Indicates Matter Stricken
Indicates New Matter

The House assembled at 12:00 noon.
Deliberations were opened with prayer by the Chaplain of the House of Representatives, the Rev. Dr. Alton C. Clark, as follows:

At the very beginning of this Legislative Session and of the millennium, we stand tip-toed wondering what the future holds. That we cannot know, but we are sure that there will be disappointments and victories, of discouragements and joys. But we are more confident of God's presence. When we are right, enable us to stand firm; when we are knocked down by opposition, enable us to get up, not get down. Make us to remain steadfast to Your truths as in Your wisdom, You show us what is right. Lead and direct us this day and always. Amen.

Pursuant to Rule 6.3, the House of Representatives was led in the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America by the SPEAKER.

Rep. COTTY moved that when the House adjourns, it adjourn in memory of Austin M. Sheheen, Sr. of Camden, father of Representative Robert J. Sheheen, which was agreed to.

The House stood in silent prayer in memory of Austin M. Sheheen, Sr.

The following was received.

TO:             The Clerk of the Senate

The Clerk of the House
FROM:         F. Greg Delleney, Jr., Chairman

Judicial Merit Selection Commission
DATE:         January 11, 2000

In compliance with the provisions of Act No. 119, 1975 S.C. Acts 122, it is respectfully requested that the following information be printed in the Journals of the Senate and the House.

Respectfully submitted,
Representative F.G. Delleney, Jr., Chairman
Senator Glenn F. McConnell, Vice-Chairman
Representative Ralph W. Canty
Richard S. Fisher, Esquire
Dr. Harry M. Lightsey, Jr.
Mrs. Amy Johnson McLester
Senator Thomas L. Moore
Senator Edward E. Saleeby
Judge Curtis G. Shaw
Representative William Douglas Smith

January 11, 2000

Dear Members of the General Assembly:
Enclosed is the Judicial Merit Selection Commission's report of candidate qualifications. This report is designed to assist you in determining how to cast your vote. The Commission is charged by law with ascertaining whether judicial candidates are qualified for service on the bench. In accordance with this mandate, the Commission has thoroughly investigated all judicial candidates for their suitability for judicial service. The Commission found all candidates discussed in this report to be qualified.

The Commission's finding that a candidate is qualified means that the candidate satisfies both the constitutional criteria for judicial office and the Commission's evaluative criteria. The attached report details each candidate's qualifications as they relate to the Commission's evaluative criteria.

Judicial candidates are prohibited from asking for your commitment until 10:00 a.m. on Thursday, January 13, 2000. If you find a candidate violating the pledging prohibitions or if you have questions about this report, please contact the Commission office at 212-6092.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,
F. Greg Delleney, Jr.

Date Draft Report Issued:     10:00 a.m. on Tuesday, January 11, 2000
Date and Time
Final Report Issued:             10:00 a.m. on Thursday, January 13, 2000
Judicial candidates are not free to seek or accept commitments until 10:00 a.m. Thursday, January 13, 2000

The Judicial Merit Selection Commission is charged by law to consider the qualifications of candidates for the judiciary. This report details the reasons for the Commission's findings, as well as each candidate's qualifications as they relate to the Commission's evaluative criteria. The Commission is operating under the law which went into effect July 1, 1997, and which has dramatically changed the powers and duties of the Commission. One component of this law is that the Commission's finding of "qualified" or "not qualified" is binding on the General Assembly. Furthermore, the Commission is required to submit no more than three names for any particular judicial race; therefore, for one race the Commission was required to pare the number of candidates presented for consideration by the General Assembly. The Commission is also cognizant of the need for members of the General Assembly to be able to differentiate between candidates and, therefore, has attempted to provide as detailed a report as possible.

The Judicial Merit Selection Commission is composed of ten members, four of whom are non-legislators. The Commission has continued the more in-depth screening format started previously. The Commission has asked candidates their views on issues peculiar to service on the court to which they seek election. These questions were posed in an effort to provide the members of the General Assembly more information about candidates and their thought processes on issues relevant to their candidacies. The Commission has also engaged in a more probing inquiry into the depth of a candidate's experience in areas of practice that are germane to the office he or she is seeking. The Commission feels that candidates should have familiarity with the subject matter of the courts for which they offer, and feels that candidates' responses should indicate their familiarity with most major areas of the law with which they will be confronted.

In assessing each candidate's performance on the practice and procedure questions, the Commission had the option of placing candidates in either the "failed to meet expectations" or "met expectations" category. The Commission feels that these categories accurately reflect the candidate's performance on the practice and procedure questions.

As in previous years, the Commission considered judicial temperament in its evaluation of each candidate. An estimated 510,000 cases are tried each year in South Carolina, with over 276,000 jurors summoned to serve in State Court. The judiciary interacts with a great number of our state's citizens and it is important that each candidate demonstrates the ability and willingness to properly address the concerns of the large volume of people who come into contact with the Court each year.

The Commission has also used the Citizens Committees on Judicial Qualifications as an adjunct of the Commission. The Commission was concerned that since the decisions of our judiciary play such an important role in people's personal and professional lives, all South Carolinians should have a voice in the selection of the state's judges. It was this desire for broad-based grassroots participation that led the Commission to create the Citizens Committees on Judicial Qualifications. These committees composed of people from a broad range of experience (doctors, lawyers, teachers, businessmen, and advocates for varied organizations; members of these committees are also diverse in their racial and gender backgrounds) were asked to advise the Commission on the judicial candidates in their regions. Each regional committee interviewed the candidates from its assigned area and also interviewed other individuals in that region who were familiar with the candidate either personally or professionally. Based on those interviews and its own investigation, each committee provided the Commission with a report on their assigned candidates based on the Commission's evaluative criteria. The Commission then used these reports as a tool for further investigation of the candidate if the committee's report so warranted. Each committee's general findings have been included in the Commission's report for your review.

The Commission conducts a thorough investigation of each candidate's professional, personal, and financial affairs, and holds public hearings during which each candidate is questioned on a wide variety of issues. The Commission's investigation focuses on the following evaluative criteria: constitutional qualifications; ethical fitness; professional and academic ability; character; reputation; physical health; mental health; and judicial temperament. The Commission's investigation includes the following:
(1)     survey of the bench and bar;
(2)     SLED and FBI investigation;
(3)     credit investigation;
(4)     grievance investigation;
(5)     study of application materials;
(6)     verification of ethics compliance;
(7)     search of newspaper articles;
(8)     conflict of interest investigation;
(9)     court schedule study;
(10)     study of appellate record;
(11)     court observation; and
(12)     investigation of complaints.

While the law provides that the Commission must make findings as to qualifications, the Commission views its role as also including an obligation to consider candidates in the context of the judiciary on which they would serve and, to some degree, govern. To that end, the Commission inquires as to the quality of justice delivered in the courtrooms of South Carolina and seeks to impart, through its questioning, the view of the public as to matters of legal knowledge and ability, judicial temperament, and the absoluteness of the Judicial Canons of Conduct as to recusal for conflict of interest, prohibition of ex parte communication, and the disallowance of the acceptance of gifts. However, the Commission is not a forum for reviewing the individual decisions of the state's judicial system absent credible allegations of a candidate's violations of the Judicial Canons of Conduct, the Rules of Professional Conduct, or any of the Commission's nine evaluative criteria that would impact on a candidate's fitness for judicial service.

The Commission expects each candidate to possess a basic level of legal knowledge and ability, to have experience that would be applicable to the office sought, and to exhibit a strong adherence to codes of ethical behavior. These expectations are all important, and excellence in one category does not make up for deficiencies in another.

This report is the culmination of weeks of investigatory work and public hearings. The Commission takes its responsibilities seriously as it believes that the quality of justice delivered in South Carolina's courtrooms is directly affected by the thoroughness of its screening process. Please carefully consider the contents of this report as we believe it will help you make a more informed decision. If you would like to review portions of the screening transcript, which includes the personal data questionnaires, or other public information about a candidate before it is printed in the Journal, please contact Mike Couick at 212-6610.

This report conveys the Commission's findings as to the qualifications of all candidates currently offering for election to the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Circuit Court, Family Court, and the Administrative Law Judge Division.

Commission's Findings:     QUALIFIED
(1)     Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Ms. Ballenger meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as a Family Court judge.
Ms. Ballenger was born on July 15, 1957. She is 42 years old and a resident of West Union, South Carolina. Ms. Ballenger provided in her application that she has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1987.
(2)     Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Ms. Ballenger.
Ms. Ballenger demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Ms. Ballenger reported that she has made $56.10 in campaign expenditures on letters and postage.
Ms. Ballenger testified she has not:
(a)     sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)     sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)     asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Ms. Ballenger testified that she is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
(3)     Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Ms. Ballenger to be intelligent and knowledgeable. Her performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Ms. Ballenger described her continuing legal or judicial education during the past five years as follows:
(a)     Domestic Practice: Hot Tips from the Experts, S.C. Bar, 1993;
(b)     Advanced Workers' Compensation in S.C., National Business Institute, Inc., 1993;
(c)     Serving the Best Interests of Children, S.C. Bar, 1993;
(d)     Auto Torts XVI, S.C. Trial Lawyers Association, 1993;
(e)     Appellate Practice in S.C., 1993;
(f)     Domestic Practice: More Hot Tips, S.C. Bar, 1994;
(g)     Basic Probate Procedures and Practice, National Business Institute, Inc., 1994;
(h)     Auto Torts XVII, S.C. Trial Lawyers Association, 1994;
(i)     The Continuing Saga of "Hot Tips," S.C. Bar, 1995;
(j)     Marital Litigation, S.C. Bar, 1995;
(k)     Auto Torts XVIII, S.C. Trial Lawyers Association, 1995;
(l)     Domestic Practice: Hot Tips from the Experts, S.C. Bar, 1996;
(m)     Auto Torts, S.C. Trial Lawyers Association, 1996;
(n)     Domestic Practice - Hot Tips from the Experts, S.C. Bar, 1997;
(o)     The Case of the Silent Alarm, Oconee County Bar, 1997;
(p)     Auto Torts, S.C. Trial Lawyers Association, 1997;
(q)     Child Protective Services Act, S.C. Bar, 1998;
(r)     Family Court Bench/Bar, S.C. Bar, 1998;
(s)     Governor's Youth Council, 1998.
Ms. Ballenger reported that she was an Instructor in Family Law at Columbia Junior College (Paralegal Program) in the Summer of 1988.
Ms. Ballenger reported that she has not published any books and/or articles.
(4)     Character:
The Commission's investigation of Ms. Ballenger did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against her. The Commission's investigation of Ms. Ballenger did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Ms. Ballenger has handled her financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Ms. Ballenger was punctual and attentive in her dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with her diligence and industry.
(5)     Reputation:
Ms. Ballenger reported that her Martindale-Hubbell rating is "BV."
(6)     Physical Health:
Ms. Ballenger appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office she seeks.
(7)     Mental Stability:
Ms. Ballenger appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office she seeks.
(8)     Experience:
Ms. Ballenger was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1987. She described her legal experience as follows:
"At the time of my graduation, I was a law clerk for the firm of Kennedy, Price & Dial, Columbia, South Carolina. My duties included research and drafting of pleadings and other legal documents; assisting in trial preparation; maintaining client contact; and a limited amount of real estate work.
When I was admitted to the bar, I became an associate with Kennedy, Price & Dial, Columbia, South Carolina. I was employed with this firm until June of 1988. My duties expanded after I became an attorney. Areas of major emphasis included domestic litigation, civil litigation, real estate; probate and estate planning.
In June of 1988, Judge Carol Connor offered me a position as her law clerk. She needed a clerk until September of 1988. She had recently been elected as circuit court judge and she needed a clerk for the summer. She was the resident judge of the Fifth Judicial Circuit. My duties as a law clerk consisted of overseeing the docket, legal research, writing and reviewing orders. After clerking for Judge Connor, Judge Marion H. Kinon asked me if I would serve as his law clerk for approximately 6 weeks (to the best of my knowledge) while his law clerk was in training with the South Carolina National Guard.
In October 1988, the Honorable William Howard Ballenger, Resident Judge of the Tenth Judicial Circuit, offered me a position as his law clerk. My duties as a law clerk consisted of overseeing the docket, legal research, assisting with the language of the jury charge; writing and reviewing orders. During my tenure with Judge Ballenger, he presided over two death penalty cases. I was employed as Judge Ballenger's law clerk until January 1990.
In January 1990, I became an associate with the law firm of Ross, Stoudemire & Awde, P.A., Seneca, South Carolina. I had a general practice which included domestic; civil litigation; criminal; workers' compensation and social security. I would estimate that 60% of my practice was in the jurisdiction of the family court. In July of 1992, I became a named partner in the firm - Ross, Stoudemire, Ballenger & Sprouse, P.A. I was with this firm until December 31, 1994.
I then began my practice in Walhalla, South Carolina. I had a solo practice for a short period of time and then I became a principal/partner in the firm of Ballenger, Fedder, Cain & Norton, L.L.P. until July 1998. My practice included domestic; personal injury; workers' compensation; probate; social security; civil litigation and a limited amount of real estate.
From July 1998 to the present, I have had a solo practice in Walhalla, South Carolina. As a small town attorney, I have handled a wide variety of cases. However, in the last few years, I have streamlined my practice and, now by choice, I primarily handle family court matters. My domestic practice is approximately 90 to 95% of my caseload."
Ms. Ballenger described her Family Court experience as follows:
"Divorce - I have handled many, many divorce cases during my years of practice. Even though most divorce cases are uncontested, I have handled a number of contested divorce cases.
Equitable division of property - I have litigated many equitable division of property/debts cases. I have handled small cases that involved dividing the marital debts among the parties and also large cases where there were thousands and thousands of dollars of assets and division of pension and retirement accounts.
Child Custody - I have been involved in many custody cases both as an attorney for one of the parents and also as a guardian ad litem for the minor child(ren).
Adoption - This is an area which is of special interest to me. When I was practicing in Columbia, I worked for a firm who handled private adoptions. After working for the firm for a short period of time, I became the attorney who primarily handled the adoption cases. Even though I do not have the opportunity to handle as many private adoptions in Oconee County, I have handled several cases. I have done many step-parent adoptions and family adoptions.
Abuse and Neglect - I have been involved as an attorney for the parents, attorney for the guardian and guardian in abuse and neglect cases. In approximately 1993, I became the attorney for the Oconee County Guardian ad Litem program.
Juvenile Justice - I have represented juveniles in charges as serious as criminal sexual conduct with a minor. I have been involved in cases which resulted in contracts and others that had to be resolved by the family court. I am also on the Governor's Task Force for Juvenile Justice."
Ms. Ballenger reported the frequency of her court appearances during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Federal:     approximately 1 case per year
(b)     State:         average of 312 cases per year (as of Aug 12, 1999, 205 appearances)
Ms. Ballenger reported that the percentage of her practice involving civil, criminal, and domestic matters during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Civil:         6%
(b)     Criminal:     2%
(c)     Domestic:     90%
(d)     Other:         2%
Ms. Ballenger reported the percentage of her practice in trial court during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Jury:         5%
(b)     Non-jury:     95%
Ms. Ballenger provided that she most often serves as sole counsel or co-counsel.
The following is Ms. Ballenger's account of her five most significant litigated matters:
"(a)     Erby McCall v. Carol A. McCall, Gary Gordon and Mark Kubinetz. A two-day equitable division of property case. The interesting issue in the case was the determination of the status of the property. The wife had transferred all the marital property to her two sons a year before the separation. There were two legal arguments - whether there was a resulting trust and whether she conveyed the property with a fraudulent intent to deprive the spouse of his equitable interest in the property. There were other issues in the cases which included fault of the marriage that affected the economic circumstances of the marriage and alleged debts between the spouses. During the litigation, my client became terminally ill so there was the very serious concern that he would die before the final hearing. In order to preserve his testimony, a video deposition was taken of my client. At trial, the opposing party objected to the introduction of the video deposition. This case took three years to get to trial due to my client filing bankruptcy; the opposing party changing attorneys; and the difficulty in getting service on the two sons. My client was able to attend the final hearing but he was in a wheelchair and very fragile. The trial judge contacted my client's doctor who substantiated my position that my client was too ill to testify. The wife was to pay to my client a lump sum for his interest in the marital property or market the property for sale. When she did not do either, I, on my client's behalf, filed a rule to show cause. My client died the day before the contempt hearing. The contempt hearing was continued until a personal representative was appointed to act in my client's behalf. There is presently a rule to show cause pending in the Oconee County Family Court;
(b)     Wanda Waldo v. Stuart Waldo. A contested custody case. The final hearing lasted four days. I was guardian ad litem for the minor child. During the entire case, I was called on many times to make recommendations as to issues regarding the child, i.e., visitation issues. The time I spent in serving as the guardian was 83.85 hours (which was very conservative number). This time did not include telephone calls. At the trial, I was an active participant. I called witnesses including expert witnesses;
(c)     Dorothy W. Todd v. William Todd. This case involved equitable division of marital property, alimony, and attorney's fees. The reason that this case is significant to me is that I was involved as an advocate for my client for two years before the Complaint was filed. Both parties wanted to resolve the issues prior to the family court becoming involved. Both parties did not want the embarrassment of having their marital issues decided by the Court. Therefore, the parties and their attorneys negotiated and renegotiated this case for approximately two years before a settlement was reached. Because of the value of the marital property and the tax issues, experts were hired by both parties to assist with the case. When the case was filed in the family court, the Complaint requested approval of an agreement. The marital property was sold and divided among the parties before the filing of the Complaint. As the attorney for the wife, I had to prepare two qualified domestic relation orders (QDROs) in order for the wife to receive her interest in the husband's pension account and his 401(k)/retirement account;
(d)     Anthony N. Martuccio v. Helen Evelyn Martuccio. A contested case involving the issues of divorce, equitable division of marital property, alimony, and attorney's fees. The parties had been married 32 years. The issues were not complex, but the Plaintiff was very uncooperative which made the case difficult. He refused to cooperate with the pre-trial discovery. At trial, the husband contested the issue of divorce. By the testimony of the private investigator, there was no doubt that the husband had opportunity to commit adultery. However, the husband denied the adultery allegation stating that he had undergone implantation of inflatable penile prosthesis and that he was having difficulty with the prosthesis. The wife was totally disabled. Expert testimony was introduced at the hearing. This case also involved the request by my client for lump sum alimony. My client was successful and was awarded lump sum alimony. The final disposition of the case involved my preparing a QDRO for the Plaintiff's civil retirement. Although the preparation of the QDRO itself was not difficult, the process in getting the QDRO approved took approximately one year;
(e)     State of South Carolina v. Michael Rogers. A juvenile case involving a minor who was charged with criminal sexual conduct in the first degree with a minor. This case was interesting because the minor had committed a sexual act (an act which by definition constituted sexual battery) with his cousin (who is 3 years younger than he) when he was 9 years of age. Charges were never filed against the minor and law enforcement never became involved. When the minor was fourteen years of age, the minor fondled his cousin. The juvenile was then charged with Criminal Sexual Conduct with a minor (1st Degree) alleging the incident when the defendant was 9 years of age in order to establish the legal requirements of CSC 1st. This case was very interesting to me in that the minor if found guilty would be charged with filing in the Sexual Offender's Registry for a crime that he committed when he was 9 years of age (too young to be committed). Another issue that surfaced during the hearing was the Defendant had been sexually abused himself at the age of six (6) years of age. In this case, I had to employ two experts - a counselor and a clinical psychologist."
The following is Ms. Ballenger's account of the civil appeals she has personally handled:
"(a)     Oconee County Department of Social Services v. Brenda Guy. I was the attorney for the guardian ad litem in this matter. This matter is presently pending before the S.C. Court of Appeals. I filed a Reply and Memorandum in Response to the Appellant's Return. Trial Court Case No. 96-DR-37-948;
(b)     I handled an appeal very early in my practice. The attorney representing the appellant was Randy Chastain. I was successful in getting the case dismissed because the appellant did not comply with the appellate court rules. To the best of my memory, the appellant did not file his brief timely."
(9)     Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Ms. Ballenger's temperament would be excellent.
(10)     Miscellaneous:
The Upstate Citizens Advisory Committee reported: "Ms. Ballenger was found to be qualified pursuant to the evaluative criteria."
Ms. Ballenger is married to William Howard Ballenger, Jr. She has one child, Courtney Lenore Ballenger, age 8.
Ms. Ballenger reported that she was a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
(a)     S.C. Bar Association;
Oconee County Bar Association, President - 1996;
S.C. Trial Lawyers Association.
Ms. Ballenger provided that she was a member of the following civic, charitable, education, social, or fraternal organizations:
(a)     Paul Hayne Circle (women's literary circle in Walhalla). Offices held include treasurer and international affairs chairperson;
(b)     Oconee County Council for the Prevention of Child Abuse. Offices held include director and president;
(c)     Family Friends (a civic organization whose goal is to provide a mentor in the home of families in Oconee County with at-risk children). Offices held include director;
(d)     Governor's Task Force for Juvenile Justice;
(e)     Oconee County Community Theater. Offices held include director;
(f)     Walhalla Elementary PTA. Offices held include director and membership chairperson.
Ms. Ballenger additionally provided, "I feel that I have many years of experience in the family court area. I have handled a wide range of cases including complex cases and cases involving novel legal issues. But just as important, I have handled cases for the average Oconee County resident who is going through a difficult time in his or her life and feels that his or her case deserves the same attention as the cases involving millions of dollars in assets. Through my experience, I have a thorough knowledge of the law in the family court area.
I feel that it is safe to say that I am appointed to the greatest majority of cases that need a guardian ad litem in Oconee County (except in cases where I am involved or have a conflict). I feel that serving as a guardian has helped prepare me for looking at the cases involving children and making those difficult decisions.
Even though I have been practicing in family court for many years, I have tried to never lose sight that to my client that their case is one of the most important events in his or her life. Also in cases involving children, the stakes and the results are even greater. I feel that I am a person with insight and compassion. I truly feel that this is the most important characteristic and trait that a judge, especially a family court judge, needs. I feel that I will have the judicial temperament that conveys to the litigants that I have listened to their position and have rendered a decision that is fair to both parties."

Commission's Findings:     QUALIFIED
(1)     Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Mr. Baxley meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as a Circuit Court judge.
Mr. Baxley was born on August 24, 1956. He is 43 years old and a resident of Hartsville, South Carolina. Mr. Baxley provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1982.
(2)     Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Mr. Baxley.
Mr. Baxley demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Mr. Baxley reported that his campaign expenditures have consisted solely of costs incurred by preparing and posting his letter of intent to the Commission.
Mr. Baxley testified he has not:
(a)     sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)     sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)     asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Mr. Baxley testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
(3)     Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Mr. Baxley to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Mr. Baxley provided that his continuing legal or judicial education during the past five years has centered upon changes in South Carolina's automobile insurance laws, discovery tactics, evidentiary matters, advocacy, and workers' compensation because of the civil emphasis in his law practice. In addition to these courses, all continuing education credits in ethics have been obtained.
Mr. Baxley reported that he has appeared on panel programs at the U.S.C. School of Law, at various trade associations, and at attorneys' association conferences over the years to discuss legislative changes and proposals. These appearances were in relation to his role as a legislator and not as an attorney with expertise in any particular area of law.
Mr. Baxley reported that he has not published any books and/or articles.
(4)     Character:
The Commission's investigation of Mr. Baxley did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against him. The Commission's investigation of Mr. Baxley did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Mr. Baxley has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Mr. Baxley was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5)     Reputation:
Mr. Baxley reported that he is not rated by Martindale-Hubbell.
Mr. Baxley was elected to and served in the South Carolina House of Representatives, Seat No. 65, from 1987 through 1998 for a total of six two-year terms.
(6)     Physical Health:
Mr. Baxley appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7)     Mental Stability:
Mr. Baxley appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8)     Experience:
Mr. Baxley was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1982. He described his legal experience as follows:
"I have practiced with only one firm during my legal career, Driggers, Baxley & Moyd of Hartsville, S.C. Although this firm is a small town, general practice firm, over the years all three attorneys in the practice have maintained an emphasis on tort claims representing claimants.
For the first four years (1982-1986), my practice involved numerous areas of law including real estate, probate, workers compensation, domestic, criminal, corporate and business, and civil claims. During this time, for two years I served as chairman of the Darlington County Public Defender Corporation and also served for three years as prosecutor for the City of McBee Municipal Court.
It was my privilege to be elected to the South Carolina House of Representatives in 1986, commencing service in January of 1987, which significantly changed my practice. Time constraints required that I withdraw from practice in the Family and Criminal Courts, and all other areas of practice were curtailed in favor of civil practice. The nature of my civil practice also changed, switching from the general administration of tort claims to handling matters in litigation, representing both Plaintiffs and Defendants. This has further developed into litigation referrals from other attorneys of cases that involve governmental claims, unusual liability theories, and difficult damages issues."
Mr. Baxley provided the following description of his experience in criminal and civil matters:
"As briefly discussed above, early in my career I represented numerous clients with a variety of charges in the Court of General Sessions and the Magistrate's criminal court. Since 1987, my involvement in criminal cases has been limited, generally arising only in the context of an accompanying or related civil claim. At the present time, I am representing only one client in the Court of General Sessions, an eighty-year-old gentleman who is charged with first degree arson in the burning of his residence. Tragically, his wife died in this fire, but my client has not yet been charged with additional crimes arising from the fire. We now await the scheduling of the preliminary hearing in the arson case.
My civil practice has allowed me the opportunity over the years to represent clients in numerous challenging litigation cases. The primary emphasis of these cases has been personal injury, but I have also handled matters in contract litigation, business litigation, breach of warranty claims, actions to quiet title to real property, declaratory judgment actions with respect to insurance coverages, and intentional torts.
At present, I have approximately 40 litigation cases pending in the state circuit courts, federal district court, the South Carolina Court of Appeals, and the South Carolina Supreme Court.
Even though my civil experience has been primarily obtained while representing Plaintiffs, if appointed to the Bench I commit to the Judicial Merit Selection Commission that I will work diligently to be fair to all parties in the cases that come before me, and administer the law fairly and equally without regard to a party's designation as Plaintiff, Defendant, Cross-Claimant, or Intervenor.
I have only limited experience in criminal matters. It is my hope that working both as a prosecutor and with the public defender corporation early in my career has given me some insight into both sides of the General Sessions Court. To compensate for this lack of experience, it is my intention to diligently study the criminal code and circuit court rules pertaining to criminal procedure, to review advance sheets relating to criminal cases; and, should I be so fortunate as to be selected as a judge of the circuit court, to associate myself with and ask for assistance from jurists with extensive experience in the criminal court."
Mr. Baxley reported the frequency of his court appearances during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Federal:     Limited, with only 2 or 3 on the docket at any one time
(b)     State:         Numerous appearances
Mr. Baxley reported that the percentage of his practice involving civil, criminal, and domestic matters during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Civil:         90%
(b)     Criminal:     5%
(c)     Domestic:     5%
Mr. Baxley reported the percentage of his practice in trial court during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Jury:         75%
(b)     Non-jury:     25%
Mr. Baxley provided that he most often served as sole counsel.
The following is Mr. Baxley's account of his five most significant litigated matters:
"(a)     Phillip Byrd, as Adm. of the Estate of Kirlenze Byrd v. The Darlington County School District, C/A No. 85-CP-16-308 and 309. This case, brought shortly after the abolition of sovereign immunity, established liability against a school district for the death of a child occurring after school and away from school grounds. Nine-year-old Kirlenze Byrd was detained after school by the principal and missed his bus as a result. Kirlenze's older siblings rode the bus with Kirlenze each day, thus being present to supervise his activities until their parents arrived home. The principal took Kirlenze directly home in his personal vehicle, beating the bus to the premises, and left Kirlenze in the yard with no supervision. While attempting to crawl into the house through a back window, the window slammed shut, killing Kirlenze. Plaintiffs were able to overcome numerous legal defenses based on sovereign immunity theories in recovering for wrongful death;
(b)     William L. Hammon v. Brown, Case No. 4:85-2268-2, Federal District Court. An automobile accident claim in which the Plaintiff was totally deaf, requiring the case be tried through a sign language interpreter. This presented a challenge in submitting the case to the Court and jury. The case involved a difficult issue of damages in which Plaintiff was required to impeach a treating doctor who had misunderstood information concerning Plaintiff's injuries conveyed to the witness shortly after the collision occurred. As a result of the misunderstanding, the witness formed the opinion that Plaintiff was not injured as he claimed. Interestingly, with a hearing doctor testifying against him to a hearing jury, the deaf Plaintiff gave up all hope of victory, thinking that he would not be believed by the jury. Verdict for the Plaintiff of $160,054;
(c)     Sue Northam, Adm. of the Estate of Allen Lee Northam v. Carolina Assembly and Distribution Company, C/A 85-CP-16-307. First dram shop action brought against a retail liquor package store in the Pee Dee region of S.C. Plaintiff's son died in an automobile accident caused by a drunk driver and Plaintiff alleged that the drunk driver had been intoxicated at the time he purchased liquor from the retail location and that the liquor then caused the driver's further intoxication, resulting in Plaintiff's death. This case extended the dram shop theory of liability from a traditional bar setting to retail package sales;
(d)     The Estate of English, et al. v. Delonghi Italia, C/A No. 4:92-0985-2, Federal District Court of S.C. A complex products liability claim arising from the death by fire of six children caused by a defective space heater manufactured by a foreign company. Because the heater in question was destroyed in the fire, archaeological sifting of the fire site was required to obtain fragmentary evidence from which an insufficient internal electrical system was eventually proved. This case was significant in that it led to numerous suits against the manufacturer who had widely distributed the defective product throughout the southeastern United States. Settled immediately prior to trial;
(e)     R. Snyder, as GAL for Claimants v. Darlington County, et al. (96-CP-16-339) This case is still pending and involves governmental liability under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act. I represent thirty minor Plaintiffs in a suit against the County of Darlington, S.C., Court Administration, and other Defendants arising from the theft of approximately $800,000 in conservatorship funds from accounts controlled by the former (now deceased) Darlington County Probate Judge. The former judge's estate is bankrupt. This case presents some very challenging Tort Claims Act issues in attempting to fix civil liability against a governmental entity for the criminal act of a third party. Jurisdiction has been retained by Hon. James E. Lockemy as complex litigation, with trial expected in November of 1999."
The following is Mr. Baxley's account of five civil appeals he has personally handled:
"(a)     Rogers v. S.C. Dept. of Corrections, et al., 464 S.E.2d 330 (1996). Established the duty of a state agency to warn an individual of potential harm when a threat had been made by a prisoner against a particular individual who would otherwise be unaware of the danger. Under the Supreme Court's holding, the duty to warn arises upon the release of the prisoner. Prior to this ruling, the Department of Corrections had no responsibility for injuries to third parties committed by released inmates;
(b)     Leviner v. Sonoco Products Company, Case No. 96 CP 16-526A, Appeal pending. Workers' compensation action in which Claimant was awarded lifetime benefits for brain injury after appeal from Commission to Circuit Court. Remanded for trial de novo by Court of Appeals, petition for certiorari presently pending before Supreme Court;
(c)     Kelly v. S.C. Farm Bureau, 450 S.E.2d 59 (1994). Altered state law with respect to insurance policy language interpretation and the duties imposed by law upon the insured. In this case for the first time our Supreme Court held that a policyholder was not bound by the written terms of an insurance policy if an agent of the carrier had made an oral representation inconsistent with the written language. This reversed longstanding rulings by the Court that the written coverage language in a policy always controlled the agreement between the parties due to the policy total integration clause. Prior to this ruling, the insured was charged with having read and understood the policy language, notwithstanding any oral promises an agent may have made. Because of the complex and legalistic nature of the wording of insurance policies before Kelly, consumers were at a distinct disadvantage when disputing the terms of an insurance policy;
(d)     Cline v. Nosredna Corporation, 352 S.E.2d 291 (1986). In this workers' compensation case, our Supreme Court first held that a heart attack due to pre-existing pathology is fully compensable if coupled with unusual exertion or strain in the workplace. Prior to that ruling, heart attack claims were generally disfavored in a workers' compensation context, and a pre-disposition to heart attack caused by non-work related factors was dispositive of claimant's case;
(e)     Billy Thomas v. Hi-Way Dispatch and Van Leer, N.C. Court of Appeals 97-805. This appeal and the trial below handled in association with W. James Chandler, Esq., of Charlotte, N.C. This case arose from the collision of two tractor-trailer vehicles near Monroe, N.C. The Plaintiff's vehicle struck the rear of Defendant's vehicle and Defendant denied liability. Plaintiff sustained brain injury in the collision and had no recollection of events. Through circumstantial evidence Plaintiff was able to prove that Defendant's vehicle swerved into the path of Plaintiff's vehicle, thereby causing the collision. Verdict for Plaintiff of $839,000 resulted in Defendants filing three separate appeals, all of which were ultimately decided for Plaintiff."
(9)     Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Mr. Baxley's temperament would be excellent.
(10)     Miscellaneous:
The Pee Dee Citizens Advisory Committee reported: "The Committee is of the opinion that Mr. Baxley is qualified for the position of Circuit Court judge. As a result of its investigation of and interview with Mr. Baxley, the Committee recommends/approves this candidate without reservation."
Mr. Baxley is not married. He does not have children.
Mr. Baxley reported that he is a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
(a)     S.C. Bar Association (1982 - present);
(b)     Darlington County Bar Association (1982 - present);
(c)     American Bar Association (1982 - present);
(d)     S.C. Trial Lawyers Association (1981 - present);
(e)     American Association of Trial Lawyers (1981 - 1994).
Mr. Baxley provided that he is a member of the following civic, charitable, education, social, or fraternal organizations:
(a)     S.C. League of Women Voters;
(b)     S.C. Wildlife Federation;
(c)     Wildlife Action;
(d)     Butler Heritage Foundation;
(e)     Homes for Hartsville;
(f)     Darlington County Mental Health Association;
(g)     Planting Citizens for Tomorrow (Educational);
(h)     Junior Achievement;
(i)         Hartsville Branch NAACP;
(j)         Darlington County Task Force for Progress;
(k)     Prestwood Country Club;
(l)         Christmas in April.
Mr. Baxley expressed his gratitude for the Commission's consideration of his application to stand for election to the circuit court bench and for the opportunity to seek this position of public service to his fellow citizens. Mr. Baxley provided, "South Carolina and its citizens have been very good to me and to my family for many generations, and I hope through this judicial position, should you choose me to serve, that in some small way a portion of this great generosity might be returned."

Commission's Findings:     QUALIFIED
(1)     Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Judge Beatty meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as a Circuit Court judge.
Judge Beatty was born on April 29, 1952. He is 48 years old and a resident of Spartanburg, South Carolina. Judge Beatty provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1979.
(2)     Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Judge Beatty.
Judge Beatty demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Judge Beatty reported that he has not made any campaign expenditures.
Judge Beatty testified he has not:
(a)     sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)     sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)     asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Judge Beatty testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
(3)     Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Judge Beatty to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Judge Beatty described his continuing legal or judicial education during the past five years as exceeding CLE requirements each year.
Judge Beatty reported that he has taught Business Law at Limestone College.
Judge Beatty reported that he has not published any books and/or articles.
(4)     Character:
The Commission's investigation of Judge Beatty did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against him. The Commission's investigation of Judge Beatty did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Judge Beatty has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Judge Beatty was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5)     Reputation:
Judge Beatty reported that he is not rated by Martindale-Hubbell. Judge Beatty reported that he never requested a rating and was unaware of any existing rating.
Judge Beatty provided that he served in the U.S. Army on Active Duty from 1974 - 1976 and in the Reserves from 1976 - 1981. He received an Honorable Discharge in 1981 as a Captain.
(6)     Physical Health:
Judge Beatty appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7)     Mental Stability:
Judge Beatty appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8)     Experience:
Judge Beatty was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1979. He described his legal experience as follows:
"1979-1981: Neighborhood Legal Assistance Program - Civil Practice
1981-1989: Sole practitioner - General Practice
1989-1991: Beatty, Vick & Tullis - General Practice
1991-1995: Beatty Law Firm - General Practice."
The following is Judge Beatty's account of his five most significant orders or opinions:
"(a)     Treasured Arts, Inc. v. S.C. Dept. of Revenue, et al.;
(b)     Elliot v. Richland County, et al.;
(c)     United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. S.C. Dept. of Health and Environmental Control, et al.;
(d)     State of South Carolina v. Eddie Lee Arnold;
(e)     Henry E. Ingram, Jr. v. J&W Corporation for Greenwood, Inc. and Vick Scurry."
(9)     Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Judge Beatty's temperament has been and would continue to be excellent.
(10)     Miscellaneous:
The Upstate Citizens Advisory Committee reported: "Judge Beatty was found to be qualified pursuant to the evaluative criteria."
Judge Beatty is married to Angela Chestnut Beatty. He has three children: Brandon, age 20; Austine, age 10; and Morgan, age 6.
Judge Beatty reported that he was a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
(a)     S.C. Bar Association;
(b)     Spartanburg County Bar Association;
(c)     National Bar Association.
Judge Beatty provided that he was a member of the following civic, charitable, education, social, or fraternal organizations:
(a)     Progressive Men's Club;
(b)     Omega Psi Phi Fraternity.

(1)     Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Judge Buchan meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as a judge on the Court of Appeals.
Judge Buchan was born on September 9, 1952. She is 47 years old and a resident of Marion, South Carolina. Judge Buchan provided in her application that she has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1980.
(2)     Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Judge Buchan.
Judge Buchan demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Judge Buchan reported that she has incurred minimal campaign expenditures for postage, telephone, and resumé printing costs.
Judge Buchan testified she has not:
(a)     sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)     sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)     asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Judge Buchan testified that she is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
(3)     Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Judge Buchan to be intelligent and knowledgeable. Her performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Judge Buchan described her continuing legal or judicial education during the past five years as attending various seminars through the South Carolina Bar and other approved providers. Judge Buchan reported that she also engages in independent reading.
Judge Buchan reported that she has taught the following law-related courses:
(a)     Bridge the Gap, 1996, Handling Family Court Appointments;
(b)     Chief Judges' Seminar, 1997, Scheduling Problems;
(c)     Family Court Judges Annual Meeting, 1998, Race and Gender Sensitive Issues;
(d)     S.C. Trial Lawyers Association, co-panelist, 1998, Valuation of a Professional Practice;
(e)     S.C. Bar Winter Meeting, co-panelist, 1998, Joint Custody Considerations;
(f)     Family Court Judges Annual Meeting, 1999, Post-Trial Motions in Juvenile Hearings.
Judge Buchan reported that she has not published any books and/or articles.
(4)     Character:
The Commission's investigation of Judge Buchan did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against her. The Commission's investigation of Judge Buchan did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Judge Buchan has handled her financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Judge Buchan was punctual and attentive in her dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with her diligence and industry.
(5)     Reputation:
Judge Buchan reported that her last available Martindale-Hubbell rating was "BV."
(6)     Physical Health:
Judge Buchan appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office she seeks.
(7)     Mental Stability:
Judge Buchan appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office she seeks.
(8)     Experience:
Judge Buchan was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1980. She described her legal experience as follows:
"For a brief period after graduation, I continued to work with Kennedy, Price, Kosko & Coffas, Attorneys, for whom I clerked during law school. From my admission to the Bar until March 1982, I was employed with Timothy G. Quinn, Esquire, and was primarily involved in preliminary office work in his Columbia office and management of his Marion office. In March 1982, I began practicing with Edward W. Whittington, Jr., in Mullins under the name of Whittington & Buchan, Attorneys. Beginning in 1982, my practice was primarily domestic, although I handled some civil, real estate and commercial work. In May 1992, I was appointed as a Family Court judge and have served in that capacity since."
Judge Buchan reported the frequency of court appearances during the last five years of her practice, prior to serving on the bench, as follows:
(a)     Federal:     2 cases
(b)     State:         remainder of cases
Judge Buchan reported that the percentage of her practice involving civil, criminal, and domestic matters during the last five years of her practice, prior to serving on the bench, as follows:
(a)     Civil:         14%
(b)     Criminal:     1%
(c)     Domestic:     85%
Judge Buchan reported the percentage of her practice in trial court during the last five years of her practice, prior to serving on the bench, as follows:
(a)     Jury:         less than 1/2%
(b)     Non-jury:     remainder
Judge Buchan provided that she most often served as sole counsel.
The following is Judge Buchan's account of her five most significant litigated matters:
"(a)     Prevatte v. Prevatte, 297 S.C. 345, 377 S.E.2d 114 (Ct. App, 1989) This case was handled from inception through a remand hearing and subsequent appeal. It involved establishing a common law marriage, fault grounds for divorce, and the need for alimony;
(b)     Marion County DSS v. Rowell. I was appointed as counsel for Ms. Rowell in this action for termination of her parental rights. The case is significant to me because Ms. Rowell both retained her parental rights and received assistance to improve her living skills;
(c)     Turner v. Turner. This divorce case was important and difficult because my client suffered from residual injuries and disabilities as a result of a closed head injury;
(d)     Riad v. Diamond. I was the Court-appointed Guardian ad Litem in the Dillon case, which involved a custody dispute for three children between two families. The children's mother was killed by their father, who was incarcerated;
(e)     Rabon v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph, et al. This case was significant because it was a wrongful death action where the Plaintiff's son had died when his dirt bike hit a guy wire. The case settled prior to trial."
The following is Judge Buchan's account of civil appeals she has personally handled:
"(a)     Prevatte v. Prevatte, 87-MO-08 (Ct. App., filed January 28, 1987);
(b)     Prevatte v. Prevatte, 297 S.C. 345, 377 S.E.2d 114 (Ct. App, 1989)."
Judge Buchan reported that she has not personally handled any criminal appeals.
The following is Judge Buchan's five most significant orders or opinions she has handled:
"(a)     Poston v. Poston, 331 S.C. 106, 502 S.E.2d 86 (1998);
(b)     Dixon v. Dixon, Opinion No. 3013, June 21, 1999;
(c)     Branham v. Branham, 99-UP-334, filed June 1, 1999;
(d)     Eagerton v. Eagerton, This case was significant because it dealt with a relatively large estate and each of the parties had substantial difficulties. Each side called several experts, and every possible issue (divorce, fault, alimony, equitable division, attorneys' fees, etc.) was contested;
(e)     Eisenmann v. Eisenmann, This case was significant because it was so tragic. Two professionals were involved in a contested divorce and a custody dispute. The parties, both of whom are admirable people, separated after one of them was in a horrible car accident and suffered a closed head injury, which left some permanent disability. The accident and the resulting events from same made for one of the saddest cases I have heard."
(9)     Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Judge Buchan's temperament has been and would continue to be excellent.
(10)     Miscellaneous:
The Pee Dee Citizens Advisory Committee reported: "The Committee is of the opinion that Judge Buchan is qualified for the position of Judge of the South Carolina Court of Appeals. As a result of its investigation of and interview with Judge Buchan, the Committee recommends/approves this candidate without reservation."
Judge Buchan is married to Ernest McCray Graham. She has three children: David McCray Graham (stepson), 28 years old, medical illustrator; Rebecca Earl Graham (stepdaughter), 24 years old, office manager; and Martha Alison Graham, 12 years old.
Judge Buchan reported that she was a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
(a)     S.C. Bar Association (1980-present);
(b)     Marion County Bar Association (1980-present);
(c)     National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges (1997-present).
Judge Buchan provided that she was not a member of any civic, charitable, education, social, or fraternal organizations.
Judge Buchan additionally provided, "I have the desire, the work ethic, and the intelligence to handle a position on the Appeals Court."

