South Carolina Legislature


 

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S 232
Session 111 (1995-1996) 

S 0232 General Bill, By Ford
 A BILL TO ENACT THE "OMNIBUS CRIMINAL PROCESS REFORM ACT OF 1995", TO AMEND
 CHAPTER 5, TITLE 14, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO CIRCUIT
 COURTS, BY ADDING SECTION 14-5-615 SO AS TO VEST THE PREPARATION OF THE
 DOCKETS FOR GENERAL SESSIONS COURT IN THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE FOR
 GENERAL SESSIONS COURT FOR A JUDICIAL CIRCUIT; TO AMEND CHAPTER 23, TITLE 17
 OF THE 1976 CODE, RELATING TO PLEADING AND TRIAL IN CRIMINAL CASES, BY
 DESIGNATING SECTIONS 17-23-10 THROUGH 17-23-165 AS ARTICLE 1 AND BY ADDING
 ARTICLE 3, THE "SPEEDY TRIAL ACT", SO AS TO PROVIDE TIME LIMITS WITHIN WHICH
 AN INFORMATION OR INDICTMENT MUST BE FILED AGAINST AN ARRESTED PERSON, TO
 PROVIDE TIME LIMITS BETWEEN INDICTMENT OR INFORMATION AND THE TRIAL OF A
 DEFENDANT, TO PROVIDE SANCTIONS FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE TIME LIMITS, AND TO
 PROVIDE A PROCEDURE IN WHICH THE "SPEEDY TRIAL ACT" MAY BE SUSPENDED IN A
 JUDICIAL CIRCUIT; TO AMEND CHAPTER 19, TITLE 17, RELATING TO INDICTMENTS, BY
 ADDING SECTION 17-19-15, SO AS TO PROVIDE FOR A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR
 CRIMINAL OFFENSES; AND TO REPEAL SECTION 1-7-330, RELATING TO CIRCUIT
 SOLICITORS' ATTENDANCENext AT GENERAL SESSIONS COURT AND THE PREPARATION AND
 PUBLICATION OF THE GENERAL SESSIONS DOCKET.

   10/17/94  Senate Prefiled
   10/17/94  Senate Referred to Committee on Judiciary
   01/10/95  Senate Introduced and read first time SJ-79
   01/10/95  Senate Referred to Committee on Judiciary SJ-79



A BILL

TO ENACT THE "OMNIBUS CRIMINAL PROCESS REFORM ACT OF 1995", TO AMEND CHAPTER 5, TITLE 14, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO CIRCUIT COURTS, BY ADDING SECTION 14-5-615 SO AS TO VEST THE PREPARATION OF THE DOCKETS FOR GENERAL SESSIONS COURT IN THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE FOR GENERAL SESSIONS COURT FOR A JUDICIAL CIRCUIT; TO AMEND CHAPTER 23, TITLE 17 OF THE 1976 CODE, RELATING TO PLEADING AND TRIAL IN CRIMINAL CASES, BY DESIGNATING SECTIONS 17-23-10 THROUGH 17-23-165 AS ARTICLE 1 AND BY ADDING ARTICLE 3, THE "SPEEDY TRIAL ACT", SO AS TO PROVIDE TIME LIMITS WITHIN WHICH AN INFORMATION OR INDICTMENT MUST BE FILED AGAINST AN ARRESTED PERSON, TO PROVIDE TIME LIMITS BETWEEN INDICTMENT OR INFORMATION AND THE TRIAL OF A DEFENDANT, TO PROVIDE SANCTIONS FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE TIME LIMITS, AND TO PROVIDE A PROCEDURE IN WHICH THE "SPEEDY TRIAL ACT" MAY BE SUSPENDED IN A JUDICIAL CIRCUIT; TO AMEND CHAPTER 19, TITLE 17, RELATING TO INDICTMENTS, BY ADDING SECTION 17-19-15, SO AS TO PROVIDE FOR A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR CRIMINAL OFFENSES; AND TO REPEAL SECTION 1-7-330, RELATING TO CIRCUIT SOLICITORS' PreviousATTENDANCENext AT GENERAL SESSIONS COURT AND THE PREPARATION AND PUBLICATION OF THE GENERAL SESSIONS DOCKET.

