

October 29, 2021

The Honorable Wm. Weston J. Newton, Chairman  
 House Legislative Oversight Committee  
 228 Blatt Building  
 Columbia, SC 29201

Dear Chairman Newton:

I am writing in reply to your August 31, 2021 letter requesting detailed information regarding voter registration and elections in South Carolina. Thank you for the opportunity to provide this important information to the Committee. Please find our responses below.

- 1. Please provide an update on the implementation status of the ad hoc committee's recommendation for increased interagency collaboration with the Department of Health and Environmental Control and the Department of Motor Vehicles to assist with removing deceased voters from the state's active voter roll.***

**COMMISSIONERS**

JOHN WELLS  
 Chairperson

JOANNE DAY

CLIFFORD J. EDLER

LINDA MCCALL

SCOTT MOSELEY

HOWARD M. KNAPP  
 Interim Executive Director

Collaboration with the Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC):

- The SEC and DHEC have been working collaboratively to establish a method to share information on deceased South Carolinians obtained by DHEC through the State and Territorial Exchange of Vital Events (STEVE) system.
- The SEC understands data from STEVE will provide the SEC with additional information not currently included in existing death data provided by DHEC, particularly as it relates to South Carolina residents who die in other states.
- At this point, DHEC is preparing a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to establish an agreement with the SEC to share the data.
- Once the MOU is established, the SEC will receive the additional information monthly and use this information to remove deceased individuals from the list of active, registered voters.

Collaboration with the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV):

- The SEC and DMV have been working collaboratively to comply with S.C. Code 7-3-70(b) and establish a method by which the SEC can receive information on deceased individuals obtained by DMV through the Social Security Administration (SSA).
- Despite our good faith efforts to comply with this mandate, significant barriers remain to establishing this program:
  - DMVs request to redisclose information obtained from SSA through the Social Security Online Verification (SSOLV) system to the SEC is pending with SSA. The SEC understands the terms of the DMV agreement with SSA permits DMV to use SSOLV data to the extent necessary to administer driver's license and identification card programs. Therefore, the prospect of approval of the request is doubtful.

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- Even if approved, data received would not include date of death as required by the statute.
- Even if approved, data received from DMV through SSOLV would be very limited and not serve as a comprehensive source of information about deceased South Carolinians. The SEC understands Driver's License (DL) and ID card holder records are not checked through SSOLV on a regular basis and that DMV checks only unverified DL and ID-card holders through SSOLV. This would include new DL and ID-card holders and some other credential holders under limited circumstances.
- Even if approved, the information obtained through SSOLV would likely be duplicative as the SEC currently obtains more comprehensive SSA death data through the Electronic Registration and Information Center (ERIC).
- If approval cannot be obtained, the SEC suggests amending, replacing or deleting S.C. Code Section 7-3-70(b) so that compliance can be obtainable.

**2. *How many, if any, deceased voters have been removed from the state's active voter roll since July 1, 2021? If any have been removed, please note how many have been removed in each county.***

14,780 deceased voters were removed from the list of active, registered voters between July 1, 2021 and October 27, 2021.

See Enclosure 1 – Deceased Voters Removed Statistics

**3. *How does the State Election Commission ensure that responses to constituents about issues of concern, including concerns about possible deceased voters, are made in a timely manner (i.e., what steps occur if a call, email, or letter is received)?***

Years of direct feedback from our customers tell us the SEC is one of the most accessible agencies in state government. The SEC maintains this reputation by working to respond to all inquiries in a timely and thoughtful manner.

The SEC employs a “live person support policy.” When anyone calls the SEC main number during business hours, they will always be able to speak to a person. The SEC has no digital answering system nor voicemail on its main number. If the person at the main desk is busy, calls are pushed to other employees in the agency until a live person answers. If the person who answers the phone cannot answer the question or provide the information requested, a message is taken and forwarded to the appropriate division for response. Our customers find this approach refreshing as government agencies and private business have moved to automated services that tend to leave their customers frustrated.

Most emails from the public are received through the agency's general email address ([elections@elections.sc.gov](mailto:elections@elections.sc.gov)), while others are received through individual employee email

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addresses. Two employees are assigned to monitor the general email address and either respond directly to inquires or forward the email to appropriate staff for response.

Generally, the SEC works to respond to telephone calls and emails as soon as possible and within 24 hours on a first-come, first-served basis. Urgent and critical matters are given priority over less significant inquiries. While most receive a return call or email within 24 hours, the volume of inquiries, limits on organizational capacity, and the nature of any specific inquiry can cause response times to vary. Generally, the same concepts apply to responses to letters, however, the nature of letter writing and mail correspondence add significant delay to response times.

As it relates specifically to concerns about deceased voters remaining on voter registration rolls, the SEC ensures citizens understand:

- The various methods and sources of information authorized by law through which deceased voters are removed from the rolls.
- The limitations of the sources of information and the various methods.
- The fact that, due to those limitations, some number of deceased voters will remain on the voter registration list at any given time.
- Our goals for identifying and implementing additional sources of information and additional methods
- The fact that the existence of deceased voters on the voter registration rolls is not evidence of fraud and that over the course of the past 10 years, the SEC has seen no proof of any vote being fraudulently cast in the name of a deceased voter.

#### Reports of Deceased Individuals on the List of Active Registered Voters

As detailed previously in correspondence with the Committee, Ms. Laurie Zapp, a Beaufort County voter, and Ms. Hope Walker, Executive Director of the S.C. Republican Party began providing the SEC with lists of voters that, according to their research, had died but remained active in the statewide voter registration database. The SEC's initial approach to these lists was to review each individual record to determine whether the voter was actually deceased, and if so, to make the record inactive. Since the Committee's June 30, 2021 hearing on the agency's list maintenance processes, Ms. Zapp has provided the SEC with two additional lists of voters from Allendale and Horry Counties containing more than 900 names total.

After further review and analysis of our initial approach, the SEC has determined the approach is neither feasible nor advisable. Continuation of this process puts qualified voters at risk of being inadvertently removed from the rolls. One of the primary issues with this approach is the lack of clear legal authority to remove a voter from the rolls based on information found in an obituary. The SEC is not confident that information found in online obituaries is reliable. Furthermore, obituaries do not always contain enough information to confidently match the deceased person to a voter. Additionally, these time-consuming reviews drain agency resources, and due to the current limitations of official sources on deaths, such review

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processes would be potentially endless. Lastly, the SEC is very concerned with taking any action on a voter's status based on information provided by partisan individuals and organizations.

We believe the most prudent approach is to use only official sources of information on deceased individuals to carry out list maintenance processes. This includes continuing the work to identify new sources of official information as outlined in response to Item 1. The SEC also continues to make voters inactive upon notification of death by a voter's immediate family member.

#### Reports of Ballots Cast in the Name of Deceased Voters

On July 9, 2021, the S.C. Law Enforcement Division (SLED) provided the SEC with a list of 41 voters provided to SLED by Ms. Laurie Zapp appearing to show participation in various elections dating back to the January 21, 2012 Presidential Preference Primary. Eight instances showed such participation in 2020 elections (June Primary or General Election). Working with SLED, the SEC meticulously gathered records on each of the eight instances from 2020 and found no indication of fraudulent voting in the name of a deceased voter. The investigation found:

- Bad data matching (2)
- Deceased father given credit for son voting (2)
- Voting absentee before death (1)
- Poll manager selecting wrong voter (2)
- Election official selecting wrong voter (1)

After presenting the records and documents associated with each case to SLED, SLED determined no further investigation is warranted. The results of this latest investigation are consistent with previous investigations into claims of votes being cast in the names of deceased individuals.

- 4. Please work with committee staff to develop a graphic (i.e., process flow chart) illustrating what steps the agency takes to maintain accuracy of the state's active voter roll by addressing situations where the address on the voter registration record is no longer where the individual lives.***

SEC staff worked with committee staff to develop graphics and charts to illustrate steps taken by the agency to maintain the accuracy of the state's active voter registration list, including situations where the address on the voter registration record is no longer where the individual lives. We assume this information will be provided directly to the Committee by committee staff.

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- 5. Please provide an update on the number of names that have been removed from the state's active voter roll since January 2017 through the present due to a move (i.e., change of address). If any have been removed, please note how many have been removed in each county by each year.**

The SEC has no comprehensive data that would reflect every instance of a voter being removed from the list of active, registered voters due to a move out of the jurisdiction. Voters can be removed in various ways. Voters made inactive are given codes based on the reason for removal. Details on all status codes and the processes by which they are assigned are included in the graphics and flowcharts prepared in conjunction with committee staff as you requested in Item 4.

There are two codes definitively related to moves: Inactive-Left the County (I-L) and Inactive-Moved (I-M). For statistics on removals due to these two codes, see:

Enclosure 2 – Voter Move Removal Statistics.

Some examples of voter moves that would not be reflected in the I-L and I-M statistics include:

- When a registered SC voter updates their address or registers to vote in another county, the voter's registration is simply updated. While updating the address would result in a change in the voter's eligibility to vote in certain jurisdictions, the voter is never removed from the voter registration list or made inactive.
- Voters can be made inactive for failing to respond to a confirmation card mailing (Inactive – Failed to Respond, I-F). A change in address is only one possible reason for the failure to respond.
- Voters who request in writing for their name to be removed from the list are made Inactive – Written Request. While some of these may be due to a change in address (usually to another state), the reason motivating the voter to make the request is not always provided and not noted with a code.

