Journal of the Senate
of the First Session of the 111th General Assembly
of the State of South Carolina
being the Regular Session Beginning Tuesday, January 10, 1995

Page Finder Index

| Printed Page 3060, May 23 | Printed Page 3080, May 23 |

Printed Page 3070 . . . . . Tuesday, May 23, 1995

Judge Watson served in the United States Air Force from 1958- 1962.
(9) Ethics:
Judge Watson testified that he has not:
(a) sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b) sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator pending the outcome of screening; or
(c) asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
(10) Miscellaneous:
Judge Watson meets the constitutional and statutory requirements for the office he seeks.
The Bar found Judge Watson qualified and said:
He has an admirable record of more than twenty years as a Family Court judge.
He is courteous and respectful to lawyers, litigants, and witnesses.
Judge Watson works hard, is punctual and is prompt in making decisions.
He is considered to be fair-minded and patient. He has excellent judicial temperament.

H. Bruce Williams, Esquire

Candidate for the Family Court of the 5th Judicial Circuit

Joint Committee's Finding: Qualified

Mr. Williams was screened on May 9, 1995, after a thorough investigation. The Joint Committee's findings as they relate to the nine evaluative criteria are as follows:
(1) Integrity and Impartiality:
Mr. Williams demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges.
Mr. Williams is employed by Americall Corporation as an agent to sell long- distance service. He indicated that he is associated with other lawyers through Americall and that he would resolve any potential conflict of interest with these attorneys by resigning from Americall.
(2) Legal Knowledge and Ability:
The Joint Committee found Mr. Williams to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Joint Committee's practice and procedure questions exceeded expectations.
Mr. Williams' Martindale-Hubbell rating is BV.
Mr. Williams was named as a defendant creditor in a foreclosure action because of a family court order awarding him attorney's fees to be paid by defendant/debtor.


Printed Page 3071 . . . . . Tuesday, May 23, 1995

(3)Professional Experience:
Mr. Williams describes his practice since graduation from law school in 1982 as a general practice of law with a primary emphasis on family law and personal injury law. Mr. Williams has been a part-time municipal judge for the City of Irmo since 1991.
Mr. Williams estimated that he appears in federal court infrequently and in state court weekly. He said that his state court appearances are primarily in Family Court.
Mr. Williams estimated that his practice over the last five years has been 35% civil, 5% criminal, and 60% domestic.
Mr. Williams provided the Joint Committee with a list of five of his most significant matters. He described those matter as follows:

(a) Melvin v. Melvin: Long-term marriage involving issues of contested divorce and equitable distribution including military retirement.

(b) Inman v. Inman: A custody case involving a mother who moved out of state. The mother retained custody, but she had to return to South Carolina.

(c) Oswald v. Oswald: A contested domestic action involving child support, visitation, equitable distribution, and attorney's fees. This case was significant in that it involved domestic issues and private domestic actions.

(d) Jackson v. Jackson: A domestic case tried for mother, seeking custody and visitation, who had in prior years given up custody and visitation with her children. Custody was obtained for the mother.
(e) Bullard v. Ehrhardt: This case established the duty of a store owner to invitees for the criminal actions of third parties in negligence actions.
Mr. Williams provided the Joint Committee with a list of four civil appeals he has handled. Three of the appeals listed appear to have been domestic matters and one was the Bullard v. Ehrhardt matter discussed above.
(4) Judicial Temperament:
The Joint Committee believes that Mr. Williams' temperament would be excellent.
(5) Diligence and Industry:
Mr. Williams was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Joint Committee, and the Joint Committee's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
Mr. Williams is married with children, ages 7 and 3.


Printed Page 3072 . . . . . Tuesday, May 23, 1995

(6)Mental and Physical Capabilities:
Mr. Williams appears to be mentally and physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7) Financial Responsibility:
The Joint Committee's investigation did not reveal any evidence of a troubled financial status. Mr. Williams has managed his financial affairs responsibly.
(8) Public Service:
Mr. Williams ran unsuccessfully for the Family Court in 1994.
Mr. Williams is active in professional and civic activities.
(9) Ethics:
Mr. Williams was employed as a lobbyist in 1990 by the S.C. Society of Opthamologists and the S.C. Funeral Director's Association.
Mr. Williams reported on his application materials that his campaign expenditures have totaled $82.56.
Mr. Williams testified that he has not:
(a) sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b) sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator pending the outcome of screening; or
(c) asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
(10) Miscellaneous:
Mr. Williams meets the constitutional and statutory requirements for the office he seeks.
The Bar found Mr. Williams qualified and said:
His practice is primarily in family law, and he is perceived to be competent in the area.
He presently serves as a city judge and has an excellent reputation for that service.
Judge Williams is considered courteous, truthful, conscientious, and diligent. It is believed he would have excellent temperament on the Family Court bench.
He is perceived to be fair and impartial on the bench.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/Senator Glenn F. McConnell, Chairman