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina:

SECTION 1. Article 7, Chapter 5, Title 14 of the 1976 Code is amended by adding:

"Section 14-5-615. Preparation of the dockets for general sessions courts shall be exclusively vested in the Chief Administrative Judge for General Sessions Court in a judicial circuit, as designated by the Chief Justice of the South Carolina Supreme Court. The Chief Administrative Judge, at the earliest practicable time, shall, after consultation with the counsel for the defendant and the solicitor, set the case for trial on a day certain, or list it for trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at a place within the county, so as to assure a speedy trial."

SECTION 2. Section 17-23-10 through Section 17-23-165 shall be designated as "Article 1, General Provisions".

SECTION 3. Chapter 23, Title 17 of the 1976 Code is amended by adding:

"Article 3

Speedy Trial Act

Section 17-23-195. As used in this article:

(A) The terms `judge' or `judicial officer' mean, unless otherwise indicated, any magistrate, municipal court judge, or circuit court judge.

(B) The term `chief judge' means the Chief Administrative Judge for General Sessions Court in a judicial circuit, as designated by the Chief Justice of the South Carolina Supreme Court.

(C) The term `offense' means any offense triable in the court of General Sessions which is in fact tried in the court of General Sessions, and any offense triable in the court of General Sessions which is transferred to magistrate's court pursuant to Section 22-2-545.

Section 17-23-200. (A) In any case involving a defendant charged with an offense, the chief judge, at the earliest practicable time, shall, after consultation with the counsel for the defendant and the solicitor, set the case for trial on a day certain, or list it for trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at a place within the county, so as to assure a speedy trial.

(B) Any information or indictment charging an individual with the commission of an offense shall be filed within thirty days from the date on which such individual was arrested or served with a summons in connection with such charges. If an individual has been charged with a felony in a county in which no grand jury has been in session during such thirty-day period, the period of time for filing of the indictment shall be extended an additional thirty days.

(C)(1) In any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a defendant charged in an information or indictment with the commission of an offense shall commence within seventy days from the filing date (and making public) of the information or indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. If a case is transferred to magistrate's court pursuant to Section 22-3-545, the trial shall commence within seventy days from the date of such transfer.

(2) Unless the defendant consents in writing to the contrary, the trial shall not commence less than thirty days from the date on which the defendant first appears through counsel or expressly waives counsel and elects to proceed pro se.

(D)(1) If any indictment or information is dismissed upon motion of the defendant, or any charge contained in a complaint filed against an individual is dismissed or otherwise dropped, and thereafter a complaint is filed against such defendant or individual charging him with the same offense or an offense based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, or an information or indictment is filed charging such defendant with the same offense or an offense based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, the provisions of subsections (B) and (C) of this section shall be applicable with respect to such subsequent complaint, indictment, or information, as the case may be.

(2) If the defendant is to be tried upon an indictment or information dismissed by a trial court and reinstated following an appeal, the trial shall commence within seventy days from the date the action occasioning the trial becomes final, except that the court retrying the case may extend the period for trial not to exceed one hundred eighty days from the date the action occasioning the trial becomes final if the unavailability of witnesses or other factors resulting from the passage of time shall make trial within seventy days impractical. The periods of delay enumerated in subsection (H) are excluded in computing the time limitations specified in this section. The sanctions of Section 17-23-210 apply to this subsection.