Commission's Findings:     QUALIFIED
(1)     Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Mr. Buckner meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as a Circuit Court judge.
Mr. Buckner was born on May 9, 1949. He is 50 years old and a resident of Walterboro, South Carolina. Mr. Buckner provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1975.
(2)     Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Mr. Buckner.
Mr. Buckner demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Mr. Buckner reported that he has made less than $100 in campaign expenditures on postage and stationery.
Mr. Buckner testified he has not:
(a)     sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)     sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)     asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Mr. Buckner testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
(3)     Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Mr. Buckner to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Mr. Buckner described his continuing legal or judicial education during the past five years as follows:
5-6-94     Domestic Practice: More Hot Tips From the Experts;
6-9-94     How to Draft Wills and Trusts in South Carolina;
7-29-94     Rules, Rules, Rules;
10-21-94     The Secrets of Successful Civil Litigation: Hot Tips From the Experts;
10-27-94     Defending the DUI;
11-16-94     Professional Responsibility in Pretrial Litigation (ALPS);
9-29-95     S.C. Tort Law Update;
11-17-95     Ethics;
4-12-96     Understanding the New S.C. Criminal Offenses & Penalties for "Serious" and "Most Serious" Crimes & Repeat Offenders;
11-08-96     Auto Insurance Update;
11-22-96     The Masters in Trial;
4-24-97     Practical Defense of DUI and DUI Accidents;
6-26-97     67th Annual Fourth Circuit Judicial Conference, "The Independent Counsel Process: Is It Broken and How Should It Be Fixed?";
9-28-97     1997 Annual South Carolina Solicitors' Association Conference;
6-26-98     68th Annual Fourth Circuit Judicial Conference, "The Legal Profession in the 21st Century";
8-13-98     1998 Annual S.C. Trial Lawyers Annual Convention;
9-27-98     1998 Annual S.C. Solicitors' Conference;
6-25-99     69th Annual Fourth Circuit Judicial Conference, "Brave New World: The Telecommunications Act of 1996";
7-16-99     Orientation for Attorneys to Assist Disciplinary Counsel Internet Basics Seminar;
8-5-99     1999 Annual S.C. Trial Lawyers Convention;
At the S.C. Trial Lawyers Association Annual Convention on August 6, 1999:
(a)     Jury Innovations by Judge William L. Howard, Sr.;
(b)     What's Admissible: Medicaid/Medicare Payments and the Collateral Source Rule by Judge Diane S. Goodstein;
(c)     Trial and Post-Trial Motions by Judge James R. Barber, III.
Mr. Buckner reported that he has taught the following law-related courses:
(a)     1981 or 1982, S.C. Bar CLE Seminar on "Extraordinary Writs" at the U.S.C. School of Law;
(b)     May 18, 1984, Seminar on "Condemnation Law and Practice" at the U.S.C. School of Law (moderator);
(c)     October 21, 1994, CLE seminar, "Calling as a Witness An Expert Who Was Engaged but not Called by Opposing Party" at the U.S.C. School of Law.
Mr. Buckner reported that he has not published any books and/or articles.
(4)     Character:
The Commission's investigation of Mr. Buckner did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against him. The Commission's investigation of Mr. Buckner did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Mr. Buckner has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Mr. Buckner was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5)     Reputation:
Mr. Buckner reported that his Martindale-Hubbell rating is "AV."
Mr. Buckner was commissioned as a 2nd Lieutenant at graduation from Wofford College through the ROTC Program. He was on active duty from October 13, 1971 to January 13, 1972. The branch of service at this time was the Quarter Master Corps. After his discharge from active duty, he continued in the U.S. Army Reserves from 1972 until approximately 1979 and was transferred to the Judge Advocate General Corps. He received his discharge from the reserves in about 1979 at which time he believes he had attained the rank of Captain. His current status is inactive. He has an Honorable Discharge.
(6)     Physical Health:
Mr. Buckner appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7)     Mental Stability:
Mr. Buckner appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8)     Experience:
Mr. Buckner was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1975. He described his legal experience as follows:
"1975-1979         South Carolina Attorney General's Office as a Staff Attorney, Assistant Attorney General, Columbia, S.C.
1979-1981         Partner in the Law Firm of Wise and Cole, P.A., in Charleston, S.C.
1981-1986         Partner in the Law Firm of Smoak, Moody, Buckner and Siegel in Walterboro, S.C.
1986-Present     Private Practice, Law Office of Perry M. Buckner, in Walterboro, S.C.
From 1975 to 1979, I was a staff attorney in the Attorney General's Office during the first two years. My duties included prosecuting criminal cases in Magistrate and the Circuit Courts of South Carolina. I also handled criminal appeals to the South Carolina Supreme Court on behalf of the State of South Carolina during my initial two years with the South Carolina Attorney General's Office.
From 1977 to 1979, I moved to the Civil Division of the South Carolina Attorney General's Office and I handled civil litigation for the State of South Carolina including representation of the South Carolina Wildlife Department, the South Carolina Highway Department, the Medical University of South Carolina, The Citadel, and the South Carolina Forestry Commission.
From 1979-1981, I did insurance defense work as a partner with the law firm of Wise and Cole in Charleston, South Carolina. During this time, my practice consisted of almost entirely civil defense work.
From 1981-1986, as a partner with the law firm of Smoak, Moody, Buckner, and Siegel in Walterboro, South Carolina, I handled primarily Plaintiff's personal injury cases and Workmen's Compensation cases. This was a general law practice so I also handled both Plaintiff and defense cases in both magistrates and circuit court.
From 1986 to the present, I handled Plaintiff's personal injury cases, Social Security cases, Probate Court/estate work. I also handled both Plaintiff and Defendant litigation in Civil Court, and I handled criminal defense work in the Court of General Sessions of South Carolina.
In 1997, I became part-time Assistant Solicitor for the 14th Judicial Circuit prosecuting cases for the Solicitor's Office in the Court of General Sessions of Colleton County."
Mr. Buckner provided the following description of his experience in criminal and civil matters:
"I began handling criminal cases in the South Carolina Attorney General's Office in 1975 by handling criminal appeals from the Circuit Court to the South Carolina Supreme Court. I also was assigned by the Attorney General to various weeks of General Sessions Court throughout the state to prosecute criminal cases in the Court of General Sessions if the solicitor was ill or had a conflict. From 1981 until 1997, my private practice included criminal defense work in both Magistrate and Circuit Court. In 1988, I was Court appointed to handle a death penalty criminal trial in the Colleton County Court of General Sessions. In 1997, I became part-time Assistant Solicitor in the Court of General Sessions for Colleton County prosecuting cases for the State of South Carolina in the Colleton County Court of General Sessions.
I have had extensive experience in handling civil matters in my practice. I began trying condemnation cases for the South Carolina Highway Department, particularly in the Charleston area during the construction of what is known as the "Mark Clark Expressway" while employed with the South Carolina Attorney General's Office. After leaving the Attorney General's Office and entering private practice, I have represented landowners in condemnation cases in counties throughout the State of South Carolina. My civil trial practice covers most areas of civil practice. I am the attorney for the city/county airport commission. Giving a brief written description of my civil court experience would be difficult. I have handled cases for both the Plaintiff and the Defendant in the Court of Common Pleas. I have handled matters involving automobile accidents, both Plaintiff and Defendant, subrogation claims, third party claims arising out of Worker's Compensation accidents, Social Security claims, Probate Court litigation and claims, premises liability cases, unfair trade practice cases, and State Tort claims cases. I feel fortunate that I have had a very active trial practice and have been trying cases in both criminal and civil court for over 24 years."
Mr. Buckner reported the frequency of his court appearances during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Federal:     5%
(b)     State:         90%
(c)     Other:         5% administrative
Mr. Buckner reported that the percentage of his practice involving civil, criminal, and domestic matters during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Civil:         60 %
(b)     Criminal:     30 %
(c)     Domestic:     10 %
Mr. Buckner reported the percentage of his practice in trial court during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Jury:         75%
(b)     Non-jury:     25 %
Mr. Buckner provided that he most often served as sole counsel or chief counsel.
The following is Mr. Buckner's account of his five most significant litigated matters:
"(a)     George v. Empire, Shearouse Advance Sheets Opinion No. 2906, November 23, 1998 and June 10, 1999. Case is presently pending in the S.C. Court of Appeals and deals with reformation of an insurance contract. It is significant because it deals with the unusual situation of under what circumstances an automobile insurance policy can be reformed. This case involves issues concerning reformation, the effect of an invalid exclusion in an automobile insurance policy, and matters of policy interpretation;
(b)     In Re: Estate of Fabian, 326 S.C. 349, 483 S.E.2d 474 (S.C. App. 1997) Case involves the construction of a Will and whether or not the word "brother" in a Will constitutes a latent ambiguity. I represented the personal representative, Paul Fender, of this estate, who was the Respondent in this case;
(c)     Upchurch Timber Co., Inc., et al. v. Southeast Timberlands, Inc., et al., Unpublished Opinion No. 93-UP-082, March 22, 1993, S.C. Court of Appeals. Case is significant because it involved the construction of a timber contract and dealt with the issue of an "advance" on the cutting of timber. I represented Upchurch Timber Co., Inc. who was the Respondent in this case;
(d)     The State v. Charles E. Brown, Jr., Supreme Court of S.C., 267 S.C. 311, 227 S.E.2d 674 (1976) Case involved the question of construing evidence to determine what evidence was sufficient in order to prove constructive possession of marijuana. I represented The State in this case;
(e)     The State v. Carlos Elliott. I was appointed to represent Mr. Carlos Elliott who was charged with murder and this case was tried in the General Sessions Court for Colleton County in 1988. This case was significant in that I was a sole practitioner at the time, and I recall closing my office for approximately four weeks in order to prepare for this case and try it in both the guilt phase as well as the penalty phase."
The following is Mr. Buckner's account of civil appeals he has personally handled:
"(a)     George v. Empire, Shearouse Advance Sheets Opinion No. 2906, November 23, 1998 and June 10, 1999. Case involves issues concerning reformation, the effect of an invalid exclusion in an automobile insurance policy, and matters of policy interpretation;
(b)     In Re: Estate of Fabian, 326 S.C. 349, 483 S.E.2d 474 (S.C. App. 1997) Court of Appeals, Decision February 11, 1997;
(c)     Upchurch Timber Co., Inc. v. Southeast Timberlands, Inc., et al., Unpublished Opinion No. 93-UP-082, March 22, 1993. S.C. Court of Appeals."
The following is Mr. Buckner's account of criminal appeals he has handled in the South Carolina Supreme Court:
"(a)     The State v. Brewington. 267 S.C. 97, 226 S.E.2d 249 (1976) I represented the State in this case involving whether the evidence constituted the offense of assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature;
(b)     The State v. Earl L. Miller. 266 S.C. 409, 223 S.E.2d 774 (1976). My first case before the Supreme Court of S.C. I represented the State. This case involved whether or not the admission of an out-of-Court statement of the co-defendant violated the confrontation clause of the Constitution;
(c)     The State v. Lambert. 266 S.C. 574, 225 S.E.2d 340 (1976). I represented the State in this case. This case was significant because it involved the appeal of a guilty plea, and the circumstances under which the Court should determine that a plea is voluntary and intelligent."
(9)     Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Mr. Buckner's temperament would be excellent.
(10)     Miscellaneous:
The Low Country Citizens Advisory Committee reported: "Mr. Buckner meets the constitutional qualifications and is possessed of the requisite character, reputation, ability, fitness, experience, and temperament. Mr. Buckner is highly recommended."
Mr. Buckner is married to Janet Hobbs Buckner. He has two children: Daniel Graham Buckner (age 15); and Perry McPherson Buckner, IV (age 13).
Mr. Buckner reported that he was a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
(a)     S.C. Bar Association;
(b)     House of Delegates of the S.C. Bar Association, July 1, 1993 to June 30, 1995;
(c)     Colleton County Bar;
(d)     American Bar Association;
(e)     S.C. Trial Lawyers Association;
(f)     Association of Trial Lawyers of America;
(g)     S.C. Defense Trial Attorneys Association;
(h)     S.C. Bar Judicial Qualifications Committee, July 1995 through June 1996.
Mr. Buckner is a member of the following civic, charitable, educational, social, and fraternal organizations:
a)     Director, Local Advisory Board of BB&T Bank, Walterboro, S.C.;
b)     Board of Visitors of Medical University of S.C.;
c)     Board of Directors of Colleton Preparatory Academy, Walterboro, S.C.;
d)     Received the 1997-1998 Readers' Choice Award for "Best Legal Service" in Colleton County as chosen by the readers of The Press and Standard, Walterboro, S.C.;
e)     Received the 1998-1999 Readers' Choice Award for "Best Lawyer" and "Best Legal Service" in Colleton County as chosen by the readers of The Press and Standard, Walterboro, S.C.;
f)     Pastor Parish Relations Committee of Bethel U.M. Church, Walterboro, S.C.;
g)     U.S.C. Law School Alumni Association Board of Directors;
h)     Past member of the Board of Habitat for Humanity of Colleton County, Walterboro, S.C.;
i)     Past member of the Board of Directors of the Children's Hospital of the Medical University of S.C.

Commission's Findings:     QUALIFIED
(1)     Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Justice Burnett meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as a justice on the Supreme Court.
Justice Burnett was born on January 26, 1942. He is 57 years old and a resident of Pauline, South Carolina. Justice Burnett provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1969.
(2)     Ethical Fitness:
Since Justice Burnett's previous screening in 1995, the Commission's investigation did not reveal any incidents of unethical conduct by Justice Burnett.
Justice Burnett demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to Justices, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Justice Burnett reported that he has not made any campaign expenditures.
Justice Burnett testified he has not:
(a)     sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)     sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)     asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Justice Burnett testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
(3)     Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Justice Burnett to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Justice Burnett described his continuing legal or judicial education during the past five years as exceeding minimal requirements every year.
Justice Burnett reported that he has taught the following law-related courses:
(a)     S.C. Rules of Civil Procedure, Spartanburg-Cherokee Legal Secretaries Association;
(b)     Legal Motions Practice, S.C.T.L.A.;
(c)     Expert Witnesses and State v. Council, S.C.T.L.A.;
(d)     Presenter of various topics, Conference of Chief Justices for Administrative Purposes of Circuit and Family Courts;
(e)     Director of Conference of Chief Justices for Administrative Purposes of Circuit and Family Courts.
Justice Burnett reported that he has published the following:
(a)     The South Carolina Appellate Courts - Metamorphosis is Good, Vol. XXIX, August 1996, Spotlight (Publication of S.C. Association of Legal Secretaries).
(4)     Character:
The Commission's investigation of Justice Burnett did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against him. The Commission's investigation of Justice Burnett did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Justice Burnett has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Justice Burnett was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5)     Reputation:
Justice Burnett reported that he is not rated by Martindale-Hubbell.
Justice Burnett served in the U.S. Army from August 1964 to August 1966, serving as a First Lieutenant. He later served in the U.S. Army Reserves Control Group as Captain. He received an Honorable Discharge at the rank of Major.
(6)     Physical Health:
Justice Burnett appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7)     Mental Stability:
Justice Burnett appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8)     Experience:
Justice Burnett was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1969. He described his legal experience as follows:
"Private Practice, individual, 1969-1976, with experience before Magistrate, Family, County, Civil and Criminal, Common Pleas and General Sessions Court; S.C. Probation and Parole Board and S.C. Industrial Commission
1976-5/1/80     Spartanburg County Probate Judge
5/1/80-9/17/81     Judge, Family Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit
9/17/81-4/10/95     Judge, Circuit Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit
4/10/95-Present     Associate Justice, SC Supreme Court."
The following is Justice Burnett's account of his five most significant orders:
"(a)     Prescott v. Farmers Telephone Coop. Inc., 1999 WL 350588 (June 1, 1999);
(b)     State v. Donney Council, ___ S.C. ___, 515 S.E.2d 508 (1999);
(c)     Meyer v. Paschal, 330 S.C. 175, 498 S.E.2d 635 (1998);
(d)     Ross v. Medical University of S.C., 328 S.C. 51, 492 S.E.2d 62 (1997);
(e)     Payton v. Kearse, 329 S.C. 51, 495 S.E.2d 205 (1998)."
Justice Burnett reported that he has held the following judicial offices:
(a)     Elected as Spartanburg County Probate Judge from 1976-May 1980;
(b)     Elected as Judge of the Family Court for the Seventh Judicial Circuit from May 1981-September 17, 1981;
(c)     Elected as Judge of the Circuit Court for the Seventh Judicial Circuit from September 17, 1981-April 10, 1995;
(d)     Elected as Associate Justice of the S.C. Supreme Court from April 1995-Present.
Justice Burnett served in the S.C. House of Representatives from 1973 to 1974.
(9)     Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Justice Burnett's temperament has been and would continue to be excellent.
(10)     Miscellaneous:
The Upstate Citizens Advisory Committee reported: "Justice Burnett was found to be qualified pursuant to the evaluative criteria."
Justice Burnett is married to Jami Grant Burnett. He three children: E.C. Burnett, IV (34, Milliken and Company); Sharon Burnett West (31, School Teacher); and Jeffrey Grant Burnett (27, City of Spartanburg).
Justice Burnett reported that he was a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
(a)     S.C. Bar Association (1969 - present);
(b)     Spartanburg County Bar Association;
(c)     American Bar Association.
Justice Burnett provided that he is not a member of any civic, charitable, education, social, or fraternal organizations other than his church.

Commission's Findings:     QUALIFIED
(1)     Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Mr. Cain meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as a Family Court judge.
Mr. Cain was born on January 16, 1961. He is 49 years old and a resident of Walhalla, South Carolina. Mr. Cain provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1986.
(2)     Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Mr. Cain.
Mr. Cain demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Mr. Cain reported that he has made approximately $288 in campaign expenditures for postage, paper and envelopes for correspondence announcing his candidacy.
Mr. Cain testified he has not:
(a)     sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)     sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)     asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Mr. Cain testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
(3)     Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Mr. Cain to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Mr. Cain described his continuing legal or judicial education during the past five years as follows:
(a)     Limited Liability Companies & Limited Liability Partnerships, S.C. Bar, 1994;
(b)     The Secrets of Successful Civil Practice, S.C. Bar, 1994;
(c)     Ethical Issues in Law Firm Departures and Breakups, S.C. Bar, 1994;
(d)     Limited Liability Companies & Limited Liability Partnerships, S.C. Bar, 1995;
(e)     Elder Law, S.C. Bar, 1995;
(f)     Auto Torts XVIII, S.C. Trial Lawyers Association, 1995;
(g)     The New S.C. Uniform Limited Liability (LLC/LLP) Act, S.C. Bar, 1995;
(h)     Lawyers Title Underwriting Seminar, 1996;
(i)     Everyday Ethics Problems Facing Practitioners, S.C. Bar, 1996;
(j)     The Case of the Silent Alarm- A Study in Professionalism, Oconee County Bar, 1997;
(k)     Lawyers Title Underwriting Seminar, 1997;
(l)     Working with Older Clients and Others with Special Needs, S.C. Bar, 1998;
(m)     Annual Meeting, S.C. Association of County Attorneys, 1998;
(n)     Current Developments in Real Estate, S.C. Bar, 1998;
(o)     S.C. Circuit Court Arbitration, S.C. Bar, 1998;
(p)     Lawyers Underwriting Seminar, 1998;
(q)     Family Court Bench/Bar, S.C. Bar, 1998;
(r)     Auto Torts XXI, S.C. Trial Lawyers Association, 1998;
(s)     Sexual Harassment Law Update, S.C. Association of County Attorneys Annual Meeting, 1999;
(t)     County Government Financing, S.C. Association of County Attorneys Annual Meeting, 1999;
(u)     Rules of Order, S.C. Association of County Attorneys Annual Meeting, 1999;
(v)     Petition/Initiative and Referendum, S.C. Association of County Attorneys Annual Meeting, 1999;
(w)     Federal Law Update, S.C. Association of County Attorneys Annual Meeting, 1999;
(x)     TIF Litigation/Economic Development Update, S.C. Association of County Attorneys Annual Meeting, 1999;
(y)     Reassessment, S.C. Association of County Attorneys Annual Meeting, 1999;
(z)     Hot Tips in Domestic Law, S.C. Bar, 1999.

Mr. Cain reported that he has taught the following law-related courses:
The Case of the Silent Alarm- A Study in Professionalism. Further, Mr. Cain reported that he assisted in the presentation of an Ethics Program for the Oconee Bar. The program was based on a seminar approved by the State of Georgia and involved a videotaped presentation and panel/participant discussion. Mr. Cain was one of the moderators for this program and provided proof of compliance to the S.C. Commission on Continuing Legal Education and Specialization on behalf of the Bar. The program was attended by 21 Bar members.
Mr. Cain reported that he has not published any books and/or articles.
(4)     Character:
The Commission's investigation of Mr. Cain did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against him. The Commission's investigation of Mr. Cain did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Mr. Cain has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Mr. Cain was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5)     Reputation:
Mr. Cain reported that his Martindale-Hubbell rating is "BV."
(6)     Physical Health:
Mr. Cain appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7)     Mental Stability:
Mr. Cain appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8)     Experience:
Mr. Cain was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1986. He described his legal experience as follows:
"Since graduation from law school, I have engaged in the general practice of law, including practice in the areas of criminal law, family law, real estate, corporations and partnerships, wills and estates, personal injury, workers compensation, social security disability, and government and administrative law.
During the first two years, while working with the Law Firm of Miley & Macaulay, my practice primarily involved trial work in the areas of domestic relations, criminal law and personal injury, as well as an office practice which included real estate and wills. During this time, I was fortunate to work closely with and learn from an experienced attorney who had been in practice for several years. While working with this Firm, I also became a part-time Assistant Public Defender for Oconee County for approximately one year during 1987, and was responsible for representing all juveniles charged with crimes and offenses in Family Court who were not represented by private counsel. During this time, I represented juveniles in Family Court charged with a variety of offenses ranging from criminal sexual conduct, assault and battery, malicious damage to property as well as status offenses. I was also responsible for representing defendants in General Sessions Court. My work with juveniles included representation at each stage of the legal process, including intake interviews, pre-trial conferences and court appearances, including trials in Family Court.
In January 1988, while still working with Miley & Macaulay, I was offered a position as a part-time Assistant Solicitor for the Tenth Judicial Circuit (Oconee and Anderson Counties). My primary responsibility in this position was to represent the Oconee County Department of Social Services in child abuse and neglect proceedings in Family Court, as well as in Adult Protective Services cases in the Family Court. At that time, all such matters were handled by the Solicitor's Office.
In July 1988, I accepted a full-time position as Assistant Solicitor and served in this capacity until December 1989. During my two years as an Assistant Solicitor, I prosecuted numerous child abuse and neglect cases in the Family Court and Court of General Sessions and handled cases through each stage of the legal process and worked with various agencies involved in these proceedings. These agencies included the Guardian ad Litem Program, Department of Mental Health, Department of Juvenile Justice, Victim-Witness Assistance Program, school officials, as well as numerous professionals such as physicians, psychologists, therapists and others involved in the process.
Cases I handled in the Family Court included physical abuse, sexual abuse, physical neglect, educational neglect and mental injury. I also represented the Department in several adult protective services cases brought before the Family Court involving elderly clients and persons with special needs and prosecuted juvenile cases in Family Court.
During my time as Assistant Solicitor, I also prosecuted cases, including abuse and neglect cases, in the Court of General Sessions and tried cases in Anderson and Oconee Counties. I prosecuted many types of cases, including cases involving homicide, assault and battery with intent to kill, burglary and other cases involving crimes against persons and property. In General Sessions cases, I have represented the State of South Carolina at each stage of the legal process, including bail hearings, preliminary hearings, motion hearings, and trials.
In 1990, I joined the Law Firm of Brandt and Fedder, with offices in Walhalla and Seneca. My primary office was located in Seneca, and I have practiced at this location since January 1990. In 1991, this firm became Brandt, Fedder, Graham & Cain. When I went back into private practice in January 1990, my primary areas of practice included domestic relations, criminal law and real estate law. I also assisted in representing several governmental entities which were clients of the firm, including Oconee County and two municipalities.
In late 1992, Mr. W.J. Fedder, who has been in practice since 1956, and whose primary areas of practice included estate planning, corporations, partnerships and other business formations, real estate, and workers compensation, expressed a desire to limit his practice. As a result, and in an effort to maintain these areas of practice and the client base of the firm, I began to devote more attention to these areas of law. Again, I was very fortunate to have the opportunity to work with other attorneys with a wide variety and depth of legal experience.
In 1992, I was also appointed as County Attorney for Oconee County after the resignation of Larry C. Brandt from this position, and I have acted as County Attorney since that time.
In 1993, after the dissolution of the Firm of Brandt, Fedder, Graham & Cain, I formed my own Professional Association, Timothy M. Cain, P.A., and practiced under the style and name of Fedder and Cain, with Mr. Fedder acting in an "of counsel" position with the firm. At that time, Mr. Graham moved to the Seneca location where we had an office-sharing arrangement and were associated on a case by case basis.
In January 1996, I, along with attorneys Bradley A. Norton and Karen F. Ballenger, formed the Law Firm of Ballenger, Fedder, Cain & Norton, L.L.P., with offices in Walhalla and Seneca. Mr. Fedder and William H. Ballenger were "of counsel" to the firm. Mr. Norton primarily worked with me in the Seneca office, and in July 1998, upon the dissolution of that firm, we formed the firm of Fedder, Cain & Norton, L.L.P.
I have been fortunate to have had the opportunity to handle many types of matters in the Family Court.
During my practice, I have handled divorce cases for Plaintiffs and Defendants on the grounds of adultery, physical cruelty, habitual drunkenness or dependence on drugs and/or alcohol, and one year's separation, as well as many actions for separate maintenance. These cases have often involved issues of child custody and adoptions, visitation, child support, equitable division of property and alimony. Cases involving equitable division of property have included the valuation and division of real property, tangible personal property and intangible personal property, including securities, stock and pension plans and interests in closely held corporations. I have also handled many adoptions and have been court appointed as Guardian ad Litem in many cases involving child custody. In addition, I have been appointed to act as attorney for the Guardian ad Litem in abuse and neglect proceedings in Family Court and have also represented Defendants in abuse and neglect proceedings in the Family Court in actions initiated by the Department of Social Services.
In recent years, the Oconee County Department of Social Services began to employ the services of a contract attorney to represent DSS in child abuse and neglect matters as well as adult protective services. In December 1998, I was asked to serve as a backup attorney for the primary contract attorney for DSS. Mr. Bradley A. Norton and I have served as contract attorneys for the Department since that time. In this capacity, I have represented DSS in several actions, including temporary hearings, merits hearings and termination of parental rights proceedings.
As for my civil practice, I have handled cases in Magistrate's Court and the Court of Common Pleas, in both jury and non-jury matters, and have appeared before the Master-in-Equity. I have handled cases involving personal injury, property damage, automobile accidents, slip and fall, trip and fall, mechanics liens, contract disputes, boundary line disputes, rights-of-way and easements, condemnations, mortgage foreclosures, and have handled matters in the Probate Court involving actions for the appointment of conservators, guardians and disputes concerning the validity of testamentary documents and the administration of estates. I have handled four medical malpractice cases, one of which involved a claim against the United States Army. I have also handled workers compensation and Social Security disability cases.
While most of my civil practice has involved representing Plaintiffs, I have also represented Defendants in cases involving automobile accidents, workers compensation claims, mechanics liens, contract disputes, boundary disputes, and have represented local governmental entities in several lawsuits involving various matters. I have also represented landowners as well as governmental entities in condemnation trials.
I feel that my experience in handling many types of cases in the Family Court, as well as my work in criminal law and general civil practice, which has included the formation and valuation of business entities such as corporations, partnerships, and limited liability companies, as well as my experience in real estate matters, would assist me as a Family Court Judge. Often, a Family Court Judge is required to make decisions concerning valuations and equitable divisions of these types of business interests, and some understanding of these types of business entities and the methods of formation and valuation is helpful.
As my practice has developed over time, I have had the opportunity to represent people from all walks of life in a variety of types of cases. Additionally, I understand the everyday challenges that members of the Bar face as they try to represent their clients in a competent and professional manner while trying to earn a living practicing law."
Mr. Cain reported the frequency of his court appearances during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Federal:     Approximately 5 cases total
(b)     State:         Approximately 250 - 300 cases total
Mr. Cain reported that the percentage of his practice involving civil, criminal, and domestic matters during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Civil:         65 %
(b)     Criminal:     10 %
(c)     Domestic:     25 %
Mr. Cain reported the percentage of his practice in trial court during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Jury:         30 %
(b)     Non-jury:     70 %
Mr. Cain provided that he most often served as sole counsel or chief counsel, and occasionally served as associate counsel or co-counsel.
The following is Mr. Cain's account of his five most significant litigated matters:
"(a)     Oconee County Department of Social Services v. Rowland (1988). As Assistant Solicitor, I represented DSS in this abuse and neglect action brought after two children were taken into protective custody by law enforcement officers. The report which resulted in the investigation included allegations that the children, ages 13 and 17, had been subjected to verbal abuse, intimidation and threats by their father, who had threatened to kill himself, the family, and law enforcement officials. There was no evidence of physical abuse and the mother would not corroborate the information given by the children. It was determined to prosecute the case on the basis of mental injury and threat of harm to the children. This was a contested case, and both parents were represented by separate legal counsel. There were also two Guardians ad Litem. I represented DSS throughout the proceedings, including the temporary hearing and merits hearing. The trial, which lasted for two days, involved testimony from both lay and expert witnesses, as to the effect of the actions of the parents on the mental state of the children. The Family Court made a finding of mental injury and continued threat of harm to the children and awarded custody to DSS. To my knowledge, this was the first abuse and neglect case in Oconee County which went to trial on the basis of an alleged mental injury without allegations or evidence of actual physical abuse;
(b)     Bowen v. Bowen (1988). I represented the husband at the temporary and final hearings in this divorce action initiated by the wife after nineteen (19) years of marriage. The wife sought a divorce on the grounds of physical cruelty. My client counterclaimed on the grounds of adultery. The issues before the Court included the grounds for divorce, property division, division of debts, child custody and support and alimony. The assets deemed marital property included the marital home, securities and retirement funds. Testimony included that of a private investigator hired by the husband. While child custody was settled at trial, all other issues were litigated. At the conclusion of the trial, the Court denied the wife's prayer for a divorce on the ground of physical cruelty and awarded the husband a divorce on the ground of adultery. My client received a favorable division of marital assets. Aside from being significant to the parties involved, this case was significant to me, in part, because it was my first contested case which went through a full trial involving these issues;
(c)     Conyers v. Nimmons (1992). My firm represented the Plaintiff in this medical negligence action. The Plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident and was treated by the Defendant. The allegations included that the Defendant physician had improperly and prematurely removed a cervical collar and restraints placed on the Plaintiff at the accident scene by emergency medical personnel and that this incident was indicative of a pattern of similar conduct. The Plaintiff was rendered a quadriplegic as a result of his injuries. This lawsuit involved extensive discovery and depositions over a period of approximately two and one-half years, as well as the preparation and use of expert witnesses, including emergency physicians, neurosurgeons, economists, and life care planners. I was one of the principal trial attorneys in this case. The trial, which lasted for two weeks, resulted in a favorable verdict for the Plaintiff, which was the largest jury verdict ever rendered in Oconee County. The Defendant filed an appeal. However, a favorable settlement was reached while the case was on appeal. It is my belief that as a result, in part, of this case, the hospital which was involved thereafter implemented changes in its emergency care procedures;
(d)     Trice v. Trice (1996). A contested custody case in which I was appointed by the Court as Guardian ad Litem for the minor children. I conducted numerous interviews with the parties and minor children over a five-month period of time. The trial lasted approximately two days during which I examined witnesses and presented my report to the Court. The Court followed my recommendations as to custody and support, as well as my recommendation that the parties be required to successfully complete the P.A.C.T. program;
(e)     Uden v. Uden (1998). I represented the husband in this divorce action involving the dissolution of a thirty-four year marriage and the issues of grounds for divorce, property and debt division and alimony. There were significant assets, including my client's medical practice. Some assets were accumulated and/or located within and outside of the U.S. and required the use of an expert witness to determine values and conversions. This case went through mediation for approximately two days wherein each side presented its arguments and evidence to the mediator, including information as to the nature and valuations of the assets of the parties, as well as the needs, income and income-producing potential of the parties. Mediation did not resolve the case, but it was settled on the day of trial."
Mr. Cain reported that he has handled an appeal through the memorandum stage but has not handled a domestic appeal.
(9)     Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Mr. Cain's temperament would be excellent.
(10)     Miscellaneous:
The Upstate Citizens Advisory Committee reported: "Mr. Cain was found to be qualified pursuant to the evaluative criteria."
Mr. Cain is married to Peggy Renee Patterson Cain. He has one child, Martin Emerson Cain, 4 years old.
Mr. Cain reported that he was a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
(a)     S.C. Bar Association (1986 - Present);
(b)     Oconee County Bar Association, 1986 - Present; President, 1995;
(c)     S.C. Association of County Attorneys 1997 - Present; elected secretary, 1999.
Mr. Cain provided that he was a member of the following civic, charitable, education, social, or fraternal organizations:
(a)     St. Luke U.M. Church, Walhalla, S.C.; Chairman, Finance Committee (three of the last five years); member of the Administrative Council for one year; former member of the Pastor-Parish Relations Committee;
(b)     Board of Directors, Carolina-Georgia Blood Center, January 1989 - December 1994;
(c)     Board of Directors, Oconee Public Defender Corporation;
(d)     United Way of Oconee County, member, Budget and Allocations Committee and Board of Directors.
Mr. Cain reported the following additional information:
"In April 1984, I received a Citation from the Faculty at the University of South Carolina College of Criminal Justice for academic excellence in scholarly writing. Since graduation from Law School, I have also served as a member of the Budget and Allocations Committee for the United Way of Oconee County and the Board of Directors for the United Way of Oconee County.
In 1993, I received an award from the Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 22, for service to the law enforcement community in Oconee County. I was also appointed by the President of the Oconee County Bar Association to serve as the Bar's representative on the Magistrate Selection Advisory Committee and have previously served as a member of the Oconee County Family Court Bench-Bar Liason Committee. Since I was admitted to the Bar, I have represented numerous indigent persons on a pro bono basis, and have attempted to make a positive contribution to my community. Oconee County is governed by the Council-Supervisor form of local government. The County supervisor is also the Chairman of the Council. Since I became County Attorney in 1992, I have represented both Democratic and Republican Supervisors, as well as Councils comprised of a majority of Democrats and Councils comprised of a majority of Republicans.
I was raised in rural Oconee County. I have two sisters. My family had a small farm and we grew much of our own food. My parents both retired from the local textile mill, where I also worked for four summers while in college and law school. During most of my time in college and law school, I was employed in part-time positions. While in college, I tutored students in math and was a Residence Hall Advisor at the University of South Carolina. During my first year of law school, I was the Director of Men's Residence Hall, supervising six staff members and two hundred forty-three students. I also clerked for the Law Firm of Kligman & Fleming, where I learned how to examine real estate titles in Richland and Lexington Counties, and later worked as a Law Clerk in the Fifth Circuit Solicitor's Office (Richland and Kershaw Counties).
My wife, Renee, has been a great blessing and inspiration to me throughout our marriage. As a licensed MSW, she has been very involved in children's issues in our community and coordinates a program in two of the local high schools known as HUGS (Help, Understanding, Guidance and Support) to help pregnant teenagers stay in school to complete their education. She is also a member of the Board of the Anderson-Oconee Council on Teen Pregnancy Prevention.
I was fortunate to grow up in an environment in which I learned important values by following the examples set by my parents as they faced the challenges of everyday life and am hopeful that I will set the same example for my own son.
If given the opportunity to serve on the Family Court, I will devote my energy and efforts to improving the legal system as well as the practice in Family Court."

Commission's Findings:     QUALIFIED
(1)     Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Judge Clary meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as a Justice on the Supreme Court.
Judge Clary was born on January 5, 1948. He is 52 years old and a resident of Gaffney, South Carolina. Judge Clary provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1975.
(2)     Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Judge Clary.
Judge Clary demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Judge Clary reported that he has not made any campaign expenditures.
Judge Clary testified he has not:
(a)     sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)     sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)     asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Judge Clary testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
(3)     Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Judge Clary to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Judge Clary reported that during the past five years he has exceeded the minimum legal and judicial education requirements annually. Since his election as a Circuit Court judge, he has attended a three-week general jurisdiction course at the National Judicial College, as well as a course on Capital Case Trials. He was selected by the Chief Justice of the S.C. Supreme Court to attend the National Mass Torts Conference in 1994. He also attended and participated in the University of Minnesota Sentencing Workshop (1997).
Judge Clary reported that he has taught the following law-related courses:
(a)     Adjunct Professor of Business Law, Limestone College, Gaffney, S.C., with teaching responsibilities in general business and commercial law;
(b)     Moderator/Panelist for Circuit Judges Forum at the S.C. Defense Attorneys Annual Meeting (1994, 1997);
(c)     Instructor, Criminal Law, S.C. New Judges School (1996 - Present);
(d)     Lecturer, S.C. Chief Administrative Judges School (1997, 1998);
(e)     Lecturer, S.C. Solicitors Conference (1996);
(f)     Participant - Panel Discussion of S.C. Courts System, S.C. Educational Television Network (1993);
(g)     Judge for S.C. Defense Lawyers Trial Academy (1997);
(h)     Lecturer, S.C. Attorney General's Capital Litigation Seminar (1997);
(i)     Lecturer, Annual Criminal Law Update, S.C. Bar Mid-Winter Meeting (1998);
(j)     Lecturer, S.C. Circuit Judges Association Seminar, The Capital Trial (1999).
Judge Clary reported that he has published the following:
(a)     Co-author, Criminal Trial Notebook for S.C. Circuit Judges (1998);
(b)     Author, The Capital Trial Bench Book for Circuit Judges (1999);
(c)     Co-author, Criminal Trial Bench Book, School for New Circuit Court Judges (1999).
(4)     Character:
The Commission's investigation of Judge Clary did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against him. The Commission's investigation of Judge Clary did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Judge Clary has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Judge Clary was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5)     Reputation:
Judge Clary reported that his last available Martindale-Hubbell rating was "BV".
Judge Clary served in the United States Air Force Reserve and received an Honorable Discharge in 1969.
(6)     Physical Health:
Judge Clary appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7)     Mental Stability:
Judge Clary appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8)     Experience:
Judge Clary was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1975. He described his legal experience as follows:
"1992-Present     Circuit Court Judge for the State of South Carolina, at Large, Seat #5;
1991-92     Gary E. Clary, Attorney at Law, P. A. Engaged in the private practice of law as a sole practitioner. Areas of emphasis included administrative, workers compensation, insurance, public utility, hospital and healthcare, corporate and real estate law. Experienced in complex contract drafting and negotiation, construction arbitration, and trial and appellate practice in state and federal courts. In the hospital and health care field, I was experienced in certificates of need, physician contracts, and medical staff/peer review issues. Extensive experience in the areas of workers compensation and insurance matters as plaintiff and defense counsel. Counsel for a public utility and experienced in regulatory matters concerning wastewater and water with appearances before the S.C. Department of Health and Environmental Control and the United States Environmental Protection Agency;
1980-91     Hall, Daniel, Winter & Clary, Attorneys at Law, P. A. Engaged in the private practice of law with areas of emphasis in administrative, workers compensation, hospital and health care law, corporate and real estate law;
1976-80     Gary E. Clary, Attorney at Law, P. A. Engaged in the general private practice of law in criminal and civil areas as a sole practitioner.
1975-76     Associate, J.P. Askins, Attorney at Law, Hemingway, S.C. Engaged in the general private practice of law as an associate.
1976-86     Adjunct Professor of Business Law, Limestone College, Gaffney, S.C. with teaching responsibilities in general business and commercial law;
1974-75     Minority Counsel, United States Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security and Legislative Assistant to United States Senator Strom Thurmond, Washington, D.C. Duties included legal counsel, management of all Judiciary Committee responsibilities and preparation of speeches and position papers;
1972-74     Law Clerk, South Carolina Attorney General, Columbia, S.C. As a law student, my duties included legal research and preparation of opinions for staff attorneys. (Part-time law school employment)."
Judge Clary reported the frequency of his court appearances during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Federal:     5%
(b)     State:         95%
Judge Clary reported that the percentage of his practice involving civil, criminal, and domestic matters during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Civil:         65%
(b)     Criminal:     5%
(c)     Domestic:     30%
Judge Clary reported the percentage of his practice in trial court during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Jury:         30%
(b)     Non-jury:     70%
Judge Clary provided that he most often served as sole counsel.
The following is Judge Clary's account of his five most significant litigated matters:
"(a)     State v. Tanner, Williamsburg County Court of General Sessions; In 1976, I served as co-counsel for the Defendant who was charged with night hunting of deer. Due to the serious penalties involved regarding the confiscation and forfeiture of property used in connection with the charge, this case is significant in that the not guilty verdict was my first trial and resulted in a not guilty verdict;
(b)     Thomas v. Bryson Chevrolet Olds, Inc.; 80-CP-11-82; An action wherein the Plaintiff alleged misrepresentation in the purchase of an automobile from the Defendant. The Plaintiff alleged that he signed a blank installment contract and related documents which resulted in him paying substantially more than the parties had agreed upon. As attorney for Defendant, I relied upon the case law of the State which does not allow an individual to avoid a contract upon the ground he did not read the contract or that he took another party's word as to what it contained. This case was significant in that the Defendant received a directed verdict at the conclusion of the Plaintiff's case;
Sossamon Construction Company v. General Signal, a Division of BIF Corporation; 81-CP-11-304; JR 15, 74; A very complicated case in which the Plaintiff alleged the Defendant had failed to supply in a timely manner certain valves and related equipment in the construction of an elevated water tank. The Defendant counterclaimed alleging that all equipment had been properly supplied and that any delays were the fault of the Plaintiff. The Defendant's counterclaim further alleged that the Plaintiff had not paid for the equipment received. During the course of the trial, the officers of the Plaintiff corporation admitted on cross examination that they owed the Defendant for the goods delivered. This case is significant in that the small verdict returned for the Plaintiff due to delays in shipment was offset by the Defendant's counterclaim, and resulted in my client obtaining a $12,000 judgment against the Plaintiff;
(d)     Hambright v. Peeler; 82-CP-11-68; JR 15, 810; A boundary line dispute between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. The case is significant in that the line in question had been in dispute for a number of years and involved a tremendous amount of work and research in preparing for trial. The jury verdict affirmed my client's position as to the true location of the property line;
(e)     Newton v. Clement Brothers; 84-CP-11-84; In representing the Plaintiff in this worker's compensation case, a novel issue was presented to the Court. Plaintiff contended that a severe leg injury was causally related to his subsequent heart attack five days after surgery to his leg. A single commissioner held there was no causal relationship. The full commission overturned the single commissioner's decision. The matter was appealed to Circuit Court where the Circuit Court affirmed the full commission's decision in favor of the worker. This matter was appealed to the Supreme Court but was settled prior to arguments."
The following is Judge Clary's account of civil appeals he has personally handled:
"(a)     Roper Hospital v. South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control and St. Francis Xavier Hospital, 410 S.E.2d 558, 306 S.C. 138 (1991);
(b)     In re: Zaman, 329 S.E.2d 436, 285 S.C. 345 (1985);
(c)     National Health Corporation d/b/a National Health Care Center of Charleston, Appellant v. South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, North Charleston Convalescent Center, Inc., and Cadam Corporation d/b/a Southeastern Geriatric and Rehabilitation Hospital, Respondents. (S.C. Ct. App. Not reported) (87-CP-40-4387) Settled prior to hearing."
(9)     Judicial Temperament:
Defense attorneys Christopher Gill Olson and John Delgado provided testimony regarding Judge Clary's temper and impartiality during criminal trials.
Mr. Olson testified that he questioned Judge Clary's impartiality and complained that Judge Clary "fussed" at him in open court. Mr. Olson further testified that Judge Clary is "prosecution oriented." Mr. Olson provided as an example of Judge Clary's partiality the fact that Judge Clary required the defendant's expert witness to make a special trip (the day before he was scheduled to testify) to appear before the court for a motions hearing. Mr. Olson complained that this was unnecessary and particularly burdensome on the defendant because of the cost of paying the expert for an additional day. Judge Clary responded that although he does not normally require an expert to appear before the court on a day prior to the scheduled time of testimony, he did require it in this case because he wanted more time to consider the motion than would have been available had the motion been heard on the same day as the expert was scheduled to testify. Mr. Olson also complained that Judge Clary gave him only five minutes to provide case law to dispute a motion made by the prosecution and that Judge Clary threatened to require the defendant's expert to remain in court all day when Mr. Olson objected to the prosecution excusing one of its expert witnesses.
Mr. Delgado testified concerning Judge Clary's impatience and temper. Mr. Delgado noted an incident that occurred in Judge Clary's chambers when Judge Clary was upset when Mr. Delgado's client, the defendant, was late for court. Judge Clary, at Mr. Delgado's request, had allowed the defendant in the murder trial to remain out on bond. When the defendant had not appeared at the designated time, Judge Clary requested to see all lawyers in chambers. Mr. Delgado testified that: "when we went back into his chambers, his tone of voice, his mannerism, his facial gestures, his finger-pointing, I've never been treated like that before in my 24-odd years [of practicing law]." Mr. Delgado also testified that he felt Judge Clary was "partial to the State."
Another attorney, James Donald Willingham, who represented the State in the trial Mr. Delgado was involved in and who is a former law clerk of Judge Clary, testified that Judge Clary did not lose his temper with Mr. Delgado while they were in the Judge's chamber. Judge Clary responded that he was angry during the meeting in his chambers but that he tries "each and every day to keep from, in any way, doing anything that would be offensive to any lawyer or anyone else for that matter."
Judge Clary testified: "I wouldn't sit here and tell you that I have not lost my patience, that I have not become angry, because I have. I think as a human being, that's something that all of us acknowledge. But I have to work on that because I am a very intense person." Judge Clary also testified that he has taken steps in the last few years to address his temper and his reaction to stress through a variety of techniques ranging from breathing exercises to taking relaxation breaks during his day. When asked if he has a habit of castigating attorneys, Judge Clary responded that he does not. He also testified that he may have chastised attorneys in the past but that he has changed his habits and makes every effort not to offend the attorneys who appear before him. Judge Clary stated that "patience is something I work on every day" and that he has a "sense of compassion for each and every defendant as well as each and every victim that comes into my courtroom."
(10)     Miscellaneous:
The Upstate Citizens Advisory Committee reported: "Judge Clary was found to be qualified pursuant to the evaluative criteria. The past screening uncovered judicial temperament as a possible problem area for Judge Clary. The current round of interviews brought a unanimous response that Judge Clary's judicial temperament has improved. Some interviewees indicated that Judge Clary is still sometimes impatient on the bench. During his personal interview, Judge Clary indicated that he has worked on patience on the bench, and also believes that he has improved. He stated that he has to work on patience when attorneys come to court unprepared."
Judge Clary is married to Patricia Mae Brumbach. He has two children: Adair Clary Pederson, Age 23, Teacher, Pickens High School; and Lawson Brumbach Clary, Age 19, Sophomore, Furman University.
Judge Clary reported that he was a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
(a)     American Bar Association;
(b)     S.C. Bar Association;
(c)     American Academy of Hospital Attorneys;
(d)     National Health Lawyers Association;
(e)     Cherokee County Bar Association (President 1983-85);
(f)     S.C. Circuit Judges Association.
Judge Clary provided that he is also a member of the Boy Scouts of America, Palmetto Council, Kattan District.