/s/Rep. F. Greg Delleney, Jr., Vice-Chairman

/s/Senator Edward E. Saleeby

/s/Senator Thomas L. Moore

/s/Senator John R. Russell

/s/Rep. Paula H. Thomas


Printed Page 3073 . . . . . Tuesday, May 23, 1995

/s/Rep. Ralph W. Canty

/s/Rep. W. Douglas Smith

The Honorable William K. Charles, Jr.

Candidate for Re-election to the Family Court

of the 8th Judicial Circuit

Joint Committee's Finding: Four members voted to find Judge Charles qualified and four members voted to find Judge Charles not qualified.

Judge Charles was screened on May 11, 1995, after a thorough investigation. The Joint Committee's findings as they relate to the nine evaluative criteria are as follows:
(1) Integrity and Impartiality:

See the attached reports of the majority and minority.
(2) Legal Knowledge and Ability:
The Joint Committee found Judge Charles to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Joint Committee's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Judge Charles has been appealed in 5 reported appellate decisions and was reversed, in whole or in part, in 2 of those matters.
(3) Professional Experience:
Judge Charles was admitted to the Bar in 1949.
Judge Charles practiced with the firm of Charles & Charles from 1949 to 1971. He was engaged in the general practice of law, particularly civil, criminal, tort, and real estate law. Judge Charles was the city attorney for the City of Greenwood from 1961 to 1983. From 1971 to 1975, Judge Charles was a sole practitioner engaged in the practice of civil, criminal, real estate, and family law. Judge Charles practiced with the firm of Charles, Charles & Scurry from 1975 to 1983. He was elected to the Family Court bench in 1983.
(4) Judicial Temperament:
The Joint Committee believes that Judge Charles' temperament would be excellent.
(5) Diligence and Industry:
Judge Charles was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Joint Committee, and the Joint Committee's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
Judge Charles is married with 3 adult children.
(6) Mental and Physical Capabilities:
Judge Charles appears to be mentally and physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.


Printed Page 3074 . . . . . Tuesday, May 23, 1995

(7)Financial Responsibility:
The Joint Committee's investigation did not reveal any evidence of a troubled financial status. Judge Charles has managed his financial affairs responsibly.
(8) Public Service:
Judge Charles has been a member of the Family Court since 1984.
Judge Charles was a member of the United States Marine Corps from 1943 to 1946.
(9) Ethics:
Judge Charles testified that he has not:
(a) sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b) sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator pending the outcome of screening; or
(c) asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
(10) Miscellaneous:
Judge Charles meets the constitutional and statutory requirements for the office he seeks.
Judge Charles has been sued twice. The first matter was in 1984, Brown v. Charles, and was an action for reimbursement of expenses paid by the City of Greenwood on his behalf as city attorney. Judge Charles incurred the expenses in meetings of the S.C. Municipal Association and other related city activities. The suit was dismissed with prejudice. Judge Charles indicated that the plaintiff had a history of filing law suits against public officials, and the court admonished him on the record for bringing this and other frivolous actions.
The second action was 1990, Potts v. C. Price, Clerk of Family Court and the Chief Judge of Family Court, and was an action which in which the plaintiff contended that she was denied due process in that the defendant failed to file her summons and complaint for a divorce. Judge Charles had made a determination that the Family Court did not have jurisdiction, that the plaintiff had not been a resident of S.C. for the required period. He had instructed the Clerk to write the plaintiff and inform her of the jurisdictional problem and return her filing fee. This matter was dismissed on motion for summary judgment.
The Bar found Judge Charles qualified and said:
He has considerable experience in the judicial system having served as Family Court judge for approximately twelve years.
He is respected by an overwhelming majority of the members of the Bar contacted for his legal skills, impartiality, judicial temperament, and promptness and industry in his work.

Printed Page 3075 . . . . . Tuesday, May 23, 1995

Lawyers practicing before Judge Charles felt he ran an efficient court and was described by many as a no-nonsense judge.
His character, integrity, and reputation are considered excellent.

The Honorable William K. Charles, Jr.

