South Carolina General Assembly
114th Session, 2001-2002
Journal of the House of Representatives

Tuesday, May 8, 2001
(Statewide Session)

Indicates Matter Stricken
Indicates New Matter

The House assembled at 12:00 noon.
Deliberations were opened with prayer by Rep. COBB-HUNTER as follows:

God of our fathers and our God today, give us the ability to fulfill our high calling. Make us to cherish all that is good in our heritage and welcome all that is worthy in innovation. Help us to treasure the wisdom of the past but also be ready for new revelations for the future. Give to each of us resources sufficient for what needs to be done. Grant to each one the individuality that is creative, the discipline which sustains, the diversity which enriches and the unity of purpose that moves forward Your Kingdom on earth. To You, Lord, we give our praise and thanksgiving. Amen.

Pursuant to Rule 6.3, the House of Representatives was led in the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America by the SPEAKER.

After corrections to the Journal of the proceedings of Friday, the SPEAKER ordered it confirmed.

MOTION ADOPTED

Rep. J. M. NEAL moved that when the House adjourns, it adjourn in memory of former Representative Garrett Judson Mobley of Kershaw, which was agreed to.

SILENT PRAYER

The House stood in silent prayer for Representative Moody-Lawrence who is in the hospital due to a severe allergic reaction to medication.

REPORT RECEIVED

The following was received:

REPORT RECEIVED
JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION COMMISSION

TO:         The Clerk of the Senate

The Clerk of the House
FROM:     Glenn F. McConnell, Chairman

Judicial Merit Selection Commission
DATE:     May 8, 2001

In compliance with the provisions of Act No. 119, 1975 S.C. Acts 122, it is respectfully requested that the following information be printed in the Journals of the Senate and the House.

Respectfully submitted,
Senator Glenn F. McConnell, Chairman
Representative F.G. Delleney, Jr., Vice Chairman
Richard S. Fisher, Esquire
John P. Freeman, Esquire
Representative James G. McGee III
Mrs. Amy Johnson McLester
Senator Thomas L. Moore
Senator James H. Ritchie, Jr.
Judge Curtis G. Shaw
Representative Fletcher N. Smith, Jr.

Judicial Merit Selection Commission

Report of Candidate Qualifications
Date Draft Report Issued:     Tuesday, May 8, 2001
Date and Time
Final Report Issued:     Thursday, May 10, 2001, at 10:00 a.m.
Judicial candidates are not free to seek
or accept commitments until
Thursday, May 10, 2001
at 10:00 a.m.
INTRODUCTION

The Judicial Merit Selection Commission is charged by law to consider the qualifications of candidates for the judiciary. This report details the reasons for the Commission's findings, as well as each candidate's qualifications as they relate to the Commission's evaluative criteria. The Commission operates under the law which went into effect July 1, 1997, and which dramatically changed the powers and duties of the Commission. One component of this law is that the Commission's finding of "qualified" or "not qualified" is binding on the General Assembly. Furthermore, the Commission is required to submit no more than three names for any particular judicial race; therefore, for seats in which more than three candidates seek office, the Commission was required to pare the number of candidates presented for consideration by the General Assembly. The Commission is also cognizant of the need for members of the General Assembly to be able to differentiate between candidates and, therefore, has attempted to provide as detailed a report as possible.
The Judicial Merit Selection Commission is composed of ten members, four of whom are non-legislators. The Commission has continued the more in-depth screening format started in 1997. The Commission has asked candidates their views on issues peculiar to service on the court to which they seek election. These questions were posed in an effort to provide members of the General Assembly with more information about candidates and the candidates' thought processes on issues relevant to their candidacies. The Commission has also engaged in a more probing inquiry into the depth of a candidate's experience in areas of practice that are germane to the office he or she is seeking. The Commission feels that candidates should have familiarity with the subject matter of the courts for which they offer, and feels that candidates' responses should indicate their familiarity with most major areas of the law with which they will be confronted.
The Commission also used the Citizens Committees on Judicial Qualifications as an adjunct of the Commission. Since the decisions of our judiciary play such an important role in people's personal and professional lives, the Commission believes that all South Carolinians should have a voice in the selection of the state's judges. It was this desire for broad-based grassroots participation that led the Commission to create the Citizens Committees on Judicial Qualifications. These committees, composed of people from a broad range of experience (doctors, lawyers, teachers, businessmen, and advocates for varied organizations; members of these committees are also diverse in their racial and gender backgrounds), were asked to advise the Commission on the judicial candidates in their regions. Each regional committee interviewed the candidates from its assigned area and also interviewed other individuals in that region who were familiar with the candidate either personally or professionally. Based on those interviews and its own investigation, each committee provided the Commission with a report on their assigned candidates based on the Commission's evaluative criteria. The Commission then used these reports as a tool for further investigation of the candidate if the committee's report so warranted. Summaries of these reports have also been included in the Commission's report for your review.
The Commission conducts a thorough investigation of each candidate's professional, personal, and financial affairs, and holds public hearings during which each candidate is questioned on a wide variety of issues. The Commission's investigation focuses on the following evaluative criteria: constitutional qualifications; ethical fitness; professional and academic ability; character; reputation; physical health; mental health; and judicial temperament. The Commission's investigation includes the following:
(1)         survey of the bench and bar;
(2)         SLED and FBI investigation;
(3)         credit investigation;
(4)         grievance investigation;
(5)         study of application materials;
(6)         verification of ethics compliance;
(7)         search of newspaper articles;
(8)         conflict of interest investigation;
(9)         court schedule study;
(10)     study of appellate record;
(11)     court observation; and
(12)     investigation of complaints.

While the law provides that the Commission must make findings as to qualifications, the Commission views its role as also including an obligation to consider candidates in the context of the judiciary on which they would serve and, to some degree, govern. To that end, the Commission inquires as to the quality of justice delivered in the courtrooms of South Carolina and seeks to impart, through its questioning, the view of the public as to matters of legal knowledge and ability, judicial temperament, and the absoluteness of the Judicial Canons of Conduct as to recusal for conflict of interest, prohibition of ex parte communication, and the disallowance of the acceptance of gifts. However, the Commission is not a forum for reviewing the individual decisions of the state's judicial system absent credible allegations of a candidate's violations of the Judicial Canons of Conduct, the Rules of Professional Conduct, or any of the Commission's nine evaluative criteria that would impact on a candidate's fitness for judicial service.
The Commission expects each candidate to possess a basic level of legal knowledge and ability, to have experience that would be applicable to the office sought, and to exhibit a strong adherence to codes of ethical behavior. These expectations are all important, and excellence in one category does not make up for deficiencies in another.
Routine questions related to compliance with ethical Canons governing ethics and financial interests are now administered through a written questionnaire mailed to candidates and completed by them in advance of each candidate's staff interview. These issues are no longer automatically made a part of the public hearing process unless a concern or question was raised during the investigation of the candidate. The necessary public record of a candidate's pledge to uphold the canons, etc., is his completed and sworn questionnaire.
A written examination of each candidate's knowledge of judicial practice and procedure is given at the time of a candidate's interview with staff and graded on a "blind" basis by a panel of three persons designated by the Chairman. In assessing each candidate's performance on these practice and procedure questions, the Commission placed each candidate in either the "failed to meet expectations" or "met expectations" category. The Commission feels that these categories should accurately impart the candidate's performance on the practice and procedure questions.
Staff interviews were expanded to cover all issues related to candidate's qualification for election. The staff then prepared a memorandum on each candidate summarizing the results of staff interviews, highlighting any staff concerns, and providing the score results, bench/bar survey results, and a copy of the candidate's completed ethics questionnaire. This memorandum was forwarded (with all relevant candidate information) to Commission members in advance of the scheduled public hearing date.
This report is the culmination of weeks of investigatory work and public hearings. The Commission takes its responsibilities seriously as it believes that the quality of justice delivered in South Carolina's courtrooms is directly affected by the thoroughness of its screening process. Please carefully consider the contents of this report as we believe it will help you make a more informed decision.
This report conveys the Commission's findings as to the qualifications of all candidates currently offering for election to Circuit Court judgeships in the Ninth, Tenth, and Fifteenth Judicial Circuits.

C. Reuben Goude
Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Seat 1
Commission's Findings:     QUALIFIED AND NOMINATED

(1)     Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Mr. Reuben Goude meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as a Circuit Court judge.
Mr. Goude was born on April 17, 1950. He is 50 years old and a resident of Hemingway, South Carolina. Mr. Goude provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1979.
(2)     Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal evidence of unethical conduct by Mr. Goude.
Mr. Goude demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Mr. Goude reported that he has spent $1,505.00 in campaign expenditures.
Mr. Goude testified he has not:
(a)     sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)     sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)     asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Mr. Goude testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
(3)     Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Mr. Goude to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Mr. Goude described his continuing legal or judicial education during the past five years as follows:
"attended more than mandatory hours of CLE."
Mr. Goude reported that he has taught the following law-related courses:
"paralegal and criminal justice courses at Georgetown, S.C., branch of Horry-Georgetown TEC, for a couple of years."
Mr. Goude reported that he has not published any books and/or articles.
(4)     Character:
The Commission's investigation of Mr. Goude did not reveal evidence of founded grievances made against him. The Commission's investigation of Mr. Goude did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Mr. Goude has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Mr. Goude was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5)     Reputation:
Mr. Goude reported that he was not aware of his Martindale-Hubbell rating. His rating is "CV."
Mr. Goude reported that he had served in the military in the following capacities:
"USMC, 1968-1972, Sgt., Honorable Discharge.
USAF, 1980-1983, Capt., Judge Advocate General Office, Honorable Discharge."
(6)     Physical Health:
Mr. Goude appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7)     Mental Stability:
Mr. Goude appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8)     Experience:
Mr. Goude was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1979.
Mr. Goude provided the following as his legal experience since graduation from law school:
"(a)     1980-1983, Judge Advocate in USAF, was prosecutor and defense attorney in court-martial cases; also was a claims officer, reviewed contracts, advised personnel on private civil matters such as divorces, wills, etc.
(b)     1984-present, private attorney, solo practice, large practice of divorces, bankruptcies, injuries, wills, adoptions, real estate.
(c)     1984-present, public defender in Georgetown County, S.C., represent all types of General Sessions, and Juvenile Court offenses, from murder to shoplifting."
Mr. Goude reported the frequency of his court appearances during the last five years as follows:
"(a)     Federal:     bankruptcy court, 2-3 times per month
(b)     State:         in general sessions court about one week per month. In common pleas court, once each couple of months or so."
Mr. Goude reported that the percentage of his practice involving civil, criminal, and domestic matters during the last five years as follows:
"(a)     Civil:         25%
(b)     Criminal:     50%
(c)     Domestic:     25%"
Mr. Goude reported the percentage of his practice in trial court during the last five years as follows:
"(a)     Jury:         10%
(b)     Non-jury:     90%"
Mr. Goude provided that he most often served as sole counsel.
The following is Mr. Goude's account of his five most significant litigated matters:
"(a)     Presently defense counsel in murder case, representing defendant charged with murder of 2 year old boy. Significance is penalty client faces, and amount of preparation involved.
(b)     In 2000, represented a defendant in a murder case, trial lasted about 3 days, significant for penalty client faced, and amount of preparation involved.
(c)     In 2000, represented client, elderly lady, in medical malpractice case against hospital involving client falling and breaking leg in hospital room. Significant for extent of injuries, amount of preparation involved, and my willingness to work for client and take the case all the way through trial.
(d)     In 1999, represented wife in family court contested trial. We offered to settle case. Husband would not settle. We tried the case. We won larger award at trial than we had offered to settle for. Husband now appeals case. Appeals hearing before Court of Appeals is in March 2001. Significance was amount of work I put in, and fact that husband is on his 4th lawyer now, and I'm still the sole lawyer for my client.
(e)     Years ago, represented defendant in murder trial. Trial resulted in not guilty verdict for my client. Significant for penalty client faced, amount of preparation involved, trial lasted about 3 days, and the good work I did in case, and good not guilty result."
The following is Mr. Goude's account of civil appeals he has personally handled:
"I have appealed or defended a couple of family court appeals, and one or so workers compensation appeals to circuit court. I do not do a lot of civil court appeals."
Mr. Goude reported that he had never held a judicial position.
(9)     Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Mr. Goude's temperament would be excellent.
(10)     Miscellaneous:
The Pee Dee Citizens Committee reported that "the committee is of the opinion that Mr. Goude is qualified for the position of circuit court judge and recommends and approves this candidate."
Mr. Goude is not married. He does not have any children.
Mr. Goude reported that he was a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
"(a)     S.C. Bar;
(b)     Georgetown County Bar;
(c)     off and on I join and quit the ATLA and the SCTLA."
Mr. Goude provided that he was a member of the following civic, charitable, education, social, or fraternal organizations:
"(a)     Mount Zion Baptist Church, Hemingway, S.C.
(b)     Georgetown Breakfast Rotary Club, Georgetown, S.C."

Deadra L. Jefferson
Circuit Court for the Ninth Judicial Circuit, Seat 1
Commission's Findings:     QUALIFIED AND NOMINATED

(1)     Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Judge Jefferson meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as a Circuit Court judge.
Judge Jefferson was born on October 13, 1963. She is 37 years old and a resident of Charleston, South Carolina. Judge Jefferson provided in her application that she has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1989.
(2)     Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Judge Jefferson.
Judge Jefferson demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Judge Jefferson reported, "I have spent approximately $100.00 dollars to date on stationary, envelopes, postage and copy costs."
Judge Jefferson testified she has not:
(a)     sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)     sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)     asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Judge Jefferson testified that she is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
The Commission did receive a complaint from Mr. Dusty Rhoades, a Charleston attorney, alleging that Judge Jefferson had abused her discretion in failing to grant his motion for Judge Jefferson to recuse herself from a child custody matter. Mr. Rhoades further charged Judge Jefferson with being dilatory as to the issuance of orders, abusive in her behavior toward him, and having engaged in inappropriate ex parte communications. The Commission did not find Mr. Rhoades' testimony, documentation, or the testimony of his witnesses to be persuasive as to any of these allegations.
(3)     Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Judge Jefferson to be intelligent and knowledgeable. Her performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Judge Jefferson described her continuing legal or judicial education during the past five years as follows:
"(a)     Family Law (covering a variety of topics);
(b)     Ethics;
(c)     Criminal Law;
(d)     All judicial seminars and other bar seminars which have included a variety of topics including: family law (equitable distribution, custody, child support, attorneys fees, juvenile issues, adoptions, divorces, bankruptcy, and all other issues relevant to the daily operation of Court) evidence, ethics, civil law updates, U.S. Supreme Court updates, and media issues;
(e)     Chief Administrative Judges Seminar, 1999;
(f)     New Judges School, 1996.
I have consistently satisfied my CLE requirements in excess of the basic hours required."
Judge Jefferson reported that she has taught the following law-related courses:
"(a)     "Rules, Rules, Rules" South Carolina Practice and Procedures Update, Presenter on the issue of Family Court Rules, SC Bar, March 20, 1998;
(b)     Speaker/Panel Participant Wiley A. Branton Symposium, National Bar Association, October 24, 1998;
(c)     "Current Issues in Attorney's Fees", Presenter, SC Bar Association, November 6, 1998;
(d)     Recent Developments in Family Law, "Six by Six" CLE Seminar, Presenter, Charleston County Bar Association, December 10, 1998;
(e)     "Adjudication Hearings", Presenter and Contributor to Family Court Judges Juvenile Workbook, SC Association of Family Court Judges, May 20, 1999;
(f)     "Tips from the Bench", Adoption, Presenter, SC Bar Association, February 25, 2000;
(g)     "The Role of the Judge and Guardian ad Litem in Abuse and Neglect Proceedings" Judges Panel, South Carolina Guardian ad Litem Conference, April 14, 2000;
(h)     "Women, Leadership and the Law", Brown Bag Lunch Panel Participant, SC Women Lawyers Association and College of Charleston Women's Studies Program, September 22, 2000;
(i)     Family Law Update and Tips from the Bench, Presenter, Charleston Lawyers Club, May 2, 2001;
(j)     "The Use of Psychological Evaluations in Juvenile Proceedings", Panel, Children's Law Center, May 18, 2001;
(k)     Business Law Instructor, Trident Technical College Paralegal Program, 1993-1994 School Term."
Judge Jefferson reported that she has published the following:
"I have provided written seminar materials for the courses listed above and these materials have been published by the S.C. Bar as a part of their published seminar materials. I have not published any books or articles."
(4)     Character:
The Commission's investigation of Judge Jefferson did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against her. The Commission's investigation of Judge Jefferson did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Judge Jefferson has handled her financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Judge Jefferson was punctual and attentive in her dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with her diligence and industry.
(5)     Reputation:
Judge Jefferson reported that she is not rated by Martindale-Hubbell.
(6)     Physical Health:
Judge Jefferson appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office she seeks.
(7)     Mental Stability:
Judge Jefferson appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office she seeks.
(8)     Experience:
Judge Jefferson was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1989.
Judge Jefferson provided the following account of her legal experience:
"(a)     Law Clerk to the Honorable Richard E. Fields of the Ninth Judicial Circuit, Charleston, S.C., August 1989 through August 1990. Primary Responsibilities: legal research, preparation of jury charges, preparation of Orders, scheduling of motions, all tasks required to prepare the Judge and myself for trials/hearings during the term and all other daily tasks as required by the Judge that ensured the smooth operation of Court.
(b)     McFarland and Associates, Attorney, October 1990 through March 1996. Trial practice focusing on the following areas: Domestic Relations, Civil Litigation (all types), Probate Law, Real Estate Law and Criminal Law.
(c)     Resident Family Court Judge of the Ninth Judicial Circuit, elected to serve February 14, 1996 to the present.
During the past five (5) years I have been a sitting judge. I was elected to the Family Court on February 14, 1996, and have served continuously in that position since April 1, 1996. Prior to my election I enjoyed an active trial practice. My civil court experience consisted of representing the plaintiff in personal injury, wrongful death, excessive force, contract dispute and probate cases. There were also circumstances when my firm represented the defendant in personal injury cases. I have also represented clients in the Master's Court (default matters, partitions, and references). I have also represented clients in business incorporations, trademark matters, domestic cases and real estate transactions. I have also represented the defendant in various contractual disputes. I would estimate that, in the five (5) years prior to my election, I handled over 100 cases that resulted in settlement during litigation but prior to trial. The procedural history of these cases involved filing, serving and answering pleadings, motion practice, roster meetings, pre-trial conferences, and either settlement or jury trial. I would estimate that I tried five (5) to seven (7) cases to jury verdict in the five (5) years prior to my election. I routinely handled the non-jury motions for my firm. I have handled civil matters in the Court of Common Pleas in Charleston, Berkeley and Georgetown. In addition, Family Court matters require application of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence in much the same way as the Circuit Court (i.e. motions to compel, discovery issues, default, amendment of pleadings, joinder of parties, relief from judgment, etc.). These type matters are handled on a daily basis in the Family Court.
During my years in practice I represented both adult and juvenile defendants in criminal matters. I represented adults in both state and federal criminal court. I generally was able to have my clients placed in pre-trial intervention or have the charges dismissed. The vast majority of the remainder of the cases resulted in guilty pleas. I also routinely handled bond hearings for my clients in both state and federal Court. In the past five (5) years as a Family Court Judge, I have presided over proceedings involving a full range of criminal law and procedure in juvenile court. My experience has included qualifying various types of guilty pleas, detention hearings (comparable to bond hearings), waiver hearings, adjudicatory hearings and dispositional hearings. In May of 1999, I was also a contributor to the family court judges manual on juvenile proceedings. I have conducted trials involving a full range of charges from misdemeanors to more serious felonies. The Family Court Judge acts as a jury to find facts and fashion an appropriate sentence based on the facts before the Court. The same constitutional and statutory principles of criminal procedure applicable to adults are applicable to juveniles. As a result, I have had to apply the South Carolina Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rules of Evidence in Family Court in the same manner applicable in the Circuit Court. During an average month in Charleston I would estimate hearing an average of one hundred (100) juvenile cases. On a juvenile court day I will qualify an average of fifteen (15) to twenty (20) pleas.
My experience in the Circuit Court has been broad and varied. Prior to entering the practice of law and upon my graduation from law school I served as law clerk to the Hon. Richard E. Fields (Circuit Court of the 9th Judicial Circuit) from 1989 through 1990. During my time as his law clerk my responsibilities included legal research, preparation of jury charges, preparation of Orders, scheduling of motions, assisting the Judge in qualification of the jury venire, all other tasks required to prepare the Judge and myself for trials/hearings during the term of Court and all other tasks required by the Judge that ensured the smooth operation of the Court. As Judge Fields' law clerk I observed and participated in the Circuit Court on a daily basis. I would estimate that I have observed and participated in Circuit Court and General Sessions proceedings too numerous to count. This position afforded me the unique opportunity to not only observe the system but to be an integral part of its operation."
Judge Jefferson reported the frequency of her court appearances during the last five years as follows:
"(a)     Federal:     approximately 15 times
(b)     State:         approximately 50-60 times"
Judge Jefferson reported that the percentage of her practice involving civil, criminal, and domestic matters during the last five years as follows:
"I have been a sitting judge since April 1, 1996 and am therefore providing the responses from my previous judicial screening application dated October, 1995.
(a)     Civil:         49%
(b)     Criminal:     2%
(c)     Domestic:     49%"
Judge Jefferson reported the percentage of her practice in trial court during the last five years as follows:
"I have been a sitting judge since April 1, 1996 and am therefore providing the responses from my previous judicial screening application dated October 1995.
(a)     Jury:         5%
(b)     Non-jury:     95%"
Judge Jefferson provided that she most often served as sole counsel.
The following is Judge Jefferson's account of her five most significant litigated matters:
"(a)     Blake v. County of Charleston. This case involved complex (federal) civil rights litigation. It was tried for two (2) weeks and involved many motions and other complex legal issues relating to evidence and the new federal rules. The case also resulted in a mistrial and was later tried a second time for one (1) week. I tried this case with two (2) other lawyers, both of whom had been practicing more than eighteen (18) years. During this process I was treated as an equal and an integral part of the litigation team. I was entrusted with a great deal of responsibility which included arguing motions, examination of witnesses, preparation of motions, and preparation of jury charges. This case challenged many current practices within the Charleston County Police Department. This case caused the Charleston County Police Department to evaluate and change many of their policies and practices.
(b)     Hymes v. Khoury. This case was a simple auto accident which I did not think would be successful. This case taught me the importance of the strategic application of the civil rules of procedure and case law. Although this case took one (1) day to try, the jury deliberated for two (2) days and returned a verdict in favor of my client.
(c)     In Re: The Estate of Joseph J. White, Jr., et al. This was a probate court case. The central issue in this case involved the paternity of a two (2) year old minor child of the victim of an automobile fatality. The case involved an intense three (3) day probate trial. The trial involved approximately forty (40) witnesses. It also involved a unique question of law concerning the jurisdictional conflict between the probate and family courts. A favorable ruling was returned by the Probate Judge and the Circuit Court on appeal. In addition, I handled the wrongful death cause of action on behalf of the minor which resulted in a substantial recovery for the minor.
(d)     Ashby v. Ashby. In this case I represented the plaintiff/husband who sought custody of his three (3) children. The Court applied the primary caretaker doctrine in awarding custody to the father. The case also involved issues of equitable distribution, adultery, child support and attorney's fees.
(e)     Thompson v. Polite. This case involved a hotly contested issue of visitation between the plaintiff/husband and his minor son. The defendant/wife was adamant in her refusal to allow visitation. My client was awarded reasonable visitation at the Temporary Hearing of this case. Prior to the Final Hearing the parties submitted to mediation. Through this process they were able to come to an amicable agreement regarding visitation and the rearing of their child. This case reinforced my belief in the value of alternative dispute resolution (mediation) as a method of improving the efficient use of court time and resources.
Prior Judicial Positions:
"I am currently a resident Family Court Judge of the Ninth Judicial Circuit, seat five. My service in this seat began April 1, 1996, and will expire June 30, 2002. I was elected to this position by the General Assembly. The Family Court is a statutory court of limited and specific jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the Family Court is set forth in S.C. Code Annotated section 20-7-420, et seq. (i.e. divorce, custody, child support, name changes, juveniles, equitable distribution, adoptions, abuse and neglect, and as further set forth in the statute)."
Judge Jefferson provided the following list of significant orders:
"(a)     Henggeler v. Hanson, 333 S.C. 598, 510 S.E.2d 722 (S.C. App. 1998), heard November 14, 1998, decided December 14, 1998, Rehearing denied February 27, 1999, Certiorari denied June 24, 1999;
(b)     Todd v. Martin, et al., 96-DR-26-2063;
(c)     Dean v. Pollard, 99-DR-10-2508;
(d)     John and Jane Roe v. Baby Girl N, 97-DR-04-1868;
(e)     Dowling v. Dowling, 98-DR-07-0624."
Judge Jefferson further provided:
"I ran for the seat that was to be vacated by the Hon. Robert R. Mallard in or about January 1995 through March of 1995. I went through the screening process successfully and was found qualified to hold judicial office. I voluntarily withdrew from the process prior to the election. I was subsequently elected to the Family Court of the Ninth Judicial Circuit, Seat 5 on February 14, 1996."
(9)     Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Judge Jefferson's temperament has been and would continue to be excellent.
(10)     Miscellaneous:
The Low Country Citizens Committee found Judge Jefferson to be "qualified and highly recommended."
Judge Jefferson is not married. She does not have any children.
Judge Jefferson reported that she was a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
"(a)     South Carolina Bar Association;
(b)     Charleston County Bar Association;
(c)     S.C. Family Court Judges Association, Legislative Committee 2000 to the present;
(d)     National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges."
Judge Jefferson reported that she was a member of the following civic, charitable, education, social, or fraternal organizations:
"(a)     The Life Center of Charleston Church, Charleston, S.C. Board of Directors, 2001 Co-Founder and Director of Young Women's Ministry "YWCE", 1999-present;
(b)     Charleston Chapter of the Links, Inc., Co-Chair Services to Youth 2000-present;
(c)     Junior League of Charleston, former Strategic Planning Committee, Community Project Development Committee, and Advisory Planning Committee, current President's Ad Hoc Committee on Diversity;
(d)     Junior League Hall of Fame, 1994;
(e)     Delta Sigma Theta Sorority, Inc., 1982-present;
(f)     South Carolina Bar Mock Trial Judge, 1997-1999;
(g)     Sigma Gamma Rho Sorority, Inc., Distinguished Woman of the 1990's, 1997;
(h)     Top 25 African American Influencers, 1998, South Carolina Business Vision Magazine."
Judge Jefferson further provided:
"I served as law clerk to the Hon. Richard E. Fields of the Circuit Court of the Ninth Judicial Circuit. During my time with him I had the unique opportunity to observe and participate in dozens of trials and hearings and observe a "master jurist." He taught me the importance of "people skills." I learned the role of judge is central to the lawyers and the litigants perception that the system afforded them a fair trial/hearing. In addition, my legal research and writing skills were refined during this process. These skills were further refined during my time on the bench. I count myself fortunate to have found my vocation in life and attempt to walk worthy of that vocation. It is a rare privilege to have been allowed to serve the citizens of South Carolina as a Family Court Judge for the past five (5) years.
At the outset I want to state that I love being a Family Court Judge. The last five (5) years have been enjoyable, rewarding and intellectually challenging. I have learned much about the law and human nature. I was taught that the position of a judge should be a continual growth process. I believe that I have continuously grown in my judicial perspective. I still have the same enjoyment for my work as the day I began five (5) years ago. The Family Court has one of the largest caseloads within the judicial system. I believe that I have been a productive member of the Court. Judge Martin's retirement will leave a vacancy on the Circuit Court of the Ninth Judicial Circuit. This vacancy will create the opportunity for intellectual growth while contributing to the court system and the welfare of the community."