Commission's Findings:     QUALIFIED
(1)     Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Judge Cureton meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as a justice on the Supreme Court.
Judge Cureton was born on April 26, 1938. He is 61 years old and a resident of Columbia, South Carolina. Judge Cureton provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1967.
(2)     Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Judge Cureton.
Judge Cureton demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Judge Cureton reported that he has made $180.32 in campaign expenditures on stamps, stationery, typing, and supplies.
Judge Cureton testified he has not:
(a)     sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)     sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)     asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Judge Cureton testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.

(3)     Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Judge Cureton to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Judge Cureton stated, "I believe I have attended all judicial continuing legal education seminars offered during the last five years. Additionally, I have attended several lawyer continuing legal education seminars during the same period."
Judge Cureton reported that he has taught the following law-related courses:
(a)     Lecturer, Fourth Annual Ethics CLE, Richland County Bar, October 23, 1998;
(b)     Lecturer, "Error Preservation," S.C. Defense Trial Attorneys Association, July 8, 1998;
(c)     Lecturer, S.C. Family Court Bench/Bar Update, S.C. Bar CLE. Div., December 5, 1997;
(d)     Lecturer, S.C. Family Law Update, S.C. Bar CLE. Div., May 30, 1997;
(e)     Lecturer at Criminal Law Seminar, S.C. Bar CLE. Div., November 1, 1996;
(f)     Lecturer at Appellate Court Judges Seminar, Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, May 1-2, 1996;
(g)     Lecturer at S.C. Appellate Practice Seminar, April 28, 1995;
(h)     Presented the Masters-In-Equity portion of the Bridge the Gap Program, S.C. Bar, for several years including 1981-1985;
(i)     Participated in several seminars presented by the Military Law Section of the S.C. Bar;
(j)     Lecturer, Appellate Practice CLE, August 24, 1984;
(k)     Lecturer, Proceedings before Master-In-Equity Seminar, S.C. Bar, December 21, 1984;
(l)     Lecturer, Basic Elements of Proof in the Family Court, S.C. Bar, August 23, 1985;
(m)     As Staff Judge Advocate of the 120th Army Reserve Command, Fort Jackson, I coordinated, arranged for, and moderated the yearly two-day JAG CLE Seminar for Reserve and National Guard JAG officers in N.C., S.C., and parts of Tennessee for the years 1989-1991;
(n)     Lecturer, Appellate Practice, Spring 1984, S.C. Black Lawyers Association;
(o)     Panel participant, Appeals, Administrative Procedures & Related Topics CLE, October 23, 1987.
Judge Cureton reported that he has published the following:
(a)     Co-author of the S.C. Appellate Practice Handbook;
(b)     Editor of Marital Litigation in South Carolina, 1993;
(c)     Author of Coming of Age: The South Carolina Court of Appeals, S.C. Reports Col. 333, Jan. 1999.
(4)     Character:
The Commission's investigation of Judge Cureton did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against him. The Commission's investigation of Judge Cureton did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Judge Cureton has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Judge Cureton was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5)     Reputation:
Judge Cureton reported that he is not rated by Martindale-Hubbell.
Judge Cureton reported that he served on active military duty from February 28, 1961 to February 27, 1963, and attained the rank of First Lieutenant. In June 1990, he retired from the U.S. Army Reserve with the rank of Colonel in JAG Corps.
Judge Cureton reported that he served on the Zoning Board of Adjustment for the City of Columbia from 1972 to 1976, appointed by the Columbia City Council. Judge Cureton also reported that he served as Appeals Agent for the Selective Service System by appointment of the President of the United States during the years 1970-1971.
(6)     Physical Health:
Judge Cureton appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7)     Mental Stability:
Judge Cureton appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8)     Experience:
Judge Cureton was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1967. He described his legal experience as follows:
"June 1967 to December 1968 - Legal Aid Service Agency, Staff Attorney, practiced civil poverty law.
January 1969 to February 1976 - General practice of law, solo practitioner with heavy emphasis on property and business matters.
February 1976 to September 1982 - Master-In-Equity for Richland County (during the period 1980-1981, I was also appointed as special circuit court judge by the Chief Justice of the South Carolina Supreme Court).
September 1982 to September 1983 - Family Court Judge, Fifth Judicial Circuit.
September 1, 1983 to present - Associate Judge, South Carolina Court of Appeals."
Judge Cureton lists his legal employment as follows:
(a)     June 1967 to December 1968 - Legal Aid Service Agency, Staff Attorney, practiced civil poverty law;
(b)     January 1969 to February 1976 - general practice of law, solo practitioner with heavy emphasis on property and business matters;
(c)     February 1976 to September 1982 - Master-In-Equity for Richland County (during the period 1980-1981; he was also appointed as special circuit judge by the Chief Justice of the S.C. Supreme Court);
(d)     September 1983 to September 1983 - Family Court Judge, Fifth Judicial Circuit;
(e)     September 1, 1983 to present - Associate Judge, S.C. Court of Appeals.
Judge Cureton reported the frequency of his court appearances during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Federal:     Two or three times a year
(b)     State:         Six to eight times monthly
Judge Cureton reported that the percentage of his practice involving civil, criminal, and domestic matters during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Civil:         50%
(b)     Criminal:     15%
(c)     Domestic:     35%
Judge Cureton reported the percentage of his practice in trial court during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Jury:         20%
(b)     Non-jury:     80%
Judge Cureton provided that he most often served as sole counsel.
The following is Judge Cureton's account of his most significant litigated matters:
"(a)     Guinyard v. State, 260 S.C. 220, 195 S.E.2d 392 (1973). In this post conviction relief proceeding, the defendant challenged the constitutionality of a state statute which prohibited sexual intercourse with a patient of a state hospital whether the patient was in the hospital or unlawfully off premises. The basis for the challenge was that under the statute a defendant could be convicted although he or she lacked knowledge of the victim's status as a patient in the state hospital. The trial court dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed, holding knowledge the victim is a patient in a state hospital was not an element of the offense charged. I represented the defendant;
(b)     United States v. Poston, 317 F.Supp. 587 (D.S.C. 1970). Poston was charged with violating Title 50, U.S.C. App. Section 462 alleging he refused to submit to induction into the Armed Forces of the United States. The district court found Poston not guilty because the Selective Service Board's opinion did not indicate a basis for its decision to deny Poston conscientious objector status. I represented the defendant;
(c)     Holder v. City of Columbia, 771 Lab. Cas. (BNA) 53, 128 (1971) (Not reported in F. Supp.). Holder sought an injunction against the City of Columbia to enjoin the City from prohibiting certain officers in the Columbia Fire Department from joining a labor union. The district court issued the injunction. I represented David Holder;
(d)     Cope v. Penn Community Serv. Inc., and Isaacson v. Penn Community Serv., Inc., 20 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 331, 67 Lab.Cas (CCH) 32, 608 (1970). Involved the question of whether Penn Community Center violated the Fair Labor Standards Act by failing to pay minimum wages to conscientious objectors for alternative service performed with the Penn Community Center (our client). The court held the center violated the Fair Labor Standards Act."
Judge Cureton indicates that he has not personally handled any civil appeals.
The following is Judge Cureton's account of a criminal appeal he has personally handled:
"(a)     Guinyard v. State, 260 S.C. 220, 195 S.E.2d 392 (1973)."
Judge Cureton indicated that he has held the following judicial offices:
He was appointed Master-In-Equity by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate and held office from February 1976 to September 1982. Masters hear non-jury civil cases referred to them by Circuit Court judges.
Judge Cureton received an interim appointment as Family Court Judge for the Fifth Judicial Circuit in September 1982 and served until elected by the Legislature the first of 1983. Thereafter, he served until September 1, 1983. Jurisdiction of the Family Court is outlined in S.C. Code Ann., Section 20-7-420 (1976).
Judge Cureton was elected to the S.C. Court of Appeals in July 1983 and has served since September 1, 1983. The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is detailed in S.C. Code Ann., Section 14-8-200 (1976).
The following is Judge Cureton's account of his most significant orders or opinions:
"(a)     Hussey v. Hussey, 280 S.C. 418, 312 S.E.2d 267 (En Banc, Ct. App. 1984). Established the doctrine of transmutation of nonmarital property by allowing consideration of husband's inherited property in determining an equitable division;
(b)     Chavous v. Brown, 299 S.C. 398, 385 S.E.2d 206 (Ct. App. 1989), rev'd, 302 S.C. 208, 396 S.E.2d 98 (1990), and judgment vacated, 501 U.S. 1202 (1991). This case extended Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding equal protection clause in Fourteenth Amendment prohibits exercise of peremptory challenges to eliminate jurors solely because of race) to private litigants in civil cases;
(c)     Eldridge v. City of Greenwood, 300 S.C. 269, 388 S.E.2d 247 (Ct. App. 1989). Precluded summary judgment where disputed existed concerning whether railroad abandoned its right-of-way by removing tracks and conveying right-of-way to city for road construction purposes (exceeding purpose set forth in charter and authorized by statute), thereby entitling original landowners/heirs to reverting interest;
(d)     Bishop Logging Co. v. John Deere Ind. Equipt. Co., 317 S.C. 520, 455 S.E.2d 183 (Ct. App. 1995). Extended economic loss rule developed in product liability cases, to determine whether tort or contract law is applicable to commercial arena, thereby barring recovery for losses resulting from a products failure to meet a purchaser's expectations."
(9)     Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Judge Cureton's temperament has been and would continue to be excellent.
(10)     Miscellaneous:
The Midlands Citizens Advisory Committee reported: "Judge Jasper M. Cureton is a highly respected and well-qualified judge. The Committee wholeheartedly recommends Judge Cureton for the position he seeks."
Judge Cureton is married to Vessie Jean Burkins Cureton. He has two children: Indira Cureton Cummings, age 32, high school drama teacher, Chapin High School, Chapin, S.C.; and Jason Marshall Cureton, age 13, student.
Judge Cureton reported that he is a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
(a)     Richland County Bar Association;
(b)     S.C. Bar Association;
(c)     American Bar Association.
Judge Cureton provided that he was a member of the following civic, charitable, education, social, or fraternal organizations:
(a)     Board of Directors of Glenforest School, Cayce, S.C.;
(b)     Board of Directors of Boys & Girls Clubs of the Midlands;
(c)     U.S.C. Law School Minority Advisory Board;
(d)     U.S.C. Medical School Partnership Board;
(e)     S.C. Law Institute;
(f)     Phi Alpha Delta Legal Fraternity;
(g)     Omega Psi Phi Fraternity.

Commission's Findings:     QUALIFIED
(1)     Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Ms. DeWitt meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as Circuit Court judge.
Ms. DeWitt was born on August 25, 1955. She is 44 years old and a resident of Beaufort, South Carolina. Ms. DeWitt provided in her application that she has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1983.
(2)     Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Ms. DeWitt.
Ms. DeWitt demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Ms. DeWitt reported that she has made $104.78 in campaign expenditures on printing and postage.
Ms. DeWitt testified she has not:
(a)     sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)     sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)     asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Ms. DeWitt testified that she is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
(3)     Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Ms. DeWitt to be intelligent and knowledgeable. Her performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Ms. DeWitt described her continuing legal or judicial education during the past five years as follows:
6-12-99     S.C. Bar Annual Meeting; Family Law Section/Misuse of Computers
05-14-99     How to Try a Wreck Case
01-22-99     S.C. Bar Mid Year Meeting
01-23-99     Employment & Labor Law Section; Family Law Section;

Solo & Small Firm Practitioners Business Valuation Seminar
11-07-98     Ethics for Family Law Practitioners
11-06-98     Family Court Bench/Bar
10-23-98     Persuasion & Communication in the Ctroom
10-02-98     Traffic/DUI: Confused About the Changes
08-28-98     Domestic Practice: Hot Tips
07-10-98     Child Protective Services Act
03-21-97     Hidden Issues in Cases Involving Children
12-06-96     1996 Family Court Bench/Bar Update
11-08-96     Auto Insurance Update
04-12-96     Understanding the New S.C. Criminal Rules
01-12-96     Worker's Compensation Practice in S.C.
11-17-95     Marital Litigation Update
08-24-95     The Proposed New S.C. Rules of Evidence
01-07-95     Civility in the Profession
03-18-94     DUI Defense
Ms. DeWitt reported that she has taught the following law-related courses:
"(a)     "Hot Tips" Domestic Relations, S.C. Bar CLE, Columbia, Corroborating the Client's Story, Sept. 24, 1999. Discussion of Rule 11, ethical requirements and practice tips for obtaining corroborating evidence;
(b)     Beaufort Police Department Reserve Officer Training, Beaufort, Jun. 1999. Four 4-hour classes on constitutional law, law of arrest, search and seizure, and ethics;
(c)     Legal and Ethical Issues in Management, Webster University, Beaufort, MA/MBA program, Spring & Fall 1993, Fall 1992. Ethical issues involving defective products, false advertising, environmental hazards, contract negotiations and mergers, price fixing and union organization, as well as legal consequences and principles that applied to the situations studied;
(d)     Business Law. Webster University, Beaufort, MA/MBA program, Spring 1994. Forms of business organizations, contract law, negligence, Fair Labor Standards Act, Sherman Antitrust Act;
(e)     Criminal Evidence, Technical College of the Lowcountry, Fall 1993. S.C. and Federal Rules of Evidence, as well as some constitutional law. Used factual situations and court decisions to teach the hearsay rule and exceptions, Miranda rights and waiver, admissibility of statements of defendants and witnesses, competency of witnesses, admissibility of prior bad acts and prior record of defendant;
(f)     Family Law, Technical College of the Lowcountry, Walterboro, Summer 1987. S.C. statutory and case law on jurisdiction, venue, Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, divorce grounds and defenses, annulment, adoptions, common law marriage, equitable division, custody factors. Also drafted pleadings;
(g)     Interviewing and Counseling, Technical College of the Lowcountry, Walterboro, Fall 1987. Interviewing techniques required to elicit information from clients and witnesses by paralegals assisting lawyers in case preparation, including financial information, history, present needs. Also counseling clients on services available through other agencies such as women's shelter, DSS. Examples used for social security cases, domestic relations and bankruptcy cases. Included lectures on confidentiality and ethics;
(h)     Criminal Law, Technical College of the Lowcountry, Walterboro, Spring 1988. Procedural law from arrest through appeal. Also elements and penalties of most common crimes, and law applicable in death penalty cases;
(i)     History of Beaufort Public Defender's Office, Port Royal Rotary Club, Port Royal, Sept. 1996. History, staffing, case load and funding from 1973 to present;
(j)     The Importance of Education for Women, Battery Creek High School, Beaufort, Feb. 1996. Educational and career opportunities and earning potential;
(k)     Careers in the Legal Profession, Career Focus Day, Technical College of the Lowcountry, Beaufort, Aug. 1995. Educational and career opportunities, earning potential and public service opportunities for lawyers;
(l)     Best Budget Proposals, S.C. Public Defender Association Conference, Myrtle Beach, Sept. 1994. Obtaining and managing funding, operating within budgets, documenting and presenting funding needs;
(m)     Insanity Defense, U.S. Law, WHHI-TV, Hilton Head Island, Feb. 1994. Elements of insanity defense in S.C., procedure after verdict;
(n)     Women and the Law, Women's Equality Day, Marine Corps Air Station, Beaufort, Aug. 1993. Opportunities in the legal profession for women;
(o)     Criminal Justice System, Panel Member, Leadership Beaufort, Feb. 1993, Jan. 1992, Jan. 1991. Procedures (arrest through trial) and role of defense counsel;
(p)     Pre-Trial Motions Practice, Public Defender Training Conference, Columbia, Aug. 1992. Suppression motions (procedure and law), search and seizure issues, eyewitness identification, admissibility of confessions;
(q)     Press Access to Juvenile Hearings, Public Defender Training Conference, Columbia, Apr. 1991. First Amendment v. Defendant's rights, procedure, burden of proof, factors;
(r)     Juvenile Transfer Hearings, S.C. Public Defender Association Conference, Myrtle Beach, Nov. 1990. Statutory requirements, case law, procedure, and evidence at transfer hearings."
Ms. DeWitt reported that she has not published any books and/or articles.
(4)     Character:
The Commission's investigation of Ms. DeWitt did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against her. The Commission's investigation of Ms. DeWitt did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Ms. DeWitt has handled her financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Ms. DeWitt was punctual and attentive in her dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with her diligence and industry.
(5)     Reputation:
Ms. DeWitt reported that she is not rated by Martindale-Hubbell.
(6)     Physical Health:
Ms. DeWitt appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office she seeks.
(7)     Mental Stability:
Ms. DeWitt appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office she seeks.
(8)     Experience:
Ms. DeWitt was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1983. She described her legal experience as follows:
"Neighborhood Legal Assistance Program, Walterboro, S.C. (serving Hampton and Colleton Counties). Hired as staff attorney in Fall 1983, served as managing attorney from 1984 until June 1988.
Represented clients at social security, FmHa, employment security commission, VA and DSS administrative hearings, appeals of ALJ decisions to state and federal courts. Also represented tenants in Magistrate Court evictions, defendants in foreclosures in Federal Court, foreclosures, collection actions and claim and delivery actions in Common Pleas. Brought claims against landlords under S.C. Landlord Tenant Act, filed claims under Consumer Protection Code, Fair Debt Collection Act, and with Manufactured Housing Board. Filed an action in Probate Court on behalf of a deaf client seeking a redetermination of his competency, permission to handle his own funds and specific accounting. Some involvement with actions to quiet title and other real estate matters. Also represented clients in Family Court. Family Court and Probate Court appointments.
These files are not available to me for purposes of obtaining details on procedural history. I also supervised and trained staff attorneys and paralegals, maintained records required under federal regulations, and served as co-counsel on assistants' cases.
Beaufort County Public Defender Office, Beaufort, S.C. Hired as Deputy Public Defender in June 1988, served as Chief Public Defender from July 1988 until April 1993.
Represented defendants in General Sessions and juveniles in Family Court. Also represented adults in Magistrate Court on related charges, and at extradition hearings. Appointed as counsel for witnesses on occasion and in DSS abuse and neglect proceedings when connected to criminal charge. Served as counsel in civil commitment and/or release proceedings for defendants previously found not guilty by reason of insanity, and in criminal contempt proceedings. Investigated cases, negotiated pleas or tried cases as necessary.
I also hired, trained and supervised staff, served as co-counsel on assistant public defender cases. Prepared and presented budget requests, reported to Public Defender Board, and had other administrative duties. In five years as public defender, I represented clients on approximately 2,000 warrants. Defendants were represented by the Office of Appellate Defense on all appeals.
Private Practice, Law Office of Diane P. DeWitt, Beaufort, S.C. April 1993 - present.
Criminal trial practice includes representation of defendants in General Sessions and Magistrate Court, occasional appearances before U.S. Magistrate and military tribunals. Also representation of persons being investigated for criminal activity but not yet charged and have been retained at times to represent victim's interests, probation and parole hearing violations. Civil trial practice includes representation of persons injured in automobile accidents, claims for violation of civil rights, negligence actions, breach of contract; defense of collection actions and other actions for damages; have brought and defended contempt motions and applications for restraining orders; represent inmates on PCR actions as appointed or retained, defense of forfeitures, and in Magistrate Court appeals. Representation of landlords and tenants in eviction actions; serve as guardian in probate appointments for minors and incompetents; serve as guardian for John Does in quiet title actions. Also represent clients in every type of case in Family Court, represent persons at social security administrative hearings and through appeals process in U.S. District Court. Basic real estate work related to conclusion of property divisions in divorce cases. Draft leases, contracts, promissory notes, powers of attorney, prenuptial agreements, other documents. Have appealed denial of medical benefit payments through CHAMPUS and BC/BS administrative appeal process. All real estate closings, estate administrations, worker's compensation, employment discrimination/harassment, medical and attorney malpractice cases are referred to outside counsel due to limits on my time, resources and staff capabilities."
Ms. DeWitt provided the following description of her experience in criminal and civil matters:
"REPRESENTATIVE LIST OF CRIMINAL CASES:
Criminal Cases as Chief Public Defender:
State v. Seabrook. 90-GS-07-933, 934. Distribution of Crack Cocaine/Possession with Intent to Distribute. Throw down case. Main issues at trial were identification of Defendant by Officer and CI, reliability, prior record of CI, motion to reveal the deal, alibi defense. Convicted.
State v. Chris Franklin. 425 S.E.2d 758 (S.C. App. 1992) Reh. Den., Cert. Den. 15-year-old charged with Murder (2 cts.) of father and stepmother and Grand Larceny. Transfer hearing in Family Court. Motion to quash indictments granted on grounds jurisdiction still in Family Court. Reindicted. Issues at trial were competency, argued a motion to change venue, motions to suppress statements, competency of two child witnesses, admissibility of statements made by deceased stepmother, admissibility of opinion evidence of defense expert, admissibility of Defendant's juvenile criminal record, requests to charge manslaughter, self-defense and battered child's defense. Convicted of Murder (2 cts.), acquitted of Grand Larceny.
State v. Antonnier Adolphe. 314 S.C. 89, 441 S.E.2d 832 (Ct.App. 1994). Defendant was tried on indictments for two counts trafficking in crack cocaine and sale of crack cocaine. Search warrant for stash house obtained based on information from street suspect who had been arrested after he assisted in a purchase of crack for a wired confidential informant at a separate location. Defendant Adolphe and others were at the stash house at time search warrant executed. Drugs and other evidence found in stereo speakers. Street suspect taken to stash house and identified Adolphe as seller of crack at first location. All defendants but Adolphe posted bond and fled prior to trial. Co-defendant cases were severed. Adolphe was tried on trafficking indictments only. At trial, motion to suppress testimony of crack sale as evidence of prior bad acts denied; motion to suppress eyewitness identification by street suspect of Adolphe as drug seller denied; motion to suppress all evidence on basis search warrant affidavit did not support probable cause denied; motion to suppress evidence on grounds inventory and officers' testimony not specific as to location individual items of evidence were found denied; motion to suppress all evidence and testimony mentioning Defendant's nationality as Haitian was denied. Court of Appeals reversed Defendant's conviction on grounds the search warrant should not have been issued because the affidavit coupled with the Johnson hearing failed to supply facts creating probable cause. There was no showing of the confidential informant's reliability and the informant's allegations were never corroborated by any identifiable individuals. Good faith exception inapplicable if the underlying affidavit does not include sufficient information to allow a magistrate to determine probable cause. Evidence seized must be suppressed. Other issues raised, not addressed by Court of Appeals.
State v. Hutson. 91-GS-07-443. Criminal Sexual Conduct with a Minor 1st Degree. Motions to exclude witness testimony of child's statements as being hearsay/bolstering outside scope of res gestae exception to hearsay rule. Cross examination of medical experts. Request to charge lesser included offenses and ABHAN.
State v. Frazier. 92-GS-07-2015. Armed Robbery. Hearing on motion to suppress eyewitness identification based on improper police procedures denied. Alibi defense. Request to charge common law/strong armed robbery denied. Acquitted.
State v. Rhoe. 92-GS-07-1381. Armed Robbery. Hearing on motion to suppress witness identification denied. Expert testimony on witness identification presented. Alibi defense. Convicted of Common Law Robbery.
State v. Smalls. Trafficking in Crack Cocaine. Motion for State to produce CI/provide additional information of whereabouts pursuant to State v. Diamond and other cases. Motion to continue so defense could find CI as potential defense witness. Denied. Motion to suppress tape and testimony received from CI who was not present to testify was granted. Convicted. Distribution of Crack dismissed because CI could not be found.
State v. Brown. 92-GS-07-991. Armed Robbery. Motion to suppress witness identification denied. Alibi defense. Convicted of Common Law Robbery.
State v. Tyrone Jenkins. 322 S.C. 414, 472 S.E.2d 251 (1996), reversing State v. Tyrone Jenkins, 317 S.C. 183, 452 S.E.2d 612 (Ct.App. 1994), rehearing denied. Defendant was convicted by a jury of first degree burglary, acquitted on the related grand larceny indictment. Motion to suppress Defendant's oral statements to officer was made on three grounds. First, the Defendant's Miranda waiver was not voluntarily or knowingly made because he was under the influence of crack cocaine at the time warnings, waiver and statement given as shown by officer's own testimony and by Defendant's testimony at Jackson v. Denno hearing. Second, the Defendant's statement that he did not commit the burglary, he just ran a school for burglars was not admissible under the Lyle "bad acts" exception because there was no evidence this burglary was connected to any other burglary. Third, the introduction of Defendant's burglary school statement was unduly prejudicial. Motion to suppress was denied. Court of Appeals upheld conviction and admissibility of statement as evidence of common scheme or plan. Supreme Court reversed. No evidence of similarity of burglaries, or common scheme or plan. Testimony clearly prejudicial as other evidence of guilt far from overwhelming.
State v. Swinton. Burglary 1st and Grand Larceny. Motion for directed verdict denied. Acquitted. Numerous indictments. Tried on one case. Multiple other indictments dismissed.
State v. Albany. Sale of Crack Cocaine. Credibility of CI in question. Motion to produce CI's complete criminal record granted. Acquitted.
State v. Howard. 92-GS-07-2168. Pointing a Firearm. Conflict in Complainant/Defendant versions of facts. Convicted.
State v. Gilbert. 91-GS-07-1239. Possession with Intent to Distribute Crack Cocaine. Throw down case. Acquitted.
State v. Heyward. Burglary 2nd Degree, Armed Robbery. Motion to suppress witness identification. Motion to suppress evidence seized on grounds of invalid search warrant. Denied. Alibi defense and expert witness presented by defense on eyewitness ID problems. Convicted.
State v. Priester. 93-UP-280 (S.C. Ct. App. dated Nov. 2, 1998). Distribution of Crack Cocaine. Motion to suppress identification. Alibi defense. Objection to reply testimony by jailhouse informant that he had bought drugs from Defendant on previous occasions for which Defendant was not charged. Prior to reply testimony, Court granted defense motions for witness record and motion to reveal the deal. Conviction reversed on appeal. Reply testimony not admissible.
State v. Yarrington. 92-GS-07-0002. CSC 1st Degree. Strictly facts. Consent defense. Not guilty.
State v. Anderson. 91-GS-07-412, 413, 414. Kidnapping, CSC 1st Degree, Armed Robbery. Motion to suppress statements, motion to suppress witness identification of Defendant. Alibi defense. Presented experts on eye witness identification and chemist to refute State's experts on clothing analysis and hair samples. Directed verdict on Armed Robbery. Allen charge. Hung Jury. Mistrial. Retried. Convicted.
State v. Prince. 90-GS-07-2216. Decedent's body found in young mother's mobile home while she was incarcerated on unrelated charges. Pre-trial motion to suppress testimony of four-year-old son as State's witness on grounds that he was not competent to testify. Reputable psychologist testified for defense that child was not competent. Child had been tested and interviewed on four different occasions and was functioning on about a two-year-old age level. Also testified that child had been improperly questioned repeatedly by police, social workers and lawyers. Judge denied motion. Also motion to suppress Defendant's statement due to violation of 6th Amendment granted. Defendant acquitted.
State v. Jenkins. 88-GS-07-835. Murder. Motion to disclose criminal record of Co-Defendant testifying as State's witness and to reveal the deal. Duress defense. Acquitted.
State v. Williams. 90-GS-07-2046. Voluntary Manslaughter. Motion for criminal records on all State's witnesses granted. Defense of others presented. Acquitted.
State v. Singleton. 91-GS-07-701. Murder. Motion to suppress statement, suppress evidence obtained as a result of statement, motion to exclude photographs of body as being unduly prejudicial. Request for instruction on self-defense denied. Convicted.
State v. Allen. 91-GS-07-1700, 1701. Assault and Battery with Intent to Kill (2 cts.). Numerous witnesses to fight testified for State and defense. Evidence of Defendant's good character introduced. Self-defense case. Convicted.
State v. Bostick. 86-GS-07-812, 813. Forgery (2 cts.). Eyewitness ID and handwriting expert case. Pled after State's case concluded.
State v. Manigault. Murder, Armed Robbery and Conspiracy. Two Co-Defendants, one testifying for State. Motion for redaction of Co-Defendant' statements under Bruton. Motion for severance on grounds 2nd Co-Defendant's testimony in her own defense concerned other bad acts of my client for which he had never been charged and were not similar or related in any way to Murder charge. Her testimony would have been unduly prejudicial and was not admissible. Severance motion granted. Indictment dismissed after Co-Defendant acquitted. Plea on unrelated charges.
State v. Woods. 91-GS-07-654. Murder. Battered Woman's Defense. Alford plea to Manslaughter, suspended sentence.
State v. Evans. 90-GS-07-1512, 1511, 1513. Kidnapping, Armed Robbery, and CSC 1st (2 cts.). Insanity defense. Found not guilty by reason of insanity. Civil Commitment Hearing.
State v. Johnson. 92-GS-07-1354. Murder. Found not competent at first hearing. Later determined not guilty by reason of insanity. Confined to State Hospital at civil commitment hearing.
Criminal Cases While in Private Practice - Last 5-6 Years:
State v. Russell. 88-GS-07-1397. Retrial of Defendant previously convicted of Manslaughter at trial on Murder indictment. Was granted new trial on PCR. Second trial issues: motions to suppress statement, admissibility of State's witness' criminal record and character evidence of other bad acts, admissibility of Defendant's prior record, request for self-defense instructions. Defendant acquitted. Co-Counsel on this case.
State v. Livingston. 327 S.C. 17, 488 S.E.2d 313 (1997). Client arrested and indicted for Reckless Homicide. Later indicted for Felony DUI. Trial on both indictments. Motion to continue denied, motion to limit police presence in courtroom denied. Motion to suppress Defendant's statement granted. Objection to coroner's lay testimony on Defendant being "under the influence" denied. Motion to suppress drug analysis on basis BA not offered or refused denied. Objection to Solicitor's introduction of victim impact testimony by victim's husband and photograph denied. Motion to require State to elect which indictment to proceed on denied. Motion for directed verdict on Felony DUI denied. Convicted of Felony DUI, acquitted of Reckless Homicide. Supreme Court reversed. Admission of victim's husband's testimony to effect they were both police officers, newlyweds and wedding photo was irrelevant, highly inflammatory and prejudicial. Not harmless error as urinalysis inconclusive as to whether Defendant was driving under influence of marijuana.
State v. Heyward. 94-GS-15-380, 381. CSC with Minor 1st, Lewd Act on Minor. Motion to require State to elect which indictment to proceed on denied. Motion to suppress identification as tainted by improper photo lineup identification. Motion to suppress testimony of victim from prior case alleging CSC with Minor wherein Defendant pled to ABHAN. Motion to suppress and objection made on grounds no similarity in crimes or evidence of common scheme or plan. Denied. Motions to determine competency of State's witness and for criminal record of State's witness granted. Alibi defense presented. Motion for directed verdict denied. Acquitted.
State v. Wright. 98-GS-07-1083, 1085, 1084. Possession of Pistol by Felon, Possession with Intent to Distribute Marijuana, Sale of Marijuana. Client was present in trailer with 8 others when search warrant was executed. Only he and one Co-Defendant arrested. Marijuana and gun in bathroom near Defendant. Sale from trailer at prior time one reason for search warrant. Filed motions to disclose CI record, motion to reveal the deal. Prepared for trial instructions on mere presence, simple possession, voir dire, motion to suppress search warrant on staleness grounds, lack of credibility of CI. Prior to call of case, motion to quash gun charge granted on ground facts set forth in indictment did not meet elements of 16-23-30. Defendant's prior conviction for possession of crack not a violent offense. Sale of Marijuana dismissed by Solicitor. CI could not be found and Defendant obviously did not meet detailed description of drug seller as set forth in report. Plea to Possession WITD Marijuana. At sentencing, motion to sentence Defendant as a first offender due to Baldazar argument was granted. Defendant had no attorney on plea to simple possession of crack which was entered on day after release from mental hospital. Although he did not get time at original plea, Defendant was on probation and facing imposition of suspended sentence since the new plea to Possession WITD Marijuana was a violation of probation. Documentation provided to Court, plus evidence that the crack case was weak. If Defendant had counsel in that case, he would not have pled. Based on facts of case ("Defendant in wrong place at wrong time"), weight of marijuana and recommendation of continued probation by agent, Defendant received suspended sentence. Would have filed PCR application on crack conviction but statute of limitations had run.
State v. Miller. 95-GS-27-0088. Murder. Shootout at night club. Motion to change venue denied. Motion to suppress Defendant's statement on 5th and 6th Amendment grounds, motion to suppress gun and ballistics evidence as being "fruit of poisonous tree" - obtained as a result of illegally obtained confession. Denied. Other issues/objections on admissibility of prior bad acts/character of State's witness. Request to charge self-defense denied. Convicted.
State v. Hardy. 94-GS-07-2108. Failure to Stop for Blue Light, Possession of Crack Cocaine, Possession within 1/2 Mile of a Park. Tried on all indictments. Suppression motion on grounds no probable cause to stop vehicle. Motion to suppress evidence/testimony of other bad acts for which Defendant had not been charged granted. Motion for directed verdict granted as to Possession and Possession within 1/2 Mile of Park. Necessity defense on Failure to Stop. Convicted.
State v. Blake. 99-GS-07-602. Indicted for Kidnapping, CSC 1st. Consent defense. Prepared for trial, including cross of DNA expert - motion to determine Defendant's competency based on mental retardation report, motion to suppress Defendant's statements, motion to disclose victim's criminal record. Indictments dismissed. Client reindicted for Violation of S.C. Code Section 44-23-1150 Unlawful for a Correctional Officer to Have Sex with an Inmate. Plea, suspended sentence.
State v. Patton. 94-GS-07-660. DUI 2nd, DUS, Open Container. Acquitted of DUS at Mag. bench trial. Acquitted of Open Container at Mag. jury trial. Jury trial on DUI 2nd.     State v. Tapley. Warrant Nos. E132237, 40, 41, 42. Unlawful Carrying of Pistol (4 cts.). Plea for suspended sentence after jury selection and opening arguments.
State v. Lingard. Warrant Nos. D725578, 77. Armed Robbery, Grand Larceny Motor Vehicle. Ran client on polygraph. Prepared for trial. Plea to Accessory After Fact. YOA suspended. Agreement to testify for State against Co-Defendants.
State v. Lucas. 97-GS-07-1874,1875,1876. Kidnapping, Spousal Sexual Battery, CDVHAN and Probation Violation. Several bond hearings. Prepared for trial. Probation revoked. Plea to Mag. level CDV, 30 days concurrent with probation revocation. Kidnapping/Marital Rape dismissed.
State v. Carter. 96-GS-07-1874, 1875. Kidnapping, ABIK. Unusual facts. Prepared for trial. After jury selection, client entered negotiated Alford plea to ABHAN. Suspended sentence and restitution for medical bills. Kidnapping charge dismissed.
State v. Heflin. 94-GS-07-2086. ABIK. Knife fight with self-defense. Jury trial. After several of State's witnesses testified, Defendant was offered plea to ABHAN, no restitution. Five years concurrent with parole revocation.
State v. Patton. 95-GS-07-0044. DUI 2nd. Jury trial. No BA. Usual cross examination on field sobriety tests. Mistrial - hung jury. Nolle prossed.
State v. Barnwell. Failure to Stop for Blue Light, DUI. PTI on Blue Light/Jury trial on DUI.
State v. David M. Juvenile. Violation of School Safety Act (2 cts.). Threats to teachers. Trial on one charge, guilty. Plea on other petition.
State v. Wagner. Burglary 1st, GL, CDV. No probable cause. Dismissed at preliminary. CDV dismissed. Husband accused of breaking in his own house and taking property of the marriage.
State v. Simmons. Dist. Crack Cocaine, Poss. WITD Crack Cocaine. Dismissed at prelim. Mere presence defense. Indicted and nolle prossed.
State v. Reynolds. DUI. Client acting pro se had been convicted by jury of DUI. Filed motion for new trial based on inadmissibilty of evidence. Motion granted. At second trial jury deadlocked, mistrial granted. At third trial, Defendant acquitted. Issues on chain of custody, admissibility of blood test results.
State v. Brinson. DUS 4th, Probation Violation. Plea for time served. Probation terminated.
State v. Evans. Accused of being part of a shoplifting ring. Receiving Stolen Goods and GL. PTI.
State v. Stegall. DUS 1st and DUI 2nd. Motion to dismiss DUS on grounds Defendant was a Georgia resident, with valid Georgia driver's license. S.C. suspension period had ended. Granted. Jury trial on DUI. Credibility of witnesses at issue. Convicted.
State v. Simmons. Distribution of Marijuana. Motion to disclose CI. Credibility of CI at issue. Entrapment defense. Plea for suspended sentence.
State v. Bunton. DUI. Plea.
State v. C.L. Client being investigated for embezzlement. Resolved through negotiation with employer. Not charged.
State v. Simmons. Harassing Telephone Call. Dismissed at preliminary hearing.
State v. Parsons. Assault and Battery. Dismissed by Complainant prior to trial.
State v. Chandler. Assault and Battery with Intent to Kill. Dismissed at preliminary hearing, no probable cause. Mag. Court bench trial on Malicious Injury to Personal Property. Not guilty.
State v. Dudley. Armed Robbery (4 cts.), Probation Violation. Plea to one count Common Law Robbery, 8 years concurrent with probation violation.
State v. Galloway. Speeding Ticket. Mag. Court bench trial.
State v. Baker. Alleged embezzlement of fines from Mag. office. Inconclusive audit report. Defense required knowledge of Mag. Court administrative reporting, division of fines, accounting and auditing principles. PTI with some restitution.
State v. Pendel. Petit Larceny. Restitution. Charge dismissed.
State v. Osborne. Unlawful Possession of Pistol - Under 21. Plea. Intimidation of a witness. Dismissed. Mag. Court - Discharging Firearm in City, Receiving Stolen Goods. Dismissed.
State v. Reese. Possession of THC with Intent to Distribute, Possession with Intent to Distribute Mushrooms. Bond hearing. Analysis showed no illegal substance. No billed.
State v. Capers. Unlawful Telephone, Stalking. PTI.
State v. Halker. Pointing a Firearm. Dismissed at preliminary hearing.
State v. Stafford. Parole hearing. Serving time for probation revocation CSC with Minor, which had involved consensual sex with teenage girlfriend. Obtained affidavits from victim and her mother for parole hearing.
State v. Mosley. Conspiracy to Traffic in Counterfeit Cocaine. Indicted as Conspiracy to Violate Drug Laws. Client riding in car with numerous people after passenger sold fake dope to undercover officer for large sum. Dismissed.
State v. Evans. GL Auto. Charge changed to Use Without Permission at preliminary hearing. Dismissed by victim.
State v. Pruitt. Distribution of Crack Cocaine. Mere presence defense. Dismissed.
State v. G.S. Represented Marine in base investigation of alleged Florida rape. Private polygraph and NIS polygraph run. Cleared by military police. Obtained co-counsel in Florida who represented client at bond hearing and preliminary hearing wherein charge was dismissed based on S.C. NIS investigation provided to Florida law enforcement.
State v. Manbeck. DUI. Attended BA refusal hearing - favorable ruling. DUI trial. Convicted.
State v. Peter P. Florida probationer in S.C. in violation of probation to care for children who were here. Requested and coordinated transfer of probation from Florida to South Carolina by obtaining necessary verification of circumstances. Dismissed Florida violation citation through agency cooperation.
State v. Davis. DUI/DUS 3rd. Convicted in Mag. Court on DUI. Plea to DUS 2nd, fined.
State v. Osborne. Possession of Alcohol by a Minor, DUS. Bench trial. Not guilty DUS. Guilty alcohol possession.
State v. Hall. Bench warrant on DUS 3rd. Vacated bench warrant. Plea to DUS 2nd.
State v. Mullins. CDV. Mag. trial. Acquitted.
State v. Smith. DUI, DUS, Open Container. Jury trial. Directed verdict DUI. Plea to other charges.
State v. Ward. Possession of Crack with Intent to Distribute. Throw down case. Entered drug treatment program. Plea, suspended sentence.
State v. Jackson. DUI. Trial in Mag. Court. Convicted.
State v. Yates. Assault and Battery. Bench trial. Not guilty.
State v. McKinnon. DUS 3rd, Possession of Cocaine. Search issue. Lab report negative for drugs. Plea to DUS 2nd.
State v. Washington. Assault and Battery with Intent to Kill. No evidence client involved. Dismissed by Complainant.
State v. Smalls. Assault and Battery with Intent to Kill. No evidence client involved. Dismissed by Complainant.
State v. Goodsen. Possession with Intent to Distribute Crack Cocaine. Plea to Possession of Cocaine.
State v. Heflin. Indecent Exposure (4 cts.). PTI.
State v. Frioux. Trespassing, Unlawful Possession of Firearm. Distraught father arrested after going to retrieve daughter from her boyfriend's house. Bench trial on Trespassing. Not guilty. Gun charge dismissed.
State v. Jansen. Possession of Beer by a Minor, False Information to Police, Fake ID. College student. PTI.
State v. Hucker. Possession of Beer by a Minor, False Information to Police, Fake ID. College student. PTI.
State v. Seaver. Assault and Battery, Simple Possession of Marijuana, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. Plea to A&B, 1 day time served. PTI on drug charges.
State v. Buckner. CSC 1st. Dismissed by Complainant.
State v. Buckner. Distribution of Crack Cocaine (2 cts.), Possession with Intent to Distribute Crack Cocaine. Dismissed when client pled to other charges.
State v. Housey. Sale and Distribution of Crack Cocaine, Sale of Marijuana (2 cts.). Plea to Sale of Crack Cocaine, marijuana charges dismissed. Imperfect entrapment defense. Defendant with psychiatric problems acted as unwitting CI for undercover cop in accommodation crack sale. Suspended sentence.
State v. Goodson. DUS 3rd. Reduced to DUS 2nd. Plea.
State v. Ladson. Distribution of Crack Cocaine, Grand Larceny. GL dismissed, no p.c. Prepared for trial on drug charge. Informant could not be found.
State v. Slagel. Grand Larceny. Lack of evidence to convict, possible fraudulent claim by victim. Dismissed.
State v. Seaver. ABHAN (2 cts.). Resolved one case through Complainant's attorney - paid medical bills, charge dismissed. Other Complainant failed to appear when case called for trial. Dismissed.
State v. McCaleb. CDV. Dismissed upon conclusion of custody litigation.
State v. Osborne. Shoplifting, Trespassing. Restitution. Charges dismissed by store owner.
State v. Randalls. Unlawful Possession Pistol/Under 21. PTI.
State v. Patilla. Possession with Intent to Distribute Cocaine, Unlawful Possession of Liquor, Simple Possession of Marijuana. Plea to Possession of Cocaine, suspended sentence. Time served on Mag. charges. Consent search of vehicle.
State v. Washington. Breach of Trust with Fraud. Intent/Obtaining Goods under False Pretense. Restitution paid. Dismissed.
State v. Simmons. Criminal Sexual Conduct with Minor 2nd Degree. Problems with medical evidence and credibility of Complainant. PTI.
State v. Steven G. Indecent Exposure. Petition dismissed . Child urinating in yard while playing. Neighbor called police.
State v. Bazemore. Burglary 2nd (3 cts.), GL (3 cts.). Plea to Burglary 2nd, Petit Larceny. Other indictments dismissed.
State v. O'Hara. Leaving Scene of Accident, Improper Backing. Dismissed on basis of witness affidavits obtained.
State v. Brian R. Juvenile. Burglary 2nd, Grand Larceny, Receiving Stolen Goods, Indecent Exposure. Extensive mental health problems and treatment record. R&E and probation.
State v. Hollman. CDV, ABHAN. Convicted of CDV on bench trial. ABHAN dismissed by Complainant.
State v. Mullins. CDV. Not guilty at bench trial.
State v. Desai. Contributing to Delinquency of Minors (3 cts.), Sale of Cigarettes to Minors. PTI
State v. Fields. B&E Auto, P/L. Motion to suppress eyewitness ID. Alibi defense. B&E dismissed. Plea to P/L.
State v. Priest. CDV. PTI
State v. Ruth. Forgery, P/L. Restitution paid. Charges dismissed.
State v. Dangerfield. DUI trial. Hung jury, mistrial. Motion to dismiss based on testimony at first trial granted.
State v. Desai. Speeding ticket. Bench Trial-Not Guilty.
State v. Wright. Armed Robbery. Eyewitness ID case. Perfect alibi. Obtained verification Defendant was in prison in Delaware at time this armed robbery occurred in S.C. Charge dismissed. Vacated bench warrant on old crack sale indictment which was dismissed.
State v. Harvey. Assault and Battery. Ex-wife/new wife fight. Jury trial. Convicted.
State v. Russell. DUI 2nd. Plea.
State v. Angela S. Juvenile probation violation.
State v. Ferguson. Possession with Intent to Distribute Crack Cocaine. Client a passenger in vehicle stopped for speeding. Mere presence defense. Dismissed at preliminary hearing.
State v. Dashi. Possession of Sawed-Off Shotgun, Possession with Intent to Distribute Crack Cocaine, Possession with Intent to Distribute within 1/2 Mile of School, Carrying a Concealed Weapon. Police called to house in reference to domestic dispute. Told Defendant and friend to leave, put on jeans girlfriend handed him, grabbed bags belonging to him and friend. Searched as leaving. Crack in jeans. Claimed lack of knowledge, not his pants or bag. Petition for PTI denied. Plea to 2 indictments. Others dismissed.
State v. Client. Insurance Fraud investigation. Resolved with restitution and civil penalty. Memorandum of Understanding entered. No criminal action pursued.
State v. Fennell. CSC with Minor. Grand jury requested victim and parent appearance. Failed to appear 3 times. No billed.
State v. Shelton P. Juvenile. Bomb threat (2 cts.). Client a resident of Kentucky. Not wanted back in state to try case. Petitions dismissed.
State v. Hill. Transfer of alcohol to a minor. Pending.
State v. Gadson. Trafficking Crack Cocaine, Conspiracy to Traffic, Possession of Crack, Unlawful Possession Pistol, Assaulting Police Officer, Resisting Arrest. Three different cases involving probable cause to stop vehicles, consent to search, validity of search warrant. Negotiated plea to Possession with Intent to Distribute, 18 years. Other indictments dismissed.
State v. Greene. Possession Cocaine, Simple Possession Marijuana, Resisting Arrest. Cocaine lab report negative, charge dismissed. Validity search warrant and legality of search procedures in question. Co-Defendant claimed marijuana. Resisting Arrest dismissed since Defendant was shot by police during arrest and lost his civil suit.
State v. Baughman. Possession with Intent to Distribute Crack Cocaine, Possession with Intent to Distribute Marijuana. Lab report negative for crack cocaine. No probable cause for search warrant. Dismissed.
State v. Harrell. Possession with Intent to Distribute Crack Cocaine, Possession with Intent to Distribute Marijuana. Lab report negative for crack cocaine. No probable cause for search warrant. Dismissed.
State v. Boyles. ABHAN. Dismissed by Complainant upon resolution of custody case.
State v. Suzanne A. Juvenile. Assault and Battery. Girl fight. Plea, probation, essay and apology.
State v. Roger C. Juvenile. Burglary 2nd, Grand Larceny. R&E, evaluation, probation, restitution.
State v. Corley. Conspiracy to Commit Grand Larceny. Vacated bench warrant. Indictment dismissed upon review of case with Solicitor.
State v. Robert W. Juvenile. GAL Appointment for fifteen-year-old accused of CSC 1st on younger sister. Approved plea to Lewd Act. Sexual offender treatment.
State v. Burns. CDV. Dismissed by Complainant.
State v. Kari T. Juvenile. Possession Weapon on School Grounds. EH student. Suspended R&E, probation.
State v. Granet. CDVHAN. Complainant moved to California. Dismissed.
State v. Skipper. Indecent Exposure. PTI.
State v. Jamar S. Juvenile. Grand Larceny. Plea R&E, evaluation and probation.
State v. Sparta. Contributing to Delinquency of a Minor-Attempted CSC with a Minor. Pending.
State v. Chaplin. Resisting Arrest, Possession with Intent to Distribute Crack Cocaine, Probation Violation. Videotape case. Negotiated plea concurrent with probation violation. Client fled. Bench warrant issued.
State v. Charleton. Petit Larceny. Pending.
State v. Singleton. DUS 3rd. Reduced to DUS 2nd per driving record. Plea, fined.
State v. Scott. Hindering an Officer, Threatening Public Official, Possession of Cocaine, Crack Cocaine and Marijuana. PTI.
State v. Ezell. DUI. Acquitted at Magistrate jury trial. Unusual facts.
State v. Riebold. Simple Possession of Marijuana. Florida college student forfeited bond on Simple Possession. Driver's license suspended. Consent Order vacating conviction and granting new trial. Enrolled in PTI.
US v. Gestwicki. DUI trial before US Magistrate. Motion to suppress client's statements.
State v. Ferguson. Possession of Crack Cocaine. Mere presence defense. Dismissed at preliminary hearing.
State vs. MacArthur. DUI trial. Convicted. Appeal to Circuit Court. Upheld.
State v. McBride. DUI. Jury trial. Not guilty.
State v. Jenkins. Probation Violation. Restitution paid. Terminated.
State v. George H. Larceny of Vehicle. Juvenile trial. Found guilty.
State v. Scott. Possession Crack Cocaine, Possession Cocaine, Simple Possession Marijuana. Search warrant executed at residence where Defendant was roommate. Convicted at Mag. bench trial without counsel on marijuana charge. Filed motion for new trial which was granted. PTI all charges.
State v. Driggers. Assault and Battery. Blind man accused of fondling co-worker. Jury Trial. Directed verdict, not guilty at conclusion of State's case.
State v. Scott. Assault and Battery. Dismissed by Complainant day of trial.
State v. Kinlaw. Burglary 1st. Bond hearing. Dismissed at preliminary hearing. Should have been charged with Magistrate level Receiving Stolen Goods. State's witness against person he purchased items from.
State v. Sanders. Possession with Intent to Distribute Marijuana. Imperfect entrapment defense. Plea, suspended sentence.
State v. Sparta. CDV. Not guilty, bench trial.
State v. Jenkins. Simple Possession Marijuana, Possession with Intent to Distribute Crack Cocaine. Questionable probable cause for stop of vehicle. PTI.
State v. Galloway. Possession with Intent to Distribute Marijuana. Probable cause for investigative stop and consent to search vehicle an issue. Negotiated plea.
State v. Simmons. Possession with Intent to Distribute Marijuana. Search warrant validity in question. Plea, suspended sentence.
State v. Buckner. Trafficking Cocaine, Possession with Intent to Distribute Marijuana, Possession Weapon by Felon. Validity of search warrant an issue. Plea to package deal with new charges, some indictments dismissed.
State v. Gainey. Represented Defendant during investigation of CSC with Minor. Defendant passed polygraph, not arrested.
State v. Samuels. Conspiracy to Violate S.C. Drug Laws, Conspiracy to Violate S.C. Drug Laws within 1/2 Mile of School. Defendant present at residence when search warrant executed based on prior drug sales from home he was visiting. No evidence of conspiracy as set forth in State v. Mouzon. Indictment dismissed.
State v. McCollough. ABIK. Fight with husband's girlfriend. PTI with restitution for medicals.
State v. Chris L. Grand Larceny, B&E Auto (4 cts.). Juvenile. Plea in Family Court.
State v. Moultrie. Possession with Intent to Distribute Crack Cocaine. Mere presence defense. PTI.
State v. Todd. DUI. Jury trial, convicted. Cross-examination on field tests. Handicapped client.
State v. Mitchell. Assault and Battery of a High and Aggravated Nature. PTI.
State v. Simmons. DUS. Convicted. Appeal to Circuit Court. Reversed. No Valid S.C. Driver's License.
State v. Robertson. DUI. Defendant not competent to be tried. Committed to State Hospital.
State v. Witter. Sale Crack Cocaine, Sale within 1/2 Mile, Conspiracy. Bond hearing. Direct indictment by grand jury. Turned client in. Problems with CI, undercover officer and chain of custody of evidence. Negotiated plea to sale indictment, suspended sentence. Others dismissed.
State v. Themins. CDVHAN. PTI.
State v. Williams. CDV (2 cts.). Motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause, alleged facts don't meet elements of offense denied. Pending trial.
State v. Jenkins. Possession of Crack. Dismissed. No probable cause for arrest.
State v. Taylor. CDVHAN, Child Endangerment. Pending.
State v. Steve. Sale of Crack Cocaine. Videotape case. Pending.
State v. Byson. DUS 2nd, Failure to Stop for Blue Light, Open Container, Possession with Intent to Distribute Crack Cocaine. Problem with identification of vehicle driver, who ran from police. DUS dismissed. PTI on other charges.
State v. Pruitt. Possession Cocaine. Mere presence defense. PTI.
State v. Glasner. DUI. Hired to enter plea in Defendant's absence and pay fine.
State v. Finley. Possession with Intent to Distribute Marijuana, Distribution of Marijuana (11 cts.), Distribution within 1/2 Mile of School (11 cts.). Some sales were accommodation sales. Imperfect entrapment defense. Plea to one sale, Possession with Intent to Distribute.
State v. Spaulding. Fraudulent Check. Dismissed by Solicitor. Pre-existing debt.
State v. Jenkins. DUI, Open Container. Pending, waiting on jury trial. Represented Defendant at administrative hearing. Waiting on decision.
State v. Bulock. Eavesdropping/Peeping Tom. PTI.
State v. Pellam. Conspiracy to Trawl for Shrimp, Conspiracy to Trawl in Closed Waters. Dismissed.
State v. Baker. Conspiracy to Trawl for Shrimp, Conspiracy to Trawl in Closed Waters.
State v. Baker. Conspiracy to Trawl for Shrimp, Conspiracy to Trawl in Closed Waters. Plea to one charge, other dismissed.
State v. Ladson. Threatening to Use Incendiary Device. Remanded to Magistrate Court as Disorderly Conduct.
State v. Nicole B. Juvenile. CDVHAN. Plea, probation and mental health counseling.
State v. Bobby U. Juvenile. Trial in Family Court. Main issue eye witness identification of Defendant as perpetrator. Found guilty. R&E, evaluation, probation.
State v. Francis. Possession with Intent to Distribute Crack Cocaine. Mere presence defense. Dismissed.
State v. Ferguson. Sale & Distribution Crack Cocaine (3 cts.). Three incidents alleged sale to confidential informant accompanied by an undercover officer. Negotiated plea to one sale, others dismissed - 7 years.
State v. Setzler. DUI. Trial in Magistrate Court. Accident. No witness to driving, .09 BA. First trial - hung jury, mistrial. Second trial - acquitted.
State v.. Antoine S. Juvenile. Carrying Gun in Public Building. R&E, suspended probation.
U.S. v. Skierski. General Court Martial. 8 cts. Assault (CDV), 1 ct. False Statement. Preliminary hearing. Negotiated pre-trial agreement. Entered plea to 6 cts. Assault and False Statement. Sentencing trial. Beat the plea agreement, 7 months, no bad conduct discharge, reduced in rank.
SC v. Client. Represented client under investigation by A.G. for failure to file tax returns. Returns filed and proof of mitigating circumstances, including medical evidence submitted. Criminal action not pursued.
REPRESENTATIVE LIST OF CIVIL CASES HANDLED IN LAST 5 YEARS:
Terrence Greene v. Jeffrey Palkowski, Civil Action No. 9:95-2603-19. Plaintiff was shot by law enforcement officer during execution of a search warrant. Procedural history: Filed complaint in common pleas as Terrence Greene v. Beaufort County 95-CP-07-1162 alleging assault & battery, negligence and violation of federal civil rights. Procedural history: Case removed to Federal Court by Defendant. Complaint amended with consent of Defendant to correct clerical error. Parties filed their Statements Concerning Establishment of Scheduling Order. Scheduling Order issued. Motions to Strike and for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant on grounds Beaufort County exercises no authority over Sheriff's Department. Defendant's summary judgment motion granted. Plaintiff filed Motion for New Trial, Amendment of Judgment and Motion for Joinder of Persons Needed for Just Adjudication or for Amendment of Pleadings. Motion for Joinder and Amendment of Complaint granted. Filed Second Amended Complaint as Terrence Greene v. Carl McLeod, Sheriff of Beaufort County Sheriff's Department, in his official capacity, Beaufort County Sheriff's Department, and Jeffrey J. Palkowski, individually and in his official capacity. Defendant filed new Motion to Strike request for punitive damages from amended Complaint on grounds punitive damages not recoverable under S. C. Tort Claims Act, and 11th Amendment protects state agents from damage suits. Defendant also filed Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff filed Response in Opposition to Motions. Trial Judge granted motion for summary judgment against Carl McLeod, Sheriff, and Palkowski in his official capacity on basis of 11th amendment immunity from damages and suits brought in federal court. In opposition had argued that Plaintiff filed case in state court and Defendant removed case, creating the circumstances for the 11th Amendment immunity. Summary judgment granted to Beaufort County Sheriff's Department on basis it is not a separate legal entity. Motion to strike punitive damages as to Palkowski in his individual capacity was denied. Pretrial Motions included arguments on Plaintiff's objections to introduction of portions of depositions, motion to exclude testimony of Plaintiff's arrest on drug charges on which he had not yet been tried, hearsay testimony of information from confidential informant used to obtain search warrant for Plaintiff's home. Objection to jury selection procedure whereby names of jurors selected to juries in cases already picked were not returned to jury box. Direct and cross examination of experts. Verdict for Defendant who presented accidental discharge defense. Motion for New Trial made on grounds hearsay testimony of defense witnesses that Plaintiff and one of Plaintiff's witnesses were involved in illegal activities was irrelevant to shooting and highly prejudicial. Motion for new trial denied. Client did not want to appeal.
Peggy Bailey v. Sirloin Family Steakhouse. 95-CP-15-281. Represented Plaintiff in slip and fall. Original Complaint amended to reflect correct name of steakhouse. Had also named as a Defendant Rent-a-Mat. After discovery completed, Rent-a-Mat's motion for summary judgment was granted. Defendant Steakhouse motion for summary judgment was argued and denied. Case settled prior to trial.