- 6. When was the last time the agency conducted postcard outreach to those on the active voter roll that did not vote in two prior general election cycles? How many, if any, were removed based upon this last postcard outreach effort? If any have been removed, please note how many have been removed in each county based upon this outreach effort.**

The last confirmation card mailing conducted by the SEC occurred in 2019. 75,796 voters were mailed cards. At the end of the process, 17,001 of those voters remained active, and 58,795 voters had been made inactive. Of those made inactive, 54,448 were made inactive for reasons directly related to the confirmation card mailing. 4,347 records were made inactive for other reasons during the process. For more detail and county-by-county results:

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See Enclosure 3 – 2019 Confirmation Card Mailing.

**7. *Inform the public, without compromising security, about physical and electronic election systems in place and safeguards for those systems***

*A concern expressed by some constituents pertaining to the accuracy of voter rolls is unauthorized access to election systems (i.e., hacking via Internet connectivity). A specific concern expressed at the ad hoc committee June 30, 2021, meeting is if adequate safeguards are in place to ensure a qualified elector's vote is counted as cast.*

See Enclosure 4 – Vote Storage & Transmission

NOTE: Some have expressed concern that ballot scanners/tabulators used in South Carolina have the capacity to be connected to the internet. Enclosure 4 notes that scanners have no capacity to be connected to the internet. Confusion over this issue stems from the fact that in some other states, the same scanner models used here are equipped with modems and the associated software and service required to be connected to the internet. This functionality is either required or permitted in those states, and the vendor equips and prepares equipment specifically for use in those states to meet those states' requirements. Such equipment does not exist in South Carolina. For facts on modems and scanners/tabulators used in South Carolina:

See Enclosure 5 – Facts about SC Ballot Scanners & Modems.

**8. *Please list the physical and electronic locations and devices through which votes cast in an election are transmitted or stored (e.g., county election offices; physical absentee ballot; voting machine; Statewide Voter Registration and Election Management System, etc.).***

See Enclosure 4 – Vote Storage & Transmission

**9. *For each location provided in response to the question above, please list and explain, with applicable dates, (a) internet connectivity capacity of each electronic device, (b) measures taken to secure both physical and electronic locations from physical or electronic tampering or manipulation by outside entities (e.g., security software, security audits, locks on doors where absentee ballots maintained, etc.) from January 2017 through December 2020, and (c) any relevant agency policies with the date of the most recent review and update.***

*For subpart (b):*

- *Please separate those for which the agency has direct control and those on which the agency instructs counties but may not have direct control.*

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- ***For measures on which the agency instructs counties, please explain how the agency holds counties accountable for complying with the instructions.***

See Enclosure 4 – Vote Storage & Transmission

***10. Please list in an Excel document all reviews, audits, or other postelection analysis performed by the agency between January 2017 and the present pursuant to S.C. Code Section 7-3-20(C)(2)1 or any other directive. For each, please include: (a) the date, (b) one to two sentence summary of the purpose of the review, audit, or analysis; and (c) how the public may access the review, audit, or other postelection analysis.***

Since January 2017, the SEC has engaged with county boards of voter registration and elections on various formal reviews, audits and other postelection analyses. In addition to these formal engagements, the SEC regularly engages county boards and conducts reviews and analyses on an informal, ad hoc basis. For a list of formal engagements:

See Enclosure 6 – Reviews, Audits & Postelection Analysis

***11. Please explain how the agency complies with S.C. Code Section 7-3-20C(2).***

The S.C. General Assembly amended S.C. Code 7-3-20 in 2014 requiring the Executive Director of the SEC to supervise, review and audit the conduct and performance of the county boards of voter registration and elections, effective June 2, 2014. As part of its efforts to comply with this mandate, the SEC contracted with the Coeur Group in 2014 to develop a field audit plan. Subsequently, the SEC County Field Audit Plan was adopted in January 2015. The plan includes seven broad audit topics:

- Voter Registration
- Absentee Voting
- Candidate Filing
- Voting System
- Polling Place Operations
- Canvassing and Post-Election Reconciliation and Audits
- Administration

Necessary appropriations and increase in funded staffing levels needed to execute compliance reviews and audits did not materialize until July 1, 2015. Staffing for new positions was not completed until January 2016. Since then, the SEC has conducted various reviews, audits and post-election analyses as outline in Enclosure 5. In addition, the SEC regularly engages county boards on an informal, ad hoc basis. No field audits were conducted in 2019 as staff were engaged in the implementation of the new statewide voting system.

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Currently, the SEC County Field Audit Program has not been fully realized. The SEC is taking the following measures to fully realize the program:

- Establishing an annual schedule for field audits.
- Removing auditing responsibility from the area representative team who currently have training, field assistance, and general liaison duties associated with the county boards.
- Requesting funding in the agency's FY2023 budget to hire trained audit staff that will be dedicated solely to the conduct of regular, annual audits.

Since implementation of the current voting system in 2019, the SEC has overseen the hand-count voting system audits performed after every statewide election. In a hand-count audit, the SEC selects precincts and offices for each county to audit. County election officials then publicly hand count the voter-verified paper ballots to determine if the results match those produced by the ballot scanners. While this has tremendous value, the SEC is working to expand and improve its voting system audit program.

Beginning in 2022, the SEC will add an independent results verification process in which every ballot cast in all statewide elections will be re-tabulated using a third-party system to verify the voting system results. In addition to third-party verification, we also plan to conduct some level of risk-limiting audits (RLAs). An RLA uses a statistically significant, random sample of voted ballots to manually examine for evidence that the originally reported outcome is correct. Just as importantly, the SEC is working to establish an online portal through which details about these audits can be communicated proactively to the public. We believe these additional audits and increase in transparency will provide voters and election officials even greater confidence in the integrity of our elections.

Again, thank you for the opportunity to provide this important information to the Committee. If I can be of further assistance, please let me know.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Howard Knapp", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Howard Knapp  
Interim Executive Director

Enclosures



<b>County</b>	<b>Made Inactive-Deceased between 7/1/21 and 10/27/21</b>
01-ABBEVILLE	99
02-AIKEN	455
03-ALLENDALE	49
04-ANDERSON	611
05-BAMBERG	70
06-BARNWELL	74
07-BEAUFORT	501
08-BERKELEY	477
09-CALHOUN	57
10-CHARLESTON	914
11-CHEROKEE	233
12-CHESTER	144
13-CHESTERFIELD	154
14-CLARENDON	152
15-COLLETON	170
16-DARLINGTON	268
17-DILLON	111
18-DORCHESTER	399
19-EDGEFIELD	69
20-FAIRFIELD	111
21-FLORENCE	431
22-GEORGETOWN	266
23-GREENVILLE	1,251
24-GREENWOOD	244
25-HAMPTON	99
26-HORRY	1,298
27-JASPER	108
28-KERSHAW	240
29-LANCASTER	277
30-LAURENS	224
31-LEE	80
32-LEXINGTON	800
33-MCCORMICK	35
34-MARION	117
35-MARLBORO	113
36-NEWBERRY	129
37-OCONEE	231
38-ORANGEBURG	349
39-PICKENS	340
40-RICHLAND	928
41-SALUDA	76
42-SPARTANBURG	882
43-SUMTER	352
44-UNION	110

45-WILLIAMSBURG	133
46-YORK	549
State Total	14,780

<b>County</b>	<b>Inactive Reason</b>	<b># of Voters Removed 1/1/2017 to 10/18/2021</b>
01-ABBEVILLE	L-Moved out of County	17
02-AIKEN	L-Moved out of County	293
03-ALLENDALE	L-Moved out of County	4
04-ANDERSON	L-Moved out of County	320
05-BAMBERG	L-Moved out of County	25
06-BARNWELL	L-Moved out of County	18
07-BEAUFORT	L-Moved out of County	569
08-BERKELEY	L-Moved out of County	1,073
09-CALHOUN	L-Moved out of County	20
10-CHARLESTON	L-Moved out of County	1,068
11-CHEROKEE	L-Moved out of County	77
12-CHESTER	L-Moved out of County	51
13-CHESTERFIELD	L-Moved out of County	74
14-CLARENDON	L-Moved out of County	54
15-COLLETON	L-Moved out of County	83
16-DARLINGTON	L-Moved out of County	79
17-DILLON	L-Moved out of County	63
18-DORCHESTER	L-Moved out of County	344
19-EDGEFIELD	L-Moved out of County	25
20-FAIRFIELD	L-Moved out of County	98
21-FLORENCE	L-Moved out of County	155
22-GEORGETOWN	L-Moved out of County	576
23-GREENVILLE	L-Moved out of County	1,812
24-GREENWOOD	L-Moved out of County	49
25-HAMPTON	L-Moved out of County	34
26-HORRY	L-Moved out of County	1,083
27-JASPER	L-Moved out of County	33
28-KERSHAW	L-Moved out of County	209
29-LANCASTER	L-Moved out of County	192
30-LAURENS	L-Moved out of County	52
31-LEE	L-Moved out of County	22
32-LEXINGTON	L-Moved out of County	659
33-MCCORMICK	L-Moved out of County	16
34-MARION	L-Moved out of County	25
35-MARLBORO	L-Moved out of County	39
36-NEWBERRY	L-Moved out of County	48
37-OCONEE	L-Moved out of County	107
38-ORANGEBURG	L-Moved out of County	122
39-PICKENS	L-Moved out of County	154
40-RICHLAND	L-Moved out of County	916
41-SALUDA	L-Moved out of County	24
42-SPARTANBURG	L-Moved out of County	461
43-SUMTER	L-Moved out of County	209