Steven H. John
Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Seat 1
Commission's Findings:     QUALIFIED AND NOMINATED

(1)     Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Mr. John meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as a Circuit Court judge.
Mr. John was born on December 1, 1953. He is 47 years old and a resident of North Myrtle Beach, South Carolina. Mr. John provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1978.
(2)     Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Mr. John.
Mr. John demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Mr. John reported that he has not made any campaign expenditures in seeking this office.
Mr. John testified he has not:
(a)     sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)     sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)     asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Mr. John testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
(3)     Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Mr. John to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Mr. John described his continuing legal or judicial education during the past five years as follows:
"(a)     2000 - 43.75 legal ed. hours and 6.0 ethics hours;
(b)     1999 - 45.02 legal ed. hours and 4.83 ethics hours;
(c)     1998 - 45 legal ed. hours and 4.58 ethics hours;
(d)     1997 - 25.5 legal ed. hours and 5.75 ethics hours;
(e)     1996 - 42.92 legal ed. hours and 9.5 ethics hours."
Mr. John reported that he has not taught or lectured at any bar association conferences, educational institutions, or continuing legal or judicial education programs.
Mr. John reported that he has not published any books and/or articles.
(4)     Character:
The Commission's investigation of Mr. John did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against him. The Commission's investigation of Mr. John did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Mr. John has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Mr. John was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5)     Reputation:
Mr. John reported that his Martindale-Hubbell rating is "BV."
(6)     Physical Health:

Mr. John appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7)     Mental Stability:
Mr. John appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8)     Experience:
Mr. John was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1978.
Mr. John described his legal experience as follows:
"Law Clerk to the Honorable Sidney T. Floyd, Resident Judge, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, 1978 - 1980;
Private Trial Practice, 1981 - Present. Opened solo practice in N. Myrtle Beach, S.C. in 1986, having an active trial practice in all of the State Courts. In Civil Court, cases ranging from contracts and automobile accidents to multi-million dollar construction cases; Criminal Court, cases ranging from traffic offenses to court appointed defense in death penalty cases; Family Court, cases from uncontested divorces to all manner of contested family disputes;
Court Appointed Special Referee in the Circuit Court, appointed by Judges Sidney T. Floyd and David H. Maring, Sr., in over Fifty (50) cases;
Certified Circuit Court Arbitrator, By South Carolina Supreme Court Board of Arbitration;
Court Appointed Mediator in the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, appointed by Judges Sidney T. Floyd and David H. Maring, Sr., in over Fifty (50) cases;
Court Appointed Guardian Ad Litem in disputed child custody cases in the Family Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, in over One Hundred (100) cases;
City of North Myrtle Beach Zoning Board, 1993 - Present;
Pro Bono Lawyer for Horry County Disabilities and Special Needs Agency, 1993 - Present.
Experience:
In criminal court I have handled a variety of cases ranging from traffic and driving offenses to violent crimes involving lethal weapons. The most recent death penalty case I have had was State v. Titus Huggins.
In civil court I have handled many different types of cases, both for plaintiffs and defendants, including construction defect cases, contracts, 1983 actions, wrongful discharge, mechanic and condominium liens and foreclosures, mortgage disputes and foreclosures, auto accidents and personal injury, slander and libel, property and zoning disputes, landlord tenant, negligent infliction of emotional distress, premises liability, tort claims act, and unfair trade practices."
Mr. John reported the frequency of his court appearances during the last five years as follows:
"(a)     federal:     Infrequent
(b)     state:     Over the last five (5) years in Circuit Court and Family Court I have had a variety of matters, whether by motion, uncontested action, non-jury trial, or jury trial, in virtually every week that there has been Court in the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit"
Mr. John reported that the percentage of his practice involving civil, criminal, and domestic matters during the last five years as follows:
"(a)     civil:         40%
(b)     criminal:     20%
(c)     domestic:     40%"
Mr. John reported the percentage of his practice in trial court during the last five years as follows:
"(a)     jury:         30%
(b)     non-jury:     70%"
Mr. John provided that he most often served as sole counsel.
The following is Mr. John's account of his five most significant litigated matters:
"(a)     Mariners Pointe Homeowners Association v. U.D.C.-Universal Development, d/b/a U.D.C. Homes Limited Partnership vs. over thirty (30) Third Party Defendants, and Paul Martin and Be Bushong, Individually and as Class Representatives v. U.D.C.-Universal Development, d/b/a U.D.C. Homes Limited Partnership - 1990 - 1996.

As the title indicates, this was an extremely complex construction case. The main action by the Association dealt with the damages to the common elements at the Mariners Pointe Condominium and Marina project. The construction issues involved roofing damage, settlement of the marsh in areas near the buildings, pool defects, marina design defects, porch and deck defects, fire wall defects, spoilage basin design defects, ventilation defects, irrigation system defects, parking lot design defects, sighting defects, and a host of other general construction problems, many of which violated the standard building code. The class action dealt with interior unit damages suffered by the individual owners.

I developed the case from its initial interviews through development of all of the necessary experts, numerous depositions and production of documents, and upon the eve of trial, through the use of mediation, this case was eventually settled to the satisfaction of the Plaintiffs in the multi-million dollar range.
(b)     State v. Titus Huggins, 1996. This was a death penalty case. I was court appointed with a public defender for Horry County to provide the defense. There was an initial trial of the first phase, during which Mr. Huggins was convicted armed robbery and murder with a pistol. The Defense presented Motions to the Trial Judge regarding juror improprieties, which led the Court to declare a mistrial. There was a retrial in which I again participated as one (1) of the two (2) defense counsels for Mr. Huggins, in which Mr. Huggins was again convicted of armed robbery and murder of a shopkeeper, and subsequently received the death penalty. This matter is currently on appeal.
(c)     North Carolina Federal Savings and Loan Association v. DAV Corporation, et al., 1986 - 1993. I was retained to file a mortgage foreclosure action on certain ocean view property, upon which there had been a failed condominium project. Before trial, due to motions for a jury trial, made by one (1) of the Defendants on certain of his counter-claims, this matter was the subject of an appeal to the South Carolina Court of Appeals and thereafter, Certiorari was granted and an opinion issued by the South Carolina Supreme Court, which helped to define legal and equitable claims. This matter was also placed in the purview of the Bankruptcy Court for a period of time due to actions of a Defendant, which caused certain filings to remove the matter from the Bankruptcy Court. Thereafter, the Plaintiff went into receivership and was taken over by an agency of the Federal Government, the Resolution Trust Corporation, which caused the matter to be transferred to Federal Court. Eventually we were able to successfully convince the Federal Court to issue a Summary Judgment Order granting Foreclosure. Besides the issues decided on Appeal, as reported in 294 S.C. 27, 362 S.E.2d 308, and 298 S.C. 514, 381 S.E.2d 903, this case also epitomized the difficulties that can be encountered and necessarily overcome in what may appear to be initially a relatively straight forward matter.
(d)     State v. Limme Arther, 1985 - 1988. This was a death penalty case. I was Court appointed, with another counsel, to provide the defense for Mr. Arther, who was ultimately convicted of armed robbery and murder with an ax. At Mr. Arther's first trial, he was convicted and given the death sentence; however, due to objections made by myself and other trial counsel, because of improper arguments and statements by the Solicitor, the Supreme Court overturned the death sentence and returned it for new sentencing hearing. At the second trial of the death penalty phase, due to the intervention of Attorney David Bruck, who was also appointed as defense counsel for Mr. Arther, this matter was tried only by a Circuit Judge, without a jury, over my objections, and the death sentence was then imposed. The Supreme Court reviewed this and returned the matter for the imposition of a life sentence. This case was reported in 290 S.C. 291, 350 S.E.2d 187 (1986), and 296 S.C. 495, 374 S.E.2d 291 (1998)
(e)     McCormac v. The Town of Pawleys Island, et al. I was the Court Appointed Special Referee in this matter. This case involved an Appeal from the decision of the Town of Pawleys Island Zoning Board of Appeals, in which that Board granted a variance for the construction of a residence. As the non-jury trial judge in this matter, I reversed the decision of the Zoning Board of Appeals. The Town and the other parties appealed this matter to the South Carolina Court of Appeals, and in an unpublished opinion, number 95-UP-077, filed March 23, 1995, my decision was upheld and my Order was adopted as the decision on Appeal.
(f)     Horry County v. The Insurance Reserve Fund, a division of the S.C. Budget & Control Board, an agency of the State of S.C., Op. No. 3301, S.C. Ct. of Appeals, 2/20/01. I was the Court appointed Special Referee in this matter. It involved a declaratory judgment action filed by Horry County against the Insurance Reserve Fund whereby the County was asking to be indemnified for damage payments it paid in other actions regarding a country operated coquina mine. My decision finding the Insurance Reserve Fund contractually liable under a tort liability insurance policy was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in the above referenced decision."
The following is Mr. John's account of five civil appeals he has personally handled:
"(a)     State v. Sapps, 295 S.C. 484, 369 S.E.2d 145 (1988). I filed this appeal on behalf of a defendant who was convicted of first degree criminal sexual conduct and kidnaping. The main issue on appeal was whether or not it was proper for the Solicitor, in cross examination, to ask the Defendant whether other witnesses were lying, thereby forcing the Defendant to attack the veracity and truthfulness of other witnesses, thereby improperly invading an area to be determined by the Jury. The South Carolina Supreme Court overturned the conviction and returned the matter for new trial. Later this party pled guilty to lessor charges, more reflective of his limited involvement in the crime.
(b)     Kincaid v. The Landing Development Corporation, et al., 289 S.C. 89, 344 S.E.2d 869 (Ct. App., 1986). This was a significant construction case that I developed for trial, along with John R. Clarke, Esquire, and upon a successful verdict being rendered to our client, an appeal was taken by the Defendants. The verdict was upheld by the Court of Appeals, and certain important areas in construction litigation were clarified by this decision, including qualification of expert witnesses, sufficiency of damage information, and liability of interrelated corporations. I wrote the appeal brief in this matter and participated in the oral arguments with John R. Clarke, Esquire.
(c)     Roundtree Villas Association, Inc. v. 4701 Kings Corp., et al., 282 S.C. 415, 321 S.E.2d 46 (1984). This was a construction case which I developed for trial with John R. Clarke, Esquire, and upon a successful jury verdict, an appeal was taken by the Defendants. The Supreme Court returned the matter for a new trial, in which the Plaintiff was again successful. This matter is significant because it did extend liability when a lending agency undertakes to make repairs on a building it previously only participated in by financing. There is then a common law duty which arises to use due care in the repairs, thereby making the lender liable for any damages caused by negligent repairs. I wrote the appeal brief in this matter and participated in the oral arguments with John R. Clarke, Esquire.
(d)     Piedmont Aviation, Inc. v. Quinn, 294 S.C. 502, 366 S.E.2d 31, (Ct. App) 1988. I was retained to write the appeal brief for the Plaintiff in this matter by the trial counsel, and they used these arguments I developed at oral arguments. The jury verdict was upheld by the Court of Appeals which helped define the two issue rule.
Note: for the above cases, no trial briefs are available. Since all of these matters have been concluded, the trial briefs were destroyed as extraneous and are no longer available. Therefore, for the last Appeal I am listing the case of:
(e)     Baldwin Construction Co., Inc. (Respondent) v. Barry P. Graham and Terry D. Graham, d/b/a The Auto Tech (Appellants), which is currently on appeal to the South Carolina Court of Appeals, under Docket Number 98-CP-26-3362. This is an appeal before final decision alleging the trial court erred in denying Appellants Motion for a Jury Trial and their Motion to Amend their Answer. Attached please find a copy of my Final Brief of Appellant."
Mr. John provided that in regards to unsuccessful candidacies:
"In 1998 I filed as a candidate for Seat #2 of the Circuit Court, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit. I was qualified as one (1) of the three (3) candidates by the Judicial Merit Selection Commission for this seat. At Large Judge Paula Thomas was the eventual successful candidate. In the fall of 1998, I filed as a candidate for At Large Seat #1 of the Circuit Court of the State of South Carolina. I withdrew as a candidate for this seat which the Honorable John Milling won by acclamation. In 1999 I filed as a candidate for At Large Seat #8 of the Circuit Court of the State of South Carolina. I was found qualified, but not selected by the Judicial Merit Selection Commission. The Honorable Kenneth G. Goode won this seat by acclamation."
(9)     Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Mr. John's temperament would be excellent.
(10)     Miscellaneous:
The Pee Dee Citizens Committee reported "the committee is of the opinion that Mr. John is well qualified for the position of circuit court judge and recommends/approves this candidate without reservation."
Mr. John is married to Susan Watts John. He has one child, Nicolas Blake John, born June 14, 2000.
Mr. John reported that he was a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
"a)     South Carolina Bar Association, 1978 - present;
b)     Horry County Bar Association, 1978 - present."
Mr. John provided that he was a member of the following civic, charitable, education, social, or fraternal organizations:
"(a)     Rotary International and local North Myrtle Beach Club, 1987 - present. I have been a member of our local club Board of Directors and held numerous committee chairmanships. I am also a Paul Harris Fellow and have received the perfect attendance award ever since joining in 1987;
(b)     Optimist International and local North Myrtle Beach Club, 1987 - 1996. I was a member of the Board of Directors and held various officer positions;
(c)     Citadel Alumni Association and Citadel Brigadier Club, both 1975 - present;
(d)     Horry County Citadel Club, 1980 - present;
(e)     U.S.C. Alumni Association and U.S.C. Gamecock Club, 1978 - present."

J. Cordell Maddox, Jr.
Circuit Court for the Tenth Judicial Circuit, Seat 1
Commission's Findings:     QUALIFIED[1] AND NOMINATED

[1] Mr. Maddox will not meet the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as a Circuit Court judge unless the elections are held on or after November 7, 2001. According to S.C. Code Ann. 2-19-70, "(A) No member of the General Assembly may be elected to a judicial office while he is serving in the General Assembly nor shall that person be elected to a judicial office for a period of one year after he either: (1) ceases to be a member of the General Assembly; or (2) fails to file for election to the General Assembly in accordance with Section 7-11-15."

(1)     Constitutional Qualifications:
Mr. Maddox was born on June 14, 1958. He is 42 years old and a resident of Anderson, South Carolina. Mr. Maddox provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1983.
(2)     Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Mr. Maddox.
Mr. Maddox demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Mr. Maddox reported that he has not made any campaign expenditures.
Mr. Maddox testified he has not:
(a)     sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)     sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)     asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Mr. Maddox testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
(3)     Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Mr. Maddox to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Mr. Maddox described his continuing legal or judicial education during the past five years as follows:
"08/10/95     1995 Annual Convention- S.C.T.L.A.
09/05/95     The New South Carolina Rules of Evidence
10/10/95     Client Relations LEPR Series
01/2-6/96     Law Education Institute Civil Litigation Conference
01/02/96     1996 Winter CLE Conference - Civil
08/08/96     1996 Annual Conference - S.C.T.L.A.
08/14/97     1997 Annual Convention-S.C.T.L.A.
11/08/97     Better Client Relations the Key to Success
12/04/98     S.C.T.L.A. Auto Torts
08/13/98     1998 Annual Convention-S.C.T.L.A.
09/27/98     1998 Annual SC Solicitors Conference
12/11/98     SC Association of Counties
05/19/99     Family Court Judges Conference
10/03/99     1999 Annual SC Solicitors Association Conference
11/12/99     SC Ethics Seminar
11/15/99     Judge Ross Anderson's Ethics Seminar
12/17/99     10 Things You Need to Know
10/00         ADR Seminar
12/02/00     Auto Torts
12/20/00     Ethics Update"
Mr. Maddox reported that he has taught the following law-related courses:
"(a)     Business Law at Central Wesleyan College (now known as Southern Wesleyan University) for several years during the late 1980's. I was an adjunct professor of business law teaching undergraduate courses in general business law at Central Wesleyan College.
(b)     1998 Family Judges Conference - Legislative Update
(c)     1999 Family Judges Conference - Legislative Update
(d)     1999 South Carolina Solicitors Conference - Legislative."
Mr. Maddox reported that he has not published any books and/or articles.
(4)     Character:
The Commission's investigation of Mr. Maddox did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against him. The Commission's investigation of Mr. Maddox did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Mr. Maddox has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Mr. Maddox was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5)     Reputation:
Mr. Maddox reported that his Martindale-Hubbell rating is "BV."
The Commission noted that Mr. Maddox had the reputation of being a forthright and honest legislator and they would expect him to be the same on the bench.
(6)     Physical Health:
Mr. Maddox appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7)     Mental Stability:
Mr. Maddox appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8)     Experience:
Mr. Maddox was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1983.
Mr. Maddox reported that his legal experience since law school has been the following:
"From 1986 until 1992 I was an Associate and then Partner at Jones, Spitz, Moorehead, Baird & Maddox in Anderson, South Carolina. My practice was predominantly a civil practice with some small amounts of real estate and criminal matters.
From 1992 until 2001 I have been a Partner with the Law Firm of Glenn, Haigler, Maddox & McClain. My practice continues to be predominantly a civil practice with some criminal work.
From 1996 until 2000, in addition to practicing law, I served in the South Carolina House of Representatives representing District 9 in Anderson County.
Criminal Matters:
a) State v. Young - I was appointed co-counsel in the penalty phase of the State v. Young. This case involved re-trial of the death penalty phase of a previously tried case. The case required the picking of a jury in Lancaster County and the approximate one-week trial of the penalty phase.
b) During the past I represented a defendant in a criminal case in which my client was charged with engaging a child for sexual performance, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature. This case involved the issue of the admission of video taped evidence. The case was dismissed.
c) I handled a criminal case in 2000 in which my client was charged with grand larceny. The issues were whether or not the defendant and her co-defendant were guilty of stealing $10,000.00 to $15,000.00 worth of jewelry and personal items from the home of an acquaintance. The defendant pled guilty.
d) Currently I am representing a defendant who has been charged with numerous counts of burglary and breaking and entering. The case is currently awaiting trial or other disposition.
e) I have also been involved, in a peripheral manner, with several criminal cases handled by my law partners including a murder case in which the death penalty was at issue and a case involving a guilty plea for assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature.
f) I have represented, either as the attorney or as the guardian ad litem, several juvenile defendants and adult defendants in the Family Court. The charges have ranged from criminal domestic violence to various degrees of child abuse and neglect.
While my background in criminal matters is less than my experience in civil matters, I feel that I could compensate for the lack of experience. I am aware of and keep abreast of developments in the case law regarding criminal matters. It is my intention to continue to keep abreast of criminal case law developments and to step up my observation of criminal court pending election to the bench.
Civil Matters:
My primary practice in the last several years in civil court has been as a representative of the plaintiff. In the past I have also represented defendants including corporations, individuals, and financial institutions. In the past five years my trial experience has included:
a) Two complicated medical malpractice cases. One case involved the alleged negligence of a surgeon leading to the death of the plaintiff after laparoscopic surgery. This case was tried in Chester County. Both plaintiff and defendant utilized experts from throughout the country and the case involved many elements common to most medical malpractice and other tort actions. The case was settled after trial began and after opening statements and the call of two of the plaintiff's witnesses. I was co-counsel on that case with an out of state attorney and a local attorney who had associated me. b)

Additionally, I have tried a medical malpractice case in Richland County involving obstetrical malpractice. The case was tried for approximately eight days and involved fairly complicated issues of causation.
c) I was co-counsel with my law partner in a dental malpractice case tried for three days in Anderson County involving the issue of malpractice resulting from a broken jaw during a dental procedure.
d) Currently I am involved as co-counsel in a nationwide class action filed in Federal Court in Anderson County. This case involves the issue of fraudulent interest computation by a lending institution. The case has been filed and the nationwide class has been certified. The trial is expected in October 2001.
e) I have been associated with co-counsel in another Federal Class Action case involving the allegations of fraudulent recordation of credit information. That case should be tried some time in the late fall of 2001.
f) I have, in addition to the above, handled numerous automobile accident cases that have settled prior to trial.
g) Currently I am representing a civil defendant in a breach of contract action that has been set for trial in June of 2001.
h) I have also represented several physicians as personal attorney in malpractice cases and in other general litigation matters.
i) I am currently involved innumerous litigation matters including a case based upon negligent construction of a subdivision and the subsequent denial of a payment bond. The complaint has been filed; the trial has not been set.
j) I am also currently representing a large homeowners' association in a lawsuit against adjoining homeowners regarding the application of restrictions to the adjoining landowner's property. The case was tried and a verdict was granted to my clients. The case involved the application of restrictions to property and the interpretation and restoration of the restrictions and by-laws of the homeowners' association. The case is currently on appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court."
Mr. Maddox reported the frequency of his court appearances during the last five years as follows:
"(a)     Federal: 1996 - 2000 - Infrequent. 2000-2001 - Frequently. I am currently involved in two Federal Class Actions that have required numerous appearances in District Court.
(b)     State: I have appeared in State Court either in Civil, Criminal or Domestic matters on average twice a week for the past 5 years."
Mr. Maddox reported that the percentage of his practice involving civil, criminal, and domestic matters during the last five years as follows:
"(a)     Civil:         30%
(b)     Criminal:     10%
(c)     Domestic:     60%"
Mr. Maddox reported the percentage of his practice in trial court during the last five years as follows:
"(a)     Jury:         10%
(b)     Non-jury:     90%"
Mr. Maddox provided that he most often served as both co-counsel and sole counsel.
The following is Mr. Maddox's account of his five most significant litigated matters:
"(a)     State v. Young. I was appointed co-counsel in the sentencing phase of Kevin Dean Young. The state had obtained a guilty verdict and sentence of death in a prior trial. The case was remanded to the circuit court for the retrial of the penalty phase only. A jury was selected in Lancaster County and brought to Anderson for the trial. Every case potentially involving the death penalty has significant ramifications not only for the defendant but the community, attorneys and other court personnel. Apart from its nature, the case was significant from a personal legal perspective because it exposed me to the complicated legal issues associated with a criminal trial in general and a death penalty trial in particular.
(b)     Linda A. Massingale, Ruth I. Bickel, Denise M. McTigue, Marie A. Pacifico, and all other similarly situated v. The Money Store, Inc., TMS Mortgage, Inc., and John Does 1-100. This is an ongoing case in Federal Court. The case involves a large nationwide class action against the defendant. The class has been certified by the District Court and two appeals have been taken to the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals. We've prevailed on both appeals and are now awaiting trial in April or May of 2001. The case is significant in that it involves unique issues of interest computation and the possibility of up to 20,000 class members seeking damages against the defendant. I am co-counsel in this case with several out of state attorneys.
(c)     Laughridge v. Parkinson, et al. This case was a medical mal-practice case involving complicated issues of causation and damage. The lawsuit was on behalf of the minor child injured at birth. The case was tried initially in Greenville County, South Carolina, over a period of approximately 22 weeks. After deliberating for a day and a half, a mistrial was declared because of a hung jury. Approximately one year later the case was re-tried for approximately 10 days and the jury returned a verdict for $5,000,000.00. Prior to the 1st trial the Circuit Court granted partial Summary Judgment for the hospital. I was involved in the appeal to the Supreme Court which resulted in a ruling that the abolition of the doctrine of charitable immunity was prospective in application only. The case was significant because almost every possible evidentiary scenario was presented during both trials.
(d)     Kneale v. Bonds, 452 S.E.2d 840; 317 S.C.262, SC Court of Appeals 1994. This case was significant in that it involved interpretation of the covenants of a horizontal property regime and a mandatory injunction for the removal of a structure. I represented 12 homeowners who sought a mandatory injunction to have a structure removed from the regime property. After an approximate 3-day non-jury trial, the circuit court ruled in the favor of the defendants. On appeal, the Supreme Court found in favor of my clients and issued an order requiring defendants to remove a previously constructed building on the property. The case is significant in that it involved interpretation of legal documents as well as equitable principals of law.
(e)     South Carolina Department of Social Services v. Broome, 413 S.E.2d 835, SC 48 and SC (SC 1992) I was appointed to represent Mrs. Broome in a DSS termination of parental rights action. Mrs. Broome was a schizophrenic who opposed the termination of her rights. Subsequent to the trial, Ms. Broome asked me to appeal and then disappeared. After perfecting her appeal, I filed an affidavit with the Supreme Court and was asked to do a brief and argue certain elements of her appeal. The case was argued before the South Carolina Supreme Court and has been cited many times by the Court as an example of one of the standards for termination of parental rights in South Carolina."
The following is Mr. Maddox's account of civil appeals he has personally handled:
"(a)     In the matter of Marshal - S.C. Supreme Court - 03/23/98, 498 S.E.2d 869, 331 S.C. 514 (S.C. 1998)
(b)     Laughridge v. Parkinson (co-counsel) - 04/01/91, 403 S.E.2d 120, 304 SC 51 (S.C. 1991)
(c)     South Carolina Department of Social Services v. Broome - 01/13/92, 413 S.E.2d 835, 307 SC 48 (S.C. 1992)
(d)     Kneale v. Bonds, et al., 425 S.E.2d 840; 317 S.C.262, SC Court of Appeals 1994"
(9)     Judicial Temperament:

The Commission believes that Mr. Maddox's temperament would be excellent.
(10)     Miscellaneous:
The Upstate Citizens Committee found Mr. Maddox to be "qualified pursuant to the evaluative criteria established by the Commission."
Mr. Maddox is married to Victoria Tobin Maddox. He has three children: Jesse Cordell Maddox, III, age 15; Brett Garland Maddox, age 12; and Jacob Hunter Maddox, age 6.
Mr. Maddox reported that he was a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
"(a)     Anderson County Bar Association;
(b)     South Carolina Bar Association;
(c)     South Carolina Trial Lawyer's Association;
(d)     American Trial Lawyer's Association;
(e)     American Bar Association."
Mr. Maddox provided that he was a member of the following civic, charitable, education, social, or fraternal organizations:
"(a)     Rotary Club of Anderson;
(b)     YMCA - member of Board of Directors from 1984 to present; currently ex-officio member of the Board.
(c)     Past and Present member of S.C. Bar House of Delegates
(d)     Hospice of the Upstate."