KZ v. Singleton. Represented Plaintiff in auto accident. Knee injury that required surgery. Liability clear. Hit from behind by driver charged with DUI. Case settled without filing suit.
Smith v. Singleton. Represented Plaintiff in auto accident. Reinjured knee. Liability clear. Hit from behind by driver charged with DUI. Settled without filing suit.
Butler v. Appleby. Represented Plaintiff in auto accident. Minor personal injuries. Liability clear. Settled without filing suit.
Hunt v. Schwartz. Represented Plaintiff in auto accident. Relatively minor neck and back injuries. Liability clear. Settled without filing suit.
Griffin v. Port Royal Seafood. Represented Plaintiff in auto accident. Liability clear. Settled without filing suit.
Rivers v. Port Royal Seafood. Represented Plaintiff in auto accident. Liability clear. Settled without filing suit.
Reising v. Casper. Defense of Rule to Show Cause in Magistrate Court that alleged violation of restraining order issued pursuant to harassment statute. Bench trial, conflicting testimony.
BCSD v. Pruitt. Forfeiture. Represented Defendant. Filed Answer and Counterclaim. Settled by consent order.
BCSD v. Dudley. Forfeiture. Represented Defendant. Filed Answer and Counterclaim. Settled by consent order.
Ward v. Garrett. Represent Plaintiff in automobile accident. Significant injury to shoulder requiring surgery. Other driver's liability clear.
Moreland v. City of Beaufort, Durangos and others. Client assaulted in nightclub restroom by two women, all women ordered off premises where assault continued, police arrested client and others for disorderly conduct. During assault or arrest client's wrist broken requiring several surgeries. Preparing Complaint. Excessive use of force, civil rights violation by police officer, premises liability claim against nightclub and assault & battery claims against other defendants.
Ladys Pointe Apts. v. Leadingham. Represented landlord in eviction. Knowledge of Section 8 regulations required.
Parkview Apts. v. Reid. Represented landlord in eviction based on criminal activity.
Parkview Apts. v. Green. Represented landlord in eviction based on criminal activity.
Spellman v. Bostick. Defended Magistrate suit requesting restraining order filed pursuant to harassment statute. Request for R/O denied.
Coverly v. Ortega. Auto accident. Liability clear. Case settled without filing complaint.
Witter v. Powell. 95-CP-07-1710. Defendant injured in automobile accident. He was sued by other driver. I represented the Defendant on his counterclaim against the Plaintiff for negligence. Client also represented by attorney for his insurer. After discovery and depositions, counterclaim settled.
Coker v. Asnip. 95-0854. Client sued in Magistrate Court by ex-wife for reimbursement of income taxes she paid. Filed Answer and moved to dismiss on grounds of lack of subject matter jurisdiction (Divorce Decree required payment of taxes by client) and on basis of res judicata - client already found in contempt at family court hearing and sentenced, ordered to reimburse ex-wife. Consent order of dismissal entered.
BCSC v. Gadson. Forfeiture. Consent order entered.
Brown v. Kjos, Enterprise Rental Car & Heflin. 95-CP-07-1835. Represented Defendant Heflin in personal injury action that alleged negligent entrustment of his rented vehicle to a minor. Forwarded pleadings to Helfin's insurer but his policy had lapsed. Filed Motion to vacate Heflin's appointment as guardian for minor in litigation as he had no relation to her. Order appointing minor's mother as guardian. Filed Answer denying minor had permission to use his vehicle. Some discovery. Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Enterprise argued and granted. Parties unable to locate Defendant Kjos or mother for service of pleadings and discovery requests. Case stricken pursuant to Rule 40(j).
Watson v. Buckles. Represented Plaintiff in auto accident. Liability clear. Settled without filing complaint.
Bostick v. Hilton. Represented Plaintiff in auto accident. Liability clear. Settled without filing complaint.
LaSanta Perry v. State of South Carolina. Represented inmate in action for Post Conviction Relief. Alleged ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to investigate and talk with alibi witnesses. Re-investigated case and talked with witnesses for client. PCR denied after hearing.
Casper v. Newton. Represented Plaintiff in auto accident. Liability clear. Settled prior to filing complaint.
BCSD v. Chisolm. Forfeiture. Filed Answer. Consent order.
McLeod & Washington v. Smith. Represented Plaintiff in auto accident. Liability clear. Settled without filing complaint.
Washington v. Bi-Lo. 94-CP-07-1760. Represented Plaintiff in slip and fall. Had to file and argue motion to compel production of documents which was granted. Case tried by substitute counsel. Verdict for Plaintiff.
Washington v. Firestone, et al., 93-CP-15-856. Represented one of several persons injured in automobile accident believed to have been caused by defective product. Confidentiality provision contained in settlement agreement.
Jones as GAL for Cook v. Port Royal Department of Public Safety and Roy Fife. 95-CP-07-341. Represented minor who had been assaulted by police officer crossing guard. Filed Complaint alleging causes for assault & battery, negligence, civil rights violation. Filed motion to amend Complaint to correct typographical error, granted. Filed amended Complaint. After discovery completed Defendants filed motion for summary judgment on second and third causes of action. Plaintiff's second cause of action was dismissed as to all defendants. Third cause of action dismissed as to original Defendants Town of Port Royal and Port Royal Police Department. No causes of action were remaining against the Town or Police Dept. The Complaint against those defendants was dismissed. Jury trial at which most of witnesses were children who had seen the assault. Verdict for Plaintiff on assault & battery, found not liable on civil rights act claims. Filed Motion for New Trial or in alternative New Trial Nisi Additur, with memorandum which was denied.
Probate Court Case No. 94GCO70022. Appointed GAL for minor on petition for appointment of conservator. Criminal records check and interview with child's mother to ensure she could handle funds, reconcile bank statements and file required accountings. Attendance at hearing.
Brown v. City of Beaufort. 93-CP-07-1936 and 93-CP-07-1937. Consolidated for trial. Represented Plaintiff in cases alleging malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, defamation, negligence. Defendant filed motion for summary judgment which was argued and denied. Plaintiff filed motion for continuance and motion to compel discovery. Jury Trial. Defendant's motion for directed verdict was granted at conclusion of Plaintiff's case. Filed Motion for New Trial and to Reconsider which was granted as to cause of action for slander. Defendant filed another Motion for Summary Judgment on the cause of action for slander which was argued and granted. Client did not want to appeal.
Jones v. Beaufort County. 94-CP-07-989. Jones as GAL for J. Cook v. Beaufort County, 94CP-07-990. Jones as GAL for J. A. Cook v. Beaufort County, 94-CP-07-991. Represented mother falsely accused of shoplifting. Detained, searched, had purse dumped out in front of her children and others. Police had been searching for shoplifter. Only similarity between client and suspected shoplifter was they were both black females. Mother's Complaint set forth causes of action for false imprisonment, invasion of privacy, assault & battery, defamation, negligence and civil rights violations. Filed Complaints on behalf of children for emotional distress. Cases settled after discovery completed.
HR v. GA. Client leased building for use as store that still contained refrigeration equipment, shelving belonging to prior evicted tenant. Dispute over removal of equipment and whether landlord had authority to lease building inclusive of equipment belonging to prior tenant. Negotiated purchase of equipment by client and renegotiated lease with landlord. Prior tenant resolved his conflict with landlord through separate counsel.
Don Young dba Southland Properties v. Fosnight, Kegler & Wade. 94-CP-07-1330. Represented Defendant Fosnight in action that alleged Fosnight cut down neighbor's trees without permission and sold the timber. Kegler & Wade were Plaintiff's tenants. Complaint set forth causes of action against Fosnight for trespass, conversion, malicious injury to trees. Fosnight filed an Answer & Counterclaim asserting tenants gave him permission and had implied authority to give permission. His Counterclaim alleged action for malicious prosecution as a result of his arrest on a related criminal warrant taken out by Plaintiff, Cross-Claim against tenants for indemnification. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on Counterclaim denied. Kegler dismissed from suit. Wade in default. All settlement offers rejected by Plaintiff. Main issue was dispute over measure of damages. Malicious prosecution claim dismissed. Judgment for Plaintiff against Def. Fosnight of $9500 actual and $100 punitive. Fosnight entitled to indemnity against Wade to extent he pays Plaintiff.
Jackson v. Hanna. 94-CP-07-543. Represented Plaintiff in automobile accident. Filed Complaint. Defendant moved to change venue to Aiken, Defendant's county of residence. Motion granted. After some discovery Plaintiff filed motion to change venue back to Beaufort County on grounds Aiken not a convenient forum, all witnesses in Beaufort and Defendant no longer in Aiken. Consent order entered sending case back to Beaufort County. Filed motion to compel discovery responses. Several motions for continuance by Defendant were granted because he was in college out of state. Substitute counsel tried case.
Martin v. Preventor Security. 93-CP-07-1037. Represented Plaintiff in suit for malicious prosecution. Settled after depositions.
Teacher v. Bft. Co. School District. Represented teacher whose contract was not being renewed due to letter she wrote to newspaper. Resolved by way of settlement agreement containing confidentiality provision.
Employee v. RG. Represented discharged employee on appeal of denial of unemployment benefits.
Employee v. DSS. Represented employee being investigated on sexual harassment charges. Negotiated transfer of employee.
Smith v. USAA. Client's driver's license has been indefinitely suspended for many years due to outstanding Georgia judgment for damages caused by client when he previously drove uninsured vehicle. Located judgment and insurer, negotiated settlement, satisfied judgment. Client obtained S.C. license.
Sears v. Feise. 97-CP-07-1774. Represented Defendant in collection action. Prepared Answer and cross-claim, motion to add client's wife as Defendant or necessary third party for purposes of asserting cross-claim against her for use of credit card without permission. Also represented Defendant in divorce though so settled property division by using Sears debt as offset and client assuming responsibility for payment. Payment plan on debt approved by Sears.
IRS v. Feise. Negotiated reduction in wage garnishment for back taxes upon verification of client financial situation and custody of three children.
Johnson v. Simmons. 93-0835 and 93-CP-07-1944. Represented defendant sued in Magistrate Court for damages on claims alleging assault & battery and injury to personal property. Bench trial. Verdict for Defendant and award of $500 attorneys fees under Frivolous Claims Act. Pro se Plaintiff appealed. Magistrate decision upheld.
DR v. Ladies Workout Express. Disputed debt collection. Canceled client's contract and resolved dispute.
In the Interest of R.R. Appointed to represent client on petition for involuntary commitment for chemical dependency. Client fled, later voluntarily committed to alcohol rehab.
Lewis v. Watson & Randall. Defense of magistrate collection action. Resolved by settlement and payment plan.
Cunningham v. U-Haul. Accident caused by defective U-Haul caused substantial damages to client's personal property, other expenses. Settled without filing suit.
Morrall v. Hooters. Represented car owner. Vehicle left with mechanic to have engine replaced. Without vehicle several months and work defective. Resolved by settlement when mechanic obtained counsel.
Moore v. Beaufort County. 95CP-07-1169. Represented woman arrested by deputy at concert for disorderly conduct. Acquitted by jury in Magistrate Court. Filed Complaint alleging false imprisonment, assault & battery, negligence. Defendant filed motion to strike claim for punitive damages under SC Tort Claims act, and motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed motion to amend Complaint to correct name and add necessary parties was granted. Summary judgment denied. Motion for reconsideration and/or amendment of order denying summary judgment which was denied. Notice of appeal filed on order denying summary judgment. Filed Amended Complaint with additional defendants added. Defendant's counsel refused to accept service. Personally served all defendants. Case settled after depositions taken. Appeal dismissed - interlocutory.
Raino v. Raino. 93-CP-07-1916. Defended Plaintiff's ex-husband on claims for unjust enrichment, and breach of contract alleging that after the divorce ex-wife loaned ex-husband $20,000 which he was to pay back to her upon receipt of monies on a loss of consortium law suit then pending as a result of wife's personal injuries in an automobile accident/defective tire case. In answer, pled statute of frauds, unjust enrichment to wife, lack of jurisdiction. Filed motion in Family Court to set aside and complete property division in Decree. No mention of personal injury action or equitable division of these claims in divorce decree. Plaintiff filed motion to strike defenses. After hearing, order issued by Master-in-Equity denied motion, suggested Plaintiff take voluntary non-suit or parties settle. Order entered settling case.
State v. Means. Represented Defendant at hearing on Rule to Show Cause. Client had previously been found not guilty by reason of insanity, committed to State Hospital for many years, then released under an order that required him to abstain from illicit drug use. Client tested positive for marijuana. Solicitor issued Rule. State wanted Defendant re-committed. Bench trial. Defendant fined, continued under terms of order.
98-CP-07-1512/99-DR-07-117. 10 year relationship in which man and woman lived and worked together in establishing a business, substantial properties and funds in his name. She received no salary. Substituted as counsel in action transferred from Common Pleas to Family Court for determination as to whether a common law marriage exists. If so, equitable division of property to be made in Family Court. If the parties do not have a common law marriage, the case is to be transferred back to Common Pleas for a hearing on Defendant's motion for a more definite statement and/or amendment of Complaint filed by prior counsel that alleges breach of contract, breach of partnership agreement, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, fraud, unjust enrichment and quantum meruit. Defendant had moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because last cause of action alleged common law marriage. Pending in Family Court at this time. All original counsel relieved due to conflicts of interest.
OTHER CIVIL:
I have also argued for and against many motions in Family Court, applied the rules of civil procedure and rules of evidence in that court and argued equitable doctrines, including laches, "unclean hands", res judicata, judicial and equitable estoppel. A domestic relations case list can be provided.
I have not had the opportunity to serve as counsel on a death penalty case but was in charge of organizing the mitigation/sentencing evidence in the one death penalty case handled by the Beaufort Public Defender Office while I was Public Defender. A plea was negotiated based on the mitigating evidence, and the client received a life sentence. As a law clerk at the Richland County Public Defender Office, I worked on two death penalty cases by assisting the mitigation/sentencing team in investigating and putting together this evidence. I was the investigator at the Beaufort Public Defender Office when John Plath and John Arnold were arrested. I worked on the case in chief. I also assisted in compilation of juror information used to challenge the Beaufort County grand and petit jury selection process in State v. Clemmie Moultrie, a Colleton County death penalty case transferred to Beaufort for trial around 1975. Mr. Moultrie was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter. I am very familiar with the procedural history and facts of State v. Linder, a Colleton County death penalty case in which the Defendant's death sentence was overturned and he was acquitted at his retrial.
I would want to review and study the current case law prior to presiding at a death penalty trial.
I would like to have tried more civil cases. I am familiar with issues ordinarily raised in civil cases, know the rules of evidence, court rules and legal principles that apply. I also acquired knowledge of civil areas in which I have not practiced by teaching graduate classes in business law. To compensate for any shortcomings, I would read the court files prior to hearing motions and/or beginning trials, familiarize myself with the law that applies, and hold pre-trial conferences in an effort to determine what issues may arise during the trial."
Ms. DeWitt reported the frequency of her court appearances during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Federal:     One completed jury trial; pretrial motion on that case; one criminal trial before U.S. Magistrate; one court martial before military judge advocate; Social Security Administration four hearings and two appeals to SSA Appeals Council.
(b)     State:     Until April 1993, she appeared approximately two weeks per month in the Court of General Sessions; several times per week before Magistrates for preliminary and bond hearings; two days per month in Family Court, plus detention and transfer hearings as scheduled. In the last five years, she has had 10-20 appearances in Family Court per month; Magistrate's Court bench or jury trials an average of five times per month; General Sessions Court an average of four times per month for pleas or motions, eight completed jury trials; Master-In-Equity motions average six per year, one trial; Common Pleas motions six times per year, two completed trials, roster meetings and pre-trial conferences.
Ms. DeWitt reported that the percentage of her practice involving civil, criminal, and domestic matters during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Civil:         20%
(b)     Criminal:     30%
(c)     Domestic:     50%
Ms. DeWitt reported the percentage of her practice in trial court during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Jury:         20%
(b)     Non-jury:     80%
Ms. DeWitt provided that she most often served as sole counsel.
The following is Ms. DeWitt's account of her five most significant litigated matters:
"(a)     State v. Christopher Lee Franklin, 425 S.E.2d 758 (S.C. App. 1992) Reh. Den., Cert. Denied. Fifteen-year-old troubled youth killed father and stepmother. Competency evaluation ordered. Ten hour transfer hearing in Family Court. Testimony on child's competency, history and culpability presented by both sides. Motion to quash first indictments was granted on grounds jurisdiction was still in the Family Court. A motion to reconsider had not been ruled on. Defendant indicted again. Trial in General Sessions Court. Defense presented some evidence of physical and emotional abuse but insufficient for battered child's defense or self-defense instructions. Convicted of two counts of murder. Concurrent life sentences. Motions at trial - request for venue change, voluntariness of Defendant's confessions and sufficiency of evidence to give manslaughter or self-defense instructions. Also competency of two child witnesses was an issue. Court of Appeals affirmed conviction and held Defendant not entitled to manslaughter instruction that was given by trial court; also defended media requests for access to transfer hearing. Ex Parte: The Island Packet and The Beaufort Gazette, Appellants In Re: Christopher F., a minor, Defendant. 417 S.E.2d 575 (S.C. 1992) Both appeals handled by S.C. Office of Appellate Defense;
(b)     State v. Prince, 90-GS-07-2216. Decedent's body found in young mother's mobile home while she was incarcerated on unrelated charges. Pre-trial motion to suppress testimony of four-year-old son as State's witness on grounds that he was not competent to testify. Reputable psychologist testified for defense that child was not competent. Child had been tested and interviewed on four different occasions and was functioning on about a two-year-old age level. Also testified that child had been improperly questioned repeatedly by police, social workers and lawyers. Judge denied motion. Also motion to suppress Defendant's statement due to violation of 6th Amendment granted. Defendant acquitted;
(c)     State v. Antonnier Adolphe, 314 S.C. 89, 441 S.E.2d 832 (Ct.App. 1994) Defendant was tried on indictments for two counts trafficking in crack cocaine and sale of crack cocaine. Search warrant for stash house obtained based on information from street suspect who had been arrested after he assisted in a purchase of crack for a wired confidential informant at a separate location. Defendant Adolphe and others were at the stash house at time search warrant executed. Drugs and other evidence found in stereo speakers. Street suspect taken to stash house and identified Adolphe as seller of crack at first location. All defendants but Adolphe posted bond and fled prior to trial. Co-defendant cases were severed. Adolphe was tried on trafficking indictments only. At trial, motion to suppress testimony of crack sale as evidence of prior bad acts denied; motion to suppress eyewitness identification by street suspect of Adolphe as drug seller denied; motion to suppress all evidence on basis search warrant affidavit did not support probable cause denied; motion to suppress evidence on grounds inventory and officers' testimony not specific as to location individual items of evidence were found denied; motion to suppress all evidence and testimony mentioning Defendant's nationality as Haitian was denied. Court of Appeals reversed Defendant's conviction on grounds the search warrant should not have been issued because the affidavit coupled with the Johnson hearing failed to supply facts creating probable cause. There was no showing of the confidential informant's reliability and the informant's allegations were never corroborated by any identifiable individuals. Good faith exception inapplicable if the underlying affidavit does not include sufficient information to allow a magistrate to determine probable cause. Evidence seized must be suppressed. Other issues raised, not addressed by Court of Appeals;
(d)     State v. Tyrone Jenkins, 322 S.C. 414, 472 S.E.2d 251 (1996), reversing State v. Tyrone Jenkins, 317 S.C. 183, 452 S.E.2d 612 (Ct.App. 1994), rehearing denied. Defendant was convicted by a jury of first degree burglary, acquitted on the related grand larceny indictment. Motion to suppress Defendant's oral statements to officer was made on three grounds. First, the Defendant's Miranda waiver was not voluntarily or knowingly made because he was under the influence of crack cocaine at the time warnings, waiver and statement given as shown by officer's own testimony and by Defendant's testimony at Jackson v. Denno hearing. Second, the Defendant's statement that he did not commit the burglary, he just ran a school for burglars was not admissible under the "bad acts" exception because there was no evidence this burglary was connected to any other burglary. Third, the introduction of Defendant's burglary school statement was unduly prejudicial. Motion to suppress was denied. Court of Appeals upheld conviction and admissibility of statement as evidence of common scheme or plan. Supreme Court reversed. No evidence of similarity of burglaries, or common scheme or plan. Testimony clearly prejudicial as other evidence of guilt far from overwhelming;
(e)     Terrence Greene v. Jeffrey Palkowski, Civil Action No. 9:95-2603-19. Represented Plaintiff who was shot by law enforcement officer during execution of a search warrant. Initial Complaint alleged assault and battery, negligence and federal civil rights violations, was originally filed in Common Pleas as Terrence Greene v. Beaufort County, 95-CP-07-1162. Defendant removed case to federal court and was granted summary judgment, but Plaintiff's motion to amend and for joinder of necessary parties was granted. Some joined party defendants were later granted summary judgment. Lengthy procedural history of amendments and motions. Pre-trial motions on objections to exhibits, objection to defense introduction of selected portions of witness depositions and objection and request for pretrial ruling on admissibility of testimony regarding Plaintiff's pending drug charges arising from execution of search warrant. Significant issues related to expert witness testimony on police practices and procedures, safety features of weapon, forensic evidence and opinion testimony on distance between Plaintiff and Defendant at time of shooting, at trial related to the relevance and prejudicial effect of defense witness testimony of hearsay information from confidential informant that Plaintiff was an armed, dangerous, drug dealer and introduction of search warrant affidavit itself as exhibit in Defendant's case. Verdict for Defendant who put up accidental discharge defense. Same issues argued in motion for new trial, which was denied. No appeal."
The following is Ms. DeWitt's account of a civil appeal she has personally handled:
"(a)     Hess v. Hess. Court of Appeals, Unpublished Opinion No. 96-UP-468, submitted December 3, 1996, filed December 16, 1996. Represented respondent/mother. Father appealed award of custody to mother, and property division. Custody award affirmed. Equitable distribution award to mother vacated and remanded."
(9)     Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Ms. DeWitt's temperament would be excellent.
(10)     Miscellaneous:
The Lowcountry Citizens Advisory Committee reported: "Ms. DeWitt meets the constitutional qualifications and is possessed of the requisite character, reputation, ability, fitness, experience, and temperament. Ms. Dewitt is recommended for Seat 1 of the Fourteenth Judicial Circuit with one observation -- the Committee noted that Ms. Dewitt has limited civil trial experience."
Ms. DeWitt has three children: Jenny P. Sopshier (26, sales/supervisor); Gregory M. Piazza (23, U.S. Navy); and James Tyler DeWitt (10, student).
Ms. DeWitt reported that she was a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
(a)     S.C. Bar Association (1983 - present), Family Law Council (1998-2000);
(b)     Beaufort County Bar Association;
(c)     Beaufort County Family Court Bar Association, secretary;
(d)     American Bar Association;
(e)     S.C. Women's Law Association;
(f)     S.C. Criminal Defense Lawyer's Association.
Ms. DeWitt provided that she was a member of the following civic, charitable, education, social, or fraternal organizations:
(a)     Equal Employment Opportunity Certificate of Appreciation for significant contributions to the Federal Women's Program, MCAS/Beaufort, S.C., 1993;
(b)     S.C. Bar Certificate of Appreciation, Mock Trial Competition Coach, 1985;
(c)     Boys & Girls Club Certificate of Appreciation, Support of Basketball Intramurals, 1998;
(d)     Beaufort Chamber of Commerce;
(e)     Hendersonville Baptist Church, Walterboro, S.C.;
(f)     Shell Point Elementary School PTO & Booster Club, Burton, S.C.;
(g)     Battery Creek High School PTO & Booster Club, Burton, S.C.
Ms. DeWitt additionally provided, "My professional and personal experiences have provided me with the knowledge, organizational skills, common sense and objective fairness required of a Circuit Court judge."

Commission's Findings:     QUALIFIED
(1)     Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Ms. Elder meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as a Family Court judge.
Ms. Elder was born on October 5, 1966. She is 33 years old. Ms. Elder provided in her application and during her testimony that she is a resident of Union, South Carolina, and has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years. Further, she provided that she has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1991.
(2)     Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Ms. Elder.
Ms. Elder demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Ms. Elder reported that she has not made any campaign expenditures.
Ms. Elder testified she has not:
(a)     sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)     sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)     asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Ms. Elder testified that she is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
(3)     Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Ms. Elder to be intelligent and knowledgeable. Her performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Ms. Elder described her continuing legal or judicial education during the past five years as follows: She has attended numerous CLE training programs focusing primarily on the area of Family Law, Ethics and Juvenile Law. She has maintained the required hours plus additional carry over hours
Ms. Elder reported that she has been an instructor at Limestone College, Gaffney, S.C., for the Block Program and Day program for law related classes (i.e. Business Law I and II, American Government, State and Local Government).
Ms. Elder reported that she has not published any books and/or articles.
(4)     Character:
The Commission's investigation of Ms. Elder did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against her. The Commission's investigation of Ms. Elder did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Ms. Elder has handled her financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Ms. Elder was punctual and attentive in her dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with her diligence and industry.
(5)     Reputation:
Ms. Elder reported that her Martindale-Hubbell rating is "CV."
Ms. Elder reported she has held the following public offices:
a)     S.C. Juvenile Parole Board- September 1994 to present, Appointed; Board Chairman- 1995, 1997, currently.
(6)     Physical Health:
Ms. Elder appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office she seeks.
(7)     Mental Stability:
Ms. Elder appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office she seeks.
(8)     Experience:
Ms. Elder was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1991. She described her legal experience as follows:
"Ken Holland, Attorney, Gaffney, S.C., 1991-1992, Associate. Assisted with civil caseload to include personal injury and workers compensation. Prepared pleadings, interviewed clients, prepared discovery, assisted with deposition and trial prep.
1992-Current-Solo Practice-Primarily domestic caseload, approximately %85, to include litigation in custody, divorce, equitable division and support areas. Remaining %15 of caseload is contractual, corporate and work for the local school district as their retained attorney.     My current practice consists of primarily all domestic work. I would estimate that per term of Family Court in Cherokee County I would average at least four cases per term. Those cases would include contested and uncontested divorces, equitable division of property and child custody. I have had an opportunity to litigate divorce cases which have exposed me to all of the fault grounds and no fault grounds allowed in South Carolina. Most of the contested divorce cases I do also have some property issues at dispute, which include the determination and evaluation of marital assets, retirement, alimony, military benefits and debt. I have had numerous divorces that require preparation of QUADRO's. I do an average of five adoptions per year and have had several adoptions that were contested for various reasons (capacity of parent to sign relinquishment, lack of parental support and/or visitation). I will normally not take abuse and neglect cases unless they stem from a current domestic case or I am appointed in a DSS action. I do, however, try to attend the annual conference on abuse and neglect that most of the volunteer guardians and DSS caseworkers attend. I currently sit on the Juvenile Parole Board, which does not allow me to represent juvenile cases in Family Court; however, by and through my service on the Parole Board, I am confronted with the entire juvenile history from the initial Court proceeding until his release from DJJ and am uniquely aware of the process."
Ms. Elder reported the frequency of her court appearances during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Federal:     N/A
(b)     State:         At least one appearance per term of Family Court and one appearance in Circuit Court every four months (on average)
Ms. Elder reported that the percentage of her practice involving civil, criminal, and domestic matters during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Civil:         13 %
(b)     Criminal:     2 %
(c)     Domestic:     85 %
Ms. Elder reported the percentage of her practice in trial court during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Jury:         30 %
(b)     Non-jury:     70 %
Ms. Elder provided that she most often served as sole counsel.
The following is Ms. Elder's account of her five most significant litigated matters:
"(a)     Newton v. Greenville Hospital System. (Trial and Appellate) This matter involved a 20-year-old sexual assault. There were numerous issues regarding the Statute of limitations, the ability to have numerous pretrial summary judgement motions heard and the scope of discovery. This case provided me with a view of how discovery can be used to extend a party's ability to file pretrial motions;
(b)     DSS v. Lewis and Lacy Lewis, a minor. (Trial) I was appointed to represent the minor child as the Guardian ad Litem in this matter. It was a DSS removal case and ultimately an adoption. DSS attempted to intervene in the foster family's adoption of the minor child because of invalid reasons and contrary to the best interest of the minor child. This matter lasted more than 2 years. It was the first case I had been involved with that the Guardian ad Litem served as primary litigator;
(c)     Smith v. Adams/Adams v. Adams. (Trial) This matter initially stemmed from Smith v. Adams, where Ms. Smith alleged that Mr. Adams broke a promise to marry her by marrying Ms. Adams, the plaintiff of the second action. The first trial dealt with unique issues regarding premarital promises to marry and reliance on said promises. The trial was held in Circuit Court. The second case filed by the actual wife of Mr. Adams was held in Family Court and involved several issues (extensive equitable division, alimony, fault ground divorce, domestic violence, protective orders). It was an unusual trial experience to have two actions in two separate courts dealing with identical assets;
(d)     Marshburn v. Drake. (Trial) This matter was held in Family Court and involved an adoption by the plaintiffs of the minor defendant. The mother had signed an appropriate relinquishment. Seven months later and two days before the adoption hearing, the defendant mother filed an emergency motion attempting to have the relinquishment withdrawn, claiming incapacity and undue influence. As the attorney for the plaintiff's, I had to do an extensive amount of research dealing with the ability to withdraw a properly signed and executed relinquishment. The Court ruled in favor of the Marshburns and granted the adoption several months and several hearings later;
(e)     Hyatt v. Broad River Electric Company. (Trial and Appellate) This matter deals with the issues of adverse possession, laches and prescriptive easements. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. After a full day of arguments, the Court granted the defendants motion. As plaintiff's counsel, I filed an appeal. The Court of Appeals heard arguments, reversed and remanded the case for retrial. Through research, trial and appeal preparation, I have gained a better ability to interpret statutes, previous Court precedent and how to apply them to current factual situations."
The following is Ms. Elder's account of a civil appeal she has personally handled:
"DSS v. Gerald Hamlett. (Trial Court/Court of Appeals)-98-UP-114, February 24, 1998. I tried this matter, without co-counsel, in the Family Court, and was successful for my client. DSS appealed and I had co-counsel assist with the Appeal."
Ms. Elder reported she served as Summary Court Judge for Cherokee County in July through September 1994 in an appointed position. The court's civil jurisdiction was up to $2,500 and its criminal jurisdiction was limited to misdemeanors. As Summary Court Judge, Ms. Elder reported she held traffic court and criminal court, issued bench, arrest, and search warrants, and conducted preliminary hearings.
In 1996, Ms. Elder ran for the House District 30 seat unsuccessfully.
(9)     Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Ms. Elder's temperament would be excellent.
(10)     Miscellaneous:
The Piedmont Citizens Advisory Committee reported: "We found Ms. Elder acceptable. She was most cordial to the Committee. Although she has limited Family Court experience in Union, her experience in Cherokee County Family Court is a large portion of her practice. The Committee expressed some concern that she may not live or practice in Union County but just leases a house there. At least two Committee members tried to get in touch with her references, but only one reference returned a phone call. Repeated attempts to reach the others were fruitless."
Ms. Elder is married to Donald Ray Elder. She does not have any children.
Ms. Elder reported that she was a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
(a)     S.C. Bar Association;
(b)     Phi Delta Phi;
(c)     Cherokee County Bar-Treasurer;
(d)     American Bar Association.
Ms. Elder provided that she was a member of the following civic, charitable, education, social, or fraternal organizations:
a)     Altrusa International-current president, charter president;
b)     American Red Cross Board, chairman;
c)     Palmetto Girl Scouts Board;
d)     Baptist Hospital Pastoral Advisory Board;
e)     American Cancer Society-Cherokee County Relay for Life Chairman;
f)     Gaffney Main Street Corporation-Taste of Gaffney-Event Chairman;
g)     Cherokee County Business Woman of the Year;
h)     S.C. Business Woman of the Year.
Ms. Elder also reported the following information which reflects positively on her candidacy:
"I have worked diligently in the area of domestic law for the past seven years. I have served on various committees in an attempt to improve this area (Children's Law Committee, Attorney General's Gang Task Force, Juvenile Legislative Task Force). I believe it is important for those who practice in Family Law to be involved with the shaping of the laws and statutes. Although the learning process never truly ends I do believe that I have developed a keen grasp of the domestic statutes and juvenile procedures to competently serve as a member of the Bench."

