A) authenticated by a debtor or consumer obligor;

(B) requesting that the recipient provide an explanation; and

(C) sent after disposition of the collateral under Section 36‑9‑610.

(b) In a consumer‑goods transaction in which the debtor is entitled to a surplus or a consumer obligor is liable for a deficiency under Section 36‑9‑615, the secured party shall:

(1) send an explanation to the debtor or consumer obligor, as applicable, after the disposition and:

(A) before or when the secured party accounts to the debtor and pays any surplus or first makes written demand on the consumer obligor after the disposition for payment of the deficiency; and

(B) within fourteen days after receipt of a request; or

(2) in the case of a consumer obligor who is liable for a deficiency, within fourteen days after receipt of a request, send to the consumer obligor a record waiving the secured party’s right to a deficiency.

(c) To comply with subsection (a)(1)(B), a writing must provide the following information in the following order:

(1) the aggregate amount of obligations secured by the security interest under which the disposition was made, and, if the amount reflects a rebate of unearned interest or credit service charge, an indication of that fact, calculated as of a specified date:

(A) if the secured party takes or receives possession of the collateral after default, not more than thirty‑five days before the secured party takes or receives possession; or

(B) if the secured party takes or receives possession of the collateral before default or does not take possession of the collateral, not more than thirty‑five days before the disposition;

(2) the amount of proceeds of the disposition;

(3) the aggregate amount of the obligations after deducting the amount of proceeds;

(4) the amount, in the aggregate or by type, and types of expenses, including expenses of retaking, holding, preparing for disposition, processing, and disposing of the collateral, and attorney’s fees secured by the collateral which are known to the secured party and relate to the current disposition;

(5) the amount, in the aggregate or by type, and types of credits, including rebates of interest or credit service charges, to which the obligor is known to be entitled and which are not reflected in the amount in item (1); and

(6) the amount of the surplus or deficiency.

(d) A particular phrasing of the explanation is not required. An explanation complying substantially with the requirements of subsection (a) is sufficient, even if it includes minor errors that are not seriously misleading.

(e) A debtor or consumer obligor is entitled without charge to one response to a request under this section during any six‑month period in which the secured party did not send to the debtor or consumer obligor an explanation pursuant to subsection (b)(1). The secured party may require payment of a charge not exceeding twenty‑five dollars for each additional response.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. New.

2. Duty to Send Information Concerning Surplus or Deficiency. This Section reflects the view that, in every consumer‑goods transaction, the debtor or obligor is entitled to know the amount of a surplus or deficiency and the basis upon which the surplus or deficiency was calculated. Under subsection (b)(1), a secured party is obligated to provide this information (an “explanation,” defined in subsection (a)(1)) no later than the time that it accounts for and pays a surplus or the time of its first written attempt to collect the deficiency. The obligor need not make a request for an accounting in order to receive an explanation. A secured party who does not attempt to collect a deficiency in writing or account for and pay a surplus has no obligation to send an explanation under subsection (b)(1) and, consequently, cannot be liable for noncompliance.

A debtor or secondary obligor need not wait until the secured party commences written collection efforts in order to receive an explanation of how a deficiency or surplus was calculated. Subsection (b)(2) obliges the secured party to send an explanation within 14 days after it receives a “request” (defined in subsection (a)(2)).

3. Explanation of Calculation of Surplus or Deficiency. Subsection (c) contains the requirements for how a calculation of a surplus or deficiency must be explained in order to satisfy subsection (a)(1)(B). It gives a secured party some discretion concerning rebates of interest or credit service charges. The secured party may include these rebates in the aggregate amount of obligations secured, under subsection (c)(1), or may include them with other types of rebates and credits under subsection (c)(5). Rebates of interest or credit service charges are the only types of rebates for which this discretion is provided. If the secured party provides an explanation that includes rebates of pre‑computed interest, its explanation must so indicate. The expenses and attorney’s fees to be described pursuant to subsection (c)(4) are those relating to the most recent disposition, not those that may have been incurred in connection with earlier enforcement efforts and which have been resolved by the parties.

4. Liability for Noncompliance. A secured party who fails to comply with subsection (b)(2) is liable for any loss caused plus $500. See Section 9‑625(b), (c), (e)(6). A secured party who fails to send an explanation under subsection (b)(1) is liable for any loss caused plus, if the noncompliance was “part of a pattern, or consistent with a practice of noncompliance,” $500. See Section 9‑625(b), (c), (e)(5). However, a secured party who fails to comply with this Section is not liable for statutory minimum damages under Section 9‑625(c)(2). See Section 9‑628(d).

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑616 requires a secured party in a consumer‑goods transaction who is obligated to pay a surplus to the debtor or attempts in writing to collect a deficiency from a consumer obligor to provide a written explanation of the calculation of the surplus or deficiency. Subsection (b) establishes the time within which the secured party must send the written explanation. Subsections (a)(1) and (c) specify the required content of the explanation. Subsections (a)(2) and (b)(1)(B) provide that a consumer obligor who is liable for a deficiency can request a written explanation and require the secured party to respond to the request. Subsection (e) addresses when a secured party can impose a charge for responding to a request for an explanation.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Authenticate” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(7) |
| “Collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Consumer‑goods transaction” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(24) |
| “Consumer obligor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(25) |
| “Debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “Record” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(69) |
| “Secured party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |
| “Writing” | Section 36‑1‑201(46) |

Cross References—

1. A debtor’s right to a surplus and an obligor’s liability for a deficiency following a disposition of collateral. Section 36‑9‑615(d).

2. A secured party’s liability for actual damages resulting from a failure to send a sufficient explanation. Section 36‑9‑625(b).

3. A secured party’s liability for statutory damages for failure to send a sufficient explanation. Section 36‑9‑625(e)(5).

4. A secured party’s liability for statutory damages for failure to respond to a consumer obligor’s request under Section 36‑9‑616(b)(2). Section 36‑9‑625(e)(6).

5. A secured party is not liable for minimum damages under Section 36‑9‑625(c)(2) for a failure to provide or respond to a request for an explanation of a surplus or deficiency under Section 36‑9‑616. Section 36‑9‑628(d).

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 237, 240.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak237; 349Ak240.

**SECTION 36‑9‑617.** Rights of transferee of collateral.

(a) A secured party’s disposition of collateral after default:

(1) transfers to a transferee for value all of the debtor’s rights in the collateral;

(2) discharges the security interest under which the disposition is made; and

(3) discharges any subordinate security interest or other subordinate lien.

(b) A transferee that acts in good faith takes free of the rights and interests described in subsection (a), even if the secured party fails to comply with this chapter or the requirements of any judicial proceeding.

(c) If a transferee does not take free of the rights and interests described in subsection (a), the transferee takes the collateral subject to:

(1) the debtor’s rights in the collateral;

(2) the security interest or agricultural lien under which the disposition is made; and

(3) any other security interest or other lien.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑504(4).

2. Title Taken by Good‑Faith Transferee. Subsection (a) sets forth the rights acquired by persons who qualify under subsection (b)‑transferees who act in good faith. Such a person is a “transferee,” inasmuch as a buyer at a foreclosure sale does not meet the definition of “ purchaser” in Section 1‑201 (the transfer is not, vis‑a‑vis the debtor, “voluntary”). By virtue of the expanded definition of the term “debtor” in Section 9‑102, subsection (a) makes clear that the ownership interest of a person who bought the collateral subject to the security interest is terminated by a subsequent disposition under this Part. Such a person is a debtor under this Article. Under former Article 9, the result arguably was the same, but the statute was less clear. Under subsection (a), a disposition normally discharges the security interest being foreclosed and any subordinate security interests and other liens.

A disposition has the effect specified in subsection (a), even if the secured party fails to comply with this Article. An aggrieved person (e.g., the holder of a subordinate security interest to whom a notification required by Section 9‑611 was not sent) has a right to recover any loss under Section 9‑625(b).

3. Unitary Standard in Public and Private Dispositions. Subsection (b) now contains a unitary standard that applies to transferees in both private and public dispositions‑acting in good faith. However, this change from former Section 9‑504(4) should not be interpreted to mean that a transferee acts in good faith even though it has knowledge of defects or buys in collusion, standards applicable to public dispositions under the former Section. Properly understood, those standards were specific examples of the absence of good faith.

4. Title Taken by Nonqualifying Transferee. Subsection (c) specifies the consequences for a transferee who does not qualify for protection under subsections (a) and (b) (i.e., a transferee who does not act in good faith). The transferee takes subject to the rights of the debtor, the enforcing secured party, and other security interests or other liens.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑617 defines the rights acquired by a transferee at a secured party’s disposition of collateral. Subsection (a) provides that a disposition to a transferee for value transfers the debtor’s title to the collateral and discharges the security interest under which the disposition was made and any subordinate security interest or lien. The transferee, however, takes subject to security interests or liens senior to the security interest under which the disposition was made. Subsection (b) provides that a transferee that acts in good faith takes free of the rights and interests described in subsection (a), even if the disposition failed to conform to the requirements imposed under part 6. Subsection (c) makes clear that a transferee who does not take free of the rights and interests specified in subsection (a), takes subject to these interests.

Purchasers at a disposition of a business debtor’s assets should be aware of Section 12‑36‑530, S.C. Code Ann. (2000). Under that provision when the assets of a retailer are sold any unpaid State sales tax is considered to be due and constitutes a lien against the inventory, fixtures, and equipment in the hands of the purchaser. Moreover, until all taxes due the State are paid, the Department of Revenue cannot issue a retail license to purchaser to continue or conduct business.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Agricultural lien” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(5) |
| “Collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Good faith” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(43) |
| “Secured party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |
| “Value” | Section 36‑1‑201(44) [see now Section 36‑1‑204] |

Cross References—

1. Disposition of collateral after default. Section 36‑9‑610.

2. Notification of disposition of collateral. Section 36‑9‑611.

3. Timeliness of notification of disposition of collateral. Section 36‑9‑612.

4. Contents of and forms for notification of disposition of collateral. Sections 36‑9‑613 and 36‑9‑614.

Code Commissioner’s Note

In 2014, at the direction of the Code Commissioner, in subsection (a)(3), deleted “[other than liens created under [cite acts or statutes providing for liens, if any, that are not to be discharged]]” to correct an error.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 234.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak234.

**SECTION 36‑9‑618.** Rights and duties of certain secondary obligors.

(a) A secondary obligor acquires the rights and becomes obligated to perform the duties of the secured party after the secondary obligor:

(1) receives an assignment of a secured obligation from the secured party;

(2) receives a transfer of collateral from the secured party and agrees to accept the rights and assume the duties of the secured party; or

(3) is subrogated to the rights of a secured party with respect to collateral.

(b) An assignment, transfer, or subrogation described in subsection (a):

(1) is not a disposition of collateral under Section 36‑9‑610; and

(2) relieves the secured party of further duties under this chapter.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑504(5).

2. Scope of This Section. Under this Section, assignments of secured obligations and other transactions (regardless of form) that function like assignments of secured obligations are not dispositions to which Part 6 applies. Rather, they constitute assignments of rights and (occasionally) delegations of duties. Application of this Section may require an investigation into the agreement of the parties, which may not be reflected in the words of the repurchase agreement (e.g., when the agreement requires a recourse party to “purchase the collateral” but contemplates that the purchaser will then conduct an Article 9 foreclosure disposition).

This Section, like former Section 9‑504(5), does not constitute a general and comprehensive rule for allocating rights and duties upon assignment of a secured obligation. Rather, it applies only in situations involving a secondary obligor described in subsection (a). In other contexts, the agreement of the parties and applicable law other than Article 9 determine whether the assignment imposes upon the assignee any duty to the debtor and whether the assignor retains its duties to the debtor after the assignment.

Subsection (a)(1) applies when there has been an assignment of an obligation that is secured at the time it is assigned. Thus, if a secondary obligor acquires the collateral at a disposition under Section 9‑610 and simultaneously or subsequently discharges the unsecured deficiency claim, subsection (a)(1) is not implicated. Similarly, subsection (a)(3) applies only when the secondary obligor is subrogated to the secured party’s rights with respect to collateral. Thus, this subsection will not be implicated if a secondary obligor discharges the debtor’s unsecured obligation for a post‑ disposition deficiency. Similarly, if the secured party disposes of some of the collateral and the secondary obligor thereafter discharges the remaining obligation, subsection (a) applies only with respect to rights and duties concerning the remaining collateral, and, under subsection (b), the subrogation is not a disposition of the remaining collateral.

As discussed more fully in Comment 3, a secondary obligor may receive a transfer of collateral in a disposition under Section 9‑610 in exchange for a payment that is applied against the secured obligation. However, a secondary obligor who pays and receives a transfer of collateral does not necessarily become subrogated to the rights of the secured party as contemplated by subsection (a)(3). Only to the extent the secondary obligor makes a payment in satisfaction of its secondary obligation would it become subrogated. To the extent its payment constitutes the price of the collateral in a Section 9‑610 disposition by the secured party, the secondary obligor would not be subrogated. Thus, if the amount paid by the secondary obligor for the collateral in a Section 9‑610 disposition is itself insufficient to discharge the secured obligation, but the secondary obligor makes an additional payment that satisfies the remaining balance, the secondary obligor would be subrogated to the secured party’s deficiency claim. However, the duties of the secured party as such would have come to an end with respect to that collateral. In some situations the capacity in which the payment is made may be unclear. Accordingly, the parties should in their relationship provide clear evidence of the nature and circumstances of the payment by the secondary obligor.

3. Transfer of Collateral to Secondary Obligor. It is possible for a secured party to transfer collateral to a secondary obligor in a transaction that is a disposition under Section 9‑610 and that establishes a surplus or deficiency under Section 9‑615. Indeed, this Article includes a special rule, in Section 9‑615(f), for establishing a deficiency in the case of some dispositions to, inter alia, secondary obligors. This Article rejects the view, which some may have ascribed to former Section 9‑504(5), that a transfer of collateral to a recourse party can never constitute a disposition of collateral which discharges a security interest. Inasmuch as a secured party could itself buy collateral at its own public sale, it makes no sense to prohibit a recourse party ever from buying at the sale.

4. Timing and Scope of Obligations. Under subsection (a), a recourse party acquires rights and incurs obligations only “after” one of the specified circumstances occurs. This makes clear that when a successor assignee, transferee, or subrogee becomes obligated it does not assume any liability for earlier actions or inactions of the secured party whom it has succeeded unless it agrees to do so. Once the successor becomes obligated, however, it is responsible for complying with the secured party’s duties thereafter. For example, if the successor is in possession of collateral, then it has the duties specified in Section 9‑207.

Under subsection (b), the same event (assignment, transfer, or subrogation) that gives rise to rights to, and imposes obligations on, a successor relieves its predecessor of any further duties under this Article. For example, if the security interest is enforced after the secured obligation is assigned, the assignee‑but not the assignor‑has the duty to comply with this Part. Similarly, the assignment does not excuse the assignor from liability for failure to comply with duties that arose before the event or impose liability on the assignee for the assignor’s failure to comply.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑618 addresses the situation in which a secondary obligor under a secured obligation takes an assignment of the obligation from the secured party, receives a transfer of the collateral from a secured party and agrees to accept the rights and duties of the secured party, or is subrogated to the rights of a secured party with respect to the collateral. For example, Section 36‑9‑618 would apply when a guarantor of a secured obligation that is in default pays the secured party under the terms of the guaranty and receives from the secured party an assignment of the secured obligation. In this situation, subsection (a) provides that the guarantor acquires the rights and becomes subject to the obligations of the secured party. Subsection (b)(1) provides that the assignment to the guarantor is not a disposition of collateral within the scope of Section 36‑9‑610. Moreover, subsection (b)(2) provides that the assignment relieves the secured party of further duties under Article 9.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Secondary obligor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(71) |
| “Secured party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |

Cross References—

1. Secured party’s obligation to conduct a disposition of collateral in a commercially reasonable manner. Section 36‑9‑610(b).

2. Secured party’s obligation to send reasonable notification of a disposition of collateral. Sections 36‑9‑611 to 36‑9‑614.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 183, 229.1.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak183; 349Ak229.1.

**SECTION 36‑9‑619.** Transfer of record or legal title.

(a) In this section, “transfer statement” means a record authenticated by a secured party stating:

(1) that the debtor has defaulted in connection with an obligation secured by specified collateral;

(2) that the secured party has exercised its post‑default remedies with respect to the collateral;

(3) that, by reason of the exercise, a transferee has acquired the rights of the debtor in the collateral; and

(4) the name and mailing address of the secured party, debtor, and transferee.

(b) A transfer statement entitles the transferee to the transfer of record of all rights of the debtor in the collateral specified in the statement in any official filing, recording, registration, or certificate‑of‑title system covering the collateral. If a transfer statement is presented with the applicable fee and request form to the official or office responsible for maintaining the system, the official or office shall:

(1) accept the transfer statement;

(2) promptly amend its records to reflect the transfer; and

(3) if applicable, issue a new appropriate certificate of title in the name of the transferee.

(c) A transfer of the record or legal title to collateral to a secured party under subsection (b) or otherwise is not of itself a disposition of collateral under this chapter and does not of itself relieve the secured party of its duties under this chapter.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. New.

2. Transfer of Record or Legal Title. Potential buyers of collateral that is covered by a certificate of title (e.g., an automobile) or is subject to a registration system (e.g., a copyright) typically require as a condition of their purchase that the certificate or registry reflect their ownership. In many cases, this condition can be met only with the consent of the record owner. If the record owner is the debtor and, as may be the case after the default, the debtor refuses to cooperate, the secured party may have great difficulty disposing of the collateral.

Subsection (b) provides a simple mechanism for obtaining record or legal title, for use primarily when other law does not provide one. Of course, use of this mechanism will not be effective to clear title to the extent that subsection (b) is preempted by federal law. Subsection (b) contemplates a transfer of record or legal title to a third party, following a secured party’s exercise of its disposition or acceptance remedies under this Part, as well as a transfer by a debtor to a secured party prior to the secured party’s exercise of those remedies. Under subsection (c), a transfer of record or legal title (under subsection (b) or under other law) to a secured party prior to the exercise of those remedies merely puts the secured party in a position to pass legal or record title to a transferee at foreclosure. A secured party who has obtained record or legal title retains its duties with respect to enforcement of its security interest, and the debtor retains its rights as well.

3. Title‑Clearing Systems Under Other Law. Applicable non‑UCC law (e.g., a certificate‑of‑title statute, federal registry rules, or the like) may provide a means by which the secured party may obtain or transfer record or legal title for the purpose of a disposition of the property under this Article. The mechanism provided by this Section is in addition to any title‑ clearing provision under law other than this Article.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Under Section 9‑619 a secured party may issue a transfer statement following a disposition of collateral. A transfer statement is an authenticated record which states that a debtor has defaulted under an obligation secured by specified collateral, that the secured party has exercised its post‑default remedies, and that by reason of that exercise the transferee has acquired the debtor’s rights in the collateral. The transfer statement must also give the name and mailing address of the secured party, the debtor, and the transferee. The principal function of the transfer statement is to enable a buyer of goods subject to a certificate of title statute at a disposition under Part 6 to have the goods titled in the buyer’s name. Section 9‑619(b) provides that upon tending a transfer statement and the appropriate fee to the office responsible for maintaining the certificate of title system, the office must accept the statement, amend its records to reflect the transfer, and issue a new appropriate certificate of title in the name of the transferee.

Section 56‑19‑390 to 15‑19‑420, S.C. Code Ann. (1976 and Supp. 1999) provide procedures under which a purchaser of a motor vehicle at a sale to enforce a security interest can obtain a certificate of title listing the purchaser as the owner of the motor vehicle. Subsection 56‑19‑390(1), S.C. Code Ann. (Supp. 1999) applies to all involuntary transfers of an owner’s interest in motor vehicles and this provision requires the transferee to deliver to the Department of Highways and Public Transportation “the last certificate of title, if available, proof of transfer and his application for a new certificate.” Subsection 56‑19‑390(1), however, is subject to subsection (2) which applies only to sales to enforce security interests and statutory liens under Section 29‑15‑10, S.C. Code Ann. (1976). Subsection (2) requires the purchaser at a nonjudicial sale to enforce a security interest to submit to the Department the last certificate of title covering the vehicle, an application for a new certificate, and an affidavit that the vehicle was repossessed and that the interest of owner was lawfully terminated or sold pursuant to the terms of a security agreement. Section 56‑19‑400 requires the Department to issue a new certificate of title to the purchaser upon receipt of the application, the required fee, and “any other documents required by law.”

