S 232 Session 111 (1995-1996)
S 0232 General Bill, By Ford
A BILL TO ENACT THE "OMNIBUS CRIMINAL PROCESS REFORM ACT OF 1995", TO AMEND
CHAPTER 5, TITLE 14, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO CIRCUIT
COURTS, BY ADDING SECTION 14-5-615 SO AS TO VEST THE PREPARATION OF THE
DOCKETS FOR GENERAL SESSIONS COURT IN THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE FOR
GENERAL SESSIONS COURT FOR A JUDICIAL CIRCUIT; TO AMEND CHAPTER 23, TITLE 17
OF THE 1976 CODE, RELATING TO PLEADING AND TRIAL IN CRIMINAL CASES, BY
DESIGNATING SECTIONS 17-23-10 THROUGH 17-23-165 AS ARTICLE 1 AND BY ADDING
ARTICLE 3, THE "SPEEDY TRIAL ACT", SO AS TO PROVIDE TIME LIMITS WITHIN WHICH
AN INFORMATION OR INDICTMENT MUST BE FILED AGAINST AN ARRESTED PERSON, TO
PROVIDE TIME LIMITS BETWEEN INDICTMENT OR INFORMATION AND THE TRIAL OF A
DEFENDANT, TO PROVIDE SANCTIONS FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE TIME LIMITS, AND TO
PROVIDE A PROCEDURE IN WHICH THE "SPEEDY TRIAL ACT" MAY BE SUSPENDED IN A
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT; TO AMEND CHAPTER 19, TITLE 17, RELATING TO INDICTMENTS, BY
ADDING SECTION 17-19-15, SO AS TO PROVIDE FOR A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR
CRIMINAL OFFENSES; AND TO REPEAL SECTION 1-7-330, RELATING TO CIRCUIT
SOLICITORS' ATTENDANCE AT GENERAL SESSIONS COURT AND THE PREPARATION AND
PUBLICATION OF THE GENERAL SESSIONS DOCKET.
10/17/94 Senate Prefiled
10/17/94 Senate Referred to Committee on Judiciary
01/10/95 Senate Introduced and read first time SJ-79
01/10/95 Senate Referred to Committee on Judiciary SJ-79
A BILL
TO ENACT THE "OMNIBUS CRIMINAL PROCESS
REFORM ACT OF 1995", TO AMEND CHAPTER 5,
TITLE 14, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976,
RELATING TO CIRCUIT COURTS, BY ADDING SECTION 14-5-615 SO AS TO VEST THE PREPARATION OF THE
DOCKETS FOR GENERAL SESSIONS COURT IN THE CHIEF
ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE FOR GENERAL SESSIONS COURT
FOR A JUDICIAL CIRCUIT; TO AMEND CHAPTER 23, TITLE
17 OF THE 1976 CODE, RELATING TO PLEADING AND
TRIAL IN CRIMINAL CASES, BY DESIGNATING SECTIONS
17-23-10 THROUGH 17-23-165 AS ARTICLE 1 AND BY
ADDING ARTICLE 3, THE "SPEEDY TRIAL ACT",
SO AS TO PROVIDE TIME LIMITS WITHIN WHICH AN
INFORMATION OR INDICTMENT MUST BE FILED AGAINST
AN ARRESTED PERSON, TO PROVIDE TIME LIMITS
BETWEEN INDICTMENT OR INFORMATION AND THE
TRIAL OF A DEFENDANT, TO PROVIDE SANCTIONS FOR
VIOLATIONS OF THE TIME LIMITS, AND TO PROVIDE A
PROCEDURE IN WHICH THE "SPEEDY TRIAL
ACT" MAY BE SUSPENDED IN A JUDICIAL CIRCUIT;
TO AMEND CHAPTER 19, TITLE 17, RELATING TO
INDICTMENTS, BY ADDING SECTION 17-19-15, SO AS TO
PROVIDE FOR A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR
CRIMINAL OFFENSES; AND TO REPEAL SECTION 1-7-330,
RELATING TO CIRCUIT SOLICITORS' ATTENDANCE AT
GENERAL SESSIONS COURT AND THE PREPARATION AND
PUBLICATION OF THE GENERAL SESSIONS DOCKET.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of South
Carolina:
SECTION 1. Article 7, Chapter 5, Title 14 of the 1976 Code is
amended by adding:
"Section 14-5-615. Preparation of the dockets for general
sessions courts shall be exclusively vested in the Chief
Administrative Judge for General Sessions Court in a judicial
circuit, as designated by the Chief Justice of the South Carolina
Supreme Court. The Chief Administrative Judge, at the earliest
practicable time, shall, after consultation with the counsel for the
defendant and the solicitor, set the case for trial on a day certain, or
list it for trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at a
place within the county, so as to assure a speedy trial."