Commission's Findings:     QUALIFIED
(1)     Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Mr. Few meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as a Circuit Court judge.
Mr. Few was born on April 9, 1963. He is 36 years old and a resident of Greenville, South Carolina. Mr. Few provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1988.
(2)     Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Mr. Few.
Mr. Few demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Mr. Few reported that he has not made any campaign expenditures, although he does indicate that he has made phone calls and incurred copying and postage expenses, for which he has not kept records of the amounts or dates.
Mr. Few testified he has not:
(a)     sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)     sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)     asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Mr. Few testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
(3)     Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Mr. Few to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Mr. Few described his continuing legal or judicial education during the past five years by stating that he has attended the annual convention of the S.C. Trial Lawyers Association every year except 1997. He has attended the SCTLA Auto Torts seminar every year. Additionally, Mr. Few stated that for many of those years he attended seminars of the Attorneys Information Exchange Group. Mr. Few has also attended selected seminars put on by the S.C. Bar. In 1997 he attended the five-day mediation certification school in Columbia. Finally, Mr. Few stated that he typically has many more than the required number of hours.
Mr. Few described the following law-related course he has taught:
(a)     Automobile Crashworthiness, S.C. Bar, Columbia (May 14, 1999);
(b)     Nuts and Bolts of Handling a Property Contamination Case, S.C. Trial Lawyers Association, Hilton Head (Aug. 19, 1998);
(c)     Rules of Effective Cross-Examination, S.C. Bar, Columbia (Mar. 20, 1998);
(d)     Impeaching Expert Witnesses and Corporate Representatives Through Cross-Examination: Thorough Preparation Makes Easy Execution, S.C. Bar, Columbia (Oct. 11, 1996);
(e)     Discovery and Its Abuse, 1996 Annual Judicial Conference, Columbia (Aug. 22, 1996);
(f)     Documents/Demonstrative Evidence, S.C. Bar, Spartanburg and Greenville (Jun. 19, 1996);
(g)     Use of Patents in the Back-Up Alarm Case, ATLA Annual Convention, Chicago, Illinois (Jul. 24, 1994);
(h)     Japanese/Korean Manufacturers, Attorneys Information Exchange Group Discovery Seminar, Houston, Texas (Mar. 25-26, 1994);
(i)     Presentation of Evidence in a Groundwater Contamination Case, S.C. Trial Lawyers Association Annual Convention, Hilton Head (Aug. 19, 1993);
(j)     Discovery Involving Japanese Manufacturers, Attorneys Information Exchange Group Seminar, Atlanta, Georgia (May 14-15, 1993);
(k)     Insurance & Other Collateral Sources, S.C. Bar, Columbia (Jul. 14, 1992);
(l)     In addition to these continuing legal education seminars, I have been invited on several occasions to give legal education presentations to classes at the U.S.C. School of Law, classes in the paralegal program at Greenville Technical College, local professional organizations, and local schools.
Mr. Few reported that he has published the following:
(a)     "Products Liability" chapter of Litigation, to be published by S.C. Bar (1999);
(b)     "Citizens Participation in the Legal System," South Carolina Lawyer, July 1997;
(c)     Contributing Author, "Fraud" & "Libel and Slander" chapters, S.C. Jurisprudence;
(d)     Co-Author, "Recognizing, Developing and Presenting the Crashworthiness Case," South Carolina Trial Lawyer Bulletin, Spring 1993.
(4)     Character:
The Commission's investigation of Mr. Few did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against him. The Commission's investigation of Mr. Few did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Mr. Few has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Mr. Few was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5)     Reputation:
Mr. Few reported that his Martindale-Hubbell rating is "AV."
(6)     Physical Health:
Mr. Few appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7)     Mental Stability:
Mr. Few appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8)     Experience:
Mr. Few was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1988. He described his legal experience as follows:
"For the first year after law school and taking the Bar exam, August 1988-August 1989, I was a law clerk to the Honorable G. Ross Anderson, Jr., United States District Judge, in Anderson, South Carolina. Since that time, I have been engaged in the private practice of complex civil litigation, with primary emphasis on Products Liability, Environmental Contamination, and Business Litigation. From August 1989 until December 31, 1997, I was an owner and employee of Few & Few, P.A. in Greenville. Since then I have been the sole owner of John C. Few, P.A."
Mr. Few provided the following description of his experience in criminal and civil matters:

"I have no experience in criminal matters as a practicing lawyer. As law clerk to Judge Anderson, I watched him preside over criminal trials and did considerable research on matters of criminal procedure and substantive criminal law. I also wrote jury charges for criminal trials. During my practice, my sole involvement with criminal law has been in reading the opinions of our State appellate courts. Since most evidentiary rulings that apply to civil cases come out of criminal cases, I have tried to pay attention to the development of the law on the criminal side.
I have already begun to compensate for this lack of experience. I have recently read and studied a hornbook of criminal procedure. I have studied more carefully than before the opinions of our appellate courts in criminal cases. I have visited with the Solicitor of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit to discuss his views on the administration of the criminal courts. I have been to court several times to observe different judges in the taking of guilty pleas. I plan to study carefully between now and the time I would take office the law of criminal procedure, the substantive criminal law of this State, and the practicalities of a criminal trial, as opposed to a civil trial. I have no doubt that I will be completely prepared to preside over criminal proceedings and trials by the time I take office if I am elected.
In civil matters, almost everything I have done in my law practice since its beginning has been either in preparation for or participation in a hearing or a trial. I have been heavily involved in all areas of civil practice, from screening cases and early case investigation, through discovery, trial, and appeal. I believe my understanding of civil litigation is very strong. In the last five years, and throughout my practice, I have handled primarily complex civil cases, including products liability, environmental contamination, business, and other litigation, including several class actions. I have also handled a limited number of small cases, from small car wrecks and personal injury cases to contract and property disputes involving a small amount of money. While I have been primarily a plaintiff's lawyer, I have developed what I think is a strong ability to see cases objectively."
Mr. Few reported the frequency of his court appearances during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Federal:     One to two court appearances per month
(b)     State:         One to two court appearances per month
Mr. Few reported that the percentage of his practice involving civil, criminal, and domestic matters during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Civil:         100%
Mr. Few reported the percentage of his practice in trial court during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Jury:         95%
(b)     Non-jury:     5%
Mr. Few provided that he most often served as chief counsel, or co-counsel with his father and former law partner, J. Kendall Few.
The following is Mr. Few's account of his five most significant litigated matters:
"(a)     Duke Sandwich Company Salmonella Litigation, C/A 97-CP-23-2387; C/A 97-CP-23-3860; C/A 97-CP-23-3861; C/A 98-CP-23-322; C/A 98-CP-23-323; C/A 98-CP-23-3506; and C/A 99-CP-23-1870; This group of cases is significant because it involved hundred of claimants, and many complex issues. I represented the plaintiffs in the seven cases listed above, several of whom had some of the larger cases. In each case, the ingestion of mayonnaise in food served at Duke Sandwich Company caused the plaintiff to become seriously ill with salmonella poisoning. Many of the claims were brought as part of a class action. All of my clients opted out of the class and proceeded with their claims individually. In the Case Management Order, the Honorable Henry F. Floyd appointed me to be lead counsel for all opt-out plaintiffs. As such, I had primary responsibility for coordinating the preparation of the case. In cooperation with other counsel for plaintiffs, I was able to steer the cases to an early settlement and save the courts from months of trials;
(b)     Karr v. McGraw-Edison, Co. & American Laundry Machinery Co., C/A 7:97-3512-13; This case is typical of the product liability cases I have handled. The plaintiff, my client in the case, had his hand burned and had his shoulder severely injured when the hot head of a press came down on his hand while he was pressing shirts at the laundry he owned. I was able to compile evidence on over 100 similar claims from all over the country involving presses made by the same manufacturer;
(c)     Owens v. Marshall & Williams, C/A 91-CP-23-4851; Another typical products liability case, but one of those which was tried to a jury and resulted in a verdict for my client in the amount of $168,000, if my memory is correct. I tried the case along with my father;
(d)     Roshto and Willis v. Petroleum World, Inc., C/A 94-CP-30-447; An environmental contamination case in which I was hired by the owners of the former Clinton Holiday Inn, now a Ramada Inn. In the late 1970's, gasoline leaked from a pumping system at a service station across Highway 56, and migrated over the years in significant concentrations to the Holiday Inn property, causing the owners difficulty in getting financing on the hotel and in selling it. The case involved complex issues of groundwater hydrogeology, contaminant remediation, real estate valuation, and bank lending practices. I was able to settle the case in an amount satisfactory to my client;
(e)     Beasley v. Southland Life, C/A 92-UP-171 (Unpublished Opinion, S.C. Ct. App. The Circuit Court docket number could not be located); This case is significant because it was the first case I ever tried as lead counsel. I lost. I also lost the appeal."
The following is Mr. Few's account of five civil appeals he has personally handled:
"(a)     William H. Ehlies, P.A. v. William L. Shirley, Wilton Miller, and Bryant, Miller & Olive, P.A., C/A 96-CP-23-585A (Not yet argued);
(b)     Kelly v. Para-Chem Southern, Inc., 311 S.C. 223, 428 S.E.2d 703 (1993);
(c)     Ravan v. Greenville County, 315 S.C. 447, 434 S.E.2d 296 (Ct. App. 1993);
(d)     Shockley v. Hoeschst Celanese, 92-1521(L) & 92-1543 (4th Cir.) (I had primary responsibility for the writing of the briefs in this case, but did not conduct the oral argument);
(e)     Beasley v. Southland Life, 92-UP-171 (S.C. Ct. App)."
(9)     Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Mr. Few's temperament would be excellent.
(10)     Miscellaneous:
The Upstate Citizens Advisory Committee reported: "Mr. Few was found to be qualified pursuant to the evaluative criteria."
Mr. Few is married to Jane Ellen Scott Few. He has three children: Mary Reed Few, age 9; Anna Gillespie Few, age 7; and Cannon Mims Few, age 2.
Mr. Few reported that he was a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
(a)     S.C. Bar Association;
(b)     American Bar Association;
(c)     S.C. Trial Lawyers Association;
(d)     Greenville County Bar Association;
(e)     Association of Trial Lawyers of America;
(f)     Attorney's Information Exchange Group.
Mr. Few provided that he was a member of the following civic, charitable, education, social, or fraternal organizations:
(a)     Buncombe Street U.M. Church;
(b)     Greenville Technical College Paralegal Advisory Board;
(c)     Greenville Chamber of Commerce;
(d)     Gower Estates Community Pool;
(e)     Friends of the Reedy River;
(f)     American Canoe Association;
(g)     Foothills Paddling Club;
(h)     Duke University Alumni Association;
(i)     U.S.C. Alumni Association.
Mr. Few also provided the following statements:
"My wife and I have made numerous charitable contributions over the years to many different organizations, and some of these organizations give 'memberships' for those contributions. This would include organizations such as the American Cancer Society, Muscular Dystrophy Foundation, The Nature Conservancy, The Audubon Society, the South Carolina ETV Endowment, and others. I have not listed all of these contributions.
I was the recipient of the 1996 American Bar Association's Edward R. Finch Law Day Speech Award, First Place, given annually for the best Law Day speech given in the country that year. I gave the speech at a "Town Meeting" sponsored by the Greenville County Bar Association in downtown Greenville. After winning the award, I was invited to the American Bar Association's mid-winter convention in San Antonio, Texas, to accept the award at the Joint Luncheon of the National Conference of Bar Presidents and National Association of Bar Executives. I was invited to present the speech to the Greenville County Bar Association at its Law Day Luncheon in May 1997. The speech was reprinted in South Carolina Lawyer Magazine in July 1997.
In law school, in addition to being on the editorial board of the South Carolina Law Review, I was inducted into the Order of the Coif and Order of Wig and Robe, academic honor societies. Since law school, I have tried to remain active in private community service. Some of my service activities include:
(a)     Greenville Technical College, Paralegal Advisory Board;
(b)     Volunteer Teacher, Junior Achievement of Greenville, Inc.;
(c)     Greenville Safe Kids Coalition Member;
(d)     Weekly Guest Reader, Head Start Program;
(e)     Volunteer Tutor, Save Our Sons (past)."

Commission's Findings:     QUALIFIED
(1)     Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Judge Geathers meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as an Administrative Law judge.
Judge Geathers was born on April 10, 1961. He is 38 years old and a resident of Columbia, South Carolina. Judge Geathers provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1986.
(2)     Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Judge Geathers.
Judge Geathers demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Judge Geathers reported that he has not made any campaign expenditures.
Judge Geathers testified he has not:
(a)     sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)     sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)     asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Judge Geathers testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
(3)     Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Judge Geathers to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Judge Geathers reported that during the past five years he has satisfied all of the CLE requirements and has also attended a seminar at the National Judicial College.
Judge Geathers reported that he lectured on Appellate Practice before the Administrative Law Judge Division at a S.C. Bar Association program: "Appellate Practice in South Carolina." He also presented in-house lectures at orientation seminars for new judges in the Administrative Law Judge Division.
Judge Geathers reported that he has not published any books and/or articles.
(4)     Character:
The Commission's investigation of Judge Geathers did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against him. The Commission's investigation of Judge Geathers did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Judge Geathers has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Judge Geathers was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5)     Reputation:
Judge Geathers reported that he is not rated by Martindale-Hubbell.
(6)     Physical Health:
Judge Geathers appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7)     Mental Stability:
Judge Geathers appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8)     Experience:
Judge Geathers was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1986. He described his legal experience as follows:
"I was employed for approximately eight months as the OSHA attorney for the South Carolina Department of Labor upon graduation from law school in 1986. I resigned from the Department of Labor to accept employment with the Office of Senate Research of the South Carolina Senate, where I became Senior Staff Counsel. Upon being elected to Administrative Law Judge Seat #4, I subsequently resigned employment with the Senate."
The following is Judge Geathers' account of his five most significant orders or opinions:
"(a)     Myrtle Beach Hospital, Inc. v. Horry County Assessor, 97-ALJ-17-0449-CC (addressed novel issue in S.C. of valuation of investor-owned hospital for tax purposes);
(b)     S.C. Dept. of Labor v. James E. MacDonald, 98-ALJ-11-0360-IJ (contempt order);
(c)     Gardener v. State Board of Dentistry, 98-ALJ-0316-AP. Greenville Metro Treatment Center v. S.C. Dept. of Health and Environmental Control, 97-ALJ-07-0143;
(d)     Charleston Naval Shipyard v. S.C. Dept. of Health and Environmental Control, 96-ALJ- 07-0264 (waiver of federal government's sovereign immunity);
(e)     Julius Murray and George Martin v. S.C. DHEC, Baptist Healthcare System of S.C., Inc. and Richland Memorial Hospital, 97-ALJ-07-0262 (extensive discussion on subject matter jurisdiction and standing)."
Judge Geathers has served as an Administrative Law judge since 1995. He provided, "Pursuant to Section 1-23-600, an Administrative Law judge is authorized to preside over all hearings of contested cases involving the departments of the executive branch of government in which a single hearing officer is permitted to hear and decide. Exempted, however, are cases brought under OSHA, matters arising under Title 56 of the S.C. Code of Laws, and hearings mandated by federal law. The Administrative Law Judge Division also has appellate jurisdiction over decisions from various boards and commissions. Finally, the Administrative Law Judge Division presides over regulation hearings during the promulgation of regulations by a department for which the governing authority is a single director. The Administrative Law Judge Division provides the General Assembly with written findings as to the need and reasonableness of the proposed regulations."
(9)     Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Judge Geathers' temperament has been and would continue to be excellent.
(10)     Miscellaneous:
The Midlands Citizens Advisory Committee reported: "Judge John D. Geathers is a well-qualified judge. The committee wholeheartedly recommends his re-election to Seat 4, Administrative Law Judge Division."
Judge Geathers is married to Doris Williams. He has one child, Lydia Kaden Geathers, age 6.
Judge Geathers reported that he was a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
(a)     S.C. Bar Association (1986 -present);
(b)     N.C. Bar Association (1994- present).
Judge Geathers provided that he was a member of the following civic, charitable, education, social, or fraternal organizations:
(a)     NAACP.
When questioned about his membership in the NAACP, given its involvement with public interest litigation, Judge Geathers affirmed that he would not hear any case involving the NAACP and alerted the Commission to the precedent of Chief Justice Finney and Judge Matthew Perry maintaining life memberships with the NAACP.

Commission's Findings:     QUALIFIED
(1)     Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Mr. Guess meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as a Family Court judge.
Mr. Guess was born on June 14, 1948. He is 51 years old and a resident of Union, South Carolina. Mr. Guess provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1974.
(2)     Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Mr. Guess.
Mr. Guess demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Mr. Guess reported that he has not made any campaign expenditures.
Mr. Guess testified he has not:
(a)     sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)     sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)     asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Mr. Guess testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
(3)     Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Mr. Guess to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Mr. Guess described his continuing legal or judicial education during the past five years as follows:
(a)     S.C. Bar Estate Planning & Probate (1994);
(b)     AAEPA Estate Planning Summit (1994);
(c)     S.C. Bar Civility in the Profession (1994);
(d)     NBI Planning Opportunities with Living Trusts (1994);
(e)     AAEPA Estate Planning Summit (1995);
(f)     S.C. Bar Client Relations LEPR (1995);
(g)     Public Sector Labor Law in S.C. (1995);
(h)     AAEPA Estate Planning Summit (1996);
(i)     S.C. Bar Annual Fall Estate Planning and Probate Update (1996);
(j)     AAEPA Advanced Estate Planning and Office Management (1996);
(k)     AAEPA Estate Planning and Office Management (1997);
(l)     AAEPA Estate Planning (1997);
(m)     AAEPA Estate Planning and Office Management (1998);
(n)     S.C. Bar Working with Older Clients and Others (1998);
(o)     S.C. Association of County Attorneys Annual Meeting (1998);
(p)     National Network Practicum 1, Estate Planning & Office Management (1999);
(q)     National Network Practicum 2, Estate Planning & Office Management (1999);
(r)     NBI Family Limited Partnerships in S.C. (1999);
(s)     S.C. Association of County Attorneys Annual Meeting (1999).
Mr. Guess reported that he has taught Business Law at U.S.C.-Union campus during 1983-84 and 1984-85 school years.
Mr. Guess reported that he has not published any books and/or articles.
(4)     Character:
The Commission's investigation of Mr. Guess did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against him. The Commission's investigation of Mr. Guess did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Mr. Guess has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Mr. Guess was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5)     Reputation:
Mr. Guess reported that his Martindale-Hubbell rating is "BV."
Mr. Guess completed a six-year enlistment with the S.C. National Guard from January 20, 1970 to January 20, 1976. He was with the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 118th Infantry (Mech), Union, S.C. He received an Honorable Discharge.
(6)     Physical Health:
Mr. Guess appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7)     Mental Stability:
Mr. Guess appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8)     Experience:
Mr. Guess was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1974. He described his legal experience as follows:
"March 1975 through November 1977:         Private solo practice of law, Charleston, S.C.; Practice consisted of criminal, real estate, probate and commercial collections. While not associated in a formal partnership, during this period I shared office space with Paul W. Garfinkle, Esquire, and O. Benjamin Peeples, Esquire.
November 1977 through July 1979:     Practiced law in Greenville, S.C., in a partnership with Paul E. Wilburn, III, Esquire; General civil and criminal practice, primarily real estate, wills and estate planning, commercial collections and domestic.
July 1979 through December 1986:     Solo practice of law in Union, S.C.; General civil and criminal practice, including domestic and family court, wills, estate planning and probate, real estate, personal injury, social security disability, workman's compensation and business law. Extensive criminal trial experience as an associate to the Union County Public Defender from 1980-1984. As Associate Public Defender handled numerous juvenile criminal matters.
December 1986 through October 1988:     Practice of law in Union, S.C. in partnership with Ralph Phillips, Jr., Esquire and Pete G. Diamaduros, Esquire; General practice of civil and criminal law, with emphasis for my individual practice on real estate, domestic and family court, wills and probate, with some limited criminal practice.
October 1988 through July 1996:     Solo practice of law in Union, S.C.; General civil practice with criminal practice limited to court appointed cases. Emphasis in practice on real estate, family court and domestic, wills, probate and estate planning, including fiduciary litigation, business and commercial law including litigation; some personal injury, workman's compensation and social security disability. In 1993 I was retained as attorney for the town of Jonesville and as such handle issues of municipal law, prosecute criminal cases in the Recorder's Court, review contracts and handle litigation involving the Town. In August 1994 I was appointed Union County Attorney. A significant portion of my practice is devoted to government law, contracts, and litigation for Union County.
July 1996 to date:     Solo practice of law in Union, S.C., with emphasis on transactional office-type practice, including estate planning, wills, trusts, and probate, issues involving aging and the elderly and commercial and business planning. Litigation primarily limited to fiduciary litigation including wills contests and construction, etc. in both probate court and circuit court, litigation involving real estate and criminal trial practice limited to court appointed defendants. During this period family court work was de-emphasized and limited to my established client base, resulting in a large reduction in family court related cases and court appearances. I continue to serve as Union County Attorney and as attorney for the Town of Jonesville."
Mr. Guess provided the following description of his Family Court experience:
"Divorce and equitable division of property: My principle involvement in the Family Court has been in the area of divorce and related issues. Fully 75% of the divorce cases have been either default-type cases where there were no property or other ancillary issues or where the ancillary issues had been settled by negotiation and agreement. Where negotiation and agreement were undertaken, my cases would typically include a property settlement of some type, child custody, child support and visitation, all of which had to be negotiated and then approved by the trial court.
Of the cases which had to be litigated, I have handled numerous divorces where the grounds for divorce were at issue. In contested cases which were tried, I have proved adultery, drunkenness, and physical cruelty on numerous occasions, using both the testimony of the parties, corroborating witnesses and private detectives. I am thoroughly familiar with the elements of these various grounds for divorce and in representing my clients I advise them on the facts necessary to prove the various grounds, identify the appropriate witnesses and present their testimony to the court.
The cases which I have taken to trial have covered issues of equitable division of property including marital residences, rental and other real estate, retirement accounts and benefits, life insurance policies and cash values, household goods, tools, furniture, automobiles, and other personal property, and business interests. Particular issues in marital distribution have included the transmutation of property brought into a marriage by one spouse from a status of separate property to a status of marital property, the percentage of ownership of each party and the facts necessary to establish or defend such percentages. I have also litigated cases where alimony was an issue and have advised my clients and presented evidence to support awards of alimony and to successfully defend against claims for alimony. I have litigated cases where the primary issue was the division of retirement accounts and have successfully proved facts which supported division of retirement accounts and prepared Qualified Domestic Relations Orders, for filing with the trustees of the various retirement accounts as necessary.
Child custody: Child custody is an element of the majority of divorce cases; but one which is typically settled without litigation. Where necessary, I have litigated a number of child custody cases and was successful in obtaining custody for the father of an adopted child as against the mother when the mother was involved in a homosexual relationship with another woman. Proof of elements supporting custody other than that of the sexual orientation of the mother were presented to the court, became a part of the ruling and withstood an attack when the ruling was appealed in grounds that the court relied solely or unduly on the sexual orientation of the mother. I successfully obtained custody of eight year old twins, a boy and a girl, for the father through the use of expert testimony that supported father's contention that the best interests of the children would be served by awarding custody to him. In litigation for change of custody, I succeeded in obtaining custody of an eight year old girl for the father upon proof of misconduct and instability of the mother which included investigation and interview of numerous witnesses by a private detective and interviews in my office. When presented with the list of witnesses and subpoenas, the mother failed to appear for the trial on the merits and custody was changed to the father after an offer of proof to the court. I succeeded in obtaining in a contested case a termination of parental rights of the absent father and the adoption of the mother's children by the stepfather. This case required extensive testimony as to the father's failure to support the children and the father's failure to exercise visitation with the children. I have handled a contested adoption case where a transsexual (male to female) sought adoption of the illegitimate child of a prostitute. The defendant/mother initially consented, then withdrew consent and contested the adoption. Court gave custody of the child, on its own motion, to the Department of Social Services. I have handled a number of uncontested adoptions where the child was placed with the adoptive parents by agencies or where grandparents were adopting the illegitimate child of their own child. I have also handled adult adoptions, undertaken by the consent of the parties to ensure inheritance rights.
Abuse and Neglect: The vast majority of my experience in abuse and neglect cases has come as either appointed counsel or appointed guardian ad litem for indigent parties. In the course of these cases I have been involved in the investigation process, interviewing Department of Social Services case workers and psychologists, interviewing other witnesses and advocating the positions of accused parents or stepparents and advocating the position and protecting the interests of the abused or neglected children. In one case, lasting in excess of one year, as guardian ad litem for the defendant mother (alleged to be mentally ill) with appointed counsel, succeeded in having three children returned to the mother after numerous attempts by Department of Social Services to terminate mother's parental rights. I represented the stepfather in a sexual abuse case and succeeded in having the case sealed upon its conclusion. The case was later unsealed upon application of a newspaper when the issue of the alleged abuse became a matter of widespread public interest.
Juvenile Justice: In the period from 1980 to 1983 I had extensive experience in juvenile justice as an associate to the Public Defender in Union County. I handled cases which were settled with the prosecutor, after an investigation and favorable recommendation and also handled cases that were tried in front of the judge with witnesses when the juvenile denied delinquency. Since 1983, the vast majority of my experience with juvenile justice has been as an appointed attorney for indigent defendants. However, in the course of these appointments, I have represented defendants charged with all types of criminal offenses and status offenses, have investigated the cases, interviewed witnesses and Department of Juvenile Justice case workers and the Solicitors, negotiated agreements and tried cases where the proof was inadequate or where the juvenile refused to admit delinquency. I have occasionally, but infrequently, been retained to represent juveniles. It has been until recently the practice in Union County for the family court to appoint attorneys for all juvenile defendants, on the theory that all juveniles are indigent. Because of this there has been little or no motivation for the parents of juvenile defendants to retain attorneys to represent their children."
Mr. Guess reported the frequency of his court appearances during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Federal:     none
(b)     State:         30 per year
Mr. Guess reported that the percentage of his practice involving civil, criminal, and domestic matters during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Civil:         20%
(b)     Criminal:     1%
(c)     Domestic:     10% (1995) and 20% (1996)
Mr. Guess reported the percentage of his practice in trial court during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Jury:         25%
(b)     Non-jury:     75%
Mr. Guess provided that he most often served as sole counsel.
The following is Mr. Guess' account of his most significant litigated matters:
"(a)     State v. Plemmons I. 286 S.C. 78. Death penalty case created issues which resulted in death sentence being vacated by U.S. Supreme Court. 476 US 102. Appeals handled by S.C. Office of Appellate Defense;
(b)     State v. Plemmons II. 296 S.C. 76. Re-trial of death penalty case created issues which resulted in reversal of death sentence by the S.C. Supreme Court. Appeal handled by S.C. Office of Appellate Defense. As associate counsel in State v. Plemmons III. Defendant sentenced to life in prison;
(c)     McDaniel v. Gregory. 303 S.C. 500, 401 S.E.2d 864 (1990). Lawsuit which interpreted the effective date provisions of the S.C. Probate Code has been criticized as being result oriented. See 44 S.C. Law Review 287 at page 335. Associate counsel handled appeal affirming trial court;
(d)     Hughes v. Hughes. Unpublished opinion. 92-UP-161. (S.C. Court of Appeals). Represented father in child custody case against homosexual wife/mother. Custody to father not based solely on sexual orientation. Appeal handled by other counsel;
(e)     Triangle v. Woodbridge. Not reported. Represented retailer against manufacturer of defective carpet cushion. Case included over 400 defective installations. Litigation resulted in favorable settlement with damages to both retailer and to customers."
(9)     Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Mr. Guess' temperament would be excellent.
(10)     Miscellaneous:
The Piedmont Citizens Advisory Committee reported: "We found Mr. Guess was qualified. He was most cordial to the Committee. The comments were positive in nature. He paused before he answered questions. One of his references suggested that he often weighs thoughts before he answers. The committee found him professional, cool, collected and, at times, distant. One of the members who checked his references was impressed with Mr. Guess and wanted to rate him imminently qualified but several members were equally adamant that he only be given a qualified by this Committee."
Mr. Guess is married to Vanda Lee McLeod. He has two children: Carolyn Hunter Guess, age 14; and Julia McLeod Guess, age 12.
Mr. Guess reported that he was a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
(a)     S.C. Bar Association;
(b)     Union County Bar Association;
(c)     American Bar Association.
Mr. Guess provided that he was a member of the following civic, charitable, education, social, or fraternal organizations:
(a)     Union Rotary Club for 17 years. Director, Vice President, President elect; President for the year 1997-1998; Paul Harris Fellow;
(b)     Board of Directors of the Union County YMCA from 1986 through 1996. Performed legal work to incorporate the YMCA; Vice President for a number of years, and President for the year 1996. During his years of service on YMCA board, the YMCA grew from a start-up organization meeting in a store front and using borrowed facilities to a full-fledged organization with 1,000 dues-paying members, a full-time professionally trained director and a modern facility consisting of gymnasium, outdoor swimming pool, shower and locker rooms and fully equipped weight room and fitness center; Co-Chairman of the 1998 "YMCA Partners with Youth" fundraising campaign.
Mr. Guess additionally provided, "I am 51 years old, have practiced law for 25 years and possess the health and maturity to serve effectively as a Family Court judge. I have been extensively involved in the affairs of the community and believe I possess the respect and credibility required of the Family Court as an institution."

Commission's Findings:     QUALIFIED
(1)     Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Judge Harwell meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as a Circuit Court judge.
Judge Harwell was born on February 27, 1933. He is 66 years old and a resident of Florence, South Carolina. Judge Harwell provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1961.
(2)     Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Judge Harwell.
Judge Harwell demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Judge Harwell reported that he has not made any campaign expenditures.
Judge Harwell testified he has not:
(a)     sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)     sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)     asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Judge Harwell testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
(3)     Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Judge Harwell to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Judge Harwell stated that every year for the past five years, he has more than exceeded the required continuing legal and judicial education hours.
Judge Harwell reported that he has not taught or lectured at any bar association conferences, educational institutions, or continuing legal or judicial education programs.
However, Judge Harwell stated that at the 1997 Judicial Conference, Judge Henry Floyd referenced a case Judge Harwell decided, Creech v. South Carolina Wildlife and Marine Resources Department, 328 S.C. 24, 491 S.E.2d 571 (1997). Judge Henry Floyd recommended to the judiciary use of the charge and verdict form in that case as a model in comparative negligence cases where there are multiple defendants.
Judge Harwell reported that he has not published any books and/or articles.
(4)     Character:
The Commission's investigation of Judge Harwell did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against him. The Commission's investigation of Judge Harwell did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Judge Harwell has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Judge Harwell was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5)     Reputation:
Judge Harwell reported that his last available Martindale-Hubbell rating was "BV."
From 1954 to 1956, Judge Harwell served in the U.S. Army, P.F.C., US 5322234. He received an Honorable Discharge.
Judge Harwell was elected to the S.C. House of Representatives from 1979 to 1980 and again elected to the S.C. House of Representatives from 1989 to 1994. He was appointed to U.S. Congressional Ad-Hoc Committee for Expansion of Florence National Cemetery. He was also appointed Chairman by U.S. Congressman John Napier. He was appointed by Florence County Council to Florence City County Complex Jail Commission. He was elected Chairman by Commission Members from the City and County. He was appointed by Governor West as charter member to the State Commission on Aging and served two terms. He was elected by members of the House of Representatives in 1992 and 1994 to serve as one of five Representatives on the State Reorganization Commission. He was the Chairman of the Florence County Delegation.
(6)     Physical Health:
Judge Harwell appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7)     Mental Stability:
Judge Harwell appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8)     Experience:
Judge Harwell was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1961. He described his legal experience as follows:
"Harwell & Harwell (later became Harwell, Ballenger & DeBerry Law Firm) April 1961 to June 1995; Senior Law Partner of six-member law firm. General Practice."
Judge Harwell reported that his most significant orders are as follows:
"(a)     Creech v. South Carolina Wildlife and Marine Resources Department, 491 S.E.2d 571, 328 S.C. 24 (1997);
(b)     State v. Jerry Pruitt, Opinion No. 98-UP-248 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998);
(c)     Dale Muir v. C.R. Bard, Inc., Opinion No. 3012 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999);
(d)     The State-Record Co., Inc. v. Richland County School District No. 2, Trial Court Case No. 94-CP-40-1911 (Richland County, March 1997) (Appeal Dismissed September 22, 1997);
(e)     John Cox, et al. v. Pauline Frierson, et al., Opinion No. 99-UP-129 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999)."
(9)     Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Judge Harwell's temperament has been and would continue to be excellent.
(10)     Miscellaneous:
The Pee Dee Citizens Advisory Committee reported: "The Committee is of the opinion that Judge Harwell is qualified for the position of Circuit Court judge. As a result of its investigation of and interview with Judge Harwell, the Committee recommends/approves this candidate for re-election as a Circuit Court judge."
Judge Harwell is married to Nancy Crum Cockfield Harwell. He has three children: Jennie Harwell-Lee, 39, Promotional Advertising Salesperson; Rankin Harwell-Hammond, 35, Social Services Coordinator, Pines Nursing and Convalescent Home; and Ashley Harwell-Beach, 30, Assistant Research Director, House Judiciary Committee.
Judge Harwell reported that he was a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
(a)     Florence County Bar;
(b)     S.C. Bar;
(c)     American Bar Association.
Judge Harwell provided that he was a member of the following civic, charitable, education, social, or fraternal organizations:
(a)     First Presbyterian Church, Florence, S.C.;
(b)     Life Member of the Veterans of Foreign Wars;
(c)     American Legion;
(d)     Masons;
(e)     Omar Shrine.
Judge Harwell additionally provided "I feel that my previous experience as a member of the judiciary where I have handled both civil and criminal litigation has been invaluable in further preparing me to continue judicial service. I look forward to the opportunity to continue to serve in this capacity."

Commission's Findings:     QUALIFIED
(1)     Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Judge Huff meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as a judge of the Court of Appeals.
Judge Huff was born on June 5, 1949. He is 50 years old and a resident of North Augusta, South Carolina. Judge Huff provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1976.
(2)     Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Judge Huff.
Judge Huff demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Judge Huff reported that he has not made any campaign expenditures.
Judge Huff testified he has not:
(a)     sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)     sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)     asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Judge Huff testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
(3)     Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Judge Huff to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Judge Huff described his continuing legal or judicial education during the past five years as follows: "I have attended numerous CLE and JCLE programs offered by the South Carolina Bar, South Carolina Trial Lawyers Association and Defense Lawyers. I delivered a review of judicial opinions in the area of workers' compensation at the 1997 South Carolina Bar Convention in Charleston, South Carolina. I accumulated 44.50 JCLE/CLE hours in 1998 and carried forward 19.75 JCLE/CLE hours from 1997."
Judge Huff reported that he delivered an overview of recent judicial opinions in the area of workers' compensation at the 1997 S.C. Bar Association Winter Meeting in Charleston, S.C.
Judge Huff reported that he has not published any books and/or articles.
(4)     Character:
The Commission's investigation of Judge Huff did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against him. The Commission's investigation of Judge Huff did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Judge Huff has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Judge Huff was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5)     Reputation:
Judge Huff reported that his last available Martindale-Hubbell rating was "BV."
Judge Huff reported that he was elected to the S.C. House of Representatives in 1978 and served until 1996, when he was elected to the S.C. Court of Appeals. While serving in the S.C. House of Representatives, he chaired the Rules Committee and the General Laws Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee.
(6)     Physical Health:
Judge Huff appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7)     Mental Stability:
Judge Huff appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8)     Experience:
Judge Huff was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1976. He described his legal experience as follows:
"After graduation from law school I started a practice in North Augusta, South Carolina in 1977. I maintained a general civil practice with primary emphasis in domestic litigation, tort litigation, limited criminal defense and real estate. My practice also included appellate work. I also served as chief legal counsel to Aiken Electric Cooperative for approximately 6 years immediately preceding my election to the South Carolina Court of Appeals. At the time I was elected, my practice would reflect the following distribution: Real estate-21%; Criminal-12%; Probate/Wills/Trusts-14%; Domestic-37%; Civil/Personal Injury-12%; Other-4%."
Judge Huff reported that the percentage of his practice involving civil, criminal, and domestic matters during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Civil:             12%
(b)     Criminal:         12%
(c)     Domestic:         37%
(d)     Real Estate:         21%
(e)     Probate/Wills/Trusts:     14%
(f)     Other:             4%
The following is Judge Huff's account of his most significant orders or opinions:
"(a)     Mullinax v. J.M. Brown Amusement Co., Inc., 326 S.C. 453, 485 S.E.2d 103 (Ct. App. 1997), affirmed, 333 S.C. 89, 508 S.E.2d 848 (1998);
(b)     State v. Kerr, 330 S.C. 132, 498 S.E.2d 212 (Ct. App. 1998), cert. denied, (Feb. 5, 1999);
(c)     Hawkins v. Pathology Associates of Greenville, P.A., 330 S.C. 92, 498 S.E.2d 395 (Ct. App. 1998);
(d)     Crosby v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 330 S.C. 489, 489 S.E.2d 253 (Ct. App. 1998), cert. denied, (March 3, 1999);
(e)     O'Cain v. O'Cain, 322 S.C. 551, 473 S.E.2d 460 (Ct. App. 1996)."
(9)     Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Judge Huff's temperament has been and would continue to be excellent.
(10)     Miscellaneous:
The Midlands Citizens Advisory Committee reported: "Judge Huff is a well-qualified judge. The Committee wholeheartedly recommends his re-election to Seat 8, Court of Appeals."
Judge Huff is married to Patricia Dale Huff. He has one child: Tiffany Dale Faugl, housewife and part-time secretary (age 22).
Judge Huff reported that he was a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
(a)     S.C. Bar Association;
(b)     Aiken County Bar Association.

Commission's Findings:     QUALIFIED
(1)     Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Judge Jenkins meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as a Circuit Court judge.
Judge Jenkins was born on August 8, 1947. He is 52 years old and a resident of Travelers Rest, South Carolina. Judge Jenkins provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1976.
(2)     Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Judge Jenkins.
Judge Jenkins demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Judge Jenkins reported that he has made $40 in campaign expenditures for stationery and postage for sending letters announcing his candidacy.
Judge Jenkins testified he has not:
(a)     sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)     sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)     asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Judge Jenkins testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
(3)     Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Judge Jenkins to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Judge Jenkins described his continuing legal or judicial education during the past five years as follows:
(a)     Orientation for new Family Court Judges (1996);
(b)     Annual Judicial Conference (1996-1999);
(c)     Annual Family Court Judges Conference (1996-1999);
(d)     National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, Annual Conference (1998);
(e)     National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, Evidence in Juvenile and Family Court (1998);
(f)     National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, Advanced Family Law (1997).
Judge Jenkins reported that he has taught the following law-related courses:
(a)     Juvenile Law/Pre-Trial Diversion Course through the sponsorship of the Department of Youth Services and the local Solicitor's Office. A ten-week course designed to teach juveniles between ages 13 and 16 responsible civil conduct under the law; giving them exposure through site visits and guest presenters on law enforcement functions (1986-88);
(b)     Presenter for the SBA Committee for Indigent Representation on Judicial Responses to pro se Representation (1998);
(c)     Presenter for the Family Court Judges Conference on Judicial Ethics (1998).
Judge Jenkins reported that he has not published any books and/or articles.
(4)     Character:
The Commission's investigation of Judge Jenkins did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against him. The Commission's investigation of Judge Jenkins did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Judge Jenkins has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Judge Jenkins was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5)     Reputation:
Judge Jenkins reported that he is not rated by Martindale-Hubbell.
Judge Jenkins served in the Air Force from August 1966 to May 1969 and in the active Reserves from June 1969 to August 1972, receiving an Honorable Discharge.
(6)     Physical Health:
Judge Jenkins appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7)     Mental Stability:
Judge Jenkins appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8)     Experience:
Judge Jenkins was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1976. He described his legal experience as follows:
"1976-79: Engaged in the active practice of law as a Staff Attorney/Managing Attorney at Legal Services Agency headquartered in Charleston, South Carolina (NLAP, Inc.).
Provided direct legal assistance to indigent clients in the areas of Family Law (50%), State/Federal Housing Law (20%), State/Federal Public Benefit Laws (15%), and State/Federal Consumer Law involved in Claim & Delivery and Deficiency Suits (10)%). Other areas of service provided included the preparation of wills and deeds; powers of attorney for clients financial affairs. Yearly caseload exceeded 300 cases. In this position, I also coordinated the expansion of offices to Georgetown, Kingstree and Beaufort Counties.
In addition, coordinated the attorneys' weekly office schedule for client intake and served as the office liaison with the local courts. The office yearly caseload exceeded 5,000 cases.
1979-95: Engaged in the active practice of law as Attorney/Administrator titled: Director/General Counsel for Legal Services Agency of Western Carolina, Inc., in Greenville South Carolina. Fifty percent of time was devoted to client practice in association with 13 staff attorneys in the areas of: Family Law Practice (50%), Federal Consumer Law (10%) and other legal services associated with the practice of Poverty Law.
I was responsible for the legal services provided through offices located in Greenville, Anderson, and Greenwood, serving those areas and the adjoining counties of Edgefield, McCormick, Abbeville, Oconee, and Pickens. The yearly total caseload exceeded 4,000 cases.
Served as legal counsel for numerous local community organizations whose mission are to improve the lives of people in poverty. Examples include: Greenville's Child, Inc., Save Our Sons, Neighborhoods In Action, The Neighborhood Economic Development Corporation, and Brockwood Senior Housing Corporation.
Served as an attorney member on the Kellogg Bar & Bench Sub-Committee of Judicial Administrative Policy, recommending Family Court Rule changes affecting disposition of cases where the State is involved in establishing permanent placement for Foster Care children (1993-on-going).
I was responsible for the hiring and training of all staff attorneys. I was responsible for public relations with the court system and the community. I served as liaison to the local state and national bar associations.
I was responsible for managing a yearly operating budget of over one million dollars and served as the general counsel for the corporation's financial affairs with state/federal government and other regulating bodies.
I reported to a fifteen-member board of directors appointed by bar associations and community groups."
Judge Jenkins provided the following description of his experience in criminal and civil matters:
"My initial experience in Criminal Law Practice began through the Law School's Corrections Clinic Program where, in my senior year, under special court rule for supervised appearances, I represented inmates in Post Conviction Relief proceedings. This essentially involved challenging their convictions based on legal defects in either the proceeding or the quality of the representation given during the prosecution of the case. This involved conducting extensive interviews with the inmates at the Central Correction Institute location, interviewing other pertinent witnesses, reviewing transcripts of the trial, and drafting pleadings and motions to challenge the convictions at the Circuit Court level.
In the past four years, as a Family Court Judge, I have presided over proceedings involving the full range of Criminal Law and Procedure in Juvenile Court. These have included taking various forms of guilty pleas, conducting Waiver hearings, Detention hearings, Adjudicatory and Dispositional hearings and full- blown trials involving the full range of charges from misdemeanors to more serious felonies by juveniles. In these proceedings the judge acts without a jury to "find facts" and impose an appropriate sentence after receiving a history on the juvenile and his family circumstances. I have had to apply the South Carolina Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rules of Evidence in these proceedings in the same manner as applicable in the Circuit Court. During the past four years I have conducted no less than 500 cases in this area of court practice.
In the Fall of 1998 I received 40 hours of Continuing Legal Education Instructions in a four-day course entitled "Evidence In Juvenile and Family Court Proceedings" at the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges School at the University of Nevada at Reno. I believe my learning curve in Criminal Law Practice will be no greater or less than others who have come to the Circuit Court bench and that I can quickly get current to a greater degree by attending targeted Criminal Law CLEs and by the actual experience of presiding over criminal proceedings with juries. I am a very hard worker at self-improvement in whatever I do. My approach to Circuit Court Judicial Practice will be consistent with my current judicial record in Family Court. I will attend selected Criminal Law CLEs this fall and winter of 1999 before the election date of this campaign in 2000.
My past experience at Circuit Court in civil practice is very broad and varied. In the past eighteen years of my practice prior to becoming a Family Court Judge, I served as a Staff Attorney, Managing Attorney and Director of Legal Services Programs in Charleston and Greenville Counties. The description of my practice experience is outlined hereinbelow and above."
Judge Jenkins reported the frequency of his court appearances prior to serving on the bench as follows:
(a)     Federal:     infrequent appearances by written motions in social security cases
(b)     State:         frequent
Judge Jenkins reported that the percentage of his practice involving civil, criminal, and domestic matters prior to serving on the bench as follows:
(a)     Civil:         65%
(b)     Criminal:     0%
(c)     Domestic:     35%
Judge Jenkins reported the percentage of his practice in trial court prior to serving on the bench as follows:
(a)     Jury:         2%
(b)     Non-jury:     98%
Judge Jenkins provided that he most often served as sole counsel.
The following is Judge Jenkins' account of his most significant litigated matters:
"(a)     Fieldcrest Tenants Association, et al. v. Housing Authority of Greenville, U.S. Dist. Ct., Greenville, 1980. This case involved the prosecution of Due Process rights of public housing tenants against irregular conduct and practices of public housing management in setting improper rent, improper assessments for maintenance repairs and causing wide spread evictions for improper reasons. Prosecuted as a class action, the matter was successfully resolved by court consent in favor of all families living in Greenville Public Housing. It resulted in better management practices which gave proper respect for the leasehold rights of public tenants;
(b)     John Plumley, et al. v. School District of Greenville and State Board of Education, U.S. 4th Cir. (Unpublished 1982, #81-1894). This case was important because right to attorneys fees by staff lawyers were permitted at reasonable levels where prosecution is successful under Section 1983 of the federal civil statute;
(c)     Greenville Housing Auth. v. Jessie Salters, 316 S.E.2d. 718 (S.C. 1984). This case is important because it involved preventing a 64 year old lady who lived in public housing all her life from being made homeless by ejectment action of the housing authority based on circumstances beyond her control;
(d)     Jenkins, et al. v. American Modern Homes, et al., 90-10-5549 (Cir. Ct. - Charleston County). This case involved seeking to enforce proper hazard insurance coverage for Hugo related damages against a claim of exclusion due to alleged flood damages. The issues were successfully resolved in clients favor after extensive discovery and trial preparation, thus preventing a homeless outcome for clients. (1990);
(e)     Hatchcock and Shuly v. Tammy McKensie, 94-CP-23-1336 (Cir. Ct. Greenville) on Supersedeas to S.C. Supreme Court. This case involved the enforcement of client's right to continue possession of premises under the HUD Section 8 Housing Subsidy Program against improper ejectment proceeding brought by landlord. The client's mental condition complicated resolution of the issues (client is covered under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Case resolved favorable to interest of client. (1994)."
The following is Judge Jenkins' account of civil appeals he has personally handled:
"(a)     Creel v. Miles, In re: Dianne Mary Miles, Supreme Court unpublished memorandum #79-179, September 1979. This case involved an unsuccessful attempt to get practical compliance with the ten day hearing rule in cases where a minor has been taken into protective custody through DSS and law enforcement to protect rights of the parent;
(b)     Fieldcrest Tenants Association, et al. v. Housing Authority of Greenville, U.S. Dist. Ct., Greenville, 1980. This case involved the prosecution of Due Process rights of public housing tenants against irregular conduct and practices of public housing management in setting improper rent, improper assessments for maintenance repairs and causing wide spread evictions for improper reasons. Prosecuted as a class action, the matter was successfully resolved by court consent in favor of all families living in Greenville Public Housing. It resulted in better management practices which gave proper respect for the leasehold rights of public tenants;
(c)     John Plumley, et al. v. School District of Greenville and State Board of Education, U.S. 4th Cir. (Unpublished 1982, #81-1894). This case was important because right to attorneys' fees by staff lawyers were permitted at reasonable levels where prosecution is successful under Section 1983 of the federal civil statute;
(d)     Greenville Housing Auth. v. Jessie Salters, 316 S.E.2d. 718 (S.C. 1984). This case is important because it involved preventing a 64 year old lady who lived in public housing all her life from being made homeless by ejectment action of the housing authority based on circumstances beyond her control."
Judge Jenkins currently serves as Family Court Judge for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Seat 5. Since January 1999, he has served as Chief Administrative Judge for Family Court for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit (Greenville and Pickens Counties).
Judge Jenkins has held the following public offices prior to serving as a judge:
(a)     1979-1996 - Director, Legal Services Agency of Western Carolina, Inc., appointed through selection by quasi-public Board of Directors;
(b)     1984-86 - State Advisory Committee on Workers' Compensation Law, appointed by the Governor;
(c)     1990-1996 - Board of Directors, S.C. Protection and Advocacy System for the Handicapped, Inc., appointed by Board of Directors;
(d)     1991-1996 - The Citadel Board of Visitors, by designation for the State Superintendent of Education;
(e)     1993-1996 - Board of Directors, S.C. Families for Kids, appointment by Board of Directors.
(9)     Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Judge Jenkins' temperament has been and would continue to be excellent.
(10)     Miscellaneous:
The Upstate Citizens Advisory Committee reported: "Judge Jenkins was found to be qualified pursuant to the evaluative criteria."
Judge Jenkins is married to Margaret Helen (Rivers) Jenkins. He has two children: Robert Nathaniel Jenkins, Jr., 26, employed at Data Stream, Administration, Greenville, S.C.; and Jason Matthew Jenkins, 18, student at Tuskegee University, Tuskegee, Alabama.
Judge Jenkins reported that he was a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
(a)     S.C. Bar Association, Economics of Law Practice Division;
(b)     S.C. Black Lawyers Association, Treasurer 1976-1980;
(c)     Greenville Bar Association;
(d)     American Bar Association, Economics of Law Practice Group;
(e)     S.C. Legal Services Advisory Group; Chairman 1983-1996;
(f)     National Project Advisory Group for Legal Services; S.C. representative (1983/96).
Judge Jenkins provided that he was a member of the following civic, charitable, education, social, or fraternal organizations:
(a)     Allen Temple A.M.E. Church-Board of Trustees; Assist. Superintendent of Sunday School; Finance Commission;
(b)     Association of Citadel Men;
(c)     Northwest (Travelers Rest) YMCA-Board member (1996 to present).
Judge Jenkins reported the following additional information regarding his candidacy:
(a)     Concurrent Resolution S698 from the State Legislature for Outstanding Service as a Governor Appointee to the State Committee for Improvement of Workers' Compensation Law (1987);
(b)     Certification of Appreciation Award from the State Department of Youth Services for teaching the Pre-Trial Diversion Class for Juveniles (1985);
(c)     Columbia University School of Law - Completed two weeks course in Civil Procedure taught by Judge J. Weinstein (1982);
(d)     Leadership South Carolina (1983 Graduate);
(e)     Leadership Greenville (1982 Graduate);
(f)     Executive Leadership Course, Center for Creative Leadership, Greensboro, N.C. (1989);
(g)     Received Board Member of the Year Award for board and legal services work for Greenville's Child, Inc. (1993);
(h)     Received Outstanding Attorney Award for legal services rendered to the Save Our Sons, Inc. (S.O.S.), 1994. Save Our Sons is a non-profit community-based organization dedicated to reducing the rate of incarceration of African-American male juveniles by working with the Family Court System and judges as an alternative placement for structured mentoring and development;
(i)     Coordinated the establishment of the Libra Society, a local volunteer organization for lawyers to give pro-bono service to indigent clients through Legal Services of Western Carolina, Inc. and the State Bar Pro-Bono Program. This has resulted in more than 115 lawyers from Greenville and Pickens counties serving on referral panels to serve the Family and Probate Courts in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit;
(j)     Judicial member appointed by the Chief Justice to serve on the Commission of Judicial Conduct (1996-present);
(k)     Member - Family Court Judges Advisory Committee (1996-present).