The effect of adopting Section 36‑9‑619, is to provide an alternative method under which a purchaser of a motor vehicle at a sale following a repossession can obtain a new certificate of title. The Department of Highways and Public Transportation is required to issue a new certificate to the purchaser if the purchaser either complies with the requirements of Sections 56‑19‑390 and 400 or if the purchaser submits a transfer statement under Section 39‑9‑619 accompanied by the required fee and application form.

Section 50‑23‑130 (Supp. 1999) provides procedure under which the purchaser of watercraft or outboard motors at a sale to enforce a security interest can obtain a new certificate of title. Under subsection 50‑23‑130(a) the transferee of a watercraft or outboard motor by a “repossession upon default in performance of the terms of a security agreement” is required to deliver to the Department of Wildlife and Fisheries the last certificate of title if available or satisfactory proof of the transfer, an application for a new certificate, and the required fee. Subsection (a), however, is subject to subsection (b) which applies when the ownership of a watercraft or outboard motor is terminated in accordance with the terms of a security agreement. Under subsection (b) the transferee is required to deliver to the department the last certificate of title, an application for a new certificate, the prescribed filing fee, and an affidavit of the secured party setting forth facts entitling him to possession and ownership of the watercraft or outboard motor.

The effect of adopting Section 36‑9‑619 is to provide purchasers at sales to enforce security interests on watercraft and outboard motors two methods of obtaining a new certificate of title. The purchaser can either comply with the requirements of Section 50‑23‑130 or submit a transfer statement under Section 36‑9‑619 accompanied by an application for a new certificate and the prescribed filing fee.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Authenticate” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(7) |
| “Certificate of title” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(10) |
| “Collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “Record” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(69) |
| “Secured party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |

Cross References—

1. Perfection of security interests in goods subject to certificate of title statutes. Section 36‑9‑311(a)(2)(3).

2. Rights of transferees who acquire collateral at a secured party’s disposition after default. Section 36‑9‑617.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 229.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak229.

**SECTION 36‑9‑620.** Acceptance of collateral in full or partial satisfaction of obligation; compulsory disposition of collateral.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (g), a secured party may accept collateral in full or partial satisfaction of the obligation it secures only if:

(1) the debtor consents to the acceptance under subsection (c);

(2) the secured party does not receive, within the time set forth in subsection (d), a notification of objection to the proposal authenticated by:

(A) a person to which the secured party was required to send a proposal under Section 36‑9‑621; or

(B) any other person, other than the debtor, holding an interest in the collateral subordinate to the security interest that is the subject of the proposal;

(3) if the collateral is consumer goods, the collateral is not in the possession of the debtor when the debtor consents to the acceptance; and

(4) subsection (e) does not require the secured party to dispose of the collateral or the debtor waives the requirement pursuant to Section 36‑9‑624.

(b) A purported or apparent acceptance of collateral under this Section is ineffective unless:

(1) the secured party consents to the acceptance in an authenticated record or sends a proposal to the debtor; and

(2) the conditions of subsection (a) are met.

(c) For purposes of this section:

(1) a debtor consents to an acceptance of collateral in partial satisfaction of the obligation it secures only if the debtor agrees to the terms of the acceptance in a record authenticated after default; and

(2) a debtor consents to an acceptance of collateral in full satisfaction of the obligation it secures only if the debtor agrees to the terms of the acceptance in a record authenticated after default or the secured party:

(A) sends to the debtor after default a proposal that is unconditional or subject only to a condition that collateral not in the possession of the secured party be preserved or maintained;

(B) in the proposal, proposes to accept collateral in full satisfaction of the obligation it secures; and

(C) does not receive a notification of objection authenticated by the debtor within twenty days after the proposal is sent.

(d) To be effective under subsection (a)(2), a notification of objection must be received by the secured party:

(1) in the case of a person to which the proposal was sent pursuant to Section 36‑9‑621, within twenty days after notification was sent to that person; and

(2) in other cases:

(A) within twenty days after the last notification was sent pursuant to Section 36‑9‑621; or

(B) if a notification was not sent, before the debtor consents to the acceptance under subsection (c).

(e) A secured party that has taken possession of collateral shall dispose of the collateral pursuant to Section 36‑9‑610 within the time specified in subsection (f) if:

(1) sixty percent of the cash price has been paid in the case of a purchase‑money security interest in consumer goods; or

(2) sixty percent of the principal amount of the obligation secured has been paid in the case of a nonpurchase‑money security interest in consumer goods.

(f) To comply with subsection (e), the secured party shall dispose of the collateral:

(1) within ninety days after taking possession; or

(2) within any longer period to which the debtor and all secondary obligors have agreed in an agreement to that effect entered into and authenticated after default.

(g) In a consumer transaction, a secured party may not accept collateral in partial satisfaction of the obligation it secures.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑505.

2. Overview. This Section and the two Sections following deal with strict foreclosure, a procedure by which the secured party acquires the debtor’s interest in the collateral without the need for a sale or other disposition under Section 9‑610. Although these provisions derive from former Section 9‑505, they have been entirely reorganized and substantially rewritten. The more straightforward approach taken in this Article eliminates the fiction that the secured party always will present a “proposal” for the retention of collateral and the debtor will have a fixed period to respond. By eliminating the need (but preserving the possibility) for proceeding in that fashion, this Section eliminates much of the awkwardness of former Section 9‑505. It reflects the belief that strict foreclosures should be encouraged and often will produce better results than a disposition for all concerned.

Subsection (a) sets forth the conditions necessary to an effective acceptance (formerly, retention) of collateral in full or partial satisfaction of the secured obligation. Section 9‑621 requires in addition that a secured party who wishes to proceed under this Section notify certain other persons who have or claim to have an interest in the collateral. Unlike the failure to meet the conditions in subsection (a), under Section 9‑622(b) the failure to comply with the notification requirement of Section 9‑621 does not render the acceptance of collateral ineffective. Rather, the acceptance can take effect notwithstanding the secured party’s noncompliance. A person to whom the required notice was not sent has the right to recover damages under Section 9‑625(b). Section 9‑622(a) sets forth the effect of an acceptance of collateral.

3. Conditions to Effective Acceptance. Subsection (a) contains the conditions necessary to the effectiveness of an acceptance of collateral. Subsection (a)(1) requires the debtor’s consent. Under subsections (c)(1) and (c)(2), the debtor may consent by agreeing to the acceptance in writing after default. Subsection (c)(2) contains an alternative method by which to satisfy the debtor’s‑consent condition in subsection (a)(1). It follows the proposal‑and‑objection model found in former Section 9‑505: The debtor consents if the secured party sends a proposal to the debtor and does not receive an objection within 20 days. Under subsection (c)(1), however, that silence is not deemed to be consent with respect to acceptances in partial satisfaction. Thus, a secured party who wishes to conduct a “partial strict foreclosure” must obtain the debtor’s agreement in a record authenticated after default. In all other respects, the conditions necessary to an effective partial strict foreclosure are the same as those governing acceptance of collateral in full satisfaction. (But see subsection (g), prohibiting partial strict foreclosure of a security interest in consumer transactions.)

The time when a debtor consents to a strict foreclosure is significant in several circumstances under this Section and the following one. See Sections 9‑620(a)(1), (d)(2), 9‑621(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3). For purposes of determining the time of consent, a debtor’s conditional consent constitutes consent.

Subsection (a)(2) contains the second condition to the effectiveness of an acceptance under this Section‑the absence of a timely objection from a person holding a junior interest in the collateral or from a secondary obligor. Any junior party‑secured party or lienholder‑is entitled to lodge an objection to a proposal, even if that person was not entitled to notification under Section 9‑621. Subsection (d), discussed below, indicates when an objection is timely.

Subsections (a)(3) and (a)(4) contain special rules for transactions in which consumers are involved. See Comment 12.

4. Proposals. Section 9‑102 defines the term “proposal.” It is necessary to send a “proposal” to the debtor only if the debtor does not agree to an acceptance in an authenticated record as described in subsection (c)(1) or (c)(2). Section 9‑621(a) determines whether it is necessary to send a proposal to third parties. A proposal need not take any particular form as long as it sets forth the terms under which the secured party is willing to accept collateral in satisfaction. A proposal to accept collateral should specify the amount (or a means of calculating the amount, such as by including a per diem accrual figure) of the secured obligations to be satisfied, state the conditions (if any) under which the proposal may be revoked, and describe any other applicable conditions. Note, however, that a conditional proposal generally requires the debtor’s agreement in order to take effect. See subsection (c).

5. Secured Party’s Agreement; No “Constructive” Strict Foreclosure. The conditions of subsection (a) relate to actual or implied consent by the debtor and any secondary obligor or holder of a junior security interest or lien. To ensure that the debtor cannot unilaterally cause an acceptance of collateral, subsection (b) provides that compliance with these conditions is necessary but not sufficient to cause an acceptance of collateral. Rather, under subsection (b), acceptance does not occur unless, in addition, the secured party consents to the acceptance in an authenticated record or sends to the debtor a proposal. For this reason, a mere delay in collection or disposition of collateral does not constitute a “constructive” strict foreclosure. Instead, delay is a factor relating to whether the secured party acted in a commercially reasonable manner for purposes of Section 9‑607 or 9‑610. A debtor’s voluntary surrender of collateral to a secured party and the secured party’s acceptance of possession of the collateral does not, of itself, necessarily raise an implication that the secured party intends or is proposing to accept the collateral in satisfaction of the secured obligation under this Section.

6. When Acceptance Occurs. This Section does not impose any formalities or identify any steps that a secured party must take in order to accept collateral once the conditions of subsections (a) and (b) have been met. Absent facts or circumstances indicating a contrary intention, the fact that the conditions have been met provides a sufficient indication that the secured party has accepted the collateral on the terms to which the secured party has consented or proposed and the debtor has consented or failed to object. Following a proposal, acceptance of the collateral normally is automatic upon the secured party’s becoming bound and the time for objection passing. As a matter of good business practice, an enforcing secured party may wish to memorialize its acceptance following a proposal, such as by notifying the debtor that the strict foreclosure is effective or by placing a written record to that effect in its files. The secured party’s agreement to accept collateral is self‑executing and cannot be breached. The secured party is bound by its agreement to accept collateral and by any proposal to which the debtor consents.

7. No Possession Requirement. This Section eliminates the requirement in former Section 9‑505 that the secured party be “in possession” of collateral. It clarifies that intangible collateral, which cannot be possessed, may be subject to a strict foreclosure under this Section. However, under subsection (a)(3), if the collateral is consumer goods, acceptance does not occur unless the debtor is not in possession.

8. When Objection Timely. Subsection (d) explains when an objection is timely and thus prevents an acceptance of collateral from taking effect. An objection by a person to which notification was sent under Section 9‑621 is effective if it is received by the secured party within 20 days from the date the notification was sent to that person. Other objecting parties (i.e., third parties who are not entitled to notification) may object at any time within 20 days after the last notification is sent under Section 9‑621. If no such notification is sent, third parties must object before the debtor agrees to the acceptance in writing or is deemed to have consented by silence. The former may occur any time after default, and the latter requires a 20‑day waiting period. See subsection (c).

9. Applicability of Other Law. This Section does not purport to regulate all aspects of the transaction by which a secured party may become the owner of collateral previously owned by the debtor. For example, a secured party’s acceptance of a motor vehicle in satisfaction of secured obligations may require compliance with the applicable motor vehicle certificate‑of‑title law. State legislatures should conform those laws so that they mesh well with this Section and Section 9‑610, and courts should construe those laws and this Section harmoniously. A secured party’s acceptance of collateral in the possession of the debtor also may implicate statutes dealing with a seller’s retention of possession of goods sold.

10. Accounts, Chattel Paper, Payment Intangibles, and Promissory Notes. If the collateral is accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes, then a secured party’s acceptance of the collateral in satisfaction of secured obligations would constitute a sale to the secured party. That sale normally would give rise to a new security interest (the ownership interest) under Sections 1‑201(37) and 9‑109. In the case of accounts and chattel paper, the new security interest would remain perfected by a filing that was effective to perfect the secured party’s original security interest. In the case of payment intangibles or promissory notes, the security interest would be perfected when it attaches. See Section 9‑309. However, the procedures for acceptance of collateral under this Section satisfy all necessary formalities and a new security agreement authenticated by the debtor would not be necessary.

11. Role of Good Faith. Section 1‑203 imposes an obligation of good faith on a secured party’s enforcement under this Article. This obligation may not be disclaimed by agreement. See Section 1‑102. Thus, a proposal and acceptance made under this Section in bad faith would not be effective. For example, a secured party’s proposal to accept marketable securities worth $1, 000 in full satisfaction of indebtedness in the amount of $100, made in the hopes that the debtor might inadvertently fail to object, would be made in bad faith. On the other hand, in the normal case proposals and acceptances should be not second‑guessed on the basis of the “value” of the collateral involved. Disputes about valuation or even a clear excess of collateral value over the amount of obligations satisfied do not necessarily demonstrate the absence of good faith.

12. Special Rules in Consumer Cases. Subsection (e) imposes an obligation on the secured party to dispose of consumer goods under certain circumstances. Subsection (f) explains when a disposition that is required under subsection (e) is timely. An effective acceptance of collateral cannot occur if subsection (e) requires a disposition unless the debtor waives this requirement pursuant to Section 9‑624(b). Moreover, a secured party who takes possession of collateral and unreasonably delays disposition violates subsection (e), if applicable, and may also violate Section 9‑610 or other provisions of this Part. Subsection (e) eliminates as superfluous the express statutory reference to “conversion” found in former Section 9‑505. Remedies available under other law, including conversion, remain available under this Article in appropriate cases. See Sections 1‑103, 1‑106.

Subsection (g) prohibits the secured party in consumer transactions from accepting collateral in partial satisfaction of the obligation it secures. If a secured party attempts an acceptance in partial satisfaction in a consumer transaction, the attempted acceptance is void.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑620 sets forth the rules governing the strict foreclosure of security interests. The most significant change from prior law under former Section 36‑9‑505 is that in transactions other than consumer transactions the secured party can accept collateral in partial satisfaction of a secured obligation. See Section 36‑9‑620(a) and (g).

Section 36‑9‑620 envisions a process commencing when after default the secured party sends the debtor and persons the secured party is required to notify under Section 36‑9‑621 a proposal to accept collateral in satisfaction of a secured obligation. Subsection (a) states the conditions for an effective acceptance. That provision imposes two basic requirements. First, the debtor must consent to the acceptance under subsection (c). Second, the secured party must not have received a timely notification of objection to the acceptance under subsection (d) from a person specified in subsection (2)(A) or (B). Subsections (a)(3) and (4), (e), (f), and (g) impose further restrictions upon an effective acceptance in consumer transactions.

Subsection (b)(1) provides that a purported or apparent acceptance of collateral in satisfaction of an obligation is ineffective unless the secured party expressly consents to the acceptance. This provision addresses the problem that arises when a secured party takes possession of collateral following a default and delays in disposing of the collateral. Under former law, some courts held that the delay in disposing of the collateral could constitute a constructive strict foreclosure. See, e.g., Lamp Fair, Inc. v. Perez‑Ortiz, 888 F. 2d 173, 176 (1st Cir. 1989); Millican v. Turner, 503 So 2d 289, 291 (Miss. 1987). By precluding constructive strict foreclosure, Section 36‑9‑620(b)(1) establishes that a debtor cannot compel a secured party to accept collateral in satisfaction of a debt. See Section 36‑9‑620, Official Comment 5.

Section 36‑9‑620(1)(b) clarifies the law of South Carolina. In Andrews v. Van Elton and Walker, Inc., 315 S.C. 199, 432 S.E. 2d 500 (Ct. App. 1993), the Court of Appeals considered a case involving an apparent constructive strict foreclosure. The secured party in Andrews lawfully repossessed the business assets of a debtor securing the debtor’s obligations under a consulting and a noncompetition agreement. The secured party retained the assets and used them in the operation of the business without providing the debtor written notice of a proposal to retain the assets in satisfaction of the secured obligations. See former Section 36‑9‑505(2). The court held that the retention of the collateral did not necessarily result in the satisfaction of the obligations. Rather Andrews held that the trial court must first determine whether the secured party acted in a commercially reasonable manner in retaining the collateral. If that conduct was commercially unreasonable, the court asserted that a rebuttable presumption would arise that had the collateral been disposed of in a commercially reasonable manner the secured obligation would have been satisfied. The Court noted that the secured party could rebut this presumption by proving that the value of the collateral was less than the amount of the debt at the time of the repossession. If the secured party fails to rebut the presumption, the Court held that the secured party had “by retention of the collateral elected to accept it in satisfaction of his (total) indebtedness.” 315 S.C. at 204, 432 S.E. 2d at 503. Although the quoted language suggests that the Court adopted the position that the retention of the collateral can constitute a constructive strict foreclosure, the opinion when read in its entirety belies that conclusion. More accurately stated the holding in Andrews appears to be that the secured party will be precluded from recovering a deficiency to the extent it fails to rebut the presumption that the value of the collateral equaled the amount of the debt.

Had Andrews v. Von Elton and Walker been decided under the current statute, the Court would have reached the same result. Assuming that the secured party’s retention of the collateral was commercially unreasonable, under Section 36‑9‑626(3)(8) the debtor’s liability for a deficiency would be limited to the amount by which the secured obligation exceeds the amount that would have been realized had the collateral been disposed of in a commercially reasonable manner. Moreover, for the purpose of determining that deficiency, Section 36‑9‑626(a)(4) provides a rebuttable presumption that the proceeds of a commercially reasonable disposition would have satisfied the full amount of the secured obligation.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Agreement” | Section 36‑1‑201(3) |
| “Authenticate” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(7) |
| “Collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Consumer good” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(23) |
| “Consumer transaction” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(26) |
| “Debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “Notification” | Section 36‑1‑201(26) [see now Section 36‑1‑202] |
| “Person” | Section 36‑1‑201(30) |
| “Proposal” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(66) |
| “Purchase‑money security interest” | Section 36‑9‑103 |
| “Record” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(69) |
| “Secondary obligor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(71) |
| “Secured party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |
| “Send” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(74) |

Cross References—

1. Persons to whom a secured party must send notification of a proposal to accept collateral in satisfaction of a secured obligation. Section 36‑9‑621.

2. Effect of acceptance of collateral. Section 36‑9‑622.

3. Post‑default waiver of the mandatory disposition of consumer goods under Section 36‑9‑620(e). Section 36‑9‑624(b).

4. The effect of a retention of collateral despite a timely notification of an objection to a proposal to accept collateral in satisfaction of an obligation. Section 36‑9‑622, Official Comment 2.

5. A secured party’s liability for actual damages resulting from a failure to comply with the requirements for acceptance of collateral in full or partial satisfaction of an obligation. Section 36‑9‑625(b).

6. A secured party’s liability for minimum damages for failure to comply with the requirements for acceptance of collateral in satisfaction of an obligation when the collateral consists of consumer goods. Sections 36‑9‑625(c) and 36‑9‑628(c) and (e).

7. Determining a debtor’s liability for a deficiency in a transaction other than a consumer transaction when the secured party fails to prove that it conducted an acceptance of collateral in accordance with the requirements of Section 36‑9‑620. Section 36‑9‑626(a).

8. Determining a debtor’s liability for a deficiency in a consumer transaction when the secured party failed to conduct an acceptance of collateral in accordance with the requirements of Section 36‑9‑620. Section 36‑9‑626(b).

CROSS REFERENCES

Discharge of account debtor, notification, identification, and proof of assignment, restrictions on assignment of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes ineffective, see Section 36‑9‑406.

Restrictions on assignment of promissory notes, health‑care‑insurance receivables, and certain general intangibles ineffective, see Section 36‑9‑408.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 238, 239.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak238; 349Ak239.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 1

1. In general

A secured creditor’s simultaneous pursuit of the alternate remedies of repossessing the collateral and filing suit on the contract without first disposing of the collateral is proper under both the UCC and the security agreement where the value of the collateral at the time of repossession is less than the amount due. Andrews v. von Elten & Walker, Inc. (S.C.App. 1993) 315 S.C. 199, 432 S.E.2d 500.

Once a default on an obligation has occurred, the secured party is authorized to take possession of the collateral, proceed to reduce the debt to judgment, foreclose on the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner, or retain the goods in satisfaction of his claim. Andrews v. von Elten & Walker, Inc. (S.C.App. 1993) 315 S.C. 199, 432 S.E.2d 500.

A secured party did not waive his claim to a deficiency judgment by failing to dispose of the collateral by sale after repossession pursuant to Section 36‑9‑505(1) since (1) the goods at hand consisted of photography equipment used in a photography business and thus were not consumer goods, and (2) there was no indication that the secured party proposed the retention of the collateral to be in satisfaction of the debt pursuant to Section 36‑9‑505(2). Skinner v. Elrod (S.C.App. 1992) 308 S.C. 239, 417 S.E.2d 599.