SECTION 2. Section 17-23-10 through Section 17-23-165 shall be
designated as "Article 1, General Provisions".
SECTION 3. Chapter 23, Title 17 of the 1976 Code is amended
by adding:
"Article 3
Speedy Trial Act
Section 17-23-195. As used in this article:
(A) The terms `judge' or `judicial officer' mean, unless
otherwise indicated, any magistrate, municipal court judge, or
circuit court judge.
(B) The term `chief judge' means the Chief Administrative
Judge for General Sessions Court in a judicial circuit, as designated
by the Chief Justice of the South Carolina Supreme Court.
(C) The term `offense' means any offense triable in the court of
General Sessions which is in fact tried in the court of General
Sessions, and any offense triable in the court of General Sessions
which is transferred to magistrate's court pursuant to Section 22-2-545.
Section 17-23-200. (A) In any case involving a defendant
charged with an offense, the chief judge, at the earliest practicable
time, shall, after consultation with the counsel for the defendant and
the solicitor, set the case for trial on a day certain, or list it for trial
on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at a place within the
county, so as to assure a speedy trial.
(B) Any information or indictment charging an individual with
the commission of an offense shall be filed within thirty days from
the date on which such individual was arrested or served with a
summons in connection with such charges. If an individual has
been charged with a felony in a county in which no grand jury has
been in session during such thirty-day period, the period of time for
filing of the indictment shall be extended an additional thirty days.
(C)(1) In any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the
trial of a defendant charged in an information or indictment with
the commission of an offense shall commence within seventy days
from the filing date (and making public) of the information or
indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared before a
judicial officer of the court in which such charge is pending,
whichever date last occurs. If a case is transferred to magistrate's
court pursuant to Section 22-3-545, the trial shall commence within
seventy days from the date of such transfer.
(2) Unless the defendant consents in writing to the contrary,
the trial shall not commence less than thirty days from the date on
which the defendant first appears through counsel or expressly
waives counsel and elects to proceed pro se.
(D)(1) If any indictment or information is dismissed upon
motion of the defendant, or any charge contained in a complaint
filed against an individual is dismissed or otherwise dropped, and
thereafter a complaint is filed against such defendant or individual
charging him with the same offense or an offense based on the
same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, or an
information or indictment is filed charging such defendant with the
same offense or an offense based on the same conduct or arising
from the same criminal episode, the provisions of subsections (B)
and (C) of this section shall be applicable with respect to such
subsequent complaint, indictment, or information, as the case may
be.
(2) If the defendant is to be tried upon an indictment or
information dismissed by a trial court and reinstated following an
appeal, the trial shall commence within seventy days from the date
the action occasioning the trial becomes final, except that the court
retrying the case may extend the period for trial not to exceed one
hundred eighty days from the date the action occasioning the trial
becomes final if the unavailability of witnesses or other factors
resulting from the passage of time shall make trial within seventy
days impractical. The periods of delay enumerated in subsection
(H) are excluded in computing the time limitations specified in this
section. The sanctions of Section 17-23-210 apply to this
subsection.
(E) If the defendant is to be tried again following a declaration
by the trial judge of a mistrial or following an order of such judge
for a new trial, the trial shall commence within seventy days from
the date the action occasioning the retrial becomes final. If the
defendant is to be tried again following an appeal or a collateral
attack, the trial shall commence within seventy days from the date
the action occasioning the retrial becomes final, except that the
court retrying the case may extend the period for retrial not to
exceed one hundred eighty days from the date the action
occasioning the retrial becomes final if unavailability of witnesses
or other factors resulting from passage of time shall make trial
within seventy days impractical. The periods of delay enumerated in
subsection (H) are excluded in computing the time limitations
specified in this section. The sanctions of Section 17-23-210 apply
to this subsection.