(E) If the defendant is to be tried again following a declaration by the trial judge of a mistrial or following an order of such judge for a new trial, the trial shall commence within seventy days from the date the action occasioning the retrial becomes final. If the defendant is to be tried again following an appeal or a collateral PreviousattackNext, the trial shall commence within seventy days from the date the action occasioning the retrial becomes final, except that the court retrying the case may extend the period for retrial not to exceed one hundred eighty days from the date the action occasioning the retrial becomes final if unavailability of witnesses or other factors resulting from passage of time shall make trial within seventy days impractical. The periods of delay enumerated in subsection (H) are excluded in computing the time limitations specified in this section. The sanctions of Section 17-23-210 apply to this subsection.

(F) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (B), for the first twelve-calendar-month period following the effective date of this section as set forth in subsection (A), the time limit imposed with respect to the period between arrest and indictment by subsection (B) of this section shall be sixty days, for the second such twelve-month period such time limit shall be forty-five days and for the third such period such time limit shall be thirty-five days.

(G) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (C), for the first twelve-calendar-month period following the effective date of this section as set forth in subsection (B), the time limit with respect to the period between arraignment and trial imposed by subsection (C) shall be one hundred eighty days, for the second such twelve-month period such time limit shall be one hundred twenty days, and for the third such period such time limit with respect to the period between arraignment and trial shall be eighty days.

(H) The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time within which an information or an indictment must be filed, or in computing the time within which the trial of any such offense must commence:

(1) any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including, but not limited to:

(a) delay resulting from any proceeding, including any examinations, to determine the mental competency or physical capacity of the defendant;

(b) delay resulting from any proceeding, including any examination of the defendant, requiring treatment of the defendant for drug or alcohol addiction;

(c) delay resulting from deferral of prosecution for examination or treatment of the defendant for drug or alcohol addiction;

(d) delay resulting from trial with respect to other charges against the defendant;

(e) delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion;

(f) delay resulting from any proceeding relating to the transfer of a case or the removal of any defendant from another circuit;

(g) delay resulting from transportation of any defendant from another circuit, or to and from places of examination or hospitalization, except that any time consumed in excess of ten days from the date an order of removal or an order directing such transportation, and the defendant's arrival at the destination shall be presumed to be unreasonable;

(h) delay resulting from consideration by the court of a proposed plea agreement to be entered into by the defendant and the solicitor; and

(i) delay reasonably PreviousattributableNext to any period, not to exceed thirty days, during which any proceeding concerning the defendant is actually under advisement by the court;

(2) any period of delay during which prosecution is deferred by the solicitor pursuant to written agreement with the defendant, with the approval of the court, for the purpose of allowing the defendant to demonstrate his good conduct;

(3)(a)any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of the defendant or an essential witness;

(b) for purposes of subitem (a) of this item, a defendant or an essential witness shall be considered absent when his whereabouts are unknown and, in addition, he is PreviousattemptingNext to avoid apprehension or prosecution or his whereabouts cannot be determined by due diligence. For purposes of such subitem, a defendant or an essential witness shall be considered unavailable whenever his whereabouts are known but his presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence or he resists appearing at or being returned for trial;

(4) any period of delay resulting from the fact that the defendant is mentally incompetent or physically unable to stand trial;

(5) any period of delay resulting from the examination or treatment of the defendant for alcohol or drug addiction;

(6) if the information or indictment is dismissed upon motion of the solicitor and thereafter a charge is filed against the defendant for the same offense, or any offense required to be joined with that offense, any period of delay from the date the charge was dismissed to the date the time limitation would commence to run as to the subsequent charge had there been no previous charge;

(7) a reasonable period of delay when the defendant is joined for trial with a codefendant as to whom the time for trial has not run and no motion for severance has been granted;

(8)(a) any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any judge on his own motion or at the request of the defendant or his counsel or at the request of the solicitor, if the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. No such period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court in accordance with this item shall be excludable under this subsection unless the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial;

(b) the factors, among others, which a judge shall consider in determining whether to grant a continuance under subitem (a) of this item in any case are as follows:

(i) whether the failure to grant such a continuance in the proceeding would be likely to make a continuation of such proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice;