**SECTION 36‑9‑621.** Notification of proposal to accept collateral.

(a) A secured party that desires to accept collateral in full or partial satisfaction of the obligation it secures shall send its proposal to:

(1) any person from which the secured party has received, before the debtor consented to the acceptance, an authenticated notification of a claim of an interest in the collateral;

(2) any other secured party or lienholder that, ten days before the debtor consented to the acceptance, held a security interest in or other lien on the collateral perfected by the filing of a financing statement that:

(A) identified the collateral;

(B) was indexed under the debtor’s name as of that date; and

(C) was filed in the office or offices in which to file a financing statement against the debtor covering the collateral as of that date; and

(3) any other secured party that, ten days before the debtor consented to the acceptance, held a security interest in the collateral perfected by compliance with a statute, regulation, or treaty described in Section 36‑9‑311(a).

(b) A secured party that desires to accept collateral in partial satisfaction of the obligation it secures shall send its proposal to any secondary obligor in addition to the persons described in subsection (a).

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑505.

2. Notification Requirement. Subsection (a) specifies three classes of competing claimants to whom the secured party must send notification of its proposal: (i) those who notify the secured party that they claim an interest in the collateral, (ii) holders of certain security interests and liens who have filed against the debtor, and (iii) holders of certain security interests who have perfected by compliance with a statute (including a certificate‑of‑title statute), regulation, or treaty described in Section 9‑311(a). With regard to (ii), see Section 9‑611, Comment 4. Subsection (b) also requires notification to any secondary obligor if the proposal is for acceptance in partial satisfaction.

Unlike Section 9‑611, this Section contains no “safe harbor,” which excuses an enforcing secured party from notifying certain secured parties and other lienholders. This is because, unlike Section 9‑610, which requires that a disposition of collateral be commercially reasonable, Section 9‑620 permits the debtor and secured party to set the amount of credit the debtor will receive for the collateral subject only to the requirement of good faith. An effective acceptance discharges subordinate security interests and other subordinate liens. See Section 9‑622. If collateral is subject to several liens securing debts much larger than the value of the collateral, the debtor may be disinclined to refrain from consenting to an acceptance by the holder of the senior security interest, even though, had the debtor objected and the senior disposed of the collateral under Section 9‑610, the collateral may have yielded more than enough to satisfy the senior security interest (but not enough to satisfy all the liens). Accordingly, this Section imposes upon the enforcing secured party the risk of the filing office’s errors and delay. The holder of a security interest who is entitled to notification under this Section but does not receive it has the right to recover under Section 9‑625(b) any loss resulting from the enforcing secured party’s noncompliance with this Section.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑621 specifies the persons in addition to the debtor to whom a secured party must send a proposal to accept collateral in satisfaction of a secured obligation. Subsection (a) applies to proposals to accept collateral either in full or partial satisfaction of an obligation. Under that provision a secured party must send the proposal to a person from whom the secured party received an authenticated notification of a claim in the collateral before the debtor consented to the acceptance. Subsection (a) also requires the secured party to pay to send the proposal to any other secured party or lienholder who perfected by filing or under a certificate of title statute ten days before the debtor consented to the acceptance.

Subsection (b) applies to proposals to accept collateral in partial satisfaction and requires the secured party to send the proposal to secondary obligors, as well as, the persons designated in subsection (a).

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Authenticate” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(7) |
| “Collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “Debtor’s name” | Section 36‑9‑503(a)‑(c) |
| “Financing statement” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(39) |
| “Person” | Section 36‑1‑201(30) |
| “Proposal” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(66) |
| “Secondary obligor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(71) |
| “Secured party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |
| “Send” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(74) |

Cross References—

1. Requirements for acceptance of collateral in full or partial satisfaction of a secured obligation. Section 36‑9‑620.

2. Effect of acceptance of collateral. Section 36‑9‑622.

3. Notification of a disposition of collateral following a default. Section 36‑9‑611.

4. A secured party’s liability for actual damages resulting from a failure to send a proposal for the acceptance of collateral in satisfaction of an obligation to the persons specified in Section 36‑9‑621. Section 36‑9‑625(b).

5. A secured party’s liability for minimum damages for failure to send a proposal to accept collateral in satisfaction of an obligation when the collateral is consumer goods. Sections 36‑9‑625(c) and 36‑9‑628(c) and (e).

6. Determining a debtor’s liability for a deficiency in a transaction other than a consumer transaction when a secured party fails to send, as required, a proposal for the acceptance of collateral in satisfaction of an obligation. Section 36‑9‑626(a).

7. Determining a debtor’s liability for a deficiency in a consumer transaction when a secured party fails to send, as required, a proposal for acceptance of collateral in satisfaction of an obligation. Section 36‑9‑626(b) .

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 239.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak239.

**SECTION 36‑9‑622.** Effect of acceptance of collateral.

(a) A secured party’s acceptance of collateral in full or partial satisfaction of the obligation it secures:

(1) discharges the obligation to the extent consented to by the debtor;

(2) transfers to the secured party all of a debtor’s rights in the collateral;

(3) discharges the security interest or agricultural lien that is the subject of the debtor’s consent and any subordinate security interest or other subordinate lien; and

(4) terminates any other subordinate interest.

(b) A subordinate interest is discharged or terminated under subsection (a), even if the secured party fails to comply with this chapter.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. New.

2. Effect of Acceptance. Subsection (a) specifies the effect of an acceptance of collateral in full or partial satisfaction of the secured obligation. The acceptance to which it refers is an effective acceptance. If a purported acceptance is ineffective under Section 9‑620, e.g., because the secured party receives a timely objection from a person entitled to notification, then neither this subsection nor subsection (b) applies. Paragraph (1) expresses the fundamental consequence of accepting collateral in full or partial satisfaction of the secured obligation‑the obligation is discharged to the extent consented to by the debtor. Unless otherwise agreed, the obligor remains liable for any deficiency. Paragraphs (2) through (4) indicate the effects of an acceptance on various property rights and interests. Paragraph (2) follows Section 9‑617(a) in providing that the secured party acquires “all of a debtor’s rights in the collateral.” Under paragraph (3), the effect of strict foreclosure on holders of junior security interests and other liens is the same regardless of whether the collateral is accepted in full or partial satisfaction of the secured obligation: all junior encumbrances are discharged. Paragraph (4) provides for the termination of other subordinate interests.

Subsection (b) makes clear that subordinate interests are discharged under subsection (a) regardless of whether the secured party complies with this Article. Thus, subordinate interests are discharged regardless of whether a proposal was required to be sent or, if required, was sent. However, a secured party’s failure to send a proposal or otherwise to comply with this Article may subject the secured party to liability under Section 9‑625.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑622 specifies the effect of a secured party’s acceptance of collateral in full or partial satisfaction of a secured obligation. Under subsection (a)(1) an acceptance discharges the obligation to the extent consented to by the debtor. Subsection (a)(2) provides that the acceptance transfers all of the debtor’s rights in the collateral to the secured party. Subsections (a)(3) and (4) provide that the acceptance discharges the security interest or agricultural lien that was subject to the consent and all subordinate liens and security interests as well as terminating all other subordinate interests.

Subsection (b) provides that an acceptance as the effect specified in subsection (a) even if the secured party fails to comply with the requirements for an acceptance in satisfaction of an obligation. Nevertheless, if a secured party ignores a notification of objection to a proposed acceptance, no acceptance can occur and neither subsection (a) nor subsection (b) apply. See Section 36‑9‑622, Official Comment 2.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Agricultural lien” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(5) |
| “Collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “Secured party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |

Cross References—

1. Requirements for acceptance of collateral in full or partial satisfaction of a secured obligation. Section 36‑9‑620 .

2. Persons in addition to the debtor to whom a secured party is required to send a proposal to accept collateral in satisfaction of an obligation. Section 36‑9‑621.

3. Effect of a disposition of collateral after default. Section 36‑9‑617.

4. A secured party’s liability for actual damages for losses resulting from the secured party’s failure to comply with the requirements for an acceptance of collateral in full or partial satisfaction of a secured obligation. Section 36‑9‑625(b).

5. A secured party’s liability for minimum damages for failure to comply with the requirements for acceptance of collateral in satisfaction of a secured obligation when the collateral consists of consumer goods. Sections 36‑9‑625(c) and 36‑9‑628(c) and (e).

6. Determining a debtor’s liability for a deficiency in a transaction other than a consumer transaction when a secured party has failed to comply with the requirements of Part 6 in conducting an acceptance of collateral in satisfaction of an obligation. Section 36‑9‑626(a).

7. Determining a debtor’s liability for a deficiency in a consumer transaction when a secured party has failed to comply with Part 6 in conducting an acceptance of collateral in satisfaction of an obligation. Section 36‑9‑626(b).

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 239.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak239.

**SECTION 36‑9‑623.** Right to redeem collateral.

(a) A debtor, any secondary obligor, or any other secured party or lienholder may redeem collateral.

(b) To redeem collateral, a person shall tender:

(1) fulfillment of all obligations secured by the collateral; and

(2) the reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees described in Section 36‑9‑615(a)(1).

(c) A redemption may occur at any time before a secured party:

(1) has collected collateral under Section 36‑9‑607;

(2) has disposed of collateral or entered into a contract for its disposition under Section 36‑9‑610; or

(3) has accepted collateral in full or partial satisfaction of the obligation it secures under Section 36‑9‑622.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑506.

2. Redemption Right. Under this Section, as under former Section 9‑506, the debtor or another secured party may redeem collateral as long as the secured party has not collected (Section 9‑607), disposed of or contracted for the disposition of (Section 9‑610), or accepted (Section 9‑620) the collateral. Although this Section generally follows former Section 9‑506, it extends the right of redemption to holders of nonconsensual liens. To redeem the collateral a person must tender fulfillment of all obligations secured, plus certain expenses. If the entire balance of a secured obligation has been accelerated, it would be necessary to tender the entire balance. A tender of fulfillment obviously means more than a new promise to perform an existing promise. It requires payment in full of all monetary obligations then due and performance in full of all other obligations then matured. If unmatured secured obligations remain, the security interest continues to secure them (i.e., as if there had been no default).

3. Redemption of Remaining Collateral Following Partial Enforcement. Under Section 9‑610 a secured party may make successive dispositions of portions of its collateral. These dispositions would not affect the debtor’s, another secured party’s, or a lienholder’s right to redeem the remaining collateral.

4. Effect of “Repledging.” Section 9‑207 generally permits a secured party having possession or control of collateral to create a security interest in the collateral. As explained in the Comments to that Section, the debtor’s right (as opposed to its practical ability) to redeem collateral is not affected by, and does not affect, the priority of a security interest created by the debtor’s secured party.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑623 grants the debtor, any secondary obligor, and other secured party or lienholder the right to redeem collateral. In order to redeem, a person must tender the full amount of all obligations secured by the collateral and the secured party’s reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees. A redemption must occur before the secured party has collected, disposed of, or accepted the collateral.

Definitional Cross References:

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| --- | --- |
|  |  |
| “Collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “Person” | Section 36‑1‑201(30) |
| “Secondary obligor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(71) |
| “Secured party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |

Cross References—

1. Application of cash proceeds from a disposition of collateral to a secured party’s reasonable expenses in enforcing its security interest and, to the extent provided for by agreement and not prohibited by law, reasonable attorney’s fees. Section 36‑9‑615(a)(1).

2. When acceptance of collateral in satisfaction of an obligation occurs. Section 36‑9‑620, Official Comment 6.

3. Post‑default waiver of a right of redemption in transactions other than consumer‑goods transactions. Section 36‑9‑624 (c).

4. Requirement in a consumer‑goods transaction that a notification of a disposition of collateral include a telephone number from which the amount necessary to redeem the collateral is available. Section 36‑9‑614(1)(C).

5. A secured party’s liability for actual damages resulting from a failure to comply with the requirements for a redemption of collateral. Section 36‑9‑625(b).

6. A secured party’s liability for minimum damages for a failure to comply with the requirements for redemption when the collateral is consumer goods. Sections 36‑9‑625(c) and 36‑9‑628(c) and (e).

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 241.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak241.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 1

1. In general

If collateral is negligently damaged while in the possession of the secured party who has obtained possession after default, the debtor may bring an action for impairment of his or her equity of redemption. The measure of damage is the amount which returns the plaintiff to the position which he or she enjoyed prior to the negligent act. Isaac v. Gene’s Used Cars (S.C.App. 1988) 296 S.C. 280, 372 S.E.2d 102.

The actions of a car dealer which had lawful possession of a repossessed car, in allowing a prospective purchaser to remove the car from the lot and drive it during some or all of the 10‑day redemption period set forth in the notice of repossession did not constitute a conversion under Section 37‑5‑111 or a violation of the Unfair Trade Practices Act where the owner did not make an effort to pay the redemption price during the 10‑day period. Kirby v. Horne Motor Co. (S.C.App. 1988) 295 S.C. 7, 366 S.E.2d 259. Conversion And Civil Theft 134

**SECTION 36‑9‑624.** Waiver.

(a) A debtor or secondary obligor may waive the right to notification of disposition of collateral under Section 36‑9‑611 only by an agreement to that effect entered into and authenticated after default.

(b) A debtor may waive the right to require disposition of collateral under Section 36‑9‑620(e) only by an agreement to that effect entered into and authenticated after default.

(c) Except in a consumer‑goods transaction, a debtor or secondary obligor may waive the right to redeem collateral under Section 36‑9‑623 only by an agreement to that effect entered into and authenticated after default.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Sections 9‑504(3), 9‑505, 9‑506.

2. Waiver. This Section is a limited exception to Section 9‑602, which generally prohibits waiver by debtors and obligors. It makes no provision for waiver of the rule prohibiting a secured party from buying at its own private disposition. Transactions of this kind are equivalent to “ strict foreclosures” and are governed by Sections 9‑620, 9‑621, and 9‑622.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 224.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak224.

Subpart 2

Noncompliance with Chapter

**SECTION 36‑9‑625.** Remedies for secured party ‘ s failure to comply with chapter.

(a) If it is established that a secured party is not proceeding in accordance with this chapter, a court may order or restrain collection, enforcement, or disposition of collateral on appropriate terms and conditions.

(b) Subject to subsections (c), (d), and (f), a person is liable for damages in the amount of any loss caused by a failure to comply with this chapter. Loss caused by a failure to comply may include loss resulting from the debtor’s inability to obtain, or increased costs of, alternative financing.

(c) Except as otherwise provided in Section 36‑9‑628:

(1) a person that, at the time of the failure, was a debtor, was an obligor, or held a security interest in or other lien on the collateral may recover damages under subsection (b) for its loss; and

(2) if the collateral is consumer goods, a person that was a debtor or a secondary obligor at the time a secured party failed to comply with this part may recover for that failure in any event an amount not less than the credit service charge plus ten percent of the principal amount of the obligation or the time‑price differential plus ten percent of the cash price.

(d) A debtor whose deficiency is eliminated under Section 36‑9‑626 may recover damages for the loss of any surplus. However, a debtor or secondary obligor whose deficiency is eliminated or reduced under Section 36‑9‑626 may not otherwise recover under subsection (b) for noncompliance with the provisions of this part relating to collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance.

(e) In addition to any damages recoverable under subsection (b), the debtor, consumer obligor, or person named as a debtor in a filed record, as applicable, may recover five hundred dollars in each case from a person that:

(1) fails to comply with Section 36‑9‑208;

(2) fails to comply with Section 36‑9‑209;

(3) files a record that the person is not entitled to file under Section 36‑9‑509(a);

(4) fails to cause the secured party of record to file or send a termination statement as required by Section 36‑9‑513(a) or (c);

(5) fails to comply with Section 36‑9‑616(b)(1) and whose failure is part of a pattern, or consistent with a practice, of noncompliance; or

(6) fails to comply with Section 36‑9‑616(b)(2).

(f) A debtor or consumer obligor may recover damages under subsection (b) and, in addition, five hundred dollars in each case from a person that, without reasonable cause, fails to comply with a request under Section 36‑9‑210. A recipient of a request under Section 36‑9‑210 which never claimed an interest in the collateral or obligations that are the subject of a request under that section has a reasonable excuse for failure to comply with the request within the meaning of this subsection.

(g) If a secured party fails to comply with a request regarding a list of collateral or a statement of account under Section 36‑9‑210, the secured party may claim a security interest only as shown in the list or statement included in the request as against a person that is reasonably misled by the failure.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑507.

2. Remedies for Noncompliance; Scope. Subsections (a) and (b) provide the basic remedies afforded to those aggrieved by a secured party’s failure to comply with this Article. Like all provisions that create liability, they are subject to Section 9‑628, which should be read in conjunction with Section 9‑605. The principal limitations under this Part on a secured party’s right to enforce its security interest against collateral are the requirements that it proceed in good faith (Section 1‑203), in a commercially reasonable manner (Sections 9‑607 and 9‑610), and, in most cases, with reasonable notification (Sections 9‑611 through 9‑614). Following former Section 9‑507, under subsection (a) an aggrieved person may seek injunctive relief, and under subsection (b) the person may recover damages for losses caused by noncompliance. Unlike former Section 9‑507, however, subsections (a) and (b) are not limited to noncompliance with provisions of this Part of Article 9. Rather, they apply to noncompliance with any provision of this Article. The change makes this Section applicable to noncompliance with Sections 9‑207 (duties of secured party in possession of collateral), 9‑208 (duties of secured party having control over deposit account), 9‑209 (duties of secured party if account debtor has been notified of an assignment), 9‑210 (duty to comply with request for accounting, etc.), 9‑509(a) (duty to refrain from filing unauthorized financing statement), and 9‑513(a) or (c) (duty to provide termination statement). Subsection (a) also modifies the first sentence of former Section 9‑507(1) by adding the references to “collection” and “enforcement.” Subsection (c)(2), which gives a minimum damage recovery in consumer‑goods transactions, applies only to noncompliance with the provisions of this Part.

3. Damages for Noncompliance with This Article. Subsection (b) sets forth the basic remedy for failure to comply with the requirements of this Article: a damage recovery in the amount of loss caused by the noncompliance. Subsection (c) identifies who may recover under subsection (b). It affords a remedy to any aggrieved person who is a debtor or obligor. However, a principal obligor who is not a debtor may recover damages only for noncompliance with Section 9‑616, inasmuch as none of the other rights and duties in this Article run in favor of such a principal obligor. Such a principal obligor could not suffer any loss or damage on account of noncompliance with rights or duties of which it is not a beneficiary. Subsection (c) also affords a remedy to an aggrieved person who holds a competing security interest or other lien, regardless of whether the aggrieved person is entitled to notification under Part 6. The remedy is available even to holders of senior security interests and other liens. The exercise of this remedy is subject to the normal rules of pleading and proof. A person who has delegated the duties of a secured party but who remains obligated to perform them is liable under this subsection. The last sentence of subsection (d) eliminates the possibility of double recovery or other over‑compensation arising out of a reduction or elimination of a deficiency under Section 9‑626, based on noncompliance with the provisions of this Part relating to collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance. Assuming no double recovery, a debtor whose deficiency is eliminated under Section 9‑626 may pursue a claim for a surplus. Because Section 9‑626 does not apply to consumer transactions, the statute is silent as to whether a double recovery or other over‑compensation is possible in a consumer transaction.

Damages for violation of the requirements of this Article, including Section 9‑609, are those reasonably calculated to put an eligible claimant in the position that it would have occupied had no violation occurred. See Section 1‑106. Subsection (b) supports the recovery of actual damages for committing a breach of the peace in violation of Section 9‑609, and principles of tort law supplement this subsection. See Section 1‑103. However, to the extent that damages in tort compensate the debtor for the same loss dealt with by this Article, the debtor should be entitled to only one recovery.

4. Minimum Damages in Consumer‑Goods Transactions. Subsection (c)(2) provides a minimum, statutory, damage recovery for a debtor and secondary obligor in a consumer‑goods transaction. It is patterned on former Section 9‑507(1) and is designed to ensure that every noncompliance with the requirements of Part 6 in a consumer‑goods transaction results in liability, regardless of any injury that may have resulted. Subsection (c)(2) leaves the treatment of statutory damages as it was under former Article 9. A secured party is not liable for statutory damages under this subsection more than once with respect to any one secured obligation (see Section 9‑628(e)), nor is a secured party liable under this subsection for failure to comply with Section 9‑616 (see Section 9‑628(d)).