Candidate for Re-election to the Family Court

of the 8th Judicial Circuit

Report of Members Voting to Find Judge Charles Not Qualified

The Joint Committee was contacted by a witness who wished to testify in opposition to Judge Charles' re-election. A Joint Committee staff person contacted Judge Charles as per the Joint Committee's rules to inform him of the witness' desire to testify against him. Judge Charles then contacted the witness' attorney whom he knew would discourage her from testifying. In his testimony before the Joint Committee, Judge Charles admitted contacting the witness' attorney and did not appear to believe that his conduct was improper.

We believe that Judge Charles' conduct was inexcusable. Judge Charles attempted to protect himself by intimidating a witness. Such behavior is repugnant, particularly when the conduct is by a member of the judiciary. Judge Charles admitted on the record that he contacted the witness' attorney and said "It's my decision when my neck's on the line." We believe that this matter is of such a serious nature that we cannot in good conscience find Judge Charles qualified for further service on the bench.

The judicial screening process depends on witnesses being able to appear before the Joint Committee without fear of reprisal or intimidation or being subject to chilling influences. Interference with witnesses strikes at the heart of this process, and judges should be held to the highest standards in this regard.

VOTING AGAINST CANDIDATE:
/s/Senator Glenn F. McConnell, Chairman
/s/Senator John R. Russell
/s/Rep. F. Greg Delleney, Jr., Vice-Chairman
/s/Rep. W. Douglas Smith


Printed Page 3076 . . . . . Tuesday, May 23, 1995

The Honorable William K. Charles, Jr.

Candidate for Re-election to the Family Court

of the 8th Judicial Circuit

Report of Members Voting to Find Judge Charles Qualified

Judge Charles has had a long record of service on the bench and has served with distinction. Judge Charles may have acted improperly in contacting the witness' attorney, but he was honest and forthright about having made the contact and this was one isolated incident which should not disqualify him from further service on the bench.

VOTING IN SUPPORT OF CANDIDATE:
/s/Senator Edward E. Saleeby
/s/Senator Thomas L. Moore
/s/Rep. Paula H. Thomas
/s/Rep. Ralph W. Canty

The Honorable Abigail Rogers
Candidate for Re-election to the Family Court
of the 5th Judicial Circuit
Report of the Majority

Joint Committee's Finding: Not Qualified

Judge Rogers was screened on May 11, 12, and 16, 1995, after a thorough investigation. The majority's findings as they relate to the nine evaluative criteria are as follows:
(1) Integrity and Impartiality:
The input the Joint Committee received from the public and from members of the Bar was very divided. Some individuals reported that Judge Rogers' integrity and impartiality are excellent, but the Joint Committee received evidence that Judge Rogers is at times arrogant and attempts to intimidate people by using the power and prestige of her office.
The majority is particularly concerned by evidence of a situation in which Judge Rogers attempted to use her judicial office to intimidate her former secretary. The majority believes that Judge Rogers threatened to issue a bench warrant for the arrest of her former secretary after the secretary took another job. The majority is aware of inconsistencies in the testimony on this issue, particularly with respect to when telephone calls were made, how many telephone calls were made, and whether the secretary had given Judge Rogers notice of her intent to resign, but the majority believes that these inconsistencies were not material and actually help to corroborate the secretary and her


Printed Page 3077 . . . . . Tuesday, May 23, 1995

employer because they tend to indicate that the witnesses had not rehearsed their testimony. The secretary and her employer were subpoenaed late at night to immediately appear before the Joint Committee, had not previously contacted the Joint Committee, and reluctantly testified. Their testimony was corroborated by a family court judge and several other witnesses who appeared only after being subpoenaed. For these and other reasons, the majority believes that Judge Rogers threatened to issue a bench warrant for the secretary's arrest and was not truthful about this issue in her testimony under oath before the Joint Committee. The majority believes that they cannot, in view of the evidence, find a judge who abused her power and did not tell the truth under oath to the General Assembly's screening committee qualified for further service on the bench.
The majority was also very troubled by testimony that Judge Rogers issued an invalid subpoena to Southern Bell and then attempted to intimidate a Southern Bell employee into complying with the subpoena. Southern Bell's custodian of records testified that she was served with a subpoena duces tecum which Judge Rogers had signed and which attempted to compel her to produce the records of incoming local telephone calls to Judge Rogers' residence. The custodian of records contacted Judge Rogers about the subpoena because she believed it to be invalid. The custodian of records testified that Judge Rogers' tone was harsh and that Judge Rogers used her judicial office in an attempt to intimidate the custodian of records into complying with an invalid subpoena. Judge Rogers admitted issuing the subpoena, but said she did so at the suggestion of a Southern Bell employee whom she could not name. Judge Rogers denied attempting to intimidate the custodian of records. The majority is troubled by this incident because it believes that Judge Rogers abused her judicial power by issuing the subpoena and, most importantly, by attempting to intimidate the custodian of records.
(2) Legal Knowledge and Ability:
The majority believes that Judge Rogers is intelligent and knowledgeable. Her performance on the Joint Committee's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Judge Rogers' record on appeal since her election in 1991 has been good as she has been appealed in two reported appellate decisions and was affirmed in both of those matters. She was, however, reversed in several unreported appellate decisions. These matters concern the majority as they dealt with situations in which the appellate court believed that Judge Rogers improperly incarcerated juveniles. In June
Printed Page 3078 . . . . . Tuesday, May 23, 1995