Julius C. Nicholson, Jr.
Circuit Court for the Tenth Judicial Circuit, Seat 1
Commission's Findings:     QUALIFIED AND NOMINATED

(1)     Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Judge Nicholson meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as Circuit Court judge.
Judge Nicholson was born on September 30, 1942. He is 58 years old and a resident of Anderson, South Carolina. Judge Nicholson provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1973.
(2)     Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Judge Nicholson.
Judge Nicholson demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Judge Nicholson reported that he has not made any campaign expenditures.
Judge Nicholson testified he has not:
(a)     sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)     sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)     asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Judge Nicholson testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
(3)     Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Judge Nicholson to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Judge Nicholson described his continuing legal or judicial education during the past five years as follows:
"(a)     Seminars with SC Bar;
(b)     Circuit Court Judge's Associate Meeting & S.C. Judicial Conference;
(c)     University of Nevada Judicial College - 2 weeks & took General Jurisdiction Course."
Judge Nicholson reported that he has taught law-related courses at the South Carolina Solicitors Conference.
Judge Nicholson reported that he has not published any books and/or articles.
(4)     Character:
The Commission's investigation of Judge Nicholson did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against him. The Commission's investigation of Judge Nicholson did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Judge Nicholson has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Judge Nicholson was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5)     Reputation:
Judge Nicholson reported that his Martindale-Hubbell rating is "BV."
Judge Nicholson provided that he was elected to the following public office other than his judicial office:
"Elected to County Council in Orangeburg County 1976-1982."
(6)     Physical Health:
Judge Nicholson appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7)     Mental Stability:
Judge Nicholson appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8)     Experience:
Judge Nicholson was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1973.
Judge Nicholson reported that his legal experience since law school as follows:
"During the twenty-five years I practiced law, I practiced in all areas of law.
Fogle & Watson - 1973; Fogle & Nicholson - 1975; J.C. Nicholson -1975-1978; Nicholson & Williams - 1978-1981; Assistant Solicitor in Greenville- 1982; Epps & Krause - 1982-1985; Epps, Krause & Nicholson - 1985-1994; Epps, Nicholson & Stathakis 1995-3/1/99; Circuit Court Judge 3/1/99 until present."
Judge Nicholson provided that he has the following judicial experience:
"Circuit Court 3-1-99 to present with unlimited trial court jurisdiction for trials in South Carolina except for cases which S.C. Supreme Court has original jurisdiction."
(9)     Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Judge Nicholson's temperament has been and would continue to be excellent.
(10)     Miscellaneous:
The Upstate Citizens Committee reported, "we find that Judge Nicholson is qualified pursuant to the evaluative criteria established by the Commission."
Judge Nicholson is married to Janet Elaine Nicholson. He has five children: Amanda Nicholson, age 31, School Teacher; Stacy Nicholson, age 30, Captain in Air Force; J.C. Nicholson, III, age 26, Junior at USC Law School; Lara Nicholson, age 22, Housewife; and John Beeks, age 23, Senior at Clemson University.
Judge Nicholson reported that he was a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
"(a)     Anderson County Bar Association;
(b)     S.C. Bar- member of the House of Delegates (1995-1997);
(c)     S.C. Trial Lawyers Association."
Judge Nicholson provided that he was a member of the following civic, charitable, education, social, or fraternal organizations:
"Rotary."

L. Mendel Rivers, Jr.
Circuit Court for the Ninth Judicial Circuit, Seat 1
Commission's Findings: QUALIFIED, BUT NOT NOMINATED

(1)     Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Judge Rivers meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as a Circuit Court judge.
Judge Rivers was born on October 6, 1947. He is 53 years old and a resident of Mt. Pleasant, South Carolina. Judge Rivers provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1972.
(2)     Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Judge Rivers.
Judge Rivers demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Judge Rivers reported that he has not made any campaign expenditures in seeking this office.
Judge Rivers testified he has not:
(a)     sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)     sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)     asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Judge Rivers testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
(3)     Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Judge Rivers to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations; however, his answers did indicate some concerns in the areas of substantive law and evidence.
The Commission's investigation showed Judge Rivers could improve the expediency with which he disposes of his caseload.
The Commission also found Judge Rivers could improve in the areas of judicial temperament with respect to witnesses and litigants.
Judge Rivers described his continuing legal or judicial education during the past five years as follows:
(a)     2000-Taught Child Custody Seminar sponsored by NBI and attended Family Court Seminar sponsored by Chas. Co. Bar Assn.;
(b)     1999-Had excess hours from 1998;
(c)     1998-Attended Winning Legal Negotiations sponsored by S.C. Bar and was certified as Family Court Mediator by SCCMDR (40-hour course).
In addition, Judge Rivers states: "In the past five years, I have enjoyed CLEs on Defending DUI cases and on Substance Abuse & Ethics, and I have taught Effective Family Law Practice, sponsored by NBI. I have always maintained full compliance with all CLE requirements."
Judge Rivers reported that he has taught the following law-related courses:
Legal Environment of Business and Business Law at the College of Charleston,
1981-c. 1986, and Effective Family Law Practice, sponsored by NBI.
Judge Rivers reported that he was a published weekly columnist for the Charleston Post and Courier from 1985 until 1993.
(4)     Character:
The Commission's investigation of Judge Rivers did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against him. The Commission's investigation of Judge Rivers did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Judge Rivers has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Judge Rivers was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5)     Reputation:

Judge Rivers reported that his Martindale-Hubbell rating is "BV."
(6)     Physical Health:
Judge Rivers appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7)     Mental Stability:
Judge Rivers appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8)     Experience:
Judge Rivers was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1972.
Judge Rivers described his legal experience as follows:
"1972-1973-General practice of law as sole practitioner, with emphasis on plaintiff's litigation, real estate, domestic relations, and criminal defense.
1973-1974-Associate with Young, Clement & Rivers (now Young, Clement, Rivers & Tisdale), Charleston, S.C., in litigation department, handling mainly insurance defense.
1974-1975-General practice of law as sole practitioner, with emphasis on plaintiff's litigation, real estate, domestic relations, and criminal defense.
1975-1978-Partner in Tillman & Rivers. General practice.
1978-1993-Served as Judge of the Family Court of the Ninth Judicial Circuit, Seat 1, resident judge, Charleston County.
1993-2000-General practice of law as sole practitioner, with emphasis on plaintiff's litigation and domestic relations.
2000-2001-Partner in Rivers & Grogan, LLP. Strong emphasis on domestic relations and plaintiff's litigation.
I divide my career into three phases: 1) the early years, when I had the privilege of many legal arrangements and learned to practice the whole spectrum of law as an employee, as a partner, and as a sole practitioner; 2) the judgeship years, when I learned to think deeply about the law and gained true respect for the amazing machine which is our legal system; and 3) the post-judgeship years, when I came into my own as an attorney and learned both how to think like an experienced lawyer and how to make a living!
Legal Experience:
Criminal - I have significant experience in handling adult criminal charges in the Magistrate's Court and juvenile criminal charges in Family Court. I have handled DUIs, drug possession, criminal domestic violence, and assault charges. At the General Sessions Court level, I successfully handled a DUI (Second) charge for a significantly impaired client and successfully defended a probation revocation charge for another client. In another matter, I bargained with the federal prosecutor and was able, through careful negotiation, to persuade the prosecutor to drop all charges against my client who was accused of bank fraud in the Charleston phone-sex scandals. To my knowledge, that client is the only defendant in the bank-fraud-phone-sex scandals to emerge with all charges dismissed. In addition, I have fifteen (15) years' experience on the Family Court bench, many of which were devoted to terms of Juvenile Court, where I handled every type of criminal case from petty thievery to murder.
Civil - Although I have a strong emphasis on domestic relations in my practice, I do not shy away from Circuit Court cases and believe I have been successful in handling them. Recently, I tried two plaintiffs' cases before juries in the Charleston and Orangeburg Counties Courts of Common Pleas with substantial verdicts. I tried a major personal-injury case involving a slip and fall in the Charleston County Court of Common Pleas and was successful in getting the case to the jury against the remaining two defendants. Unfortunately, the jury felt sympathetic for the defendants! (Despite that set back, I was able to settle the case against two other defendants for substantial amounts.) I have both settled and tried civil cases in the Court of Common Pleas and feel at home there.
I have handled civil cases as simple as fender-benders and as complicated as a slip and fall with five Defendants, including a famous rock star, without assistance or co-counsel. I have deliberately chosen to handle those cases which appear both interesting and lucrative, because I enjoy new challenges. Family Court taught me a great deal about human nature and the essential equality of man. Circuit Court has the potential to take that knowledge to the next level, because of the intellectual challenges and the complexity of the law usually not available in Family Court.
My personality is such that I thrive on an intellectual and legal challenge. As important as Family Court is, the judge is unfortunately required to apply very familiar law to constantly recurring, similar facts. At some point, the intellectually curious become bored. After fifteen (15) years on the Family Court bench, I lost my enthusiasm to perform the same job over and over each day. I gave myself the freedom to resign from the Family Court bench and pursue other interests, which I believe greatly benefited me.
I have been privileged to serve in the General Assembly, as an attorney, and as a judge. I am old enough to have achieved a great deal of wisdom and young enough to have the energy to put it to excellent use. I believe I have a combination of legislative, judicial, legal, and life experiences possessed by few other candidates."
Judge Rivers reported the frequency of his court appearances during the last five years as follows:
"(a)     federal:     Two cases in the last five years, one civil and one criminal. Two court appearances.
(b)     state:     Appear approximately three - five times per week in Family Court, twice per month in Magistrate's Court, and once per month in Circuit Court."
Judge Rivers reported that the percentage of his practice involving civil, criminal, and domestic matters during the last five years as follows:
"(a)     civil:         10%
(b)     criminal:     5%
(c)     domestic:     85%"
Judge Rivers reported the percentage of his practice in trial court during the last five years as follows:
"(a)     jury:         15%
(b)     non-jury:     85%"
Judge Rivers provided that he most often served as sole counsel.
The following is Judge Rivers' account of his five most significant litigated matters:
"(a)     Heape v. Heape, 335 S.C. 420, 517 S.E.2d 1 (Ct.App. 1999). Heape was a complicated, lengthy divorce trial which involved unsuccessful mediation, many days of trial, perjury, efforts to intimidate by extraneous lawsuits, and a voluminous evidentiary presentation. The result was very successful at the trial level. Not only was the adversary required to pay substantial attorney's fees to my client, but so was her paramour! Unfortunately, in a landmark decision, the Court of Appeals ruled that paramours may not be required to pay substantial attorney's fees beyond the minimal efforts to cause them to be restrained from interfering with the marriage.
(b)     Maggy v. City of North Charleston, et al. Maggy involved a young woman who was badly injured when she slipped and fell at the North Charleston Coliseum during a Tom Petty concert. We chose to sue the city, its hired coliseum management, the beer vendor, the coliseum architect, and Tom Petty himself. (All involved, including defense counsel, earnestly hoped that Defendant Petty would be required to testify at length in deposition, or at least sing a song! Unfortunately, he was dismissed as a party.) The case involved endless depositions, visits to the accident scene, and delving into the minutiae of coliseum construction. The case was settled against two defendants and tried against the remainder.
(c)     Rivers v. Unisun. Rivers involved uninsured motorist coverage and the stacking of liability policies, as well as a suit by a minor brought under the shadow of a looming Statute of Limitations. The real issue was damages and the extent of permanent impairment of a young woman. The case was difficult to try, because it involved bringing forth doctors from various parts of the state and had to be tried in a county inconvenient for most individuals concerned.
(d)     Walsh v. Walsh. Walsh was the domestic case which had it all: Fight over custody, fight over visitation, fight over sexually aberrant behavior, fight over support, fight over property, fight over enforcement. Walsh illustrates the dilemma of having to fight over every issue, as juxtaposed against the necessity to protect one's client and to stand up against intimidation. While the final result in Walsh was very favorable to the client, the client was understandably worn out by the struggle, as was her lawyer.
(e)     Freedland v. MUSC. Freedland was an administrative hearing before the Honor Counsel of the Medical College of MUSC, in which the client was accused of violating an honor code which was poorly drafted to the point of almost ceasing to exist. My task as attorney for the accused was first, to inform a group of self-important senior medical students that their honor code was legally insufficient to convict anybody of anything and secondly, to convince them that my client was entirely innocent of wrongdoing in any case. Freedland illustrates the importance of keeping one's "eyes on the prize" and making certain that the client gets what he needs, rather than the lawyer getting notoriety for a flamboyant lawsuit. By negotiation, we achieved for the client what the litigation process could not."
The following is Judge Rivers' account of five civil appeals he has personally handled:
"(a)     Heape v. Heape -- Court of Appeals -- April 26, 1999 -- 335 S.C. 420, 517 S.E.2d 1 (Ct.App. 1999)
(b)     Scott v. Schneider-Court of Appeals - Decided 2000 -- Unpublished
(c)     Taylor v. Taylor-Court of Appeals - Decided 1999 -- Unpublished
(d)     Brown v. Brown -Court of Appeals - Decided 1996 -- Unpublished
(e)     McMillan v. Mid-Carolina Pools, Inc. -Court of Appeals - Decided 2001 - Unpublished"
Judge Rivers stated the following about his judicial service:
"I served as Judge of the Family Court of the Ninth Judicial Circuit, Seat #1, from 1978 until 1993. That position is elected by the General Assembly, and the Family Court has exclusive civil jurisdiction over divorce, annulment, validity of marriage, custody of children, child support, alimony, visitation, distribution of marital property and debt, and awards of attorneys fees in connection therewith. It has exclusive criminal and status-offense jurisdiction over juveniles."
Judge Rivers described five of his most significant orders or opinions as follows:
"(a)     Marsh v. Marsh, 313 S.C. 42, 437 S.E.2d 34 (1993) and Marsh v. Marsh, 308 S.C. 304, 417 S.E.2d 638 (Ct.App. 1992), cert. gr. 1993. I was the first Family Court Judge to rule on, and to be appealed from, the issue of whether the Family Court may equitably distribute personal-injury awards accrued during the marriage. I ruled in the affirmative and was affirmed twice, by the Court of Appeals and by the Supreme Court.
(b)     Charleston County Dept. of Social Services v. Father, Stepmother, and Mother, 317 S.C. 283, 454 S.E.2d 307 (1995). Father, Stepmother was an extraordinarily painful child abuse case in which the natural mother, who came from a prominent family, was accused of oral sex (fellatio) with her young son. Trial was difficult and prolonged. I permitted the son to testify, because I believed his testimony was the only way to get near the truth. His testimony persuaded me that the abuse did occur and that his mother was the perpetrator. Shortly after my ruling, I resigned from the bench (to run for Congress). The mother hired new counsel and sought a new trial by means of a Rule 63, SCRCP motion. Judge Mallard granted her motion, and he was reversed by the Supreme Court. In its opinion, the Supreme Court discussed at length my rulings and Judge Mallard's reasons for granting a new trial. The Supreme Court essentially affirmed my rulings and found Judge Mallard's reasoning inadequate.
(c)     Eichman v. Eichman, 285 S.C. 378, 329 S.E.2d 764 (1985). A divided Supreme Court affirmed my ruling that a previous support and visitation order was res judicata as to whether the husband in a later divorce action could claim that he was not the father of the children who were the subject of the previous order and therefore could request paternity tests. The issue is important, because many fathers (and husbands) claim to learn, years after consenting to pay child support, that they are not in fact the fathers of the children in question. Interestingly, two justices dissented, reasoning that recent advances in paternity testing suggest that the doctrine of res judicata should not be applied under those facts.
(d)     Frasier v. McClair, 282 S.C. 491, 319 S.E.2d 350 (Ct.App. 1984). This was a reversal. I believed that an adoption had been brought solely to obtain Social Security benefits and therefore denied the adoption. Judge Curtis Shaw of the Court of Appeals wrote a lengthy opinion explaining that my reasons were unsupported by the evidence and that, in any event, such an improper purpose for the adoption, if it existed, would not permit the Family Court to deny the adoption, as long as the adoption was in the best interests of the minor child. The decision was important to educate bench and bar as to the standards for granting adoptions.
(e)     Spartanburg County Dept. of Social Services v. Padgett, 296 S.C. 79, 370 S.E.2d 872 (1988). This case proved to be an important lesson in humility for me. I was assigned to a term in Spartanburg County. The Family Court Judges there had complained that local attorneys were deliberately underestimating the time needed to try their cases, and the Chief Administrative Judge had issued a "Notice to Attorneys," threatening sanctions against offending attorneys. I imposed a small fine upon two attorneys in two cases who appeared to have substantially underestimated the time required to try their cases. Both appealed. The Supreme Court ruled that I had overstepped my authority. After reading their opinion, I agreed with them completely and wrote letters of apology to the attorneys."
Judge Rivers listed his employment while serving as a judge as follows:
"While serving as Family Court Judge, I taught Legal Environment of Business and Business Law at the College of Charleston from 1981 until approximately 1986. From 1985 until 1993, I wrote a column of general interest in the Charleston Evening Post (later the Charleston Post and Courier). The column was popular, and it eventually became a weekly feature. I was required to stop writing the column when I ran for the Republican nomination for U.S. Congress in 1993."
Judge Rivers listed his unsuccessful candidacies as follows:
"a)     In 1983, I ran for one of the original seats on the South Carolina Court of Appeals. I dropped out of the race after the balloting had begun, in favor of Franklin Robson, who dropped out in favor of Bob Stoddard, who was defeated by the incumbent Bert Goolsby.
b)     In 1988, I ran for the Circuit bench against William Howard, who was elected to replace Lawrence Richter, who resigned.
c)     In 1991, I contemplated running for the Circuit bench, for the seat now occupied by Vic Rawl. I withdrew after speaking to various legislators and long before any balloting.
d)     In 1994, I was an unsuccessful candidate for the Republican nomination to U.S. Congress from the First Congressional District. The race was won by the smart candidates who spent the most money."
(9)     Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Judge Rivers' temperament has been and would continue to be excellent.
(10)     Miscellaneous:
The Low Country Citizens Committee found Judge Rivers to be "qualified and recommended. Somewhat 'offbeat.' Not sure if that is a plus or a minus."
Judge Rivers is married to Rebecca Jane Benton. He has three children: Lucius Mendel Rivers, III, age 24, production manager; James Abyad Rivers, age 22, student; and Charles Francis Middleton Rivers, age 21, student.
Judge Rivers reported that he was a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
"(a)     South Carolina Bar, continuously since 1972;
(b)     Charleston County Bar Association since 1993;
(c)     Family Law Section of South Carolina Bar since 1993."
Judge Rivers provided that he was a member of the following civic, charitable, education, social, or fraternal organizations:
"(a)     South Carolina Society, 72 Meeting Street, Charleston, SC 29401;
(b)     Preservation Society of Charleston, 147 King Street, Charleston, SC 29401;
(c)     National Audubon Society, 700 Broadway, New York, NY 10003;
(d)     Poetry Society of South Carolina, P.O. Box 99, Charleston, SC 29402;
(e)     Humane Society of the United States, New York, NY."

James A. Turner
Circuit Court for the Ninth Judicial Circuit, Seat 1
Commission's Findings:     QUALIFIED AND NOMINATED

(1)     Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Judge Turner meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as a Circuit Court judge.
Judge Turner was born on July 28, 1957. He is 43 years old and a resident of Charleston, South Carolina. Judge Turner provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1991.
(2)     Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Judge Turner.
Judge Turner demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Judge Turner reported that he has made approximately $40.00 in campaign expenditures for postage.
Judge Turner testified he has not:
(a)     sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)     sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)     asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Judge Turner testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
(3)     Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Judge Turner to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Judge Turner described his continuing legal or judicial education during the past five years as follows:
"(a)     Landlord Tenant CLE - April 14, 2000;
(b)     Ethics Roundup, Professor Freeman - April 2000;
(c)     Ethics, SC Bar Annual Meeting, Hilton Head - June 2000;
(d)     DUI: S.C. Case Law and Opinions - November 16, 2000;
(e)     MUSC: Substance Abuse Seminar - December 2000;
(f)     Update on Recent Law - February 17, 1999;
(g)     Contracts - June 18, 1999;
(h)     Torts - April 14, 1998;
(i)     Evidence - June 9, 1998;
(j)     Jury Selection and Instruction - August 6, 1998;
(k)     Civil Trial Procedures - April 4, 1997;
(l)     Fourth Amendment Issues - October 6, 1997;
(m)     Virtue and Vice (Ethics) - November 6, 1997;
(n)     Update on Recent Law - February 29, 1996."
Judge Turner reported that he has taught the following law-related courses:
"(a)     Orientation for new magistrates at the criminal justice academy in the area of conducting preliminary hearings;
(b)     Presenter at Tips From the Bench seminar sponsored by the South Carolina Bar, lecturing in the areas of civil and criminal practice in Magistrate Court;
(c)     Presenter at College of Charleston CLE for local attorneys on the topic of practice procedure and substantive law in Magistrate Court (civil);
(d)     Panel participant at yearly seminar on landlord-tenant issues sponsored by local apartment managers."
Judge Turner reported that he has published the following:

"The New Magistrate Court Rules, The Bar Tab (1998)."
(4)     Character:
The Commission's investigation of Judge Turner did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against him. The Commission's investigation of Judge Turner did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Judge Turner has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Judge Turner was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5)     Reputation:
Judge Turner reported that he is not rated by Martindale-Hubbell.
(6)     Physical Health:
Judge Turner appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7)     Mental Stability:
Judge Turner appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8)     Experience:
Judge Turner was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1991.
Judge Turner provided the following account of his legal experience:
"1990-1991     Stucky and Kobrovsky-general practice, including insurance defense and Section 1983 actions;
1991         Rosen, Rosen, and Hagood-school voting rights;
1991-1994     Private Practice-general practice;
1992-1995     Magistrate Preliminary Hearing Court;
1994-present     Magistrate Small Claims Court.
I have served as a judicial officer for the past five years hearing both civil and criminal cases. I noted in responding to question 17 the percentage of my law practice that was devoted to either civil or criminal areas.
Specifically, I have conducted preliminary hearings and made rulings concerning all areas of substantive criminal law. I was selected as the first Magistrate to hear transfer cases in Charleston County.
Presently, I serve and have served for seven years, as a Charleston County Small Claims Court Judge. This position has enabled me to hear jury and non-jury matters in almost all areas of civil law. I hear cases consistently on remand from Circuit Court.
Finally, I have been recommended to serve as Special Circuit Court Judge in our circuit to assist in handling present cases on the docket."
The Commission was impressed with this recommendation for service as a special circuit court judge. Further, it noted that Judge Turner's service and experience as a magistrate would be beneficial to service as a circuit court judge.
Judge Turner reported the frequency of his court appearances during the last five years as follows:
"(a)     Federal:     N/A
(b)     State:         N/A"
Judge Turner reported that the percentage of his practice involving civil, criminal, and domestic matters during the last five years as follows:
"(a)     Civil:         40%
(b)     Criminal:     20%
(c)     Domestic:     40%"
Judge Turner reported the percentage of his practice in trial court during the last five years as follows:
"Not applicable. (I handle both jury and non-jury trials as judge.)"
The following is Judge Turner's account of his five most significant litigated matters:
"(a)     Passailaigue v. McCants (Legal issues included Statute of Elizabeth, anti-assignment statute and fraudulent conveyance issues and included appeals.
(b)     Ellis v. South Carolina Department of Highways and Public Transportation (Legal issues included Tort Claims Act and chain of custody issues)
(c)     Lester v. Pasjon (The case concerned the litigation of a partnership dissolution)
(d)     Cade v. Guerreri (Breach of contract case which featured technical testimony on construction)
(e)     State v. In the interest of Eric Milligan (Defense of a thirteen year old on cocaine charges and other matters)"
Judge Turner provided that he has held the following judicial positions:
"Preliminary Hearing Court, 1992 - 1995, appointed;
Small Claims Court, 1994 - present, appointed."
Judge Turner reported that he has engaged in the private practice of law while serving as a judge.
Judge Turner reported that he has been a candidate for the circuit court bench in 1996, 1998, and 1999.
(9)     Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Judge Turner's temperament has been and would continue to be excellent.
(10)     Miscellaneous:
The Low Country Citizens Committee found Judge Turner to be "qualified and recommended."
Judge Turner is married to Janice Kirishtein. He has one child: Abigail, age 23 months.
Judge Turner reported that he was a member of the South Carolina Bar Association.
Judge Turner provided the following regarding membership in civic, charitable, education, social, or fraternal organizations:

"I do not belong to these organizations because I have been a judicial officer for the past five years to avoid any potential conflict."

Charles W. Whiten, Jr.
Circuit Court for the Tenth Judicial Circuit, Seat 1
Commission's Findings:     QUALIFIED AND NOMINATED

(1)     Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Mr. Whiten meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as a Circuit Court judge.
Mr. Whiten was born on September 17, 1944. He is 56 years old and a resident of Anderson, South Carolina. Mr. Whiten provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1969.
(2)     Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Mr. Whiten.
Mr. Whiten demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Mr. Whiten reported that he has not made any campaign expenditures.
Mr. Whiten testified he has not:
(a)     sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)     sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)     asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Mr. Whiten testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
(3)     Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Mr. Whiten to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Mr. Whiten described his continuing legal or judicial education during the past five years as follows:
"(a)     03/05/96     Medical Malpractice     6.0 hrs.

12/06/96     Family Ct. Bench/Bar Updates     6.0 hrs.
(b)     11/14/97     Criminal Practice in SC     6.5 hrs.

11/21/97     Breaking the Ties that Bind (Effective Intervention Strategies with Violent Relationships)     5.0 hrs.

12/09/97     Ethics for Family Law Practitioners 3.25 hrs.

12/12/97     The Masters in Trial     7.5 hrs.
(c)     10/02/98     Traffic/DUI     6.5 hrs.

12/19/98     Ethical Dilemmas Common Problems and Not-So-Common Solutions     6.0 hrs.
(d)     01/29/99     PC's from the Inside Out     6.0 hrs.

08/20/99     Paralegal Practice in SC     6.0 hrs.

11/19/99     Drug Litigation in SC     6.83 hrs.
(e)     03/10/00     Solo & Small Office 6.0 hrs.

09/22/00     Issues in Domestic Violence 6.0 hrs.