Following former Section 9‑507(1), this Article does not include a definition or explanation of the terms “credit service charge,” “principal amount,” “time‑price differential,” or “cash price,” as used in subsection (c)(2). It leaves their construction and application to the court, taking into account the subsection’s purpose of providing a minimum recovery in consumer‑goods transactions.

5. Supplemental Damages. Subsections (e) and (f) provide damages that supplement the recovery, if any, under subsection (b). Subsection (e) imposes an additional $500 liability upon a person who fails to comply with the provisions specified in that subsection, and subsection (f) imposes like damages on a person who, without reasonable excuse, fails to comply with a request for an accounting or a request regarding a list of collateral or statement of account under Section 9‑210. However, under subsection (f), a person has a reasonable excuse for the failure if the person never claimed an interest in the collateral or obligations that were the subject of the request.

6. Estoppel. Subsection (g) limits the extent to which a secured party who fails to comply with a request regarding a list of collateral or statement of account may claim a security interest.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑625 specifies the remedies for a secured party’s failure to comply with the requirements of Article 9. Subsection (a) empowers a court to issue orders to compel a secured party to comply with the requirements of Article 9 in collecting, enforcing, or disposing of collateral. Under subsection (b) and (c)(1) a secured party is liable for actual damages for the amount of any loss caused by a failure to comply with the requirements of the statute. Subsection (d), however, limits a debtor’s or secondary obligor’s right to recover actual damages when their liability for a deficiency has been eliminated under Section 36‑9‑626. Such a debtor is limited to recovering for the loss of any surplus. A secondary obligor whose deficiency liability has been eliminated has no claim for actual damages under subsection (b).

Subsection (c)(2) provides that if the collateral is consumer goods the minimum damages a debtor or secondary obligor can recover for a secured party’s failure to comply with part 6 is an amount equal to the credit service charge plus ten percent of the principal amount of the obligation or the time‑price differential plus ten percent of the cash price. Note that in allowing a secondary obligor to recover minimum statutory damages when the collateral is consumer goods, subsection (c)(2) does not change the law in South Carolina. See former Section 360‑9‑505(2). Section 36‑9‑628(e), however, overrules the holding in Crane v. Citicorp National Services, Inc., 313 S.C. 70, 437 S.E. 2d 50 (1998) that a secured party can be liable to multiple debtors and secondary obligors for minimum damages with respect to a single secured obligation. Moreover, Section 36‑9‑628(d) provides that a secured party is not liable under Section 36‑9‑625(c)(2) for a failure to respond to a request for or to provide an explanation of the calculation of a surplus or deficiency under Section 36‑9‑616.

Subsection (e) provides that in addition to actual damages, a debtor, consumer obligor, or person listed as a debtor can recover statutory damages of $500 for a breach of specified obligations under Article 9. Subsections (e)(1), (2), and (4) impose liability for a secured party’s failure to release its claim to collateral when there is no obligation or commitment to give value secured by the collateral. Subsection (e)(3) imposes liability upon a person who files an unauthorized financing statement. Subsection (e)(5) imposes liability upon a secured party who fails to provide a timely explanation of a deficiency or surplus in consumer‑goods transaction when the failure is part of a pattern, or consistent with a practice of noncompliance. Subsection (e)(6) imposes liability upon a secured party in a consumer‑goods transaction who fails to send an explanation of a deficiency or surplus to a consumer obligor within 14 days after receipt of a request.

Subsection (f) provides that a debtor or consumer obligor can recover statutory damages of $500 when a secured party fails without reasonable cause to comply with a request for an accounting, a list of collateral, or a statement of account under Section 36‑9‑210. Moreover, under subsection (g) a secured party who fails to comply with a request for a list of collateral or statement of account is estopped by claiming a security interest in more collateral than included in the request.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Consumer goods” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(23) |
| “Consumer obligor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(25) |
| “Debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “List of collateral” | Section 36‑9‑210(a)(3) |
| “Obligor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(59) |
| “Person” | Section 36‑1‑201(30) |
| “Secondary obligor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(71) |
| “Secured party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |
| “Secured party of record” | Section 36‑9‑511 |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |
| “Statement of account” | Section 36‑9‑210(a)(4) |
| “Termination statement” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(79) |

Cross References—

1. Obligation of a secured party to collect or enforce the obligation of an account debtor in a commercially reasonable manner. Section 36‑9‑607(c).

2. Obligation of a secured party to dispose of collateral in a commercially reasonable manner. Section 36‑9‑610(b).

3. Determination of whether the conduct of a secured party was commercially reasonable. Section 36‑9‑327.

4. Conclusive presumption that a disposition of collateral was commercially reasonable under South Carolina’s Public Sale Procedures. Section 36‑9‑629.

5. Obligation of a secured party to send authenticated notification of a disposition of collateral. Sections 36‑9‑611 to 36‑9‑614.

6. Obligation of a secured party to provide and to respond to requests for an explanation or calculation of a surplus or deficiency in a consumer‑goods transaction. Section 36‑9‑616.

7. Obligations of a secured party relating to an acceptance of collateral in full or partial satisfaction of an obligation. Sections 36‑9‑620 and 36‑9‑621.

8. Right of a debtor or secondary obligor to redeem collateral. Section 36 ‑9‑623.

9. Obligation of a secured party having control of collateral to release control of the collateral upon the debtor’s demand when there is no outstanding secured obligation and the secured party is not committed to give value. Section 36‑9‑208.

10. Obligation of a secured party to release an account debtor that has received notification of an assignment to the secured party upon the debtor’s demand when there is not secured obligation and the secured party is not committed to give value. Section 36‑9‑209.

11. Obligation of a secured party to file or send a termination statement. Section 36‑9‑513.

12. Obligation of secured party to respond to a debtor’s requests for an accounting, a list of collateral, and a statement of account. Section 36‑9‑210.

13. Elimination of a debtor’s liability for a deficiency in a transaction other than a consumer transaction. Section 36‑9‑626(a).

14. Elimination of a debtor’s liability for a deficiency in a consumer transaction. Section 36‑9‑626(b).

15. Calculation of a deficiency or surplus when the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor is the transferee at a disposition of collateral and the proceeds of the disposition are significantly below the range of proceeds then complying disposition to a transferee other than the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor would have brought. Section 36‑9‑615(f).

16. Limitation upon the liability of a secured party generally. Section 36‑9‑628(a)—(c).

17. Limitations upon the liability of a secured party for minimum damages when the collateral is consumer goods. Section 36‑9‑628(d) and (e).

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 225, 242.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak225; 349Ak242.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Encyclopedias

S.C. Jur. Limitation of Actions Section 38, General Provisions.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 1

Construction and application 2

1. In general

If a secured party fails to give defaulting debtor the required notice of disposition of repossessed goods, a debtor may seek to recover the statutory penalty under Article 9 of the Uniform Code (UCC). Brockbank v. Best Capital Corp. (S.C. 2000) 341 S.C. 372, 534 S.E.2d 688, rehearing denied. Secured Transactions 243

2. Construction and application

Debtor’s action seeking relief for secured creditor’s alleged failure to comply with Uniform Commercial Code’s (UCC) notice requirements in connection with sale of repossessed truck was subject to one or three‑year limitations period applicable to actions upon statutes for a penalty, not the six‑year limitations period applicable to actions for breach of contract for a sale of goods; debtor never alleged a breach of contract, and the relief requested by debtor, a finance charge and 10% of the principal amount of the obligation, was a mandatory, pre‑determined amount of “damages” that a debtor could obtain if a secured party failed to comply with the UCC’s notice requirements and thus constituted a statutory penalty. Delaney v. First Financial of Charleston, Inc. (S.C.App. 2016) 418 S.C. 209, 791 S.E.2d 546, rehearing denied. Penalties 1

Even if three‑year, rather than one‑year, statute of limitations applied to debtor’s action seeking statutory penalty for secured creditor’s alleged failure to comply with Uniform Commercial Code’s (UCC) notice requirements in connection with sale of repossessed truck, debtor’s action accrued, and the applicable limitations period began to run, when debtor received the allegedly deficient notice of sale, not when the truck was sold; although the three‑year statute was silent as to accrual, under the UCC, debtors could ask the court to restrain disposition of collateral upon recipe of deficient notice and a secured party could elect not to dispose of the property after giving notice, thus suggesting that the sale date was not the accrual date. Delaney v. First Financial of Charleston, Inc. (S.C.App. 2016) 418 S.C. 209, 791 S.E.2d 546, rehearing denied. Limitation of Actions 95(9)

Statutory amendment which limits a secured party’s aggregate liability, for failure to comply with obligation to give notice of sale of repossessed collateral, to a single recovery applies prospectively. Singleton v. Stokes Motors, Inc. (S.C. 2004) 358 S.C. 369, 595 S.E.2d 461, rehearing denied. Secured Transactions 242.1

**SECTION 36‑9‑626.** Action in which deficiency or surplus is in issue.

(a) In an action arising from a transaction, other than a consumer transaction, in which the amount of a deficiency or surplus is in issue, the following rules apply:

(1) A secured party need not prove compliance with the provisions of this part relating to collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance unless the debtor or a secondary obligor places the secured party’s compliance in issue.

(2) If the secured party’s compliance is placed in issue, the secured party has the burden of establishing that the collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance was conducted in accordance with this part.

(3) Except as otherwise provided in Section 36‑9‑628, if a secured party fails to prove that the collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance was conducted in accordance with the provisions of this part relating to collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance, the liability of a debtor or a secondary obligor for a deficiency is limited to an amount by which the sum of the secured obligation, expenses, and attorney’s fees exceeds the greater of:

(A) the proceeds of the collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance; or

(B) the amount of proceeds that would have been realized had the noncomplying secured party proceeded in accordance with the provisions of this part relating to collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance.

(4) For purposes of item (3)(B), the amount of proceeds that would have been realized is equal to the sum of the secured obligation, expenses, and attorney’s fees unless the secured party proves that the amount is less than that sum.

(5) If a deficiency or surplus is calculated under Section 36‑9‑615(f), the debtor or obligor has the burden of establishing that the amount of proceeds of the disposition is significantly below the range of prices that a complying disposition to a person other than the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor would have brought.

(b) The limitation of the rules in subsection (a) to transactions other than consumer transactions is intended to leave to the court the determination of the proper rules in consumer transactions. The court may not infer from that limitation the nature of the proper rule in consumer transactions and may continue to apply established approaches.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. New.

2. Scope. The basic damage remedy under Section 9‑625(b) is subject to the special rules in this Section for transactions other than consumer transactions. This Section addresses situations in which the amount of a deficiency or surplus is in issue, i.e., situations in which the secured party has collected, enforced, disposed of, or accepted the collateral. It contains special rules applicable to a determination of the amount of a deficiency or surplus. Because this Section affects a person’s liability for a deficiency, it is subject to Section 9‑628, which should be read in conjunction with Section 9‑605. The rules in this Section apply only to noncompliance in connection with the “collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance” under Part 6. For other types of noncompliance with Part 6, the general liability rule of Section 9‑625(b)—recovery of actual damages—applies. Consider, for example, a repossession that does not comply with Section 9‑609 for want of a default. The debtor’s remedy is under Section 9‑625(b). In a proper case, the secured party also may be liable for conversion under non‑UCC law. If the secured party thereafter disposed of the collateral, however, it would violate Section 9‑610 at that time, and this Section would apply.

3. Rebuttable Presumption Rule. Subsection (a) establishes the rebuttable presumption rule for transactions other than consumer transactions. Under paragraph (1), the secured party need not prove compliance with the relevant provisions of this Part as part of its prima facie case. If, however, the debtor or a secondary obligor raises the issue (in accordance with the forum’s rules of pleading and practice), then the secured party bears the burden of proving that the collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance complied. In the event the secured party is unable to meet this burden, then paragraph (3) explains how to calculate the deficiency. Under this rebuttable presumption rule, the debtor or obligor is to be credited with the greater of the actual proceeds of the disposition or the proceeds that would have been realized had the secured party complied with the relevant provisions. If a deficiency remains, then the secured party is entitled to recover it. The references to “the secured obligation, expenses, and attorney’s fees” in paragraphs (3) and (4) embrace the application rules in Sections 9‑608(a) and 9‑615(a).

Unless the secured party proves that compliance with the relevant provisions would have yielded a smaller amount, under paragraph (4) the amount that a complying collection, enforcement, or disposition would have yielded is deemed to be equal to the amount of the secured obligation, together with expenses and attorney’s fees. Thus, the secured party may not recover any deficiency unless it meets this burden.

4. Consumer Transactions. Although subsection (a) adopts a version of the rebuttable presumption rule for transactions other than consumer transactions, with certain exceptions Part 6 does not specify the effect of a secured party’s noncompliance in consumer transactions. (The exceptions are the provisions for the recovery of damages in Section 9‑625.) Subsection (b) provides that the limitation of subsection (a) to transactions other than consumer transactions is intended to leave to the court the determination of the proper rules in consumer transactions. It also instructs the court not to draw any inference from the limitation as to the proper rules for consumer transactions and leaves the court free to continue to apply established approaches to those transactions.

Courts construing former Section 9‑507 disagreed about the consequences of a secured party’s failure to comply with the requirements of former Part 5. Three general approaches emerged. Some courts have held that a noncomplying secured party may not recover a deficiency (the “absolute bar” rule). A few courts held that the debtor can offset against a claim to a deficiency all damages recoverable under former Section 9‑507 resulting from the secured party’s noncompliance (the “offset” rule). A plurality of courts considering the issue held that the noncomplying secured party is barred from recovering a deficiency unless it overcomes a rebuttable presumption that compliance with former Part 5 would have yielded an amount sufficient to satisfy the secured debt. In addition to the nonuniformity resulting from court decisions, some States enacted special rules governing the availability of deficiencies.

5. Burden of Proof When Section 9‑615(f) Applies. In a non‑consumer transaction, subsection (a)(5) imposes upon a debtor or obligor the burden of proving that the proceeds of a disposition are so low that, under Section 9‑615(f), the actual proceeds should not serve as the basis upon which a deficiency or surplus is calculated. Were the burden placed on the secured party, then debtors might be encouraged to challenge the price received in every disposition to the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor.

6. Delay in Applying This Section. There is an inevitable delay between the time a secured party engages in a noncomplying collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance and the time of a subsequent judicial determination that the secured party did not comply with Part 6. During the interim, the secured party, believing that the secured obligation is larger than it ultimately is determined to be, may continue to enforce its security interest in collateral. If some or all of the secured indebtedness ultimately is discharged under this Section, a reasonable application of this Section would impose liability on the secured party for the amount of any excess, unwarranted recoveries but would not make the enforcement efforts wrongful.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑626 addresses the affect of a secured party’s right to a deficiency. This issue typically arises when a secured party fails to give notification of a disposition of collateral or fails to dispose of the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner. Under former law the courts developed three approaches to the problem. See Section 36‑9‑626, Official Comment 4. First, some courts adopted an “absolute bar” rule under which a secured party who failed to give notice of or conducted a disposition in a commercially unreasonable manner was precluded from recovering a deficiency. Second, some courts limited an aggrieved debtor to a setoff against a deficiency for damages recoverable under former Section 9‑507(1). Third, a plurality of courts adopted the “rebuttable presumption” rule. Under this rule a court presumes that had a secured party given notice of and conducted a disposition in a commercially reasonable manner, the collateral would have sold for the full amount of the secured obligation and no deficiency would have arisen. The secured party, however, can rebut the presumption by proving that the proceeds from a disposition complying with the statutory requirements would not have satisfied the secured obligation.

Section 36‑9‑626(a) adopts the rebuttable presumption test for transactions other than consumer transactions. Under this provision a debtor or secondary obligor may be able to limit or avoid its liability for a deficiency when a secured party fails to comply with the provisions of part 6 relating to the collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance of collateral.

Subsection (a) imposes a framework of shifting burdens of proof. Under subsections (a)(1) and (2) a secured party’s burden of establishing that it complied with the provisions of part 6 relating to collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance does not arise until the debtor or secondary obligor places the secured party’s compliance in issue. If the secured party fails to prove compliance, subsection (a)(3)(B) limits the debtor’s or secondary obligor’s liability for a deficiency to the amount by which the sum of the secured obligation plus expenses and attorney’s fees exceeds the amount of proceeds that would have been realized had the secured party complied with the provisions of part 6 relating to collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance. The critical provision in subsection (a) is paragraph (4) which provides that for purposes of paragraph(3)(b), the amount of proceeds that would have been realized had the secured party complied with the applicable provisions of part 6 is equal to the sum of the secured obligation, expenses, and attorney’s fees, unless the secured party establishes an amount that is less than that sum.

Subsection (b) addresses the liability of a debtor or secondary obligor for a deficiency in consumer transactions. Subsection (b) provides that the limitation of the rebuttable presumption rule of subsection (a) to non‑ consumer transactions is intended to leave to the court the determination of the proper rules in consumer transactions. Moreover, subsection (b) provides that the court may not infer from the limitation on the scope of subsection ( a) the nature of the proper rule in consumer transactions. Thus, the courts may adopt a rule in consumer transactions under which a secured party who fails to comply with part 6 is absolutely barred from recovering a deficiency.

In contrast to the provisions of subsections (a)(1)—(4) and (b) apply when a secured party’s misconduct places its right to a deficiency in issue, subsection (a)(5) applies when a secured party disposes of collateral in compliance with part 6, but the disposition fall within the scope of Section 36‑9‑615(f). For Section 36‑9‑615(f) to apply to a disposition two conditions must be met. First, the transferee of the collateral at the disposition must be the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor. Second, the proceeds from the disposition must be significantly below the range of proceeds that would be realized in a complying disposition to a person other than the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor. If these conditions are not met, Section 36‑9‑615(f) provides that the surplus or deficiency following the disposition is calculated based upon the proceeds that would have been realized in a complying disposition to a person other than the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or secondary obligor. Subsection 36‑9‑626(a)(5) provides that in a dispute under Subsection 36‑9‑615(f), the debtor or obligor has the burden of proving that the amount of the proceeds realized at the disposition is substantially below the range of prices that would have realized on a complying disposition to a person other than the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor.

Subsection (a) does not change the law of South Carolina. Under former law, South Carolina courts adopted the “rebuttable presumption” rule. In Republic National Bank v. DLP Industries, Inc. , 314 S.C. 108, 441 S.E. 2d 827 (1994) Supreme Court held that a secured party’s failure to give notice of disposition of collateral results in a rebuttable presumption that the value of the collateral was equal to the amount of the debt. In Andrews v. Von Elton and Walker, Inc., 315 S.C. 199, 432 S.C. 2d 500 (Ct. App. 1993), the Court of Appeals held that a secured party’s failure to dispose of collateral in a commercially reasonable manner also gave rise to a rebuttable presumption that the value of the collateral was equal to the amount of the debt.

The impact of subsection (b) on the law of South Carolina is less certain. Although the South Carolina cases adopting the rebuttable presumption of rule draw no distinction between commercial transactions and consumer transactions, all of the cases involved a commercial transaction. See Republic National Bank v. DLP Industries, Inc., 314 S.C. 108, 441 S.E. 2d 827 (1994) ($100,000 loan secured by 33,000 pieces of surplus clothing); Andrews v. Von Elten and Walker, Inc., 315 S.C. 199, 432 S.E. 2d 500 (Ct. App. 1993) (security interest in equipment securing the purchase price of a business); Mathias v. Hicks, 294 S.C. 305, 363 S.E. 2d 914 (Ct. App. 1987) (security interest in equipment securing price of business. Cf. Brockbank v. Best Capital Corp., \_\_\_ S.C. \_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_ S.E. 2d \_\_\_\_\_ (2000) (in a consumer transaction a secured party’s failure to send a notification to a debtor entitled the debtor to recover minimum damage under former Section 36‑9‑507(1). As a result, the established law of South Carolina might not preclude a court from adopting the “absolute bar” rule in a consumer transaction. Moreover, the South Carolina Consumer Protection Code, Section 37‑5‑103(1) provides that in consumer credit sales of goods or services and in certain consumer loans, “(a) consumer is not liable for a deficiency unless the creditor has disposed of the goods in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner.” With respect to consumer transactions within its scope, Section 37‑5‑103(1), the statute may be a statement of public policy on which a court could rely in adopting the “absolute bar” rule.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Consumer transaction” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(26) |
| “Debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “Obligor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(59) |
| “Secondary obligor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(71) |
| “Secured party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |

Cross References—

1. Obligor’s liability for a deficiency following the application of the proceeds realized upon collection or enforcement. Section 36‑9‑608(a)(4) and (b).