44-UNION	L-Moved out of County	12
45-WILLIAMSBURG	L-Moved out of County	18
46-YORK	L-Moved out of County	1,097
01-ABBEVILLE	M-Moved	1
02-AIKEN	M-Moved	374
03-ALLENDALE	M-Moved	1
04-ANDERSON	M-Moved	368
05-BAMBERG	M-Moved	199
07-BEAUFORT	M-Moved	59
08-BERKELEY	M-Moved	1,084
09-CALHOUN	M-Moved	116
10-CHARLESTON	M-Moved	301
11-CHEROKEE	M-Moved	450
12-CHESTER	M-Moved	41
13-CHESTERFIELD	M-Moved	16
14-CLARENDON	M-Moved	467
15-COLLETON	M-Moved	222
16-DARLINGTON	M-Moved	91
17-DILLON	M-Moved	6
18-DORCHESTER	M-Moved	115
19-EDGEFIELD	M-Moved	16
20-FAIRFIELD	M-Moved	304
21-FLORENCE	M-Moved	47
22-GEORGETOWN	M-Moved	374
23-GREENVILLE	M-Moved	2,909
24-GREENWOOD	M-Moved	351
25-HAMPTON	M-Moved	42
26-HORRY	M-Moved	2,326
28-KERSHAW	M-Moved	740
29-LANCASTER	M-Moved	203
30-LAURENS	M-Moved	536
31-LEE	M-Moved	182
32-LEXINGTON	M-Moved	2,642
35-MARLBORO	M-Moved	1
36-NEWBERRY	M-Moved	495
37-OCONEE	M-Moved	8
38-ORANGEBURG	M-Moved	674
39-PICKENS	M-Moved	31
40-RICHLAND	M-Moved	4,726
41-SALUDA	M-Moved	288
42-SPARTANBURG	M-Moved	3,189
43-SUMTER	M-Moved	1,338
44-UNION	M-Moved	460
45-WILLIAMSBURG	M-Moved	31
46-YORK	M-Moved	1,396

TOTAL	L-Moved out of County	12,479
TOTAL	M-Moved	27,220
TOTAL	TOTAL	39,699

County	Inactive Reason	# of Voters
01-ABBEVILLE	L-Moved out of County	21
01-ABBEVILLE	M-Moved	229
02-AIKEN	L-Moved out of County	381
02-AIKEN	M-Moved	1475
03-ALLENDALE	L-Moved out of County	9
03-ALLENDALE	M-Moved	84
04-ANDERSON	L-Moved out of County	328
04-ANDERSON	M-Moved	1478
05-BAMBERG	L-Moved out of County	14
05-BAMBERG	M-Moved	99
06-BARNWELL	L-Moved out of County	23
06-BARNWELL	M-Moved	37
07-BEAUFORT	L-Moved out of County	714
07-BEAUFORT	M-Moved	997
08-BERKELEY	L-Moved out of County	975
08-BERKELEY	M-Moved	1939
09-CALHOUN	L-Moved out of County	11
09-CALHOUN	M-Moved	26
10-CHARLESTON	L-Moved out of County	1320
10-CHARLESTON	M-Moved	7297
11-CHEROKEE	L-Moved out of County	75
11-CHEROKEE	M-Moved	238
12-CHESTER	L-Moved out of County	49
12-CHESTER	M-Moved	116
13-CHESTERFIELD	L-Moved out of County	60
13-CHESTERFIELD	M-Moved	280
14-CLARENDON	L-Moved out of County	35
14-CLARENDON	M-Moved	132
15-COLLETON	L-Moved out of County	131
15-COLLETON	M-Moved	704
16-DARLINGTON	L-Moved out of County	110
16-DARLINGTON	M-Moved	471
17-DILLON	L-Moved out of County	41
17-DILLON	M-Moved	482
18-DORCHESTER	L-Moved out of County	402
18-DORCHESTER	M-Moved	1536
19-EDGEFIELD	L-Moved out of County	37
19-EDGEFIELD	M-Moved	125
20-FAIRFIELD	L-Moved out of County	88
20-FAIRFIELD	M-Moved	36
21-FLORENCE	L-Moved out of County	263
21-FLORENCE	M-Moved	1226
22-GEORGETOWN	L-Moved out of County	428
22-GEORGETOWN	M-Moved	664
23-GREENVILLE	L-Moved out of County	1967
23-GREENVILLE	M-Moved	7186

24-GREENWOOD	L-Moved out of County	95
24-GREENWOOD	M-Moved	716
25-HAMPTON	L-Moved out of County	29
25-HAMPTON	M-Moved	256
26-HORRY	L-Moved out of County	1379
26-HORRY	M-Moved	5872
27-JASPER	L-Moved out of County	92
27-JASPER	M-Moved	328
28-KERSHAW	L-Moved out of County	179
28-KERSHAW	M-Moved	349
29-LANCASTER	L-Moved out of County	222
29-LANCASTER	M-Moved	655
30-LAURENS	L-Moved out of County	197
30-LAURENS	M-Moved	511
31-LEE	L-Moved out of County	12
31-LEE	M-Moved	35
32-LEXINGTON	L-Moved out of County	478
32-LEXINGTON	M-Moved	1101
33-MCCORMICK	L-Moved out of County	13
33-MCCORMICK	M-Moved	60
34-MARION	L-Moved out of County	28
34-MARION	M-Moved	206
35-MARLBORO	L-Moved out of County	27
35-MARLBORO	M-Moved	474
36-NEWBERRY	L-Moved out of County	47
36-NEWBERRY	M-Moved	62
37-OCONEE	L-Moved out of County	181
37-OCONEE	M-Moved	942
38-ORANGEBURG	L-Moved out of County	105
38-ORANGEBURG	M-Moved	680
39-PICKENS	L-Moved out of County	176
39-PICKENS	M-Moved	463
40-RICHLAND	L-Moved out of County	800
40-RICHLAND	M-Moved	4053
41-SALUDA	L-Moved out of County	8
41-SALUDA	M-Moved	117
42-SPARTANBURG	L-Moved out of County	482
42-SPARTANBURG	M-Moved	2097
43-SUMTER	L-Moved out of County	132
43-SUMTER	M-Moved	218
44-UNION	L-Moved out of County	17
44-UNION	M-Moved	99
45-WILLIAMSBURG	L-Moved out of County	34
45-WILLIAMSBURG	M-Moved	281
46-YORK	L-Moved out of County	991
46-YORK	M-Moved	2606

TOTAL	L-Moved out of County	13206
TOTAL	M-Moved	49038
TOTAL	TOTAL	62244



County	Inactive Reason	# of Voters
01-ABBEVILLE	L-Moved out of County	10
02-AIKEN	L-Moved out of County	262
02-AIKEN	M-Moved	415
03-ALLENDALE	L-Moved out of County	9
04-ANDERSON	L-Moved out of County	608
04-ANDERSON	M-Moved	1887
05-BAMBERG	L-Moved out of County	10
05-BAMBERG	M-Moved	20
06-BARNWELL	L-Moved out of County	14
06-BARNWELL	M-Moved	2
07-BEAUFORT	L-Moved out of County	442
07-BEAUFORT	M-Moved	10
08-BERKELEY	L-Moved out of County	729
08-BERKELEY	M-Moved	482
09-CALHOUN	L-Moved out of County	10
10-CHARLESTON	L-Moved out of County	891
10-CHARLESTON	M-Moved	317
11-CHEROKEE	L-Moved out of County	35
11-CHEROKEE	M-Moved	25
12-CHESTER	L-Moved out of County	38
13-CHESTERFIELD	L-Moved out of County	33
13-CHESTERFIELD	M-Moved	2
14-CLARENDON	L-Moved out of County	34
15-COLLETON	L-Moved out of County	43
15-COLLETON	M-Moved	40
16-DARLINGTON	L-Moved out of County	53
17-DILLON	L-Moved out of County	25
17-DILLON	M-Moved	1
18-DORCHESTER	L-Moved out of County	329
18-DORCHESTER	M-Moved	85
19-EDGEFIELD	L-Moved out of County	54
19-EDGEFIELD	M-Moved	4
20-FAIRFIELD	L-Moved out of County	93
20-FAIRFIELD	M-Moved	17
21-FLORENCE	L-Moved out of County	122
21-FLORENCE	M-Moved	94
22-GEORGETOWN	L-Moved out of County	534
22-GEORGETOWN	M-Moved	163
23-GREENVILLE	L-Moved out of County	1448
23-GREENVILLE	M-Moved	876
24-GREENWOOD	L-Moved out of County	60
24-GREENWOOD	M-Moved	497
25-HAMPTON	L-Moved out of County	15
25-HAMPTON	M-Moved	22
26-HORRY	L-Moved out of County	938
26-HORRY	M-Moved	2590

27-JASPER	L-Moved out of County	60
27-JASPER	M-Moved	44
28-KERSHAW	L-Moved out of County	213
28-KERSHAW	M-Moved	416
29-LANCASTER	L-Moved out of County	135
29-LANCASTER	M-Moved	40
30-LAURENS	L-Moved out of County	34
30-LAURENS	M-Moved	20
31-LEE	L-Moved out of County	10
31-LEE	M-Moved	2
32-LEXINGTON	L-Moved out of County	430
32-LEXINGTON	M-Moved	547
33-MCCORMICK	L-Moved out of County	21
34-MARION	L-Moved out of County	16
34-MARION	M-Moved	3
35-MARLBORO	L-Moved out of County	17
35-MARLBORO	M-Moved	4
36-NEWBERRY	L-Moved out of County	26
36-NEWBERRY	M-Moved	3
37-OCONEE	L-Moved out of County	83
37-OCONEE	M-Moved	64
38-ORANGEBURG	L-Moved out of County	673
38-ORANGEBURG	M-Moved	224
39-PICKENS	L-Moved out of County	140
39-PICKENS	M-Moved	3
40-RICHLAND	L-Moved out of County	551
40-RICHLAND	M-Moved	2340
41-SALUDA	L-Moved out of County	11
41-SALUDA	M-Moved	45
42-SPARTANBURG	L-Moved out of County	358
42-SPARTANBURG	M-Moved	949
43-SUMTER	L-Moved out of County	139
43-SUMTER	M-Moved	27
44-UNION	L-Moved out of County	10
45-WILLIAMSBURG	L-Moved out of County	16
45-WILLIAMSBURG	M-Moved	1
46-YORK	L-Moved out of County	519
46-YORK	M-Moved	405
TOTAL	L-Moved out of County	10301
TOTAL	M-Moved	12686
TOTAL	TOTAL	22987