11/10/00     10th Annual Criminal Practice in SC     6.25 hrs."
Mr. Whiten reported that he has not taught or lectured at any bar association conferences, educational institutions, or continuing legal or judicial education programs.
Mr. Whiten reported that he has published the following:
"(a)     The Republican Manifesto, a novel published by 1st Books Library, December 1999."
(4)     Character:
The Commission's investigation of Mr. Whiten did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against him. The Commission's investigation of Mr. Whiten did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Mr. Whiten has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Mr. Whiten was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5)     Reputation:
Mr. Whiten reported that he is not rated by Martindale-Hubbell.
Mr. Whiten reported that he has served in the military from "September 1969-February 1976 US Air Force Captain; Honorable Discharge-Non-active."
(6)     Physical Health:
Mr. Whiten appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7)     Mental Stability:
Mr. Whiten appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8)     Experience:
Mr. Whiten was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1969.
Mr. Whiten reported that his work history since law school has been:
"1969-1976:     Prosecuted and defended numerous criminal cases while with U.S. Air Force JAG; was Chief of Claims at Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, North Carolina; advised base commanders on military related issues including impact of martial law imposed by Ferdinand Marcos in The Republic of the Philippines; advised military members and defendants on legal issues; staffed remote Air Force legal office in Tahkli, Thailand; advised returning POW's on legal issues;
1976-1978:     Worked as an associate with Harold Lowery Law Firm, Anderson, S.C.;
1978-Present:     I have been a sole practitioner with a general practice with primary emphasis on Civil Law, Family Law, Criminal Law, Social Security, Estates, Elder Law, Landlord & Tenant Law and other legal questions of a general nature. In the past, I have also practiced in the area of Workers' Compensation (including representation of clients in byssinosis cases) and have handled several bankruptcy cases in Bankruptcy Court.
1979-1984:     I served as Public Defender for Anderson County. The character of my practice has changed very little over the years and retains its general nature."
Mr. Whiten also provided:
"In the last twenty-five years, I have represented thousands of criminal defendants for every criminal offense from traffic violations to capital murder. I served as Public Defender for Anderson County from 1979-1984 and represented Defendants in three capital murder trials during that period.
In the last five years, I have served as Chief Counsel on two capital murder cases and represented dozens of criminal defendants in other General Sessions cases ranging from trafficking in drugs to DUI. Some of the issues involved in these cases were: search and seizure; voluntariness of confessions; admissibility of evidence obtained by forensic specialists; credibility of psychiatric and psychological expert testimony; accuracy of judge's charges, and sentencing considerations.
I have handled civil cases in torts, contract disputes, products liability, medical malpractice, unfair trade practices, and other cases involving issues usually associated with a Plaintiff's practice. In the past five years, I have appeared in the Court of Common Pleas as sole counsel for Plaintiffs in automobile accident cases, slip and fall cases, contract disputes, and insurance claims. I have also appeared to represent a few Defendants in insurance claims including subrogation and rate issues."
Mr. Whiten reported the frequency of his court appearances during the last five years as follows:
"(a)     Federal:     Once (excluding Social Security disability hearings before Administrative Law Judge)
(b)     State:         Fifty to Sixty"
Mr. Whiten reported that the percentage of his practice involving civil, criminal, and domestic matters during the last five years as follows:
"(a)     Civil:         25%
(b)     Criminal:     25%
(c)     Domestic:     25%
(d)     Other:         25%"
Mr. Whiten reported the percentage of his practice in trial court during the last five years as follows:
"(a)     Jury:         60%
(b)     Non-jury:     40%"
Mr. Whiten provided that, "I served as sole counsel in all trials in which I appeared other than death penalty trials and on both death penalty cases, I served as Chief Counsel."
The following is Mr. Whiten's account of his five most significant litigated matters:
"(a)     State v. Timothy Wayne Brown (not reported) This case involved a fourteen-year-old child charged with murder. Timothy Wayne Brown was one of the youngest defendants ever charged with murder in the State of South Carolina. The case began in Family Court and was removed to General Sessions Court for trial of the juvenile as an adult. Issues included "when is a juvenile to be treated as an adult for criminal prosecution". This case helped establish appropriate guidelines for removal of juvenile cases to the Court of General Sessions. Another issue in the case was the mens rea of the child, to wit: was a fourteen-year-old child capable of forming the malice aforethought necessary for a conviction of murder? The jury found the defendant guilty of manslaughter, an offense not requiring malice aforethought.
(b)     Gerald Williams v. G.R.C., Inc.; Ig-Lo Products, et al. (not reported) This was a products liability suit brought against G.R.C., Inc., the manufacturer of a can of starter fluid containing ethyl ether. The plaintiff was set afire when the can exploded as he started his riding lawnmower. Issues involved federal laws and regulations allegedly preempting imposition of liability under South Carolina statutory or common law in respect to the type and design of the container used by the Defendants to distribute the ethyl ether; adequate safety warnings; chemical properties of the ethyl ether; standards for admissibility of expert testimony, and the level of damages to someone with first and second degree burns. The case was settled favorably to the Plaintiff just before trial was to begin.
(c)     State v. Norris, 285 S.C. 86, 328 S.E.2d 339 (1985). This was a capital murder case involving the aggravating circumstance of criminal sexual assault in the first degree. The defendant was convicted and sentenced to death. At the trial, I intentionally waived voir dire of the jury venire and secured an agreement by the solicitor not to conduct voir dire. My purpose in waiving voir dire was to attempt to obtain a jury that was not death penalty oriented. The tactic was approved on appeal, the court ruling that 16-3-20 (D) grants a capital defendant the "right" for such examination, but does not mandate its exercise and agreeing that voir dire could be waived. In that case, a detailed questionnaire was submitted to all prospective jurors. This case was one of the first cases in which such a questionnaire was allowed and helped establish the current procedure of submitting detailed questionnaires to jury venire in capital cases. The case also was the first to establish the right of a defendant to both testify as a witness and to make a closing statement to the jury in a capital case. The case also dealt with the restriction on reference to parole eligibility upon a conviction (which was the law at the time) and lead to the current status of the law on reference to parole eligibility. The court also ruled that the statutory aggravating circumstance of a prior conviction for murder can only apply to "murder" as defined in South Carolina law. At the trial, the State submitted as a statutory aggravating circumstance appellant's second-degree murder conviction in Virginia which did not contain the critical element of malice aforethought as required in South Carolina. The case was remanded for re-sentencing and at the re-sentencing, John Foster Norris received a life sentence instead of the death penalty.
(d)     State v. Angela Taylor, 323 S.C. 162, 473 S.E.2d 817 (1996) In this case, defendant was charged with trafficking in methamphetamine. At the trial, the judge instructed the jury that "The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was at least criminally negligent". On appeal, the Court of Appeals of South Carolina reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. The case was never retried and was dismissed. The case was significant in that it established that a person charged with trafficking in methamphetamine must be found to act "knowingly" and that negligence is a lower standard than knowledge.
(e)     George Tucker v. Covil Insulation Co., Inc., et al. (not reported) This was a workers' compensation case in which Mr. Tucker incurred mesothelioma, a cancer of the lining of the lungs, from breathing asbestos some 20 years before he was pronounced terminally ill. I was able to acquire workers' compensation benefits for Mr. Tucker's wife after he died by preserving pieces of Mr. Tucker's lung and acquiring testimony from a pathologist at Duke University that Mr. Tucker had asbestos in his lung lining which was the cause of his mesothelioma. Mrs. Tucker later received additional amounts from national asbestos litigation. The case was significant in that it was one of the asbestos cases that strongly supported the link between remote asbestos exposure and terminal cancer."
The following is Mr. Whiten's account of civil appeals he has personally handled:
"(a)     Christopher M. Jordan and Betty Branyon v. Narcissus Payton, 305 S.C. 537, 409 S.E.2d 739 (1991) This case was in the Court of Appeals for South Carolina. Date of decision was September 23, 1991.
(b)     State v. James B. King, 306 S.C. 335, 412 S.E.2d 375 (1991) This case was in the Supreme Court of South Carolina. Date of decision was December 2, 1991."
Mr. Whiten provided that, "I ran unsuccessfully for Anderson County Council in 1978. Also, I applied for the position of Judge of the Circuit Court, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Seat One in 1998, but withdrew when Circuit Judge H. Dean Hall announced that he would be seeking that position."
(9)     Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Mr. Whiten's temperament would be excellent.
(10)     Miscellaneous:
The Upstate Citizens Committee found Mr. Whiten to be "qualified pursuant to the evaluative criteria established by the Commission."
Mr. Whiten is married to Carla Renee Whiten. He has two children and two step-children: Brandice Camille Whiten, age 30, projectionist; Matthew William Whiten, age 26, stand-up comedian/waiter; Christopher Allen Davis, age 18, student at Tri County Tech; Harold Marshall Davis, age 16, student at Westside High School.
Mr. Whiten reported that he was a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
"(a)     I am a member of the Anderson County Bar Association;
(b)     I have held no offices or titles with the Anderson County Bar Association."
Mr. Whiten provided "I am not a member of any civic, charitable, educational, social or fraternal organizations and have not been in the last five years. I have not received any professional honors, awards or other forms of recognition in the last five years."
Mr. Whiten additionally provided:
"I have been engaged in the practice of law in Anderson County since 1976. From 1978 to the present, I have been a sole practitioner with a general practice at my current address for the last 22 years. During that time, I have represented 897 litigants in civil actions, 1,013 domestic litigants, 214 Social Security claimants, 148 Workers Compensation claimants and have handled 195 estates, 1,041 real estate transactions, including closings, and have prepared 1,317 Wills, Powers of Attorney, corporate charters, licenses of various forms or other legal documents not falling into one of the above categories. I have also represented approximately 4,000 criminal defendants, including criminal defendants assigned to me as Public Defender from 1979 through 1984. I have appeared as Chief Counsel in five death penalty cases and as Assistant Counsel in one other death penalty case. I was also successful in avoiding a death penalty prosecution for a client charged with the murder of a police officer through an agreement with the solicitor's office involving a substantial assistance agreement. I have appeared in Bankruptcy Court and before various other administrative agencies. I have represented students before school boards and a politician in an election dispute.
I also served as deacon at Central Presbyterian Church, have taught Sunday School at that church, served as legal advisor for the Council on Aging in Anderson County for several years, including a period in which I served on the committee to elect a new chairman to the Council on Aging. I prepared the original charter for the Good Neighbor Cupboard in Anderson County (established to provide free food for the indigent) and monitored its initial steps. I am familiar with the political workings of Anderson County as well as the educational processes and I believe I have served my community well the past 25 years. I am seeking the position of circuit court judge in hopes of continuing my community service at a different level. I have achieved all I hoped to achieve professionally in my law practice and am prepared to serve the remainder of my legal career as a circuit court judge."

Roger M. Young
Circuit Court for the Ninth Judicial Circuit, Seat 1
Commission's Findings:     QUALIFIED AND NOMINATED

(1)     Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Judge Young meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as a Circuit Court judge.
Judge Young was born on February 15, 1960. He is 41 years old and a resident of North Charleston, South Carolina. Judge Young provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1983.
(2)     Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Judge Young.
Judge Young demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Judge Young reported that he has made $200.84 in campaign expenditures for the following:
"12-17-00     Supplies, Office Max     54.06
12-18-00     Copies, Office Max         53.28
12-19-00     Stamps, USPS             93.50"
Judge Young testified he has not:
(a)     sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)     sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)     asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Judge Young testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
(3)     Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Judge Young to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Judge Young described his continuing legal or judicial education during the past five years as follows:

Date         Sponsor     Class                         Hours

05/19/96     NJC         Logic for Judges             12.50

05/22/96     NJC         Opinion Writing             12.83

06/19/96     SC Bar         Trial Practice Tune-Up         3.0

07/19/96     SC Bar         ADR Basics                     8.0

10/18/96     SC Bar         Practice Before MIE             6.50

01/10/97     CC Bar         Ethics                         3.0

05/18/97     NJC         Basic Evidence                 23.83

07/11/97     CC Bar         Insurance Coverage

During Hurricane Season     2.0

09/19/97     CC Bar         Real Estate Update             0.8

01/23/98     SC Bar         Annual Criminal Law

Update                         6.50

03/01/98     NJC         Advanced Evidence             24.17

03/20/98     SC Bar         Rules-SC Civil Procedure     6.0

06/11/98     SC Bar         Developments in Real Estate

Law                             6.0

06/21/98     NJC         Managing the Complex Civil

Case                             26.0

10/09/98     SC Bar         Practice Before MIE             6.0

03/26/99     SC Bar         Mechanic's Liens             5.67

04/12/99     NJC         Judicial Writing                 28.25

05/07/99     CC Bar         Real Estate Update             0.75

06/18/99     SC Bar         SC Environmental Law         6.75

07/12/99     NJC         General Jurisdiction             82.75

02/27/00     NJC         Financial Statements

in Court                         13.50

03/01/00     NJC         Business Issues                 13.08

10/13/00     SC Bar         Business Torts                 6.0

01/26/01     SC Bar         Annual Criminal Law

Update                         6.0
In addition to these CLE classes, I took the following classes in the MJS program that I did not apply for CLE credit. These were graduate school classes that lasted 2-4 weeks. With the one exception noted below, each class ran from 8:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. four days a week and required at least two papers per class. The History and Theory of Jurisprudence class was a night class that ran for four weeks. It met from 6:30 p.m. to 9:30 p.m. I took it two weeks at a time over two summers while I was taking classes during the day.
Summer 99/00 UNR History and Theory of Jurisprudence     3 credits
Spring 99         UNR Conducting the Trial     2 credits

(one-week class, test instead of paper)
Spring 00         UNR Law and the Social and Behavioral Sciences 3 credits
Summer 98     UNR Public Policy in the Courts     3 credits
Summer 00     UNR Criminology     3 credits"
Judge Young reported that he has taught the following law-related courses:
"(a)     Speaker, "Practice Before Masters-in-Equity," Bridge the Gap, South Carolina Bar Continuing Legal Education Division and the Supreme Court of South Carolina, March 13, 2001.
(b)     Speaker, "Recent Judicial Decisions Involving Tax Sales," County Auditors, Treasurers and Tax Collectors Academy, February 8, 2001.
(c)     Moderator, "Business Torts, Accounting & Damages," South Carolina Bar Continuing Legal Education Division CLE, October 13, 2000.
(d)     Speaker, "Practice Before Masters-in-Equity," Bridge the Gap, South Carolina Bar Continuing Legal Education Division and the Supreme Court of South Carolina, May 23, 2000.
(e)     Speaker, "Law of Tax Sales," Charleston County Bar Association Real Estate Section, March 7, 2000.
(f)     Speaker, "Recent Judicial Decisions Involving Tax Sales," County Auditors, Treasurers and Tax Collectors Academy, February 3, 2000.
(g)     Speaker, "Twelve by Twelve" CLE, Charleston County Bar Association, December 16, 1999.
(h)     Speaker, "Equitable Remedies," South Carolina Bar Continuing Legal Education Division CLE, October 8, 1999.
(i)     Moderator, Mechanic's Liens CLE, South Carolina Bar Continuing Legal Education Division, March 26, 1999.
(j)     Speaker, "Practice Before Masters-in-Equity," Bridge the Gap, South Carolina Bar Continuing Legal Education Division and the Supreme Court of South Carolina, March 9, 1999, May 18, 1999.
(k)     Speaker, "Law on Tax Sales," Practice Before Masters-in-Equity and Special Referees CLE, South Carolina Bar Continuing Legal Education Division, October 9, 1998.
(l)     Speaker, "Law on Tax Sales," Practice Before Masters-in-Equity and Special Referees CLE, South Carolina Bar Continuing Legal Education Division, October 18, 1996.
(m)     I have taught a business law class approximately two to three times a year for the past five years at the Charleston branch of Southern Wesleyan University.
(n)     I taught Introduction to Criminal Justice this past fall at Charleston Southern University.
(o)     I taught Real Estate Transactions II at the USC Law School in the Spring 2000 semester.
(p)     I have been a guest lecturer on several occasions at Professor Steve Spitz's classes at the law school."
Judge Young reported that he has published the following:
"(a)     The Law of Real Estate Tax Sales, South Carolina Lawyer, September/October 1999;
(b)     Tax Sales of Real Property in South Carolina, 1999 (South Carolina Bar-Continuing Legal Education Division);
(c)     "Sexually Violent Predator Acts," Community-Based Corrections, 4th ed. Wadsworth-Thomason Learning (2000);
(d)     "Using Social Science to Assess the Need for Jury Reform in South Carolina," 52 S.C. Law. Rev. 135 (Fall 2000)."
(4)     Character:
The Commission's investigation of Judge Young did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against him. The Commission's investigation of Judge Young did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Judge Young has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Judge Young was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5)     Reputation:
Judge Young reported that he is not rated by Martindale-Hubbell.
Judge Young provided:
"I was elected to the South Carolina House of Representatives in 1990 and 1992.
I was appointed to serve as interim City Attorney for the City of North Charleston from January to April 1995, and continued to handle legal matters for the City until I began service as Master-in-Equity."
(6)     Physical Health:
Judge Young appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7)     Mental Stability:
Judge Young appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8)     Experience:
Judge Young was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1983.
Judge Young gave the following account of his legal experience:
"When I graduated from law school in 1983, I became an associate with Howard R. Chapman, P.A. Mr. Chapman died in December 1984. From then on I was a sole practitioner. My practice was a general practice handling primarily civil matters including litigation, real estate, and some criminal practice. I became part-time Municipal Court judge for the City of North Charleston in 1988 and served there until 1990 when I resigned to run for the S.C. House of Representatives. I was elected to the House in 1990 and served two terms. I decided not to seek re-election in 1994. I was elected to be the Master-in-Equity for Charleston County in 1995 and began service on January 1, 1996. Since it is a full-time judgeship, I closed my law office in 1995. I have been serving as Master for Charleston continuously since 1996, and have had a concurrent appointment as a Special Circuit Court Judge by the Supreme Court since then.
In the first five to ten years of my practice I handled approximately a dozen criminals cases, including approximately a half-dozen felony matters, several of which went to trial. After about five years of practice I began to handle primarily civil matters, but I would still handle criminal matters on appointment. When I was a Municipal Court judge my jurisdiction was exclusively criminal. I heard mainly summary trials, but I would usually preside over jury trials one week a month. Most of these jury trials were DUIs and simple assault. I have continued to study criminal law and procedure since becoming Master-in-Equity. I have attended two of the Annual Criminal Law Update CLEs required for circuit court judges, including the most recent on January 26, 2001. In addition, I had two days of criminal procedure included in the General Jurisdiction class I took two years ago at the National Judicial College, and I took a two week long class in Criminology last summer as part of my graduate degree program at the University of Nevada-Reno.
As Master-in-Equity my jurisdiction is exclusively civil. Many people are of the misconception that the Master hears only cases involving real estate. In fact, it is only a part of what we do, at least those of us who are full-time. A lot of the litigation I hear is business-related, including breach of contract, insurance claims, unfair trade practice, partnership claims and accounting, and complex business litigation. All of it is non-jury. Once a matter is referred to a Master for a trial, the Master has all the jurisdiction and powers as a circuit court judge sitting non-jury. Coupled with my appointment as a Special Circuit Court Judge, that means I hear every type of motion in every type of civil case, including those involving jury matters. I hear motions on jury and non-jury cases for the circuit court on Fridays and on an as-needed basis throughout the week.
Obviously, I have not had any jury trials in the past five years since I became Master. However, I did try jury cases in my private practice and as a Municipal Court Judge. In addition, I have studied jury trial practice at the National Judicial College and wrote my Masters thesis on reforming jury practice in South Carolina."
Judge Young reported the frequency of his court appearances during the last five years as follows:
"(a)     Federal:     3
(b)     State:         20"
Judge Young reported that the percentage of his practice involving civil, criminal, and domestic matters during the last five years as follows:
"(a)     Civil:         90%
(b)     Criminal:     5%
(c)     Domestic:     5%"
Judge Young reported the percentage of his practice in trial court during the last five years as follows:
"(a)     Jury:         50%
(b)     Non-jury:     50%"

"I presume this means the case was tried and the matter was submitted to a judge for a verdict since non-jury matters don't ever go to a jury."
Judge Young provided that he most often served as sole counsel.
The following is Judge Young's account of his five most significant litigated matters:
"(a)     C-21 v. C-21 Action Realty. This was a federal district court case. As a young associate I was given significant responsibilities in preparing and assisting in a two-day injunction hearing against one of the largest law firms in the state.
(b)     State v. Williams. This was ABWIK and Armed Robbery case. I was sole counsel for one of the co-defendants. It was a three-day trial in circuit court.
(c)     AMIC v. Brown. Case involved violation of restrictive covenants and had interesting issues involving interpretation of covenants, waiver and laches.
(d)     Altman v. Altman. Case involved a dispute between a father and son over an alleged oral agreement involving real estate, construction trusts and parol evidence.
(e)     CMCT v. Bechtel. Case involved a multi-million dollar contract claim against the world's largest construction company."
"I was appointed Municipal Court Judge for the City of North Charleston from 1988 to 1990. My jurisdiction was exclusively criminal and at the time had jurisdictional limits of 30 days in jail and $200 in fines.
I was elected by the General Assembly to be the Master-in-Equity for Charleston County in 1995 and began service on January 1, 1996. Once a case is appointed to the Master, I have the same authority to hear a case as a circuit court judge sitting non-jury. I have also been appointed by the Supreme Court to be a Special Circuit Court Judge for Charleston County for the past five years. As Special Circuit Court Judge, my jurisdiction is to hear all motions in jury and non-jury matters, hear appeals from magistrate, municipal and probate courts, accept Grand Jury returns and hear and approve settlement of minor's interest and wrongful death and survivor action settlements."
Judge Young reported the following as his most significant orders:
"(a)     Kuznick v. Bees Ferry, 96-CP-10-4495. Affirmed in part, reversed in part by the S.C. Court of Appeals, 2000 WL 1409774;
(b)     Lowcountry Open Land Trust v. South Carolina, 96-CP-10-1933;
(c)     Strong v. Sand Castle Builders, 99-CP-10-2920;
(d)     City of Folly Beach v. SCDHEC, OCCRM, 99-CP-10-403;
(e)     Carter v. Patel, 97-CP-15-235."
"I have taught a class in Business Law two to three times a year for Southern Wesleyan University's Charleston campus for the past five years.
I taught a class in Real Estate Transactions II for the USC Law School in the Spring 2000 semester. I reported to Dean Phil Lacy.
I taught a class in Introduction to Criminal Justice for Charleston Southern University in the Fall 2000 semester. The department head is Dr. Elizabeth McConnell."
(9)     Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Judge Young's temperament has been and would continue to be excellent.
(10)     Miscellaneous:
The Lowcountry Citizens Committee found Judge Young to be "qualified and recommended."
Judge Young is married to Janice M. Young. He has two children. Grace Lee Young, 13, and Roger M. Young, 11.
Judge Young reported that he was a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
"(a)     South Carolina Bar;
(b)     Charleston County Bar;
(c)     American Judicature Society;
(d)     American Judges Association."
Judge Young provided that he was a member of the following civic, charitable, education, social, or fraternal organizations:
"(a)     Board of Visitors, Charleston Southern University;
(b)     Charleston Southern University Distinguished Alumnus of the Year, 1998;
(c)     Order of the Palmetto presented by Gov. Carroll Campbell, 1994;
(d)     Service to Mankind Award by Sertoma International, 2000;
(e)     Honorary Doctor of Humane Letters from the University of Charleston, 1992;
(f)     Honorary Kentucky Colonel by commission of Gov. Brereton C. Jones, 1993."
Judge Young additionally reported:
"I enjoy every aspect of being a judge. I have dedicated my life's work to improving the judiciary and the legal system. I have been especially mindful of the need to have judges on the bench who are not only qualified, but who exhibit fairness and equal justice under the law. To this end, I remind myself at every trial that the case I am presiding over is probably the most important thing in the parties' lives. I know that I cannot rule in such a way as to make everyone happy, but hopefully I leave the parties feeling that they received a fair trial. One of the highest compliments I have ever received was when a lawyer against whose client I had ruled was quoted in the newspaper as saying that while he was disappointed I had ruled against his client, he thought I gave his client a fair trial.

One of the main reasons I wish to move to the circuit court is to continue my research in the area of jury reform. Judges have a duty to improve the legal system. My research has shown me that there are areas in which we can do better in South Carolina to improve our system of jury trials. Jury trials are the cornerstone of our country. The right to a jury trial was considered vitally important to the Founding Fathers of this country, so much so that they memorialized it in our Constitution. My particular area of research is currently in the area of improving juror comprehension of jury instructions; however, there are other areas that I believe we should look at as well. Chief Justice Toal has spoken to me about this subject and she intends to launch a jury reform effort in South Carolina. Regardless of whether I am elected to the circuit court, I intend to help in this effort."

CONCLUSION

The following candidates were found qualified:
Judge Deadra L. Jefferson     Circuit Court for the Ninth Judicial Circuit, Seat 1
Judge L. Mendel Rivers, Jr.     Circuit Court for the Ninth Judicial Circuit, Seat 1
Judge James A. Turner     Circuit Court for the Ninth Judicial Circuit, Seat 1
Judge Roger M. Young     Circuit Court for the Ninth Judicial Circuit, Seat 1
J. Cordell Maddox, Jr.         Circuit Court for the Tenth Judicial Circuit, Seat 1
Judge J.C. Nicholson, Jr.     Circuit Court for the Tenth Judicial Circuit, Seat 1
Charles W. Whiten, Jr.     Circuit Court for the Tenth Judicial Circuit, Seat 1
C. Reuben Goude     Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Seat 1
Steven H. John     Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Seat 1
Received as information.

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

The following was introduced:

H. 4068 (Word version) -- Reps. Lourie and J. E. Smith: A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION TO EXPRESS THE PROFOUND SORROW OF THE MEMBERS OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY UPON THE DEATH OF WILLIAM RIPLEY "BILL" BALLOU, SR., OF COLUMBIA AND TO EXTEND DEEPEST SYMPATHY TO HIS FAMILY AND MANY FRIENDS.

The Concurrent Resolution was agreed to and ordered sent to the Senate.

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

The following was introduced:

H. 4069 (Word version) -- Rep. Hayes: A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION TO REQUEST THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION TO NAME A PORTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA HIGHWAY 301 IN DILLON COUNTY AS THE "EUNICE JONES MEMORIAL HIGHWAY" IN MEMORY OF THE LATE MRS. EUNICE JONES, A DISTINGUISHED CITIZEN OF DILLON COUNTY.
The Concurrent Resolution was ordered referred to the Committee on Invitations and Memorial Resolutions.

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

The following was introduced:

H. 4070 (Word version) -- Reps. Scott, Allen, Allison, Altman, Askins, Bales, Barfield, Barrett, Battle, Bingham, Bowers, Breeland, G. Brown, J. Brown, R. Brown, Campsen, Carnell, Cato, Chellis, Clyburn, Coates, Cobb-Hunter, Coleman, Cooper, Cotty, Dantzler, Davenport, Delleney, Easterday, Edge, Emory, Fleming, Freeman, Frye, Gilham, Gourdine, Govan, Hamilton, Harrell, Harrison, Harvin, Haskins, Hayes, J. Hines, M. Hines, Hinson, Hosey, Howard, Huggins, Jennings, Keegan, Kelley, Kennedy, Kirsh, Klauber, Knotts, Koon, Law, Leach, Lee, Limehouse, Littlejohn, Lloyd, Loftis, Lourie, Lucas, Mack, Martin, McCraw, McGee, McLeod, Meacham-Richardson, Merrill, Miller, Moody-Lawrence, J. H. Neal, J. M. Neal, Neilson, Ott, Owens, Parks, Perry, Phillips, Quinn, Rhoad, Rice, Riser, Rivers, Robinson, Rodgers, Rutherford, Sandifer, Scarborough, Sharpe, Sheheen, Simrill, Sinclair, D. C. Smith, F. N. Smith, G. M. Smith, J. E. Smith, J. R. Smith, W. D. Smith, Snow, Stille, Stuart, Talley, Taylor, Thompson, Townsend, Tripp, Trotter, Vaughn, Walker, Webb, Weeks, Whatley, Whipper, White, Wilder, Wilkins, Witherspoon, A. Young and J. Young: A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION TO COMMEND ANNA J. AMOS FOR HER MANY YEARS OF DEDICATED SERVICE TO THIS STATE THROUGH HER WORK IN PUBLIC SAFETY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AND TO CONGRATULATE HER ON BEING PROMOTED TO COLONEL OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA STATE TRANSPORT POLICE.

The Concurrent Resolution was agreed to and ordered sent to the Senate.