2. Obligor’s liability for a deficiency following the application of the proceeds realized upon the disposition of collateral. Section 36‑9‑615(d)—(f).

3. Obligor’s liability for a deficiency following an acceptance of collateral in partial satisfaction of a secured obligation. Section 36‑9‑622(a)(1).

4. Obligations of a secured party relating to the collection and enforcement of collateral. Sections 36‑9‑607(c) and 36‑9‑608(a)(3).

5. Obligations of a secured party relating to the disposition of collateral. Sections 36‑9‑610(b), 36‑9‑611(b), 36‑9‑612, to 36‑9‑614, 36‑9‑615(c).

6. Standards for determining whether the conduct of a secured party is commercially reasonable. Section 36‑9‑627.

7. The effect of the elimination of liability for a deficiency upon a debtor’s or secondary obligor’s right to recover damages for a secured party’s failure to comply with the provisions of Part 6 relating to collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance. Section 36‑9‑625(d).

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 240, 242.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak240; 349Ak242.

**SECTION 36‑9‑627.** Determination of whether conduct was commercially reasonable.

(a) The fact that a greater amount could have been obtained by a collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance at a different time or in a different method from that selected by the secured party is not of itself sufficient to preclude the secured party from establishing that the collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance was made in a commercially reasonable manner.

(b) A disposition of collateral is made in a commercially reasonable manner if the disposition is made:

(1) in the usual manner on any recognized market;

(2) at the price current in any recognized market at the time of the disposition; or

(3) otherwise in conformity with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the type of property that was the subject of the disposition.

(c) A collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance is commercially reasonable if it has been approved:

(1) in a judicial proceeding;

(2) by a bona fide creditors’ committee;

(3) by a representative of creditors; or

(4) by an assignee for the benefit of creditors.

(d) Approval under subsection (c) need not be obtained, and lack of approval does not mean that the collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance is not commercially reasonable.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. Former Section 9‑507(2).

2. Relationship of Price to Commercial Reasonableness. Some observers have found the notion contained in subsection (a) (derived from former Section 9‑507(2)) (the fact that a better price could have been obtained does not establish lack of commercial reasonableness) to be inconsistent with that found in Section 9‑610(b) (derived from former Section 9‑504(3) (every aspect of the disposition, including its terms, must be commercially reasonable). There is no such inconsistency. While not itself sufficient to establish a violation of this Part, a low price suggests that a court should scrutinize carefully all aspects of a disposition to ensure that each aspect was commercially reasonable.

The law long has grappled with the problem of dispositions of personal and real property which comply with applicable procedural requirements (e.g., advertising, notification to interested persons, etc.) but which yield a price that seems low. This Article addresses that issue in Section 9‑615(f). That Section applies only when the transferee is the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor. It contains a special rule for calculating a deficiency or surplus in a complying disposition that yields a price that is “significantly below the range of proceeds that a complying disposition to a person other than the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor would have brought.”

3. Determination of Commercial Reasonableness; Advance Approval. It is important to make clear the conduct and procedures that are commercially reasonable and to provide a secured party with the means of obtaining, by court order or negotiation with a creditors’ committee or a representative of creditors, advance approval of a proposed method of enforcement as commercially reasonable. This Section contains rules that assist in that determination and provides for advance approval in appropriate situations. However, none of the specific methods of disposition specified in subsection (b) is required or exclusive.

4. “Recognized Market.” As in Sections 9‑610(c) and 9‑611(d), the concept of a “recognized market” in subsections (b)(1) and (2) is quite limited; it applies only to markets in which there are standardized price quotations for property that is essentially fungible, such as stock exchanges.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑627 sets forth the standards for determining whether the conduct of a secured party in the collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance of collateral is commercially reasonable. Subsection (a) provides that the fact that a greater amount could have been obtained had the secured party collected, enforced, disposed of, or accepted the collateral in a different method is not sufficient to establish that the secured party’s conduct was commercially unreasonable. Subsection (a) is consistent with prior law. See former Section 36‑9‑507(2) and Associates Commercial Corp. v. Hammond, 285 S.C. 277, 330 S.E. 2d 82 (Ct. App. 1985).

Subsection (b) provides the standards for determining whether a disposition is made in a commercially reasonable manner. Paragraphs (1) and (2) are limited situations in which there is a recognized market for the collateral. The basic standard is set forth in paragraph 3 under which a disposition is commercially reasonable if it is conducted in conformity with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the type of property involved. This standard is consistent with the finding of a commercially reasonable disposition in Associates Commercial Corp. v. Hammond, 285 S.C. 277, 330 S.E. 2d 82 (Ct. App. 1985).

Under subsection (c) a collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance is commercially reasonable if it has been approved in a judicial proceeding or by one of the enumerated representatives of the creditors. Note that under South Carolina’s Public Sale Procedures, a public sale of collateral which meets the requirements of those procedures is conclusively considered to be commercially reasonable in all aspects. See Section 36‑9‑629.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Creditor” | Section 36‑1‑201(12) |
| “Recognized market” | See Section 36‑9‑610,  Official Comment 9 |
| “Secured Party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |

Cross References—

1. Secured party’s obligation to proceed in a commercially reasonable manner in the collection and enforcement of collateral. Section 36‑9‑607(c).

2. Secured party’s obligation to proceed in a commercially reasonable manner in the disposition of collateral. Section 36‑9‑610(b).

3. Secured party’s liability for actual damages for losses resulting from commercially unreasonable conduct in the collection, enforcement, or disposition of collateral. Section 36‑9‑625(b) and (c)(1).

4. Secured party’s liability for minimum damages for failure to act in a commercially reasonable manner when the collateral is consumer goods. Section 36‑9‑625(c)(2).

5. A secured party’s failure to collect, enforce, dispose, or accept collateral in a commercially reasonable manner as a grounds for limiting or avoiding an obligor’s liability for a deficiency in a transaction other than a consumer transaction. Section 36‑9‑626(a).

6. A secured party’s failure to act in a commercially reasonable manner as a grounds for limiting or avoiding an obligor’s liability for a deficiency in a consumer transaction. Section 36‑9‑626(b).

7. South Carolina’s Public Sale Procedures. Sections 36‑9‑629 to 36‑9‑635.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 231.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak231.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

In general 1

1. In general

The court did not err in finding that a bank’s sale of collateral for $11,000 was commercially reasonable under Section 36‑9‑504(3), and the bank was entitled to a deficiency judgment, although the bank offered only the bids it received as evidence of the collateral’s value and borrowers argued that the fair market value of the collateral was at least $82,000, in reliance on the original purchase price of the collateral for $170,000 and purchase orders which they claimed to have procured for over $82,000, where there was testimony that the collateral (consisting mostly of surplus clothing) was in poor condition, was 6 to 8 years old, and was worth only $11,000. Republic Nat. Bank v. DLP Industries, Inc. (S.C. 1994) 314 S.C. 108, 441 S.E.2d 827, rehearing denied.

A secured creditor who chooses to pursue the alternate remedies of repossessing the collateral and filing suit on a non‑competition and consulting agreement has the duty to respect the collateral, and the creditor’s conduct with respect to the collateral must be commercially reasonable. Andrews v. von Elten & Walker, Inc. (S.C.App. 1993) 315 S.C. 199, 432 S.E.2d 500.

Once a default on an obligation has occurred, the secured party is authorized to take possession of the collateral, proceed to reduce the debt to judgment, foreclose on the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner, or retain the goods in satisfaction of his claim. Andrews v. von Elten & Walker, Inc. (S.C.App. 1993) 315 S.C. 199, 432 S.E.2d 500.

When secured creditor introduces evidence of how resale of repossessed collateral was conducted but introduces no evidence of value of collateral at time of resale or any other evidence which would enable jury to determine whether sale was commercially reasonable, trial judge properly directs verdict in favor of purchaser. Mid‑Continent Refrigerator Co. v. Carpenter (S.C.App. 1986) 287 S.C. 624, 340 S.E.2d 559.

Where a finance institution repossessed and sold earthmoving equipment, which had been collateral on a promissory note on which the maker had defaulted, and two witnesses testified that the finance institution’s method of sale was “standard in the industry” and “about the best way they could go about it,” and the only evidence in behalf of the maker of the promissory note was his own testimony that if more repairs had been made and the equipment had been sold in a group, instead of piece‑by‑piece, the proceeds would have been greater, there was no evidence for the jury reasonably to infer, under Section 36‑9‑507(2), that the sale was not “commercially reasonable” as required by Section 36‑9‑504(1), (3). Associates Commercial Corp. v. Hammond (S.C.App. 1985) 285 S.C. 277, 330 S.E.2d 82.

Contention by guarantor of bankruptcy corporate debtor’s note that repossession sale of note’s collateral (equipment) was not commercially reasonable under UCC Section 36‑9‑504(3), on ground that collateral was not sufficiently repaired by secured party and was sold piece‑by‑piece rather than as a “group,” could not be sustained because UCC Section 36‑9‑507(2) provides that fact that better price could have been obtained by sale in different method from that selected by secured party is not, by itself, sufficient to establish sale was commercially unreasonable. Associates Commercial Corp. v. Hammond (S.C.App. 1985) 285 S.C. 277, 330 S.E.2d 82.

**SECTION 36‑9‑628.** Nonliability and limitation on liability of secured party; liability of secondary obligor.

(a) Unless a secured party knows that a person is a debtor or obligor, knows the identity of the person, and knows how to communicate with the person:

(1) the secured party is not liable to the person, or to a secured party or lienholder that has filed a financing statement against the person, for failure to comply with this chapter; and

(2) the secured party’s failure to comply with this chapter does not affect the liability of the person for a deficiency.

(b) A secured party is not liable because of its status as secured party:

(1) to a person that is a debtor or obligor, unless the secured party knows:

(A) that the person is a debtor or obligor;

(B) the identity of the person; and

(C) how to communicate with the person; or

(2) to a secured party or lienholder that has filed a financing statement against a person, unless the secured party knows:

(A) that the person is a debtor; and

(B) the identity of the person.

(c) A secured party is not liable to any person, and a person’s liability for a deficiency is not affected, because of any act or omission arising out of the secured party’s reasonable belief that a transaction is not a consumer‑goods transaction or a consumer transaction or that goods are not consumer goods, if the secured party’s belief is based on its reasonable reliance on:

(1) a debtor’s representation concerning the purpose for which collateral was to be used, acquired, or held; or

(2) an obligor’s representation concerning the purpose for which a secured obligation was incurred.

(d) A secured party is not liable to any person under Section 36‑9‑625(c)(2) for its failure to comply with Section 36‑9‑616.

(e) A secured party is not liable under Section 36‑9‑625(c)(2) more than once with respect to any one secured obligation.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Source. New.

2. Exculpatory Provisions. Subsections (a), (b), and (c) contain exculpatory provisions that should be read in conjunction with Section 9‑605. Without this group of provisions, a secured party could incur liability to unknown persons and under circumstances that would not allow the secured party to protect itself. The broadened definition of the term “debtor” underscores the need for these provisions.

If a secured party reasonably, but mistakenly, believes that a consumer transaction or consumer‑goods transaction is a non‑consumer transaction or non‑consumer‑goods transaction, and if the secured party’s belief is based on its reasonable reliance on a representation of the type specified in subsection (c)(1) or (c)(2), then this Article should be applied as if the facts reasonably believed and reasonably relied upon were true. For example, if a secured party reasonably believed that a transaction was a non‑consumer transaction and its belief was based on reasonable reliance on the debtor’s misrepresentation that the collateral secured an obligation incurred for business purposes, the rebuttable presumption rule would apply under 9‑626(b). Of course, if the secured party’s belief is not reasonable or, even if reasonable, is not based on reasonable reliance on the debtor’s misrepresentation, this limitation on liability is inapplicable.

3. Inapplicability of Statutory Damages to Section 9‑616. Subsection (d) excludes noncompliance with Section 9‑616 entirely from the scope of statutory damage liability under Section 9‑625(c)(2).

4. Single Liability for Statutory Minimum Damages. Subsection (e) ensures that a secured party will incur statutory damages only once in connection with any one secured obligation.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑628 limits the liability of a secured party for failure to comply with the requirements of Article 9. Subsections (a) and (b) and Section 36‑9‑605 protect the secured party from liability to unknown persons. Subsection (c) may shield a secured party from liability and preserves its right to deficiency when a secured party violates a provision applicable only in a consumer transaction, a consumer‑goods transaction, or with respect to consumer goods. If the secured party had a reasonable belief founded on the debtor’s or obligor’s representations that the transaction was not a consumer transaction or a consumer‑goods transaction, or did not involve consumer goods and relied upon that belief in failing to comply with a consumer provision, subsection (c) provides that the secured party is not liable for the violation.

Subsection (d) provides that a secured party cannot be liable for statutory minimum damages under Section 36‑9‑625(c)(2) for a failure to provide a response to a request for an explanation of a surplus or deficiency under Section 36‑9‑616 .

Under Section 36‑9‑628(e) a secured party is not liable for the minimum statutory damages under Section 36‑9‑625(c)(2) more than once with respect to any one secured obligation. For example, assume that Debtor granted Secured Party a security interest in consumer goods to secure a loan and Guarantor guaranteed Debtor’s obligation to pay the loan. Following Debtor’s default, Secured Party repossessed the consumer goods and sold them without providing notification to either Debtor or Guarantor as required under Section 36‑9‑611(c)(1) and (2). Under Section 36‑9‑625(c)(2) both Debtor and Guarantor, as a secondary obligor, have claims for minimum damages. Section 36‑9‑628(e), however, limits Secured Party’s aggregate liability to a single recovery under Section 36‑9‑625(c)(2).

Section 36‑9‑328(e) overrules one of the holdings in Crane v. Citicorp National Services, Inc., 313 S.C. 70, 437 S.E. 2d 945 (1993). In Crane the Court asserted that a debtor and a guarantor could both recover statutory minimum damages under former Section 36‑9‑507(1) for a secured party’s misconduct with respect to a single secured obligation.

Definitional Cross References:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  |  |
| “Collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Consumer goods” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(23) |
| “Consumer‑goods transaction” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(24) |
| “Consumer transaction” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(26) |
| “Debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “Financing statement” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(39) |
| “Know” | Section 36‑1‑201(25) [see now Section 36‑1‑202] |
| “Obligor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(59) |
| “Person” | Section 36‑1‑201(30) |
| “Secured party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |

Cross References—

1. A secured party does not owe a duty to an unknown debtor or secondary obligor. Section 36‑9‑605.

2. A secured party’s liability for minimum damages in a transaction in which the collateral is consumer goods. Section 36‑9‑625(c)(2).

3. A secured party’s obligation to provide and to respond to requests for an explanation of the calculation of a surplus or deficiency. Section 36‑9‑616.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 242.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak242.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

Construction and application 1

1. Construction and application

Statutory amendment which limits a secured party’s aggregate liability, for failure to comply with obligation to give notice of sale of repossessed collateral, to a single recovery applies prospectively. Singleton v. Stokes Motors, Inc. (S.C. 2004) 358 S.C. 369, 595 S.E.2d 461, rehearing denied. Secured Transactions 242.1

**SECTION 36‑9‑629.** Disposition of collateral by public sale.

Disposition of collateral by public proceedings as permitted by Section 36‑9‑610 may be made in accordance with the provisions of this part. The provisions of this part are not mandatory for disposition by public proceedings, but any disposition of the collateral by public sale wherein the secured party has substantially complied with the procedures provided in this part is conclusively considered to be commercially reasonable in all aspects.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

None.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Sections 36‑9‑629 to 36‑9‑635 constitute South Carolina’s Public Sale Procedures. These provisions are not part of the UCC Official Text. The Public Sale Procedures are designed to provide a “safe harbor” for public sales of repossessed collateral. This is accomplished by the last part of Section 36‑9‑629 which states that a public sale that substantially complies “with the procedures provided in this part shall conclusively be deemed to be commercially reasonable in all respects.” At the present time the only other similar “safe harbors” are a judicially approved public sale, and approvals by representative of creditor under Section 36‑9‑627.

A public sale not made in conformity to this part and all private sales would continue to be subject to the commercial reasonableness requirements of Section 36‑9‑610(b). Sections 36‑9‑625 and 36‑9‑626 specify the remedies for a sale that is determined not to be commercially reasonable.

Definitional Cross References:

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| --- | --- |
|  |  |
| “Collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Commercially reasonable” | Section 36‑9‑627 |

Cross References—

1. Disposition of collateral after default. Section 36‑9‑610.

2. Determination of whether a secured party’s conduct is commercially reasonable. Section 36‑9‑627.

3. The right to recover a deficiency arising after disposition of collateral made pursuant to the Public Sale.

4. Procedures to the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or to a secondary obligor may be limited. Section 36‑9‑615(f).

5. A secured party’s liability for failure to conduct a disposition of collateral in a commercially reasonable manner. Section 36‑9‑625(b) and (c).

6. The elimination or limitation of a secured party’s right to recover a deficiency following a commercially unreasonable disposition of collateral. Section 36‑9‑626.

LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES

South Carolina’s Public Sale Procedures Under the Uniform Commercial Code Revised Article 9—Secured Transactions. 55 SC Law Rev 501 (Spring 2004).

**SECTION 36‑9‑630.** Contents of notice of sale.

The notice of sale shall substantially:

(a) Refer to the security agreement pursuant to which the sale is held;

(b) Designate the date, hour, and place of sale consistent with the provisions of the security agreement and the provisions found in this part;

(c) Describe personal property to be sold substantially as it is described in the security agreement pursuant to which the power of sale is being exercised and may add a further description as will acquaint bidders with the nature of the property;

(d) State the terms of the sale provided by the security agreement pursuant to which the sale is held, including the amount of the cash deposit, if any, to be made by the highest bidder at the sale;

(e) Include any other provisions required by the security agreement to be included therein;

(f) State that the property will be sold subject to taxes and special assessments if it is to be so sold.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

None.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑630 sets forth the necessary contents of a notice of sale under the Public Sale Procedures. Note that the requirements of this provision differ from those imposed by Sections 36‑9‑613 and 36‑9‑614. For a disposition to be effective under the Public Sale Procedures, the notification must meet the requirements of both Section 36‑9‑630 and of either Section 36‑9‑613 or 36‑9‑614.

Definitional Cross References:

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| --- | --- |
|  |  |
| “Security agreement” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(73) |

Cross References—

1. Requirements for content of a notification of a disposition of collateral in a transaction other than a consumer‑goods transaction. Section 36‑9‑613.

2. Requirements for the content of a notification of a disposition of collateral in a consumer goods transaction. Section 36‑9‑614.

**SECTION 36‑9‑631.** Posting and mailing notice of sale.

(1) In each public sale conducted, the notice of sale must be posted on a bulletin board provided for the posting of legal notices, in the courthouse, in the county in which the sale is to be held, for at least five days immediately preceding the sale.

(2) In addition to the posting of notice required by subsection 91), the secured party or other party holding a public sale shall, at least five days before the date of sale, mail by registered or certified mail a copy of the notice of sale to each debtor obligated under the security agreement:

(a) At the actual address of the debtors, if known to the secured party, or

(b) At the address, if any, furnished the secured party, in writing, by the debtors, or otherwise at the last known address.

(c) In the case of consumer goods, no other notification need be sent. In other cases, in addition to mailing a copy of the notice of sale to each debtor, the secured party shall also mail a copy of such notice by registered or certified mail to any other secured party from whom the secured party has received (before sending the notice of sale to the debtor) written notice of a claim or an interest in the collateral.

(4) The time for the posting of the notice of sale and the mailing of the notice required by this section shall be computed so as to exclude the first day of posting and mailing and to include the day on which the sale is to occur.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

None.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑631(1) requires a secured party invoking the Public Sales Procedures to post a notice of the sale in the courthouse in the county in which the sale is to be held at least five days prior to the sale. Subsection (2) requires the secured party to mail by registered or certified mail a copy of the notice of sale to each debtor at least five days before the sale. Subsection (2)(6) requires the secured party to mail by certified or registered mail a notice of the sale to any other secured party from whom the secured party has received a written notice of a claim or interest in the collateral.

The requirements of Section 36‑9‑631 are not consistent with the requirements of Section 36‑9‑611 and 36‑9‑612. Section 36‑9‑611 specifies the persons to whom a secured party must send notification of a disposition of collateral and imposes a more rigorous requirement than Section 36‑9‑631. Section 36‑9‑612 addresses the timeliness of sending a notification of disposition. Subsection 36‑9‑612(b) provides a safe harbor under which a notification is timely if it is sent ten days prior to the earliest time the disposition could be held. This period is longer than the five day provision in Section 36‑9‑631.