(F) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (B), for the
first twelve-calendar-month period following the effective date of
this section as set forth in subsection (A), the time limit imposed
with respect to the period between arrest and indictment by
subsection (B) of this section shall be sixty days, for the second
such twelve-month period such time limit shall be forty-five days
and for the third such period such time limit shall be thirty-five
days.
(G) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (C), for the
first twelve-calendar-month period following the effective date of
this section as set forth in subsection (B), the time limit with
respect to the period between arraignment and trial imposed by
subsection (C) shall be one hundred eighty days, for the second
such twelve-month period such time limit shall be one hundred
twenty days, and for the third such period such time limit with
respect to the period between arraignment and trial shall be eighty
days.
(H) The following periods of delay shall be excluded in
computing the time within which an information or an indictment
must be filed, or in computing the time within which the trial of
any such offense must commence:
(1) any period of delay resulting from other proceedings
concerning the defendant, including, but not limited to:
(a) delay resulting from any proceeding, including any
examinations, to determine the mental competency or physical
capacity of the defendant;
(b) delay resulting from any proceeding, including any
examination of the defendant, requiring treatment of the defendant
for drug or alcohol addiction;
(c) delay resulting from deferral of prosecution for
examination or treatment of the defendant for drug or alcohol
addiction;
(d) delay resulting from trial with respect to other charges
against the defendant;
(e) delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the
filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or
other prompt disposition of, such motion;
(f) delay resulting from any proceeding relating to the
transfer of a case or the removal of any defendant from another
circuit;
(g) delay resulting from transportation of any defendant
from another circuit, or to and from places of examination or
hospitalization, except that any time consumed in excess of ten days
from the date an order of removal or an order directing such
transportation, and the defendant's arrival at the destination shall be
presumed to be unreasonable;
(h) delay resulting from consideration by the court of a
proposed plea agreement to be entered into by the defendant and the
solicitor; and
(i) delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to
exceed thirty days, during which any proceeding concerning the
defendant is actually under advisement by the court;
(2) any period of delay during which prosecution is deferred
by the solicitor pursuant to written agreement with the defendant,
with the approval of the court, for the purpose of allowing the
defendant to demonstrate his good conduct;
(3)(a)any period of delay resulting from the absence or
unavailability of the defendant or an essential witness;
(b) for purposes of subitem (a) of this item, a defendant or
an essential witness shall be considered absent when his
whereabouts are unknown and, in addition, he is attempting to
avoid apprehension or prosecution or his whereabouts cannot be
determined by due diligence. For purposes of such subitem, a
defendant or an essential witness shall be considered unavailable
whenever his whereabouts are known but his presence for trial
cannot be obtained by due diligence or he resists appearing at or
being returned for trial;
(4) any period of delay resulting from the fact that the
defendant is mentally incompetent or physically unable to stand
trial;
(5) any period of delay resulting from the examination or
treatment of the defendant for alcohol or drug addiction;
(6) if the information or indictment is dismissed upon motion
of the solicitor and thereafter a charge is filed against the defendant
for the same offense, or any offense required to be joined with that
offense, any period of delay from the date the charge was dismissed
to the date the time limitation would commence to run as to the
subsequent charge had there been no previous charge;
(7) a reasonable period of delay when the defendant is joined
for trial with a codefendant as to whom the time for trial has not
run and no motion for severance has been granted;
(8)(a) any period of delay resulting from a continuance
granted by any judge on his own motion or at the request of the
defendant or his counsel or at the request of the solicitor, if the
judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the
ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best
interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. No such
period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court in
accordance with this item shall be excludable under this subsection
unless the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or
in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by
the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the
public and the defendant in a speedy trial;
(b) the factors, among others, which a judge shall consider
in determining whether to grant a continuance under subitem (a) of
this item in any case are as follows:
(i) whether the failure to grant such a continuance in the
proceeding would be likely to make a continuation of such
proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice;
(ii) whether the case is so unusual or so complex, due to
the number of defendants, the nature of the prosecution, or the
existence of novel questions of fact or law, that it is unreasonable to
expect adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings or for the trial
itself within the time limits established by this section;
(iii) whether, in a case in which arrest precedes
indictment, delay in the filing of the indictment is caused because
the arrest occurs at a time such that it is unreasonable to expect
return and filing of the indictment within the period specified in
Section 17-23-200(B) or because the facts upon which the grand
jury must base its determination are unusual or complex;
(iv) whether the failure to grant such a continuance in a
case which, taken as a whole, is not so unusual or so complex as to
fall within clause (ii), would deny the defendant reasonable time to
obtain counsel, would unreasonably deny the defendant or the State
continuity of counsel, or would deny counsel for the defendant or
the solicitor the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation,
taking into account the exercise of due diligence;
(c) no continuance under subitem (a) of this item shall be
granted because of general congestion of the court's calendar, or
lack of diligent preparation or failure to obtain available witnesses
on the part of the solicitor.