County	Inactive Reason	# of Voters
01-ABBEVILLE	L-Moved out of County	14
01-ABBEVILLE	M-Moved	5
02-AIKEN	L-Moved out of County	244
02-AIKEN	M-Moved	379
03-ALLENDALE	L-Moved out of County	7
04-ANDERSON	L-Moved out of County	226
04-ANDERSON	M-Moved	304
05-BAMBERG	L-Moved out of County	8
05-BAMBERG	M-Moved	11
06-BARNWELL	L-Moved out of County	6
07-BEAUFORT	L-Moved out of County	506
07-BEAUFORT	M-Moved	104
08-BERKELEY	L-Moved out of County	1196
08-BERKELEY	M-Moved	39
09-CALHOUN	L-Moved out of County	6
10-CHARLESTON	L-Moved out of County	968
10-CHARLESTON	M-Moved	283
11-CHEROKEE	L-Moved out of County	42
11-CHEROKEE	M-Moved	33
12-CHESTER	L-Moved out of County	25
13-CHESTERFIELD	L-Moved out of County	23
13-CHESTERFIELD	M-Moved	3
14-CLARENDON	L-Moved out of County	31
14-CLARENDON	M-Moved	3
15-COLLETON	L-Moved out of County	52
15-COLLETON	M-Moved	53
16-DARLINGTON	L-Moved out of County	83
16-DARLINGTON	M-Moved	4
17-DILLON	L-Moved out of County	44
17-DILLON	M-Moved	17
18-DORCHESTER	L-Moved out of County	287
18-DORCHESTER	M-Moved	26
19-EDGEFIELD	L-Moved out of County	31
20-FAIRFIELD	L-Moved out of County	77
20-FAIRFIELD	M-Moved	3
21-FLORENCE	L-Moved out of County	181
21-FLORENCE	M-Moved	1550
22-GEORGETOWN	L-Moved out of County	328
22-GEORGETOWN	M-Moved	10
23-GREENVILLE	L-Moved out of County	744
23-GREENVILLE	M-Moved	596
24-GREENWOOD	L-Moved out of County	132
24-GREENWOOD	M-Moved	646
25-HAMPTON	L-Moved out of County	17
25-HAMPTON	M-Moved	29
26-HORRY	L-Moved out of County	922

26-HORRY	M-Moved	1611
27-JASPER	L-Moved out of County	54
27-JASPER	M-Moved	2
28-KERSHAW	L-Moved out of County	179
28-KERSHAW	M-Moved	425
29-LANCASTER	L-Moved out of County	151
29-LANCASTER	M-Moved	59
30-LAURENS	L-Moved out of County	99
30-LAURENS	M-Moved	294
31-LEE	L-Moved out of County	8
31-LEE	M-Moved	2
32-LEXINGTON	L-Moved out of County	365
32-LEXINGTON	M-Moved	264
33-MCCORMICK	L-Moved out of County	15
33-MCCORMICK	M-Moved	4
34-MARION	L-Moved out of County	7
34-MARION	M-Moved	12
35-MARLBORO	L-Moved out of County	11
35-MARLBORO	M-Moved	13
36-NEWBERRY	L-Moved out of County	13
36-NEWBERRY	M-Moved	2
37-OCONEE	L-Moved out of County	129
37-OCONEE	M-Moved	71
38-ORANGEBURG	L-Moved out of County	67
38-ORANGEBURG	M-Moved	8
39-PICKENS	L-Moved out of County	257
39-PICKENS	M-Moved	482
40-RICHLAND	L-Moved out of County	609
40-RICHLAND	M-Moved	810
41-SALUDA	L-Moved out of County	8
41-SALUDA	M-Moved	3
42-SPARTANBURG	L-Moved out of County	361
42-SPARTANBURG	M-Moved	632
43-SUMTER	L-Moved out of County	104
43-SUMTER	M-Moved	3
44-UNION	L-Moved out of County	10
44-UNION	M-Moved	36
45-WILLIAMSBURG	L-Moved out of County	16
45-WILLIAMSBURG	M-Moved	4
46-YORK	L-Moved out of County	843
46-YORK	M-Moved	1267
TOTAL	L-Moved out of County	9506
TOTAL	M-Moved	10102
TOTAL	TOTAL	19608











46-YORK	O-Other	27
46-YORK	T-Twice registered	45
46-YORK	W-Written Request for Removal	4

County	Inactive Reason	# of Voters
01-ABBEVILLE	L-Moved out of County	3
01-ABBEVILLE	M-Moved	2
02-AIKEN	L-Moved out of County	348
02-AIKEN	M-Moved	1075
03-ALLENDALE	L-Moved out of County	2
03-ALLENDALE	M-Moved	1
04-ANDERSON	L-Moved out of County	118
04-ANDERSON	M-Moved	149
05-BAMBERG	L-Moved out of County	6
05-BAMBERG	M-Moved	39
06-BARNWELL	L-Moved out of County	8
06-BARNWELL	M-Moved	1
07-BEAUFORT	L-Moved out of County	237
07-BEAUFORT	M-Moved	29
08-BERKELEY	L-Moved out of County	241
08-BERKELEY	M-Moved	52
09-CALHOUN	L-Moved out of County	3
09-CALHOUN	M-Moved	2
10-CHARLESTON	L-Moved out of County	560
10-CHARLESTON	M-Moved	733
11-CHEROKEE	L-Moved out of County	17
11-CHEROKEE	M-Moved	18
12-CHESTER	L-Moved out of County	10
13-CHESTERFIELD	L-Moved out of County	8
13-CHESTERFIELD	M-Moved	13
14-CLARENDON	L-Moved out of County	11
14-CLARENDON	M-Moved	5
15-COLLETON	L-Moved out of County	22
15-COLLETON	M-Moved	23
16-DARLINGTON	L-Moved out of County	26
16-DARLINGTON	M-Moved	65
17-DILLON	L-Moved out of County	4
18-DORCHESTER	L-Moved out of County	158
18-DORCHESTER	M-Moved	4
19-EDGEFIELD	L-Moved out of County	6
20-FAIRFIELD	L-Moved out of County	13
20-FAIRFIELD	M-Moved	1
21-FLORENCE	L-Moved out of County	74
21-FLORENCE	M-Moved	278
22-GEORGETOWN	L-Moved out of County	58
22-GEORGETOWN	M-Moved	4
23-GREENVILLE	L-Moved out of County	615
23-GREENVILLE	M-Moved	1112
24-GREENWOOD	L-Moved out of County	63
24-GREENWOOD	M-Moved	288
25-HAMPTON	L-Moved out of County	5

25-HAMPTON	M-Moved	24
26-HORRY	L-Moved out of County	530
26-HORRY	M-Moved	1675
27-JASPER	L-Moved out of County	21
27-JASPER	M-Moved	16
28-KERSHAW	L-Moved out of County	388
28-KERSHAW	M-Moved	762
29-LANCASTER	L-Moved out of County	83
29-LANCASTER	M-Moved	218
30-LAURENS	L-Moved out of County	27
30-LAURENS	M-Moved	26
31-LEE	L-Moved out of County	4
31-LEE	M-Moved	2
32-LEXINGTON	L-Moved out of County	186
32-LEXINGTON	M-Moved	273
33-MCCORMICK	L-Moved out of County	14
34-MARION	L-Moved out of County	12
34-MARION	M-Moved	49
35-MARLBORO	L-Moved out of County	3
35-MARLBORO	M-Moved	12
36-NEWBERRY	L-Moved out of County	12
36-NEWBERRY	M-Moved	4
37-OCONEE	L-Moved out of County	44
37-OCONEE	M-Moved	43
38-ORANGEBURG	L-Moved out of County	29
38-ORANGEBURG	M-Moved	40
39-PICKENS	L-Moved out of County	84
39-PICKENS	M-Moved	132
40-RICHLAND	L-Moved out of County	246
40-RICHLAND	M-Moved	21
41-SALUDA	L-Moved out of County	4
41-SALUDA	M-Moved	4
42-SPARTANBURG	L-Moved out of County	461
42-SPARTANBURG	M-Moved	1050
43-SUMTER	L-Moved out of County	47
43-SUMTER	M-Moved	101
44-UNION	L-Moved out of County	4
44-UNION	M-Moved	18
45-WILLIAMSBURG	L-Moved out of County	13
45-WILLIAMSBURG	M-Moved	2
46-YORK	L-Moved out of County	340
46-YORK	M-Moved	714
TOTAL	L-Moved out of County	5168
TOTAL	M-Moved	9080
TOTAL	TOTAL	14248













46-YORK	O-Other	11
46-YORK	T-Twice registered	25
46-YORK	W-Written Request for Removal	2