For a secured party to make a proper disposition under the Public Sale Procedures, the secured party must meet the requirements of Section 36‑9‑611 and 36‑9‑612, as well as the requirements of Section 36‑9‑631.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “Secured party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |

Cross References—

1. Persons to whom a secured party is required to send a notification of a disposition of collateral. Section 36‑9‑611(c).

2. Timeliness of a notification of a disposition of collateral. Section 36‑9‑612.

**SECTION 36‑9‑632.** Exception as to perishable property.

If in the opinion of a secured party about to conduct a public sale of personal property, the property is perishable because subject to rapid deterioration or threatens to decline speedily in value, he may report this fact, together with a description of the property to the clerk of court of the county in which the property is to be sold, and apply for authority to sell the property at an earlier date than is provided in this chapter. Upon the clerk’s determination that the property is perishable or speedily depreciating property, he shall order a sale of the property to be held at a time and place and upon notice, if any, as he considers advisable.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

None.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑632 provides a means for obtaining an accelerated sale of property that is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value. Under this provision a secured party must apply to the clerk of court for the county in which the property will be sold. If the clerk determines that the collateral is perishable or speedily depreciating, the clerk is required to order the sale of the property at a time and upon such notice as the clerk deems advisable.

Definitional Cross References:

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| --- | --- |
|  |  |
| “Secured party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |

**SECTION 36‑9‑633.** Postponement of public sale.

(1) Any person exercising a power of sale or conducting a public sale may postpone the sale to a day certain not later than six days, exclusive of Sunday, after the original date for the sale:

(a) When there are no bidders; or

(b) When, in his judgment, the number of prospective bidders at the sale is substantially decreased by inclement weather or by any casualty; or

(c) When there are so many other sales advertised to be held at the same time and place as to make it inexpedient and impracticable in his judgment to hold the sale on that day; or

(d) When he is unable to hold the sale because of illness or for other good reason; or

(e) When other good cause exists.

(2) Upon postponement of a public sale, the person exercising the power of sale shall personally, or through his agent or attorney:

(a) At the time and place advertised for the sale, publicly announce the postponement of the sale;

(b) On the same day, attach to or enter on the original notice of sale or a copy of the original notice of sale, posted on the bulletin board provided for this purpose, as provided by Section 36‑9‑631 , a notice of the postponement.

(3) The posted notice of postponement shall:

(a) State that the public sale is postponed;

(b) State the hour and date to which the public sale is postponed;

(c) Substantially state the reason for the postponement;

(d) Be signed by the person authorized to hold the public sale, or by his agent or attorney.

(4) If a public sale is not held at the time fixed for the public sale and is not postponed as provided by this section, or if a postponed sale is not held at the time fixed for the postponed sale, the person authorized to hold the public sale may readvertise the property in the same manner as he was required to advertise the sale which was not held and may hold a public sale at a later date as is fixed in the new notice of sale.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

None.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

This section sets out procedures for postponed sales. No additional notices to the debtor or secured parties are required unless the rescheduled date is more than six days from the original date or the second sale is not held as scheduled.

**SECTION 36‑9‑634.** Procedure upon dissolution of order restraining or enjoining sale.

(1) When, before the date fixed for a sale, a judge of competent jurisdiction dissolves an order restraining or enjoining the sale, he may, if the required notice of sale has been given, as provided in Section 36‑9‑631, provide by order that the public sale must be held without additional notice at the time and place originally fixed for the public sale; or he may, in his discretion, make an order with respect to the public sale as provided in subsection (2).

(2) When, after the date fixed for a public sale, a judge of competent jurisdiction dissolves an order restraining or enjoining the sale, he shall, by order, fix the time and place for the sale to be held upon notice to be given and in a manner and for a length of time as he considers advisable.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

None.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

This debtor or another secured party might seek to enjoin a proposed public sale brought under the Public Sale Procedures. If the selling party is successful in getting an injunction dissolved, the judge who issued the injunction must decide when and where the sale will be held and who shall be required to receive notice of the sale.

**SECTION 36‑9‑635.** Disposition of proceeds of sale.

The proceeds of any sale or other disposition of the collateral must be applied by the person making the sale in the manner prescribed by Section 36‑9‑615 and by other applicable provisions of law.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

None.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

This section provides that the proceeds of a sale conducted under the Public Sale Procedures will be distributed in the same manner provided under Section 36‑9‑615 which applies to the application of proceeds realized upon a disposition under Section 36‑9‑610.

Definition Cross References

“Collateral” Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12)

Part 7

Transition

**SECTION 36‑9‑702.** Savings clause.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this part, this act applies to a transaction or lien within its scope, even if the transaction or lien was entered into or created before this act takes effect.

(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c) and Sections 36‑9‑703 through 36‑9‑709:

(1) transactions and liens that were not governed by former Chapter 9, were validly entered into or created before this act takes effect, and would be subject to this act if they had been entered into or created after this act takes effect, and the rights, duties, and interests flowing from those transactions and liens remain valid after this act takes effect; and

(2) the transactions and liens may be terminated, completed, consummated, and enforced as required or permitted by this act or by the law that otherwise would apply if this act had not taken effect.

(c) This act does not affect an action, case, or proceeding commenced before this act takes effect.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Pre‑Effective‑Date Transactions. Subsection (a) contains the general rule that this Article applies to transactions, security interests, and other liens within its scope (see Section 9‑109), even if the transaction or lien was entered into or created before the effective date. Thus, secured transactions entered into under former Article 9 must be terminated, completed, consummated, and enforced under this Article. Subsection (b) is an exception to the general rule. It applies to valid, pre‑effective‑date transactions and liens that were not governed by former Article 9 but would be governed by this Article if they had been entered into or created after this Article takes effect. Under subsection (b), these valid transactions, such as the creation of agricultural liens and security interests in commercial tort claims, retain their validity under this Article and may be terminated, completed, consummated, and enforced under this Article. However, these transactions also may be terminated, completed, consummated, and enforced by the law that otherwise would apply had this Article not taken effect.

2. Judicial Proceedings Commenced Before Effective Date. As is usual in transition provisions, subsection (c) provides that this Article does not affect litigation pending on the effective date.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Subsection (a) states the general rule for the transition provisions of revised Article 9. Under subsection (a), revised Article 9 applies to a transaction or lien within its scope even if the transaction or lien predates the effective date of the revision. Subsection (b)(1) provides an exception to this rule for a pre‑effective date transfer or lien that was not governed by former Article 9. Even if such a transfer or lien is within the scope of revised Article 9, subsection (b)(1) provides that the rights, duties, and interests flowing from the transaction or lien remain valid. For example, assume that prior to the effective date of the revision A sold to B A’s right to receive payments under a land sale contract. A’s right to receive the payments was a general intangible under former Article 9, but former Article 9 did not apply to sales of general intangibles. See former Section 36‑9‑102. Under revised Article 9 A’s right to receive payments under a land sale contract is an account and A’s sale to B is within the scope of the statute. Sections 36‑9‑102(a)(2) and 36‑9‑109(a)(3). Under Section 36‑9‑702(b)(1) B’s right to the payments under the land sale contract remains valid even if B fails to comply with attachment provisions of revised Article 9.

Subsection (b)(2) provides that pre‑effective date transactions and liens that were not governed by former Article 9 but which are within the scope of revised Article 9 may be terminated, completed, consummated or enforced either under revised Article 9 or the law that would apply had revised Article 9 not taken effect.

Subsection (c) provides that the provisions of revised Article 9 do not affect an action, case, or proceeding commenced before the effective date of the revision.

Cross References—

Effective date of revised Article 9. Section 36‑9‑701.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 8.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak8.

**SECTION 36‑9‑703.** Security interest perfected before effective date.

(a) A security interest that is enforceable immediately before this act takes effect and would have priority over the rights of a person that becomes a lien creditor at that time is a perfected security interest under this act if, when this act takes effect, the applicable requirements for enforceability and perfection under this act are satisfied without further action.

(b) Except as otherwise provided in Section 36‑9‑705, if, immediately before this act takes effect, a security interest is enforceable and would have priority over the rights of a person that becomes a lien creditor at that time, but the applicable requirements for enforceability or perfection under this act are not satisfied when this act takes effect, the security interest:

(1) is a perfected security interest for one year after this act takes effect;

(2) remains enforceable thereafter only if the security interest becomes enforceable under Section 36‑9‑203 before the year expires; and

(3) remains perfected thereafter only if the applicable requirements for perfection under this act are satisfied before the year expires.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Perfected Security Interests Under Former Article 9 and This Article. This Section deals with security interests that are perfected (i.e., that are enforceable and have priority over the rights of a lien creditor) under former Article 9 or other applicable law immediately before this Article takes effect. Subsection (a) provides, not surprisingly, that if the security interest would be a perfected security interest under this Article (i.e., if the transaction satisfies this Article’s requirements for enforceability (attachment) and perfection), no further action need be taken for the security interest to be a perfected security interest.

2. Security Interests Enforceable and Perfected Under Former Article 9 but Unenforceable or Unperfected Under This Article. Subsection (b) deals with security interests that are enforceable and perfected under former Article 9 or other applicable law immediately before this Article takes effect but do not satisfy the requirements for enforceability (attachment) or perfection under this Article. Except as otherwise provided in Section 9‑705, these security interests are perfected security interests for one year after the effective date. If the security interest satisfies the requirements for attachment and perfection within that period, the security interest remains perfected thereafter. If the security interest satisfies only the requirements for attachment within that period, the security interest becomes unperfected at the end of the one‑year period.

Example 1: A pre‑effective‑date security agreement in a consumer transaction covers “all securities accounts.” The security interest is properly perfected. The collateral description was adequate under former Article 9 (see former Section 9‑115(3)) but is insufficient under this Article (see Section 9‑108(e)(2)). Unless the debtor authenticates a new security agreement describing the collateral other than by “type” (or Section 9‑203(b)(3) otherwise is satisfied) within the one‑year period following the effective date, the security interest becomes unenforceable at the end of that period.

Other examples under former Article 9 or other applicable law that may be effective as attachment or enforceability steps but may be ineffective under this Article include an oral agreement to sell a payment intangible or possession by virtue of a notification to a bailee under former Section 9‑305. Neither the oral agreement nor the notification would satisfy the revised Section 9‑203 requirements for attachment.

Example 2: A pre‑effective‑date possessory security interest in instruments is perfected by a bailee’s receipt of notification under former 9‑305. The bailee has not, however, acknowledged that it holds for the secured party’s benefit under revised Section 9‑313. Unless the bailee authenticates a record acknowledging that it holds for the secured party (or another appropriate perfection step is taken) within the one‑year period following the effective date, the security interest becomes unperfected at the end of that period.

3. Interpretation of Pre‑Effective‑Date Security Agreements. Section 9‑102 defines “security agreement” as “an agreement that creates or provides for a security interest.” Under Section 1‑201(3), an “agreement” is a “bargain of the parties in fact.” If parties to a pre‑effective‑date security agreement describe the collateral by using a term defined in former Article 9 in one way and defined in this Article in another way, in most cases it should be presumed that the bargain of the parties contemplated the meaning of the term under former Article 9.

Example 3: A pre‑effective‑date security agreement covers “all accounts” of a debtor. As defined under former Article 9, an “ account” did not include a right to payment for lottery winnings. These rights to payment are “accounts” under this Article, however. The agreement of the parties presumptively created a security interest in “accounts” as defined in former Article 9. A different result might be appropriate, for example, if the security agreement explicitly contemplated future changes in the Article 9 definitions of types of collateral‑e.g., “Accounts” means ‘ accounts’ as defined in the UCC Article 9 of [State X], as that definition may be amended from time to time.” Whether a different approach is appropriate in any given case depends on the bargain of the parties, as determined by applying ordinary principles of contract construction.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑703 addresses the effect of revised Article 9 upon security interests that attached and were perfected under former Article 9. Subsection (a) provides that if the actions taken by the secured party under former Article 9 meet the requirements for enforceability and perfection under revised Article 9, the security interest is perfected under the revision. For example, assume that D, Inc. is a South Carolina corporation and that prior to the effective date of the revision SP and D, Inc. entered into a security agreement which met the requirements of former Section 36‑9‑203 and granted SP a security interest in D, Inc.’s equipment located in South Carolina. Also prior to the effective date of the revision, SP filed a financing statement covering D., Inc.’s equipment in the office of the Secretary of State for South Carolina. If SP’s security agreement meets the requirements of Section 36‑9‑203 and its financing statement meets the requirements of revised Article 9, Section 36‑9‑703(a) provides that SP’s security interest is a perfected security interest under revised Article 9. See also Section 36‑9‑705(b) (a pre‑effective date filing is effective to perfect a security interest to the extent the filing satisfies the requirements of revised Article 9).

Subsection (b) addresses the situation in which a security interest was enforceable and perfected under former Article 9, but the applicable requirements for enforceability or perfection under revised Article 9 have not been met. Subsection (b)(1) provides that the security interest is perfected for one year after the effective date of the revision. Under subsection (b)(2) the security interest remains enforceable beyond the one year period only if the requirements of Section 36‑9‑203 are met before the year expires. Under subsection (b)(3) the security interest will remain perfected beyond the one year period only if the requirements for perfection under revised Article 9 are satisfied before the year expires.

The scope of subsection (b) is limited because the provision is subject to Section 36‑9‑705. Under Section 36‑9‑705(c) a pre‑revision security interest that was perfected by a filing under former Article 9 remains perfected after the effective date of revised Article 9 until the earlier of the date on which the pre‑revision financing statement lapses or July 1, 2006. As a result, the one year period of perfection under Subsection 36‑9‑702(b)(1) and (3) will control only those pre‑revision security interests that were perfected under former Article 9 in a manner other than filing. See Section 36‑9‑705, Official Comment 4.

Definitional Cross References:

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| --- | --- |
|  |  |
| “Lien creditor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(51) |
| “Person” | Section 36‑1‑201(30) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |

Cross References—

1. Effective date of revised Article 9. Section 36‑9‑701.

2. Requirements for enforceability of a security interest. Section 36‑9‑203.

3. Requirements for perfection of a security interest. Sections 36‑9‑308 to 36‑9‑316.

4. Effectiveness of a financing statement filed to perfect a security interest under former Article 9. Section 36‑9‑705.

5. Lapse of a financing statement under pre‑revision Article 9. Former Section 36‑9‑403(2).

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 135.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak135.

**SECTION 36‑9‑704.** Security interest unperfected before effective date.

A security interest that is enforceable immediately before this act takes effect but which would be subordinate to the rights of a person that becomes a lien creditor at that time:

(1) remains an enforceable security interest for one year after this act takes effect;

(2) remains enforceable thereafter if the security interest becomes enforceable under Section 36‑9‑203 when this act takes effect or within one year thereafter; and

(3) becomes perfected:

(A) without further action, when this act takes effect if the applicable requirements for perfection under this act are satisfied before or at that time; or

(B) when the applicable requirements for perfection are satisfied if the requirements are satisfied after that time.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

This Section deals with security interests that are enforceable but unperfected (i.e., subordinate to the rights of a person who becomes a lien creditor) under former Article 9 or other applicable law immediately before this Article takes effect. These security interests remain enforceable for one year after the effective date, and thereafter if the appropriate steps for attachment under this Article are taken before the one‑year period expires. (This Section’s treatment of enforceability is the same as that of Section 9‑703.) The security interest becomes a perfected security interest on the effective date if, at that time, the security interest satisfies the requirements for perfection under this Article. If the security interest does not satisfy the requirements for perfection until sometime thereafter, it becomes a perfected security interest at that later time.

Example: A security interest has attached under former Article 9 but is unperfected because the filed financing statement covers “all of debtor’s personal property” and controlling case law in the applicable jurisdiction has determined that this identification of collateral in a financing statement is insufficient. Upon the effective date of this Article, the financing statement becomes sufficient under Section 9‑504(2). On that date the security interest becomes perfected. (This assumes, of course, that the financing statement is filed in the proper filing office under this Article.)

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑704 applies to security interests that were enforceable but unperfected under former Article 9 on the effective date of revised Article 9. Subsections (1) and (2) provide that the security interest remains enforceable for one year after the effective date and thereafter if the requirements of Section 36‑9‑203 are met on or within the year after the effective date. Subsection (3) addresses perfection of such a security interest under revised Article 9. Subsection (3)(A) provides that the security interest becomes perfected without further action if the requirements for perfection under revised Article 9 were satisfied at or before the effective date. To illustrate consider:

Example —On July 1, 2000, SP and D, Inc., a South Carolina corporation, entered into a security agreement that met the requirements of both former and current Section 36‑9‑203 and granted SP a security interest in a promissory note. On July 1, 2000, SP filed a financing statement in the office of the Secretary of State. Under former Article 9 SP’s filing was ineffective to perfect the security interest. See former Section 36‑9‑312(a). As a result, if SP’s statement meets the requirements of Section 36‑9‑502, SP’s security interest became perfected on the effective date of the revision.

Subsection (3)(B) applies when an enforceable pre‑effective date security interest was unperfected both under former law and revised Article 9 when the revision took effect. Under this provision such a security interest becomes perfected when the applicable requirements for perfection under the revision are satisfied.

Definitional Cross References:

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| “Lien creditor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |

Cross References—

1. Effective date of revised Article 9. Section 36‑9‑701.

2. Requirements for creation of an enforceable security interest. Section 36‑9‑203.

3. Requirements for perfection of a security interest. Sections 6‑9‑308 to 36‑9‑316.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 135.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak135.

**SECTION 36‑9‑705.** Effectiveness of action taken before effective date.

(a) If action, other than the filing of a financing statement, is taken before this act takes effect and the action would have resulted in priority of a security interest over the rights of a person that becomes a lien creditor had the security interest become enforceable before this act takes effect, the action is effective to perfect a security interest that attaches under this act within one year after this act takes effect. An attached security interest becomes unperfected one year after this act takes effect unless the security interest becomes a perfected security interest under this act before the expiration of that period.

(b) The filing of a financing statement before this act takes effect is effective to perfect a security interest to the extent the filing would satisfy the applicable requirements for perfection under this act.

(c) This act does not render ineffective an effective financing statement that, before this act takes effect, is filed and satisfies the applicable requirements for perfection under the law of the jurisdiction governing perfection as provided in former Section 36‑9‑103. However, except as otherwise provided in subsections (d) and (e) and Section 36‑9‑706, the financing statement ceases to be effective at the earlier of:

(1) the time the financing statement would have ceased to be effective under the law of the jurisdiction in which it is filed; or

(2) June 30, 2006.

(d) The filing of a continuation statement after this act takes effect does not continue the effectiveness of the financing statement filed before this act takes effect. However, upon the timely filing of a continuation statement after this act takes effect and in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction governing perfection as provided in Part 3, the effectiveness of a financing statement filed in the same office in that jurisdiction before this act takes effect continues for the period provided by the law of that jurisdiction.

(e) Subsection (c)(2) applies to a financing statement that, before this act takes effect, is filed against a transmitting utility and satisfies the applicable requirements for perfection under the law of the jurisdiction governing perfection as provided in former Section 36‑9‑103 only to the extent that Part 3 provides that the law of a jurisdiction other than the jurisdiction in which the financing statement is filed governs perfection of a security interest in collateral covered by the financing statement.

(f) A financing statement that includes a financing statement filed before this act takes effect and a continuation statement filed after this act takes effect is effective only to the extent that it satisfies the requirements of Part 5 for an initial financing statement.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. General. This Section addresses primarily the situation in which the perfection step is taken under former Article 9 or other applicable law before the effective date of this Article, but the security interest does not attach until after that date.

2. Perfection Other Than by Filing. Subsection (a) applies when the perfection step is a step other than the filing of a financing statement. If the step that would be a valid perfection step under former Article 9 or other law is taken before this Article takes effect, and if a security interest attaches within one year after this Article takes effect, then the security interest becomes a perfected security interest upon attachment. However, the security interest becomes unperfected one year after the effective date unless the requirements for attachment and perfection under this Article are satisfied within that period.

3. Perfection by Filing: Ineffective Filings Made Effective. Subsection (b) deals with financing statements that were filed under former Article 9 and which would not have perfected a security interest under the former Article (because, e.g., they did not accurately describe the collateral or were filed in the wrong place), but which would perfect a security interest under this Article. Under subsection (b), such a financing statement is effective to perfect a security interest to the extent it complies with this Article. Subsection (b) applies regardless of the reason for the filing. For example, a secured party need not wait until the effective date to respond to the change this Article makes with respect to the jurisdiction whose law governs perfection of certain security interests. Rather, a secured party may wish to prepare for this change by filing a financing statement before the effective date in the jurisdiction whose law governs perfection under this Article. When this Article takes effect, the filing becomes effective to perfect a security interest (assuming the filing satisfies the perfection requirements of this Article). Note, however, that Section 9‑706 determines whether a financing statement filed before the effective date operates to continue the effectiveness of a financing statement filed in another office before the effective date.