(ii) whether the case is so unusual or so complex, due to the number of defendants, the nature of the prosecution, or the existence of novel questions of fact or law, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings or for the trial itself within the time limits established by this section;

(iii) whether, in a case in which arrest precedes indictment, delay in the filing of the indictment is caused because the arrest occurs at a time such that it is unreasonable to expect return and filing of the indictment within the period specified in Section 17-23-200(B) or because the facts upon which the grand jury must base its determination are unusual or complex;

(iv) whether the failure to grant such a continuance in a case which, taken as a whole, is not so unusual or so complex as to fall within clause (ii), would deny the defendant reasonable time to obtain counsel, would unreasonably deny the defendant or the State continuity of counsel, or would deny counsel for the defendant or the solicitor the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence;

(c) no continuance under subitem (a) of this item shall be granted because of general congestion of the court's calendar, or lack of diligent preparation or failure to obtain available witnesses on the part of the solicitor.

(I) If trial did not commence within the time limitation specified in Section 17-23-200 because the defendant had entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere subsequently withdrawn to any or all charges in an indictment or information, the defendant shall be deemed indicted with respect to all charges therein contained within the meaning of Section 17-23-200 on the day the order permitting withdrawal of the plea becomes final.

(J)(1) If the solicitor knows that a person charged with an offense is serving a term of imprisonment in any penal institution, he shall promptly:

(a) undertake to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial; or

(b) cause a detainer to be filed with the person having custody of the prisoner and request him to so advise the prisoner and to advise the prisoner of his right to demand trial.

(2) If the person having custody of such prisoner receives a detainer, he shall promptly advise the prisoner of the charge and of the prisoner's right to demand trial. If at any time thereafter the prisoner informs the person having custody that he does demand trial, such person shall cause notice to that effect to be sent promptly to the solicitor who caused the detainer to be filed.

(3) Upon receipt of such notice, the solicitor shall promptly seek to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial.

(4) When the person having custody of the prisoner receives from the solicitor a properly supported request for temporary custody of such prisoner for trial, the prisoner shall be made available to that solicitor (subject, in cases of interjurisdictional transfer, to any right of the prisoner to contest the legality of his delivery).

(K)(1) If the defendant is absent (as defined by subsection (H)(3)) on the day set for trial, and the defendant's subsequent appearance before the court on a bench warrant or other process or surrender to the court occurs more than twenty one days after the day set for trial, the defendant shall be deemed to have first appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which the information or indictment is pending within the meaning of subsection (C) on the date of the defendant's subsequent appearance before the court.

(2) If the defendant is absent (as defined by subsection (H)(3)) on the day set for trial, and the defendant's subsequent appearance before the court on a bench warrant or other process or surrender to the court occurs not more than twenty one days after the day set for trial, the time limit required by subsection (C), as extended by subsection (H), shall be further extended by twenty one days.

Section 17-23-210. (A)(1) If, in the case of any individual against whom a complaint is filed charging such individual with an offense, no indictment or information is filed within the time limit required by Section 17-23-200(B) as extended by Section 17-23-200(H), such charge against that individual contained in such complaint shall be dismissed or otherwise dropped. In determining whether to dismiss the case with or without prejudice, the court shall consider, among others, each of the following factors: the seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of this chapter and on the administration of justice.

(2)(a) If a defendant is not brought to trial within the time limit required by Section 17-23-200(B) as extended by Section 17-23-200(H), the information or indictment shall be dismissed on motion of the defendant. The defendant shall have the burden of proof of supporting such motion but the State shall have the burden of going forward with the evidence in connection with any exclusion of time under Section 17-23-200(H)(3).

(b) In determining whether to dismiss the case with or without prejudice, the court shall consider, among others, each of the following factors: the seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of this chapter and on the administration of justice.

(c) Failure of the defendant to move for dismissal prior to trial or entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere shall constitute a waiver of the right to dismissal under this section.