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

The following was introduced:

H. 4071 (Word version) -- Reps. J. H. Neal, Bales, J. Brown, Cotty, Harrison, Howard, Lourie, Quinn, Rutherford, Scott and J. E. Smith: A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION TO REQUEST THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION TO NAME THE INTERCHANGE AT THE INTERSECTION OF INTERSTATE HIGHWAY 77 AND SHOP ROAD IN RICHLAND COUNTY THE "LIEUTENANT COLONEL GEORGE D. MARTIN III INTERCHANGE" IN MEMORY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL GEORGE D. MARTIN III WHO LOST HIS LIFE ALONG WITH SIX OTHER AMERICANS AND NINE VIETNAMESE IN A HELICOPTER CRASH ON APRIL 7, 2001, IN VIETNAM WHILE SEARCHING FOR AMERICANS MISSING IN ACTION DURING THE VIETNAM WAR, AND TO ERECT APPROPRIATE SIGNS OR MARKERS WHICH CONTAIN THE WORDS "LIEUTENANT COLONEL GEORGE D. MARTIN III INTERCHANGE".
The Concurrent Resolution was ordered referred to the Committee on Invitations and Memorial Resolutions.

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

The Senate sent to the House the following:

S. 665 (Word version) -- Senator Leatherman: A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION EXPRESSING HEARTFELT APPRECIATION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO MESSRS. ARTHUR STRICKLAND AND JOE NICHOLSON OF FLORENCE, PRODUCERS OF THE TELEVISION PROGRAM "CAROLINAS MOST WANTED" AND WISHING THE PROGRAM CONTINUING SUCCESS IN THE CAUSE OF BRINGING CRIMINALS TO JUSTICE.

The Concurrent Resolution was agreed to and ordered returned to the Senate with concurrence.

INTRODUCTION OF BILLS

The following Bills were introduced, read the first time, and referred to appropriate committees:

H. 4072 (Word version) -- Rep. Sharpe: A BILL TO AMEND SECTION 16-11-610 CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO ENTRY ON ANOTHER'S LANDS FOR VARIOUS PURPOSES WITHOUT PERMISSION, SO AS TO ALLOW REGISTERED LAND SURVEYORS, THEIR EMPLOYEES AND AGENTS TO ENTER ONTO THE LANDS OF OTHERS FOR THE PURPOSE OF PERFORMING CUSTOMARY AND NECESSARY ACTS OF SURVEYING LAND.
Referred to Committee on Judiciary

S. 536 (Word version) -- Senator Wilson: A BILL TO AMEND SECTION 56-5-4030, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO THE MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE WIDTH OF A VEHICLE, SO AS TO PROVIDE THAT APPURTENANCES ON CERTAIN VEHICLES MAY EXCEED THE MAXIMUM WIDTH REQUIREMENT AS LONG AS THEY REMAIN INSIDE THE EXTERIOR REAR VIEW MIRRORS OF THE VEHICLE, OR ITS TOW VEHICLE; AND TO AMEND SECTION 56-5-4070, RELATING TO LIMITATIONS PLACED ON THE LENGTH OF COMBINATION VEHICLES, SO AS TO INCREASE THE MAXIMUM LENGTH OF CERTAIN VEHICLES THAT TRAVEL ALONG THE STATE'S HIGHWAYS FROM FORTY FEET TO FORTY-FIVE FEET.
Referred to Committee on Education and Public Works

S. 538 (Word version) -- Senators Matthews and Hutto: A BILL TO AMEND ACT 526 OF 1996, RELATING TO THE THREE CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICTS IN ORANGEBURG COUNTY, SO AS TO AUTHORIZE THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF EACH DISTRICT TO SET BY MAJORITY VOTE A SALARY THAT EACH MEMBER OF THE BOARD SHALL RECEIVE FOR ATTENDING MEETINGS OF THE BOARD, AND TO PROVIDE FOR THE MANNER IN WHICH THESE AMOUNTS SHALL BE PAID AND FOR LIMITATIONS THEREON.
On motion of Rep. COBB-HUNTER, with unanimous consent, the Bill was ordered placed on the Calendar without reference.

HOUSE RESOLUTION

The following was introduced:

H. 4073 (Word version) -- Reps. Chellis and A. Young: A HOUSE RESOLUTION TO COMMEND CADET RUSS T. TOUCHBERRY OF SUMMERVILLE FOR HIS OUTSTANDING ACADEMIC, ATHLETIC, AND LEADERSHIP ACHIEVEMENTS AS A CADET AND STUDENT ATHLETE AT THE CITADEL, THE MILITARY COLLEGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, AND TO CONGRATULATE CADET TOUCHBERRY ON WINNING BOTH THE MACARTHUR FOUNDATION AWARD FOR LEADERSHIP AND THE BRIGADIER FOUNDATION PRESIDENT'S AWARD FOR ATHLETICS AS A CADET OFFICER AND CAPTAIN OF THE VARSITY TRACK TEAM DURING HIS SENIOR YEAR AT THE CITADEL.

The Resolution was adopted.

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

The following was introduced:

H. 4074 (Word version) -- Reps. J. Brown and J. H. Neal: A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION TO CONGRATULATE BISHOP THEODORE R. MYERS OF RICHLAND COUNTY UPON THE OCCASION OF HIS INSTALLATION AS DIOCESAN BISHOP OF THE BIBLE WAY CHURCHES OF SOUTH CAROLINA ON FRIDAY, MAY 11, 2001.

The Concurrent Resolution was agreed to and ordered sent to the Senate.

HOUSE RESOLUTION

The following was introduced:

H. 4075 (Word version) -- Reps. Harvin and J. Young: A HOUSE RESOLUTION TO COMMEMORATE THE CLARENDON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL UPON THE CELEBRATION OF ITS FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY AND TO WISH THE HOSPITAL, ITS PAST AND PRESENT BOARD MEMBERS, PHYSICIANS, NURSES, ADMINISTRATION, AND STAFF MANY MORE YEARS OF SUCCESS IN CARING FOR THE PEOPLE OF CLARENDON COUNTY.

The Resolution was adopted.

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

The following was introduced:

H. 4076 (Word version) -- Reps. Rutherford, J. Brown, J. H. Neal, Scott, Howard, Bales, Lourie, J. E. Smith, Harrison, Cotty and Quinn: A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION TO COMMEND MRS. TRACI YOUNG COOPER OF RICHLAND COUNTY FOR HER COMMITMENT TO PROVIDING QUALITY EDUCATION TO THE CHILDREN OF SOUTH CAROLINA AND TO CONGRATULATE HER ON BEING NAMED THE 2002 SOUTH CAROLINA TEACHER OF THE YEAR.

The Concurrent Resolution was agreed to and ordered sent to the Senate.

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

The following was introduced:

H. 4077 (Word version) -- Rep. Scott: A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION RECOGNIZING MRS. DOROTHY C. WILSON OF RICHLAND COUNTY FOR THIRTY-THREE YEARS OF DEDICATED SERVICE IN THE FIELD OF PUBLIC EDUCATION UPON HER RETIREMENT.

The Concurrent Resolution was agreed to and ordered sent to the Senate.

ROLL CALL

The roll call of the House of Representatives was taken resulting as follows:

Allen                  Allison                Altman
Bales                  Barfield               Barrett
Bingham                Bowers                 Breeland
Brown, J.              Brown, R.              Carnell
Cato                   Chellis                Clyburn
Coates                 Cobb-Hunter            Coleman
Cooper                 Cotty                  Dantzler
Davenport              Delleney               Easterday
Emory                  Fleming                Freeman
Frye                   Gilham                 Gourdine
Hamilton               Harrell                Haskins
Hayes                  Hines, J.              Hines, M.
Hinson                 Hosey                  Howard
Jennings               Keegan                 Kelley
Kirsh                  Knotts                 Koon
Law                    Leach                  Littlejohn
Lloyd                  Loftis                 Lourie
Lucas                  Martin                 McCraw
McGee                  McLeod                 Meacham-Richardson
Merrill                Miller                 Neal, J.H.
Neal, J.M.             Ott                    Owens
Parks                  Perry                  Phillips
Quinn                  Rhoad                  Rice
Riser                  Rivers                 Robinson
Rodgers                Sandifer               Scarborough
Scott                  Sharpe                 Sheheen
Simrill                Sinclair               Smith, D.C.
Smith, G.M.            Smith, J.E.            Smith, J.R.
Smith, W.D.            Stille                 Stuart
Talley                 Taylor                 Thompson
Townsend               Trotter                Vaughn
Walker                 Webb                   Weeks
Whatley                White                  Wilder
Wilkins                Young, A.              Young, J.

STATEMENT OF ATTENDANCE

I came in after the roll call and was present for the Session on Tuesday, May 8.

Chip Huggins                      James Battle
John J. Snow                      Tracy Edge
David Mack                        H.B. "Chip" Limehouse
James Klauber                     Jackson Whipper
Grady Brown                       Harry Askins
George Campsen                    Alex Harvin
Daniel Tripp                      James Harrison
Kenneth Kennedy                   Brenda Lee
Fletcher Smith                    Todd Rutherford
Total Present--120

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

The SPEAKER granted Rep. NEILSON a leave of absence for the week due to a car accident.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

The SPEAKER granted Rep. WITHERSPOON a leave of absence for the week due to surgery.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

The SPEAKER granted Rep. MOODY-LAWRENCE a leave of absence for the week due to complications from dental medication.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

The SPEAKER granted Rep. GOVAN a leave of absence for the day due to medical reasons.

DOCTOR OF THE DAY

Announcement was made that Dr. James R. Pruitt of Seneca is the Doctor of the Day for the General Assembly.

CO-SPONSORS ADDED AND REMOVED

In accordance with House Rule 5.2 below:
"5.2     Every bill before presentation shall have its title endorsed; every report, its title at length; every petition, memorial, or other paper, its prayer or substance; and, in every instance, the name of the member presenting any paper shall be endorsed and the papers shall be presented by the member to the Speaker at the desk. After a bill or resolution has been presented and given first reading, no further names of co-sponsors may be added. A member may add his name to a bill or resolution or a co-sponsor of a bill or resolution may remove his name at any time prior to the bill or resolution receiving passage on second reading. The member or co-sponsor shall notify the Clerk of the House in writing of his desire to have his name added or removed from the bill or resolution. The Clerk of the House shall print the member's or co-sponsor's written notification in the House Journal. The removal or addition of a name does not apply to a bill or resolution sponsored by a committee."

CO-SPONSOR ADDED

Bill Number:     H. 3417 (Word version)
Date:     ADD:
05/08/01     THOMPSON

CO-SPONSOR ADDED

Bill Number:     H. 3010 (Word version)
Date:     ADD:
05/08/01     D. C. SMITH

CO-SPONSOR ADDED

Bill Number:     H. 3389 (Word version)
Date:     ADD:
05/08/01     PERRY

CO-SPONSOR REMOVED

Bill Number:     H. 3462 (Word version)
Date:     REMOVE:
05/08/01     KNOTTS

H. 3385--DEBATE ADJOURNED

Rep. TOWNSEND moved to adjourn debate upon the following Bill until Thursday, May 17, which was adopted:

H. 3385 (Word version) -- Reps. Townsend and Stille: A BILL TO PROVIDE FOR THE AUTHORITY OF THE ANDERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION IN REGARD TO SCHOOL BUDGETARY MATTERS INCLUDING THE AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE THAT UP TO TWO MILLS OF COUNTYWIDE AD VALOREM PROPERTY TAX LEVIES FOR SCHOOL OPERATIONS BE DISTRIBUTED TO DISTRICTS MEETING CERTAIN CRITERIA ESTABLISHED BY THE BOARD.

ORDERED TO THIRD READING

The following Joint Resolution was taken up, read the second time, and ordered to a third reading:

H. 4062 (Word version) -- Rep. Hayes: A JOINT RESOLUTION TO PROVIDE FOR AN INCREASE IN THE LEVY OF TAXES FOR SCHOOL PURPOSES IN DILLON COUNTY FOR THE FISCAL YEAR BEGINNING JULY 1, 2001, AND ENDING JUNE 30, 2002.

H. 3822--DEBATE ADJOURNED

Rep. CATO moved to adjourn debate upon the following Bill until Wednesday, May 9, which was adopted:

H. 3822 (Word version) -- Reps. Cato, Tripp, Bales, Barfield, Edge, Limehouse, McCraw, Meacham-Richardson, Merrill, Robinson, Sandifer, Scott and Whatley: A BILL TO AMEND CHAPTER 77, TITLE 38, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE, BY ADDING ARTICLE 12 SO AS TO PROVIDE THE DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE THE AUTHORITY TO ISSUE TO A RENTAL COMPANY A LIMITED LICENSE WHICH AUTHORIZES THE COMPANY TO OFFER OR SELL INSURANCE IN CONNECTION WITH THE RENTAL OF A MOTOR VEHICLE.

S. 537--AMENDED AND ORDERED TO THIRD READING

The following Bill was taken up:

S. 537 (Word version) -- Banking and Insurance Committee: A BILL TO AMEND TITLE 38, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO INSURANCE, BY ADDING SECTION 38-90-25 SO AS TO PROVIDE FOR A CAPTIVE REINSURANCE COMPANY TO BE LICENSED TO WRITE REINSURANCE CONTRACTS IN SOUTH CAROLINA; BY ADDING SECTION 38-90-45 SO AS TO PROVIDE FOR MINIMUM CAPITALIZATION OR RESERVES FOR LICENSING OF A CAPTIVE REINSURANCE COMPANY; BY ADDING SECTION 38-90-55 SO AS TO REQUIRE THE INCORPORATION OF A CAPTIVE REINSURANCE COMPANY AS A STOCK INSURER; BY ADDING SECTION 38-90-75 SO AS TO PROVIDE FOR A CAPTIVE REINSURANCE COMPANY TO DISCOUNT ITS LOSS AND LOSS ADJUSTMENT EXPENSE RESERVES; BY ADDING SECTION 38-90-145 SO AS TO PROVIDE FOR AN ANNUAL CAPTIVE REINSURANCE TAX OF FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS; BY ADDING SECTION 38-90-185 SO AS TO PROVIDE FOR IN-STATE MANAGEMENT OF THE ASSETS OF A CAPTIVE REINSURANCE COMPANY; TO AMEND SECTION 38-90-10, RELATING TO DEFINITIONS FOR PURPOSES OF REGULATION OF CAPTIVE INSURANCE COMPANIES, SO AS TO PROVIDE DEFINITIONS FOR "CAPTIVE REINSURANCE COMPANY" AND CERTAIN ACCOUNTING TERMS; TO AMEND SECTION 38-90-70, RELATING TO FINANCIAL REPORTING TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, SO AS TO REQUIRE AN ANNUAL REPORT FROM A CAPTIVE REINSURANCE COMPANY; TO AMEND SECTION 38-90-220, RELATING TO SPONSORS OF CAPTIVE INSURANCE COMPANIES, SO AS TO REQUIRE STATE LICENSING OR AUTHORIZATION OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, A TRUST FUND SECURING LOSSES; TO AMEND SECTION 38-10-10, RELATING TO THE PURPOSES OF ESTABLISHING PROTECTED CELLS OF A DOMESTIC INSURER, SO AS TO INCLUDE A CAPTIVE INSURER; TO AMEND SECTION 38-10-20, RELATING TO DEFINITIONS FOR PURPOSES OF PROTECTED CELL INSURANCE COMPANIES, SO AS TO INCLUDE A CAPTIVE INSURER; AND TO AMEND SECTION 38-9-200, AS AMENDED, RELATING TO CREDIT ALLOWANCE FOR INSURANCE COMPANIES, SO AS TO PROHIBIT CREDIT FOR REINSURANCE BASED ON THE STATUS OF A CAPTIVE REINSURANCE COMPANY.

The Labor, Commerce and Industry Committee proposed the following Amendment No. 1 (Doc Name COUNCIL\DKA\AMEND\ 4349MM01), which was adopted:
Amend the bill, as and if amended, by striking all after the enacting words and inserting:
/ SECTION     1.     The 1976 Code is amended by adding:

"Section 38-90-25.     (A)     A captive reinsurance company, if permitted by its articles of incorporation or charter, may apply to the director for a license to write reinsurance covering property and casualty insurance or reinsurance contracts. A captive reinsurance company authorized by the director may write reinsurance contracts covering risks in any state.

(B)     To conduct business in this State, a captive reinsurance company shall:

(1)     obtain from the director a license authorizing it to conduct business as a captive reinsurance company in this State;

(2)     hold at least one board of directors' meeting each year in this State;

(3)     maintain its principal place of business in this State; and

(4)     appoint a registered agent to accept service of process and act otherwise on its behalf in this State.

(C)     Before receiving a license, a captive reinsurance company shall file with the director:

(1)     a certified copy of its charter and bylaws;

(2)     a statement under oath of its president and secretary showing its financial condition; and

(3)     other documents required by the director.

(D)     In addition to the information required by subsection (C), the applicant captive reinsurance company shall file with the director evidence of:

(1)     the amount and liquidity of its assets relative to the risks to be assumed;

(2)     the adequacy of the expertise, experience, and character of the person who manages it;

(3)     the overall soundness of its plan of operation; and

(4)     other overall factors considered relevant by the director in ascertaining if the proposed captive reinsurance company is able to meet its policy obligations.

(E)     Information submitted pursuant to this section is confidential and may not be made public by the director or an agent or employee of the director without the written consent of the company, except that:

(1)     information may be discoverable by a party in a civil action or contested case to which the submitting captive reinsurance company is a party, upon a showing by the party seeking to discover the information that:

(a)     the information sought is relevant to and necessary for the furtherance of the action or case;

(b)     the information sought is unavailable from other nonconfidential sources;

(c)     a subpoena issued by a judicial or administrative law officer of competent jurisdiction has been submitted to the director; and

(2)     the director may disclose the information to the public officer having jurisdiction over the regulation of insurance in another state if:

(a)     the public official agrees in writing to maintain the confidentiality of the information; and

(b)     the laws of the state in which the public official serves require the information to be confidential.

(F)     The provisions of subsection (E) do not apply to an industrial insured captive reinsurance company insuring the risks of an industrial insured group."
SECTION     2.     The 1976 Code is amended by adding:

"Section 38-90-45.     (A)     The director may not issue a license to a captive reinsurance company unless the company possesses and maintains capital or free surplus of not less than the greater of three hundred million dollars or ten percent of reserves. The surplus may be in form of cash or securities.

(B)     The director may prescribe additional capital or surplus based upon the type, volume, and nature of the insurance business transacted.

(C)     A captive reinsurance company may not pay a dividend out of, or other distribution with respect to, capital or surplus in excess of the limitations, without the prior approval of the director. Approval of an ongoing plan for the payment of dividends or other distributions must be conditioned upon the retention, at the time of each payment, of capital or surplus in excess of amounts specified by, or determined in accordance with formulas approved by, the director."
SECTION     3.     The 1976 Code is amended by adding:

"Section 38-90-55.     (A)     A captive reinsurance company must be incorporated as a stock insurer with its capital divided into shares and held by its shareholders.

(B)     A captive reinsurance company may not have fewer than three incorporators of whom at least two must be residents of this State.

(C)     Before the articles of incorporation are transmitted to the Secretary of State, the incorporators shall petition the director to issue a certificate finding that the establishment and maintenance of the proposed corporation promotes the general good of this State. In arriving at this finding the director shall consider:

(1)     the character, reputation, financial standing, and purposes of the incorporators;

(2)     the character, reputation, financial responsibility, insurance experience, and business qualifications of the officers and directors; and

(3)     other factors the director considers advisable.

(D)     The capital stock of a captive reinsurance company must be issued at par value or greater.

(E)     At least one of the members of the board of directors of a captive reinsurance company incorporated in this State must be a resident of this State."
SECTION     4.     The 1976 Code is amended by adding:

"Section 38-90-75.     (A)     A sponsored captive insurance company and a captive reinsurance company may discount its loss and loss adjustment expense reserves at treasury rates applied to the applicable payments projected through the use of the expected payment pattern associated with the reserves.

(B)     A sponsored captive insurance company and a captive reinsurance company shall file annually an actuarial opinion on loss and loss adjustment expense reserves provided by an independent actuary. The actuary may not be an employee of the captive company or its affiliates.

(C)     The director may disallow the discounting of reserves if a sponsored captive insurance company or a captive reinsurance company violates a provision of this title."
SECTION     5.     The 1976 Code is amended by adding:

"Section 38-90-145.     (A)     A captive reinsurance company shall pay to the department by March first of each year a captive reinsurance tax of five thousand dollars.

(B)     The tax provided in this section is the only tax collectible pursuant to the laws of this State from a captive reinsurance company, and no tax on reinsurance premiums, other than occupation tax, nor any other taxes may be levied or collected from a captive reinsurance company by the State or a county, city, or municipality within this State, except ad valorem taxes on real and personal property used in the production of income.

(C)     A captive reinsurance company failing to make returns or to pay all taxes required by this section, is subject to sanctions provided in this title."
SECTION     6.     The 1976 Code is amended by adding:

"Section 38-90-185.     At least thirty-five percent of the assets of a captive reinsurance company must be managed by an asset manager domiciled in this State."
SECTION     7.     The 1976 Code is amended by adding:

"Section 38-90-235.     (A)     Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the terms and conditions provided in Chapter 10 relating to a protected cell insurance company apply in full to a sponsored captive insurance company.

(B)     In the case of a sponsored captive insurance company:

(1)     a protected cell need not be established solely for the purpose of effecting insurance securitizations, but may be established for the purpose of isolating the expenses and claims of a sponsored captive insurance company participant;

(2)     the sponsored captive insurance company shall attribute all insurance obligations, assets, and liabilities relating to a participant's risks to the participant's protected cell; and

(3)     Section 38-10-40-(F) does not apply."
SECTION     8.     Section 38-90-10 of the 1976 Code, as added by Act 331 of 2000, is amended to read:

"Section 38-90-10.     As used in this chapter, unless the context requires otherwise:

(1)     'Alien captive insurance company' means an insurance company formed to write insurance business for its parents and affiliates and licensed pursuant to the laws of an alien jurisdiction which imposes statutory or regulatory standards in a form acceptable to the director on companies transacting the business of insurance in such jurisdiction.

(2)     'Affiliated company' means a company in the same corporate system as a parent, an industrial insured, or a member organization by virtue of common ownership, control, operation, or management.

(3)     'Association' means a legal association of individuals, corporations, partnerships, or associations that has been in continuous existence for at least one year:

(a)     the member organizations of which collectively, or which does itself;

(i)         own, control, or hold with power to vote all of the outstanding voting securities of an association captive insurance company incorporated as a stock insurer; or

(ii)     have complete voting control over an association captive insurance company incorporated as a mutual insurer; or

(b)     the member organizations of which collectively constitute all of the subscribers of an association captive insurance company formed as a reciprocal insurer.

(4)     'Association captive insurance company' means a company that insures risks of the member organizations of the association and their affiliated companies.

(5)     'Branch business' means any insurance business transacted by a branch captive insurance company in this State.

(6)     'Branch captive insurance company' means an alien captive insurance company licensed by the director to transact the business of insurance in this State through a business unit with a principal place of business in this State.

(7)     'Branch operations' means any business operations of a branch captive insurance company in this State.

(8)     'Captive insurance company' means a pure captive insurance company, association captive insurance company, captive reinsurance company, sponsored captive insurance company, or industrial insured captive insurance company formed or licensed under this chapter. For purposes of this chapter, a branch captive insurance company must be a pure captive insurance company with respect to operations in this State, unless otherwise permitted by the director.

(9)     'Captive reinsurance company' means a reinsurance company that is formed or licensed pursuant to this chapter and is wholly owned by a qualifying reinsurance parent company. A captive reinsurance company is a stock corporation.

(10)     'Consolidated debt to total capital ratio' means the ratio of the sum of (a)     all debts and hybrid capital instruments including, but not limited to, all borrowings from banks, all senior debt, all subordinated debts, all trust preferred shares, and all other hybrid capital instruments that are not included in the determination of consolidated GAAP new worth issued and outstanding to (b) total capital, consisting of all debts and hybrid capital instruments as described in subitem (a) plus shareholders' equity determined in accordance with GAAP for reporting to the United States Securities and Exchange Commission.

(11)     'Consolidated GAAP net worth' means the consolidated shareholders' equity determined in accordance with GAAP for reporting to the United States Securities and Exchange Commission.

(12)     'Controlled unaffiliated business' means a company:

(a)     that is not in the corporate system of a parent and affiliated companies;

(b)     that has an existing contractual relationship with a parent or affiliated company; and

(c)     whose risks are managed by a pure captive insurance company in accordance with Section 38-90-190.

(10)(13)     'Director' means the Director of the South Carolina Department of Insurance or the director's designee.

(11)(14)     'Department' means the South Carolina Department of Insurance.

(15)     'GAAP' means generally accepted accounting principles.

(12)(16)     'Industrial insured' means an insured as defined in Section 38-25-150(8).

(13)(17)     'Industrial insured captive insurance company' means a company that insures risks of the industrial insureds that comprise the industrial insured group and their affiliated companies.

(14)(18)     'Industrial insured group' means a group that meets either of the following criteria:

(a)     a group of industrial insureds that collectively:

(i)         own, control, or hold with power to vote all of the outstanding voting securities of an industrial insured captive insurance company incorporated as a stock insurer; or

(ii)     have complete voting control over an industrial insured captive insurance company incorporated as a mutual insurer; or

(b)     a group which is created under the Product Liability Risk Retention Act of 1981, 15 U.S.C. Section 3901 et seq., as amended, as a corporation or other limited liability association taxable as a stock insurance company or a mutual insurer under this title.

(15)(19)     'Member organization' means a an individual, corporation, partnership, or association that belongs to an association.

(16)(20)     'Parent' means a corporation, partnership, or individual that directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote more than fifty per cent of the outstanding voting securities of a pure captive insurance company.

(17)(21)     'Participant' means an entity as defined in Section 38-90-230, and any affiliates of that entity, that are insured by a sponsored captive insurance company, where the losses of the participant are limited through a participant contract to the assets of a protected cell.

(18)(22)     'Participant contract' means a contract by which a sponsored captive insurance company insures the risks of a participant and limits the losses of the participant to the assets of a protected cell.

(19)(23)     'Protected cell' means a separate account established and maintained by a sponsored captive insurance company for one participant.

(20)(24)     'Pure captive insurance company' means a company that insures risks of its parent and affiliated companies.

(25)     'Qualifying reinsurer parent company' means a reinsurer authorized to write reinsurance by this State and that has a consolidated GAAP net worth of not less than five hundred million dollars and consolidated debt to total capital ratio not greater than 0.50.

(21)(26)     'Sponsor' means an entity that meets the requirements of Section 38-90-220 and is approved by the director to provide all or part of the capital and surplus required by applicable law and to organize and operate a sponsored captive insurance company.

(22)(27)     'Sponsored captive insurance company' means a captive insurance company:

(a)     in which the minimum capital and surplus required by applicable law is provided by one or more sponsors;

(b)     that is formed or licensed under this chapter;

(c)     that insures the risks of separate participants through the contract; and
(d) that segregates each participant's liability through one or more protected cells.

