South Carolina General Assembly
116th Session, 2005-2006

Download This Bill in Microsoft Word format

Indicates Matter Stricken
Indicates New Matter

H. 4310

STATUS INFORMATION

General Bill
Sponsors: Reps. F.N. Smith, Clark, Altman, Vaughn, Loftis, Kirsh and Moody-Lawrence
Document Path: l:\council\bills\bbm\9049mm06.doc

Introduced in the House on January 10, 2006
Currently residing in the House Committee on Judiciary

Summary: Protection of Private Property Act

HISTORY OF LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS

     Date      Body   Action Description with journal page number
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  11/16/2005  House   Prefiled
  11/16/2005  House   Referred to Committee on Judiciary
   1/10/2006  House   Introduced and read first time HJ-26
   1/10/2006  House   Referred to Committee on Judiciary HJ-26

View the latest legislative information at the LPITS web site

VERSIONS OF THIS BILL

11/16/2005

(Text matches printed bills. Document has been reformatted to meet World Wide Web specifications.)

A BILL

TO AMEND THE CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, SO AS TO ENACT THE "SOUTH CAROLINA PROTECTION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY ACT" BY ADDING SECTION 28-2-65 PROVIDING FOR A LIMITATION ON CONDEMNATION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY TO A REQUIREMENT OF PUBLIC USE AND TO SPECIFICALLY DEFINE "PUBLIC USE" FOR THAT PURPOSE; TO AMEND SECTIONS 28-2-60 AND 28-2-210, BOTH RELATING TO A CONDEMNATION ACTION SO AS TO CONFORM THEM TO THE REQUIREMENT OF "PUBLIC USE" AS OPPOSED TO "PUBLIC PURPOSE".

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina:

SECTION    1.    This act may be cited as the "South Carolina Protection of Private Property Act".

SECTION    2.    The General Assembly finds:

(1)    The protection of property rights against government seizures and other unreasonable government interference is a fundamental principle and core commitment of the framers of the South Carolina Constitution;

(2)    Article I, Section 13 of the South Carolina Constitution states that "private property shall not be taken for private use without the consent of the owner, nor for public use without just compensation being first made therefore".

(3)    This constitutional provision thus provides an essential guarantee of liberty against the abuse of the power of eminent domain by permitting government to seize private property only "for public use".

(4)    On June 23, 2005, the United States Supreme Court issued a decision entitled Kelo v. City of New London, No. 04-108, holding that government may seize the home, small business, or other private property of one owner, and transfer that same property to another private owner, simply by concluding that such a transfer would benefit the community through increased economic development.

(5)    The court's decision in Kelo is alarming because, as Justice O'Connor accurately noted in her dissenting opinion, the court has "effectively . . . delete[d] the words 'for public use' from the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment" and thereby "refus[ed] to enforce properly the Federal Constitution".

(6)    Under the court's decision in Kelo, Justice O'Connor warns, "[t]he specter of condemnation hangs over all property. Nothing is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory".

(7)    In contrast to the decision in Kelo, the South Carolina Supreme Court has zealously enforced Article I, Section 13 of the South Carolina Constitution, noting the "restrictive view of the power of eminent domain expressed by the framers of our constitution and the courts of this State is indicative of a high regard for private property".

(8)    The court also has noted that the term "'public use' means just that and private property cannot be taken except for public use, without the consent of the owner" and that, contrary to the determination of the United States Supreme Court in Kelo, the terms "public benefit and public use are not synonymous".

(9)    Finally, as the United States Supreme Court noted in Kelo, "nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power".

(10)    To this end, the General Assembly wishes to enhance the current protections for private property by preserving the law of eminent domain as it currently is defined in South Carolina by the South Carolina Constitution and by various decisions of the South Carolina Supreme Court, including but not limited to Georgia Dep't of Trans. v. Jasper County, 355 S.C. 631, 586 S.E.2d 853 (2003); Goldberg v. City Council of the City of Charleston, 273 S.C. 140, 254 S.E.2d 803 (1979); Karesh v. City Council of the City of Charleston, 271 S.C. 339, 247 S.E.2d 342 (1978); Edens v. City of Columbia, 228 S.C. 563, 91 S.E.2d 280 (1956); Bookhart v. Central Electric Power Cooperative, 219 S.C. 414, 65 S.E.2d 781 (1951).

SECTION    3.    Chapter 2, Title 28 of the 1976 Code is amended by adding:

"Section 28-2-65.    (A)    Notwithstanding another provision of this chapter, a condemnor may not commence an action for the acquisition of an interest in real property unless the property is to be condemned for public use.

(B)    For purposes of this chapter, the term 'public use' is defined as a fixed, definite, and enforceable right of use by the public. The term requires possession, occupation, and enjoyment of the condemned property by the public at large or by public agencies.

(C)    The term 'public use' does not permit a condemnor to transfer or lease condemned property to a private person or entity, except as may be permitted by Article XIV, Section 5 of the South Carolina Constitution or by express delegation of the power of eminent domain to a corporation by statute."

SECTION    4.    Section 28-2-60 of the 1976 Code is amended to read:

"Section 28-2-60.    A condemnor may commence an action under pursuant to this chapter for the acquisition of an interest in any real property necessary for any a public purpose use. The provisions of this chapter shall constitute the exclusive procedure whereby for condemnation may be undertaken in this State."

SECTION    5.    Section 28-2-210 of the 1976 Code is amended to read:

"Section 28-2-210.    Any A condemnor may institute an action under pursuant to this chapter for the acquisition of an interest in any real property necessary for any a public purpose use, subject to the restrictions in Section 28-2-65. The provisions of this act constitute the exclusive procedure whereby for condemnation may be undertaken in this State."

SECTION    6.    This act takes effect upon approval by the Governor.

----XX----

This web page was last updated on Friday, December 4, 2009 at 3:48 P.M.