Commission's Findings:     QUALIFIED
(1)     Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Judge Johnson meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as a Circuit Court judge.
Judge Johnson was born on August 16, 1951. He is 48 years old and a resident of Clinton, South Carolina. Judge Johnson provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1976.
(2)     Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Judge Johnson.
Judge Johnson demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Judge Johnson reported that he has not made any campaign expenditures.
Judge Johnson testified he has not:
(a)     sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)     sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)     asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Judge Johnson testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
(3)     Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Judge Johnson to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Judge Johnson provided that he has complied with the continuing legal and judicial education requirements for a judge in this State during the past five years. He has accumulated the maximum number of carry-forward hours annually. He reported that he attends seminars sponsored by the S.C. Bar Association and the Judicial Department.
Judge Johnson reported that he has taught the following law-related courses:
(a)     Speaker, New Judges School (1996 - Ethics);
(b)     Speaker, New Judges School (1999 - Common Pleas);
(c)     Bridge the Gap (March and May 1999 - Essential tips for Practice in Circuit Court);
(d)     Speaker, Solicitors' Annual Meeting (Recent Court Decisions).
Judge Johnson reported that he has published a number of Attorney General opinions as an Assistant Attorney General on a variety of topics.
(4)     Character:
The Commission's investigation of Judge Johnson did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against him. The Commission's investigation of Judge Johnson did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Judge Johnson has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Judge Johnson was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5)     Reputation:
Judge Johnson reported that his last available Martindale-Hubbell rating was "BV."
(6)     Physical Health:
Judge Johnson appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7)     Mental Stability:
Judge Johnson appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8)     Experience:
Judge Johnson was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1976. He described his legal experience as follows:
"August 1976-November 1981: Assistant Attorney General, State of S.C.; consumer fraud, representation of various state agencies; civil litigation, including tort claims and highway condemnation throughout the state.
November 1981-February 1983: Sole practice, Clinton, S.C.; general practice, both civil and criminal, in all state courts.
February 1983-December 1988: Partner in firm of Blalock & Johnson, Clinton, S.C.; general practice in all state and federal courts.
December 1988-March 1992: Sole practice, Clinton, S.C.; general practice
March 1992-present: Circuit Court Judge, Eighth Judicial Circuit."
Judge Johnson reported that his most significant orders or opinions are:
"(a)     State v. Patrick, 457 S.E.2d 632, 318 S.C. 352 (1995);
(b)     Taylor v. Medenica, 479 S.E.2d 35, 324 S.C. 200 (1996) Acting Associate Justice;
(c)     State v. Barton, 481 S.E.2d 439, 325 S.C. 522 (1997);
(d)     Shelton v. Oscar Mayer, 481 S.E.2d 706, 325 S.C. 248 (1997);
(e)     State v. Robinson, 99-UP-285, Court of Appeals filed 5-3-99. The court later decided to publish the opinion."
(9)     Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Judge Johnson's temperament has been and would continue to be excellent.
(10)     Miscellaneous:
The Piedmont Citizens Advisory Committee reported: "We found Judge Johnson extremely qualified. He was most cordial to the Committee. The comments received were positive in nature."
Judge Johnson is married to Jean Katherine Mangum Johnson. He has four children: Ryan William Johnson (age 22); Austin Michael Johnson (age 19); Katherine Marie Johnson (age 17); and Elizabeth Leigh Johnson (age 15).
Judge Johnson reported that he is a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
(a)     S.C. Bar Association (1976 - present);
(b)     Commission on Judicial Conduct (1994 - present);
(c)     Circuit Judges Advisory Committee (1995 - present);
(d)     Laurens County Bar Association (President, January - May 1991; Vice-President, 1990).
Judge Johnson additionally provided that he is an Elder at First Presbyterian Church.

Commission's Findings:     QUALIFIED
(1)     Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Judge Keesley meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as a Circuit Court judge.
Judge Keesley was born on May 10, 1953. He is 46 years old and a resident of Edgefield, South Carolina. Judge Keesley provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1978.
(2)     Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Judge Keesley.
Judge Keesley demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Judge Keesley reported that he has not made any campaign expenditures.
Judge Keesley testified he has not:
(a)     sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)     sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)     asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Judge Keesley testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
(3)     Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Judge Keesley to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Judge Keesley described his continuing legal or judicial education during the past five years as follows:
(a)     Judicial training at Spring Conference of the S.C. Association of Circuit Judges each year;
(b)     Judicial training at annual meeting of the judiciary in August of each year;
(c)     Criminal law seminar at S.C. Bar meeting each January;
(d)     Seminars at ABA convention in Chicago;
(e)     Drug court training at numerous sites.
Judge Keesley reported that he has taught the following law-related courses:
(a)     He spoke about drug courts at the following:

two meetings of the S.C. Solicitors' Association;

two meetings of the S.C. Association of Circuit Judges;

the Medical College of S.C., Charleston, seminar on addiction;

Greenville Technical College;

a meeting of the Pre-Trial Intervention group;

training sessions of Leadership Columbia;

S.C. Drug and Other Abuse Services (DAODAS) training;

S.C. Association of Drug Court Professionals annual meeting;

National Association of Drug Court Professionals;
(b)     He spoke about sentencing guidelines at training sessions of the S.C. Department of Corrections;
(c)     He presented a seminar session on the S.C. Rules of Evidence at the U.S.C. School of Law.
Judge Keesley reported that he has published an article on Drug Courts published in the July/August 1998 issue of South Carolina Lawyer.
(4)     Character:
The Commission's investigation of Judge Keesley did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against him. The Commission's investigation of Judge Keesley did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Judge Keesley has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Judge Keesley was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.

(5)     Reputation:
Judge Keesley reported that he is not rated by Martindale-Hubbell.
Judge Keesley was a member of the House of Representatives, District 82, from November 1988 - August 12, 1991.
(6)     Physical Health:
Judge Keesley appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7)     Mental Stability:
Judge Keesley appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8)     Experience:
Judge Keesley was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1978. He described his legal experience as follows:
"1978-1980         Associate, John F. Byrd, Jr., Esq., Edgefield, S.C., General practice primarily involving real estate.
1980-1983         Associate, J. Roy Berry, Esq., Johnston, S.C., General practice primarily domestic relations.
1983-1991         Sole practitioner, Johnston, S.C., General practice.
From 1983-1987, part-time Public Defender for four counties.
From 1983-1989, part-time Town Attorney for Johnston, S.C.
From 1988-1989, part-time Assistant Solicitor, 11th Judicial Circuit."
Judge Keesley has held the judicial office of resident judge of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit since August 13, 1991. The position is elected by the General Assembly.
The following is Judge Keesley's account of his most significant orders:
"(a)     S.C. Tax Comm. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., et al. Case No. 92 CP-32-0503: 316 S.C. 163, 447 S.E.2d 843 (1994). This case held that documents were available for release under the Freedom of Information Act requests and dealt with the impact of the defendant's actions on the disclosure;
(b)     Orangeburg Sausage Co. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., et al. Case No. 90-CP-38-480; 316 S.C. 331, 450 S.E.2d 66 (Ct. App.1994) A multi-million dollar verdict on a bad faith refusal to pay insurance benefits for damages arising from Hurricane Hugo. Case was appealed to U.S. Supreme Court, which denied cert.;
(c)     Calcaterra v. City of Columbia. 90-CP-32-3000; 315 S.C. 196, 432 S.E.2d 498 (1993) Challenge by property owners to the right of the City of Columbia to charge higher water rates outside the city limits. Affirmed on appeal;
(d)     Parrish v. Koontz. Case No. 92-CP-23-209 & 210 Appealed to the S.C. Supreme Court as Ex Parte: The S.C. Farm Bureau 13 S.E.2d 252 (1993) Novel issue in S.C. concerning whether a statute was a notice statute or a statute of limitations;
(e)     State v. Michael Rian Torrence. Case No. 87-GS-32-1429; 322 S.C. 475, 473 S.E.2d 703 (1996). Death penalty case involving whether the defendant was competent to waive his rights on automatic appeal and be put to death. The order is about 30 pages long. In summary, it involved novel issues in this state and required the court to develop a procedural mechanism to reach the conclusions necessary. The order is a detailed analysis of the testimony about the defendant's mental state and his decision to accept the death penalty."
Judge Keesley reported that he has not been employed as a judge other than his elected judicial office.
(9)     Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Judge Keesley's temperament has been and would continue to be excellent.
(10)     Miscellaneous:
The Midlands Citizens Advisory Committee reported: "Judge Keesley is a well-qualified judge. The Committee wholeheartedly recommends his re-election to Seat 1, Circuit Court for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit."
Judge Keesley is married to Linda Faye Black Keesley. He has one child, Kyliene Lee Keesley, who is a college student.
Judge Keesley reported that he was a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
(a)     S.C. Bar Association (1978 - present);
(b)     Edgefield County Bar Association - President, 1985. Treasurer for many years;
(c)     Tri-County (Edgefield, Saluda, McCormick) Bar Association;
(d)     S.C. Association of Circuit Judges, Secretary, 1992-present;
(e)     S.C. Association of Drug Court Professionals, President, 1997-present;
(f)     National Association of Drug Court Professionals.
Judge Keesley provided that he was a Mason, Concordia Lodge #50, in Edgefield, S.C., and that he holds no office.
Judge Keesley provided that he has had eight years of experience as a Circuit Court judge.

Commission's Findings:     QUALIFIED
(1)     Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Judge King meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as a Circuit Court judge.
Judge King was born on April 13, 1939. He is 60 years old and a resident of Sumter, South Carolina. Judge King provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1966.
(2)     Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Judge King.
Judge King demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Judge King reported that he has not made any campaign expenditures.
Judge King testified he has not:
(a)     sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)     sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)     asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Judge King testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
(3)     Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Judge King to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Judge King described his continuing legal or judicial education during the past five years as follows:
(a)     Seminars sponsored by S.C. Bar and other providers, including all mandatory JCLE seminars;
(b)     Completed General Jurisdiction course at National Judicial College;
(c)     Usually carries over hours on MCLE each year.
Judge King reported that he has taught the following law-related courses:
(a)     Business Law, Sumter Area Technical College;
(b)     Program Moderator, S.C. Bar CLE;
(c)     Lecturer, Mechanics Liens, Stewart Title Co. Seminar.
Judge King reported that he has published the following:
(a)     Comment: Cohabitation as a Denial of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 17 SCLR 292 (1965);
(b)     Comment: Search and Seizure - A Constitutional Standard for South Carolina, 17 SCLR 687 (1965).
(4)     Character:
The Commission's investigation of Judge King did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against him. The Commission's investigation of Judge King did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Judge King has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Judge King was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5)     Reputation:
Judge King reported that his last available Martindale-Hubbell rating was "AV."
Judge King reported that he was in the U.S. Army (Artillery) - November 1961 - November 1963, 1st Lieutenant; and in the S.C. Army National Guard - September 1964 - September 1966, 1st Lieutenant, Honorable Discharge.
(6)     Physical Health:
Judge King appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7)     Mental Stability:
Judge King appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8)     Experience:
Judge King was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1966. He described his legal experience as follows:
"1966-1969     Associate, Bryan & Bahnmuller, Sumter, S.C.
1969-1996     Partner (including 17 years as Managing Partner), Bryan, Bahnmuller, King, Goldman & McElveen
Originally had a general civil and criminal practice, including family. Gradually got out of criminal and family practice and into a more general civil practice with emphasis on business, employment, real estate, corporate, contract, banking law, and civil litigation.
March 1966-Present - Resident Circuit Judge; Third Judicial Circuit."
The following is Judge King's account of his most significant orders:
"(a)     Beaufort County Board of Education v. Lighthouse Charter School Committee, Civil Action No. 97-CP-07-794; aff'd and remanded, Supreme Court Opinion No. 24950 (June 1, 1999). Supreme Court Opinion No. 24950;
(b)     Hall v. Sumter School District #2, Civil Action No. 96-CP-43-580; aff'd, Opinion No. 2811 (Ct. App. 1998), cert. denied, 99-OR-0014 (January 12, 1999). Court of Appeals Opinion No. 2811;
(c)     Simmons v. Tuomey Regional Medical Center, Civil Action No. 95-CP-43-529; rev'd and remanded, 330 S.C. 115, 498 S.E.2d 408 (Ct. App. 1998), cert. granted April 8, 1999. 498 S.E.2d 408;
(d)     Small v. Pioneer Machinery, Civil Action No. 91-CP-21-1749; aff'd, 330 S.C. 62, 496 S.E.2d 884 (Ct. App. 1998). Jury verdict also aff'd, 329 S.C. 448, 494 S.E.2d 835 (Ct. App. 1997). 496 S.E.2d 884 and 494 S.E.2d 835;
(e)     McKenzie v. Readen v. Sosnowski, Civil Action No. 96-CP-10-645; aff'd, 98-UP-264 (Ct. App. 1998) 98-UP-264."
(9)     Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Judge King's temperament has been and would continue to be excellent.
(10)     Miscellaneous:
The Pee Dee Citizens Advisory Committee reported: "Judge King is qualified for the position of Circuit Court judge. As a result of its investigation of and interview with Judge King, the Committee recommends/approves this candidate without reservation."
Judge King is married to Nancy Leslie Ariail King. He has two children: Nancy Leslie King Ducey (32, teacher); and Ariail Elizabeth King (28, attorney at law, private practice).
Judge King reported that he was a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
(a)     S.C. Bar Association (1966 - present)
Chairman - House of Delegates 1980-1982, Secretary 1987-1988, Treasurer 1988-1989, President-Elect 1989-1990, President 1990-1991, Immediate Past-President 1991-1992, Member - House of Delegates 1976-1988, 1992-Present;
(b)     American Bar Association: House of Delegates, 1992-1996;
(c)     S.C. Trial Lawyers Association (former member);
(d)     Southern Conference of Bar Presidents;
(e)     National Conference of Bar Presidents (former member);
(f)     Sumter County Bar Association (President, 1995);
(g)     American Association of Trial Lawyers (former member).
Judge King provided that he was a member of the following civic, charitable, education, social, or fraternal organizations:
(a)     Sunset Country Club;
(b)     Sumter County Library Board (1982-1987);
(c)     Woodmen of the World;
(d)     U.S.C.-Sumter Educational Foundation;
(e)     Trinity Methodist Church-former Trustee (1984-1988) and former Chairman Administrative Board (1994-1997);
(f)     Mac Boykin Trust Fund-former Trustee;
(g)     Phi Delta Phi Legal Fraternity;
(h)     Citadel Alumni Association;
(i)     The Citadel Brigadier Club;
(j)     Sumter Jaycees (1966-1973);
(k)     Sumter Lions Club (former member-president 1982);
(l)     Sumter County OEO Board (1970-1975).
Judge King additionally provided, "At a term of the Court of Common Pleas for Richland County, a case came before me where one of the parties, Craig Stoneburner, had been the landlord for my daughter when she was a student at USC some eight (8) years earlier. We had some problems regarding this landlord-tenant relationship and I disclosed this before the case began and offered to recuse myself. All parties agreed that it was not necessary that I recuse myself and the case went forward. Mr. Stoneburner was unhappy with the result and sent a letter to the Commission on Judicial Conduct. I responded and the Commission summarily dismissed the complaint."

Commission's Findings:     QUALIFIED
(1)     Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Judge Macaulay meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as a Circuit Court judge.
Judge Macaulay was born on January 18, 1942. He is 58 years old and a resident of West Union, South Carolina. Judge Macaulay provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1970.
(2)     Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Judge Macaulay.
Judge Macaulay demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Judge Macaulay reported that he has not made any campaign expenditures.
Judge Macaulay testified he has not:
(a)     sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)     sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)     asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Judge Macaulay testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
(3)     Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Judge Macaulay to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Judge Macaulay described his continuing legal or judicial education during the past five years as meeting or exceeding annual requirements. Judge Macaulay reported that he has attended seminars approved or sponsored by the South Carolina Bar Continuing Legal Education Division and Supreme Court. He additionally reported that he has completed the National Judicial College at the University of Nevada-Reno.
Judge Macaulay reported that he has not taught or lectured at any bar association conferences, educational institutions, or continuing legal or judicial education programs.
Judge Macaulay reported that he has not published any books and/or articles.
(4)     Character:
The Commission's investigation of Judge Macaulay did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against him. The Commission's investigation of Judge Macaulay did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Judge Macaulay has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Judge Macaulay was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5)     Reputation:
Judge Macaulay reported that his last available Martindale-Hubbell rating was "AV."
(6)     Physical Health:
Judge Macaulay appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7)     Mental Stability:
Judge Macaulay appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8)     Experience:
Judge Macaulay was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1970. He described his legal experience as follows:
"1970-72:     Assistant Attorney General of South Carolina, civil and criminal, trial and appellate, and counsel for various State agencies (Department of Social Services, Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission, State Highway Department).
1973-1994: Private practice, civil and criminal, trial and appellate, plaintiff and defense, including torts, eminent domain, contracts, property, domestic and estate.
Miley and Macaulay                 1973-1976
Miley, Macaulay & Boggs             1976-1980
Miley, Macaulay, Day & Agnew, P.A.     1981-1984
Miley, Macaulay & Cain, P.A.         1986-1988
Miley & Macaulay, P.A.             1988-1994."

The following is Judge Macaulay's account of his most significant orders or opinions:
"(a)     Rogers v. South Carolina Dept. of Parole & Community Corrections, 320 S.C. 253, 258, 464 S.E.2d 330, 333 (S.C. 1996) (Alexander S. Macaulay, A.A.J., separate opinion concurring in dissent of Toal, A.J.);
(b)     Liberty Life Insurance Co. v. Policy Management Systems Corp., C.A. No. 96-CP-23-171, Petition for Certiorari denied (S.C. June 20, 1996);
(c)     John Doe, M.D. v. South Carolina Medical Malpractice Liability J.U.A., C.A. No. 97-CP-10-3071 (filed August 18, 1998, appeal pending);
(d)     Commander v. Karampournioti, C.A. Nos. 97-CP-16-279 and 281 (Two Cases) (filed April 9, 1999, no appeal);
(e)     State ex rel. Condon v. City of Charleston, C.A. No. 97-CP-10-375, affirmed, 334 S.C. 246, 513 S.E.2d 97 (S.C. 1999)."
Judge Macaulay reported that he served as a captain in the U.S. Army Medical Service Corps from 1964 to 1975. Judge Macaulay retired with an Honorable Discharge on February 4, 1975.
Judge Macaulay was appointed to the State Board of Education from the Tenth Judicial Circuit during the years of 1979-1980.
Judge Macaulay was also elected to the S.C. Senate from District One, Seat Three, from 1981-1984, 1985-1992, and 1993-1994.
Judge Macaulay reported that he unsuccessfully ran in the Democratic Primary for nomination to be a candidate for the S.C. House of Representatives from Richland County in June 1970.
Judge Macaulay reported that he was elected as Circuit Court Judge for the Tenth Judicial Circuit in 1994.
(9)     Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Judge Macaulay's temperament has been and would continue to be excellent.
(10)     Miscellaneous:
The Upstate Citizens Advisory Committee reported: "Judge Macaulay was found to be qualified pursuant to the evaluative criteria."
Judge Macaulay is married to the former Maria Locke Boineau. He has two children: Maria Locke Macaulay Sellers, a teacher of hearing impaired students & a mother, age 29; and Alexander Stephens Macaulay, a doctoral candidate in history at the University of Georgia, age 26.
Judge Macaulay reported that he was a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
(a)     S.C. Bar Association (1970 - present);
(b)     Oconee County Bar Association, President 1980;
(c)     American Bar Association.
Judge Macaulay additionally provided that he was a member of the following civic, charitable, education, social, or fraternal organizations:
(a)     Walhalla Presbyterian Church (Deacon and Elder);
(b)     Walhalla Rotary Club (former president);
(c)     Tri-State Trout Club;
(d)     S.C. Society of the Cincinnati;
(e)     St. Andrew's Societies of Columbia and Upper S.C.;
(f)     Societies of the High Hills of Santee and Lower Richland;
(g)     S.C. Society of the Sword and Mace;
(h)     South Caroliniana Society;
(i)     S.C. Historical Society;
(j)     Tarantella Club of Columbia;
(k)     Oconee Assembly;
(l)     Columbia Cotillion Club.
Judge Macaulay additionally provided, "I was actively engaged in the practice of law from 1970 to 1994, representing individuals and the State, plaintiffs and defendants, in civil and criminal matters in trials and on appeals, with cases tried, or ultimate disposition being made on appeal, in all levels of Courts of this State and the United States. More importantly, my life has been one of representation of people and public service requiring an appreciation for, and the maintenance of, a mutual respect between individuals, the public and their institutions, regardless of the matters involved.
Since June 1994, I have presided over terms of Circuit Court, jury and non-jury, civil and criminal, to include capital cases, trials and appeals, throughout our State, and on occasion I have served as an acting associate justice of the South Carolina Supreme Court."

Commission's Findings:     QUALIFIED
(1)     Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Judge Manning meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as a Circuit Court judge.
Judge Manning was born on December 7, 1950. He is 49 years old and a resident of Columbia, South Carolina. Judge Manning provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1977.
(2)     Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Judge Manning.
Judge Manning demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Judge Manning reported that he has not made any campaign expenditures.
Judge Manning testified he has not:
(a)     sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)     sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)     asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Judge Manning testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
(3)     Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Judge Manning to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Judge Manning described his continuing legal or judicial education during the past five years as follows:
(a)     Orientation School for Circuit Court Judges (S.C. Court Administration, 1994);
(b)     Circuit Judges' Seminar (1994);
(c)     Judicial Conference (S.C. Court Administration, 1994);
(d)     Circuit Court Bench/Bar Seminar (S.C. Bar, 1994);
(e)     General Jurisdiction (1994);
(f)     Advanced Evidence Course (1994);
(g)     Mid-Year Meeting- Tenth Annual Criminal Law Update (S.C. Bar, 1995);
(h)     Circuit Judges' Spring Conference (S.C. Association of Circuit Judges, 1995);
(i)     Judicial Conference (S.C. Court Administration, 1995);
(j)     S.C. Tort Law Update: A Circuit Court Bench/Bar Seminar (S.C. Bar, 1995);
(k)     Fall Seminar (S.C. Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, 1995);
(l)     Eleventh Annual Criminal Law Update (S.C. Bar, 1996);
(m)     Alternative Dispute Resolution for Advocates: Just Do It (S.C. Bar, 1996);
(n)     Understanding the New S.C. Criminal Offenses & Penalties for "Serious" (S.C. Bar, 1996);
(o)     Circuit Judges' Spring Conference (S.C. Office of Indigent Defense, 1996);
(p)     1996 Annual Convention (S.C. Trial Lawyers Association, 1996);
(q)     Judicial Conference (S.C. Court Administration, 1996);
(r)     Twelfth Annual Criminal Law Update (S.C. Bar, 1997);
(s)     ADR Pilot Program Workshop (Judicial Conference Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1997);
(t)     Circuit Judges' Spring Conference (1997);
(u)     Seminar of Chief Judges for Circuit and Family Courts (S.C. Court Administration, 1997);
(v)     Judicial Conference (S.C. Court Administration, 1997);
(w)     Group Facilitator in General Jurisdiction Course (Reno, Nevada, 1997);
(x)     Thirteenth Annual Criminal Law Update (S.C. Bar, 1998);
(y)     Circuit Judges Association Meeting (S.C. Bar, 1998);
(z)     1998 Orientation School for New Circuit Court Judges (S.C. Court Administration, 1998);
(aa)     Bureau of Justice Assistance Faculty Development Workshop (Reno, Nevada, 1998);
(bb)     1998 Annual Conference (S.C. Trial Lawyers Association, 1998);
(cc)     Judicial Conference (S.C. Court Administration, 1998);
(dd)     Group Facilitator in Essential Judicial Skills Course (Reno, Nevada, 1998).
Judge Manning reported that he has taught the following law-related courses:
(a)     Group Facilitator in General Jurisdiction Course, Reno, Nevada (1997);
(b)     Group Facilitator in Essential Judicial Skills Course, Reno, Nevada (1998).
Judge Manning reported that he has not published any books and/or articles.
(4)     Character:
The Commission's investigation of Judge Manning did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against him. The Commission's investigation of Judge Manning did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Judge Manning has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Judge Manning was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5)     Reputation:
Judge Manning reported that his last available Martindale-Hubbell rating was "BV."
(6)     Physical Health:
Judge Manning appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7)     Mental Stability:
Judge Manning appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8)     Experience:
Judge Manning was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1977.
Judge Manning was elected Circuit Court Judge for the Fifth Judicial Circuit on February 21, 1994
Judge Manning reported he has held the following public offices:
(a)     S.C. Assistant Attorney General, 1983 to 1989;
(b)     Bar Examiner, 1992.
Judge Manning describes his most significant orders as follows:
"(a)     Michael & Lisa Strebler as Personal Representatives of the Estate of Jacob Strebler v. Milner Super Gas, Inc., Stephen Mark Jones, Pulliam Motor Company, Heathwood Episcopal School, J. Robert Shirley, and Mary Stuart Dargan James, 94-CP-40-4582.Complex litigation involving wreck of school van. Mediated twice by Alex Sanders. Finally able to resolve;
(b)     State of South Carolina v. Edgar Thomas, 98-GS-21-395. Death penalty case in Florence County. From date of assignment until resolution, case lasted about 90 days;
(c)     Arant v. Kressler, M.D., 489 S.E.2d 206, 327 S.C. 225 (1997)."
(9)     Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Judge Manning's temperament has been and would continue to be excellent.
(10)     Miscellaneous:
The Midlands Citizens Advisory Committee reported: "Judge Manning is a well-qualified judge. The Committee wholeheartedly recommends his re-election to Seat 2, Circuit Court for the Fifth Judicial Circuit."
Judge Manning is married to LaVerne Hunter Manning. He has three children: Charlotte (Age 19), Casey, Jr. (Age 18), and Morgan (Age 9).
Judge Manning reported that he was a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
(a)     S.C. Bar Association, 1977 - Present;
(b)     S.C. Bar- Criminal Law Secretary; Chairman, 1987 - 1988;
(c)     American Bar Association;
(d)     S.C. Trial Lawyers Association- National Minority Delegate;
(e)     Greater Columbia Chamber of Commerce, Sports Committee, 1973-1974;
(f)     Richland County Bar Association;
(g)     S.C. Bar Board of Law Examiners, 1992;
(h)     S.C. Bar Special Committee on the Judiciary, 1991-1992;
(i)     S.C. Commission on Judicial Conduct;
(j)     S.C. Sentencing Guidelines Commission, 1996-Present;
(k)     Hearing Masters, Rules on Judicial Discipline & Standards, 1994-1998.
Judge Manning provided that he was a member of the following civic, charitable, education, social, or fraternal organizations:
(a)     Columbia Tip-Off Club, 1989-Present; President, 1991-1992;
(b)     S.C. Athletic Hall of Fame, 1989-Present;
(c)     S.C. Special Olympics, 1989-1996;
(d)     Children's Justice Task Force Committee;
(e)     Citizens Summit Steering Committee;
(f)     U.S.C. Bi-Centennial Committee, 1998-Present.
Additionally, since 1993, Judge Manning has provided play-by-play for basketball games for the University of South Carolina Network.

Commission's Findings:     QUALIFIED
(1)     Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Judge Matthews meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as an Administrative Law judge.
Judge Matthews was born on November 8, 1950. She is 49 years old and a resident of Columbia, South Carolina. Judge Matthews provided in her application that she has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1978.
(2)     Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Judge Matthews.
Judge Matthews demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Judge Matthews reported that she has not made any campaign expenditures.
Judge Matthews testified she has not:
(a)     sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)     sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)     asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Judge Matthews testified that she is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.

(3)     Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Judge Matthews to be intelligent and knowledgeable. Her performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Judge Matthews described her continuing legal or judicial education during the past five years as follows:
06/03/94     S.C. Bar Natural Resources Section;
10/14/94     S.C. Bar - What Every S.C. Lawyer Should Know About Environmental Law;
04/21/95     CLE Seminar at U.S.C. Law School in Columbia;
06/30/95     The New Circuit Court Arbitration Rules;
08/10/95     S.C. Trial Lawyers Annual Convention Environmental Law Seminar;
08/11/95     Ethics & Civility;
08/12/95     General Session & Legislative Update;
08/24/95     S.C. Bench/Bar Statewide Video; CLE Seminar: The New S.C. Rules of Evidence;
01/26/96     S.C. Bar - Eleventh Annual Criminal Law Update;
04/26/96     S.C. Bar - The Woman Advocate in South;
01/24/97     S.C. Bar - Alternative Dispute Resolution;
01/25/97     S.C. Bar - Government Law;
03/06/97     SCCFP - Governor's Conference on Youth;
04/18/97     S.C. Bar 1997 - Women Lawyers Assoc.;
11/09/97     Richland Bar 3rd Annual Ethics Seminar;
01/24/98     S.C. Bar Trial & Appellate Advocacy;
05/29/98     S.C. Bar S.C. Woman Advocate: Making Practice;
01/23/98     S.C. Bar Government/Construction Law.
Judge Matthews reported that she has taught the following law-related courses:
(a)     Lecture to Annual Meeting of S.C. Bar, June 3, 1994;
(b)     Legislative Update for Natural Resource Section, 1994;
(c)     Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel: 4-hour seminar presentation to S.C. Attorney General, Assistant Attorneys General, and Solicitors, 1986;
(d)     Presentation to S.C. Circuit Court Judges on Appellate Practice, Fall 1982.
Judge Matthews reported that she has published the following:
(a)     Editor, S.C. Bar Natural Resources Newsletter 1992-1994;
(b)     South Carolina Business Journal, Busy Year for Environmental Issues, S.C. Chamber of Commerce, July 1994;
(c)     Legislative Year in Review, S.C. Bar Annual Conference, June 1994;
(d)     Legislative Review, S.C. Bar Annual Conference, June 1993;
(e)     South Carolina State Government Restructured: The Private Sector Impact, September 1993.
(4)     Character:
The Commission's investigation of Judge Matthews did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against her. The Commission's investigation of Judge Matthews did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Judge Matthews has handled her financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Judge Matthews was punctual and attentive in her dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with her diligence and industry.
(5)     Reputation:
Judge Matthews reported that her last available Martindale-Hubbell rating was "AV."
(6)     Physical Health:
Judge Matthews appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office she seeks.
(7)     Mental Stability:
Judge Matthews appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office she seeks.
(8)     Experience:
Judge Matthews was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1978. She described her legal experience as follows:
"Staff Attorney, South Carolina Supreme Court (1978-1981): Reviewed and researched civil and criminal appeals; recommended disposition by the Court; supervised junior Staff Attorneys. Assisted at settlement conferences; Drafted Court Rules.
Law Clerk, South Carolina Supreme Court, Justice George T, Gregory, Jr. (1981 to 1982): Reviewed and researched civil and criminal appeals and Motions; Drafted opinions, rules and orders for Justice Gregory; Assisted at Hearings on Extraordinary Writs, such as Mandamus, Supersedeas, and Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings.
Assistant Attorney General, State of South Carolina (1982-1986): Researched and wrote more than 200 briefs and argued more than 80 appeals before the S.C. Supreme Court of Appeals, and U.S. Supreme Court; Coordinated appeals with Solicitors; Prosecuted Medical Board and other licensing board cases; Wrote opinions as directed by the Attorney General; Represented State Agencies pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act; Coordinated Continuing Education Legal Seminars; Chaired first Law Enforcement Leadership Conference
Counsel, South Carolina House of Representatives Judiciary Committee David H. Wilkins, Committee Chairman (1986 to 1988): Managed research and drafting of legislation and amendments on all legislation referred to Judiciary Committee. Coordinated legislative efforts with Governor's office, Legislative staff, and state agencies; Managed staff attorneys and law clerks
Partner, Nelson Mullins Riley& Scarborough (1988 to 1996): Administrative Law and Governmental Relations
Partner, Woodward Cothran & Herndon (1996 to December 1998): Commercial Litigation, and Appellate, and Administrative Law Practice before State Agencies, including Department of Health and Environmental Control, Insurance Commission, and Public Service Commission State and Federal Governmental Relations: Clients included Sprint, NAII (National Association of Independent Insurers), and Grand Stand Water and Sewer Authority
Carolyn C. Matthews, Attorney and Counselor at Law (December 1998 to June 9, 1999): Administrative Law Practice; State and Federal Governmental Relations
Administrative Law Judge, Seat 3 (June 9, 1999-present)."
Judge Matthews reported the frequency of her court appearances during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Federal:     6-8 times per year
(b)     State:         6-8 times per year
Judge Matthews reported that the percentage of her practice involving civil, criminal, and domestic matters during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Civil:         85%
(b)     Criminal:     10%
(c)     Domestic:     5%
Judge Matthews reported the percentage of her practice in trial court during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Jury:         5%
(b)     Non-jury:     95%
Judge Matthews provided that she most often served as sole counsel.
The following is Judge Matthews' account of her five most significant litigated matters:
"(a)     State v. Donald Henry Pee Wee Gaskins, 284 SC 105, 326 S.E.2d 132 (1985), Sole Counsel representing State of South Carolina in death penalty appeal to S.C. Supreme Court. The case involved a 10,000-page transcript, more than 200 pages of briefs, and issues of first impression under South Carolina's Death Penalty statue. In Favorem Vitae review required that counsel be prepared at oral argument not only on the briefed issues, but also any other issues which might be raised by the Supreme Court. Affirmed, with certiorari denied by the U.S. Supreme Court;
(b)     State v. Kiser, 288 SC 441, 343 S.E.2d 292 (1986): Sole Counsel representing State in case of first impression: the constitutionality of South Carolina's newly-enacted Drug Trafficking Statute, which imposed the strictest penalties in the United States. Affirmed per curiam after oral argument;
(c)     State v. Brantley, 279 SC 215, S.E.2d (1983): Sole Counsel for the State in briefing and arguing the constitutional issue of the scope of Circuit Judge's contempt power. Affirmed;
(d)     Alexander S., et al. v. Flora Brooks Boyd, et al., U.S.D.C., District of S.C., Civil Action No. 3:90-3062-17: [1990-present] Eight-year long complex federal litigation involving numerous alleged violations of constitutional rights of juveniles incarcerated at DJJ; landmark national case regarding prison overcrowding: numerous federal mediations, orders, opinions, and appeals;
(e)     In Re: Stucco Litigation, U.S. District Court; Eastern District of North Carolina, Southern Division: Civil Action No. 5:96-CV-287-BR(2): Numerous individual cases and preliminary orders and opinions. Plaintiffs have moved to Certify and Class."
The following is Judge Matthews' account of civil appeals she has personally handled:
"(a)     Watford v. Byers, S.C. Court of Appeals, 1/7/99, No. 99-UP-003;
(b)     Alexander S. v. Boyd, et al., 113 F.3d 1373, (4th Circuit 1997), cert denied, 118 S. Ct. 880, 139 L.E. 2d 869 (1998): Sole Counsel on brief and oral argument on case of first impression: Retroactive application of Prison Litigation Reform Act's limitations on attorney's fee awards in Juvenile Prison Litigation under Section 1983."
Judge Matthews was elected to her current position as Administrative Law Judge, Seat 3, on June 2, 1999.
(9)     Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Judge Matthews' temperament has been and would continue to be excellent.
(10)     Miscellaneous:
The Midlands Citizens Advisory Committee reported: "Judge Carolyn C. Matthews is a well-qualified judge. The Committee wholeheartedly recommends her re-election to Seat 3, Administrative Law Judge Division."
Judge Matthews is married to John A. McAllister, Jr. She has three children: Martha Austin Adams (full-time student at the University of the South, age 20); and two stepchildren: Anne Leigh McAllister, age 9; and Sarah Elizabeth McAllister, age 4.
Judge Matthews reported that she was a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
(a)     S.C. Bar;
(b)     S.C. District Court, Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, and U.S. Supreme Court;
(c)     S.C. Bar House of Delegates (1998-present);
(d)     S.C. Bar Legislative Counsel Committee (1991-1996);
(e)     S.C. Bar Committee on Continuing Legal Education;
(f)     American Bar Association;
(g)     Chair, Richland County Bar Legal Services Committee (1996-present);
(h)     Chair, Richland County Bar Programs Committee (1991-92);
(i)     Mentor, S.C. Young Lawyers Division (1996-present);
(j)     Board of Directors, S.C. Women Lawyers Association (1995-present).
Judge Matthews provided that she was a member of the following civic, charitable, education, social, or fraternal organizations:
(a)     Board of Directors, S.C. Chapter, Leukemia Society of America (1990-present);
(b)     Member, Hammond School Board of Trustees (1990-1996);
(c)     1993 Graduate, Leadership South Carolina;
(d)     Board of Directors, Parents Anonymous of S.C.;
(e)     Governing Board, Trenholm Road U.M. Church;
(f)     City of Columbia Chamber of Commerce Issues Committee;
(g)     Volunteer, Hope for Kids: Vice-Chair, 1999 Annual Fund-raiser;
(h)     Furman University National Development Council.