(28)     'Treasury rates' means the United States treasury strips asked yield as published in the Wall Street Journal as of a balance sheet date."
SECTION     9.     Section 38-90-70(B) of the 1976 Code, as added by Act 331 of 2000, is amended to read:

"(B)     Before March 1 first of each year, a captive insurance company or a captive reinsurance company shall submit to the director a report of its financial condition, verified by oath of two of its executive officers. Except as provided in Sections 38-90-40 and 38-90-50, a captive insurance company or a captive reinsurance company shall report using generally accepted accounting principles, unless the director approves the use of statutory accounting principles, with any useful or necessary modifications or adaptations required or approved or accepted by the director for the type of insurance and kinds of insurers to be reported upon, and as supplemented by additional information required by the director. Except as otherwise provided, an association captive insurance company and an industrial insured group shall file its report in the form required by Section 38-13-80, and each industrial insured group shall comply with the requirements set forth in Section 38-13-85. The director by regulation shall prescribe the forms in which pure captive insurance companies and industrial insured captive insurance companies shall report."
SECTION     10.     Section 38-90-100 of the 1976 Code, as added by Act 331 of 2000, is amended to read:

"Section 38-90-100.     (A)     An association captive insurance company, a sponsored captive insurance company, and an industrial insured group shall comply with the investment requirements contained in this title. Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, the director may approve the use of alternative reliable methods of valuation and rating.

(B)     A pure captive insurance company, or an industrial insured captive insurance company, and a sponsored captive insurance company is are not subject to any restrictions on allowable investments contained in this title; however, the director may prohibit or limit an investment that threatens the solvency or liquidity of the company.

(C)     Only a pure captive insurance company may make loans to its parent company or affiliates and only upon the prior written approval of the director and must be evidenced by a note in a form approved by the director. Loans of minimum capital and surplus funds required by Sections 38-90-40(A) and 38-90-50(A) are prohibited."
SECTION     11.     Section 38-90-150 of the 1976 Code, as added by Act 331 of 2000, is amended to read:

"Section 38-90-150.     The director may promulgate and, from time to time, amend rules and regulations and issue orders relating to captive insurance companies as are necessary to enable the director to carry out the provisions of this chapter."
SECTION     12.     Section 38-90-180 of the 1976 Code, as added by Act 331 of 2000, is amended to read:

"Section 38-90-180.     (A)     Except as otherwise provided in this section, the terms and conditions set forth provided for in Chapter 27 pertaining to insurance reorganizations, receiverships, and injunctions apply in full to captive insurance companies formed or licensed under pursuant to this chapter.

(B)     In the case of a sponsored captive insurance company:

(1)     the assets of the protected cell may not be used to pay any expenses or claims other than those attributable to the protected cell; and

(2)     its capital and surplus at all times must be available to pay any expenses of or claims against the sponsored captive insurance company and may not be used to pay expenses or claims attributable to a protected cell."
SECTION     13.     Section 38-90-220 of the 1976 Code, as added by Act 331 of 2000, is amended to read:

"Section 38-90-220.     A sponsor of a sponsored captive insurance company must be an insurer licensed under pursuant to the laws of any a state, an insurance holding company that controls an insurer licensed pursuant to the laws of any state and subject to registration pursuant to the insurance holding company system laws of the state of domicile of the insurer, a reinsurer authorized or approved under pursuant to the laws of any a state, or a captive insurance company formed or licensed under pursuant to this chapter. A risk retention group may not be either a sponsor or a participant of a sponsored captive insurance company. The business written by a sponsored captive insurance company with respect to each protected cell must be fronted by an insurance company licensed under the laws of any state. A risk retention group may not be either a sponsor or a participant of a sponsored captive insurance company.:

(1)     fronted by an insurance company licensed pursuant to the laws of:

(a)     any state; or

(b)     any jurisdiction if the insurance company is a wholly owned subsidiary of an insurance company licensed pursuant to the laws of any state;

(2)     reinsured by a reinsurer authorized or approved by this State; or

(3)     secured by a trust fund in the United States for the benefit of policyholders and claimants funded by an irrevocable letter of credit or other asset acceptable to the director. The amount of security provided by the trust fund may not be less than the reserves associated with those liabilities, including reserves for losses, allocated loss adjustment expenses, incurred but unreported losses, and unearned premiums for business written through the participant's protected cell. The director may require the sponsored captive to increase the funding of a trust established pursuant to this item. If the form of security in the trust is a letter of credit, the letter of credit must be established, issued, or confirmed by a bank chartered in this State, a member of the federal reserve system, or a bank chartered by another state if that state-chartered bank is acceptable to the director. A trust and trust instrument maintained pursuant to this item must be in a form and upon terms approved by the director."
SECTION     14.     Section 38-90-230 of the 1976 Code, as added by Act 331 of 2000, is amended to read:

"Section 38-90-230.     (A)     An association, a corporation, a limited liability company, a partnership, a trust, or other business entity may be a participant in a sponsored captive insurance company formed or licensed under pursuant to this chapter.

(B)     A sponsor may be a participant in a sponsored captive insurance company.

(C)     A participant need not be a shareholder of the sponsored captive insurance company or an affiliate of the company.

(D)     A participant shall insure only its own risks through a sponsored captive insurance company, unless otherwise approved by the director."
SECTION     15.     Section 38-10-10 of the 1976 Code, as added by Act 238 of 2000, is amended to read:

"Section 38-10-10.     This chapter is adopted to provide a basis for the creation of protected cells by a domestic insurer or captive insurer as defined in Chapter 90 as one means of accessing alternative sources of capital and achieving the benefits of insurance securitization. Investors in fully funded insurance securitization transactions provide funds that are available to pay the insurer's insurance obligations or to repay the investors, or both. The creation of protected cells is intended to be a means to achieve more efficiencies in conducting insurance securitizations."
SECTION     16.     Section 38-10-20(10) of the 1976 Code, as added by Act 238 of 2000, is amended to read:

"(10)     'Protected cell company' means a domestic insurer or captive insurer that has one or more protected cells."
SECTION     17.     Section 38-9-200(B) of the 1976 Code, as last amended by Act 422 of 1998, is further amended to read:

"(B)     Credit shall must be allowed when the reinsurance is ceded to an assuming insurer which is licensed to transact insurance or reinsurance in this State, or approved as a reinsurer by the director or designee provided by Section 38-5-60, or licensed as a captive reinsurance company pursuant to Chapter 90 of this title. It is not the intent of this provision to allow an insurer domiciled outside this State to take credit for reinsurance in its financial statements based on the domestic license, authorization, accreditation, or 'substantially similar' status of the captive reinsurance company."
SECTION     18.     This act takes effect upon approval by the Governor. /
Renumber sections to conform.
Amend totals and title to conform.

Rep. CATO explained the amendment.
The amendment was then adopted.

The Bill, as amended, was read the second time and ordered to third reading.

H. 3768--POINT OF ORDER

The following Bill was taken up:

H. 3768 (Word version) -- Rep. Askins: A BILL TO AMEND SECTION 56-3-120, AS AMENDED, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO EXEMPTIONS FROM MOTOR VEHICLE REGISTRATION AND LICENSING REQUIREMENTS, SO AS TO EXEMPT CERTAIN FIREFIGHTING VEHICLES.

Rep. MARTIN explained the Bill.

POINT OF ORDER

Rep. RICE made the Point of Order that the Bill was improperly before the House for consideration since its number and title have not been printed in the House Calendar at least one statewide legislative day prior to second reading.
The SPEAKER sustained the Point of Order.

H. 3907--AMENDED AND ORDERED TO THIRD READING

The following Bill was taken up:

H. 3907 (Word version) -- Rep. Townsend: A BILL TO AMEND SECTION 56-5-4170, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO THE TENDER OR INTERCHANGE OF AN INTERMODAL TRAILER, CHASSIS, OR CONTAINER, SO AS TO MAKE TECHNICAL CHANGES, PROVIDE THAT IF THE EQUIPMENT PROVIDER FOR CERTAIN OUT-OF-SERVICE VEHICLES FAILS TO REIMBURSE THE MOTOR CARRIER OPERATOR FOR FINES AND PENALTIES INCURRED PURSUANT TO THE VEHICLE'S OUT-OF-SERVICE ORDER WITHIN THIRTY DAYS OF A CONVICTION FOR VIOLATING A ROADSIDE INSPECTION, THEN THE MOTOR CARRIER OPERATOR HAS A CIVIL CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE EQUIPMENT PROVIDER, TO PROVIDE THAT THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THIS SECTION ARE INTENDED TO ELIMINATE THE RESPONSIBILITY AND OBLIGATION OF A MOTOR CARRIER AND OPERATOR TO MAINTAIN AND OPERATE VEHICLES IN ACCORDANCE WITH FEDERAL MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY REGULATIONS AND ALL STATE AND LOCAL LAWS, AND TO PROVIDE THAT ANY PROVISION CONTAINED IN AN INTERMODAL INTERCHARGE CONTRACT PROVIDING FOR A HOLD HARMLESS OR INDEMNITY AGREEMENT, OR BOTH, BETWEEN THE MOTOR CARRIER OPERATOR AND THE TENDERER OR OWNER OF A VEHICLE, CONTRARY TO ANY PROVISION OF THIS SECTION IS VOID.

The Education and Public Works Committee proposed the following Amendment No. 1 (Doc Name COUNCIL\GGS\AMEND\ 22035CM01), which was adopted:
Amend the bill, as and if amended, by striking the title and inserting:
/TO AMEND SECTION 56-5-4170, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO THE TENDER OR INTERCHANGE OF AN INTERMODAL TRAILER, CHASSIS, OR CONTAINER, SO AS TO MAKE TECHNICAL CHANGES, PROVIDE THAT IF THE EQUIPMENT PROVIDER FOR CERTAIN OUT-OF-SERVICE VEHICLES FAILS TO REIMBURSE THE MOTOR CARRIER OPERATOR FOR FINES AND PENALTIES INCURRED PURSUANT TO THE VEHICLE'S OUT-OF-SERVICE ORDER WITHIN THIRTY DAYS OF A CONVICTION FOR VIOLATING A ROADSIDE INSPECTION, THEN THE MOTOR CARRIER OPERATOR HAS A CIVIL CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE EQUIPMENT PROVIDER, TO PROVIDE THAT THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THIS SECTION ARE NOT INTENDED TO ELIMINATE THE RESPONSIBILITY AND OBLIGATION OF A MOTOR CARRIER AND OPERATOR TO MAINTAIN AND OPERATE VEHICLES IN ACCORDANCE WITH FEDERAL MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY REGULATIONS AND ALL STATE AND LOCAL LAWS, AND TO PROVIDE THAT ANY PROVISION CONTAINED IN AN INTERMODAL INTERCHARGE CONTRACT PROVIDING FOR A HOLD HARMLESS OR INDEMNITY AGREEMENT, OR BOTH, BETWEEN THE MOTOR CARRIER OPERATOR AND THE TENDERER OR OWNER OF A VEHICLE, CONTRARY TO ANY PROVISION OF THIS SECTION IS VOID./
Amend further Section 56-5-4170(I) as contained in SECTION 1, by striking Section 56-5-4170(I) and inserting:
/     (I)     Except as provided in subsection (G) of this section, any provision contained in an intermodal interchange contract providing for a hold harmless or indemnity agreement, or both, between the motor carrier operator and the tenderer or owner of a vehicle, contrary to any provision of this section, is contrary to public policy and is null and void. /
Renumber sections to conform.
Amend title to conform.

Rep. TOWNSEND explained the amendment.
The amendment was then adopted.

The Bill, as amended, was read the second time and ordered to third reading.

S. 187--POINT OF ORDER

The following Bill was taken up:

S. 187 (Word version) -- Senators Rankin, Short and Hutto: A BILL TO AMEND SECTION 56-5-6410, AS AMENDED, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO THE USE OF A CHILD PASSENGER RESTRAINT SYSTEM IN A MOTOR VEHICLE THAT TRANSPORTS A CHILD UNDER SIX YEARS OF AGE, SO AS TO PROVIDE THAT A CHILD FOUR YEARS OF AGE OR MORE WHO CANNOT SIT WITH THEIR BACKS STRAIGHT AGAINST THE VEHICLE SEAT BACK CUSHION WITH KNEES BENT OVER A VEHICLE'S SEAT EDGE MUST BE SECURED BY A BELT-POSITIONING BOOSTER SEAT PRESCRIBED BY THE NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION.

The Education and Public Works Committee proposed the following Amendment No. 1 (Doc Name COUNCIL\GGS\AMEND\ 22063CM01):
Amend the bill, as and if amended, by striking all after the enacting words and inserting:
/ SECTION     1.     Section 56-5-6410 of the 1976 Code, as last amended by Act 115 of 1999, is further amended to read:

"Section 56-5-6410.     Every driver of a motor vehicle (passenger car, pickup truck, van, or recreational vehicle) registered in this State or primarily operated on the highways and streets of this State when transporting a child under six years of age upon the public streets and highways of the State shall must provide an appropriate child passenger restraint system and shall must secure the child as follows:

(1)     Any A child three years of age or less from birth to twenty pounds and one year of age must be properly secured in a rear facing child restraint system safety seat which meets the standards prescribed by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

(2)     Any A child four or five years of age who is between twenty pounds and one year of age to forty pounds and age four must be secured by a in a forward facing child safety belt seat provided in the motor vehicle unless properly secured in a child restraint system which meets the standards prescribed by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

(3)     A child up to the age of six years who is between forty and eighty pounds must be secured by a belt-positioning booster seat. The belt-positioning booster seat must be used with both lap and shoulder belts. A booster seat must not be used with a lap belt alone.

(4)     If a child up to the age of six years is over eighty pounds, the child may be restrained in an adult seat belt. If a child under the age of six years can sit with his back straight against the vehicle seat back cushion, with his knees bent over the vehicle's seat edge without slouching, the child may be moved out of the booster seat into the regular back seat and secured by the adult seat belt.

(5)     A child under six years of age may not occupy a front passenger seat of a motor vehicle. This restriction does not apply if the motor vehicle does not have rear passenger seats or if all rear passenger seats are occupied by other children under six years of age.

Any child restraint system of a type sufficient to meet the physical standards prescribed by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration at the time of its manufacture is sufficient to meet the requirements of this article."
SECTION     2.     Section 56-5-6520 of the 1976 Code is amended to read:

"Section 56-5-6520.     The driver and every occupant of a motor vehicle, when it is being operated on the public streets and highways of this State, shall must wear a fastened safety belt which complies with all provisions of federal law for their use. The driver is charged with the responsibility of requiring each occupant over six years of age up to and under seventeen eighteen years of age to wear a safety belt or be secured in a child restraint system as provided in Article 47 of this chapter."
SECTION     3.     Section 56-5-6540 of the 1976 Code is amended to read:

"Section 56-5-6540.     (A)     A person violating the provisions of this article, upon conviction, must be fined not more than ten twenty-five dollars, all or part of which may be suspended. No court costs, assessments, or surcharges may be assessed against the person convicted. No person may be fined more than twenty fifty dollars for any one incident of one or more violations of the provisions of this article. No custodial arrest for a violation of this article may be made, except upon a warrant issued for failure to appear in court when summoned or for failure to pay an imposed fine. A conviction for violation of this article does not constitute a criminal offense. Notwithstanding Section 56-1-640, a conviction for a violation of this article must not be included in the offender's motor vehicle records maintained by the Department of Public Safety or in the criminal records maintained by SLED.

(B)     A law enforcement officer may not stop and issue a citation to a driver solely for a violation of this article in the absence of another violation of the motor vehicle laws except when a driver under the age of eighteen years or an occupant of the motor vehicle under the age of eighteen years of age is not wearing a safety belt or is not secured in a child restraint system as required by Article 47, or except when the stop is made in conjunction with a driver's license check or registration check conducted at a checkpoint established to stop all drivers on a certain road for a period of time. A citation for a violation of this article must not be issued without citing the violation that initially caused the officer to effect the enforcement stop.

(C)     A violation of this article does not constitute negligence per se or contributory negligence and is not admissible as evidence in a civil action.

(D)     Probable cause for a violation of this article must be based on a law enforcement officer's clear and unobstructed view of a person under the age of eighteen not restrained as required by this article. No vehicle, driver, or occupant in a vehicle may be searched solely as a result of a violation of this article."
SECTION     4.     This act takes effect July 1, 2001, and applies to all offenses committed on or after that date. /
Amend title to conform.

Rep. TOWNSEND explained the amendment.

POINT OF ORDER

Rep. SIMRILL made the Point of Order that the Bill was improperly before the House for consideration since its number and title have not been printed in the House Calendar at least one statewide legislative day prior to second reading.
The SPEAKER sustained the Point of Order.

S. 384--POINT OF ORDER

The following Bill was taken up:

S. 384 (Word version) -- Senators Verdin, Branton, Ryberg, Patterson and Ritchie: A BILL TO AMEND SECTION 56-3-630, AS AMENDED, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY CLASSIFYING CERTAIN MOTOR VEHICLES AS PRIVATE PASSENGER MOTOR VEHICLES, SO AS TO REVISE THE MAXIMUM EMPTY WEIGHT OF A TRUCK THAT THE DEPARTMENT SHALL CLASSIFY AS A PRIVATE PASSENGER MOTOR VEHICLE.

POINT OF ORDER

Rep. MARTIN made the Point of Order that the Bill was improperly before the House for consideration since its number and title have not been printed in the House Calendar at least one statewide legislative day prior to second reading.
The SPEAKER sustained the Point of Order.

S. 495--POINT OF ORDER

The following Bill was taken up:

S. 495 (Word version) -- Senators Wilson, Verdin and McConnell: A BILL TO AMEND THE CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, BY ADDING SECTION 56-3-1265 SO AS TO PROVIDE THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY MUST DISPLAY IN ALL DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLE OFFICES WHERE MOTOR VEHICLE LICENSE PLATES OR STICKERS MAY BE OBTAINED OR RENEWED EXAMPLES OF ALL TYPES OF SPECIAL LICENSE PLATES WHICH INDIVIDUALS OF A PARTICULAR GROUP MAY OBTAIN, AND TO PROVIDE EXCEPTIONS.

POINT OF ORDER

Rep. TOWNSEND made the Point of Order that the Bill was improperly before the House for consideration since its number and title have not been printed in the House Calendar at least one statewide legislative day prior to second reading.
The SPEAKER sustained the Point of Order.

H. 3034--POINT OF ORDER

The following Bill was taken up:

H. 3034 (Word version) -- Rep. Lucas: A BILL TO AMEND THE CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, BY ADDING SECTION 59-104-25 SO AS TO ESTABLISH CRITERIA FOR THE AWARDING OF PALMETTO FELLOWS SCHOLARSHIPS TO STUDENTS GRADUATING IN 2001 AND THEREAFTER WHO ATTEND "MAGNET SCHOOLS" OR SCHOOLS WITH "OPEN ENROLLMENT".

POINT OF ORDER

Rep. TOWNSEND made the Point of Order that the Bill was improperly before the House for consideration since its number and title have not been printed in the House Calendar at least one statewide legislative day prior to second reading.
The SPEAKER sustained the Point of Order.

H. 3974--AMENDED AND ORDERED TO THIRD READING

The following Bill was taken up:

H. 3974 (Word version) -- Rep. Cato: A BILL TO AMEND SECTION 37-17-10, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO REGULATION OF PERSONS WHO SELL PRESCRIPTION DRUG DISCOUNT CARDS, SO AS TO PROVIDE THAT SUCH PERSONS MUST REGISTER AND REPORT TO THE DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, RATHER THAN TO THE DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE; TO AMEND SECTION 38-5-80, AS AMENDED, RELATING TO REQUIREMENTS TO OBTAIN A LICENSE TO CONDUCT INSURANCE BUSINESS IN THIS STATE, SO AS TO CLARIFY WHAT BOOKS AND RECORDS OF AN INSURER MUST BE MAINTAINED IN THIS STATE; TO AMEND SECTION 38-31-20, AS AMENDED, RELATING TO DEFINITIONS IN THE SOUTH CAROLINA PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION ACT, SO AS TO INCLUDE NEW DEFINITIONS AND REVISE CERTAIN EXISTING DEFINITIONS; TO AMEND SECTION 38-31-60, RELATING TO THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA PROPERTY AND CASUALTY GUARANTY ASSOCIATION, SO AS TO PROVIDE THAT THE ASSOCIATION'S OBLIGATION TO AN INSURED CEASES WHEN TEN MILLION DOLLARS HAS BEEN PAID TO OR ON BEHALF OF THE INSURED AND TO ALLOW FOR ALLOCATION OF PAYMENTS WHEN THERE IS MORE THAN ONE CLAIMANT WITH A COVERED CLAIM; TO AMEND SECTION 38-31-70, AS AMENDED, RELATING TO THE PLAN OF OPERATION FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION, SO AS TO AUTHORIZE REPORTING AND THE DELEGATION OF CERTAIN AUTHORITY TO AN ASSOCIATION SIMILAR TO THE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION; TO AMEND SECTION 38-31-90, AS AMENDED, RELATING TO RIGHTS OF THE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION REGARDING CLAIMANTS PAID AND ASSETS OF INSOLVENT INSURERS, SO AS TO PROVIDE THAT THE ASSOCIATION HAS THE RIGHT TO RECOVER THE AMOUNT OF A CLAIM PAID FROM CERTAIN INSUREDS AND AFFILIATES OF AN INSOLVENT INSURER; TO AMEND SECTION 38-31-100, AS AMENDED, RELATING TO PROCEDURES REQUIRED TO BE FOLLOWED BY PERSONS ASSERTING CLAIMS AND TO LIMITATIONS ON CLAIMS, SO AS TO REVISE THESE PROVISIONS; TO AMEND SECTION 38-39-90, AS AMENDED, RELATING TO CANCELLATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS BY PREMIUM SERVICE COMPANIES AND THE CREDITING OF RETURN PREMIUMS WHICH RESULT IN A SURPLUS, SO AS TO ALLOW A REFUND OF SURPLUS TO AN AGENT OF AN INSURED AND TO PROVIDE THAT NO REFUND IS REQUIRED IF IT AMOUNTS TO LESS THAN FIVE DOLLARS, RATHER THAN THREE DOLLARS; TO AMEND SECTION 38-43-80, AS AMENDED, RELATING TO LICENSE FEES FOR AGENTS OF INSURERS, SO AS TO PROVIDE THAT FEES MUST BE PAID AS PRESCRIBED BY THE DEPARTMENT, RATHER THAN PAID IN ADVANCE; TO AMEND SECTION 38-55-30, AS AMENDED, RELATING TO THE AMOUNT OF RISK THAT AN INSURER OR CAPTIVE INSURER MAY EXPOSE ITSELF TO, SO AS TO PROVIDE THAT THIS SECTION DOES NOT APPLY TO CAPTIVE INSURERS; TO AMEND SECTION 38-71-1370, AS AMENDED, RELATING TO THE APPLICATION OF GROUP ACCIDENT AND HEALTH INSURANCE PROVISIONS TO SMALL EMPLOYER INSURERS, SO AS TO EXCLUDE COVERAGE TO LATE ENROLLEES FOR A PERIOD OF TIME; TO AMEND SECTION 38-71-1980, RELATING TO EXPEDITED EXTERNAL REVIEWS, SO AS TO CHANGE AN INTERNAL CROSS REFERENCE; TO AMEND SECTION 38-87-40, AS AMENDED, RELATING TO REQUIREMENTS FOR OUT-OF-STATE CHARTERED RISK RETENTION GROUPS TO DO BUSINESS IN SOUTH CAROLINA, SO AS TO PROVIDE THAT SUCH GROUP IS SUBJECT TO TAXATION AS AN ADMITTED INSURER WOULD BE, RATHER THAN AS A FOREIGN ADMITTED INSURER WOULD BE; TO AMEND SECTION 38-90-60, RELATING TO INCORPORATION OPTIONS AND REQUIREMENTS FOR CAPTIVE INSURANCE COMPANIES, SO AS TO CHANGE A CROSS REFERENCE; TO AMEND SECTION 38-90-140, RELATING TO TAX PAYMENTS BY CAPTIVE INSURANCE COMPANIES, SO AS TO PROVIDE THAT THESE TAXES MUST BE PAID TO THE DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE RATHER THAN TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT; TO AMEND SECTION 38-90-180, RELATING TO THE APPLICATION OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE REHABILITATION AND LIQUIDATION ACT TO CAPTIVE INSURANCE COMPANIES, SO AS TO ALSO APPLY CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OF INSURERS ACT TO THESE COMPANIES; TO AMEND SECTION 56-10-240, AS AMENDED, RELATING TO PROCEDURES THAT MOTOR VEHICLE INSUREDS AND INSURERS MUST FOLLOW IF A MOTOR VEHICLE SUBJECT TO FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS BECOMES UNINSURED, SO AS TO PROVIDE THAT NOTICE MUST BE GIVEN TO THE DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE IF THE LAPSE OR TERMINATION OCCURRED WITHIN THREE MONTHS OF THE ISSUANCE OF A NEW POLICY; AND TO AMEND SECTION 56-10-280, AS AMENDED, RELATING TO THE MINIMUM DURATION OF INSURANCE ISSUED TO MEET MOTOR VEHICLE FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS, SO AS TO PROVIDE THAT IF A CHECK TENDERED BY THE INSURED IS RETURNED FOR INSUFFICIENT FUNDS, THE CANCELLATION IS EFFECTIVE AS OF THE POLICY INCEPTION OR RENEWAL DATE.