4. Perfection by Filing: Change in Applicable Law. Subsection (c) provides that a financing statement filed in the proper jurisdiction under former Section 9‑103 remains effective for all purposes, despite the fact that Part 3 of this Article would require filing of a financing statement in a different jurisdiction. This means that, during the early years of this Article’s effectiveness, it may be necessary to search the files not only in the jurisdiction whose law governs perfection under this Article but also (if different) in the jurisdiction(s) whose law governed perfection under former Article 9. To limit this burden, subsection (c) provides that a financing statement filed in the jurisdiction determined by former Section 9‑103 becomes ineffective at the earlier of the time it would become ineffective under the law of that jurisdiction or June 30, 2006. The June 30, 2006, limitation addresses some nonuniform versions of former Article 9 that extended the effectiveness of a financing statement beyond five years. Note that a financing statement filed before the effective date may remain effective beyond June 30, 2006, if subsection (d) (concerning continuation statements) or (e) (concerning transmitting utilities) or Section 9‑706 (concerning initial financing statements that operate to continue pre‑effective‑date financing statements) so provides.

Subsection (c) is an exception to Section 9‑703(b). Under the general rule in Section 9‑703(b), a security interest that is enforceable and perfected on the effective date of this Article is a perfected security interest for one year after this Article takes effect, even if the security interest is not enforceable under this Article and the applicable requirements for perfection under this Article have not been met. However, in some cases subsection (c) may shorten the one‑year period of perfection; in others, if the security interest is enforceable under Section 9‑203, it may extend the period of perfection. A financing statement that remains effective under subsection (c) may be amended (but generally may not be continued) after this Article takes effect by filing an amendment in the office where the financing statement was filed.

Example 1: On July 3, 1996, D, a State X corporation, creates a security interest in certain manufacturing equipment located in State Y. On July 6, 1996, SP perfects a security interest in the equipment under former Article 9 by filing in the office of the State Y Secretary of State. See former Section 9‑103(1)(b). This Article takes effect in States X and Y on July 1, 2001. Under Section 9‑705(c), the financing statement remains effective for the first five days of July, 2001, after which it lapses. See former Section 9‑403. Had SP continued the effectiveness of the financing statement by filing a continuation statement in State Y under former Article 9 before July 1, 2001, the financing statement would have remained effective to perfect the security interest through June 30, 2006. See subsection (c)(2). Alternatively, SP could have filed an initial financing statement in State X under subsection (b) or Section 9‑706 before the State Y financing statement lapsed. Had SP done so, the security interest would have remained perfected without interruption until the State X financing statement lapsed.

5. Continuing Effectiveness of Filed Financing Statement. A financing statement filed before the effective date of this Article may be continued only by filing in the State and office designated by this Article. This result is accomplished in the following manner: Subsection (d) indicates that, as a general matter, a continuation statement filed after the effective date of this Article does not continue the effectiveness of a financing statement filed under the law designated by former Section 9‑103. Instead, an initial financing statement must be filed under Section 9‑706. The second sentence of subsection (d) contains an exception to the general rule. It provides that a continuation statement is effective to continue the effectiveness of a financing statement filed before this Article takes effect if this Article prescribes not only the same jurisdiction but also the same filing office.

Example 2: On November 8, 2000, D, a State X corporation, creates a security interest in certain manufacturing equipment located in State Y. On November 15, 2000, SP perfects a security interest in the equipment under former Article 9 by filing in office of the State Y Secretary of State. See former Section 9‑103(1)(b). This Article takes effect in States X and Y on July 1, 2001. Under Section 9‑705(c), the financing statement ceases to be effective in November, 2005, when it lapses. See Section 9‑515. Under this Article, the law of D’s location (State X, see Section 9‑307) governs perfection. See Section 9‑301. Thus, the filing of a continuation statement in State Y after the effective date would not continue the effectiveness of the financing statement. See subsection (d). However, the effectiveness of the financing statement could be continued under Section 9‑706.

Example 3: The facts are as in Example 2, except that D is a State Y corporation. Assume State Y adopted former Section 9‑401(1) (second alternative). State Y law governs perfection under Part 3 of this Article. (See Sections 9‑301, 9‑307.) Under the second sentence of subsection (d), the timely filing of a continuation statement in accordance with the law of State Y continues the effectiveness of the financing statement.

Example 4: The facts are as in Example 3, except that the collateral is equipment used in farming operations and, in accordance with former Section 9‑401(1) (second alternative) as enacted in State Y, the financing statement was filed in State Y, in the office of the Shelby County Recorder of Deeds. Under this Article, a continuation statement must be filed in the office of the State Y Secretary of State. See Section 9‑501(a)(2). Under the second sentence of subsection (d), the timely filing of a continuation statement in accordance with the law of State Y operates to continue a pre‑effective‑date financing statement only if the continuation statement is filed in the same office as the financing statement. Accordingly, the continuation statement is not effective in this case, but the financing statement may be continued under Section 9‑706.

Example 5: The facts are as in Example 3, except that State Y enacted former Section 9‑401(1) (third alternative). As required by former Section 9‑401(1), SP filed financing statements in both the office of the State Y Secretary of State and the office of the Shelby County Recorder of Deeds. Under this Article, a continuation statement must be filed in the office of the State Y Secretary of State. See Section 9‑501(a)(2). The timely filing of a continuation statement in that office after this Article takes effect would be effective to continue the effectiveness of the financing statement (and thus continue the perfection of the security interest), even if the financing statement filed with the County Recorder lapses.

6. Continuation Statements. In some cases, this Article reclassifies collateral covered by a financing statement filed under former Article 9. For example, collateral consisting of the right to payment for real property sold would be a “general intangible” under the former Article but an “account” under this Article. To continue perfection under those circumstances, a continuation statement must comply with the normal requirements for a continuation statement. See Section 9‑515. In addition, the pre‑effective‑date financing statement and continuation statement, taken together, must satisfy the requirements of this Article concerning the sufficiency of the debtor’s name, secured party’s name, and indication of collateral. See subsection (f).

Example 6: A pre‑effective‑date financing statement covers “all general intangibles” of a debtor. As defined under former Article 9, a “general intangible,” would include rights to payment for lottery winnings. These rights to payment are “accounts’ ‘ under this Article, however. A post‑effective‑date continuation statement will not continue the effectiveness of the pre‑effective‑date financing statement with respect to lottery winnings unless it amends the indication of collateral covered to include lottery winnings (e.g., by adding “ accounts,” “rights to payment for lottery winnings,” or the like). If the continuation statement does not amend the indication of collateral, the continuation statement will be effective to continue the effectiveness of the financing statement only with respect to “general intangibles” as defined in this Article.

Example 7: The facts are as in Example 6, excEpt that the pre‑effective‑ date financing statement covers “all accounts and general intangibles.” Even though rights to payment for lottery winnings are “general intangibles” under former Article 9 and “accounts” under this Article, a post‑effective‑date continuation statement would continue the effectiveness of the pre‑effective‑date financing statement with respect to lottery winnings. There would be no need to amend the indication of collateral covered, inasmuch as the indication (“accounts”) satisfies the requirements of this Article.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Subsection (a) provides that if prior to the effective date of the revision a secured party perfects in a manner other than by filing a financing statement, the action of the secured party is effective to perfect a security interest which attaches within one year after the effective date of the revision. Such a security interest becomes unperfected one year after the effective date of the revision unless the perfection requirements of revised Article 9 are met before the expiration of the one year period.

Subsection (b) applies when a secured party filed a financing statement prior to the effective date of the revision which was ineffective to perfect a security interest under Article 9 but which would perfect a security interest under revised Article 9. Under subsection (b) such a pre‑effective date filing is effective to perfect a security interest under revised Article 9 provided that it meets the requirements of the revised statute.

Subsection (c) applies when prior to the effective date of revised Article 9 a secured party filed a financing statement in the jurisdiction that was proper under former Article 9 but which is improper under revised Article 9. Under subsection (c) the filing remains effective to perfect a security interest until the earlier of the date on which the financing would have lapsed under the law of the jurisdiction in which it was filed or June 30, 2006. Note that this provision expands the scope of the search a prospective lender must conduct. For example, assume that D Corporation is a South Carolina corporation operating retail stores throughout the southeast. Under revised Article 9 South Carolina is the proper jurisdiction in which to file to perfect a security interest in D Corporation’s inventory. See Sections 36‑9‑301 and 36‑9‑307(e). Nevertheless, under Subsection 36‑9‑705(c) pre‑effective date filings in other states may remain effective to perfect inventory located in those states until June 30, 2006. As a result, until June 30, 2006, lender contemplating making a loan to D Corporation secured by inventory will need to do a UCC search in all jurisdictions where D Corporation has inventory in order to determine whether D Corporation’s inventory is encumbered.

Subsection (d) and Section 36‑9‑706 govern the continuation of the perfected status of a secured party who properly filed under former Article 9. Under subsection (c)(1) the pre‑effective date financing statement will remain effective until it lapses. The issue addressed in subsection (d) is whether the secured party can continue its perfected status after the effective date of the revision by filing a continuation statement under Section 36‑9‑515. As a general rule, subsection (d) provides that the filing of a continuation statement will not continue the effectiveness of a financing statement filed prior to the effective date of the revision. If, however, the pre‑effective date financing statement was filed in the same office in the same jurisdiction in which a secured party would file under the revision, subsection (d) provides that the filing of a continuation statement will extend the effectiveness of a financing statement. In cases that do not fall within the scope of this exception, a secured party must file an initial financing statement under Section 36‑9‑706 to extend the effectiveness of a financing statement filed prior to the effective date of the revision.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Continuation statement” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(27) |
| “Financing statement” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(39) |
| “Lien creditor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(52) |
| “Person” | Section 36‑1‑201(30) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |
| “Transmitting utility” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(80) |

Cross References—

1. Effective date of revised Article 9. Section 36‑9‑701.

2. Choice of law rules on perfection by filing. Sections 36‑9‑301 and 36‑9‑307.

3. Determination of office in which to file a financing statement. Section 36‑9‑501.

4. Requirements for contents of an effective financing statement. Section 36‑9‑502.

5. Requirements for an effective continuation statement. Section 36‑9‑515.

6. Filing an initial financing statement to continue the effectiveness of certain financing statements filed prior to the effective date of revised Article 9. Section 36‑9‑706.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 98, 135.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak98; 349Ak135.

**SECTION 36‑9‑706.** When initial financing statement suffices to continue effectiveness of financing statement.

(a) The filing of an initial financing statement in the office specified in Section 36‑9‑501 continues the effectiveness of a financing statement filed before this act takes effect if:

(1) the filing of an initial financing statement in that office would be effective to perfect a security interest under this act;

(2) the pre‑effective‑date financing statement was filed in an office in another state or another office in this State; and

(3) the initial financing statement satisfies subsection (c).

(b) The filing of an initial financing statement under subsection (a) continues the effectiveness of the pre‑effective‑date financing statement:

(1) if the initial financing statement is filed before this act takes effect, for the period provided in former Section 36‑9‑403 with respect to a financing statement; and

(2) if the initial financing statement is filed after this act takes effect, for the period provided in Section 36‑9‑515 with respect to an initial financing statement.

(c) To be effective for purposes of subsection (a), an initial financing statement must:

(1) satisfy the requirements of Part 5 for an initial financing statement;

(2) identify the pre‑effective‑date financing statement by indicating the office in which the financing statement was filed and providing the dates of filing and file numbers, if any, of the financing statement and of the most recent continuation statement filed with respect to the financing statement; and

(3) indicate that the pre‑effective‑date financing statement remains effective.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Continuation of Financing Statements Not Filed in Proper Filing Office Under This Article. This Section deals with continuing the effectiveness of financing statements that are filed in the proper State and office under former Article 9, but which would be filed in the wrong State or in the wrong office of the proper State under this Article. Section 9‑705(d) provides that, under these circumstances, filing a continuation statement after the effective date of this Article in the office designated by former Article 9 would not be effective. This Section provides the means by which the effectiveness of such a financing statement can be continued if this Article governs perfection under the applicable choice‑of‑law rule: filing an initial financing statement in the office specified by Section 9‑501.

Although it has the effect of continuing the effectiveness of a pre‑effective‑date financing statement, an initial financing statement described in this Section is not a continuation statement. Rather, it is governed by the rules applicable to initial financing statements. (However, the debtor need not authorize the filing. See Section 9‑707.) Unlike a continuation statement, the initial financing statement described in this Section may be filed any time during the effectiveness of the pre‑effective‑date financing statement‑even before this Article is enacted‑ and not only within the six months immediately prior to lapse. In contrast to a continuation statement, which extends the lapse date of a filed financing statement for five years, the initial financing statement has its own lapse date, which bears no relation to the lapse date of the pre‑effective‑date financing statement whose effectiveness the initial financing statement continues. See subsection (b).

As subsection (a) makes clear, the filing of an initial financing statement under this Section continues the effectiveness of a pre‑effective‑ date financing statement. If the effectiveness of a pre‑effective‑date financing statement lapses before the initial financing statement is filed, the effectiveness of the pre‑effective‑date financing statement cannot be continued. Rather, unless the security interest is perfected otherwise, there will be a period during which the security interest is unperfected before becoming perfected again by the filing of the initial financing statement under this Section.

If an initial financing statement is filed under this Section before the effective date of this Article, it takes effect when this Article takes effect (assuming that it is ineffective under former Article 9). Note, however, that former Article 9 determines whether the filing office is obligated to accept such an initial financing statement. For the reason given in the preceding paragraph, an initial financing statement filed before the effective date of this Article does not continue the effectiveness of a pre‑effective‑date financing statement unless the latter remains effective on the effective date of this Article. Thus, for example, if the effectiveness of the pre‑effective‑date financing statement lapses before this Article takes effect, the initial financing statement would not continue its effectiveness.

2. Requirements of Initial Financing Statement Filed in Lieu of Continuation Statement. Subsection (c) sets forth the requirements for the initial financing statement under subsection (a). These requirements are needed to inform searchers that the initial financing statement operates to continue a financing statement filed elsewhere and to enable searchers to locate and discover the attributes of the other financing statement. A single initial financing statement may continue the effectiveness of more than one financing statement filed before this Article’s effective date. See Section 1‑102(5)(a) (words in the singular include the plural). If under this Article the collateral is of a type different from its type under former Article 9‑as would be the case, e.g., with a right to payment of lottery winnings (a “general intangible” under former Article 9 and an “account” under this Article), then subsection (c) requires that the initial financing statement indicate the type under this Article.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑706 enables a secured party to continue the effectiveness of a financing statement filed prior to the effective date of the revision in situations in Section 36‑9‑705(d) precludes the use of a continuation statement. Section 36‑9‑706 applies when a secured party perfected under former Article 9 by filing in an office other than the proper office in which to file under revised Article 9. Under subsection (a) the secured party can continue the effectiveness of the pre‑effective date financing statement by filing an initial financing statement which satisfies the requirements of subsection (c) in the office specified in Section 36‑9‑501. Subsection (c) provides that to continue the effectiveness of pre‑effective date financing statement the initial financing statement must identify the pre‑effective date financing statement by indicating the offices in which it was filed and providing the date of filing, the file number, and the date of any continuation statement. In addition, subsection (c) provides that the initial financing statement must indicate that the pre‑effective date financing statement remains effective.

Subsection (b)(2) provides that when an initial financing statement is filed under subsection (a) after the effective date of the revision it will continue the effectiveness of the pre‑effective date financing statement for the period provided in Section 36‑9‑515. Section 36‑9‑706, however, also envisions that secured parties will invoke its provisions prior to the effective date of the revision. See Sections 36‑9‑705, Office Comment 3; 36‑9‑706, Official Comment 2. In such cases, subsection (b)(1) provides that the initial financing statement continues the effectiveness of the pre‑ effective date financing statement for the period specified in former Section 36‑9‑403.

To illustrate the operation of Section 36‑9‑706 assume that D Corporation is a South Carolina corporation operating a factory in North Carolina. On June 1, 1998, D Corporation granted SP a security interest in the equipment located in its North Carolina factory. On that date SP perfected its security interest by filing in the proper offices in North Carolina. On July 1, 2001, revised Article 9 became effective in both North Carolina and South Carolina. Assume that after the effective date SP wants to extend the effectiveness of its North Carolina filings. Section 9‑705(d) prevents SP from continuing effectiveness of the North Carolina financing statements by filing continuation statements in North Carolina. Under Sections 36‑9‑301(1), 36‑9‑307(e), and 36‑9‑501(a)(2) the proper office in which to file a financing statement to perfect in the equipment is the office of the Secretary of State of South Carolina. Section 36‑9‑705(d) allows a secured party to extend the effectiveness of a pre‑effective date financing statement by filing a continuation statement only if the pre‑effective date filing was made in the same office in which a secured party would file to perfect under the revised statute. Under Section 36‑9‑706, however, SP can extend the effectiveness of its NorTh Carolina financing statements by filing an initial financing statement complying with the requirements of subsection (c) in the Office of the Secretary of State of South Carolina. This filing can be made at any time. In contrast to Section 36‑9‑515(d), Section 36‑9‑706 does not require that a filing be made within the six month period before the effectiveness of a pre‑effective date financing statement expires. See Section 36‑9‑706, Official Comment 1.

Definitional Cross References:

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| “Continuation statement” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(27) |
| “File number” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(36) |
| “Financing statement” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(39) |
| “State” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(76) |

Cross References—

1. Effective date of revised Article 9. Section 36‑9‑701.

2. Choice of law rules governing perfection by filing. Sections 36‑9‑301 and 36‑9‑307.

3. Determining proper office in which to file a financing statement. Section 36‑9‑501.

4. Requirements for an effective financing statement. Section 36‑9‑502.

5. Continuation statements. Section 36‑9‑515.

6. Limitations upon the use of continuation statements to extend the effectiveness of a financing statement filed prior to the effective date of the revision of Article 9. Section 36‑9‑705(d).

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 98.

Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Ak98.

**SECTION 36‑9‑707.** Pre‑effective‑date financing statement.

(a) In this section, “pre‑effective‑date financing statement” means a financing statement filed before this chapter takes effect.

(b) After this chapter takes effect, a person may add or delete collateral covered by, continue or terminate the effectiveness of, or otherwise amend the information provided in, a pre‑effective‑date financing statement only in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction governing perfection as provided in Part 3. However, the effectiveness of a pre‑effective‑date financing statement also may be terminated in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the financing statement is filed.

(c) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), if the law of this State governs perfection of a security interest, the information in a pre‑effective‑date financing statement may be amended after this chapter takes effect only if:

(1) the pre‑effective‑date financing statement and an amendment are filed in the office specified in Section 36‑9‑501;

(2) an amendment is filed in the office specified in Section 36‑9‑501 concurrently with, or after the filing in that office of, an initial financing statement that satisfies Section 36‑9‑706(c); or

(3) an initial financing statement that provides the information as amended and satisfies Section 36‑9‑706(c) is filed in the office specified in Section 36‑9‑501.

(d) If the law of this State governs perfection of a security interest, the effectiveness of a pre‑effective‑date financing statement may be continue only under Section 36‑9‑705(d) and (f) or 36‑9‑706.

(e) Whether or not the law of this State governs perfection of a security interest, the effectiveness of a pre‑effective‑date financing statement filed in this State may be terminated after this chapter takes effect by filing a termination statement in the office in which the pre‑effective‑date financing statement is filed, unless an initial financing statement that satisfies Section 36‑9‑706(c) has been filed in the office specified by the law of the jurisdiction governing perfection as provided in Part 3 as the office in which to file a financing statement.

Section 36‑9‑707

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑707 provides the procedures for amending and terminating financing statements that were filed prior to the effective date of revised Article 9. The first step in the process of applying this provision is to determine the jurisdiction whose law will govern. This step is critical when the effect of the revision is to change the law applicable to the perfection of security interests. As a general rule, subsection (b) provides that the choice of law rules of revised Article 9 determine the law governing the amendment and termination of pre‑effective date financing statements. This rule is subject to an exception, discussed below, with respect to the termination of financing statements. To illustrate the application of subsection (b) consider the following:

Example. D Corporation is a South Carolina corporation with a factory in North Carolina. Prior to the effective date of the revision SP obtained a security interest in D Corporation’s equipment located in the North Carolina factory. Also prior to the effective date, SP perfected its security interest by filing financing statements in the appropriate offices in North Carolina. Assume that both North Carolina and South Carolina adopted revised Article 9 effective July 1, 2001. After the effective date of the revision, SP seeks to amend its financing statements to reflect a change in D Corporation’s name.