(I) If trial did not commence within the time limitation
specified in Section 17-23-200 because the defendant had entered a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere subsequently withdrawn to any or
all charges in an indictment or information, the defendant shall be
deemed indicted with respect to all charges therein contained within
the meaning of Section 17-23-200 on the day the order permitting
withdrawal of the plea becomes final.
(J)(1) If the solicitor knows that a person charged with an
offense is serving a term of imprisonment in any penal institution,
he shall promptly:
(a) undertake to obtain the presence of the prisoner for
trial; or
(b) cause a detainer to be filed with the person having
custody of the prisoner and request him to so advise the prisoner
and to advise the prisoner of his right to demand trial.
(2) If the person having custody of such prisoner receives a
detainer, he shall promptly advise the prisoner of the charge and of
the prisoner's right to demand trial. If at any time thereafter the
prisoner informs the person having custody that he does demand
trial, such person shall cause notice to that effect to be sent
promptly to the solicitor who caused the detainer to be filed.
(3) Upon receipt of such notice, the solicitor shall promptly
seek to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial.
(4) When the person having custody of the prisoner receives
from the solicitor a properly supported request for temporary
custody of such prisoner for trial, the prisoner shall be made
available to that solicitor (subject, in cases of interjurisdictional
transfer, to any right of the prisoner to contest the legality of his
delivery).
(K)(1) If the defendant is absent (as defined by subsection
(H)(3)) on the day set for trial, and the defendant's subsequent
appearance before the court on a bench warrant or other process or
surrender to the court occurs more than twenty one days after the
day set for trial, the defendant shall be deemed to have first
appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which the
information or indictment is pending within the meaning of
subsection (C) on the date of the defendant's subsequent appearance
before the court.
(2) If the defendant is absent (as defined by subsection
(H)(3)) on the day set for trial, and the defendant's subsequent
appearance before the court on a bench warrant or other process or
surrender to the court occurs not more than twenty one days after
the day set for trial, the time limit required by subsection (C), as
extended by subsection (H), shall be further extended by twenty one
days.
Section 17-23-210. (A)(1) If, in the case of any individual
against whom a complaint is filed charging such individual with an
offense, no indictment or information is filed within the time limit
required by Section 17-23-200(B) as extended by Section 17-23-200(H), such charge against that individual contained in such
complaint shall be dismissed or otherwise dropped. In determining
whether to dismiss the case with or without prejudice, the court
shall consider, among others, each of the following factors: the
seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case
which led to the dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on the
administration of this chapter and on the administration of justice.
(2)(a) If a defendant is not brought to trial within the time
limit required by Section 17-23-200(B) as extended by Section 17-23-200(H), the information or indictment shall be dismissed on
motion of the defendant. The defendant shall have the burden of
proof of supporting such motion but the State shall have the burden
of going forward with the evidence in connection with any
exclusion of time under Section 17-23-200(H)(3).
(b) In determining whether to dismiss the case with or
without prejudice, the court shall consider, among others, each of
the following factors: the seriousness of the offense; the facts and
circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal; and the impact
of a reprosecution on the administration of this chapter and on the
administration of justice.