(d) No dismissal shall be granted under this subsection if the defendant was not brought to trial within the time limit specified in Section 17-23-200(B) because the time limit expired during a time when there was no session of general sessions court in the county. In such circumstances, the defendant must be given priority for trial at the next session of general sessions court in the county.

(B) In any case in which counsel for the defendant or solicitor:

(1) knowingly allows the case to be set for trial without disclosing the fact that a necessary witness would be unavailable for trial;

(2) files a motion solely for the purpose of delay which he knows is totally frivolous and without merit;

(3) makes a statement for the purpose of obtaining a continuance which he knows to be false and which is material to the granting of a continuance; or

(4) otherwise willfully fails to proceed to trial without justification consistent with Section 17-23-200 of this chapter, the court may punish any such counsel or PreviousattorneyNext, as follows:

(a) in the case of an appointed defense counsel, by reducing the amount of compensation that otherwise would have been paid to such counsel pursuant to Chapter 3 of this title in an amount not to exceed twenty five per centum thereof;

(b) in the case of a counsel retained in connection with the defense of a defendant, by imposing on such counsel a fine of not to exceed twenty five per centum of the compensation to which he is entitled in connection with his defense of such defendant;

(c) by imposing on any PreviousattorneyNext for the State a fine of not to exceed two hundred fifty dollars;

(d) by denying any such counsel or Previousattorney for the State the right to practice before the court considering such case for a period of not to exceed ninety days; or

(e) by filing a report with an appropriate disciplinary committee. The authority to punish provided for by this subsection shall be in addition to any other authority or power available to such court.

Section 17-23-220. (A) The time limitation in Section 17-23-200(B) of this chapter:

(1) shall apply to all individuals who are arrested or served with a summons on or after January 1, 1996; and

(2) shall commence to run on January 1, 1996, as to all individuals who are arrested or served with a summons prior to the January 1, 1996, in connection with the commission of an offense, and with respect to which offense no information or indictment has been filed prior to January 1, 1996.

(B) The time limitation in Section 17-23-200(C) of this chapter:

(1) shall apply to all offenses charged in informations or indictments filed on or after January 1, 1996; and

(2) shall commence to run on January 1, 1996, as to all offenses charged in informations or indictments filed prior to that date.

(C) Section 17-23-210 of this chapter shall become effective and apply to all cases commenced by arrest or summons, and all informations or indictments filed, on or after January 1, 1996.

Section 17-23-230. (A) Priority shall be accorded to the trial or other disposition of cases involving:

(1) a detained person who is being held in detention solely because he is awaiting trial; and

(2) a released person who is awaiting trial and has been designated by the solicitor as being of high risk.

(B) The trial of any person described in subsection (A)(1) or (A)(2) shall commence not later than ninety days following the beginning of such continuous detention or designation of high risk by the solicitor. The periods of delay enumerated in Section 17-23-200(H) are excluded in computing the time limitation specified in this section.

(C) Failure to commence trial of a detainee as specified in subsection (B), through no fault of the accused or his counsel, or failure to commence trial of a designated releasee as specified in subsection (B), through no fault of the solicitor, shall result in the automatic review by the court of the conditions of release. No detainee, as defined in subsection (A), shall be held in custody pending trial after the expiration of such ninety-day period required for the commencement of his trial. A designated releasee, as defined in subsection (A), who is found by the court to have intentionally delayed the trial of his case shall be subject to an order of the court modifying his nonfinancial conditions of release under this title to insure that he shall appear at trial as required.

Section 17-23-240. (A) In the event that any circuit is unable to comply with the time limits set forth in Section 17-23-200(C) due to the status of its court calendars, the chief judge, where the existing resources are being efficiently utilized, may, after seeking the recommendations of the other resident judges in the circuit, apply to the Chief Justice of the South Carolina Supreme Court for a suspension of such time limits as provided in subsection (B). The Chief Justice shall evaluate the capabilities of the circuit, the availability of at-large judges and judges from other circuits, and make any recommendations he deems appropriate to alleviate calendar congestion resulting from the lack of resources.