Commission's Findings:     QUALIFIED
(1)     Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Mr. Miller meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as a Circuit Court judge.
Mr. Miller was born on September 24, 1952. He is 47 years old and a resident of Greenville, South Carolina. Mr. Miller provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1978.
(2)     Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Mr. Miller.
Mr. Miller demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Mr. Miller reported that he has made $125.28 in campaign expenditures for resumé printing costs.
Mr. Miller testified he has not:
(a)     sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)     sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)     asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Mr. Miller testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
(3)     Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Mr. Miller to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Mr. Miller described his continuing legal or judicial education during the past five years as follows:
1998     S.C. Public Defender Conference;
1997     Advanced Federal Sentencing Guidelines, S.C. Public Defender Conference;
1996     Understanding the New S.C. Criminal Laws, Greenville County Bar Seminar, Powerful Witness Preparation;
1995     Greenville County Bar Seminar, Everyday Ethics, Family Law and Ethics;
1994     Counseling Negotiation, Advanced Federal Sentencing Guidelines, The Year That Was.
Mr. Miller reported that he has not taught or lectured at any bar association conferences, educational institutions, or continuing legal or judicial education programs.
Mr. Miller reported that he has not published any books and/or articles.
(4)     Character:
The Commission's investigation of Mr. Miller did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against him. The Commission's investigation of Mr. Miller did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Mr. Miller has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Mr. Miller was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5)     Reputation:
Mr. Miller reported that his Martindale-Hubbell rating is "BV."
(6)     Physical Health:
Mr. Miller appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7)     Mental Stability:
Mr. Miller appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8)     Experience:
Mr. Miller was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1978. He described his legal experience as follows:
"November 1978 - April 1980     Southern Bank and Trust Company, Federal Regulations Compliance Officer
April 1980 - June 1981     Assistant Public Defender for Greenville County
July 1981 - June 1982     Sole Practitioner in the General Practice of Law in Greenville, South Carolina
July 1982 - Present         Miller and Paschal, Attorneys at Law, General Practice with concentration in Criminal and Civil litigation."
Mr. Miller provided the following description of his experience in criminal and civil matters:
"My private law practice includes a significant amount of criminal work in the Court of General Sessions. Additionally, I have worked as a part time Assistant Public Defender for Greenville County for fourteen years. I have handled thousands of criminal cases. These cases have involved a wide variety of matters including: offenses against the person (murder and all other degrees of homicide, all levels of assault and battery, all degrees of criminal sexual conduct, kidnapping and all degrees of robbery); offenses against property (all degrees of burglary and larceny, arson, forgery, breach of trust, shoplifting, and all types of financial transaction crimes); drug offenses (all types of illegal drugs and all degrees of involvement including possession, possession with intent to distribute, distribution and trafficking); traffic offenses (all degrees of driving under the influence including accidents resulting in injury and death, driving under suspension, and failure to stop for police vehicles); crimes against morality (prostitution, indecent exposure, and lewd acts); prison offenses (escape and contraband possession); and violation of probation cases.
I have defended one death penalty case which resulted in a plea to a life sentence.
I have practiced criminal law in the United States District Court for South Carolina since 1982. I have handled all types of federal offenses including drug offenses, weapons offenses, economic offenses, securities fraud, and bank robberies.
My experience in the above listed cases includes bond hearings, motion hearings, guilty pleas, and jury trials to verdict.
Over the course of my career I have represented both plaintiffs and defendants in civil matters. Recently, my civil practice has included personal injury cases and other torts. I have spent a significant amount of time on a federal securities fraud case which involved a shareholder class action and a claim under an officers' and directors' errors and omissions insurance policy. The securities class action case has recently been remanded from the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals to District Court for further factual determination concerning the parties excluded from the class, including my client.
I am currently representing two death sentenced inmates in Post Conviction Relief proceedings. The first case has been fully litigated and is in the post-trial briefing stage, and the other is in the pre-trial discovery stage.
Early in my career in private practice, I handled litigation for Southern Bank and Trust Company, including general litigation and collection work.
I have handled automobile accident cases, libel and slander cases, contract disputes, water drainage damage cases, defective products cases, matters in the probate court, social security disability cases, and real estate proceedings including closings and disputes over real estate."
Mr. Miller reported the frequency of his court appearances during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Federal:     Bi-monthly
(b)     State:         Bi-weekly
Mr. Miller reported that the percentage of his practice involving civil, criminal, and domestic matters during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Civil:         25%
(b)     Criminal:     50%
(c)     Domestic:     25%
Mr. Miller reported the percentage of his practice in trial court during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Jury:         5%
(b)     Non-jury:     5%
Mr. Miller provided that he most often served as sole counsel.
The following is Mr. Miller's account of his five most significant litigated matters:
"(a)     McCall by Andrews v. Batson, 329 S.E.2d 741, 285 S.C. 243. This case was an appeal from a Demurrer which was decided by the South Carolina Supreme Court in 1985. This case abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity as it applied to the State and all local subdivisions of government, excepting discretionary authority of the three branches of government. This case has been considered a landmark decision;
(b)     State v. Anthony Caruso. This case involved the murder and armed robbery of a grocery store clerk making a night deposit. Caruso, along with two co-defendants, was charged with murder and armed robbery, and the State sought the death penalty. The case involved issues related to physical evidence, voluntariness of a confession, implicating statements of co-defendants, and the development of a mitigation defense in anticipation of a conviction. On the eve of trial the State offered a life sentence in exchange for a guilty plea, which the defendant accepted;
(c)     U.S. v. Ross Cosmetics Distribution Center, Ross Freitas, et al. This multi-defendant case involved complicated international trade agreements, corporate buyouts, and business dealings which resulted in securities fraud and the resultant loss of millions of dollars by shareholders. When the fraud was revealed, the stock price plummeted from $55 per share to $4 per share. This publicly-owned company, which traded on NASDAQ, was supplied by a manufacturer in England and financed by a Swiss factor. Both the manufacturer and the factor were owned, through seven Panamanian holding corporations, by the same group of investors located in Dubai. The Dubai investors gradually obtained control of Ross Cosmetics through 'stock for inventory' trades. The investors illegally failed to reveal their controlling interest by using the seven holding companies to acquire the stock shares of Ross Cosmetics. The investors artificially inflated the value of the Ross Cosmetics stock by selling the English manufactured goods to Ross Cosmetics below cost, thus making Ross Cosmetics appear to have a superior profit margin and thereby driving up the value of the stock. The government returned a twenty-count indictment alleging conspiracy, securities fraud, false statement, mail fraud, and customs fraud. I represented the lead defendant, Ross Freitas, who the government originally alleged to be the mastermind of this scheme. While this case resulted in the largest criminal fine in South Carolina history, Mr. Freitas plead Nolo Contendere to a misdemeanor and received six months probation;
(d)     Richard Longworth v. State. Pending Post Conviction Relief action involving a death-sentenced inmate. Richard Longworth was convicted in 1991 of armed robbery and two murders at the Westgate Cinemas in Spartanburg. He received the death penalty. The PCR has been fully litigated from the initial pleadings through a week of trial. Post trial briefing is complete, and the parties are awaiting the Judge's Order. The issues raised by the Applicant at trial included: ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel laboring under an actual conflict of interest by representing dual clients with divergent interests; prosecutorial use of false or inaccurate testimony; failure by the prosecution to disclose discoverable Brady material; failure of trial counsel and the trial court to inform applicant of his right to testify at the penalty phase of his trial; failure of trial counsel to object to the trial court's improper and misleading instruction to the applicant concerning the scope of cross examination; and other general ineffective assistance of counsel claims;
(e)     Federal Insurance Company v. Ross Cosmetics Distribution Center, et al. Numerous class action lawsuits were initiated against Ross Cosmetics' successor and various of its officers and directors alleging federal securities laws violations. Federal Insurance Company had issued an Executive Liability and Indemnification Policy, owned by Ross Cosmetics, to insure its officers and directors against errors and omissions. Federal Insurance Company initiated an interpleader action in the South Carolina District Court to determine if it should be required to pay the policy proceeds and which "insureds" would be entitled to the proceeds. The policy proceeds were paid into the registry of the Court and Federal Insurance was relieved of further liability. I represented two former officers and directors of Ross Cosmetics in their claims to the policy proceeds. Other former officers and directors had assigned their rights under the policy to Ross Cosmetics' successor corporation which strongly contested my clients' claims to the proceeds. Various Orders were filed in the District Court with respect to proceeds distribution, which resulted in Motions to Alter and Amend, and Judicial Stays imposed due to related matters before the Securities and Exchange Commission. This action was also related to a federal criminal action and shareholder class action lawsuits. Ultimately, the case was settled on the eve of the trial before the United States District Court."
The following is Mr. Miller's account of civil appeals he has personally handled:
"(a)     McCall by Andrews v. Batson, 329 S.E.2d 741, 285 S.C. 243, (1985);
(b)     Ro-Lo Enterprises v. Hicks Enterprises, Inc., 362 S.E.2d 888, 294 S.C. 111 (1987);
(c)     Robbins v. First Federal Savings Bank, 363 S.E.2d 418, 294 S.C. 219 (1987);
(d)     McCarter v. Willis, 383 S.E.2d 252, 299 S.C. 198 (1989)."
(9)     Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Mr. Miller's temperament would be excellent.
(10)     Miscellaneous:
The Upstate Citizens Advisory Committee reported: "Mr. Miller was found to be qualified pursuant to the evaluative criteria."
Mr. Miller is married to Martha Albrecht Miller. He has two children: Elizabeth L. Miller (age 16); and E. Walker Miller (age 14).
Mr. Miller reported that he was a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
(a)     S.C. Bar Association (Nov. 8, 1978 - present);
(b)     Greenville County Bar Association (1993 Board of Directors);
(c)     S.C. Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers;
(d)     National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers;
(e)     S.C. Trial Lawyers Association;
(f)     American Trial Lawyers Association.
Mr. Miller provided that he was a member of the following civic, charitable, education, social, or fraternal organizations:
(a)     President of Downtown Soccer Association (1998 - present);
(b)     Board of Directors of Downtown Soccer Association (1996 - present).
Mr. Miller further provided that he and his family are active communicants at Christ Church Episcopal in Greenville. In the early 1990's, Mr. Miller served three years as treasurer for St. James Episcopal Church, also in Greenville.
Mr. Miller reported that he is currently the President of the Downtown Soccer Association and has been so since 1998; his term will expire at the end of this calendar year. Mr. Miller has served as a volunteer youth soccer coach throughout the last five years, and has been on the Board of Directors since 1996. Mr. Miller has supervised the construction of and fund raising for a four field soccer complex, and has played a pivotal role in negotiating a "public-private" partnership with the City of Greenville related to its contemplated construction of ten additional soccer fields. Mr. Miller's participation has included dealing with the head of the City Recreation Department, the City Manager, and making a presentation to City Council and various other committees.

Commission's Findings:     QUALIFIED
(1)     Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Judge Pieper meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as a Circuit Court judge.
Judge Pieper was born on October 8, 1961. He is 38 years old and a resident of North Charleston, South Carolina. Judge Pieper provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1985.
(2)     Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Judge Pieper.
Judge Pieper demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Judge Pieper reported that he has not made any campaign expenditures.
Judge Pieper testified he has not:
(a)     sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)     sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)     asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Judge Pieper testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
(3)     Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Judge Pieper to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Judge Pieper stated that he keeps current on the law. Generally, each year he goes to the Judicial Conference, the Circuit Judges Association meetings, the S.C. Bar Convention, the Annual Criminal Law Update Seminar, and either or both of the Trial Lawyers Convention or the Defense Trial Lawyers Meeting. At all of these conferences, continuing education is offered and he attends as much as possible. Last year, he attended the three-week general jurisdiction course at the National Judicial College in Nevada. He states that each year he usually exceeds the continuing education hours required by the Supreme Court.
Judge Pieper reported that he spoke at a CLE for Masters-In-Equity on civil procedure. He is currently working on a program with the S.C. Bar that will cover practice pointers for all the courts in the State.
Judge Pieper reported that he has not published any books and/or articles.
(4)     Character:
The Commission's investigation of Judge Pieper did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against him. The Commission's investigation of Judge Pieper did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Judge Pieper has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Judge Pieper was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5)     Reputation:
Judge Pieper reported that he is not rated by Martindale-Hubbell.
(6)     Physical Health:
Judge Pieper appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7)     Mental Stability:
Judge Pieper appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8)     Experience:
Judge Pieper was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1985. He described legal experience as follows:
"March 1985 - August 1985; Lawclerk, U.S. District Court, for United States Magistrate Judge Robert Carr. I was responsible for researching the law and writing reports and recommendations for disposition of various cases such as employment and civil rights cases, social security, habeas corpus and other prisoner litigation, and all other civil cases referred to the office. Also, I attended and prepared for all criminal proceedings before Judge Carr. In August, I left to attend N.Y.U. For a few weeks after I returned from N.Y.U., I worked with the Joye law firm handling foreclosures, estate planning and civil matters.
Fall 1986 - Fall 1988; Senior Lawclerk, U.S. District Court for Judge Sol Blatt, Jr. I worked on a wide variety of civil and criminal matters involving issues of statutory and constitutional law, including habeas corpus review of decisions of the S.C. Supreme Court. Essentially, I received training and exposure to all aspects of trial, including complex litigation.
August 1988 - December 1990. During part of this time, I was associated with a lawyer under the name of Pieper & Stokes (Mark); six months thereafter, we associated with another lawyer (Kinard) but chose to operate as separate entities. Character of practice - real estate, probate, estate planning and general civil matters.
Summer 1990 - Summer 1993; Summer 1993 - Summer 1995; returned to U.S. District Court at request of Judge Blatt, because of my class action experience, to assist with the complicated bankruptcy class action for Patriots Point. After the case was completed, I was asked to stay in a career position. [The first six months of this period overlaps with my private practice time above because I was technically "of counsel" to the Court]. From Summer 1993 - Summer 1995, I assisted the court one day a week since I was appointed Master-in-Equity.
April 1989 - October 1991, part-time Berkeley County Magistrate (chronologically - this overlaps with the federal court position as I worked at night). Presided over all cases assigned to my office. Eventually, I was appointed Chief Magistrate.
June 1993 - June 1996; Berkeley County Master-in-Equity and Special Circuit Judge. Duties - I presided over all circuit court nonjury trials and proceedings referred to my office for disposition; in addition, as Special Circuit Judge, I presided over most pretrial proceedings and motions in civil jury and nonjury cases; minor settlements; civil or criminal appeals from magistrate, municipal and probate courts, as well as judicial review of state agency cases such as workers' compensation appeals, and grand jury proceedings. I gained a wide variety of circuit court judicial experience.
June 1996 - present. Resident Circuit Judge, Ninth Judicial Circuit. Preside over all civil and criminal matters and appeals within the jurisdiction of the circuit court."
Judge Pieper describes his most significant orders as follows:
"(a)     Wadford v. Pipkin; Civil Action Nos. 92-CP-08-695 and 696. (Not reported or appealed, circuit court). I found this case to be interesting because it involved two persons that apparently veered off the main roadway and ended up on or about the premises of the defendant, who held the two at gunpoint and threatened to kill the plaintiffs. The case was tried on issues of false arrest, trespassing, malicious prosecution, and outrage. I would particularly note that the case involved the scope of a citizen's arrest, an area of the law in which there was not much appellate guidance at the time;
(b)     State of South Carolina v. Paul Winn; 93-CP-08-1770 (unreported and not appealed) [Circuit Court] This case was an appeal from a lower court that I heard as Special Circuit judge. This opinion contains a good discussion of the constitutional right to a speedy trial. Based on the facts of the case and the applicable law, I concluded that the magistrate correctly denied a motion to dismiss based on an alleged 31-month delay;
(c)     Dennis v. Murphy, 93-CP-08-382 (unreported and not appealed) [Circuit Court] Plaintiffs alleged that they entered into an oral agreement with the defendant whereby the plaintiffs would convey to the defendant their undivided interest in a parcel of property so that the defendant could manage the property and operate a railway to avoid having to get signatures each time he transacted business involving the property. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant had agreed to reconvey the property at the appropriate time. Upon breach of this agreement, the plaintiffs sued. The order issued has a good discussion of the law of constructive trusts;
(d)     Clark v. Rabens, et al.; Unpublished Opinion No. 98-UP-517 (S.C. Court of Appeals; 11/23/98) (affirmed decision of Circuit Court) This was a will contest case that was tried in the probate court and appealed to the Circuit Court. I found it interesting because it was one of the few Probate Court jury trials that had been up on appeal to the Circuit Court. The case presented interesting issues about the requisite mental capacity and undue influence and the Probate Court's jury charges in this regard;
(e)     Smith v. S.C. Retirement System; Op. No. 3025 (S.C. Court of Appeals, 7/6/99) (Affirmed in part, reversed in part) This case presented some interesting questions about qualified domestic relations orders and the assignment of retirement benefits. I found the case interesting due to the overlap with domestic relations litigation and also the area of constructive trusts."
(9)     Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Judge Pieper's temperament has been and would continue to be excellent.
(10)     Miscellaneous:
The Low Country Citizens Advisory Committee reported: "Judge Pieper meets the constitutional qualifications and is possessed of the requisite character, reputation, ability, fitness, experience, and temperament. Judge Pieper is recommended with two reservations - The Committee noted that Judge Pieper lacks experience as a trial lawyer and that his temperament (arrogance) is a concern with lawyers and court personnel that were interviewed by Committee members. Judge Pieper seems to be a fair and impartial judge who is knowledgeable in the law and its application."
Judge Pieper is not married. He does not have any children.
Judge Pieper reported that he was a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
(a)     S.C. Bar Association (1985-present);
(b)     Honorary Member, Berkeley and Charleston County Bar Associations.
Judge Pieper additionally reported: "I have always been innovative, diligent and imaginative. I am also technology oriented in the operation of my office. I feel these qualities are very useful as the judiciary strives to adjust to increasing caseloads. I feel that I have been raised in the courtroom, having spent much of my career time working for, or presiding over court."

Commission's Findings:     QUALIFIED
(1)     Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Judge Pleicones meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as a Justice on the Supreme Court.
Judge Pleicones was born on February 29, 1944. He is 56 years old and a resident of Columbia, South Carolina. Judge Pleicones provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1968.
(2)     Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Judge Pleicones.
Judge Pleicones demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Judge Pleicones reported that he has not made any campaign expenditures.
Judge Pleicones testified he has not:
(a)     sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)     sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)     asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Judge Pleicones testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
(3)     Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Judge Pleicones to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Judge Pleicones described his continuing legal or judicial education during the past five years as follows:
(a)     S.C. Trial Lawyers Association Meetings, 1994 - 1998;
(b)     S.C. DTA Meetings, 1994 - 1998;
(c)     Bench/Bar Seminar, 1994;
(d)     Tenth Annual Criminal Law Update, S.C. Bar, 1995;
(e)     The Woman Advocate in S.C., 1995 (as speaker);
(f)     Circuit Judges' Spring Conference, 1995;
(g)     Orientation School for Magistrates, 1995 (as speaker);
(h)     S.C. Judicial Conference, 1995;
(i)     S.C. Tort Law Update, 1995;
(j)     Eleventh Annual Criminal Law Update, S.C. Bar, 1996;
(k)     S.C. Judicial Conference, S.C. Bar, 1996;
(l)     Twelfth Annual Criminal Law Update, S.C. Bar, 1997;
(m)     S.C. Judicial Conference, 1997;
(n)     University of Kansas, Law and Organizational Economics Center, Lawrence, Kansas, 1997 (1 week course);
(o)     Seminar for Chief Judges, 1998;
(p)     Thirteenth Annual Criminal Law Update, S.C. Bar, 1998;
(q)     S.C. Evidence Workshop, S.C. Bar, 1998 (as speaker);
(r)     University of Kansas, Law and Organizational Economics Center, Snowbird, Utah, 1998 (1 week course);
(s)     SCTLA Annual Convention, 1998;
(t)     S.C. Judicial Conference, 1998;
(u)     Circuit Judges' Conference, 1998;
(v)     Fourteenth Annual Criminal Law Update, S.C. Bar, 1998;
(w)     Circuit Judges' Conference, 1999.
Judge Pleicones reported that he has taught the following law-related courses:
(a)     Bridge the Gap for many years through 1996;
(b)     S.C. Association of Legal Secretaries, 1994;
(c)     The Woman Advocate in South Carolina, S.C. Bar, 1995;
(d)     Orientation for S.C. Magistrates, 1995;
(e)     Panelist at SCDTAA meeting, 1995;
(f)     Trial and Appellate Advocacy, S.C. Bar, 1996;
(g)     Alternative Dispute Resolution, S.C. Bar, 1996;
(h)     S.C. Young Lawyers "School for Non-Lawyers," 1996;
(i)     Criminal Practice in S.C., S.C. Bar, 1997;
(j)     Trial and Appellate Advocacy, S.C. Bar, 1998;
(k)     Criminal Practice in S.C., S.C. Bar, 1998.
Judge Pleicones reported that he has not published any books or articles since he wrote for a literary magazine in college.
(4)     Character:
The Commission's investigation of Judge Pleicones did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against him. The Commission's investigation of Judge Pleicones did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Judge Pleicones has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Judge Pleicones was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5)     Reputation:
Judge Pleicones reported that his last available Martindale-Hubbell rating was "AV."
(6)     Physical Health:
Judge Pleicones appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7)     Mental Stability:
Judge Pleicones appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8)     Experience:
Judge Pleicones was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1968. He described his legal experience as follows:
"June 1968-November 1968: Preparation of course materials for proposed South Carolina Bar Course.
November 1968-March 1973: Active Duty United States Army.
Legal experience included: Student, The Judge Advocate General's School, Charlottesville, VA; Chief of Military Justice and Trial Counsel (Prosecutor).
March 1973-February 1975: Assistant Public Defender for Richland County, S.C. Duties entailed defense preparation for and trial of indigent persons accused of criminal offenses. Cases ranged from murder charges through Magistrate and Municipal Court offenses.
February 1975-February 1976: Private practice with law offices of N. Welch Morrisette, and independent contractor with Richland County Public Defender Agency. Private practice duties entailed preparation and trial of federal and state civil matters. Independent contractor duties continued Public Defender duties.
February 1976-March 1977: Chief Deputy Public Defender, Richland County, S.C. Duties included supervision of personnel, in addition to the preparation and trial of major criminal charges such as murder, armed robbery, etc.
March 1977-January 1981: Private practitioner in general civil and criminal practice with the firm of Harrison and Pleicones, Columbia, S.C. Additionally served as Assistant County Attorney for Richland County (August 1977-December 1978) and as County Attorney for Richland County (January 1979-January 1981). Duties included representing Richland County in litigation matters, advising County Council and supervising staff of twelve.
January 1981-June 1991: Sole General Practitioner (January 1981-October 1984). Partner in Lewis, Babcock, Pleicones & Hawkins (formerly Lewis, Babcock, Gregory & Pleicones) of Columbia, SC (October 1984-June 1991). The firm grew in that time from four to thirteen lawyers and engaged in major civil litigation (both plaintiff and defense litigation). Served as member of three person executive committee of the firm. Other responsibilities included legislative monitoring and liaison work with the South Carolina General Assembly for two large trade associations. Additional duties as Municipal Judge for the City of Columbia from September 1982-March 1988.
At all times during my years as a lawyer my emphasis was heavily on trial practice.
July 1991-Present: Resident Circuit Court Judge for the Fifth Judicial Circuit of South Carolina."
Judge Pleicones reported the frequency of his court appearances during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Federal:     5%
(b)     State:         85%
(c)     Other:         10%
Judge Pleicones reported that the percentage of his practice involving civil, criminal, and domestic matters during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Civil:         70%
(b)     Criminal:     10%
(c)     Domestic:     20%
Judge Pleicones reported the percentage of his practice in trial court during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Jury:         5%
(b)     Non-jury:     10 % (Does not include cases that settled or were plead prior to trial)
Judge Pleicones provided that he most often served as sole and/or chief counsel.
The following is Judge Pleicones' account of his most significant litigated matters:
"(a)     Southern Bell v. Steven W. Hamm, 306 S.C. 70, 409 S.E.2d 775 (1991), 60 USLW 2294, 126 P.U.R. 4th 535, 9 ALR 5th 1131. I believe this case was the first in the United States to judicially approve "caller ID" telephone service. Important constitutional questions were implicated, e.g., right to privacy. I argued and won the case in the trial court, and was the principal author of the brief to the South Carolina Supreme Court. I did not argue this case in the Supreme Court, as I was pending swearing in to the Circuit Court. The Supreme Court affirmed;
(b)     Funderburk v. Funderburk, 281 S.C. 246, 315 S.E.2d 126 (Ct. App. 1984) on cert to S.C. Supreme Court 286 S.C. 129, 332 S.E.2d 205 (1985). The Supreme Court ruled that jurisdiction of the question of a property settlement agreement's voluntary nature was properly before the Family Court, and not the Circuit Court. I did not handle the trial, where my client did not prevail, but did handle the appellate stage with co-counsel. Our client prevailed, and the decision was helpful to the bench and bar in clarifying jurisdictional matters;
(c)     Barnwell v. Barber-Coleman Co., 301 S.C. 534, 393 S.E.2d (1989). The Supreme Court held in a case of novel impression that punitive damages are not recoverable in a cause of action based solely upon the theory of strict liability. This question was certified to the Court by the United States District Court. I was involved only at the state court as the author and proponent of an amicus brief filed on behalf of my client, a trade association of property and casualty writers;
(d)     Russo v. Sutton, ___S.C. ___, 422 S.E.2d 750 (1992). In December of 1990, I tried this case in Common Pleas Court in Richland County and secured a verdict for the plaintiff. The case is significant because on appeal the defendant's argument as to the non-viability of the cause of action (alienation of affections) was accepted by the Supreme Court, which prospectively did away with the cause of action;
(e)     State v. Motes, 264 S.C. 317, 215 S.E.2d 190 (1975). I represented Mr. Motes at trial and on appeal. He was convicted of murder largely upon the testimony of his estranged wife, who was allowed to testify over our objection. The case is significant because in interpreting our statute on first impression, the Supreme Court (and of course the trial judge) ruled that the marital privilege belonged to the testifying spouse, not the one testified against."
The following is Judge Pleicones' account of civil appeals he has personally handled:
"(a)     Funderburk v. Funderburk, 281 S.C. 246, 315 S.E.2d 126, (Ct. App. 1984); quashed by S.C. Supreme Court after grant of certiorari. 286 S.C. 129, 332 S.E.2d 205 (1985);
(b)     Hamm v. Southern Bell, 305 S.C. 1, 406 S.E.2d 157 (1991);
(c)     Peoples Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Myrtle Beach Retirement Group, Inc., et al., 300 S.C. 277, 387 S.E.2d 672 (1989);
(d)     Dale v. South Carolina Tax Commission, et al., 276 S.C. 110, 276 S.E.2d 293 (1981). I appeared on behalf of Richland County, another party to the suit;
(e)     Truett v. Georgeson, ___S.C. ___, 258 S.E.2d 499 (1979)."
The following in Judge Pleicones' account of his five most significant criminal appeals:
"(a)     State v. Monroe, 262 S.C. 346, 204 S.E.2d 433 (1974);
(b)     State v. Thomas, 264 S.C. 159, 213 S.E.2d 452 (1975);
(c)     State v. Motes, 264 S.C. 317, 215 S.E.2d 190 (1975);
(d)     State v. Sweet, 270 S.C. 97, 240 S.E.2d 648 (1978);
(e)     State v. Watson, 81-MO-232, (S.C. 1981); cert. denied 454 U.S. 1148, 71 L.Ed.2d 301 (1982)."
Judge Pleicones reported that he has served as a Circuit Court Judge for the Fifth Judicial Circuit of South Carolina from July 1991 to the present. From September 1982 to March 1988, Judge Pleicones was a part-time Municipal Judge in the City of Columbia.
Judge Pleicones identified the following cases as his five most significant orders or opinions:
"(a)     State of South Carolina ex rel. Michael Carter v. The State of South Carolina, et al., 94-CP-40-1566;
(b)     Town of Hilton Head Island, et al. v. Earle E. Morris, Jr., et al., 94-CP-40-4442;
(c)     Byerly Hospital, et al. v. South Carolina State Health and Human Services Finance Commission, 319 S.C. 225, 460 S.E.2d 383 (1995);
(d)     Neese v. Michelin, et al., 324 S.C. 465, 478 S.E.2d 91 (1996);
(e)     State v. Jackson was a spousal sexual criminal jury trial over which I presided."
(9)     Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Judge Pleicones' temperament has been and would continue to be excellent.
(10)     Miscellaneous:
The Midlands Citizens Advisory Committee reported: "Judge Costa M. Pleicones is a highly respected and well-qualified judge. The Committee wholeheartedly recommends Judge Pleicones for the position he seeks."
Judge Pleicones is married to Donna Singletary Pleicones. He has two children, Sara Venetia Pleicones Norrell, clerical staff member with Companion Life (age 29); and Laura Suzanne Pleicones, law student (age 26).
Judge Pleicones reported that he was a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
(a)     S.C. Bar Association (1968 - present);
(b)     S.C. Bar, prior service as member of the House of Delegates;
(c)     Richland County Bar;
(d)     S.C. Woman Lawyers Association;
(e)     S.C. Circuit Judge's Association;
(f)     American Bar Association, served as Delegate from S.C. Circuit Judges Association.
Judge Pleicones provided that he was a member of the following civic, charitable, education, social, or fraternal organizations:
(a)     Charter member (Master of the Bench), John Belton O'Neall Chapter, American Inns of Court;
(b)     Board of Commissioners, Columbia Housing Authority;
(c)     Board Member, Richland County DSS;
(d)     Board Chairperson, Richland County Public Defender Agency;
(e)     United Way Palmetto Society;
(f)     Order of AHEPA;
(g)     WildeWood Country Club.
Judge Pleicones additionally provided, "I do not avoid tough or thankless assignments. I do not exhibit or indulge in favoritism. I am sometimes impatient and abrupt."

Commission's Findings: QUALIFIED
(1)     Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Mr. Shine meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as a judge on the Court of Appeals.
Mr. Shine was born on December 15, 1949. He is 50 years old and a resident of Columbia, South Carolina. Mr. Shine provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1974.
(2)     Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Mr. Shine.
Mr. Shine demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Mr. Shine reported that he has made $20.70 in campaign expenditures for office supplies and copying.
Mr. Shine testified he has not:
(a)     sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)     sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)     asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Mr. Shine testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.

(3)     Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Mr. Shine to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Mr. Shine reported that he has met all continuing legal education requirements during the past five years. He has taken continuing legal education seminars focusing on trial and appellate advocacy, administrative law, and employment law.
(a)     02/07/98 - 10/23/98     Total of 55.50 hours including 10.00 ethics;
(b)     01/24/97 - 10/03/97     Total of 43.75 hours including 8.00 ethics;
(c)     03/11/96 - 11/08/96     Total of 27.75 hours including 3.00 ethics;
(d)     03/03/95 - 08/24/95     Total of 36.00 hours including 7.50 ethics;
(e)     02/14/94 - 10/28/94     Total of 26.75 hours including 2.00 ethics.
Mr. Shine reported that he has taught the following law-related courses:
Mr. Shine has been a moderator at several government law section seminars of the S.C. Bar. He has also conducted agency-wide training on federal standards of conduct and conflicts of interest laws for the U.S. General Services Administration.
Mr. Shine reported that he has published the following:
"A perspective on Title 18 U.S.C. Section 207(g)", in the Ethics Newsgram of the United States Office of Government Ethics (vol.3, no.4, August 1986).
(4)     Character:
The Commission's investigation of Mr. Shine did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against him. The Commission's investigation of Mr. Shine did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Mr. Shine has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Mr. Shine was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5)     Reputation:
Mr. Shine reported that his Martindale-Hubbell rating is "AV."
Mr. Shine was on active duty as Captain with the U.S. Air Force from August 13, 1974, to May 15, 1976. Upon expiration of his reserve commitment, he received an Honorable Discharge.
(6)     Physical Health:
Mr. Shine appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7)     Mental Stability:
Mr. Shine appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8)     Experience:
Mr. Shine was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1974. He described his legal experience as follows:
"Employment: 1974 to 1976 - Office of General Counsel (Honors Program), United States Department of Air Force, specialized in administrative law, and procurement law related matters;
1976 to 1977 - City of Charleston, South Carolina, served as Deputy Corporation Counsel, provided day-to-day legal advice to the Mayor and city department heads, served as principal prosecutor in Municipal Court and police legal advisor;
1977 to 1978 - Walter Bilbro and Associates, P. A., litigated personal injury, commercial and criminal cases in State and Federal courts;
1978 to 1979 - Chapman and Shine, P. A. (formerly Chapman, Sink, and Shine), litigated various civil matters including personal injury, commercial, construction contract claims in State and Federal courts;
1979 to 1980 - Washington, District of Columbia, served as Assistant Corporation Counsel, prosecuted "District of Columbia cases" in the Superior Court, reviewed and recommended welfare fraud cases for Federal prosecution;
1980-1987 - United States General Services Administration; served as Special Counsel to the Administrator and Director of Ethics (Designated Agency Ethics Official), provided legal advice to Administrator of General Services and senior management officials concerning Federal conflicts of interests laws and standards of conduct, reviewed financial disclosure reports of all senior management officials for conflicts of interests, established agency-wide policy on standards of conduct;
1987 to 1993 - State of South Carolina, served as Chief Deputy Attorney General, managed and directed attorneys and support staff of a major civil litigation group, represented the Governor and other members of the State Budget and Control Board in civil litigation matters, directed and participated in post-conviction relief litigation, directed and participated in civil litigation concerning various public interest areas as education, social services, mental health, higher education, voting rights, natural resources, and Federal Civil Rights Acts involving state agencies, institutions, and commissions;
1993 to present - serves as General Counsel to the State Budget and Control Board, represents and advises the Governor and other members of the Budget and Control Board, represents the Budget and Control Board in civil litigation matters, directs legal staff in support of the administrative operations of the Budget and Control Board in diverse areas such as public finance, personnel law, real estate, procurement law, administrative procedures and appeals, constitutional law, and civil defense litigation involving the South Carolina Tort Claims Act."
Mr. Shine reported the frequency of his court appearances during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Federal:     Two to three times per year
(b)     State:         Eight to ten times per year
(c)     Other:         None specified
Mr. Shine reported that the percentage of his practice involving civil, criminal, and domestic matters during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Civil:         100%
Mr. Shine reported the percentage of his practice in trial court during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Non-jury:     100%
Mr. Shine provided that he most often served as chief counsel.
The following is Mr. Shine's account of his five most significant litigated matters:
"(a)     Gilstrap, et al. v. South Carolina Budget and Control Board, 310 S.C. 210, 423 S.E.2d 101 (1992), argued landmark case before the South Carolina Supreme Court concerning the legality of a proposed plan by the State Budget and Control Board to reduce the budget based on growth of individual agency budgets;
(b)     Belton v. The State of South Carolina, et al., 313 S.C. 549, 443 S.E.2d 554 (1994), argued case before the South Carolina Supreme Court concerning the application of the State's Whistleblower Statute involving alleged facts of retaliation by the employing state agency;
(c)     Coble, et al. v. The State of South Carolina, et al., argued unprecedented case before the South Carolina Supreme Court (November 15, 1994) on behalf of the Director of General Services concerning the legality of the Confederate Battle Flag being flown above the State House dome;
(d)     Myers, et al. v. Patterson, et al., 315 S.C. 248, 433 S.E.2d 841 (1993), participated in landmark case before the South Carolina Supreme Court concerning the authority of the South Carolina General Assembly to apply prospectively the collection of state gasoline tax to pay bond indebtedness from Hurricane Hugo;
(e)     Brown v. South Carolina State Board of Education, et al., 301 S.C. 326, 91 S.E.2d 866 (1990), participated in South Carolina Supreme Court case involving the application of administrative due process to the revocation of a teaching certificate."
The following is Mr. Shine's account of five civil appeals he has personally handled:
"(a)     Gilstrap, et al. v. South Carolina Budget and Control Board, 310 S.C. 210, 423 S.E.2d 101 (September 15, 1993), The S.C. Supreme Court;
(b)     Belton v. The State of South Carolina, et al., 313 S.C. 549, 443 S.E.2d 554 (May 9, 1994), The S.C. Supreme Court;
(c)     Coble, et al. v. The State of South Carolina, et al., (unreported, argued on November 15, 1994, dismissed by the S.C. Supreme Court;
(d)     Myers, et al. v. Patterson, et al., 315 S.C. 248, 433 S.E.2d 841 (August 17, 1993), The S.C. Supreme Court;
(e)     Kennedy, et al. v. South Carolina Retirement System and the South Carolina Budget and Control Board, C.A. No.:95-CP-36-268 (argued before the S.C. Supreme Court on May 26, 1999). No opinion has been issued."
Mr. Shine has not handled any direct criminal appeals. However, he has been personally involved in several post-conviction relief (PCR) matters along with his staff that proceeded to appellate review. PCR cases are civil collateral attacks on criminal convictions. The issues argued usually involved the application of federal and state constitutional laws to substantive criminal law matters. The PCR cases Mr. Shine reported being involved with included:
"(a)     Cartrette v. State, 323 S.C. 15, 448 S.E.2d 553 (August 15,1994), submitted to the S.C. Supreme Court without oral argument;
(b)     Ford v. State, 314 S.C. 245, 442 S.E.2d 604 (March 21, 1994), submitted to the S.C. Supreme Court without oral argument;
(c)     Langford v. State, 310 S.C. 357, 426 S.E.2d 793 (February 1, 1993), submitted to the S.C. Supreme Court without oral argument;
(d)     Clark v. State, 315 S.C. 385, 434 S.E.2d 266 (July 12, 1993), submitted to the S.C. Supreme Court without oral argument;
(e)     Richardson v. State, 310 S.C. 360, 426 S.E.2d 795 (February 1, 1993), submitted to the S.C. Supreme Court without oral argument."
(9)     Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Mr. Shine's temperament would be excellent.
(10)     Miscellaneous:
The Midlands Citizens Advisory Committee reported: "The Midlands Advisory Committee finds Joseph D. Shine well qualified for the position he seeks. The Committee wholeheartedly recommends Mr. Shine for a judgeship on the Court of Appeals."
Mr. Shine is married to Margaret Louise Beane Seymour. He has two children: Eric Dawson Shine (age 7); and Craig Allen Seymour, II (Graduate student, age 30).
Mr. Shine reported that he was a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
(a)     S.C. Bar Association (1998 - present);
(b)     Board of Directors, S.C. Bar Foundation (1992 to 1996);
(c)     President of the Board of the S.C. Bar Foundation (1995 to 1996);
(d)     Board of Directors for Trustus Theater (1992 to 1995);
(e)     Secretary to the Board of Trustus Theater (1993 to 1995);
(f)     Past Chairman of the Government Law Section of the S.C. Bar (1993 to 1994);
(g)     Delegate to the House of Delegates, S.C. Bar (1998 to present).
Mr. Shine provided that he was a member of the following civic, charitable, education, social, or fraternal organizations:
(a)     Board of Stewards (Rear Commodore, 1994 to 1995), Lake Murray Sailing Club;
(b)     Board of Directors S.C. Orchestra Association (Philharmonic);
(c)     S.C. Cultural Coordinating Council (rural economic development, 1993 to present).
Mr. Shine received the following honors:
(a)     Order of the Palmetto from Governor Carroll A. Campbell (January 10, 1995);
(b)     Meritorious Service Award (1987) from the Administrator of General Services (United States);
(c)     Community Service Award from Trident United Way (Charleston, S.C., 1980);
(d)     President's Honorary Scholarship and the United States Air Force ROTC Scholarship while attending the Citadel;
(e)     Distinguished Air Force Graduate (1971);
(f)     Earl Warren Scholarship (NAACP Legal Defense Fund) and Harvard University General Scholarship for Financial Assistance while attending Harvard Law School.

Commission's Findings:     QUALIFIED
(1)     Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Judge Shuler meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as a judge of the Court of Appeals.
Judge Shuler was born on May 9, 1948. He is 51 years old and a resident of Kingstree, South Carolina. Judge Shuler provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1973.
(2)     Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Judge Shuler.
Judge Shuler demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Judge Shuler reported that he has not made any campaign expenditures.
Judge Shuler testified he has not:
(a)     sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)     sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)     asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Judge Shuler testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
(3)     Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Judge Shuler to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Judge Shuler described his continuing legal or judicial education during the past five years as having attended all mandatory seminars for Circuit Court judges.
Judge Shuler reported that he has taught the following law-related courses:
(a)     Spoke at CLEs on two occasions, most recently in January 1999, on the topic of jury selection;
(b)     Spoke at the May 1999 Judicial Conference on the topic of death penalty (penalty phase of trial).
Judge Shuler reported that he wrote a chapter on jury selection in Judge Ralph K. Anderson's book, Trial Techniques.
(4)     Character:
The Commission's investigation of Judge Shuler did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances made against him. The Commission's investigation of Judge Shuler did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Judge Shuler has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission noted that Judge Shuler was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5)     Reputation:
Judge Shuler reported that his last available Martindale-Hubbell rating was "BV."
(6)     Physical Health:
Judge Shuler appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7)     Mental Stability:
Judge Shuler appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8)     Experience:
Judge Shuler was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1973. He described his legal experience as follows:
"1973-1974, general practice associated with Leonard B. Burgess, Kingstree, S.C.
1974-1980, general practice, criminal defense, plaintiff's, family, etc., Connor, Connor & Shuler, Kingstree, S.C.
1980-1988, co-public defender for Williamsburg County
1989-1990, deputy solicitor, Williamsburg County
1983-1990, Brown & Shuler, general practice."
Judge Shuler provided that he has served as Circuit Court Judge, At Large Seat No. 3, since 1990.
Judge Shuler reported the frequency of his court appearances during the last five years of his practice, prior to serving on the bench, as follows:
(a)     Federal:     Very rarely practiced in Federal Court
(b)     State:         Very frequently, primarily in General Sessions Court, but frequently in common pleas as well
Judge Shuler reported that the percentage of his practice involving civil, criminal, and domestic matters during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Civil:         60%
(b)     Criminal:     25%
(c)     Domestic:     15%
Judge Shuler reported the percentage of his practice in trial court during the last five years of his practice, prior to serving on the bench, as follows:
(a)     Jury:         70%
(b)     Non-jury:     30%
Judge Shuler provided that he most often served as sole counsel.
The following is Judge Shuler's account of his five most significant litigated matters:
"(a)     State v. McKnight, 291 S.C. 110, 352 S.E.2d 471 (S.C. 1987). Significant decision regarding search and seizure. Argued in Supreme Court;
(b)     State v. Nathaniel Williams, death penalty defense, complete trial. (Appeal handled by appellate defense, although no citation can be found and the defendant may not have perfected any appeal.);
(c)     State v. Silas Cooper, death penalty defense, no appeal;
(d)     State v. Eddie Dean Wilson, no appeal;
(e)     State v. Benedad White, prosecution of major drug dealer in Williamsburg County."
The following is Judge Shuler's account of the civil appeals he has personally handled:
"(a)     Scott v. Boyle, 271 S.C. 252, 246 S.E.2d 887 (S.C. 1978). (Unable to locate briefs, case was argued in early 1970s);
(b)     Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Floyd, 823 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1987);
(c)     Norwood v. American Tobacco Co., 296 S.C. 415, 373 S.E.2d 694 (Ct. App. 1988);
(d)     Carl P. Baker v. Coastal States Life Insurance Co., S.C. Supreme Court Memorandum No. 85-MO-55, filed March 20, 1985."
The following is Judge Shuler's account of a criminal appeal he has personally handled:
"(a)     State v. McKnight, 291 S.C. 110, 352 S.E.2d 471 (S.C. 1987)."
Judge Shuler lists the following significant cases and orders that he has issued while serving as a Circuit Court judge:
"(a)     State v. Ellis Franklin, Appeal from Williamsburg County, M. Duane Shuler, Judge. Supreme Court of S.C. on September 21, 1994 (Opinion No. 24190). Affirmed;
(b)     State v. Gene Raffaldt, Appeal from Kershaw County, M. Duane Shuler, Judge. Supreme Court of S.C. on January 17, 1995 (Opinion No. 24218). Affirmed;
(c)     State v. Ernest Roy Trotter, Appeal from Saluda County, M. Duane Shuler, Judge. Supreme Court of S.C. on November 2, 1994 (Opinion No. 2289). Affirmed;
(d)     City of North Charleston v. Janie M. Claxton and William L. Claxton, Appeal from Charleston County, M. Duane Shuler, Judge. S.C. Court of Appeals on March 23, 1993 (Opinion No. 2113). Affirmed;
(e)     Oree B. Crosby, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Leroy Crosby, Jr., v. Santee Electric Cooperative, Appellant, and Sumter Builders, Inc., Respondent, Appeal from Williamsburg County, M. Duane Shuler, Judge. S.C. Court of Appeals on December 9, 1993 (Opinion No. 94-UP-036)."
Judge Shuler indicated that he has previously served for eight years as the City Recorder for the Town of Kingstree, South Carolina, from 1980 to 1988.
(9)     Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Judge Shuler's temperament has been and would continue to be excellent.
(10)     Miscellaneous:
The Pee Dee Citizens Advisory Committee reported: "The Committee is of the opinion that Judge Shuler is qualified for the position of Judge of the South Carolina Court of Appeals. As a result of its investigation of and interview with Judge Shuler, the Committee recommends/approves this candidate without reservation."
Judge Shuler is married to Glenda Brown Shuler. He has two children: Jonathan Duane Shuler, age 26, employed by Santee Electric Cooperative, Inc., Kingstree, S.C.; and Elizabeth Brown Shuler, age 23, recent graduate of Clemson University (August 6, 1999).
Judge Shuler reported that he was a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
(a)     S.C. Bar Association;
(b)     S.C. Trial Lawyers Association.

Commission's Findings:     QUALIFIED
(1)     Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Judge Sprouse meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as a Family Court judge.
Judge Sprouse was born on July 5, 1964. He is 35 years old and a resident of West Union, South Carolina. Judge Sprouse provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1990.
(2)     Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Judge Sprouse.
Judge Sprouse demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Judge Sprouse reported that he has made minimal campaign expenditures for gasoline and meals.
Judge Sprouse testified he has not:
(a)     sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)     sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)     asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Judge Sprouse testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
(3)     Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Judge Sprouse to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Judge Sprouse described his continuing legal or judicial education during the past five years as follows:
1994     Prof. Ed Systems, Medicine Made Easy for Lawyers;

ATLA Annual Convention;

SCTLA Auto Torts XVII;
1995     S.C. Bar-The Proposed Criminal Rules of Evidence;

SCTLA Auto Torts XVIII;
1996     S.C. Court Administration Orientation School;

SCLTLA Auto Torts XIX;
1997     Oconee Bar, The Case of the Silent Alarm;

SCTLA Auto Torts XX;

S.C. Bar Criminal Procedure (video-Tri County Tech);

S.C. Bar Masters in Trial;
1998     Circuit Court Arbitration Training (Judge Sprouse was certified as a Circuit Court arbitrator and has renewed his certification for 1999);

S.C. Bar, Masters in Trial;

S.C. Bar, Professionalism in Practice;

SCTLA Auto Torts XXI.
Judge Sprouse reported that he has not taught or lectured at any bar association conferences, educational institutions, or continuing legal or judicial education programs.
Judge Sprouse reported that he has not published any books and/or articles.
(4)     Character:
The Commission's investigation of Judge Sprouse did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against him. The Commission's investigation of Judge Sprouse did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Judge Sprouse has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Judge Sprouse was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5)     Reputation:
Judge Sprouse reported that his Martindale-Hubbell rating is "BV."
Judge Sprouse reported that he was a City Attorney for the City of Westminister. He was appointed by the City Council in February 1992 as co-attorney, and has been sole City Attorney since December 1994.
(6)     Physical Health:
Judge Sprouse appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7)     Mental Stability:
Judge Sprouse appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8)     Experience:
Judge Sprouse was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1990. He described his legal experience as follows:
"Aug 1989-Mar 1990     Barnes & Smith, P.A., Beaufort, SC-Associate for an insurance defense firm. I primarily did research and file management. This involved a large amount of discovery documents and briefs prepared for the partners.
Apr 1990-Aug 1991     Morgan Law Firm, Seneca, SC - Partner in a general practice. I began handling various general practice cases including domestic, criminal, real estate, bankruptcy and general litigation.
Aug 1991-Jul 1992     R. Scott Sprouse, Attorney at Law, Seneca, SC - I was a sole proprietor. I continued to handle the same types of cases but added social security and personal injury to my caseload. I also began sharing the City Attorney position for the City of Westminster in February of 1992.
Jul 1992-Dec 1994         Ross, Stoudemire, Ballenger & Sprouse, P.A., Seneca, SC - Partner in general practice firm. My practice primarily involved domestic litigation, criminal cases, personal injury cases and City Attorney work for the City of Westminster. From the Fall of 1993 until early 1994, I served as a Hearing Officer for the ABC Commission.
Jan 1995-Jan 1997     Ross, Stoudemire & Sprouse, P.A., Seneca, SC - My practice stayed virtually the same, but the name of the firm changed. I became the sole City Attorney for Westminster in January of 1995.
Jan 1997 to present     Stoudemire & Sprouse, P.A., Seneca, SC - My practice is the same, but the name of the firm changed again."