Under subsection (b) the choice of rules of Part 3 apply to determine the jurisdiction whose law governs. Because D Corporation is a South Carolina corporation, Sections 36‑9‑301 and 36‑9‑307(e) provide that the law of South Carolina controls.

Once the applicable law has been determined, subsection (c) provides the methods for amending a pre‑effective date financing statement. Under subsection (c)(1) a pre‑effective date financing statement can be amended if the financing statement and amendment are both properly filed in the same office under Section 36‑9‑501. Note that subsection (c)(1) would not apply in the Example because Section 36‑9‑501 specifies filing in the Office of the Secretary of State of South Carolina and the pre‑effective date financing statements were filed in North Carolina. The principal effect of subsection (c)(1) is that SP cannot amend its financing statements by filing the amendments in North Carolina.

Subsection (c)(2) and (3), however, provide three alternative procedures that SP in the Example can use to amend its pre‑effective date financing statements. Each of these procedures require SP to file an initial financing statement that meets the requirements of Section 36‑9‑706 (c) in the office of the Secretary of State of South Carolina. Under Section 36‑9‑706(c) the initial financing statement must identify the pre‑effective date financing statements by indicating the offices in which they were filed and providing the dates of filing and the file numbers for the financing statements and the most recent continuation statements. Under subsection (c)(2) SP could amend its pre‑effective date financing statements by filing its amendment in the office of the Secretary of State of South Carolina following or contemporaneously with the filing of its initial financing statement. Under subsection (c)(3), SP could amend its pre‑effective date financing statements by filing an initial financing statement in the office of the Secretary of State of South Carolina that provides the information as amended, i.e. specifies the change in the debtor’s name.

As noted above, subsection (b) provides an exception to the choice of law rules when a secured party terminates a pre‑effective date financing statement. Under subsection (b) a secured party can terminate either under the law specified by the choices of law rules in Part 3 or under the law of the jurisdiction in which the pre‑effective date financing statement was filed. As a result, if SP wanted to terminate its North Carolina pre‑ effective date financing statements it could either comply with subsection (c) or proceed under North Carolina law including North Carolina’s enactment of Section 9‑707(e). Under Section 9‑707(e) SP could terminate its pre‑effective date financing statements by filing a termination statement in the appropriate office in North Carolina, unless an initial financing statement meeting the conditions of Section 36‑9‑706(c) had already been filed in the office of the Secretary of State of South Carolina.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Financing statement” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(39) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |
| “State” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(76) |

Cross References—

1. Effective date of revised Article 9. Section 36‑9‑701.

2. Choice of law rules on perfection of security interests by filing. Sections 36‑9‑301 and 36‑9‑307.

3. Determining the office within a state in which to file. Section 36‑9‑501.

4. Amendment of financing statements. Section 36‑9‑512.

5. Termination of financing statements. Section 36‑9‑513.

6. Continuation of the effectiveness of financing statements. Section 36‑9‑515.

7. Procedure for continuing the effectiveness of a pre‑effective date financing statement. Section 36‑9‑706.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 92, 98.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak92; 349Ak98.

**SECTION 36‑9‑708.** Persons entitled to file initial financing statement or continuation statement.

A person may file an initial financing statement or a continuation statement under this part if:

(1) the secured party of record authorizes the filing; and

(2) the filing is necessary under this part:

(A) to continue the effectiveness of a financing statement filed before this act takes effect; or

(B) to perfect or continue the perfection of a security interest.

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

This Section permits a secured party to file an initial financing statement or continuation statement necessary under this Part to continue the effectiveness of a financing statement filed before this Article takes effect or to perfect or otherwise continue the perfection of a security interest. Because a filing described in this Section typically operates to continue the effectiveness of a financing statement whose filing the debtor already has authorized, this Section does not require authorization from the debtor.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Section 36‑9‑708 provides that the secured party of record can file an initial financing statement or a continuation statement under Part 7 to continue the effectiveness of a pre‑effective date financing statement or to perfect or continue the perfection of a security interest without obtaining authorization from the debtor.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Continuation statement” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(27) |
| “Debtor” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(28) |
| “Financing statement” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(39) |
| “Secured party” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(72) |
| “Secured party of record” | Section 36‑9‑511 |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |

Cross References—

1. Effective date of revised Article 9. Section 36‑9‑701.

2. Continuing the perfected status of pre‑effective date security interests that were perfected under prior law but would be unperfected under revised Article 9. Sections 36‑9‑703(b), 36‑9‑705, and 36‑9‑706.

3. Perfection of security interests that were unperfected prior to the effective date of revised Article 9. Section 36‑9‑704.

4. Limitation upon the use of continuation statements to continue the effectiveness of pre‑effective date financing statements. Section 36‑9‑705(d)

5. Amendment and termination of pre‑effective date financing statements. Section 36‑9‑707.

6. Persons authorized to file an initial financing statement. Section 36‑9‑509.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 92, 98.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak92; 349Ak98.

**SECTION 36‑9‑709.** Priority.

(a) This act determines the priority of conflicting claims to collateral. However, if the relative priorities of the claims were established before this act takes effect, former Chapter 9 determines priority.

(b) For purposes of Section 36‑9‑322(a), the priority of a security interest that becomes enforceable under Section 36‑9‑203 of this act dates from the time this act takes effect if the security interest is perfected under this act by the filing of a financing statement before this act takes effect which would not have been effective to perfect the security interest under former Chapter 9. This subsection does not apply to conflicting security interests each of which is perfected by the filing of such a financing statement.”

HISTORY: 2001 Act No. 67, Section 12.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Law Governing Priority. Ordinarily, this Article determines the priority of conflicting claims to collateral. However, when the relative priorities of the claims were established before this Article takes effect, former Article 9 governs.

Example 1: In 1999, SP‑1 obtains a security interest in a right to payment for goods sold (“account”). SP‑1 fails to file a financing statement. This Article takes effect on July 1, 2001. Thereafter, on August 1, 2001, D creates a security interest in the same account in favor of SP‑2, who files a financing statement. This Article determines the relative priorities of the claims. SP‑2’s security interest has priority under Section 9‑322(a)(1).

Example 2: In 1999, SP‑1 obtains a security interest in a right to payment for goods sold (“account”). SP‑1 fails to file a financing statement. In 2000, D creates a security interest in the same account in favor of SP‑2, who likewise fails to file a financing statement. This Article takes effect on July 1, 2001. Because the relative priorities of the security interests were established before the effective date of this Article, former Article 9 governs priority, and SP‑1’s security interest has priority under former Section 9‑312(5)(b).

Example 3: The facts are as in Example 2, except that, on August 1, 2001, SP‑2 files a proper financing statement under this Article. Until August 1, 2001, the relative priorities of the security interests were established before the effective date of this Article, as in Example 2. However, by taking the affirmative step of filing a financing statement, SP‑2 established anew the relative priority of the conflicting claims after the effective date. Thus, this Article determines priority. SP‑2’s security interest has priority under Section 9‑322(a)(1).

As Example 3 illustrates, relative priorities that are “ established” before the effective date do not necessarily remain unchanged following the effective date. Of course, unlike priority contests among unperfected security interests, some priorities are established permanently, e.g., the rights of a buyer of property who took free of a security interest under former Article 9.

One consequence of the rule in subsection (a) is that the mere taking effect of this Article does not of itself adversely affect the priority of conflicting claims to collateral.

Example 4: In 1999, SP‑1 obtains a security interest in a right to payment for lottery winnings (a “general intangible” as defined in former Article 9 but an “account” as defined in this Article). SP‑1’s security interest is unperfected because its filed financing statement covers only “accounts.” In 2000, D creates a security interest in the same right to payment in favor of SP‑2, who files a financing statement covering “accounts and general intangibles.” Before this Article takes effect on July 1, 2001, SP‑2’s perfected security interest has priority over SP‑1’s unperfected security interest under former 9‑312(5). Because the relative priorities of the security interests were established before the effective date of this Article, former Article 9 continues to govern priority after this Article takes effect. Thus, SP‑2’s priority is not adversely affected by this Article’s having taken effect.

Note that were this Article to govern priority, SP‑2 would become subordinated to SP‑1 under Section 9‑322(a)(1), even though nothing changes other than this Article’s having taken effect. Under Section 9‑704, SP‑1’s security interest would become perfected; the financing statement covering “accounts” adequately covers the lottery winnings and complies with the other perfection requirements of this Article, e.g., it is filed in the proper office.

Example 5: In 1999, SP‑1 obtains a security interest in a right to payment for lottery winnings‑a “general intangible” (as defined under former Article 9). SP‑1’s security interest is unperfected because its filed financing statement covers only “accounts.” In 2000, D creates a security interest in the same right to payment in favor of SP‑2, who makes the same mistake and also files a financing statement covering only “accounts.” Before this Article takes effect on July 1, 2001, SP‑1’s unperfected security interest has priority over SP‑2’s unperfected security interest, because SP‑1’s security interest was the first to attach. See former Section 9‑312(5)(b). Because the relative priorities of the security interests were established before the effective date of this Article, former Article 9 continues to govern priority after this Article takes effect. Although Section 9‑704 makes both security interests perfected for purposes of this Article, both are unperfected under former Article 9, which determines their relative priorities.

2. Financing Statements Ineffective Under Former Article 9 but Effective Under This Article. If this Article determines priority, subsection (b) may apply. It deals with the case in which a filing that occurs before the effective date of this Article would be ineffective to perfect a security interest under former Article 9 but effective under this Article. For purposes of Section 9‑322(a), the priority of a security interest that attaches after this Article takes effect and is perfected in this manner dates from the time this Article takes effect.

Example 6: In 1999, SP‑1 obtains a security interest in D’s existing and after‑acquired instruments and files a financing statement covering “instruments.” In 2000, D grants a security interest in its existing and after‑acquired accounts in favor of SP‑2, who files a financing statement covering “accounts.” After this Article takes effect on July 1, 2001, one of D’s account debtors gives D a negotiable note to evidence its obligation to pay an overdue account. Under the first‑to‑file‑or‑perfect rule in Section 9‑322(a), SP‑1 would have priority in the instrument, which constitutes SP‑2’ s proceeds. SP‑1’s filing in 1999 was earlier than SP‑2’s in 2000. However, subsection (b) provides that, for purposes of Section 9‑322(a), SP‑1’s priority dates from the time this Article takes effect (July 1, 2001). Under Section 9‑322(b), SP‑2’s priority with respect to the proceeds (instrument) dates from its filing as to the original collateral (accounts). Accordingly, SP‑2’s security interest would be senior.

Subsection (b) does not apply to conflicting security interests each of which is perfected by a pre‑effective‑date filing that was not effective under former Article 9 but is effective under this Article.

Example 7: In 1999, SP‑1 obtains a security interest in D’s existing and after‑acquired instruments and files a financing statement covering “ instruments.” In 2000, D grants a security interest in its existing and after‑acquired instruments in favor of SP‑2, who files a financing statement covering “instruments.” After this Article takes effect on July 1, 2001, one of D’s account debtors gives D a negotiable note to evidence its obligation to pay an overdue account. Under the first‑to‑file‑or‑perfect rule in Section 9‑322(a), SP‑1 would have priority in the instrument. Both filings are effective under this Article, see Section 9‑705(b), and SP‑1’s filing in 1999 was earlier than SP‑2’s in 2000. Subsection (b) does not change this result.

SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTER’S COMMENT

Under subsection (a) if the relative priorities of claims to collateral were established before the effective date of revised Article 9, former Article 9 determines priorities. In other cases, revised Article 9 applies to determine priorities.

Subsection (b) applies to a conflict between security interests when the security interest of one of the secured parties attaches to collateral after the effective date of the revision and that secured party filed a financing statement prior to the effective date which was not effective to perfect a security interest under former Article 9 but is effective to perfect the security interest under revised Article 9. For purposes of Section 36‑9‑322(a) , the first‑to‑file‑or perfect rule, subsection (b) provides that the priority of the security interest described above dates from the effective date of the revision. Subsection (b), however, does not apply if each of the conflicting security interests was perfected by a pre‑effective date financing statement that became effective on the effective date of revised Article 9. In such cases, priority is determined based upon the dates on which the financing statements were filed. See Section 36‑9‑709, Official Comment 2, Example 7.

Definitional Cross References:

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|  |  |
| “Collateral” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(12) |
| “Financing statement” | Section 36‑9‑102(a)(39) |
| “Security interest” | Section 36‑1‑201(37) [see now Section 36‑1‑203] |

Cross References—

1. Effective date of revised Article 9. Section 36‑9‑701.

2. Requirements for creation of enforceable security interests. Section 36‑9‑203.

3. Priority rules governing conflicts between security interests. Section 36‑9‑322.”

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Secured Transactions 3, 138 to 150.

Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak3; 349Ak138 to 349Ak150.

Part 8

Transition

**SECTION 36‑9‑802.** Application and effect.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this part, this act applies to a transaction or lien within its scope, even if the transaction or lien was entered into or created before this act takes effect.

(b) This act does not affect an action, case, or proceeding commenced before this act takes effect.

HISTORY: 2013 Act No. 96, Section 19, eff July 1, 2013.

**SECTION 36‑9‑803.** Effect on previously perfected security interests.

(a) A security interest that is a perfected security interest immediately before this act takes effect is a perfected security interest under Chapter 9, Title 36 as amended by this act if, when this act takes effect, the applicable requirements for attachment and perfection under Chapter 9, Title 36 as amended by this act are satisfied without further action.

(b) Except as otherwise provided in Section 36‑9‑805, if, immediately before this act takes effect, a security interest is a perfected security interest, but the applicable requirements for perfection under Chapter 9, Title 36 as amended by this act are not satisfied when this act takes effect, the security interest remains perfected thereafter only if the applicable requirements for perfection under Chapter 9, Title 36 as amended by this act are satisfied within one year after this act takes effect.

HISTORY: 2013 Act No. 96, Section 19, eff July 1, 2013.

**SECTION 36‑9‑804.** Timing of perfection of preexisting security interests.

A security interest that is an unperfected security interest immediately before this act takes effect becomes a perfected security interest:

(1) without further action, when this act takes effect if the applicable requirements for perfection under Chapter 9, Title 36 as amended by this act are satisfied before or at that time; or

(2) when the applicable requirements for perfection are satisfied if the requirements are satisfied after that time.

HISTORY: 2013 Act No. 96, Section 19, eff July 1, 2013.

**SECTION 36‑9‑805.** Effect of previous filing of financing statement.

(a) The filing of a financing statement before this act takes effect is effective to perfect a security interest to the extent the filing would satisfy the applicable requirements for perfection under Chapter 9, Title 36, as amended by this act.

(b) This act does not render ineffective an effective financing statement that, before this act takes effect, is filed and satisfies the applicable requirements for perfection under the law of the jurisdiction governing perfection as provided in Chapter 9, Title 36 as it existed before this act. However, except as otherwise provided in subsections (c) and (d) and Section 36‑9‑806, the financing statement ceases to be effective:

(1) if the financing statement is filed in this State, at the time the financing statement would have ceased to be effective had this act not taken effect; or

(2) if the financing statement is filed in another jurisdiction, at the earlier of:

(A) the time the financing statement would have ceased to be effective under the law of that jurisdiction; or

(B) June 30, 2018.

(c) The filing of a continuation statement after this act takes effect does not continue the effectiveness of a financing statement filed before this act takes effect. However, upon the timely filing of a continuation statement after this act takes effect and in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction governing perfection as provided in Part 3, the effectiveness of a financing statement filed in the same office in that jurisdiction before this act takes effect continues for the period provided by the law of that jurisdiction.

(d) Subsection (b)(2)(B) applies to a financing statement that, before this act takes effect, is filed against a transmitting utility and satisfies the applicable requirements for perfection under the law of the jurisdiction governing perfection as provided in Chapter 9, Title 36 as it existed before this act, only to the extent that Chapter 9, Title 36, as amended by this act provides that the law of a jurisdiction other than the jurisdiction in which the financing statement is filed governs perfection of a security interest in collateral covered by the financing statement.

(e) A financing statement that includes a financing statement filed before this act takes effect and a continuation statement filed after this act takes effect is effective only to the extent that it satisfies the requirements of Part 5 as amended by this act for an initial financing statement. A financing statement that indicates that the debtor is a decedent’s estate indicates that the collateral is being administered by a personal representative within the meaning of Section 36‑9‑503(a)(2) as amended by this act. A financing statement that indicates that the debtor is a trust or is a trustee acting with respect to property held in trust indicates that the collateral is held in a trust within the meaning of Section 36‑9‑503(a)(3) as amended by this act.

HISTORY: 2013 Act No. 96, Section 19, eff July 1, 2013.

**SECTION 36‑9‑806.** Filing of initial financing statement; requirements.

(a) The filing of an initial financing statement in the office specified in Section 36‑9‑501 continues the effectiveness of a financing statement filed before this act takes effect if:

(1) the filing of an initial financing statement in that office would be effective to perfect a security interest under this act;

(2) the preeffective‑date financing statement was filed in an office in another State; and

(3) the initial financing statement satisfies subsection (c).

(b) The filing of an initial financing statement under subsection (a) continues the effectiveness of the preeffective‑date financing statement:

(1) if the initial financing statement is filed before this act takes effect, for the period provided in former Section 36‑9‑515 with respect to an initial financing statement; and

(2) if the initial financing statement is filed after this act takes effect, for the period provided in Section 36‑9‑515 as amended by this act with respect to an initial financing statement.

(c) To be effective for purposes of subsection (a), an initial financing statement must:

(1) satisfy the requirements of Part 5 as amended by this act for an initial financing statement;

(2) identify the preeffective‑date financing statement by indicating the office in which the financing statement was filed and providing the dates of filing and file numbers, if any, of the financing statement and of the most recent continuation statement filed with respect to the financing statement; and

(3) indicate that the preeffective‑date financing statement remains effective.

HISTORY: 2013 Act No. 96, Section 19, eff July 1, 2013.

**SECTION 36‑9‑807.** Pre‑effective‑date financing statement defined; addition or deletion of collateral; effect of pre‑effective‑date financing statement.

(a) In this section, “preeffective‑date financing statement” means a financing statement filed before this act takes effect.

(b) After this act takes effect, a person may add or delete collateral covered by, continue or terminate the effectiveness of, or otherwise amend the information provided in, a preeffective‑date financing statement only in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction governing perfection as provided in Chapter 9, Title 36, as amended by this act. However, the effectiveness of a preeffective‑date financing statement also may be terminated in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the financing statement is filed.

(c) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), if the law of this State governs perfection of a security interest, the information in a preeffective‑date financing statement may be amended after this act takes effect only if:

(1) the preeffective‑date financing statement and an amendment are filed in the office specified in Section 36‑9‑501;

(2) an amendment is filed in the office specified in Section 36‑9‑501 concurrently with, or after the filing in that office of, an initial financing statement that satisfies Section 36‑9‑806(c); or

(3) an initial financing statement that provides the information as amended and satisfies Section 36‑9‑806(c) is filed in the office specified in Section 36‑9‑501.

(d) If the law of this State governs perfection of a security interest, the effectiveness of a preeffective‑date financing statement may be continued only under Section 36‑9‑805(c) and (e) or 36‑9‑806.

(e) Whether or not the law of this State governs perfection of a security interest, the effectiveness of a preeffective‑date financing statement filed in this State may be terminated after this act takes effect by filing a termination statement in the office in which the preeffective‑date financing statement is filed, unless an initial financing statement that satisfies Section 36‑9‑806(c) has been filed in the office specified by the law of the jurisdiction governing perfection as provided in Part 3 as the office in which to file a financing statement.

HISTORY: 2013 Act No. 96, Section 19, eff July 1, 2013.

**SECTION 36‑9‑808.** Filing of initial financing statement or continuation statement.

A person may file an initial financing statement or a continuation statement under this part if the:

(1) secured party of record authorizes the filing; and

(2) filing is necessary under this part to:

(A) continue the effectiveness of a financing statement filed before this act takes effect; or

(B) perfect or continue the perfection of a security interest.

HISTORY: 2013 Act No. 96, Section 19, eff July 1, 2013.

**SECTION 36‑9‑809.** Determination of priority.

This act determines the priority of conflicting claims to collateral. However, if the relative priorities of the claims were established before this act takes effect, former Chapter 9, Title 36 determines priority.

HISTORY: 2013 Act No. 96, Section 19, eff July 1, 2013.