(c) Failure of the defendant to move for dismissal prior to
trial or entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere shall constitute a
waiver of the right to dismissal under this section.
(d) No dismissal shall be granted under this subsection if the
defendant was not brought to trial within the time limit specified in
Section 17-23-200(B) because the time limit expired during a time
when there was no session of general sessions court in the county.
In such circumstances, the defendant must be given priority for trial
at the next session of general sessions court in the county.
(B) In any case in which counsel for the defendant or solicitor:
(1) knowingly allows the case to be set for trial without
disclosing the fact that a necessary witness would be unavailable for
trial;
(2) files a motion solely for the purpose of delay which he
knows is totally frivolous and without merit;
(3) makes a statement for the purpose of obtaining a
continuance which he knows to be false and which is material to
the granting of a continuance; or
(4) otherwise willfully fails to proceed to trial without
justification consistent with Section 17-23-200 of this chapter, the
court may punish any such counsel or attorney, as follows:
(a) in the case of an appointed defense counsel, by
reducing the amount of compensation that otherwise would have
been paid to such counsel pursuant to Chapter 3 of this title in an
amount not to exceed twenty five per centum thereof;
(b) in the case of a counsel retained in connection with the
defense of a defendant, by imposing on such counsel a fine of not
to exceed twenty five per centum of the compensation to which he
is entitled in connection with his defense of such defendant;
(c) by imposing on any attorney for the State a fine of not
to exceed two hundred fifty dollars;
(d) by denying any such counsel or attorney for the State
the right to practice before the court considering such case for a
period of not to exceed ninety days; or
(e) by filing a report with an appropriate disciplinary
committee. The authority to punish provided for by this subsection
shall be in addition to any other authority or power available to
such court.
Section 17-23-220. (A) The time limitation in Section 17-23-200(B) of this chapter:
(1) shall apply to all individuals who are arrested or served
with a summons on or after January 1, 1996; and
(2) shall commence to run on January 1, 1996, as to all
individuals who are arrested or served with a summons prior to the
January 1, 1996, in connection with the commission of an offense,
and with respect to which offense no information or indictment has
been filed prior to January 1, 1996.
(B) The time limitation in Section 17-23-200(C) of this chapter:
(1) shall apply to all offenses charged in informations or
indictments filed on or after January 1, 1996; and
(2) shall commence to run on January 1, 1996, as to all
offenses charged in informations or indictments filed prior to that
date.
(C) Section 17-23-210 of this chapter shall become effective and
apply to all cases commenced by arrest or summons, and all
informations or indictments filed, on or after January 1, 1996.
Section 17-23-230. (A) Priority shall be accorded to the trial or
other disposition of cases involving:
(1) a detained person who is being held in detention solely
because he is awaiting trial; and
(2) a released person who is awaiting trial and has been
designated by the solicitor as being of high risk.
(B) The trial of any person described in subsection (A)(1) or
(A)(2) shall commence not later than ninety days following the
beginning of such continuous detention or designation of high risk
by the solicitor. The periods of delay enumerated in Section 17-23-200(H) are excluded in computing the time limitation specified in
this section.
(C) Failure to commence trial of a detainee as specified in
subsection (B), through no fault of the accused or his counsel, or
failure to commence trial of a designated releasee as specified in
subsection (B), through no fault of the solicitor, shall result in the
automatic review by the court of the conditions of release. No
detainee, as defined in subsection (A), shall be held in custody
pending trial after the expiration of such ninety-day period required
for the commencement of his trial. A designated releasee, as
defined in subsection (A), who is found by the court to have
intentionally delayed the trial of his case shall be subject to an order
of the court modifying his nonfinancial conditions of release under
this title to insure that he shall appear at trial as required.
Section 17-23-240. (A) In the event that any circuit is unable to
comply with the time limits set forth in Section 17-23-200(C) due
to the status of its court calendars, the chief judge, where the
existing resources are being efficiently utilized, may, after seeking
the recommendations of the other resident judges in the circuit,
apply to the Chief Justice of the South Carolina Supreme Court for
a suspension of such time limits as provided in subsection (B). The
Chief Justice shall evaluate the capabilities of the circuit, the
availability of at-large judges and judges from other circuits, and
make any recommendations he deems appropriate to alleviate
calendar congestion resulting from the lack of resources.