(B) If the Chief Justice finds that no remedy for such congestion is reasonably available, the Chief Justices may, upon application by the chief judge of a circuit, grant a suspension of the time limits in Section 17-23-200(C) in such circuit for a period of time not to exceed one year for the trial of cases for which indictments or informations are filed during such one-year period. During such period of suspension, the time limits from arrest to indictment, set forth in Section 17-23-200(B), shall not be reduced, nor shall the sanctions set forth in Section 17-23-210 be suspended; but such time limits from indictment to trial shall not be increased to exceed one hundred eighty days. The time limits for the trial of cases of detained persons who are being detained solely because they are awaiting trial shall not be affected by the provisions of this section.

(C)(1) The approval of any application made pursuant to subsection (A) by the Chief Justice shall be reported within ten days to the Director of the Division of Court Administration, together with a copy of the application, a written report setting forth in sufficient detail the reasons for granting such application and a proposal for alleviating congestion in the circuit.

(2) The Director of the Division of Court Administration shall not later than ten days after receipt transmit such report to the General Assembly. The Chief Justice shall not grant a suspension to any circuit within six months following the expiration of a prior suspension without the consent of the General Assembly.

(D) If the chief judge of the circuit concludes that the need for suspension of time limits in such district under this section is of great urgency, he may order the limits suspended for a period not to exceed thirty days. Within ten days of entry of such order, the chief judge shall apply to the Chief Justice for a suspension pursuant to subsection (A).

Section 17-23-250. No provision of this chapter shall be interpreted as a bar to any claim of denial of speedy trial as required by amendment VI of the United States Constitution or Article I, Section 14 of the South Carolina Constitution."

SECTION 4. Chapter 19, Title 17 of the 1976 Code is amended by adding:

"Section 17-19-15. (A) Prosecution for an offense punishable by death or by imprisonment in the state prison for life or for life without possibility of parole, or for the embezzlement of public money, may be commenced at any time.

(B) Except as provided in subsection (A), prosecution for an offense punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for ten years or more shall be commenced within six years after the date of commission of the offense.

(C) Except as provided in subsections (A) and (B), prosecution for an offense punishable by imprisonment in the state prison shall be commenced within three years after commission of the offense.

(D) Notwithstanding subsection (C) or any other provision of law, prosecution for a violation of Section 38-55-170 or a violation of the Omnibus Insurance Fraud and Immunity Act, as codified in Article 5, Chapter 55, Title 38, shall be commenced within three years after discovery of the commission of the offense.

(E) Prosecution for an offense not punishable by death or imprisonment in the state prison shall be commenced within one year after commission of the offense.

(F)(1) Except as provided in this section, a limitation of time prescribed in this chapter is not tolled or extended for any reason.

(2) No time during which prosecution of the same person for the same conduct is pending in a court of this State is a part of a limitation of time prescribed in this chapter.

(3) A limitation of time prescribed in this chapter does not commence to run until discovery of an offense described in this item. This item applies to an offense punishable by imprisonment in the state prison, a material element of which is fraud or breach of a fiduciary obligation or the basis of which is misconduct in office by a public officer, employee, or appointee, including, but not limited to, the following offenses:

(a) grand theft of any type, forgery, falsification of public records, or acceptance of a bribe by a public official or a public employee;

(b) a violation of Section 16-9-10, 16-9-20, or 16-9-30;

(c) a violation of Uniform Security Act provisions codified in Article 9, Chapter 1, Title 35;

(d) a violation of Section 16-13-430, Section 43-5-65, or Section 44-6-200;

(e) felony insurance fraud in violation of Section 38-55-170 or a violation of the Omnibus Insurance Fraud and Immunity Act, as codified in Article 5, Chapter 55, Title 38;

(f) a violation of Section 16-13-450; and

(g) a violation of Section 44-63-161.