Judge Sprouse provided the following description of his experience in Family Court matters:

"I began handling domestic cases almost immediately after starting my practice in Oconee County in the Spring of 1990. I began by handling cases involving litigants with limited resources, but my practice grew. My domestic practice now compiles approximately fifty percent (50%) of my practice.
Divorce and equitable division of property: I have numerous cases on both contested and uncontested matters. I have represented clients ranging from negative marital equity to approximately one million dollars' worth of assets. I have tried many of these cases, the longest of these trials lasting almost three days.
Child Custody: I have been involved in numerous custody cases and have tried many of them. A significant portion of the divorce/separate maintenance actions that I have filed have involved a custody issue, at least initially. I have also served on many occasions as Guardian ad Litem in contested custody cases. In dealing with children's issues, I have dealt with many different facets of these types of cases, involving psychologists, law enforcement, teachers and doctors.
Adoption: Until 1995, I did not handle many adoptions, as another lawyer in our firm did them for several years. I have done several since she left the firm, although it does not compile a large part of my domestic practice.
Abuse & Neglect: I have represented Defendants in contested abuse and neglect cases. These have been situations where the Defendant was charged criminally in General Sessions Court and I undertook simultaneous representation. I have tried a sexual abuse case. I have also represented the Guardian ad Litem Program, although in a substitute role since 1992. I still represent the Guardian ad Litem Program as needed and did so as recently as August 1999 in three hearings. I have never represented the Department of Social Services.
Juvenile Justice: My experience in cases in the Department of Juvenile Justice cases has been limited, as I have never tried a juvenile case. The matters that I have handled were settled out of Court.

The nature of my domestic practice has prepared me well for a role as a Family Court Judge. My domestic practice has been well rounded, giving me insight on many levels. My civil court practice has also given me good experience in other aspects of law. Additionally, I feel as though my background as a Municipal Judge prepares me well to hear Family Court matters, as most Municipal Court matters are non-jury. My role as Municipal Judge requires me to be the trier of fact as well as the judge of the law. I have to listen to witnesses and come to an opinion as to where the truth lies. I also have learned how to deal with attorneys, some of whom are not in agreement with my rulings, and how to keep order in the courtroom."
Judge Sprouse reported the frequency of his court appearances during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Federal:     0
(b)     State:         10 - 15 hearings in Family Court

0 - 3 cases on Common Pleas trial roster

1 - 4 cases on General Sessions list
Judge Sprouse reported that the percentage of his practice involving civil, criminal, and domestic matters during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Civil:         10%
(b)     Criminal:     25%
(c)     Domestic:     50%
Judge Sprouse reported the percentage of his practice in trial court during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Jury:         15%
(b)     Non-jury:     85%
Judge Sprouse provided that he most often served as sole counsel.
The following is Judge Sprouse's account of his five most significant litigated matters:
"(a)     Steven Ray Hammond v. Ruia Boggs & Garland Brewer, d/b/a B & B Mobile Home Park. 93-CP-37-61. I represented the Plaintiff in an action for personal injuries brought under the South Carolina Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. My client's leg was amputated as a result of the injuries that he sustained. I was able to settle this case for $600,000 after mediation by Retired Justice Bruce Littlejohn;
(b)     Vicki W. Miller v. Mark S. Miller. 96-DR-37-136. I represented the Plaintiff in a divorce action. The assets, depending on valuation approached one million dollars. After extensive discovery and negotiations, I was able to settle this case prior to trial;
(c)     Jackie L. Hunt v. Alfred Hunt. 97-DR-37-708. I represented the Plaintiff initially in a separate maintenance action and the subsequent divorce. The parties had approximately one million in assets (over $750,000 in undisputed marital property). The case also involved the issue of periodic alimony, which I was able to secure for my client, along with forty-five (45%) percent of the marital property and attorney's fees. The Defendant filed a notice of intent to appeal, but dismissed the appeal after reviewing the transcript;
(d)     The State v. Robert McClure. 94-DR-37-663, 94-GS-37-0986, 95-GS-37-0429. My client was charged with Criminal Sexual Conduct with a Minor First Degree. I tried the accompanying DSS case in the Oconee Family Court. The DSS case uncovered evidence that led the Oconee County Solicitor's Office to re-evaluate the case. After extensive negotiations, a plea to Lewd Act on a Minor was entered in General Sessions Court for a probationary sentence;
(e)     The State v. Dwight Littleton. 94-GS-37-0594. My client was charged with Criminal Sexual Conduct with a Minor First Degree. I was able to attain a probationary sentence in a negotiated plea."
Judge Sprouse provided that he has filed a Notice of Intent to Appeal only once, with his client deciding to drop the matter after reviewing the transcript. Judge Sprouse has appealed no other domestic cases.
Judge Sprouse reported that has never had a case in which his ruling was appealed to the S.C. Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals. He has been ordered one time by the Circuit Court to grant a new trial as a result of errors made by the court clerk.
(9)     Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Judge Sprouse's temperament has been and would continue to be excellent.
(10)     Miscellaneous:
The Upstate Citizens Advisory Committee reported: "Mr. Sprouse was found to be qualified pursuant to the evaluative criteria."
Judge Sprouse is married to Mary Roddey Stoudemire Sprouse. He has one child: Robert Ward Sprouse (age 2).
Judge Sprouse reported that he is a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
(a)     S.C. Bar Association (1990 - present);
(b)     Oconee County Bar Association (1990 - present);
(c)     S.C. Trial Lawyers Association (1993 - present);
(d)     Association of Trial Lawyers of America (1993 - present);
(e)     Summary Court Judges' Association (1998 - present).
Judge Sprouse provided that he is a member of the following civic, charitable, education, social, or fraternal organizations:
(a)     Seneca Sertoma Club (1990 - present); Secretary 1991 - 1992, Board member 1995 - 1997;
(b)     St. John's Evangelical Lutheran Church (1997 - present); Church Council 1998 - present;
(c)     Joseph J. Norton Camp, SV (1995 - present); camp commander, 1997;
(d)     IPTAY (1986 - present); IPTAY Representative, 1994 - present;
(e)     The Oconee Assembly, 1994 - present.
Judge Sprouse additionally reported that he is an Eagle Scout, and was a member of Troop 312, Boy Scouts of America, in Piedmont, S.C.
Judge Sprouse provided that he is involved in coaching 13 and 14 year old boys' basketball for the City of Walhalla. Judge Sprouse has coached a team since 1996. Several of the players come from disadvantaged backgrounds, and Judge Sprouse reported he feels strongly that youth basketball has helped instill good values in these young men.

Commission's Findings:     QUALIFIED
(1)     Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Judge Stevens meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as a judge on the Court of Appeals.
Judge Stevens was born on October 7, 1949. He is 50 years old and a resident of Irmo, South Carolina. Judge Stevens provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1978.
(2)     Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Judge Stevens.
Judge Stevens demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Judge Stevens reported that he has made $17 in campaign expenditures on postage, envelopes, and copying.
Judge Stevens testified he has not:
(a)     sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)     sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)     asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Judge Stevens testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
(3)     Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Judge Stevens to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Judge Stevens described his continuing legal or judicial education during the past five years as follows:
(a)     State and Local Tax Seminar, January 1994;
(b)     State and Local Tax Seminar, May 1994;
(c)     Paul J. Hartman Tax Forum, August 1994;
(d)     Ethical Issues for Leg. Attorneys, December 1994;
(e)     Corporate, Business and Tax, September 1995;
(f)     NJC: Law Practice Technology, March 1996;
(g)     NJC: Logic and Writing for Judges, July 1996;
(h)     NJC: Computers in the Court Room, October 1996;
(i)     State and Local Tax Seminar, October 1997;
(j)     Decisional Composition, April 1998;
(k)     NJC: Advanced Evidence, October 1998;
(l)     Paul J. Hartman Tax Forum, October 1998.
Judge Stevens has taught or lectured the following law-related courses:
(a)     Fundamentals of Federal Taxation of partnerships, corporations, and estates at Midlands Technical College;
(b)     Guest lectures at U.S.C. Law School, State and Local Tax classes including duties and functions of county officials in property taxation and taxation of railroads under the Federal 4-R Act;
(c)     S.C. Bar: Bridge the Gap, March 1999;
(d)     S.C. Bar: Bridge the Gap, May 1999;
(e)     S.C. Bar: Annual Convention, Governmental Section, Litigating before the ALJD, Summer 1999;
(f)     S.C. Bar: 1999 - That Was the Year That Was - Review of Changes in Administrative Law;
(g)     Greenville County Tax Bar -- Remedies and Procedures for Suits Against State Officials and Administrative Procedures before the S.C. Department of Revenue;
(h)     Columbia Tax Study Group - Tax Practice under the Revenue Procedures Act;
(i)     Federation of Tax Administrators - 42 USC Section 1983 in State Court Tax Disputes;
(j)     SE Association of Tax Attorneys -- Collecting Taxes under an Automatic Stay Due to Bankruptcy and Nexus and Jurisdiction for Taxation of Delaware Holding Companies;
(k)     Vanderbilt University's Paul J. Hartman Tax Forum -- Moot Court Presentation on Taxation of Intangibles and Geoffrey v. South Carolina: Is the Camel's Nose under the Tent?;
(l)     Ohio Tax Conference - Intangibles and the Creation of Nexus for Income Tax Purposes;
(m)     S.C. Chamber of Commerce - Taxes and the Bottom Line: New Tax Appeal Process.
Judge Stevens has published the following:
(a)     "Unwanted Assets Spun Off Prior to Acquisition of Wanted Assets," 1980, S.C. Bar publication;
(b)     "The Use of Title 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 in State Tax Litigation" 1988, Revenue Administration;
(c)     "Delaware Subsidiaries Can Still Reduce Tax But More Planning Needed," March/April 1992, The Journal of Multistate Taxation;
(d)     "Geoffrey v. South Carolina Tax Commission: Is the Camel's Nose Under the Tent?," Tax Management, Multistate Tax Report, December 22, 1995.
(4)     Character:
The Commission's investigation of Judge Stevens did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against him. The Commission's investigation of Judge Stevens did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Judge Stevens has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Judge Stevens was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5)     Reputation:
Judge Stevens reported that he is not rated by Martindale-Hubbell since he is currently sitting as a judge. Judge Stevens also reported he was not rated prior to his election to the Administrative Law Judge Division because he was in public service with the S.C. Attorney General's Office.
(6)     Physical Health:
Judge Stevens appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7)     Mental Stability:
Judge Stevens appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8)     Experience:
Judge Stevens was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1978. He described his legal experience as follows:
"1978-79     Stophel, Caldwell & Heggie;

General corporate practice with emphasis on taxation
1979-80     U.S. Internal Revenue Service;

Federal estate and gift tax return examiner
1980-95     S.C. Attorney General;

Chief Dep. Atty Gen and Dir. of Tax Division; issued Atty. Gen. Opinions and responsible for all tax litigation as well as defense of State at all levels from adm. hearings to trials in the state and federal courts.
1995-present-Adm. Law Judge Division;

Judge presiding over contested cases, appeals and regulation reviews."
Judge Stevens reported the frequency of his court appearances during the last five years of his practice as follows:
(a)     Federal:     Federal District Court twice and U.S. Supreme Court 3 times - once on brief in chief, twice on brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari;
(b)     State:         Trial Court 21 times; 10 appearances with case settled before trial, and 11 appearances conducting trial as lead counsel; S.C. Court of Appeals 3 times; one as lead counsel having written the briefs and making oral argument and two as assisting counsel; and the S.C. Supreme Court 12 times; 8 appearances having written the briefs and making oral argument and 4 as assisting counsel.
Judge Stevens reported the percentage of his practice involving civil, criminal, and domestic matters during the last five years of his practice as follows:
(a)     Civil:         100 %
Judge Stevens reported the percentage of his practice in trial court during the last five years of his practice as follows:
(a)     Non-jury:     100 %
Judge Stevens provided that he most often served as sole counsel.
The following is Judge Stevens' account of his five most significant litigated matters:
"(a)     Spencer v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 281 S.C. 492, 316 S.E.2d 386 (May 15, 1984), Certiorari Granted by 469 U.S. 879, 105 S.Ct. 242, (Oct. 1984), Judgment Affirmed by Spencer v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 471 U.S. 82, 105 S.Ct. 1859 (Mar 27, 1985), Rehearing Denied by 471 U.S. 1112, 105 S.Ct. 2349 (May 13, 1985). This case established that 42 USC Section 1983 could not be used in state court to recover taxes paid and correspondingly established that attorney fees could not be obtained against the State under the companion federal statute of 42 USC Section 1988;
(b)     Reyelt v. State of South Carolina, U.S. District Court, 6:93-1491-3 (Nov. 15, 1993). This decision determined that South Carolina's initial Video Game Machines Act was constitutional in light of challenges that the Act violated free speech, constituted an involuntary taking, created an impairment of contract, failed to grant equal protection, infringed rights under the commerce clause, and denied individual's their rights to privileges and immunities. While upholding the Act in general, the decision did find S.C. Code Ann. Section 12-21-2804's use of the phrase "the primary and substantial portion of the establishment's gross proceeds" to be unconstitutionally vague;
(c)     Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 313 S.C. 15, 437 S.E.2d 13 (Jul 06, 1993), certiorari denied by 510 U.S. 992, 114 S.Ct. 550, (Nov 29, 1993). This decision established that due process is not violated by taxing an entity that utilizes an intangible (i.e. a trademark) in South Carolina to produce income even when the entity has no employees, no office, and no physical presence in the State;
(d)     M. Lowenstein Corp. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 298 S.C. 93, 378 S.E.2d 272 (Ct. App. Mar 13, 1989). This decision determined that due process is not violated by taxing the interest income of a taxpayer so long as the interest income is part of the taxpayer's unitary business and so long as a portion of the unitary business is carried on in South Carolina;
(e)     South Carolina Tax Commission v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 316 S.C. 163, 447 S.E.2d 843 (Jul 18, 1994). This case decided that the Freedom of Information Act does not prevent an agency from disclosing allegedly confidential contract documents and pollution investigation documents when those documents were voluntarily given to the state agency in an effort to lower a tax assessment."
The following is Judge Stevens' account of five civil appeals he has personally handled:
"(a)     Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 313 S.C. 15, 437 S.E.2d 13 (Jul 06, 1993), Certiorari Denied by 510 U.S. 992, 114 S.Ct. 550, (Nov 29, 1993);
(b)     South Carolina Tax Commission v. South Carolina Tax Board. of Review, 305 S.C. 183, 407 S.E.2d 627 (May 06, 1991), Certiorari Denied by Collins Music Co., Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 502 U.S. 1034, 112 S.Ct. 878, (Jan 13, 1992);
(c)     Thayer v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 307 S.C. 6, 413 S.E.2d 810 (Jan 13, 1992), rehearing denied (Feb 20, 1992);
(d)     NCR Corp. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 304 S.C. 1, 402 S.E.2d 666 (Feb 04, 1991), Appeal After Remand, NCR Corp. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 312 S.C. 52, 439 S.E.2d 254 (Dec 13, 1993), Certiorari Denied by NCR Corp. v. South Carolina Dept. of Revenue and Taxation, 512 U.S. 1245, 114, S.Ct. 2763, (Jun 27, 1994);
(e)     M. Lowenstein Corp. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 298 S.C. 93, 378 S.E.2d 272 (Ct. App. Mar 13, 1989)."
Judge Stevens reported he has not handled any criminal appeals.
Judge Stevens reported his five most significant orders as follows:
"(a)     D. Michael Woodward, M.D. v. South Carolina Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation - Division of Professional and Occupational Licensing, Board of Medical Examiners, 98-ALJ-11-0587-AP, June 1, 1999. Allegations of improper sexual conduct by a physician required an appellate review which examined constitutional and statutory challenges to an alleged "unfair hearing" held by the Medical Board. While errors were committed by the Board, a harmless error analysis found the mistakes insufficient to form a basis for reversal of the Board's decision;
(b)     Gaffney Properties as an affiliate of Boyd Management v. Lee S. Harmon, Cherokee County Assessor, 95-ALJ-17-0265-CC, decided November 8, 1995. This case established an innovative method for valuing subsidized housing projects for property tax purposes. The fair market value is based upon adding the value of the rental income stream, the value of the Government's "interest subsidy," and the value of the federal income tax credits granted to owners of subsidized housing;
(c)     Oncology Therapies of Greenville, Inc. v. South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, Greenville Cancer Center, and Greenville Hospital System, 96-ALJ-07-0205-CC, decided June 6, 1997. This case established that the standard of proof in a Certificate of Need (CON) case is that of the preponderance of the evidence with the Administrative Law Judge acting as the fact-finder and the DHEC Board as the appellate review authority. Further, the case established that an ALJ hearing a CON controversy does not act as a mere "reviewer" of the DHEC staff decision. Rather, the ALJ conducts a contested case in which evidence is weighed to determine whether granting or denying a CON is warranted;
(d)     Medstar Ambulance Service, Inc. v. South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, 96-ALJ-07-0498-CC, decided May 6, 1997. This case revoked an ambulance license for numerous violations of DHEC statutes and regulations and required examining dozens of licensing procedures, highway safety statutes, and rules for training, certification and personnel requirements of emergency medical technicians. The case also held the revocation proceeding need not examine evidence under the stringent clear and convincing standard but under the less demanding standard of preponderance of the evidence;
(e)     Dennison A. Royal v. Charleston County Assessor, 95-ALJ-17-0522-CC, decided December 12, 1995. This case found the county's property value methodology discriminated against the taxpayer in violation of the equal protection clause of the Federal and State Constitution. The assessor subjected the taxpayer to a different valuation method than other similarly situated taxpayers. This practice caused a higher value to inherently attach to the taxpayer's property and thus violated his rights to equal treatment and uniformity."
(9)     Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Judge Stevens' temperament has been and would continue to be excellent.
(10)     Miscellaneous:
The Midlands Citizens Advisory Committee reported: "Judge Ray N. Stevens is a well-qualified judge. The Committee wholeheartedly recommends Judge Stevens for a judgeship on the Court of Appeals."
Judge Stevens is married to Janice Louise Shapiro Stevens. He has three children: Ryan Nelson Stevens, 21, college student; Alan Austin Stevens, 18, high school student; and Leah Suzanne Stevens, 10.
Judge Stevens reported that he is a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
(a)     S.C. Bar Association (1978 - present);
(b)     Richland County Bar.
Judge Stevens stated that he is currently Publicity Chairman for the Chapin High School Band Booster Club
Judge Stevens additionally provided that he is the Deacon at First Baptist Church of Columbia, a Sunday school teacher of an adult class, and a Bible study teacher at a senior citizens retirement center.

Commission's Findings:     QUALIFIED
(1)     Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Judge Westbrook meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as a Circuit Court judge.
Judge Westbrook was born on October 3, 1946. He is 53 years old and a resident of West Columbia, South Carolina. Judge Westbrook provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1973.
(2)     Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Judge Westbrook.
Judge Westbrook demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Judge Westbrook reported that he has not made any campaign expenditures.
Judge Westbrook testified he has not:
(a)     sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)     sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)     asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Judge Westbrook testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
(3)     Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Judge Westbrook to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Judge Westbrook described his continuing legal or judicial education during the past five years as follows:
(a)     Attended all required CLE seminars in South Carolina;
(b)     National Judicial College, General Jurisdiction Course (3 weeks);
(c)     National Judicial College, Death Penalty Course (1 week);
(d)     National Judicial College, Advanced Evidence (1 week).
Judge Westbrook reported that he has taught the following law-related courses:
(a)     Domestic Abuse Seminar, General Discussion of New Law, November 1985;
(b)     S.C. Social Workers' Seminar, Update on Children's Rights, September 1989;
(c)     "Cocaine Babies" Seminar, Rights of "Cocaine Baby" Mothers, December 1991;
(d)     Family Court Judges Association, "Mediation/Administrative Duties," May 1993;
(e)     S.C. Bar-Bridge the Gap, "Practice in Circuit Courts," March 1997;
(f)     S.C. Bar-Bridge the Gap, "Practice in Circuit Courts," May 1997;
(g)     S.C. Bar-Bridge the Gap, "Practice in Circuit Courts," March 1998;
(h)     S.C. Bar-Bridge the Gap, "Practice in Circuit Courts," May 1998;
(i)     "Ethics in General Practice," September 1998;
(j)     Lecture to Russian Officers, "Overview of S.C. Courts," September 1998;
(k)     Criminal Law CLE, "Ethics for Criminal Law Practice," November 1998;
(l)     Administrative Judges Seminar, "Cooperation Between Family Court and Circuit Court," December 1998;
(m)     S.C. Coalition Against Domestic Violence & Sexual Assault, "Expert Witnesses," December 1998;
(n)     Circuit Judges Association, Voir Dire in Capital Cases," May 12, 1999;
(o)     Annual Judicial Conference, "Drug Courts in South Carolina," August 19, 1999
(p)     Annual Criminal Law Seminar, S.C. Bar, "Criminal Law Update for Judges," January 2000. (Committed to this seminar; preparing written background for presentation in January.)
(Numerous other speeches and addresses to civic, school and church groups.)
Judge Westbrook reported that he has published the following:
(a)     South Carolina Lawyer, "Balancing the Scales: Victims' Rights in South Carolina's Justice System," May/June 1999;
(b)     S.C. Bar, Bridge the Gap, "Practice in Circuit Courts," March1998/1999;
(c)     Article for Circuit Judges, "Handling Voir Dire in Capital Cases," May 1999;
(d)     Article for 2000 Criminal Law Seminar. "Update--Appellate Instructions to Judges in 1999," January 2000 (Now in preparation).
(4)     Character:
The Commission's investigation of Judge Westbrook did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against him. The Commission's investigation of Judge Westbrook did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Judge Westbrook has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Judge Westbrook was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5)     Reputation:
Judge Westbrook reported that he is not rated by Martindale-Hubbell.
Judge Westbrook has held the following public offices:
1976-78     Chairman, Lexington County Council - Elected;
1978-83     S.C. House of Representatives - Elected.
(6)     Physical Health:
Judge Westbrook appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7)     Mental Stability:
Judge Westbrook appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8)     Experience:
Judge Westbrook was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1973. He described his legal experience as follows:
"1973-79     Bryan, Crosby & Bates         General & Trial Practice
1979-80     Turnipseed, Westbrook & Dew     Trial Practice
1980-83     Solo Practitioner             General & Trial Practice
1983-94     Family Court Judge             Domestic Cases
1994-Now     Circuit Court Judge             General Jurisdiction."
Judge Westbrook has held the following judicial offices:
1974-1975         Municipal Judge, Springdale, S.C., Summary, Appointed;
1983-1994         Family Court Judge, Domestic, Elected by Legislature;
1994-Present     Circuit Court Judge, General, Elected by Legislature.
Judge Westbrook listed his five most significant orders or opinions as follows:
"(a)     K.L.G. v. G.A.G., (Initials used to protect privacy of parties.) Significant case in Family Court involving whether "second-hand" smoke affected a child in a custody issue. Doctor testified child's breathing problems were substantially aggravated by the mother's smoking habit, even to the point of endangering his health. Mother testified, however, that she had tried to quit smoking, but could not do so. With other factors being equal, I awarded custody to the father based on health problems created by mother's smoking;
(b)     American Heart Association, et al. v. County of Greenville, et al., 489 S.E.2d 921, 331 S.C. 498 (1997) This case centered around the will of deceased baseball player, "Shoeless Joe" Jackson. Jackson was a member of the 1919 Chicago White Sox baseball team which was charged with having "fixed" the World Series. Even though he was the most famous player of the eight who were banned from baseball, he could neither read nor write. Recent attention has been given to efforts to put Jackson in the Baseball Hall of Fame, however; and with this attention, it was discovered that his original signature was worth approximately $100,000. On learning that fact, the American Heart Association and Cancer Society, heirs of Mrs. Jackson's estate, brought an action to obtain his will, which bore his original signature. (He had no children.) The issue was whether to allow private citizens or groups to obtain original copies of documents filed with public agencies. I ruled that the original will of Mr. Jackson was public record, and not part of the estate. The Supreme Court affirmed;
(c)     The State v. Levar Bryant. (Now under appeal on the guilt issue.) Capital Case. Defendant was found guilty of the murder of a DHEC employee in a parking lot during his lunch break. His defense in the sentencing phase was that he had suffered brain damage by eating asbestos as a child. Numerous expert witnesses testified to the medical and psychological effects of asbestos on children. Jury sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment;
(d)     Delton R. Munn v. Nucor Steel, Division of Nucor Corp., Employer, and Wausau Insurance Companies, Court of Appeals, Opinion # 2997 (May 24, 1999) A novel issue in workers' compensation cases. The claimant was awarded permanent disability and lifetime medical treatment. He later had a heart attack -- which he admitted was not causally related to his injuries - and claimed that the lifetime medical treatment award should include his heart treatment. The issue was whether the term "reasonable and necessary" included medical treatment for unrelated conditions. I ruled that the heart condition was not covered by the term "reasonable and necessary." The Court of Appeals affirmed;
(e)     The State v. Joseph Kelsey, 502 S.E.2d 63, 331 S.C. 50 (1998) A murder case in which two co-defendants were charged with killing a young woman by putting a pipe bomb in her mouth. The co-defendants employed antagonistic defenses, and severance was a major legal issue. A major factual issue was whether the victim was dead or alive at the time the pipe bomb was used. The case required extremely delicate and precise rulings because of the possibility of severance if either defendant was allowed to prejudice the other. In the opinion, the Supreme Court addressed twelve different issues of substance, attesting to the heightened atmosphere and contentiousness of the case. The Supreme Court affirmed."
(9)     Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Judge Westbrook's temperament has been and would continue to be excellent.
(10)     Miscellaneous:
The Midlands Citizens Advisory Committee reported: "The Midlands Advisory Committee finds Judge Marc H. Westbrook to be a well-qualified judge. The Committee wholeheartedly recommends his re-election to Seat 2, Circuit Court for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit."
Judge Westbrook is married to Linda Louise Lawhon Westbrook. He has two children: Thadeous Herbert Westbrook III (Judicial Law Clerk for Hon. G. Ross Anderson, District Court Judge, age 24); and Richard Neal Westbrook (Student, age 21).
Judge Westbrook reported that he was a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
(a)     S.C. Bar Association (1973 - present);
(b)     Lexington County Bar (1973 - present);
(c)     S.C. Circuit Judges' Association (1994 - present);
(d)     American Judicature Society (1995 - present).
Judge Westbrook provided that he was a member of the following civic, charitable, education, social, or fraternal organizations:
(a)     Dixie Boys Baseball, President;
(b)     Lexington Baptist Association, Member, Executive Committee;
(c)     Congaree Baptist Church, Music Director;
(d)     Springdale Baptist Church, Deacon, Teacher, Moderator;
(e)     Palmetto Master Singers;
(f)     Woodmen of the World;
(g)     Masons.
Judge Westbrook additionally reported he is involved with a number of bar-related and law-related activities:
(a)     Joint Commission on Alternative Dispute Resolution. Judge Westbrook is one of two circuit judges appointed to this Commission by the Chief Justice. They have been assigned the task of developing a statewide alternative dispute resolution program in South Carolina, particularly mediation and arbitration. Judge Westbrook provided that he also began the first long-term successful mediation program in Lexington County;
(b)     Drug Court. Judge Westbrook presides weekly, along with another judge in his circuit, over sessions of "Drug Court." This is a two-track program. The other judge deals with individuals who are in Drug Court as a condition of their bond (Pre-Trial Diversion) and Judge Westbrook presides over the portion dealing with individuals who have been convicted or have pled guilty and are in Drug Court as a condition of their probation;
(c)     High-School Mock Trial. Judge Westbrook is Chairman of the Mock Trial sub-committee of the L.R.E. Division. He has been involved in this program for 12 years, and has presided over the state finals five to six times. Judge Westbrook has presided over national Mock Trial Competitions four times, including once in the final round of the National Championship. Additionally, he has presided over a number of school-related mock trials in elementary and high schools, and at the law school;
(d)     Judge Westbrook currently sits on the Mock Trial 2000 Committee, which is handling the National Finals in Columbia, in May 2000. He was also involved in the effort, along with bar representatives, to secure this program for Columbia;
(e)     New Lexington County Courthouse. Judge Westbrook serves as informal "chairman" of a committee appointed by Lexington County Council to plan and develop a new courthouse for Lexington County;
(f)     Court Web-Site. Judge Westbrook is working with the county to develop a web-site for the court system in Lexington County. He provided that he hopes to include the civil docket, mediation and arbitration information, information about the courts and judges, and frequently asked questions.

Commission's Findings:     QUALIFIED
(1)     Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Mr. White meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as a Family Court judge.
Mr. White was born on June 16, 1957. He is 42 years old and a resident of Union, South Carolina. Mr. White provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1983.
(2)     Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Mr. White.
Mr. White demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Mr. White reported that he has not made any campaign expenditures.
Mr. White testified he has not:
(a)     sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b)     sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator;
(c)     asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Mr. White testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report
(3)     Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Mr. White to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Mr. White described his continuing legal or judicial education during the last five years by stating he has attended numerous continuing legal education seminars sanctioned by the S.C. Bar Association. He believes that he has exceeded the minimum requirements for continuing legal education in the last five years.
Mr. White stated that on May 14, 1999, he presented a CLE lecture for the S.C. Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers entitled "Don't Overlook the Obvious" which examined fundamental aspects of trial preparation.
Mr. White reported that he has not published any books and/or articles.
(4)     Character:
The Commission's investigation of Mr. White did not reveal evidence of any founded grievances or criminal allegations made against him. The Commission's investigation of Mr. White did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Mr. White has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Mr. White was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5)     Reputation:
Mr. White reported that his Martindale-Hubbell rating is "BV."
(6)     Physical Health:
Mr. White appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7)     Mental Stability:
Mr. White appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8)     Experience:
Mr. White was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1983. He described his legal experience as follows:
"I began practicing law in my hometown of Union, S.C., with William E. Whitney, Jr., in November 1983. I have practiced with this firm exclusively for almost sixteen years now. We now have four attorneys in this firm and the firm name is now Whitney, White, Diamaduros & Diamaduros. I would describe my practice as a general trial practice with emphasis in Plaintiff's litigation, workers' compensation, real estate loan closings, criminal defense and domestic practice."
Mr. White provided the following description of his experience in Family Court matters:
"I would estimate that 30% of my practice is involved with Family Court work. In the areas of divorce, equitable division of property and child custody, I would estimate that I open approximately sixty new cases per year. The majority of divorce actions that I handle involve the equitable division of marital property and debt. Obviously, the amount of property and debt involved in each of these cases varies. Though custody of children is not a contested issue in the majority of the divorce cases that I have handled over the years, I have handled at least fifteen contested custody cases.
In the area of adoption, I have handled approximately ten adoptions during my sixteen years of practice.
In the area of abuse and neglect, I have served as appointed counsel for both individuals accused of abuse and neglect and as attorney and guardian ad litem for children victim of such abuse and neglect. I would estimate that I have been appointed in these areas involving cases of this type on an average of at least twice per year throughout the course of my practice.
In the area of juvenile justice, I have served as both appointed counsel and retained counsel in matters for Defendants in juvenile justice proceedings on an average of approximately four times per year over the course of my practice."
Mr. White reported the frequency of his court appearances during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Federal:     0
(b)     State:         60 times per year
Mr. White reported that the percentage of his practice involving civil, criminal, and domestic matters during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Civil:         40%
(b)     Criminal:     30%
(c)     Domestic:     30%
Mr. White reported the percentage of his practice in trial court during the last five years as follows:
(a)     Jury:         30%
(b)     Non-jury:     70%
Mr. White provided that he most often served as sole counsel.
The following is Mr. White's account of his five most significant litigated matters:
"(a)     State v. Wilbur Thompson, 90-GS-44-135. I was lead defense counsel in this death penalty murder trial. My client was a 43-year-old black male with a previous record for voluntary manslaughter. He was accused of the brutal murder of an elderly white peddler in Union County. I was appointed to represent Mr. Thompson and I utilized an alibi defense. Mr. Thompson was acquitted;
(b)     State v. Gerald Dean Canupp, 90-GS-44-550. I was retained counsel for Mr. Canupp in this murder trial. I utilized an accident defense, resulting in an acquittal for Mr. Canupp;
(c)     Robertha Davis v. Harold J. Booker and Terry Jeter, 93-CP-44-74; This personal injury trial in Union County Common Pleas Court was not significant for the amount of the verdict obtained; however, this litigation was somewhat unique in that the Defendants held liable for my client's damages had no one of impact with my client's vehicle or any of the other vehicles involved in the accident;
(d)     Karl D. Pendergrass v. Dorothea B. Pendergrass, 91-DR-44-128: This domestic action was a bitterly contested matter, particularly in the area of equitable distribution of property and debt. This case was significant in that it afforded an opportunity to utilize and consider practically every factor to be considered in the equitable distribution of property, including relative income of the parties, the property brought into the marriage, contributions to the accumulation of property, and misconduct affecting marital property. This case even involved an allegation of destruction of marital property by arson, even though this element was never fully developed;
(e)     James Garner v. Julie Adams, 98-DR-44-392. I served as a guardian ad litem in this change of custody action brought by father against mother. This case was significant in that it involved practically every factor that could be considered in determining what was in the best interest of the children. This case included questions of moral fitness of the mother, educational consideration of the children, medical considerations for the children, disciplinary considerations with respect to the children and social environment considerations for the sake of children."
Mr. White reported that he has never filed an appeal in a Family Court case;
Mr. White stated that he has personally handled the following four appeals to the S.C. Court of Appeals:
"(a)     Walker, et al. v. Harris, (291 S.C. 454, 354 S.E.2d 56) S.C. Ct. of Appeals, March 2, 1987;
(b)     Davis v. G.E. Haltiwanger Trucking, Inc., Mem. Op. 90-MO-163, S.C. Ct. of Appeals, 10/31/90;
(c)     Knox v. Bogan, 322 S.C. 64, 472 S.E.2d 43, S.C. Ct. of Appeals, May 28, 1996;
(d)     State v. Kimbrell, 326 S.C. 344, 481 S.E.2d 456, S.C. Ct. of Appeals, February 10, 1997."
(9)     Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Mr. White's temperament would be excellent.
(10)     Miscellaneous:
The Piedmont Citizens Advisory Committee reported: "We found Mr. White extremely qualified. He was most cordial to the Committee. The comments received were positive in nature. His enthusiasm for the community at large and children was infectious. The Committee was pleased that his references included people of color. References called him an outstanding young man, a good citizen. One retired coach and now city councilman fondly remembered him from high school."
Mr. White is married to Ann Brueckner White. He has two children: Kelsey Ann White, age 11; and Caitlin Thomas White, age 8.
Mr. White reported that he was a member of the following bar associations and professional associations:
(a)     S.C. Bar Association;
(b)     Union County Bar Association;
(c)     Union County Defender Corporation Board of Directors, (Treasurer 1986 - 1998; current Vice Chairman);
(d)     S.C. Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, (Current member of Board of Directors from 16th Judicial Circuit);
(e)     Association of S.C. Claimant Attorneys for Workers' Compensation;
(f)     Former member of American Bar Association;
(g)     S.C. Bar Foundation.
Mr. White provided that he was a member of the following civic, charitable, education, social, or fraternal organizations:
(a)     First Presbyterian Church (Elder, Deacon, Treasurer, Finance Chairman, Sunday School Teacher, Choir member);
(b)     Union County Disabilities and Special Needs Board (Current Board Member and Vice Chairman);
(c)     Union County Literacy Council (Board Member and former Chairman);
(d)     Providence Presbytery Bethelwoods Camp and Conference Center Division Board Member (currently serving);
(e)     Providence Presbytery Central American Traveler, June 1999;
(f)     Former member of Union County United Way Board (former Chairman and Vice Chairman).
Mr. White additionally provided: "In my professional practice and in my life, I have endeavored to be of service to my fellow man and my community. This position would provide me with a unique opportunity to continue this service."

The following persons were found qualified:
Judge Gary E. Clary     Associate Justice, Supreme Court, Seat 2
Judge Jasper M. Cureton     Associate Justice, Supreme Court, Seat 2
Judge Costa M. Pleicones     Associate Justice, Supreme Court, Seat 2
Judge E.C. Burnett, III     Associate Justice, Supreme Court, Seat 5
Judge Mary E. Buchan     Judge, Court of Appeals, Seat 3
Joseph D. Shine     Judge, Court of Appeals, Seat 3
Judge M. Duane Shuler     Judge, Court of Appeals, Seat 3
Judge Ray N. Stevens     Judge, Court of Appeals, Seat 3
Judge Thomas E. Huff     Judge, Court of Appeals, Seat 8
Judge Howard P. King     Circuit Court for the Third Judicial Circuit, Seat 2
J. Michael Baxley     Circuit Court for the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Seat 2
Judge L. Casey Manning     Circuit Court for the Fifth Judicial Circuit, Seat 2
Judge Donald W. Beatty     Circuit Court for the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Seat 2
Judge James W. Johnson, Jr. .     Circuit Court for the Eighth Judicial Circuit, Seat 2
Judge Daniel F. Pieper.     Circuit Court for the Ninth Judicial Circuit, Seat 2
Judge Alexander S. Macaulay     Circuit Court for the Tenth Judicial Circuit Seat 2
Judge William Paul Keesley     Circuit Court for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Seat 1
Judge Marc H. Westbrook     Circuit Court for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Seat 2
Judge B. Hicks Harwell, Jr.     Circuit Court for the Twelfth Judicial Circuit, Seat 1
John C. Few     Circuit Court for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Seat 2
Judge Robert N. Jenkins, Sr.     Circuit Court for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Seat 2
Edward W. "Ned" Miller     Circuit Court for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Seat 2
Perry M. Buckner     Circuit Court for the Fourteenth Judicial Circuit, Seat 1
Diane M. DeWitt     Circuit Court for the Fourteenth Judicial Circuit, Seat 1
Karen F. Ballenger     Family Court for the Tenth Judicial Circuit, Seat 2
Timothy M. Cain     Family Court for the Tenth Judicial Circuit, Seat 2
Judge R. Scott Sprouse     Family Court for the Tenth Judicial Circuit, Seat 2
Donna Earls Elder     Family Court for the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit, Seat 1
Robert E. Guess     Family Court for the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit, Seat 1
Thomas H. White, IV     Family Court for the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit, Seat 1
Judge Carolyn C. Matthews     Administrative Law Judge Division, Seat 3
Judge John D. Geathers     Administrative Law Judge Division, Seat 4

Respectfully submitted,
Senator Glenn F. McConnell                     Rep. F. G. Delleney, Jr.
Senator Edward E. Saleeby                     Senator Thomas L. Moore
Rep. Wm. Douglas Smith                         Rep. Ralph W. Canty
Dr. Harry M. Kightsey, Jr.                         Judge Curtis G. Shaw
Mrs. Amy Johnson McLester                     Richard S. Fisher, Esquire

Received as information.

The following was received.

TO:             The Clerk of the Senate

The Clerk of the House

FROM:     Committee to Review Candidates for the

South Carolina Public Service Commission

DATE:         January 11, 2000

In compliance with the provisions of Sections 58-3-26 and 2-19-30(D), Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1976, it is respectfully requested that the following information be printed in the Journals of the Senate and the House.

Donald H. Holland, Chairman

Pursuant to Act No. 181 of 1993, the Committee to Review Candidates for the South Carolina Public Service Commission (hereinafter "Committee") was organized to consider the qualifications of candidates for the Second District of the South Carolina Public Service Commission (hereinafter "Commission"), created by the resignation of Commissioner C. Dukes Scott on June 7, 1999, whose term expires on June 30, 2002. The Committee is composed of ten members, six of whom are members of the General Assembly, and four of whom are members of the public. While its statutory mission does not include selecting or nominating the most qualified persons for service on the Commission, the Committee has determined that it does bear responsibility to supply the General Assembly with findings regarding each candidate's capabilities, giving special attention to any issue or concern which might limit a commissioner's effectiveness. In making its findings, the Committee is charged with "find[ing] the best qualified people giving due consideration to their ability and integrity."

The determination of legal qualifications is limited to a determination of the candidate's residence in the appropriate Public Service Commission district as established by Section 58-3-20, the candidate's eligibility for election as determined by Section 58-3-24, and the candidate's compliance with constitutional provisions limiting election to those persons eligible to be electors of this State.

To fulfill its mandate to determine fitness beyond mere legal qualifications, the Committee conducted an intensive review of each candidate's (1) experience, (2) temperament, (3) sensitivity to legal and ethical constraints on public service, and (4) knowledge of Commission operations.

An explanation of these four benchmarks which the Committee used to judge the qualifications of candidates is as follows:

By statutory mandate, this Committee is charged with considering the knowledge and experience of potential commissioners "in such varied fields as business, government, accounting, law, engineering, statistics, consumer affairs, and finance." The Committee looked for persons who have excelled in these fields and those persons' capability to transfer this success and knowledge to the operations of the Commission. The transcript contained in this report contains each applicant's background and employment history.

The Commission is neither a court, an executive agency, nor a legislative body, but a blend of all three. The Committee sought to determine if a candidate's sense of the role or roles he is to fill on the Commission is such that his work will be productive, proactive, and protective of the interests of all South Carolinians.

Each candidate carries a wealth of life experiences as well as business and personal relationships. The Committee realizes that there is little possibility of electing candidates with no pre-existing conflicts of interest. To do so would, in effect, be asking candidates to have totally disassociated themselves from the "real world" and would be a direct repudiation of this Committee's statutory mandate to find candidates with experience in business, law, and other fields. However, the Committee finds an important standard to be that a candidate recognizes when he may have a conflict of interest between his existing responsibilities and/or business interests and his future duties as a commissioner. The Committee strongly feels that a candidate should not only readily recognize these conflicts of interest, but should pro-actively and willingly offer to divest or divorce himself from such conflicts of interest. The Committee believes that the reluctance of a candidate to readily recognize or willingly divest or divorce himself of such interests during the intense public scrutiny of these screening hearings is a likely indicator of that candidate's future unwillingness to avoid conflicts of interest when called upon to do so in a less public forum--Public Service Commission deliberations.

The Committee also strongly feels that candidates for the Commission who serve or have served as public officials, public members, or public employees must have demonstrated high ethical standards through compliance with all laws governing ethical behavior, most notably those provisions of Title 8. In order to withstand public scrutiny and to gain public confidence, these candidates for the Commission must have conducted and comported themselves with the highest regard for ethics in their actions as public officials, members, or employees.

In this regard, and pursuant to Section 58-3-26, the Committee has made findings as to integrity.

The Committee's findings are designated as follows:

QUALIFIED

UNQUALIFIED

The Committee acknowledges its statutory duty to recognize those candidates who are the most qualified in this regard. However, it would be patently unfair to require nonincumbents to have accumulated a wealth of knowledge about Commission operations specifically, or regulated utilities generally. Unlike incumbent commissioners, challengers have not had the benefit of a compensated opportunity to educate themselves in hearings or through conversations with Commission staff. The Committee expects that incumbents and others with substantial experience before the Commission should be able to discuss these matters with a greater fluency than those persons who have to date committed themselves to other employment. However, every candidate, whether incumbent or nonincumbent, must be required to demonstrate some basic understanding of the role of the Commission and its operations. The Committee emphasizes that the substantive knowledge findings contained in this report are merely a measure of a candidate's knowledge at the time of his candidacy and are by no means indicative of a candidate's ability to subsequently master Commission operations and the multitude of issues relating thereto.

The Committee adopted a written format to assist in judging the substantive knowledge of each candidate. In previous screenings, where substantive knowledge was examined solely in an oral format, candidates whose screenings occurred toward the conclusion of the hearings were at a decided advantage. Because the Committee's hearings are open to the public, the content of questions relating to substantive knowledge could be readily discerned from the screening of an earlier-scheduled candidate. The sequestration of candidates did little to remedy the unfairness.

For this round of screening, a written format was used to preserve the integrity of the process and to survey a candidate's general and specific knowledge of the workings of the Commission. Candidates were instructed to choose three discussion questions among the six provided. No candidate had the personal advantage of access to the questions prior to other candidates; nor did any candidate have the opportunity to divulge the nature of the questions to another candidate. Each candidate was given the choice of writing his or her answers or using a computer.

The Committee fee