(B) If the Chief Justice finds that no remedy for such congestion
is reasonably available, the Chief Justices may, upon application by
the chief judge of a circuit, grant a suspension of the time limits in
Section 17-23-200(C) in such circuit for a period of time not to
exceed one year for the trial of cases for which indictments or
informations are filed during such one-year period. During such
period of suspension, the time limits from arrest to indictment, set
forth in Section 17-23-200(B), shall not be reduced, nor shall the
sanctions set forth in Section 17-23-210 be suspended; but such
time limits from indictment to trial shall not be increased to exceed
one hundred eighty days. The time limits for the trial of cases of
detained persons who are being detained solely because they are
awaiting trial shall not be affected by the provisions of this section.
(C)(1) The approval of any application made pursuant to
subsection (A) by the Chief Justice shall be reported within ten days
to the Director of the Division of Court Administration, together
with a copy of the application, a written report setting forth in
sufficient detail the reasons for granting such application and a
proposal for alleviating congestion in the circuit.
(2) The Director of the Division of Court Administration
shall not later than ten days after receipt transmit such report to the
General Assembly. The Chief Justice shall not grant a suspension
to any circuit within six months following the expiration of a prior
suspension without the consent of the General Assembly.
(D) If the chief judge of the circuit concludes that the need for
suspension of time limits in such district under this section is of
great urgency, he may order the limits suspended for a period not to
exceed thirty days. Within ten days of entry of such order, the
chief judge shall apply to the Chief Justice for a suspension
pursuant to subsection (A).
Section 17-23-250. No provision of this chapter shall be
interpreted as a bar to any claim of denial of speedy trial as
required by amendment VI of the United States Constitution or
Article I, Section 14 of the South Carolina Constitution."
SECTION 4. Chapter 19, Title 17 of the 1976 Code is amended
by adding:
"Section 17-19-15. (A) Prosecution for an offense
punishable by death or by imprisonment in the state prison for life
or for life without possibility of parole, or for the embezzlement of
public money, may be commenced at any time.
(B) Except as provided in subsection (A), prosecution for an
offense punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for ten years
or more shall be commenced within six years after the date of
commission of the offense.
(C) Except as provided in subsections (A) and (B), prosecution
for an offense punishable by imprisonment in the state prison shall
be commenced within three years after commission of the offense.
(D) Notwithstanding subsection (C) or any other provision of
law, prosecution for a violation of Section 38-55-170 or a violation
of the Omnibus Insurance Fraud and Immunity Act, as codified in
Article 5, Chapter 55, Title 38, shall be commenced within three
years after discovery of the commission of the offense.
(E) Prosecution for an offense not punishable by death or
imprisonment in the state prison shall be commenced within one
year after commission of the offense.
(F)(1) Except as provided in this section, a limitation of time
prescribed in this chapter is not tolled or extended for any reason.
(2) No time during which prosecution of the same person for
the same conduct is pending in a court of this State is a part of a
limitation of time prescribed in this chapter.
(3) A limitation of time prescribed in this chapter does not
commence to run until discovery of an offense described in this
item. This item applies to an offense punishable by imprisonment
in the state prison, a material element of which is fraud or breach of
a fiduciary obligation or the basis of which is misconduct in office
by a public officer, employee, or appointee, including, but not
limited to, the following offenses:
(a) grand theft of any type, forgery, falsification of public
records, or acceptance of a bribe by a public official or a public
employee;
(b) a violation of Section 16-9-10, 16-9-20, or 16-9-30;
(c) a violation of Uniform Security Act provisions codified
in Article 9, Chapter 1, Title 35;
(d) a violation of Section 16-13-430, Section 43-5-65, or
Section 44-6-200;
(e) felony insurance fraud in violation of Section 38-55-170 or a violation of the Omnibus Insurance Fraud and Immunity
Act, as codified in Article 5, Chapter 55, Title 38;
(f) a violation of Section 16-13-450; and
(g) a violation of Section 44-63-161.