(4) If the defendant is out of the State when or after the offense is committed, the prosecution may be commenced as provided in subsection (F) within the limitations of time prescribed by this chapter, and no time up to a maximum of three years during which the defendant is not within the State shall be a part of those limitations.

(5) A limitation of time prescribed in this chapter does not commence to run until the offense has been discovered, or could have reasonably been discovered, with regard to offenses relating to the sale or distribution, obtaining, use, conservation, control, and quality of water; under the Hazardous Waste Management Act, Chapter 56, Title 44; under Section 23-39-40; and under Section 48-1-320, Section 48-1-340, Section 48-20-230, or Section 48-43-550.

(6) Notwithstanding any other limitation of time described in this section, a criminal complaint may be filed within one year of the date of a report by a responsible adult or agency when a child under eighteen years of age is subjected to harm, as that term is defined in Section 20-7-490(2), or is a victim of a crime described in Section 16-3-651, Section 16-3-652, Section 16-3-653, Section 16-3-654, Section 16-3-655, Section 16-3-656, Section 16-15-20 or Section 16-15-140.

For purposes of this item, a `responsible adult' or `agency' means a person or agency required to report pursuant to Section 20-7-510. This item shall apply only if both of the following occur:

(a) the limitation period specified in subsection (B) or (C) has expired; and

(b)(i) the defendant has subjected the same child to harm, as that term is defined in Section 20-7-490(2), within the limitation period specified for that crime in either subsection (B) or (C); or

(ii) the defendant has committed at least one violation of Section 16-3-651, Section 16-3-652, Section 16-3-653, Section 16-3-654, Section 16-3-655, Section 16-3-656, Section 16-15-20 or Section 16-15-140 against the same victim within the limitation period specified for that crime in either Section 800 or 801.

(7) Notwithstanding any other limitation of time described in this section, a criminal complaint may be filed within one year of the date of a report to a law enforcement agency by a person of any age alleging that he or she, while under the age of eighteen years, was subjected to harm, as that term is defined in Section 20-7-490(2), or is a victim of a crime described in Section 16-3-651, Section 16-3-652, Section 16-3-653, Section 16-3-654, Section 16-3-655, Section 16-3-656, Section 16-15-20 or Section 16-15-140. This paragraph shall apply only if both of the following occur:

(a) the limitation period specified in subsection (B) or (C) has expired;

(b) the crime involved a sexual battery, as defined in Section 16-3-651(h), and there is independent evidence that clearly and convincingly corroborates the victim's allegation. No evidence may be used to corroborate the victim's allegation which would otherwise be inadmissible during trial. Independent evidence shall not include the opinions of mental health professionals.

(G) For the purpose of this chapter, prosecution for an offense is commenced when any of the following occurs:

(1) an indictment or information is filed;

(2) a complaint is filed in magistrate's court or municipal court charging a public offense of which the court has original trial jurisdiction;

(3) a case is certified to the circuit court;

(4) an arrest warrant or bench warrant is issued, provided the warrant names or describes the defendant with the same degree of particularity required for an indictment, information, or complaint.

(H) For the purpose of determining the applicable limitation of time pursuant to this chapter:

(1) An offense is deemed punishable by the maximum punishment prescribed by statute for the offense, regardless of the punishment actually sought or imposed. Any enhancement of punishment prescribed by statute shall be disregarded in determining the maximum punishment prescribed by statute for an offense.

(2) The limitation of time applicable to an offense that is necessarily included within a greater offense is the limitation of time applicable to the lesser included offense, regardless of the limitation of time applicable to the greater offense.

(I)(1) As used in this section, `effective date' means January 1, 1996.

(2) Except as provided in item (3), this section applies to an offense that was committed before, on, or after the effective date.

(3) This section does not apply, and the law applicable before the effective date does apply, to an offense that was committed before the effective date, if prosecution for the offense was commenced before the effective date."

SECTION 5. Section 1-7-330 is repealed.

SECTION 6. This act takes effect upon approval by the Governor.

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