	TOTAL Confirmation Cards (CCs) Sent	Active at End of CC Process	Inactive at End of CC Process Due to Reasons Related to CC Process			Inactive at End of CC Process for Unrelated Reasons		TOTAL Inactive at End of CC Process for Any Reason
			Written Request (I-W)	Confirmation of Move: Left the County (I-L) and Moved (I-M)	Failed to Respond (I-F)	TOTAL Inactive for Related Reasons (I-W, I-L, I-M, I-F)	Deceased (I-D), Convicted (I-C), Twice Registered (I-T), Hold (I-H), and Other (I-O)	
Abbeville County	313	62	1	2	229	232	19	251
Aiken County	3,015	548	25	104	2,184	2,313	154	2,467
Allendale County	145	17	-	1	116	117	11	128
Anderson County	3,270	890	21	173	1,978	2,172	208	2,380
Bamberg County	265	37	2	3	192	197	31	228
Barnwell County	310	74	-	3	212	215	21	236
Beaufort County	1,861	363	16	42	1,310	1,368	130	1,498
Berkeley County	2,547	772	12	44	1,618	1,674	101	1,775
Calhoun County	253	68	2	-	172	174	11	185
Charleston County	7,481	1,363	34	73	5,708	5,815	303	6,118
Cherokee County	499	155	3	7	296	306	38	344
Chester County	501	140	2	3	316	321	40	361
Chesterfield County	597	145	6	2	388	396	56	452
Clarendon County	718	129	2	7	538	547	42	589
Colleton County	549	146	3	7	356	366	37	403
Darlington County	1,095	229	6	12	776	794	72	866
Dillon County	603	166	-	8	394	402	35	437
Dorchester County	2,803	588	16	29	2,062	2,107	108	2,215
Edgefield County	453	86	2	4	336	342	25	367
Fairfield County	310	70	1	5	215	221	19	240
Florence County	2,529	530	9	107	1,736	1,852	147	1,999
Georgetown County	507	155	8	31	285	324	28	352
Greenville County	7,916	1,654	59	128	5,659	5,846	416	6,262
Greenwood County	775	178	6	65	476	547	50	597
Hampton County	318	68	3	1	229	233	17	250
Horry County	5,315	1,153	28	254	3,538	3,820	342	4,162
Jasper County	460	67	1	9	366	376	17	393
Kershaw County	1,034	269	9	109	571	689	76	765
Lancaster County	1,345	299	5	45	867	917	129	1,046
Laurens County	862	190	9	14	579	602	70	672
Lee County	363	62	-	4	273	277	24	301
Lexington County	4,091	1,103	24	77	2,690	2,791	197	2,988
McCormick County	159	30	1	3	113	117	12	129
Marion County	557	121	1	2	388	391	45	436
Marlboro County	490	98	5	5	328	338	54	392
Newberry County	567	128	1	3	391	395	44	439
Oconee County	1,372	365	15	11	892	918	89	1,007
Orangeburg County	1,397	327	14	14	968	996	74	1,070
Pickens County	1,415	372	19	34	909	962	81	1,043
Richland County	6,318	1,331	44	173	4,496	4,713	274	4,987
Saluda County	217	48	2	3	147	152	17	169
Spartanburg County	4,127	1,146	29	90	2,635	2,754	227	2,981
Sumter County	1,387	322	8	10	968	986	79	1,065
Union County	460	120	3	1	290	294	46	340
Williamsburg County	523	95	2	2	386	390	38	428
York County	3,704	726	28	105	2,556	2,689	289	2,978
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>75,796</b>	<b>17,001</b>	<b>487</b>	<b>1,829</b>	<b>52,132</b>	<b>54,448</b>	<b>4,347</b>	<b>58,795</b>

# Getting the facts straight about modems and South Carolina

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## 1. Do ES&S DS200 tabulators in South Carolina have modems?

No. Modems are not present in any ES&S DS200 machines in South Carolina.

Modem components are not resident on the DS200 by default, but rather a separate board that is only installed in DS200s in those jurisdictions where a state may permit their legal use. Additionally, DS200s without a modem component do not include the application or the network architecture required to support modeming and allow a modem to operate on the machine. Neither the modem application, required modem components, or network architecture technology are used, installed or certified in South Carolina, and therefore not present in the machines.

## 2. How do we know modems aren't in DS200s in South Carolina?

South Carolina counties are prohibited from purchasing equipment that is not certified in the state and ES&S has not certified modeming capabilities for DS200s in South Carolina. Additionally, ES&S has compliance oversight procedures which prevent uncertified equipment from being shipped to states.

It's important to note that today's modern cellular modeming technology also requires a private network service provider such as Verizon. None of that technology is currently in use or in place in South Carolina.

## 3. I've read articles saying DS200s have modems. What are they referencing?

Any articles regarding the DS200 and the presence or use of modems in any state where they are not certified simply are not accurate. Modeming technology has not been certified for use in South Carolina.

Do note that in a few states it is a legal practice to use cellular modems to transmit unofficial election results after the polls are officially closed and all voting has ended. In those states which allow for the use of modems, ES&S uses mobile private network connectivity, industry best practices, and numerous security safeguards to protect the transfer of these unofficial election night results. Final official results are physically uploaded at election headquarters prior to final certification. The physical ballots and printed results tapes are always protected.

Again, modem components are not resident on the DS200, but rather a separate module that is only installed in DS200s in those jurisdictions where the state has certified their use.

## 4. Do central count tabulators in South Carolina, including the DS450 and DS850 have modems?

No. South Carolina's central count tabulators do not contain modems and they are incapable of being connected to the internet.

## 5. Do ES&S voting systems certified in South Carolina allow for modeming?

No, modeming is not certified or allowed in South Carolina. Previous voting system releases approved for use in South Carolina did allow for modeming via an analog telephone connection, however as stated previously, this capability is not currently certified nor used in South Carolina.