(4) If the defendant is out of the State when or after the offense
is committed, the prosecution may be commenced as provided in
subsection (F) within the limitations of time prescribed by this
chapter, and no time up to a maximum of three years during which
the defendant is not within the State shall be a part of those
limitations.
(5) A limitation of time prescribed in this chapter does not
commence to run until the offense has been discovered, or could
have reasonably been discovered, with regard to offenses relating to
the sale or distribution, obtaining, use, conservation, control, and
quality of water; under the Hazardous Waste Management Act,
Chapter 56, Title 44; under Section 23-39-40; and under Section
48-1-320, Section 48-1-340, Section 48-20-230, or Section 48-43-550.
(6) Notwithstanding any other limitation of time described in
this section, a criminal complaint may be filed within one year of
the date of a report by a responsible adult or agency when a child
under eighteen years of age is subjected to harm, as that term is
defined in Section 20-7-490(2), or is a victim of a crime described
in Section 16-3-651, Section 16-3-652, Section 16-3-653, Section
16-3-654, Section 16-3-655, Section 16-3-656, Section 16-15-20 or
Section 16-15-140.
For purposes of this item, a `responsible adult' or `agency' means
a person or agency required to report pursuant to Section 20-7-510.
This item shall apply only if both of the following occur:
(a) the limitation period specified in subsection (B) or (C)
has expired; and
(b)(i) the defendant has subjected the same child to harm, as
that term is defined in Section 20-7-490(2), within the limitation
period specified for that crime in either subsection (B) or (C); or
(ii) the defendant has committed at least one violation of
Section 16-3-651, Section 16-3-652, Section 16-3-653, Section 16-3-654, Section 16-3-655, Section 16-3-656, Section 16-15-20 or
Section 16-15-140 against the same victim within the limitation
period specified for that crime in either Section 800 or 801.
(7) Notwithstanding any other limitation of time described in
this section, a criminal complaint may be filed within one year of
the date of a report to a law enforcement agency by a person of any
age alleging that he or she, while under the age of eighteen years,
was subjected to harm, as that term is defined in Section 20-7-490(2), or is a victim of a crime described in Section 16-3-651,
Section 16-3-652, Section 16-3-653, Section 16-3-654, Section 16-3-655, Section 16-3-656, Section 16-15-20 or Section 16-15-140.
This paragraph shall apply only if both of the following occur:
(a) the limitation period specified in subsection (B) or (C)
has expired;
(b) the crime involved a sexual battery, as defined in Section
16-3-651(h), and there is independent evidence that clearly and
convincingly corroborates the victim's allegation. No evidence may
be used to corroborate the victim's allegation which would
otherwise be inadmissible during trial. Independent evidence shall
not include the opinions of mental health professionals.
(G) For the purpose of this chapter, prosecution for an offense is
commenced when any of the following occurs:
(1) an indictment or information is filed;
(2) a complaint is filed in magistrate's court or municipal
court charging a public offense of which the court has original trial
jurisdiction;
(3) a case is certified to the circuit court;
(4) an arrest warrant or bench warrant is issued, provided the
warrant names or describes the defendant with the same degree of
particularity required for an indictment, information, or complaint.
(H) For the purpose of determining the applicable limitation of
time pursuant to this chapter:
(1) An offense is deemed punishable by the maximum
punishment prescribed by statute for the offense, regardless of the
punishment actually sought or imposed. Any enhancement of
punishment prescribed by statute shall be disregarded in
determining the maximum punishment prescribed by statute for an
offense.
(2) The limitation of time applicable to an offense that is
necessarily included within a greater offense is the limitation of
time applicable to the lesser included offense, regardless of the
limitation of time applicable to the greater offense.
(I)(1) As used in this section, `effective date' means January 1,
1996.
(2) Except as provided in item (3), this section applies to an
offense that was committed before, on, or after the effective date.
(3) This section does not apply, and the law applicable before
the effective date does apply, to an offense that was committed
before the effective date, if prosecution for the offense was
commenced before the effective date."
SECTION 5. Section 1-7-330 is repealed.
SECTION 6. This act takes effect upon approval by the
Governor.
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