of 1992 the Supreme Court granted a habeas corpus petition in the matter of In re Christopher B. in part because Judge Rogers had ordered a 17-year old confined to DYS custody for a status offense. In this matter the status offense was truancy and the minor had been charged with only one such offense. In March of 1993, Judge Rogers' order in In re Stacey R. incarcerating a 15-year old female for incorrigibility was vacated by a per curiam order of the Supreme Court. The court stated that it must "again remind family court judges that mere status offenders are not to be placed in detention facilities." In April of 1994 in In re Beatrice N., the Supreme Court issued another per curiam order reversing Judge Rogers' detention of a 15 year old female for a status offense, this time for the offenses of incorrigibility and truancy. The majority understand that judges make mistakes of law and are reversed from time-to-time, but the majority is troubled that Judge Rogers has been repeatedly reversed on the very important issue of when juveniles are to be incarcerated.
(3) Professional Experience:
Judge Rogers was admitted to the Bar in 1983. She described her legal experience as follows:
(a) 1982-1985 Fifth Circuit Assistant Solicitor. Tried cases in both Family and General Sessions Court.
(b) 1985-1991 Assistant Chief counsel, S.C. Highway Department. Judge Rogers did some criminal work, but the main focus of her practice was in civil litigation, workers' compensation, and appellate practice.
(c) 1991-Present Family Court Judge, Fifth Judicial Circuit
Judge Rogers had little family court experience prior to her election to the bench in 1991. She testified that she attempted to compensate for that lack of experience by studying the law and attending CLE forums.
(4) Judicial Temperament:
The majority believes that Judge Rogers is capable of exhibiting good judicial temperament and often does so. The majority also believes, however, that Judge Rogers tends to lose her temper and sometimes treats individuals who appear before her very poorly. The majority believes that judges should be stern and that it is often appropriate for a family court judge to be firm with litigants and lawyers in the courtroom. However, the majority believes that Judge Rogers' demeanor can be imperious instead of merely stern.

Printed Page 3079 . . . . . Tuesday, May 23, 1995

(5)Diligence and Industry:
Judge Rogers testified that she was late and had to take frequent breaks during the period in which she was pregnant and nursing her child. Others, including courtroom personnel, litigants, lawyers, family court judges, and witnesses who testified on Judge Rogers' behalf, testified that she was frequently very late in the morning and returning from lunch and from breaks. The majority is not persuaded by the excuses Judge Rogers offered for her tardiness. The majority also believes, on the basis of testimony from a retired family court judge and other evidence, that the problem was not confined strictly to that time period during which Judge Rogers was pregnant and nursing. The majority views such problems of punctuality as very serious because they demonstrate a lack of respect for litigants, lawyers, and other courtroom participants.
The majority is also very concerned about evidence that Judge Rogers does not pay attention to affidavits and other documents she is to consider. The majority was moved by the testimony of one father who appeared before Judge Rogers in a custody matter. The father and his attorney testified that they submitted affidavits for Judge Rogers to consider, but the lengthy affidavits were clocked-in at 8:59 a.m. and the hearing began at 9:00 a.m. Judge Rogers testified that she had read the affidavits, but was concerned that the father did not understand that she had done so. Judge Rogers testified that she learned from this incident and would be more careful to ensure that litigants understood she had read their materials. The majority appreciates Judge Rogers' testimony on this issue, but is not convinced that Judge Rogers could have read the affidavits under the circumstances of this case. Furthermore, there was also testimony about another matter in which Judge Rogers asked a couple if they could be reconciled when they had been divorced for many years. The majority believes that Judge Rogers' failure to read materials presented for her consideration is further evidence of her lack of respect for litigants and lawyers and a very serious failure in her performance on the bench.
In the early period of Judge Rogers' service on the bench, she was slow in the production of orders and in one situation did not report all the matters she had under advisement to Court Administration as judges are required to do. The majority is troubled by Judge Rogers' problems in this regard, but believes that she has improved in this area.
(6) Mental and Physical Capabilities:
Judge Rogers appears to be mentally and physically capable of performing the duties of the office she seeks.


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