Device through which Votes Transmitted or Stored	Description	Hard copy or Electronic	Time Period During Which Votes Stored or Transmitted	Location	Capacity for Internet Connectivity	Security Measures	Direct Control	Available Access Policy	SEC Accountability Measures
<b>ExpressVote Ballot Marking Device (BMD)</b>	Used by voters during in-person voting to prepare and print ballot card.	Electronic	During voting session. Votes NOT stored on device after ballot printing.	Stored in county facilities, transported to and from polling places for use during in-person voting.	None	<p><b>Access Control</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No Internet Connectivity</li> <li>Not used in any election</li> <li>IEEE 802.11x secured flash drives</li> <li>Password protected dependent on user role</li> <li> voter reviews and verifies printed ballot for accuracy before casting</li> <li>Hand-count audits of voter-verified paper ballots</li> <li>Stored behind two locks in county office.</li> <li>Access to storage restricted</li> <li>Access log for storage area</li> <li>Only accepts paper of specific design &amp; quality</li> <li>Flash drive door locked</li> <li>Security seals on placed on flash drive door</li> <li>Security seals on BMD used for transportation to polling places</li> <li>Public observation of entire process of voter marking</li> <li>SEC Certification</li> <li>Limited cards provided to poll managers</li> <li> voter reviews and verifies printed card for accuracy before casting</li> <li>Hand-count audits of voter-verified paper ballots</li> <li>Specific paper design &amp; quality necessary to permit scanning</li> <li>Card contains color specific to election allowing ballot to be scanned by scanner</li> <li>Ballot reconstitutions of cards provided, cards not used, cards scanned and voters processed</li> <li>Ballot box is locked inside scanner stand</li> <li>Security seals on bin access door</li> <li>Ballot bin locked and security sealed prior to transport to county office</li> <li>Cards stored in county office behind two locks</li> <li>Access to storage restricted</li> <li>Access log for storage area</li> <li>Public observation of entire use of workflow and return of materials</li> <li>SEC Certification</li> <li>Logic and accuracy tests performed before every election to ensure ballots are tabulating correctly</li> <li>Limited ballots provided to poll managers</li> <li> voter reviews and verifies ballot for accuracy before casting</li> <li>Hand-count audits of voter-verified paper ballots</li> <li>Ballot reconstitutions of ballots provided, ballots not used, ballots scanned and voters processed</li> <li>Specific paper design &amp; quality necessary to permit scanning</li> <li>Ballot contains timing marks specific to election allowing ballot to be scanned by scanner</li> <li>Ballot box is locked inside scanner stand with security seals on bin access door</li> <li>Emergency/Provisional compartment is locked with security seals on access door</li> <li>Any additional ballot boxes are locked and sealed while in use and during transport to county office.</li> <li>Ballots stored in county office behind two locks</li> <li>Access to storage restricted</li> <li>Access log for storage area</li> <li>Public observation of testing, use at polling places, return of materials and scanning of ballots</li> </ul>	County Board	1, 4, 10	1, 6
<b>Ballot Cards</b>	Voter marks ballot card containing votes at end of BMD session.	Hard copy	From point at which voter marks ballot through at least 22 months following the date of the election	<p><b>Access Control</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li> voter marks card at scanner, and card drops in ballot bin inside scanner stand. Cards may be taken through election day. Bin is returned to county office by poll clerk on election night.</li> <li>Cards are stored in bins at county office. Bin may be opened and cards removed for hand-count audit prior to certification of election. Cards returned to bin after hand-count audit. After certification of election, cards may be removed from bins and placed in storage boxes for long-term retention.</li> </ul>	None	<p><b>Access Control</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li> voter marks card at scanner, and card drops in ballot bin inside scanner stand. Cards may be taken through election day. Bin is returned to county office by poll clerk on election night.</li> <li>Cards are stored in bins at county office. Bin may be opened and cards removed for hand-count audit prior to certification of election. Cards returned to bin after hand-count audit. After certification of election, cards may be removed from bins and placed in storage boxes for long-term retention.</li> </ul>	County Board	1, 11	1, 6
<b>Hand-Marked Emergency Ballots</b>	Used for in-person emergency voting when voting equipment is unavailable.	Hard copy	From point at which voter marks ballot through at least 22 months following the date of the election	<p><b>Access Control</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li> scanner is operable, voter marks ballot in scanner, and ballot drops in ballot bin inside scanner stand. If scanner is inoperable, voter drops ballot in emergency/provisional slot on front of scanner read or places in ballot bin. Ballots remain in emergency/provisional ballot compartment on ballot bin through election day. Escrower is operated at close of polls, poll managers use emergency ballots. If scanner is inoperable at close of polls, ballots are returned to county office by poll clerk on election night for processing at county office.</li> <li>Emergency ballots are stored at county office and processed before casting. After based ruling at provisional ballot hearing, ballots to be counted are removed from the envelopes and stored, and ballots not to be counted are left in the envelopes. Counted ballots and envelopes containing ballots not counted are stored in boxes in county office.</li> </ul>	None	<p><b>Access Control</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li> scanner is operable, voter marks ballot in scanner, and ballot drops in ballot bin inside scanner stand. If scanner is inoperable, voter drops ballot in emergency/provisional slot on front of scanner read or places in ballot bin. Ballots remain in emergency/provisional ballot compartment on ballot bin through election day. Escrower is operated at close of polls, poll managers use emergency ballots. If scanner is inoperable at close of polls, ballots are returned to county office by poll clerk on election night for processing at county office.</li> <li>Emergency ballots are stored at county office and processed before casting. After based ruling at provisional ballot hearing, ballots to be counted are removed from the envelopes and stored, and ballots not to be counted are left in the envelopes. Counted ballots and envelopes containing ballots not counted are stored in boxes in county office.</li> </ul>	County Board	1, 4, 11	1, 6
<b>Hand-Marked Provisional Ballots</b>	Used for provisional voting.	Hard copy	From point at which voter marks ballot through at least 22 months following the date of the election	<p><b>Access Control</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li> voter places ballot in provisional ballot envelope and places the envelope in the emergency/provisional slot on front of scanner read or places in ballot bin. Envelopes remain in emergency/provisional ballot compartment on ballot bin through election day. Envelopes are removed during close of polls and are returned to county office by poll clerk on election night.</li> <li>Envelopes are stored at county office and processed before casting. After based ruling at provisional ballot hearing, ballots to be counted are removed from the envelopes and stored, and ballots not to be counted are left in the envelopes. Counted ballots and envelopes containing ballots not counted are stored in boxes in county office.</li> </ul>	None	<p><b>Access Control</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li> voter places ballot in provisional ballot envelope and places the envelope in the emergency/provisional slot on front of scanner read or places in ballot bin. Envelopes remain in emergency/provisional ballot compartment on ballot bin through election day. Envelopes are removed during close of polls and are returned to county office by poll clerk on election night.</li> <li>Envelopes are stored at county office and processed before casting. After based ruling at provisional ballot hearing, ballots to be counted are removed from the envelopes and stored, and ballots not to be counted are left in the envelopes. Counted ballots and envelopes containing ballots not counted are stored in boxes in county office.</li> </ul>	County Board	1, 4, 11	1, 6
<b>D200 Scanner</b>	Voter inserts ballot in scanner at polling place for tabulation. Also used to verify count main in absentee ballots and provisional ballots at county offices in smaller jurisdictions.	Electronic	Only while in use during voting. Votes stored on D200 flash drive. Vote data returns after flash drive removal.	Stored in county facilities. Transported to and from polling places for use during in-person voting.	None. See information in letter in response to Item 9 regarding the capacity for internet connectivity of D200 scanners deployed in other states.	<p><b>Access Control</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li> voter reviews and verifies ballot for accuracy before casting</li> <li>Hand-count audits of voter-verified paper ballots</li> <li> voter reviews and verifies ballot for accuracy before casting</li> <li>Hand-count audits of voter-verified paper ballots</li> <li>Ballot reconstitutions of ballots provided, ballots not used, ballots scanned and voters processed</li> <li>Specific paper design &amp; quality necessary to permit scanning</li> <li>Ballot contains timing marks specific to election allowing ballot to be scanned by scanner</li> <li>Ballot box is locked and sealed</li> <li>Emergency/Provisional compartment is locked with security seals on access door</li> <li>Any additional ballot boxes are locked and sealed while in use and during transport to county office.</li> <li>Ballots stored in county office behind two locks</li> <li>Access to storage restricted</li> <li>Access log for storage area</li> <li>Public observation of testing, use at polling places, return of materials and scanning of ballots</li> </ul>	County Board	1, 11	1, 6
<b>D300 Flash Drive</b>	Removable data storage device in the D200 scanner. Stores vote tabulation, card vote records, ballot images, and activity logs.	Electronic	From the time a ballot is scanned through the time the flash drive is cleared. Data from vote tabulation, card vote records, ballot images, and activity logs.	All ballots are scanned, with data is recorded. Flash drive removed during close of polls. Flash drives are never returned to county office by poll clerk on election night for processing at county office.	None.	<p><b>Access Control</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li> voter reviews and verifies ballot for accuracy before casting</li> <li>Hand-count audits of voter-verified paper ballots</li> <li> voter reviews and verifies ballot for accuracy before casting</li> <li>Hand-count audits of voter-verified paper ballots</li> <li>Ballot reconstitutions of ballots provided, ballots not used, ballots scanned and voters processed</li> <li>Specific paper design &amp; quality necessary to permit scanning</li> <li>Ballot contains timing marks specific to election allowing ballot to be scanned by scanner</li> <li>Ballot box is locked and sealed</li> <li>Emergency/Provisional compartment is locked with security seals on access door</li> <li>Any additional ballot boxes are locked and sealed while in use and during transport to county office.</li> <li>Ballots stored in county office behind two locks</li> <li>Access to storage restricted</li> <li>Access log for storage area</li> <li>Public observation of testing, use at polling places, return of materials and scanning of ballots</li> </ul>	County Board	1, 11	1, 6
<b>D200 Results Tapes</b>	Two copies printed from the D200 scanner at polling place after votes are one for public reporting, other for county records.	Hard copy	From time of printing through at least 22 months following the date of the election	After printing, one copy is posted publicly at the polling place. The other copy is returned to county office by poll clerk on election night.	None.	<p><b>Access Control</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li> voter reviews and verifies ballot for accuracy before casting</li> <li>Hand-count audits of voter-verified paper ballots</li> <li> voter reviews and verifies ballot for accuracy before casting</li> <li>Hand-count audits of voter-verified paper ballots</li> <li>Ballot reconstitutions of ballots provided, ballots not used, ballots scanned and voters processed</li> <li>Specific paper design &amp; quality necessary to permit scanning</li> <li>Ballot contains timing marks specific to election allowing ballot to be scanned by scanner</li> <li>Ballot box is locked and sealed</li> <li>Emergency/Provisional compartment is locked with security seals on access door</li> <li>Any additional ballot boxes are locked and sealed while in use and during transport to county office.</li> <li>Ballots stored in county office behind two locks</li> <li>Access to storage restricted</li> <li>Access log for storage area</li> <li>Public observation of testing, use at polling places, return of materials and scanning of ballots</li> </ul>	County Board	1, 11	1, 6
<b>Hand-Marked Ballot in Absentee Ballots</b>	Used by voter to vote absentee by mail.	Hard copy	From point at which voter marks ballot through at least 22 months following the date of the election	<p><b>Access Control</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li> voter marks ballot in Ballot Here-In Envelope (BHE) and places BHE in Ballot Return Envelope (BRE). BRE received by voter or carrier through U.S. Mail or by personal delivery. BRE is placed in a locked and sealed ballot box. BRE is not signed by the voter, not properly witnessed, or returned without the BRE. The BRE is placed in an Absentee Envelope (AE) (preventing the reason for which the ballot will not count). The AE is placed in the ballot box. At the designated time for opening BREs, county officials open each BRE and remove the BRE. Once all BREs are removed, county officials open each BRE and remove the ballot. AEs are never opened and are stored in the county office. Printed copies of ballots returned by mail are deposited publicly in a Hand-Marked Absentee Ballot following the Duplication/Ballot Procedure. The scanner-readable ballots are tabulated by D200, D250 or D500 scanners. After scanning, all envelopes, original ballots and duplicate ballots are boxed and stored in the county office. Electronic copy of ballot remains in email account until deleted.</li> </ul>	None	<p><b>Access Control</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li> voter marks ballot in Ballot Here-In Envelope (BHE) and places BHE in Ballot Return Envelope (BRE). BRE received by voter or carrier through U.S. Mail or by personal delivery. BRE is placed in a locked and sealed ballot box. BRE is not signed by the voter, not properly witnessed, or returned without the BRE. The BRE is placed in an Absentee Envelope (AE) (preventing the reason for which the ballot will not count). The AE is placed in the ballot box. At the designated time for opening BREs, county officials open each BRE and remove the BRE. Once all BREs are removed, county officials open each BRE and remove the ballot. AEs are never opened and are stored in the county office. Printed copies of ballots returned by mail are deposited publicly in a Hand-Marked Absentee Ballot following the Duplication/Ballot Procedure. The scanner-readable ballots are tabulated by D200, D250 or D500 scanners. After scanning, all envelopes, original ballots and duplicate ballots are boxed and stored in the county office. Electronic copy of ballot remains in email account until deleted.</li> </ul>	County Board	4, 12	1, 6
<b>Military &amp; Overseas Ballots Transmitted by Email</b>	Paper ballot transmitted electronically via email by military and overseas voters.	Electronic	From point at which voter marks ballot through at least 22 months following the date of the election	<p><b>Access Control</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li> voter marks ballot and scans and emails the ballot to the county office. County office opens scanned image file, and prints ballot created a paper ballot that cannot be read by the scanner. Ballot is placed in BRE. BRE is placed in BHE. BHE is placed in ballot box. If BRE is not signed by the voter or returned box, the BRE is placed in an AE denoting the reason for which the ballot will not count. The AE is placed in the ballot box. At the designated time for opening BREs, county officials open each BRE and remove the BRE. Once all BREs are removed, county officials open each BRE and remove the ballot. AEs are never opened and are stored in the county office. Printed copies of ballots returned by mail are deposited publicly in a Hand-Marked Absentee Ballot following the Duplication/Ballot Procedure. The scanner-readable ballots are tabulated by D200, D250 or D500 scanners. After scanning, all envelopes, original ballots and duplicate ballots are boxed and stored in the county office. Electronic copy of ballot remains in email account until deleted.</li> </ul>	Ballots are transmitted via email over the internet.	<p><b>Access Control</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li> voter reviews and verifies ballot for accuracy before casting</li> <li>Hand-count audits of voter-verified paper ballots</li> <li> voter reviews and verifies ballot for accuracy before casting</li> <li>Hand-count audits of voter-verified paper ballots</li> <li>Ballot reconstitutions of absentee applications issued and returned, ballots issued and returned, ballots not used, ballots scanned and voters issued absentee ballots</li> <li>Specific paper design &amp; quality necessary to permit scanning</li> <li>Ballot contains timing marks specific to election allowing ballot to be scanned by scanner</li> <li>Ballot box is locked and sealed</li> <li>Ballots stored in county office behind two locks</li> <li>Access to storage restricted</li> <li>Access log for storage area</li> <li>Public observation of testing, opening of BREs, ballot duplication, and scanning of ballots</li> <li> voter must apply for military and overseas voter designation</li> <li>Conditions on who can request an application</li> <li>Ballots mailed to mailing address on file</li> <li>Limitations on who can return an absentee ballot</li> <li>Limitation on how an absentee ballot can be returned</li> <li> voter signature required</li> </ul>	County Board	4, 12	1, 6
<b>Military &amp; Overseas Ballots Transmitted by Fax</b>	Paper ballot transmitted electronically via fax by military and overseas voters.	Electronic and Hard Copy	From point at which voter marks ballot through at least 22 months following the date of the election	<p><b>Access Control</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li> voter marks ballot and scans the ballot to the county office. The results is a paper ballot that cannot be read by the scanner. Ballot is placed in BRE. BRE is placed in BHE. BHE is placed in ballot box. If BRE is not signed by the voter or returned box, the BRE is placed in an AE denoting the reason for which the ballot will not count. The AE is placed in the ballot box. At the designated time for opening BREs, county officials open each BRE and remove the BRE. Once all BREs are removed, county officials open each BRE and remove the ballot. AEs are never opened and are stored in the county office. Printed copies of ballots returned by fax are deposited publicly in a Hand-Marked Absentee Ballot following the Duplication/Ballot Procedure. The scanner-readable ballots are tabulated by D200, D250 or D500 scanners. After scanning, all envelopes, original ballots and duplicate ballots are boxed and stored in the county office. Electronic copy of ballot remains on any hard drive associated with fax device until deleted.</li> </ul>	Ballots are transmitted via fax over telephone lines or the internet.	<p><b>Access Control</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li> voter reviews and verifies ballot for accuracy before casting</li> <li>Hand-count audits of voter-verified paper ballots</li> <li> voter reviews and verifies ballot for accuracy before casting</li> <li>Hand-count audits of voter-verified paper ballots</li> <li>Ballot reconstitutions of absentee applications issued and returned, ballots issued and returned, ballots not used, ballots scanned and voters issued absentee ballots</li> <li>Specific paper design &amp; quality necessary to permit scanning</li> <li>Ballot contains timing marks specific to election allowing ballot to be scanned by scanner</li> <li>Ballot box is locked and sealed</li> <li>Ballots stored in county office behind two locks</li> <li>Access to storage restricted</li> <li>Access log for storage area</li> <li>Public observation of testing, opening of BREs, ballot duplication, and scanning of ballots</li> <li> voter must apply for military and overseas voter designation</li> <li>Conditions on who can request an application</li> <li>Ballots mailed to mailing address on file</li> <li>Limitations on who can return an absentee ballot</li> <li>Limitation on how an absentee ballot can be returned</li> <li> voter signature required</li> </ul>	County Board	4, 12	1, 6
<b>Duplicated ballots</b>	Duplicate ballots are within hand-marked paper ballots on ballot cards created during the tabulation process when original ballots are unable to be read by a ballot scanner.	Hard copy	From point at which duplicate ballot is created through at least 22 months following the date of the election	<p><b>Access Control</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li> duplicate ballot is publicly created at the county office following the Duplication/Ballot Procedure. The duplicate ballots are tabulated by D200, D250 or D500 scanners. Original ballots and duplicate ballots are boxed and stored in the county office.</li> </ul>	None	<p><b>Access Control</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li> duplicate ballot is publicly created at the county office following the Duplication/Ballot Procedure. The duplicate ballots are tabulated by D200, D250 or D500 scanners. Original ballots and duplicate ballots are boxed and stored in the county office.</li> </ul>	County Board	4, 12	1, 6
<b>D500 Scanner</b>	Used to centrally count main in absentee ballots and provisional ballots at county offices in larger jurisdictions.	Electronic	Votes stored on internal drive from the time a ballot is scanned through the time the internal drive is cleared.	Stored in county facilities.	None. See information in letter in response to Item 9 regarding the capacity for internet connectivity of D500 scanners deployed in other states.	<p><b>Access Control</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li> voter reviews and verifies ballot for accuracy before casting</li> <li>Hand-count audits of voter-verified paper ballots</li> <li> voter reviews and verifies ballot for accuracy before casting</li> <li>Hand-count audits of voter-verified paper ballots</li> <li>Ballot reconstitutions of ballots provided, ballots not used, ballots scanned and voters processed</li> <li>Specific paper design &amp; quality necessary to permit scanning</li> <li>Ballot contains timing marks specific to election allowing ballot to be scanned by scanner</li> <li>Ballot box is locked and sealed</li> <li>Emergency/Provisional compartment is locked with security seals on access door</li> <li>Any additional ballot boxes are locked and sealed while in use and during transport to county office.</li> <li>Ballots stored in county office behind two locks</li> <li>Access to storage restricted</li> <li>Access log for storage area</li> <li>Public observation of testing, opening of BREs, ballot duplication, and scanning of ballots</li> <li> voter must apply for military and overseas voter designation</li> <li>Conditions on who can request an application</li> <li>Ballots mailed to mailing address on file</li> <li>Limitations on who can return an absentee ballot</li> <li>Limitation on how an absentee ballot can be returned</li> <li> voter signature required</li> </ul>	County Board	4, 11	1, 6
<b>D500 Flash Drive</b>	Removable data storage device used to receive data from the D500 scanner.	Electronic	From the time data is downloaded to the drive from the D500 to the time the drive is cleared. Data from flash drive is saved with all election data from the election for at least 22 months.	Stored in county facilities.	None.	<p><b>Access Control</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li> voter reviews and verifies ballot for accuracy before casting</li> <li>Hand-count audits of voter-verified paper ballots</li> <li> voter reviews and verifies ballot for accuracy before casting</li> <li>Hand-count audits of voter-verified paper ballots</li> <li>Ballot reconstitutions of ballots provided, ballots not used, ballots scanned and voters processed</li> <li>Specific paper design &amp; quality necessary to permit scanning</li> <li>Ballot contains timing marks specific to election allowing ballot to be scanned by scanner</li> <li>Ballot box is locked and sealed</li> <li>Emergency/Provisional compartment is locked with security seals on access door</li> <li>Any additional ballot boxes are locked and sealed while in use and during transport to county office.</li> <li>Ballots stored in county office behind two locks</li> <li>Access to storage restricted</li> <li>Access log for storage area</li> <li>Public observation of testing, opening of BREs, ballot duplication, and scanning of ballots</li> <li> voter must apply for military and overseas voter designation</li> <li>Conditions on who can request an application</li> <li>Ballots mailed to mailing address on file</li> <li>Limitations on who can return an absentee ballot</li> <li>Limitation on how an absentee ballot can be returned</li> <li> voter signature required</li> </ul>	County Board	4, 11	1, 6
<b>D500 Results Reports</b>	Printed results report printed from the D500 scanner.	Hard Copy	From time of printing through at least 22 months following the date of the election	Stored in county facilities.	None.	<p><b>Access Control</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li> voter reviews and verifies ballot for accuracy before casting</li> <li>Hand-count audits of voter-verified paper ballots</li> <li> voter reviews and verifies ballot for accuracy before casting</li> <li>Hand-count audits of voter-verified paper ballots</li> <li>Ballot reconstitutions of ballots provided, ballots not used, ballots scanned and voters processed</li> <li>Specific paper design &amp; quality necessary to permit scanning</li> <li>Ballot contains timing marks specific to election allowing ballot to be scanned by scanner</li> <li>Ballot box is locked and sealed</li> <li>Emergency/Provisional compartment is locked with security seals on access door</li> <li>Any additional ballot boxes are locked and sealed while in use and during transport to county office.</li> <li>Ballots stored in county office behind two locks</li> <li>Access to storage restricted</li> <li>Access log for storage area</li> <li>Public observation of testing, opening of BREs, ballot duplication, and scanning of ballots</li> <li> voter must apply for military and overseas voter designation</li> <li>Conditions on who can request an application</li> <li>Ballots mailed to mailing address on file</li> <li>Limitations on who can return an absentee ballot</li> <li>Limitation on how an absentee ballot can be returned</li> <li> voter signature required</li> </ul>	County Board	4, 11	1, 6