The Labor, Commerce and Industry Committee proposed the following Amendment No. 1 (Doc Name COUNCIL\NBD\AMEND\ 11630AC01), which was adopted:
Amend the bill, as and if amended, by striking all after the enacting words and inserting:
/SECTION     1.     Section 37-1-109(4) of the 1976 Code is amended to read:

"(4)     The administrator, as defined in Section 37-1-301, shall by regulation announce publish a notice in the State Register:

(a)     On or before April thirtieth of each year in which dollar amounts are to change, the changes in dollar amounts required by subsection (2); and

(b)     Promptly after the changes occur, changes in the index required by subsection (3) including, if applicable, the numerical equivalent of the Reference Base Index under a revised Reference Base Index and the designation or title of any index superseding the index."
SECTION     2.     Section 37-6-108(1) of the 1976 Code is amended to read:

"(1)     After notice and hearing the administrator may order a creditor or, a person acting in his behalf, or a person subject to this title to cease and desist from engaging in violations of this title. A respondent aggrieved by an order of the administrator may obtain judicial review of the order and the administrator may obtain an order of the court for enforcement of its order in the court of common pleas. The proceeding for review or enforcement is initiated by filing a petition in the court. Copies of the petition shall must be served upon all parties of record."
SECTION     3.     Section 37-6-111(1) of the 1976 Code is amended to read:

"(1)     The administrator may bring a civil action to restrain a person to whom this part title applies from engaging in a course of:

(a)     making or enforcing unconscionable terms or provisions of consumer credit transactions;

(b)     fraudulent or unconscionable conduct in inducing consumers to enter into consumer credit transactions;

(c)     conduct of any of the types specified in paragraph item (a) or (b) with respect to transactions that give rise to or that lead persons to believe will give rise to consumer credit transactions; or

(d)     fraudulent or unconscionable conduct in the collection of debts arising from consumer credit transactions."
SECTION     4.     Section 37-6-113(1) of the 1976 Code is amended to read:

"(1)     After demand, the administrator may bring a civil action against a creditor or a person subject to this title to recover actual damages sustained and excess charges paid by one or more consumers who have a right to recover explicitly granted by this title. In a civil action under this subsection, penalties may not be recovered by the administrator. The court shall order amounts recovered under this subsection to be paid to each consumer or set off against his obligation. A consumer's action, except a class action, takes precedence over a prior or subsequent action by the administrator with respect to the claim of that consumer. A consumer's class action takes precedence over a subsequent action by the administrator with respect to claims common to both actions, but the administrator may intervene. An administrator's action on behalf of a class of consumers takes precedence over a consumer's subsequent class action with respect to claims common to both actions. Whenever an action takes precedence over another action under this subsection, the latter action may be stayed to the extent appropriate while the precedent action is pending and dismissed if the precedent action is dismissed with prejudice or results in a final judgment granting or denying the claim asserted in the precedent action. A defense available to a creditor in a civil action brought by a consumer is available to him in a civil action brought under this subsection."
SECTION     5.     Section 37-6-113(2) of the 1976 Code, as amended by Act 142 of 1991, is further amended to read:

"(2)     The administrator may bring a civil action against a creditor or, a person acting in his behalf, or a person subject to this title to recover a civil penalty of no more than five thousand dollars for repeatedly and intentionally violating this title. A civil penalty pursuant to this subsection may not be imposed for a violation of this title occurring more than two years before the action is brought."
SECTION     6.     Section 37-17-10 of the 1976 Code, as added by Act 400 of 2000, is amended to read:

"Section 37-17-10.     (A)     It is unlawful for a person to sell, market, promote, advertise, or distribute a card or other purchasing mechanism or device which is not insurance that purports to offer discounts or access to discounts from pharmacies for prescription drug purchases unless:

(1)     the person is registered with the Department of Insurance Consumer Affairs for this express purpose;

(2)     the card or other purchasing mechanism or device expressly states in bold and prominent type, prominently placed, that the discounts are not insurance;

(3)     documentation is provided to the Department of Insurance Consumer Affairs that the discounts are specifically authorized and the person has a separate contract with each pharmacy or pharmacy chain listed in conjunction with the card or other purchasing mechanism or device; and

(4)     the discounts or access to discounts offered, or the range of discounts or access to the range of discounts offered, are not misleading, deceptive, or fraudulent.

(B)(1)     A person who sells, markets, promotes, advertises, or distributes a card or other purchasing mechanism or device which is not insurance that purports to offer discounts or access to discounts from pharmacies for prescription drug purchases in this State shall designate a resident of this State as an agent for service of process and register the agent with the Secretary of State.

(2)     In the absence of proper registration under subsection (B)(1), the Secretary of State is designated as an agent upon whom process may be served. Service of any process on the Secretary of State may be made by delivering to and leaving with the Secretary of State, or with any person designated by him to receive such service, duplicate copies of the process, notice, or demand. The Secretary of State shall forward one of the copies by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the person required to register under subsection (B(1) at the last known physical address to the party serving process. Refusal to sign the return receipt does not affect the validity of the service. Service is effective under this subsection as of the date shown on the return receipt or five days after its deposit in the mail, whichever is earlier. The Secretary of State may charge a fee of ten dollars for the service. This subsection does not affect the right to serve process in any manner otherwise provided by law.

(C)(1)     A person who violates subsection (A) is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction must be imprisoned for not more than six months or fined not more than one thousand dollars, or both; for a second or subsequent violation a person must be imprisoned for not more than two years or fined not more than five thousand dollars, or both.

(2)     Notwithstanding subsection (C)(1), a person who violates this chapter is subject to all civil and administrative remedies available in this title.

(D)     This section does not apply to:

(1)     a pharmacy holding a permit issued pursuant to Title 40, Chapter 43;

(2)     eye or vision care services or glasses or contact lenses provided by an optometrist or ophthalmologist;

(3)     an insured Any benefit or program offered in conjunction with a health insurance plan administered by a health insurer, health care service contractor, or health maintenance organization regulated under Title 38; or

(4)     an insured benefit administered by, or under contract with, the State of South Carolina.

(E)     For purposes of this section, "person" means an individual, corporation, partnership or any other business entity, including but not limited to, a health maintenance organization, an insurance company, or a third party payor. Representatives of corporations, partnerships, or other business entities must be registered before they shall offer services under this section.

(F)     The department may promulgate regulations as necessary to assist in administering this chapter, including, but not limited to, regulations concerning assessment of registration fees and standards for corporate and individual representative registration."
SECTION     7.     Section 38-5-80(k) of the 1976 Code, as last amended by Act 181 of 1993, is further amended to read:

"(k)     The insurer's principal place of business and primary executive, administrative, and home offices and all original books and records of the insurer are located and maintained in this State. The provisions of this subsection apply to domestic health maintenance organizations. For purposes of this section, original books and records mean corporate bylaws, charters, articles of incorporation, and any other records deemed to constitute original records by the director or his designee. Insurers desiring to move business records or operations outside of the State shall apply to the director or his designee for approval. Approvals or denials of request to move records or operations fall within the discretion of the director or his designee. The director may also rescind approval of a request if in his discretion it is considered to be in the best interest of the consumers and citizens of the State. Insurers must comply with the records requirements of Section 38-5-190 and the requirements for domestic insurers set forth in this chapter. The director or his designee shall outline via bulletin or order the information required in such an application. Item (k) of this section does not apply to any domestic insurer whose primary executive, administrative, and home offices were located outside this State on July 1, 1987. If subsequently the director or his designee is of the opinion that a condition exists which would have prohibited him from issuing the original certificate of authority or license to the insurer, then that condition also constitutes a ground for license revocation under Section 38-5-120."
SECTION 8.     Section 38-21-10(2) of the 1976 Code, as amended by Act 181 of 1993, is further amended to read:

"(2)     The term 'control' (including the terms 'controlling', 'controlled by', and 'under common control with') means the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person, whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract other than a commercial contract for goods or nonmanagement services, or otherwise, unless the power is the result of an official position with or corporate office held by the person. Control is presumed to exist if any person, directly or indirectly, owns, controls, holds with the power to vote, or holds proxies representing ten percent or more of the voting securities of any other person. This presumption may be rebutted by a showing made in the manner provided by Section 38-21-220 that control does not exist in fact. The director or his designee may determine, after furnishing all persons in interest notice and opportunity to be heard and making specific findings of fact to support his determination, that control exists in fact, notwithstanding the absence of a presumption to that effect."
SECTION     9.     Section 38-31-20 of the 1976 Code, as last amended by Act 97 of 1995, is further amended to read:

"Section 38-31-20.     As used in this chapter:

(1)     'Account' means any one of the four accounts created by Section 38-31-40.

(2)     'Affiliate' means a person who directly or indirectly, through one or more intermediaries, controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with an insolvent insurer on December thirty-first of the year next preceding the date the insurer becomes an insolvent insurer.

(3)     'Affiliate of the insolvent insurer' means a person who directly or indirectly, through one or more intermediaries, controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with an insolvent insurer on December thirty-first of the year next preceding the date the insurer becomes an insolvent insurer.

(4)     'Association' means the South Carolina Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association created under Section 38-31-40.

(5)     'Association similar to the association' means any guaranty association, security fund, or other insolvency mechanism which affords protection similar to that of the association. The term also includes any property/casualty insolvency mechanism which obtains assessments or other contributions from insurers on a pre-insolvency basis.

(4)(6)     'Claimant' means any insured making a first party claim or any person instituting a liability claim. However, no person who is an affiliate of the insolvent insurer may be a claimant.

(5)(7)     'Control' means the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person, whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract other than a commercial contract for goods or nonmanagement services, or otherwise, unless the power is the result of an official position with or corporate office held by the person. Control is presumed to exist if any person directly or indirectly owns, controls, holds with the power to vote, or holds proxies representing ten percent or more of the voting securities of any other person. This presumption may be rebutted by a showing that control does not exist in fact.

(6)(8)     'Covered claim' means an unpaid claim, including one of unearned premiums, which arises out of and is within the coverage and is subject to the applicable limits of an insurance policy to which this chapter applies issued by an insurer, if the insurer is an insolvent insurer and (a) the claimant or insured is a resident of this State at the time of the insured event, if for entities other than an individual, the residence of a claimant or insured is the state in which its principal place of business is located at the time of the insured event or (b) the claim is for first-party benefits for damage to property permanently located in this State. 'Covered claim' does not include:

(a)     any amount awarded as extra-contractual damages unless awarded against the association;

(b)     any amount sought as a return of premium under any retrospective rating plan; or

(c)     any amount due any reinsurer, insurer, insurance pool, or underwriting association as subrogation recoveries, reinsurance recoveries, contribution, indemnification, or otherwise. No such claim for any amount due any reinsurer, insurer, insurance pool, or underwriting association may be asserted against a claimant or a person insured under a policy issued by an insolvent insurer other than to the extent such a claim exceeds the association obligation limitations set forth in Section 38-31-60;

(d)     any first party claim by an insured whose net worth exceeds ten million dollars on December thirty-first of the year next preceding the date the insurer becomes an insolvent insurer; provided that an insured's net worth on such date must be deemed to include the aggregate net worth of the insured and all of its subsidiaries as calculated on a consolidated basis;

(e)     any first party claims by an insured which is an affiliate of the insolvent insurer;

(f)     any fee or other amount relating to goods or services sought by or on behalf of any attorney or other provider of goods or services retained by the insolvent insurer or an insured prior to the date it was determined to be insolvent;

(g)     any fee or other amount sought by or on behalf of any attorney or other provider of goods or services retained by any insured or claimant in connection with the assertion or prosecution of any claim, covered or otherwise, against the association; or

(h)     any claims for interest.

(7)(9)     'Insolvent insurer' means an insurer (a) licensed to transact insurance in this State either at the time the policy was issued or when the insured event occurred and (b) determined to be insolvent by a court of competent jurisdiction in the insurer's state of domicile or of this State and which the director or his designee has found fails to meet its obligation to policyholders in this State.

(10)     'Insured' means any named insured, any additional insured, any vendor, lessor, or any other party identified as an insured under the policy.

(8)(11)     'Member insurer' means any person who (a) writes any kind of insurance to which this chapter applies under Section 38-31-30, including the exchange of reciprocal or interinsurance contracts, and (b) is licensed to transact insurance in this State. An insurer shall cease to be a member insurer effective on the day following the termination or expiration of its license to transact the kinds of insurance to which this chapter applies; however, the insurer shall remain liable as a member insurer for any and all obligations, including obligations for assessments levied prior to the termination or expiration of the insurer's license and assessments levied after the termination or expiration, which relate to any insurer which became an insolvent insurer prior to the termination or expiration of such insurer's license.

(9)(12)     'Net direct written premiums' means direct gross premiums written in this State on insurance policies to which this chapter applies, less return premiums on the policies and dividends paid or credited to policyholders on the direct business. It does not include premiums on contracts between insurers or reinsurers.

(13)     'Person' means an individual, corporation, partnership, association, voluntary organization, or governmental entity.
SECTION     10.     Section 38-31-60(a) of the 1976 Code, as last amended by Act 517 of 1994, is amended by adding at the end:

"(iv)     Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, except in the case of a claim for benefits under worker's compensation coverage, any obligation of the association to or on behalf of an insured and its affiliates on all covered claims combined shall cease when ten million dollars shall have been paid in the aggregate by the association and any one or more associations similar to the association of any other state or states, to or on behalf of that insured, its affiliates, and additional insureds on covered claims or allowed claims arising under the policy or policies of any one insolvent insurer. If the association determines that there may be more than one claimant having a covered claim or allowed claim against the association, or any associations similar to the association in other states, under the policy or policies of any one insolvent insurer, the association may establish a plan to allocate amounts payable by the association in such manner as the association in its discretion considers equitable."
SECTION     11.     Section 38-31-70(3)(d) of the 1976 Code, as amended by Act 181 of 1993, is further amended to read:

"(d)     Establish procedures by which claims may be filed with the association and establish acceptable forms of proof of covered claims. Notice of claims to the receiver or liquidator of the insolvent insurer is considered notice to the association or its agent and a list of these claims must be periodically submitted to the association or similar organization an association similar to the association in another state by the receiver or liquidator."
SECTION     12.     Section 38-31-70(4) of the 1976 Code, as amended by Act 181 of 1993, is further amended to read:

"(4)     The plan of operation may provide that any or all powers and duties of the association, except those under items (c) and (i) of Section 38-31-60, are delegated to a corporation, an association similar to the association, or other another organization which performs or will perform functions similar to those of this association, or its equivalent, in two or more states. This corporation, association, or organization must be reimbursed as a servicing facility would be reimbursed and must be paid for its performance of any other functions of the association. A delegation under this subsection (4) takes effect only with the approval of both the board of directors and the director or his designee and may be made only to a corporation, association, or organization which extends protection not substantially less favorable and effective than that provided by this chapter."
SECTION     13.     Section 38-31-90 of the 1976 Code, as amended by Act 181 of 1993, is further amended to read:

"Section 38-31-90.     (1)     Any A person recovering under this chapter is considered to have assigned his rights under the policy to the association to the extent of his recovery from the association. Every insured or claimant seeking the protection of this chapter shall cooperate with the association to the same extent as he would have been required to cooperate with the insolvent insurer. The association has no cause of action against the insured of the insolvent insurer for any sums it has paid out except the causes of action the insolvent insurer would have had if the sums had been paid by the insolvent insurer and except as provided in subsection (2). In the case of an insolvent insurer operating on a plan with assessment liability, payments of claims of the association do not operate to reduce the liability of insureds to the receiver, liquidator, or statutory successor for unpaid assessments.

(2)     The association has the right to recover from the following persons the amount of any 'covered claim' paid on behalf of such person pursuant to this chapter;

(a)     an insured whose net worth on December thirty-one of the year immediately preceding the date the insurer becomes an insolvent insurer exceeds twenty-five million dollars and whose liability obligations to other persons are satisfied in whole or in part by payments made under this chapter; and

(b)     a person who is an affiliate of the insolvent insurer and whose liability obligations to other persons are satisfied in whole or in part by payments made under this chapter.

(3)     The receiver, liquidator, or statutory successor of an insolvent insurer is bound by settlements of covered claims by the association or a similar organization an association similar to the association in another state. The court having jurisdiction shall grant these claims priority equal to that to which the claimant would have been entitled in the absence of this chapter against the assets of the insolvent insurer. The expenses of the association or similar organization an association similar to the association in handling claims must be accorded the same priority as the liquidator's expenses.

(3)(4)     The association shall periodically file with the receiver or liquidator of the insolvent insurer statements of the covered claims paid by the association and estimates of anticipated claims on the association which shall preserve the rights of the association against the assets of the insolvent insurer."
SECTION     14.     Section 38-31-100 of the 1976 Code, as last amended by Act 235 of 2000, is further amended to read:

"Section 38-31-100.     (1)     Any A person, having a claim against an insurer under any provision in an insurance policy other than a policy of an insolvent insurer which is also a covered claim, is under an insurance policy, whether or not it is a policy issued by a member insurer, and the claim under such other policy arises from the same facts, injury, or loss that gave rise to the covered claim against the association, is required to exhaust first exhaust his right under that all coverage and limits provided by any such policy. Any amount payable on a covered claim under this chapter must be reduced by the amount of any recovery under that insurance policy full limits of such other coverage as set forth on the declarations page and the association shall receive a full credit for such limits, or, where there are no applicable limits, the claim must be reduced by the total recovery. Notwithstanding the foregoing, no person may be required to exhaust all coverage and limits under the policy of an insolvent insurer.

(a)     A claim under a policy providing liability coverage to a person who may be jointly and severally liable with or a joint tortfeasor with the person covered under the policy of the insolvent insurer that gives rise to the covered claim must be considered to be a claim arising from the same facts, injury, or loss that gave rise to the covered claim against the association. Any amount payable on a covered claim under this chapter must be reduced by the full and combined policy limits of all joint tortfeasers.

(b)     To the extent that the association's obligation is reduced by the application of this section, the liability of the person insured by the insolvent insurer's policy for the claim must be reduced in the same amount.

(2)     Any A person having a claim which may be recovered under more than one insurance guaranty association or its equivalent shall seek recovery first associations similar to the association must be required first to exhaust all coverage and limits in recovery from the association of the place of residence of the insured except that, if it is a first-party claim for damage to property with a permanent location, he shall seek recovery be required first to exhaust all coverage and limits in recovery from the association of the location of the property, and, if it is a workers' compensation claim, he shall seek recovery be required first to exhaust all coverage and limits in recovery from the association of the residence of the claimant. Any recovery under this chapter must be reduced by the amount payable on a covered claim under this chapter must be reduced by the full amount of recovery from any other insurance guaranty association or its equivalent associations similar to the association, and the association shall receive full credit for such recovery.

(3)     Any A person having a claim or legal right of recovery under any governmental insurance or guaranty program which is also a covered claim is shall be required first to exhaust first his right all coverage and limits in recovery under the program. Any amount payable on a covered claim under this chapter must be reduced by the full amount of any recovery under the governmental insurance or guaranty program.

(4)     No claim held by an insurer, reinsurer, insurance pool, or underwriting association, based on an assignment or on rights of subrogation, or otherwise, may be recovered from a claimant or asserted in any legal action against a person insured under a policy issued by an insolvent insurer or the association except to the extent the amount of the claim exceeds the obligation of the association under this chapter.

(5)     Any A person who has liquidated by settlement or judgment a claim against an insured under a policy issued by an insolvent insurer, and the claim is a covered claim and is also a claim within the coverage of any policy issued by a solvent insurer, is must be required to exhaust first to exhaust his rights all coverage and limits provided under the policy issued by the solvent insurer before execution, levy, or any other proceedings are begun to enforce any judgment obtained against or the settlement with the insured of the insolvent insurer. Any amount payable on a covered claim under this chapter, whether through settlement, judgment, or otherwise, must be reduced by the full limits of such other coverage as set forth on the declarations page of the policy issued by the insolvent insurer.

(6)     A person having a claim against an insolvent insurer under any provision in an insurance policy is limited to ten million dollars aggregate payout from the association.

(7)     A person having a net worth of greater than twenty-five million dollars and having a claim against an insolvent insurer under any provision in an insurance policy may not make a claim against the association."
SECTION     15.     Section 38-33-80(A)(2) and (C) of the 1976 Code, as last amended by Act 181 of 1993, are further amended to read:

"(2)     No Evidence of coverage, or an amendment thereto to it, may not be issued or delivered to any a person in this State until a copy of the form of the evidence of coverage, or amendment thereto to it, has been filed with and approved by the director or his designee pursuant to Section 38-71-310(A) or 38-71-720(A).

(C)     The director or his designee shall approve, within a reasonable period, approve thirty days any form if the requirements of subsection (A) are met and. The director or his designee, in his discretion, may extend for up to an additional sixty days the period within which he shall approve or disapprove the form. The director or his designee shall approve, within a reasonable period, any schedule of charges if the requirements of subsection (B) are met. It is unlawful to issue a form or to use a schedule of charges until approved. If the director or his designee disapproves the filing, he shall notify the filer. The notice must contain the reasons for disapproval, and the filer, upon request in writing, is entitled to a public hearing thereon on it. If no action is not taken to approve or disapprove any form or schedule of charges within ninety thirty days of the filing of the forms or charges form, if the period is not extended, or at the expiration of the extended period, if any, the filing is deemed approved. If action is not taken to approve or disapprove any schedule of charges within ninety days of the filing of the charges, the filing is deemed approved. An organization may not use a form or schedule of charges deemed approved pursuant to the default provision of this section until the organization has filed with the director or his designee a written notice of its intent to use the form or schedule of charges. The notice must be filed in the office of the director at least ten days before the organization uses the form or schedule of charges."
SECTION     16.     Section 38-39-90(f) of the 1976 Code, as last amended by Act 181 of 1993, is further amended to read:

"(f)     If the crediting of return premiums to the account of the insured results in a surplus over the amount due from the insured, the premium service company shall hold the surplus in a fiduciary capacity and promptly refund the excess to the insured or the agent of record. No refund is required if it amounts to less than three five dollars."
SECTION     17.     Section 38-43-80(B) of the 1976 Code, as amended by Section 11H, Part II, Act 501 of 1992, is further amended to read:

"(B)     The fees must be paid in advance. License fees for local, state, or special agents must be paid by the insurer for whom the agent proposed to act or by which the proposed agent is vouched for in the application for license. The department shall promulgate regulations specifying the time and manner of payment of these fees."
SECTION     18.     Section 38-55-30 of the 1976 Code, as amended by Act 13 of 1991, is further amended to read:

"Section 38-55-30.     Except as otherwise provided in this title, no insurer or captive doing business in this State may expose itself to a loss on one risk in an amount exceeding ten percent of its surplus to policyholders. A risk or portion of it which has been reinsured must be deducted in determining the limitation of risk prescribed in this section. As used in this section, "captive" means an insurance company owned by another organization whose exclusive purpose is to insure risks of the parent organization and affiliated companies, or for groups and associations, an insurance organization owned by the insureds whose exclusive purpose is to insure risks of member organizations or group members and their affiliates, or both. This section does not apply to captive insurers."
SECTION     19.     The 1976 Code is amended by adding:

"Section 38-55-75.     The Department of Insurance may receive and shall maintain as confidential any documents or information furnished to the department by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners or insurance departments of other states which is classified as confidential by that association or state. The Department of Insurance may share documents or information, including confidential documents or information, with the National Association of Insurance Commissioners or insurance departments of other states if the association or other state agrees to maintain the same level of confidentiality as is provided under South Carolina law. Documents or information received or exchanged pursuant to this section are not subject to subpoena or subpoena duces tecum in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding."
SECTION     20.     Section 38-61-20 of the 1976 Code, as last amended by Act 312 of 2000, is further amended to read:

"Section 38-61-20.     (A)     It is unlawful for an insurer doing business in this State to issue or sell in this State any a policy, contract, or certificate until it has been filed with and approved by the director or his designee. The director or his designee may disapprove the form if it:

(1)     does not meet the requirements of law,;

(2)     contains any provisions which are unfair, deceptive, ambiguous, misleading, or unfairly discriminatory,; or

(3)     is going to be solicited by means of advertising, communication, or dissemination of information which is deceptive or misleading.

However, this subsection does not apply to surety contracts or fidelity bonds, except as required in Section 38-15-10, or to insurance contracts, riders, or endorsements prepared to meet special, unusual, peculiar, or extraordinary conditions applying to an individual risk or exempt commercial policies.

(B)     Within thirty days after the filing of a form requiring approval, the director or his designee shall notify the organization filing the form of the approval or disapproval of the form, and the reason if the form is disapproved. The director or his designee, in his discretion, may extend for up to an additional sixty days the period within which he shall approve or disapprove the form. A form received, but neither approved nor disapproved by the director or his designee, is deemed approved at the expiration of the thirty days if the period is not extended, or at the expiration of the extended period, if any. An organization may not use a form deemed approved pursuant to the default provision of this section until the organization has filed with the director or his designee a written notice of its intent to use the form. The notice must be filed in the office of the director at least ten days before the organization uses the form.

(C)     At any time after having given written approval, and after an opportunity for a hearing for which at least thirty days' written notice has been given, the director or his designee may withdraw approval if he finds that the forms form:

(1)     do does not meet the requirements of law,;

(2)     contain any contains provisions which are unfair, deceptive, ambiguous, misleading, or unfairly discriminatory,; or

(3)     are being is solicited by means of advertising, communication, or dissemination of information which is deceptive or misleading.

(C)(D)     The director or his designee may exempt from the requirements of subsection (A) as long as he considers proper any type of insurance policy, contract, or certificate to which in his opinion subsection (A) practically must not be applied, or the filing and approval of which, in his opinion, is not necessary for the protection of the public. However, every each insurer at least annually shall list the types and form numbers of all policies it issues or sells in this State which the director or his designee has exempted from being filed and approved, and an officer of the insurer shall certify that all of these policies comply fully with the laws of this State. If a policy, contract, or certificate is certified to be in compliance with the laws of this State and the director or his designee finds it violates a law of this State, he may disqualify that insurer from certifying policies, contracts, or certificates allowed under this subsection.

(D)(E)     Nothing in this chapter precludes the issuance of a life insurance contract that includes an optional accident, health, or accident and health insurance rider. However, the optional accident, health, or accident and health insurance rider must be filed with and approved by the director or his designee pursuant to Section 38-71-310, 38-71-720, or 38-71-740, as appropriate, and comply with all applicable sections of Chapter 71 of this title and, in addition, in the case of long term care insurance, Chapter 72 of this title."
SECTION     21.     Section 38-61-40 of the 1976 Code, as last amended by Act 181 of 1993, is further amended to read:

"Section 38-61-40.     All insurers licensed to transact insurance business in this State shall comply with the standards prescribed by regulation of the department. The director or his designee is empowered to recall withdraw approval or certification on all existing policies of commonly purchased insurance that do not comply with Section 38-61-30."
SECTION     22.     Section 38-65-60(3) of the 1976 Code, as last amended by Act 181 of 1993, is further amended to read:

"(3)     Upon request of the director or his designee, copies of policies and certificates under a policy of group life insurance issued outside this State and covering residents of this State must be made available on an informational basis only. However, mass-marketed life insurance policies and certificates shall must have prior approval of the director or his designee pursuant to Section 38-61-20 before they can be offered for sale to residents of this State."
SECTION     23.     Section 38-71-310(A) and (F) of the 1976 Code, as last amended by Act 411 of 1998, are further amended to read:

"(A)     No A policy or certificate of accident, health, or accident and health insurance may not be issued or delivered in this State, nor may any application, endorsement, or rider which becomes a part of the policy be used, until a copy of its form has been filed with and approved by the director or his designee, except as exempted by regulation of the department the director or his designee as permitted by Section 38-61-20. The director or his designee may disapprove the form if the form:

(1)     does not meet the requirements of law,;

(2)     contains any provisions which are unfair, deceptive, ambiguous, misleading, or unfairly discriminatory,; or

(3)     is going to be solicited by means of advertising, communication, or dissemination of information which is deceptive or misleading.

The director or his designee shall notify in writing, as soon as is practicable, the insurer which that has filed the form of his approval or disapproval. In the event of disapproval If the form is disapproved, the notice must contain the reasons for disapproval, and the insurer is entitled to a public hearing thereon on that decision. If no action has been is not taken to approve or disapprove a policy or certificate, application, endorsement, or rider after the documents have document has been filed for ninety thirty days, they are it is deemed to be approved. The director or his designee, in his discretion, may extend for up to an additional sixty days the period for approval or disapproval of the form. An organization may not use a form deemed approved pursuant to the default provision of this section until the organization has filed with the director or his designee a written notice of its intent to use the form. The notice must be filed in the office of the director at least ten days before the organization uses the form.