<b>OSDS Scanner</b>	Used to centrally count machine absentee ballots and provisional ballots at county offices in larger jurisdictions.	Electronic	Votes stored on internal drive. From the time a ballot is scanned through the time the internal drive is cleared.	Stored in county facilities.	None. See information letter in response to item 9 regarding the capacity for internet connectivity of OSDS scanners deployed in other states.	SEC Certification No Internet Connectivity Large and accurate tests performed before every election to ensure ballots are tabulating correctly Will only accept coded flash drives Password protected dependent on user role Clear review and verify printed ballot for accuracy before casting Hand-count audits of voter-verified paper ballots Scanner will only accept ballot cards and hand-marked ballots prepared for the specific election Policy restricts access to only approved county and SEC staff Stored behind two locks in county office Access to storage restricted Access log for storage area Only accepts paper of specific design & quality Internal drive not easily accessible locks on flash drive door Public observation of hardware reviewer of data and reviewer of ballots	County Board	4-11	1.6
<b>OSDS Flash Drive</b>	Removable data storage device on the OSDS scanner.	Electronic	From the time data is downloaded to the drive from the OSDS to the time the drive is cleared. Data from flash drive is saved with all electronic data from the election for at least 22 months.	Stored in county facilities.	None.	SEC Certification Large and accurate tests performed before every election to ensure ballots are tabulating correctly Results on flash drive compared against results on OSDS paper tapes Flash drive to computer with internet connectivity is banned by policy Data on flash drive is specifically coded and structured to be accepted by the system for a specific election Policy restricts access to only approved county and SEC staff Stored behind two locks in county office Access to storage restricted Access log for storage area Flash drive door on scanner locked Public observation of clearing of polls, return of equipment, vote tabulation	County Board	4-11	1.6
<b>OSDS Results Reports</b>	Printed results report generated from the OSDS scanner.	Hard Copy	From time of printing through at least 22 months following the date of the election.	Stored in county facilities.	None.	SEC Certification Hand-count audits results compared against reports Public observation of clearing of polls, reviewer of results reports	County Board	4-11	1.6
<b>Electroware Computer</b>	Central vote tabulation computer in county office.	Electronic	From time of reading OSDS, OSDS or OSDS Ball Drive until deleted. Data is backed up on Electroware computer or Electroware backup hard drives for at least 22 months.	Stored in county facilities.	None.	SEC Certification Owned, provided, installed and managed by SEC County has no access to admin side, cannot load software or make changes to settings or configuration Configured according to NIST cybersecurity standards Modems are hardware and software disabled Modems ports are plugged Contains no wireless modems Computer chassis locked to prevent access Password protected based on user role Configuration reviewed, assessed and approved by third-party cybersecurity vendor Policy restricts access to computer to only approved county and SEC staff Stored behind two locks in county office Access to storage restricted Access log for storage area	County Board	4-9, 11	1.6
<b>Electroware Printer</b>	Used to print results reports.	Electronic	Only while in use.	Stored in county facilities.	This capacity is handled by the Electroware Computer Is connected to Internet but is banned by policy.	Contains no wireless modems Policy restricts access to printer to only approved county and SEC staff Stored behind two locks in county office Access to storage restricted Access log for storage area	County Board	4-9	1.6
<b>Electroware Flash Drive</b>	Flash drive used to move data from Electroware Computer to Secure Endpoint Computer	Electronic	From time of export to drive until deleted.	Stored in county facilities.	None.	Owned and approved by SEC Only flash drive approved by policy for moving data to and from Electroware Computer Data is encrypted at rest and in transit until decrypted Flash drive is password protected Results on flash drive compared against results on OSDS paper tapes Flash drive in any computer other than the Electroware Computer or Secure Endpoint Computer is banned by policy Policy restricts access to only approved county and SEC staff Stored behind two locks in county office Access to storage restricted Access log for storage area	County Board	4-9, 11	1.6
<b>Secure Endpoint Computer</b>	Computer used to upload results to Election Night Results Reporting web (ENR)	Electronic	From time of accessing the data on the Electroware Flash Drive until deleted.	Stored in county facilities.	Connected to internet.	Owned, provided, installed and managed by SEC County has no access to admin side, cannot load software or make changes to settings or configuration Configured to Google enterprise security standards Wireless modems administratively disabled in computer settings Cannot connect only to an approved, white-listed site determined by SEC Password protected based on user role Configuration reviewed, assessed and approved by SEC Department of Administration Division of Technology Operations and Division of Information Security Configuration reviewed, assessed and approved by third-party cybersecurity vendor Policy restricts access to computer to only approved county and SEC staff Stored behind two locks in county office Access to storage restricted Access log for storage area	County Board	4-9	1.6
<b>Electroware Results Reports</b>	Results reports produced from Electroware Computer.	Hard copy & Electronic	From time report is produced until at least 22 months following election.	Stored in county facilities.	None.	SEC Certification Hand-count audits results compared against reports Reports compared against scanner results tapes and reports Public observation of clearing of polls, reviewer of results reports	County Board	4-9, 11	1.6
<b>Election Night Results Reporting Website (ENR)</b>	Online results reporting site provided by SEC used in all state-level elections.	Electronic	From time results data is uploaded by county until at least 22 months following election. Content persists to retain data on site indefinitely.	Data on vendor servers.	Connected to internet.	Password protected based on user role Access requires multi-factor authentication Servers secured by vendor Site results compared and verified against Election Night Results Reports and County Certification Documentation	SEC	4, 9, 11	1.6
<b>County Certification Documentation</b>	Includes census sheets signed by members of county boards of voter registration and elections and Electroware Results Reports showing the final, official results of an election.	Hard copy	From time of certification, retained permanently.	Stored in county facilities. In some cases, transferred to S.C. Department of Archives and History.	None.	Hand-count audits to confirm scanner results Searches confirm county director has completed all steps in connecting checklist All ballots cast recorded Results compared against scanner results tapes and reports Certified in public meeting	County Board	4, 9, 11	1.6
<b>SEC Certification Documentation</b>	Official documents signed by members of the SEC showing the official, certified results of an election.	Hard copy	From time of certification, retained permanently.	Stored at SEC. In some cases, transferred to S.C. Department of Archives and History.	None.	SEC verifies all results reported by counties SEC verifies hand-count audit process complete by counties SEC verifies County Certification Documentation matches Election Night Results Reporting website Certified in public meeting	SEC	4, 9-9	SEC ensure county certified results match SEC certified results
<b>Electroware Backup Hard Drives</b>	Used to store backups of the election database after certification of the election.	Electronic	From time backup until at least 22 months following election.	Stored in county facilities.	None.	Connecting to any other computer than the Electroware Computer is banned by policy Policy restricts access to only approved county and SEC staff Stored behind two locks in county office Access to storage restricted Access log for storage area	County Board	4-7	1.6