(F)     Nothing in this chapter precludes the issuance of an individual accident, health, or accident and health insurance policy that includes an optional life insurance rider. However, the optional life insurance rider must be filed with and approved by the director or his designee pursuant to Section 38-61-20 and comply with all applicable sections of Chapter 63 and, in addition, in the case of a life insurance rider with accelerated long term care benefits, Chapter 72 of this title."
SECTION     24.     Section 38-71-720 of the 1976 Code, as last amended by Act 411 of 1998, is further amended to read:

"Section 38-71-720.     (A)     A policy or contract of group accident, group health, or group accident and health insurance may not be issued or delivered in this State, nor may any application, endorsement, or rider which becomes a part of the policy be used, until a copy of the form has been filed with and approved by the director or his designee except as exempted by regulation of the department the director or his designee as permitted by Section 38-61-20. The director or his designee may disapprove the form if the form:

(1)     does not meet the requirements of law;

(2)     contains provisions which are unfair, deceptive, ambiguous, misleading, or unfairly discriminatory; or

(3)     is going to be solicited by means of advertising, communication, or dissemination of information which is deceptive or misleading.

However, If no action has been is not taken to approve or disapprove a policy, contract, certificate, application, endorsement, or rider after the documents have document has been filed for ninety thirty days, the it may be issued and delivered until or unless subsequently disapproved by the director or his designee is deemed to be approved. This time period may be extended thirty days if the director or his designee gives written notice to the filer that he needs additional time to review the filing. The director or his designee, in his discretion, may extend for up to an additional sixty days the time period for approval or disapproval of the form. An organization may not use a form deemed approved pursuant to the default provision of this section until the organization has filed with the director or his designee a written notice of its intent to use the form. The notice must be filed in the office of the director at least ten days before the organization uses the form. The director or his designee, as soon as is practicable, shall notify in writing the insurer which has filed the form of his approval or disapproval. If the form is disapproved, the notice must contain the reasons for disapproval and the insurer is entitled to a public hearing on it that decision. At any time after having given written approval, the director or his designee, after a public hearing of which at least thirty days' written notice has been given, may withdraw approval if he finds that the forms form:

(1)     do does not meet the requirements of law;

(2)     contain contains provisions which are unfair, deceptive, ambiguous, misleading, or unfairly discriminatory; or

(3)     are being is solicited by means of advertising, communication, or dissemination of information which is deceptive or misleading.

The withdrawal of approval must be effected by written notice to the insurer and the insurer is entitled to a public hearing on it that decision. Any action or decision of the director or his designee to withdraw approval may be appealed to the Administrative Law Judge Division in accordance with Section 38-3-210.

(B)     Nothing in this chapter precludes the issuance of a policy or contract of group accident, group health, or group accident and health insurance that includes an optional life insurance rider. However, the optional life insurance rider must be filed with and approved by the director or his designee pursuant to Section 38-61-20 and comply with all applicable sections of Chapter 65 and, in addition, in the case of a life insurance rider with accelerated long term care benefits, Chapter 72 of this title."
SECTION     25.     Section 38-71-750(3) of the 1976 Code, as last amended by Act 181 of 1993, is further amended to read:

"(3)     Upon request of the director or his designee, copies of policies and certificates under a policy of group accident, group health, or group accident and health insurance issued outside this State and covering residents of this State must be made available on an informational basis only. However, mass-marketed accident, health, or accident and health insurance policies and certificates shall must receive prior approval of the director or his designee pursuant to Section 38-71-720 before they can be offered for sale to residents of this State."
SECTION     26.     Section 38-71-1370 of the 1976 Code, as amended by Act 5 of 1997, is further amended to read:

"(A)     Except to the extent inconsistent with specific provisions of this article, all provisions of Article 5, are applicable to any insurance plans required to be offered by small employer insurers.

(B)     Late enrollees may be excluded from coverage for the greater of eighteen months or an eighteen month preexisting condition exclusion; however, if both a period of exclusion from coverage and a preexisting condition exclusion are applicable to a late enrollee, the combined period may not exceed eighteen months."
SECTION     27.     Section 38-71-1980(F)(3) and (4) of the 1976 Code, as added by Act 380 of 2000, is amended to read:

"(3)     If the notice provided pursuant to subsection (H)(1) (F)(1) was not in writing, within two days after the date of providing that notice, the independent review organization shall:

(a)     provide written confirmation of the decision to the covered person or his authorized representative and the health carrier; and

(b)     include the information set forth in Section 38-71-1970(H)(3).

(4)     As expeditiously as reasonably possible after receipt of the notice of a decision pursuant to subsection (H)(1) (F)(1) reversing the adverse determination or final adverse determination, the health carrier shall approve the covered benefit that was the subject of the adverse determination or final adverse determination, subject to applicable contract exclusions, limitations, or other provisions."
SECTION     28.     Section 38-73-1300 of the 1976 Code, as last amended by Act 181 of 1993, is further amended to read:

"Section 38-73-1300.     Any A member of or subscriber to a rating organization to whom the provisions of Article 3 of this chapter are applicable may make written application to the director or his designee for permission to file a deviation modification from the class rates loss costs, schedules, rating plans, or rules respecting any kind of insurance or class of risk within a kind of insurance or any combination thereof of them. The application shall must specify the basis for the modification. A copy of the application must be sent simultaneously to the rating organization."
SECTION     29.     Section 38-73-1310 of the 1976 Code, as last amended by Act 181 of 1993, is further amended to read:

"Section 38-73-1310.     Any A member of or subscriber to a rating organization to whom the provisions of Article 5 of this chapter are applicable may make written application to the department for permission to file a uniform percentage decrease or increase to be applied to the premiums produced by the rating system so filed for a kind of insurance or for a class of insurance which is found by the director or his designee to be a proper rating unit for the application of such uniform percentage decrease or increase or for a subdivision of a kind of insurance (a) comprised of a group of manual classifications which is treated as a separate unit for rate-making purposes or (b) for which separate expense provisions are included in the filings of the rating organization. The application shall must specify the basis for the modification and must be accompanied by the data upon which the applicant relies. A copy of the application and data must be sent simultaneously to the rating organization."
SECTION     30.     Section 38-87-40(3)(a) of the 1976 Code, as amended by Act 181 of 1993, is further amended to read:

"(a)     Each risk retention group is liable for the payment of premium taxes and taxes on premiums of direct business for risks resident or located within this State and shall report to the director or his designee the net premiums written for risks resident or located within this State. Such risk retention group is subject to taxation, including any applicable fines and penalties related thereto, on the same basis as a foreign an admitted insurer."
SECTION     31.     Section 38-90-60(E) of the 1976 Code, as added by Act 331 of 2000, is amended to read:

"(E)     The articles of incorporation, the certificate issued pursuant to subsection (D), and the organization fees required by Section 38-90-20(D) 33-1-220 must be transmitted to the Secretary of State, who shall record both the articles of incorporation and the certificate."
SECTION     32.     Section 38-90-140(A) and (B) of the 1976 Code, as added by Act 331 of 2000, is amended to read:

"(A)     A captive insurance company shall pay to the director department by March 1 of each year, a tax at the rate of four-tenths of one percent on the first twenty million dollars and three-tenths of one percent on the next twenty million dollars and two-tenths of one percent on the next twenty million dollars and seventy-five thousandths of one percent on each dollar thereafter on the direct premiums collected or contracted for on policies or contracts of insurance written by the captive insurance company during the year ending December 31 next preceding, after deducting from the direct premiums subject to the tax the amounts paid to policyholders as return premiums which shall include dividends on unabsorbed premiums or premium deposits returned or credited to policyholders.

(B)     A captive insurance company shall pay to the director department by March 1 of each year, a tax at the rate of two hundred and twenty-five thousandths of one percent on the first twenty million dollars of assumed reinsurance premium, and one hundred fifty thousandths of one percent on the next twenty million dollars and fifty thousandths of one percent on the next twenty million dollars and twenty-five thousandths of one percent of each dollar thereafter. However, no reinsurance tax applies to premiums for risks or portions of risks which are subject to taxation on a direct basis pursuant to subsection (A). A premium tax is not payable in connection with the receipt of assets in exchange for the assumption of loss reserves and other liabilities of another insurer under common ownership and control if the transaction is part of a plan to discontinue the operations of the other insurer and if the intent of the parties to the transaction is to renew or maintain business with the captive insurance company."
SECTION     33.     Section 38-90-180(A) of the 1976 Code, as added by Act 331 of 2000, is amended to read:

"(A)     Except as otherwise provided in this section, the terms and conditions set forth in Chapter Chapters 26 and 27 pertaining to insurance reorganizations, receiverships, and injunctions apply in full to captive insurance companies formed or licensed under this chapter."
SECTION     34.     Section 56-10-240(A) of the 1976 Code, as amended by Act 459 of 19996, is further amended to read:

"(A)     If, during the period for which it is licensed, a motor vehicle is or becomes an uninsured motor vehicle, then the vehicle owner immediately shall obtain insurance on the vehicle or within five days after the effective date of cancellation or expiration of his liability insurance policy surrender the motor vehicle license plates and registration certificates issued for the motor vehicle. If an automobile liability insurance premium is not paid within five working days after the last day to pay an automobile liability insurance the premium, whether it is the premium due date or a grace period that is granted customarily or contractually, a motor vehicle is an uninsured motor vehicle, and the insurer shall give written notice, or notice by magnetic or electronic media in a manner considered satisfactory to the department, within ten days after the five-day period ends, in addition to that notice previously given in accordance with law, by delivery under United States Post Office bulk certified mail, return receipt requested, to the department of the cancellation or refusal to renew under the following circumstances:

(1)     if the lapse or termination of such insurance or security occurs within three months of issuance, provided that this subsection only applies to new policies, and not renewal or replacement policies; or

(2)     the lapse or termination occurs after three months for a resident who fails one or more of the objective standards prescribed in Section 38-73-455."
SECTION     35.     Section 56-10-280 of the 1976 Code, as amended by Act 181 of 1993, is further amended to read:

"Section 56-10-280.     (A)     Contracts or policies of insurance issued to meet the financial responsibility requirements prescribed in this chapter must be issued for not less than six months. A contract or policy of insurance remains in effect at least sixty days notwithstanding a power of attorney which may purport to give the attorney-in-fact the right to effect cancellation on behalf of the insured. However, a contract or policy may be canceled within the first sixty days only under one or more of the following circumstances:

(1)     a check or bank draft tendered by the insured for payment of premium to an agent, an insurance company or a premium finance company is returned unpaid for insufficient funds or other reason by the insured's financial institution. If the check or draft is an initial payment made by an applicant for insurance or a payment made by an insured to renew a policy, the cancellation is effective as of the policy inception or renewal date.

(2)     the insured produces satisfactory proof from the department that he has sold or otherwise disposed of the insured vehicle or surrendered its tags and registration.

(3)     the insured has secured another policy that meets the financial responsibility requirements prescribed in this chapter.

(B)     This section does not prohibit refunds to the insured for cancellations after sixty days resulting from causes other than nonpayment of premium. Where an insurance company or premium finance company cancels a contract or policy pursuant to this section for nonpayment of premium under the circumstances in subsection (A) which occurs within the first sixty days, the insurance company, premium finance company, or agent may charge and collect a fifteen-dollar penalty in addition to that otherwise provided by law, and the penalty charge is not a premium charge."
SECTION     36.     Section 38-73-1320 of the 1976 Code is repealed.
SECTION     37.     This act takes effect upon approval by the Governor./
Renumber sections to conform.
Amend totals and title to conform.

Rep. CATO explained the amendment.
The amendment was then adopted.

The Bill, as amended, was read the second time and ordered to third reading.

H. 4063--POINT OF ORDER

The following Joint Resolution was taken up:

H. 4063 (Word version) -- Education and Public Works Committee: A JOINT RESOLUTION TO APPROVE REGULATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, RELATING TO PRINCIPAL EVALUATION PROGRAM, DESIGNATED AS REGULATION DOCUMENT NUMBER 2558, PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 1, CHAPTER 23, TITLE 1 OF THE 1976 CODE.

POINT OF ORDER

Rep. TOWNSEND made the Point of Order that the Joint Resolution was improperly before the House for consideration since its number and title have not been printed in the House Calendar at least one statewide legislative day prior to second reading.
The SPEAKER sustained the Point of Order.

H. 4064--POINT OF ORDER

The following Joint Resolution was taken up:

H. 4064 (Word version) -- Education and Public Works Committee: A JOINT RESOLUTION TO APPROVE REGULATIONS OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION, RELATING TO REQUIREMENTS FOR ADDITIONAL AREAS OF CERTIFICATION, DESIGNATED AS REGULATION DOCUMENT NUMBER 2567, PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 1, CHAPTER 23, TITLE 1 OF THE 1976 CODE.

POINT OF ORDER

Rep. TOWNSEND made the Point of Order that the Joint Resolution was improperly before the House for consideration since its number and title have not been printed in the House Calendar at least one statewide legislative day prior to second reading.
The SPEAKER sustained the Point of Order.

H. 4065--POINT OF ORDER

The following Joint Resolution was taken up:

H. 4065 (Word version) -- Education and Public Works Committee: A JOINT RESOLUTION TO APPROVE REGULATIONS OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION, RELATING TO TYPES AND LEVELS OF CREDENTIAL CLASSIFICATION, DESIGNATED AS REGULATION DOCUMENT NUMBER 2569, PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 1, CHAPTER 23, TITLE 1 OF THE 1976 CODE.

POINT OF ORDER

Rep. TOWNSEND made the Point of Order that the Joint Resolution was improperly before the House for consideration since its number and title have not been printed in the House Calendar at least one statewide legislative day prior to second reading.
The SPEAKER sustained the Point of Order.

H. 3307--SENT TO THE SENATE

The following Bill was taken up:

H. 3307 (Word version) -- Reps. Scott, Knotts, Jennings, Carnell, Govan, Whatley, Dantzler, Lee, Miller, Snow, Breeland, Hosey, Rutherford, J. E. Smith, Rivers, Weeks and Rhoad: A BILL TO AMEND THE CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, BY ADDING CHAPTER 57 TO TITLE 33 SO AS TO ENACT THE "SOUTH CAROLINA EDUCATION LOTTERY ACT"; TO PROVIDE FOR A STATE LOTTERY AND TO CREATE THE SOUTH CAROLINA EDUCATION LOTTERY CORPORATION TO CONDUCT THE STATE LOTTERY; TO PROVIDE FOR THE CORPORATION'S BOARD MEMBERSHIP, DUTIES, AND POWERS; TO PROVIDE FOR THE CREATION OF A LOTTERY RETAILERS ADVISORY COMMITTEE; TO PROVIDE FOR THE METHOD OF CONTRACTING WITH VENDORS AND RETAILERS; TO PROVIDE FOR THE SALE OF LOTTERY GAME TICKETS AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF PRIZES; TO PROVIDE FOR ALLOCATION OF LOTTERY PROCEEDS WHICH MUST BE USED FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES AND PROGRAMS; TO PROVIDE CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR SELLING A LOTTERY TICKET TO A MINOR, PURCHASING A LOTTERY TICKET AS A MINOR, AND DEFRAUDING OR OTHERWISE TAMPERING WITH THE LOTTERY OR MAKING MATERIAL REPRESENTATIONS IN AN APPLICATION OR REPORT IN CONNECTION WITH THE LOTTERY; TO CREATE A SOUTH CAROLINA EDUCATION LOTTERY OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE; TO PROVIDE FOR SET-OFF DEBT COLLECTION FROM PRIZE WINNINGS; TO ESTABLISH THE SOUTH CAROLINA EDUCATION LOTTERY ACCOUNT INTO WHICH THE NET REVENUE RECEIVED FROM THE STATE EDUCATION LOTTERY MUST BE DEPOSITED AND TO PROVIDE APPROPRIATIONS FROM THE EDUCATION LOTTERY ACCOUNT BEGINNING IN FISCAL YEAR 2001-02 FOR SPECIFIED PURPOSES; AND TO AMEND SECTION 1-3-240, AS AMENDED, RELATING TO THE ENTITIES FROM WHICH AN APPOINTEE BY THE GOVERNOR MAY BE REMOVED IN CERTAIN CONDITIONS, SO AS TO ADD THE SOUTH CAROLINA EDUCATION LOTTERY CORPORATION TO THAT LIST OF ENTITIES.

Rep. SCOTT spoke against the Bill.
Rep. HARRELL spoke in favor of the Bill.
Rep. COBB-HUNTER spoke against the Bill.
Rep. JENNINGS spoke against the Bill.
Rep. KENNEDY spoke against the Bill.
Rep. HOWARD spoke against the Bill.

The question then recurred to the passage of the Bill on third reading.

Rep. J. E. SMITH demanded the yeas and nays which were taken, resulting as follows:

Yeas 59; Nays 57

Those who voted in the affirmative are:

Allison                Altman                 Bingham
Campsen                Chellis                Coates
Cotty                  Dantzler               Easterday
Edge                   Fleming                Frye
Gilham                 Hamilton               Harrell
Harrison               Haskins                Hinson
Keegan                 Kelley                 Klauber
Law                    Leach                  Limehouse
Littlejohn             Lucas                  Martin
McGee                  Meacham-Richardson     Merrill
Owens                  Perry                  Quinn
Rice                   Riser                  Robinson
Rodgers                Sandifer               Scarborough
Sharpe                 Simrill                Sinclair
Smith, D.C.            Smith, G.M.            Smith, J.R.
Smith, W.D.            Stille                 Stuart
Talley                 Taylor                 Thompson
Townsend               Tripp                  Trotter
Walker                 Webb                   White
Wilkins                Young, J.

Total--59

Those who voted in the negative are:

Allen                  Askins                 Bales
Barrett                Bowers                 Breeland
Brown, G.              Brown, J.              Brown, R.
Carnell                Cato                   Clyburn
Cobb-Hunter            Coleman                Cooper
Davenport              Delleney               Emory
Freeman                Gourdine               Harvin
Hines, J.              Hines, M.              Hosey
Howard                 Jennings               Kennedy
Kirsh                  Knotts                 Koon
Lee                    Lloyd                  Loftis
Lourie                 Mack                   McCraw
McLeod                 Miller                 Neal, J.H.
Neal, J.M.             Ott                    Parks
Phillips               Rhoad                  Rivers
Rutherford             Scott                  Sheheen
Smith, F.N.            Smith, J.E.            Snow
Vaughn                 Weeks                  Whatley
Whipper                Wilder                 Young, A.

Total--57

So, the Bill was read the third time and ordered sent to the Senate.

STATEMENT FOR THE JOURNAL

I voted for this legislation, but with enormous reservations. The House version is a starting point for compromise, but it houses many problems. There are elements within this bill that are good; such as the pre-K program, ensuring free college tuition for those who qualify, and sharing control of the appointees of the lottery commission. Other provisions, such as making the tickets subject to a tax, I believe places a burden not only on the lottery...but the taxpayers of my district and this State.

A fundamental element of every successful business is its marketing campaign. I do agree with certain restrictions regarding advertising: ads should not be targeted to certain groups and the commission should not spend millions of excess dollars to advertise. This money is better spent on scholarships.

We must work hard to ensure the South Carolina Lottery is efficient, responsible and successful. The House version still has a long way to go to ensure this goal. I have full confidence that once the conference committee takes both the House and Senate versions, meshes them together and works out the objectionable differences, we will have a lottery the people of South Carolina will enjoy. I believe the final product will be what everyone desires most...a lottery, which is responsible, efficient and profitable. It will be a lottery which thousands of students will benefit from.

Respectfully submitted,

Rep. Michael D. Thompson

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

The SPEAKER granted Rep. M. HINES a leave of absence for the remainder of the day.

S. 496--RETURNED TO THE SENATE WITH AMENDMENTS

The following Bill was taken up:

S. 496 (Word version) -- Judiciary Committee: A BILL TO AMEND THE CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, BY ADDING CHAPTER 57 TO TITLE 33, SO AS TO ENACT THE "SOUTH CAROLINA EDUCATION LOTTERY ACT"; TO PROVIDE FOR A STATE LOTTERY AND TO CREATE THE SOUTH CAROLINA EDUCATION LOTTERY CORPORATION TO CONDUCT THE STATE LOTTERY; TO PROVIDE FOR THE CORPORATION'S BOARD MEMBERSHIP, DUTIES, AND POWERS; TO PROVIDE FOR THE CREATION OF A LOTTERY RETAILERS ADVISORY COMMITTEE; TO PROVIDE FOR THE METHOD OF CONTRACTING WITH VENDORS AND RETAILERS; TO PROVIDE FOR THE SALE OF LOTTERY GAME TICKETS AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF PRIZES; TO PROVIDE FOR ALLOCATION OF LOTTERY PROCEEDS WHICH MUST BE USED FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES AND PROGRAMS; TO PROVIDE CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR SELLING A LOTTERY TICKET TO A MINOR, PURCHASING A LOTTERY TICKET AS A MINOR, AND DEFRAUDING OR OTHERWISE TAMPERING WITH THE LOTTERY OR MAKING MATERIAL REPRESENTATIONS IN AN APPLICATION OR REPORT IN CONNECTION WITH THE LOTTERY; TO CREATE A SOUTH CAROLINA EDUCATION LOTTERY OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE; TO PROVIDE FOR SET-OFF DEBT COLLECTION FROM PRIZE WINNINGS; TO ESTABLISH THE SOUTH CAROLINA EDUCATION LOTTERY ACCOUNT INTO WHICH THE NET PROCEEDS RECEIVED FROM THE STATE EDUCATION LOTTERY MUST BE DEPOSITED AND TO PROVIDE FOR SPECIFIED PURPOSES FOR THE PROCEEDS; TO AMEND SECTION 1-3-240, RELATING TO THE REMOVAL OF OFFICERS BY THE GOVERNOR UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, SO AS TO ADD THE SOUTH CAROLINA EDUCATION LOTTERY CORPORATION TO THAT PROVISION; TO ADD SECTION 2-15-63, SO AS TO PROVIDE THAT BEGINNING IN DECEMBER 2004 AND EVERY THREE YEARS THEREAFTER, THE LEGISLATIVE AUDIT COUNCIL MUST CONDUCT A MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF THE LOTTERY CORPORATION; TO AMEND SECTION 12-36-2120, RELATING TO THE EXEMPTIONS FROM THE SALES TAX, SO AS TO INCLUDE THE SALE OF A LOTTERY TICKET; AND TO AMEND SECTION 59-63-210, RELATING TO THE GROUNDS FOR WHICH A STUDENT MAY BE EXPELLED, SO AS TO PROVIDE THAT NO STUDENT UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE WHO UNLAWFULLY PURCHASES A LOTTERY TICKET MAY BE EXPELLED FOR THAT REASON ONLY.

Rep. HARRELL spoke in favor of the Bill.
Rep. VAUGHN spoke in favor of the Bill.
Rep. ROBINSON spoke in favor of the Bill.
Rep. QUINN spoke in favor of the Bill.
Rep. J. E. SMITH spoke against the Bill.

Rep. KENNEDY moved that the House recede until 3:00 p.m.

Rep. SANDIFER demanded the yeas and nays which were taken, resulting as follows:

Yeas 11; Nays 79

Those who voted in the affirmative are:

Allen                  Bowers                 Cooper
Hines, J.              Jennings               Kennedy
Lourie                 McLeod                 Miller
Rivers                 Scott

Total--11

Those who voted in the negative are:

Allison                Altman                 Barfield
Barrett                Bingham                Breeland
Campsen                Carnell                Cato
Coates                 Coleman                Dantzler
Davenport              Delleney               Easterday
Edge                   Fleming                Frye
Gilham                 Gourdine               Hamilton
Harrell                Harrison               Haskins
Hinson                 Keegan                 Kelley
Kirsh                  Klauber                Knotts
Koon                   Law                    Leach
Lee                    Limehouse              Littlejohn
Loftis                 Lucas                  Martin
McCraw                 McGee                  Meacham-Richardson
Merrill                Owens                  Perry
Phillips               Quinn                  Rhoad
Rice                   Riser                  Robinson
Rodgers                Sandifer               Scarborough
Sharpe                 Sheheen                Sinclair
Smith, D.C.            Smith, F.N.            Smith, G.M.
Smith, J.E.            Smith, J.R.            Smith, W.D.
Snow                   Stuart                 Talley
Taylor                 Thompson               Trotter
Vaughn                 Walker                 Webb
Weeks                  Whatley                Whipper
White                  Wilkins                Young, A.
Young, J.

Total--79

So, the House refused to recede.

Rep. J. E. SMITH continued speaking.
Rep. MEACHAM-RICHARDSON spoke in favor of the Bill.
Rep. DELLENEY spoke against the Bill.
Rep. ALTMAN spoke in favor of the Bill.
Rep. JENNINGS spoke against the Bill.
Rep. W. D. SMITH spoke in favor of the Bill.
Rep. KNOTTS spoke in favor of the Bill.

The question then recurred to the passage of the Bill on third reading.

Rep. JENNINGS demanded the yeas and nays which were taken, resulting as follows:

Yeas 63; Nays 48

Those who voted in the affirmative are:

Allison                Altman                 Bingham
Brown, J.              Campsen                Chellis
Coates                 Cotty                  Dantzler
Easterday              Edge                   Fleming
Frye                   Gilham                 Hamilton
Harrell                Harrison               Haskins
Hinson                 Keegan                 Kelley
Klauber                Knotts                 Law
Leach                  Limehouse              Littlejohn
Lucas                  Martin                 McGee
Meacham-Richardson     Merrill                Owens
Perry                  Quinn                  Rice
Riser                  Robinson               Rodgers
Sandifer               Scarborough            Sharpe
Simrill                Sinclair               Smith, D.C.
Smith, G.M.            Smith, J.R.            Smith, W.D.
Stille                 Stuart                 Talley
Taylor                 Thompson               Townsend
Tripp                  Trotter                Walker
Webb                   White                  Wilder
Wilkins                Young, A.              Young, J.

Total--63

Those who voted in the negative are:

Allen                  Bales                  Barfield
Barrett                Bowers                 Breeland
Brown, G.              Brown, R.              Carnell
Clyburn                Coleman                Cooper
Davenport              Delleney               Emory
Freeman                Gourdine               Harvin
Hines, J.              Hosey                  Howard
Jennings               Kennedy                Kirsh
Koon                   Lee                    Lloyd
Lourie                 Mack                   McCraw
McLeod                 Miller                 Neal, J.H.
Neal, J.M.             Ott                    Parks
Phillips               Rhoad                  Rivers
Rutherford             Scott                  Sheheen
Smith, F.N.            Smith, J.E.            Snow
Vaughn                 Weeks                  Whipper

Total--48

So, the Bill was read the third time and ordered sent to the Senate.

Rep. J. BROWN moved that the House do now adjourn, which was agreed to.

RETURNED WITH CONCURRENCE

The Senate returned to the House with concurrence the following:

H. 3783 (Word version) -- Rep. Martin: A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION TO DECLARE THAT APRIL 3, 2001, SYMBOLIZES THE DAY ON WHICH THE WAGES PAID TO AMERICAN WOMEN TO THIS DATE IN 2001, WHEN ADDED TO THEIR EARNINGS FOR THE ENTIRE 2000 CALENDAR YEAR, FINALLY EQUAL THE 2000 EARNINGS OF AMERICAN MEN, AND TO DECLARE APRIL 3, 2001, "EQUAL PAY DAY" IN ORDER TO RECOGNIZE THE FULL VALUE OF A WOMAN'S SIGNIFICANT SKILLS AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO THIS NATION'S LABOR FORCE.

ADJOURNMENT

At 2:50 p.m. the House, in accordance with the motion of Rep. J. M. NEAL, adjourned in memory of former Representative Garrett Judson Mobley of Kershaw, to meet at 10:00 a.m. tomorrow.

***

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