	<b>Agency Policy Documents</b>	<b>Most Recent Update</b>
<b>1</b>	Poll Manager's Handbook	October 2021
<b>2</b>	BMD & Scanner Open & Close Guides	January 2020
<b>3</b>	Polling Location Technician Guide	October 2021
<b>4</b>	Election Preparation and Results Accumulation Guide	September 2020
<b>5</b>	Election Definition Guide	February 2021
<b>6</b>	Election Security Plan	October 2021
<b>7</b>	Voter Registration and Elections Handbook	April 2019
<b>8</b>	Hand Count Audit Procedure	November 2020
<b>9</b>	Ballot Reconciliation Procedure	October 2020
<b>10</b>	Ballot Duplication Prodedure	November 2019
<b>11</b>	Canvass Checklist	October 2019
<b>12</b>	UOCAVA Absentee Voting Guide	September 2008

<b>Agency Accountability Measures</b>	
<b>1</b>	Hand-Count Audits
<b>2</b>	Field Audits
<b>3</b>	Site Visits
<b>4</b>	Physical Security Assessments
<b>5</b>	Integra Eleciton Security Assessments (in development)
<b>6</b>	Ad Hoc Inquiries & Assessments

<b>Date</b>	<b>Review, Audit or Postelection Analysis</b>	<b>Purpose</b>	<b>Public Access Method</b>
2017	County Compliance Audits	Review of documentation of administration, policies and procedures for county offices and boards. Review of compliance with Training and Certification Program.	Upon request
2017	Voting System Audits of Various Local General Elections and State and Local Special Elections.	To ensure accuracy of certified results. SEC collected and analyzed data from voting system to determine if every vote was counted accurately and completely.	scVOTES.gov
2018	Physical Security Audits of County Facilities - Partnership with U.S. Department of Homeland Security	Assess and make recommendations regarding physical security of county facilities, particularly as it relates to voting system security.	Not a public record
2018	Statewide Voting System Audit of the June Primaries & Runoffs	To ensure accuracy of certified results. SEC collected and analyzed data from voting system to determine if every vote was counted accurately and completely.	scVOTES.gov
2018	Statewide Voting System Audit of General Election	To ensure accuracy of certified results. SEC collected and analyzed data from voting system to determine if every vote was counted accurately and completely.	scVOTES.gov
2018	Voting System Audits of Various Local General Elections and State and Local Special Elections.	To ensure accuracy of certified results. SEC collected and analyzed data from voting system to determine if every vote was counted accurately and completely.	scVOTES.gov
2019	Voting System Audits of Various Local General Elections and State and Local Special Elections.	To ensure accuracy of certified results. SEC collected and analyzed data from voting system to determine if every vote was counted accurately and completely.	scVOTES.gov
2020	Hand count voting system audit of 2020 Presidential Preference Primary	To ensure accuracy of certified results. SEC required county boards to hand count ballots from a variety of precincts to verify the scanner-tabulated results matched the voter-verified ballots. County boards reported results to SEC.	Upon request
2020	Hand count voting system audit of 2020 June Primaries and Runoffs	To ensure accuracy of certified results. SEC required county boards to hand count ballots from a variety of precincts to verify the scanner-tabulated results matched the voter-verified ballots. County boards reported results to SEC.	Upon request
2020	Hand count voting system audit of 2020 General Election	To ensure accuracy of certified results. SEC required county boards to hand count ballots from a variety of precincts to verify the scanner-tabulated results matched the voter-verified ballots. County boards reported results to SEC.	Upon request
2021	Physical Security Audits of County Facilities - Partnership with U.S. Department of Homeland Security	Assess and make recommendations regarding physical security of county facilities, particularly as it relates to voting system security.	Not a public record